Aug 13

LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
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Intellectual Analysis
of Religion
he article by Chinnaiah Jangam on

What Is at Stake in Rewriting California School Textbooks? (EPW, 16 July
2016) has presented the standard intellectual analysis of what is wrong with Hinduism in the modern world.
Intellectual analysis of religion(s) is a
valid scholarly activity, but what has riled
Hindu protagonists is the approach in the
writings of certain authors who have attained an almost hegemonic eminence in
the academic field. Apparently, a 20-year-old
book on the elephant-headed Ganesha has
particularly caused revulsion, by attempting a fairly crude psychoanalysis of the
connected myths, as well as, by implication,
of the Hindus who revere the deity. Sigmund Freuds theories are just one attempt
at explaining psychological patterns, and
a fairly far-fetched one which will be
soundly rejected by most of the laity if
they were made aware of their tenets.
Unfortunately, everything in Freud is
traced to childhood traumas involving
either infantile sexuality, or worry about
sexual organs, or tensions about erotic
feelings for members of the childs family.
The scholar sees all these elements in the
story of the creation of the child Ganesha:
the jealousy of Shiva in his pursuit of the
mother Parvati, the beheading, and worst
of all the substitution of the elephant
head, whose trunk is equated to a floppy
male organ. Similar allusions to matters
sexual, which appear prurient to the practising Hindu, underlie other prominent
works of scholarship and have coloured
the treatment of Hinduism in the school
textbooks.
The Hindu community apparently has
taken up these matters, especially as they
perceive a much kinder treatment of all
the other major faiths of the world, which
are themselves in no way perfect even by
their standards. For Indian intellectuals,
however, the matter appears to be one of
intellectual freedom, whereas Hindus want
scholars of religion to work from a position
of respect for the faith of the religionists.
Perhaps, what the scholars need to do is to
simultaneously apply the same principles
to other faiths, so that we get a comparative
picture. Personally, grateful as we are to

the service done to Hinduism by these
great modern scholars of the underbelly of
things spiritual, what I would love to see is
the benefits of their largesse bestowed
on the other great faiths and traditions of
the world, so that Hinduism does not
monopolise their services unfairly!
Dilip Kumar P J
BEngalUrU
Contesting Hindutva
[We reproduce here the correspondence between
EPW reader Paresh Malakar and author Sumanta
Banerjee.]
Dear Mr Banerjee,
have carefully gone through your

article Break the Umbilical Cord (EPW,
4 June 2016). You have outlined the growth
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from a
historical perspective. There is no denying
the fact that there was a Hindu nationalist streak in our freedom movement.
M K Gandhi, of course, was very candid
about his religious beliefs. In the freedom
movement, religion, culture and politics
had interlaced. We all know how the British used this, which finally led to the partition of India. We also must not forget that
many cultural elements have their roots
embedded in religion. In India, we have to
view everything from multicultural, multireligious, and multi-ethnic perspectives.
And, then, there is the caste and class
question. All these can be viewed from
secular as well as communal perspectives.
You have mentioned about Rammanohar Lohia and Jayaprakash Narayan
(JP). The present growth of the BJP started
with the JP movement. As we all know, it
is easier to interpret historical developments, but difficult to control them. No
doubt, Emergency was bad, but we should
also remember the circumstances which
led to the imposition of Emergency, and
we should also not ignore the internal
and external circumstances in those heady
days of the Cold War. Whereas, the
Communist Party of India (CPI) initially
supported Emergency, the CPI (Marxist)
and other left groups opposed it. From
the formation of the Janata Party to the
ascendency of the BJP, everything is
crystal clear in our memory.
august 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
Economic & Political Weekly
LETTERS
Politically, the BJP has come to power

fighting against the Congress rule and
exploiting the religious and cultural sentiments of a large section of the Hindu
population in the country. In their fight
against the Congress, Hindutva forces
had allied with other secular parties, including the left, in different phases of
their growth. Now, a political fight against
the BJP should also align all the secular
political parties. As far as the cultural
and religious feelings of people are concerned, these should be handled carefully without alienating them. Cultural
and religious practices of society are ingrained in a person since they are born.
Through education and other exposure,
these practices are reformed and refined.
It is common sense that we should respect
these differences. That is what we have
learnt from Gandhi. He was a practising
Hindu, but he never had any problems
with people of other faiths.
Paresh Malakar
Guwahati
Dear Paresh Malakar,
Sumanta Banerjee
hank you for a very sensitive, perceptive and interrogative response to my

article. I agree with you, and I think that
the rise of Hindutva forces in the recent
decades can also be partly attributed to
Indira Gandhis imposition of Emergency.
Unlike the past, the Congress partys accommodation of Indira Gandhi (not from
any determination to fight them, but purely
from suppressing opposition to her domination from all political sections, ranging
from the left to the Hindu religious right)
and compromise with the Hindutva
forcesput the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS)BJP leaders and activists in
jail. The Sangh Parivar made use of
their imprisonment by spreading the
propaganda of their so-called sacrifice in
order to win popular support, and as a
means, later, to join the national mainstream anti-Indira movement. It is necessary to remind the present generation that
both Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L K Advani
were imprisoned during Emergency in
a plush bungalow in Delhi, where they
enjoyed all the privileges entitled to
political party leaders. While, at the same
time, their comrade Nanaji Deshmukh
was sending letters from jail to Indira
Gandhi, appealing for his release so that

his RSS cadres could help her!
I agree that while fighting communal
forces, we should also be sensitive to the
religious feelings of communities. Cultural
practices and festivals (like Ramlila in the
north, Durga Puja in the east, the observation of Eids and gatherings of all communities at the mazars of peers in different
parts of India, etc) are rooted in religious
beliefs, but have acquired a common secular
character that brings together all. It is the
divisive forms of religious practices (like
the Sangh Parivars insistence on everyone
shouting Bharat Mata ki Jai, or the
Islamic fundamentalist maulavis fatwas
that sanction talaq, and other discriminatory practices) that have to be opposed.
An alliance of all secular political parties
and organisations to fight the BJP must
take into account the difference between
these two separate manifestations of religious beliefs and practices; the former
being positive, and the latter, negative.
Hope to carry on the dialogue.
Warmest regards,
EPW
august 13, 2016
HYDERABAD
Prejudiced Hangover
uducherry Lt Governor Kiran Bedi,

who is also an ex-IAS officer and a
member of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), has insulted and condemned denotified tribes by tweeting on 2 August:
Ex-criminal tribes are known to be very
cruel. They are hardcore professionals
in committing crimes. Rarely caught
and/or convicted.
Tribal and nomadic communities were
labelled criminals by the British government in the colonial era. They did not fare
much better under the Indian government
in independent India.
Bedis words cannot be construed as
merely petty and unjustified. It is very
clear that there are casteist and racist
overtones to the statements. We strongly
condemn the insulting casteist words
and demand that Bedi apologise to these
communities and retract her words. She is
a government servant and her words have
violated the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Acts Section 3(1) and Section 4(2) (g) which
vol lI no 33
deem this a punishable offence attracting five years imprisonment.

What is clear to us here is that even as
the nation is on the verge of celebrating the
70th anniversary of its independence, the
Indian government and police system continue to be influenced by the dreadful laws
enacted during the British rule. It is an irony
that we have been talking about involving
backward, Adivasi and nomadic communities into the mainstream and while Bedi,
an ex-police officer and present governor,
holds and expresses the views that she did.
C S Dwarakanath, T N Chandrakanth,
B Gopal, A S Prabhakar, Arun Joladkudligi,
Harshakumar Kugwe, Krishnaraj,
Kaveri Kodagu, Satya S, Lohitaksha and
Sridhara Aghalaya
Why This Harassment?
reputed research institution in Kolkata had invited an Australian citizen of Bangladeshi origin as visiting professor for a week. The citizen concerned
is a retired professor of the University of
Western Sydney and had held high posts
both in the UN Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, New York and UN
Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. However,
he has been denied a visa by the Government of India. The scholar had applied
for a visa to visit the research institute.
However, he was asked so many questions
and over such a long period, that the
time scheduled for visiting the institute
lapsed. What reason can our Ministry of
External Affairs advance for such behaviour which smacks of the worst days of
McCarthyism in the US?
Amiya Bagchi
Emeritus Professor,
Institute of Development Studies Kolkata
Erratum
In the editoral Open Season for Bullies
(6 August 2016, p 8), the last sentence of the
second to last paragraph should have read
as follows.
It is equally important to remember those
who were assassinatedM M Kalburgi,
Narendra Dabholkar, and Govind Pansare
and the suicide of Rohith Vemula, whom
the Prime Minister forgot to mention in his
many public utterances.
The error is regretted. Ed
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august 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
Sharmilas Message
By breaking her fast, Irom Sharmila compels us to think about the efficacy of such tactics.
n India, we do not want our mahatmas and goddesses to be

human. They have to be superhuman so that we can worship
them from a distance. For 16 years, Irom Chanu Sharmila was
elevated to that status by her supporters in Manipur who, like
her, were opposed to the imposition of the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act (AFSPA) in their state and the impunity it granted
the security forces. On 9 August, Sharmila tasted honey and broke
her protest fast, thereby reminding her supporters that she is not
a goddess but a human being. By doing so, she also raised relevant
questions about the efficacy of protests like hers and by choosing
the political route, she asserted the right to rethink and change
strategies to achieve the larger end. These are logical conclusions
that an individual, who has put her body through 16 years of
virtual torture with force-feeding and isolation, an annual ritual
of release and rearrest, could arrive at if this personal suffering
was not making any difference. That Sharmila did not come at
such a conclusion earlier is indicative of the enormous pressure
on her to continue. Going public with her decision was perhaps
the only way she could break out from another kind of prison, apart
from the actual one, in which she found herself incarcerated.
The negative response of some of Sharmilas supporters to her
decision to end her fast is not entirely unexpected. There have been
many campaigns in India based on the belief that an individual, by
punishing herself, can shame a government to act. In some cases
the strategy has worked; in others it has failed. In Sharmilas case,
the governments plan was to keep her technically alive but in
prison in the hope that this would break her spirit. It did not.
Instead, it turned her into an icon. But did it lead to a mass movement against AFSPA in Manipur? Unfortunately, even though this
was the kind of overarching issue that could have united
Manipuris living on the plains and in the hills, it did not happen.
Yet, though there was no mass movement, Sharmila was not
alone. In 2004, the famous naked protest by 11 elderly Meitei
women in front of Kangla Fort gave considerable traction to this
demand. When news came of the rape and murder of Thangjam
Manorama Devi, suspected of being a member of one of the
underground groups, by security forces in July 2004, these Imas
(mothers) of Manipur stripped in public and held up a banner
stating Indian Army Rape Us. That image went all over the world,
finally pushing the Government of India to address the demand.
Yet, although that dramatic intervention led to the appointment
of the Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee which recommended
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
that AFSPA be withdrawn from several parts of Manipur, the then

United Progressive Alliance government failed to act. While the
protest of the Imas illustrates the need for more than one strategy, the governments obfuscation points to the difficulty that
prolonged struggles face. On AFSPA, it is clear that no central
government will withdraw it in one state because of the ripple
effect of such a decision on other states, especially Kashmir.
Another strategy to expose the brutal reality of AFSPA is the case
filed by the Extrajudicial Execution Victim Families Association of
Manipur and Human Rights Alert documenting 1,528 cases between 1979 and 2012 that are suspected fake encounters. The
Supreme Court has asked the groups to provide detailed documentary evidence before the next hearing and in the meantime has
already sent a strong message to security forces that they cannot
use excessive and retaliatory force. This case could be a turning
point in the struggle against AFSPA that Sharmila has unwittingly led
when she began her fast in November 2000, following the Malom
massacre where 10 civilians, including a young boy, were killed.
Sharmilas decision to end her protest raises several pertinent
issues that go beyond Manipur and AFSPA. We have to ask whether
non-violent peaceful protests of the kind exemplified by Mahatma
Gandhi have any relevance in India today. Thanks to Gandhi,
hunger strikes have become a fairly common strategy used in
many different struggles from opposition to dams, to the rights
of the urban poor and more recently in the Jawaharlal Nehru
University. In Gandhis case, the fast was an instrument he used
in a larger political struggle. He was part of the politics, not separate from it. Post-independence, other instances that could be
cited are, for instance, Potti Sriramulus 58-day fast in 1952
demanding a separate Andhra Pradesh or even Anna Hazares
fast in 2011 for a Jan Lokpal Bill. In both instances, a movement
was behind the individual who undertook the fast. Sharmilas was a
personal decision in 2000 that drew support but did not trigger a
wider movement. Her being in distant Manipur also allowed the
centre, that must ultimately decide about AFSPA, to ignore her
while ensuring that she did not die in custody. In the face of such
a cynical and heartless approach by the state, it was essential
that the strategy to oppose AFSPA be rethought. This can and
should be done now. Sharmilas desire to be in politics might be
considered naive but it speaks to the need for a multipronged
strategy in any struggle so that the entire burden to sustain it is
not placed on the shoulders of one brave individual.
7
EDITORIALS
Drone Missile Assassination Inc

The US president, it seems, has a licence to kill anyone anywhere without any due process!
an the President of the United States (US), exercising his

constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive, decide to assassinate anyone his top military
and intelligence brass consider a terrorist threat, of course, following an approval process that, the US government claims, satisfies
due process standards? Going by the official document, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets
Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,
and turning to its section 5B dealing with Extraordinary Cases,
the President as Commander in Chief can even waive the
so-called due process standards in ordering the assassination
of anyone he considers a terrorist threat. Just think about it,
the President of the US has a licence to kill anyone, including US
citizens, anywhere in the world without any due process, if we
go by the just released top secret document.
The US government was forced to make public this hitherto
top secret 18-page document, called Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), after a federal court order on 5 August directed its
release. The order was the result of a long legal battle fought by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU immediately
posted the PPG on its website on 6 August. The lack of transparency, the withholding of basic information in the PPG, even in
the face of a court order, is evident in the extensive redactions
made to the document. But nevertheless, the process of approval of the assassinations, mostly by missiles fired from drones, is
now evident from what we have at hand, thanks to the ACLU.
Indeed, one can construct a flow chart of the process, starting
from the approval stage, when the nominating agencywhich,
one can surmise, is either the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
or the Pentagoncomes up with a recommendation which goes up
for approval to the director of the CIA or the secretary of defence.
The names of the terrorists approved for assassination are
reviewed by the National Security Council (NSC), and then
endorsed by a deputies committee of senior officials of the CIA,
the Pentagon, the State Department, and other security agencies.
After this a principals committee, consisting of their bosses, approves the name or names. In case of inter-agency disagreement,
or if the person targeted for assassination is a US citizen or a
person resident in the US (both, are referred to as a US person),
the final approval has to come from the President.
The point that needs to be highlighted here is the key role
that the NSC seems to be playing. Because it is an integral part

of the executive office of the US President and is based in the
White House itself, the President and his cabinet are hand in
glove with the top militaryintelligence brass, and the two together can effectively keep the drone-missile assassination
process from being subjected to close scrutiny by outsiders. It
helps that the NSC is exempt from congressional scrutiny and
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
Going by the US constitution, no one can be killed by the US
state without the application of the due process of law. But, the
countrys chief executive decides, to hell with this, the most sacred
of enshrined human rights. In 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki, a Muslim
cleric, an Islamic preacher, and a US citizen, was killed, struck down
by a missile remote fired from a drone, in Yemen. His 16-year old
son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who went in search of his missing
father, was similarly killed, struck down by a missile fired from a
drone. Were they high-value terrorists? And, if they were suspects,
why could not the Obama administration bring charges against them
in a court of law? Was it because it knew that it had no evidence
that the cleric or his minor son had committed any specific crime?
Coming to our part of the world, on 20 May this year, under
orders from the US President, the Talibans Emir (leader) Akhtar
Mohammad Mansour was killed by a missile remote fired from a
drone when he was riding in a vehicle in the Baluchistan province of
Pakistan. The US President Barack Obama claimed that Mansours
assassination was an important milestone in our long-standing
effort to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan. The Pakistani government denouncedrather mildly, we thinkthe assassination as a breach of the United Nations Charter.
Now, in the course of such assassinations, a number of civilians
have been killed, collateral damage in the establishments lexicon.
The official US estimates of non-combatant deaths are always
a fraction of independent estimates by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism or Reprieve. Perhaps the difference can be explained by the fact that the official estimates of non-combatant deaths assume that most of the people around the target
person at the time of his/her assassination were combatant
terrorists, and therefore also presumed to be guilty.
Without mincing words, to hell with any judiciary, we have
the right to killthat is what these best practices in targeted
killings by Drone Missile Assassination Inc are all about.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
EDITORIALS
Moderating the Hype

The Goods and Services Tax Council holds the key to the effective implementation of the law.
Pinaki Chakraborty writes:
he Constitution 122nd Amendment Bill 2014 or the Goods

and Services Tax (GST) Bill has been passed by both houses
of Parliament after protracted, and often acrimonious,
negotiations. This amendment will enable the introduction of
the GST by the union government as well as state governments

as a concurrent levy on an overlapping tax base. The GST would
subsume major indirect taxes (such as union excise duties, service
taxes, state level value added tax and other minor taxes) currently
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENT
levied by governments at all levels. A unified tax like the GST is

expected to provide harmonised and distortion-minimising tax
structures that would enable the development of a common
market for India which, in turn, is expected to enhance economic growth. The GST law requires the creation of the GST Council
to be chaired by the finance minister and ministers representing
states as members. The ultimate benefits of the GST would depend
greatly on the design of the tax. This design will emerge out of a
process of bargaining between the centre and the states in the
GST Council. This process could well be contentious and a poor
design of the tax will result in a suboptimal outcome.
Some of the design issues that have emerged indicate that there
will be significant compromises in keeping everyone concerned
reasonably happyor, should one say, relatively less unhappy.
A major design flaw in the new legislation is the provision relating to petroleum and petroleum products which specifies that
these goods shall not be subject to the levy of the GST till a date
has been notified based on the recommendation of the GST
Council. A large part of the taxes of state governments are
derived from petroleum products. The centre also collects substantial revenues through excise duties on these goods. In fact,
these goods account for one of the biggest chunks of the total
revenue garnered by the central and state governments. As most
petroleum products are considered intermediate inputs, it is
necessary to bring these under the GST regime at the earliest if
the cascading impact of tax on tax is to be done away with.
The council should specify a date for including these products
in the GST regime before the new tax is rolled out.
The GST Council will make recommendations on the model
GST law, principles of levy, apportionment of interstate GST and
the principles that will govern the place of supply and the taxes
that will be subsumed under the GST. In other words, the council has to develop the entire architecture of the new tax. Formulating a model GST law by the council is a step towards harmonisation of the tax system across the country. Though tax
harmonisation is often perceived as rate harmonisation, it
needs to be emphasised that if despite a single rate, trade and
industry have to face different tax laws across states, it would
increase the transaction costs of doing business. Thus, a model
GST law recommended by the council is a welcome starting
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
point. If the model law is treated as the foundation and customised to specific contexts of states, it would help evolve a harmonised tax system. The focus should be on system harmonisation
rather than harmonisation of rates across the states. Special
provisions have been made in the law for special category
states. The rationale for introducing the GST is to have a simplified tax system, minimise distortions and maximise gains in
economic efficiency. This, in turn, requires minimum exemptions, a broadening of the tax base and a low tax rate. It is hoped
that the special provisions do not become the norm and complicate the tax system. These special provisions should be used
judiciously, if not eliminated gradually.
Decisions in the GST Council will be taken through a voting
process with the central government having a weight of one-third
of the total votes cast and state governments (taken together)
having a weight of two-thirds. As formulated, the centre, individual
states and all states put together will lose fiscal autonomy as far
as changes in the GST design are concerned. Surrendering fiscal
autonomy for levying taxes that provided more than two-thirds
share of state revenue in the past which is likely to go up after
the GST is in place needs careful consideration. Due to the rigid
voting mechanism to arrive at decisions, it can be contended
that a certain amount of inflexibility has been introduced into
the system. This issue is much more important for the states
than the union government.
It is important to recognise that the GST is a destination-based tax
levied at the point of consumption. There will be gainers and losers
when the destination principle is adopted. As the act has made a
provision for 100% compensation to the states for a period of five
years; this should help overcome transitional issues relating to
revenue losses. Hopefully, the design of the GST will increase the
tax base and eliminate tax-induced fragmentation of markets.
However, it is about time that unrealistic expectations and the
hype surrounding the GST be moderated. If implemented correctly, the new GST should result in efficiency gains leading to higher
revenues and faster economic growth. This will be possible if the
GST Council functions as a professional body and is able to rise
above narrow partisan and political interests.
Pinaki Chakraborty (pinaki.chakraborty@nipfp.org.in) is at the National
Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
COMMENT
First Published in 1966
To mark 50 years of EPW, each week in 2016 will

present an extract from our archives.
Vol XXXIII, Nos 33 & 34
AUGUST 1522, 1998
Dealing with the War of

the Future
The American missile attacks on Thursday against
targets in Afghanistan and Sudan allegedly linked
to the terrorist organisation of Osama bin Laden
constituted one more instance of the US taking
law into its own hands with scant regard for the
sovereignty and rights of other countries. ...
Most ominously, it has been repeatedly asserted
by US official spokespersons that Thursdays attacks were just the beginning of a long war against
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
international terrorism. While president Clinton

has declared that our efforts against terrorism
cannot and will not end with this strike, secretary of state Madeleine Albright has described
this as the war of the future. ...
Of course, the US administration is not about
to accept UN or other multinational questioning
of its crusade against terrorism. Nevertheless
this might be a fruitful objective for countries
and governments to work towards. The US administration has claimed that it has convincing
evidence in its possession linking bin Laden and
his organisation to the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and also
showing that further similar attacks were
planned. It has also claimed that the targets of
its missile attacks had been carefully pinpointed on the basis of reliable intelligence. Since the
US actions have critically infringed international law and the sovereignty of third countries,
the US administration cannot be left to be the
vol lI no 33
sole judge of the veracity of these assertions.

The government of Sudan has claimed that the
industrial plant in the countrys capital city
which the US claimed to be a chemical factory
making intermediates for the production of
chemical weapons and which was destroyed in
the American aerial attack was actually engaged in producing pharmaceuticals. It has also
said that it proposes to take the matter to the UN
Security Council. Sudan deserves to be supported
in this so that the US claims can be subjected to
verification and a small beginning made towards bringing the unilateral use of military
force in disregard of the sovereignty of third
countries under a modicum of international review. The terms the US administration has itself
chosen to describe the terrorist threat to it and
its efforts to deal with it endorse the legitimacy
of such a course. If indeed this be the war of the
future, the UN cannot surely remain unconcerned and uninvolved.
HT PAREKH FINANCE COLUMN
Brexit and Other Harbingers of a

Return to the Dangers of the 1930s
Avinash Persaud
n a national referendum on 23 June,

Britons voted to leave the European
Union (EU) by 52% to 48%. The EU is a
borderless area for the movement of goods,
services, investment, and labour across
28 European countries. Those who voted
for Brexit, the catchphrase for Britains
exit, were often described as angrily rejecting the national and international elites
that were rolled out in support of Britain
remaining. These elites responded that
this was a vote of ignorance, laced with
xenophobia that would have enormous
negative economic consequences. Confirming everybodys prejudices, Michael
Gove, a leading Brexiter, said in the middle
of the campaign, people in this country
have had enough of experts. Despite that,
misreading the vote in favour of Brexit as a
vote of the ignorant and trying to blame
the Labour party leader for the result is
far more dangerous than leaving the EU.
It is a denial of powerful forces that left
unchecked, will plunge us into the same
economic hole that Europe and the
United States (US) fell into in the 1930s,
which in turn led inextricably to the horrors of World War II. These forces are not
uniquely British, but are worryingly
international. Brexit, the rise of Trumpism
in the US, and nationalism elsewhere are
part of the same trend.
The referendum result can be broken
down by Britains 418 local authorities. The
census also records data on social class,
education levels, age and much else by
local authorities. It is, therefore, possible
to draw empirical observations on who
voted to leave without having to ask them,
which can lead to biases. The data reveals
that there was an unusually positive correlation (+0.60) between the percentage
of those who voted to leave in a local authority and the percentage of non-graduates
in that local authority. The much-touted
correlation between age and the Brexit
10
vote was also positive but more modestly

so at +0.15. Young graduates voted heavily
to remaining and elder workers who did
not go to university voted heavily to leave.
Uneven Distribution
Artu, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010)
have shown that across a wide range of
countries and time periods, the adjustment costs from trade liberalisation are
borne most prevalently by the same group
as those that voted to leave the EU, that is,
less-skilled and older workers. Brexit was
not an irrational vote of the ignorant but
a highly rational vote by the same losers
from trade as everywhere else. Of course,
the issue of whether you lose from trade
is more nuanced than whether you have
a degree or not. It is about whether trade
liberalisation increases the relative supply of people with your skills. The consequence for those in which it does is that
their wages and conditions worsen. In the
US, average hourly wages have not risen
versus inflation since the 1970s and within
that average, 70% have seen a fall. In
sectors benefiting from migrants British
firms have been able to introduce zerohour contracts in which they are not
obligated to offer any hours of paid work
but employees must be always available.
This is one of those rare occasions in
economics when fact follows theory. Trade
boosts a countrys net welfare. Precisely
how firms respond to lower trade barriers
are hard to capture in standard economic
models, but there have been many natural
experiments that point in this direction.
The purest example is the closing of the
Suez Canal which took place the day after
Israel launched a surprise attack on
Egypts air force on 5 June 1967. During
the closure, ships travelling to Britain
from India had to travel an additional
4,800 miles and 16 days around the
Cape of Good Hope. The reopening of
the canal in 1975 was less of a surprise

but shrouded in much uncertainty. James
Freyrers (2009) study of the trade and
gross domestic product (GDP) effects
indicates that every 10% increase (or
decrease) in trade adds (or subtracts)
1.6% of national income.
Redistribution Is Inevitable
The net benefits from trade justify the
winners setting aside part of their winnings to compensate the losers. But the
trade liberalisation agenda fatally attached
itself to a neo-liberal agenda so that over
time, as trade liberalisation advanced,
unemployment benefits, tertiary education, retraining, and social housing were
all steadily withdrawn. The winnings
from trade have been concentrated on
the elites while they have abandoned
the rest. Trade liberalisation has led to a
convergence between countries and a
divergence within countries.
The Brexit and Trumps Republican
nomination tell us that the inevitable
reckoning has arrived. Easy monetary
policy and low interest rates are no solutions as they merely lift the prices of the
homes and financial assets of the skilled
elites and pushes them further out of the
reach of others. The lasting solution is to
use fiscal policy to compensate the losers
through aggressive efforts to upskill displaced workers and build them affordable homes to rent where the new jobs
are. This costs money, but the cost of not
doing so is many times greater. A collapse into the 1930s-style trade and currency wars will implode trade and GDP,
create mass unemployment and despair,
and maybe worse.
Avinash Persaud (profadpersaud@gmail.com)
is non-resident senior fellow, Peterson Institute
for International Economics, Washington, and
non-executive Chairman, Elara Capital PLC,
London and Mumbai.
References
Artu, E, S Chaudhuri and J McLaren (2010):
Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach, American Economic
Review, Vol 100, No 3, pp 100845.
Feyrer, J (2009): The 1967-75 Suez Canal Closure:
Lessons for Trade and the Trade-income Link,
VoXEU.org, 23 December, http://voxeu.org/
article/1967-75-suez-canal-closure-lessons-trade.
August 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
Kashmir: When Ignorance

Begets Tragedy and Farce
Gautam Navlakha
When the Government of India

has neither the intent nor the
political will to offer greater
autonomy, and Kashmiris refuse
to settle for anything less than
azaadi, armed confrontation is
only to be expected.
s anger simmers under the

relative surface calm in Kashmir,
a farce threatens to turn into
tragedy. Union Home Minister Rajnath
Singh said on the floor of the Parliament
on 18 July that referendum as a concept
is outdated and irrelevant. It is noteworthy that he has unwittingly lent
legitimacy to this concept by bringing it
to Parliament. This concept has indeed
gained in relevance in the 21st century
and is viewed as a democratic way to untie tangled knots and resolve intractable
problems. When a state has nothing to
offer to a rebellious people, and the ensuing armed conflict will not cease without a radical political offer, the demand
for referendum is enough to politically
nurture a movement while war rages.
Facts on the Ground
This article was earlier posted in the

Web Exclusives section of the EPW website.
Gautam Navlakha (gnavlakha@gmail.com) is
a member of the Peoples Union for Democratic
Rights, Delhi.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
Singh stated on the floor of Parliament

that a committee will look into the issue
of pellet guns. However, the Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Director
General K Durga Prasad said on 25 July
that while he was sorry about the pellet
injuries that had blinded Kashmiri youth,
his force would continue using these guns.
The pellet gun called chara bandook
was used by British hunters in the 19th
century. The pellets are made of metal
(some are rubber coated) and are sprayed
at high speeds of over 1,000 ft per second.
The 12 bore gun used to spray them has a
cartridge which carries 600 pellets. The
Israelis used it on the Palestinians but
stopped after they realised that the
pellets cause fatal casualties. Indian forces
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), however,
continue to use it. Former Minister of
Home Affairs P Chidambarams statement
that there should be greater autonomy
to deal with a grave situation in J&K,
within the constitutional framework as
was promised in 1947, was ridiculed. His
vol lI no 33
own Congress party distanced itself from

the statement while the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) accused him of compromising national security, the mother of all
charges in present-day India. There were
other official statements made in Srinagar
that made it clear that the Government
of India (GoI) will decide who to talk to
and who not to talk with only after
peace and normalcy is restored. Singhs
assertion that we want to build an
emotional bond between the centre and
Kashmir sounded almost contradictory
since the GoI is busy engaging in a war
to subjugate its own people.
Such a quixotic rush towards restoring
authority has its share of black humour
as could be seen when the authorities,
out of spite, made the curfew more stringent just as the azaadi activists relaxed
the bandh they had called. In order to
show the separatists their place the
government had no compunction about
doling out collective punishment to
people, as the British raj was wont to do
in the past. As Kashmir burst into flames,
rhetoric flourished, copious tears were
shed for soldiers and innocent people,
Pakistan was (and continues to be)
slammed, and an all party confabulation
ensued. Meetings were held, hospitals
and homes of victims were visited, and
assurances were given. Committees were
constituted, and recommendations solicited, but nothing changed once order
had been restored.
A close look at the ground reality will
lead to the question: Who got killed and
blinded? Out of the 50 killed, only one
was a soldier who met an accidental
death, the rest were all civilians: minors
and adults, men and women. According
to the official version, out of the 1,738
security force personnel only 132 were
hospitalised and 1,606 suffered minor
injuries in 566 incidents. In contrast, 49
civilians were killed, 3,000 injured and
more than a hundred were maimed and
blinded by pellet guns. In just one hospital
(the Sri Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital in
Srinagar) 167 civilians who suffered
severe pellet injuries to their eyes were
treated in 11 days. The head of ophthalmology there, Khurshid Alam was
11
COMMENTARY
reported as saying that most people

had been hit either in their head or
abdomen. They (the forces) are not
shooting in their legs (Jameel 2016).
The staggering death toll, unsolved
crimes of rapes, massacres, enforced disappearances, and the orphans, widows,
half-widows, and lakhs of people suffering from trauma and post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) are issues that are
pushed to the margins and simply do not
become part of the public discourse in
India. As for the Indian intelligentsia,
the relentless attacks launched by the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in
nexus with the police, have made them
careful and cautious. Let alone a referendum, even the communalisation of
the military as a consequence of waging
war against Kashmiri Muslims is not
acknowledged. The soldiers are told that
they are fighting Pakistan that has instigated trouble and wants to dismember
India. The Pakistani and Kashmiri
Muslims thus become indistinguishable
on the ground and in the soldiers minds.
Our own people become the enemy,
along with providing the dominant
excuse for counter-insurgency in J&K. It
also is a major cause of stress and trauma among soldiers and officers of the
armed forces.
The peoples resistance is expressed in
myriad ways: from armed militancy to
unarmed resistance; aiding and abetting
the struggle by providing relief and help
during mass upsurge and man-made
natural calamities, to creative expression
in literature, art and music. Many Indians
remain oblivious to the debate in Kashmir
over womens rights even as they fight
the Indian state and its record of sexual
violence. Kashmiris possess more respect
for civil liberties because that has been
denied to them. Indians fail to realise
how often and in how many different
ways Kashmiri society has been forced
to look within and rely on its own wits
and resources in times of crises. This
collective sense of self-reliance has made
them resilient, fearless and confident.
And thus, despite all the encumbrances,
the protests have persisted.
Post 1947, India has witnessed any
number of struggles relating to land and
resources. And so has Jammu and
12
Kashmir (J&K). The common thread in

such struggles is not the same constitutional arrangement, as much as the manner in which every type of constitutional
guarantee gets tweaked/amended/modified across India. Despite Schedules V
and VI of the Indian Constitution, the
Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas
and the Forest Rights Act, the forest
dwellers in India have witnessed brazen
violation of their provisions. Adivasis are
at the centre of the war being waged in
the name of crushing the Maoist rebellion.
In Nagaland despite Article 371 A, (a) iv
guaranteeing land and its resources to
the Naga people, the centre claimed the
right to mineral resources. In Assam there
is a struggle going on against privatisation of oil wells by the BJP-led state
government. Thus, notwithstanding constitutional guarantees, laws, and assurances, the Indian states functionaries
never give up trying to push their claims
as their sovereign prerogatives. Unlike
elsewhere, land grab in J&K takes place in
the name of development, for national
security, that is, land for the 6,00,000
strong military personnel deployed there,
for the comfort of Hindu pilgrims, fortified camps for migrants and so on.
This means that despite the constitutionally guaranteed state subject-hood,
land grabbing continues. When the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre issued a tender
for construction of staff quarters in Gulmarg in May without any statutory permission and in defiance of the J&K High
Courts order, it obviously believed that
as a GoI entity, it was above the law.
The role of the bureaucracy and the proIndian political formations in pushing
the proposal for setting up Sainik colonies
for all ex-soldiers, non-state subjects
included, and families of those who
died or served for three years in J&K
(from 2011 to 2016) is noteworthy. Land
for the Sainik colony was identified near
the Old Srinagar airport at Humhama,
but the number of applicants rose and
the Rajya Sainik Board asked for more
land. The buildings had meanwhile been
constructed. Faced with public outrage
the government backed down and the
Army declared that the constructed
buildings were for serving officers and
their families.
However, papers and documents in

the public domain indicate back-pedalling. The land policy to settle non-state
ex-ser vicemen is an old project of the
RSS to settle nationalists, and to allow
non-state subjects unhindered access to
land for industry, real estate, mining, and
fortified colonies for migrants. The state
government is sold on the idea that all
things being equal, the economy will make
up for all the political losses. Economic
policy is not an independent variable in
a war situation when there is continued
financial dependence on the centre. The
current state finance minister was quoted as saying that India follows an economically coercive federation where all
powers rest with the centre (Irfan 2015).
Comparing J&K and the North East to the
12th man in a cricket team, he said they
too are like this player with no say in the
match. The `80,000 crore economic
package is outdated, an aggregate of all
the promised projects, mostly central
projects, and not an insignificant amount
is meant for raising more armed police
personnel or pacifying the electorate in
Jammu (Kashmir Reader 2016).
The registered unemployed in the state
number 2.2 lakh which when coupled
with the unregistered, goes up to 6.5
lakh. The `80,000 crore package includes jobs for 3,000 migrant youth and
5,000 in the armed forces while the rest
of the jobs in construction will see workers and supervisors from outside the J&K
compete with locals. Besides, the legal
immunity given to the military from the
criminal court and the control of the
J&Ks representative government, all
point to micro-management of J&K by
the centre. The state government has no
authority to withdraw pellet guns, since
even policing is under the Union Ministry of Home Affairs.
Indigenous Militancy
Burhan Muzaffar Wani and his comrades
were born and died in the phase of militancy which symbolises the watershed
in politics in J&K; pre- and post-198990.
Burhan personified the new generation
of militants. He spoke for them. They did
not trust leaders and knew that they
had a short time to live. One of his last
messages was to the Amarnath pilgrims,
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
welcoming them, expressing respect for

their faith and assuring them that they
need not fear for their safety. In the midst
of the current grief and anger, social
media provides evidence of pilgrims being
rescued from a burning bus, at risk to
their own lives by Kashmiris. Even in
2008 in the midst of the ragda agitation,
volunteers ensured that langars were
organised and shelters provided to the
yatris. Indeed the Nitish Sengupta Committee appointed by the government
following the 1996 snowstorm in which
more than 200 pilgrims lost their lives,
recorded its appreciation (1996) of the
role played by the tatoowallahs and the
local villagers, most of them Muslims in
rescuing the yatris at great risk to their
own lives. The rescuers also included
militants. Eyewitness accounts of the
yatris say that the Border Security Force
(BSF) did not come to their help. Yes, the
militants are self-consciously Muslim,
but to claim they are fanatics is a lie.
Burhans message was a repeat of messages issued by indigenous militants in
the past, and was a clear signal that they
respect the faith of the other. Hatred
for the faith of the other is the hallmark
of a fanatic.
The distinction between indigenous
and foreign militancy is the sharpest here.
Remarkably, it is the azaadi leadership
which is reaching out to Kashmiri Pandits,
to come and discuss a concrete plan for
return to their original home and hearth.
Their opposition to fortified camps for
migrants is well taken. Their appeal to the
Kashmiri Pandits to return is well meant.
It is disconcerting, therefore, that Indias
civil society, with honourable exceptions,
remains mired in nationalist dogma,
communal or secular, unequivocally
wedded to the nation state and its inviolability, and refuses to accept that the
problem is primarily located in the Indian
nation state project, defined by hatred
for Pakistan and Muslim as the other.
Knowledge of communalism has not
encouraged interrogation of the role
played by Hindutva in exacerbating the
Kashmir problem. There is suppression
of facts about its patronisation in J&K by
the military, civilian establishment and the
state government: the training and arming of 29,000 village defence committee
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
members drawn from the Hindutva fold

in the Jammu region (Jammu and Kashmir
Coalition of Civil Society 2013); appointment as a minister from the BJPs quota
of an absconder from justice in a case of
lynching of two persons (Sharma 2016);
allowing the cohorts of the RSS in a disturbed area to receive arms training
and brandish weapons (Navlakha 2015);
the lynch mob form of agitation launched
in Jammu in 2008 by right wing elements which was mollycoddled, whereas
the non-violent agitation in the Valley was
showered with bullets; imposing of an
economic embargo, an act of war, for a
month against Kashmir by Jammu agitators and which the troop of 6,00,000
could not prevent (Navlakha 2008). The
list is long.
The Indian government has nothing
of substance to offer the Kashmiris.
Gulzarilal Nanda, as Union Home Minister
and interim Prime Minister, had famously
told the Lok Sabha on 4 December 1964
that Article 370 was a shell which
was emptied of its contents. When the
Farooq Abdullah government submitted
the state autonomy report in 2002 to the
Atal Bihari Vajpayee government at the
centre, it went straight into the dustbin.
The three subcommittees set up by the
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government went much farther than any other
committee in recent memory in their
recommendations, which were summarily
ignored. As for the interlocutors report
in 2012, it made itself inconsequential by
peremptorily dismissing the idea of reverting to the pre-1953 status. They were
convinced that the Kashmiris do not
know what they mean by azaadi, so all
that is needed is panchayati raj. So when
the GoI has neither intent nor political
will, to offer greater autonomy, and
Kashmiris will not settle for anything
less than azaadi, it simply means that
other than armed confrontation there is
no way out.
A fatal flaw of counter-insurgency
(COIN) is that it also implies psychological
warfare, for perception management.
The authoritarian origins of this concept
should be borne in mind. As part of
COIN, the armed forces have to appear to
be triumphing while at the same time
keeping the cauldron of fear boiling
vol lI no 33
among the rebellious population and

fuelling insecurity among the Indian
public to justify military suppression. As
a result we move from triumphalism, of
having defeated and suppressed the
separatists, to consternation when a
mass upsurge takes place, blaming Pakistan for fomenting this. The union home
ministry provided living proof of this by
simultaneously lambasting Pakistan for
interference and insisting that terrorism in J&K does not pose a threat! In
any case, J&K has been under the administrative control of the GoI for nearly
seven decades which has deployed more
than 6,00,000 armed soldiers who enjoy
legal immunity and possess enormous
powers and in addition, civil liberties
are suspended. So how come Pakistan
finds it so easy to stoke fires of rebellion
in Indian administered Kashmir? If elections and electoral turnouts are markers of peoples choice, and not a compromise to make life less onerous, then
how come the very same people join
funerals of militants and gather at
encounter sites?
Truth be told, Pakistan is able to fish
in troubled waters because the Indian
government has closed all avenues for
democratic expression and has nothing
to offer. The fact that the Lashkar or
Jaish have reactivated themselves is
because of the same reason that young
people after 2008 and 2013 began to
drift towards militancy after the bloody
suppression they experienced. Omar
Abdullah, wiser after the event, nailed
the truth when he tweeted that Burhan
Wani dead will galvanise local militancy.
Note what took place at Tral on 9 July
at Burhans funeral. The town ringed
by security forces and police camps
could not prevent the more than 40,000
people from attending his funeral.
Young volunteers manned all entry
points and obstructed the movement of
vehicles of security forces, as Hizbul
Mujahideen militants gave their martyr
a 21-gun salute. Heed also what has
taken place since.
Battles Won, War Lost
In the conditions that operate in J&K
there will be many who would take to
arms and an even larger number that
13
COMMENTARY
see value in armed resistance. So militancy

will not ebb until there are prospects of
a democratic process, and people will
not back off from lending militancy
support or invest in the non-violent process unless there is a concrete political
offer. Look at any insurgency the world
over and the message is clear, if one is
desirous of learning lessons. There has to
be a radical course correction. One can
discuss the minimum turnout required
for referendum, and put the goalpost at
two-thirds majority for a momentous decision. But to reject the right of self-determination because we have so far refused to entertain this possibility is evidence that this 69-year-old republic has
lost its creative imagination. When
wars, military suppression, manipulation
14
and machinations all have failed, and

elections cannot hide the micro management of J&K by New Delhi, then the arc
of history bends in favour of a democratic resolution, a solution we have shied
away from. When radical Hindutva runs
amok across the length and breadth of
India, it is hypocritical to complain of
radicalisation of the azaadi movement.
It has not happened, notwithstanding
febrile concoctions by Indian agencies
and their cyphers, but it can happen if a
democratic solution continues to be
evaded, and Indians refuse to stand up
in solidarity with the azaadi movement.
When ignorance and obduracy become
the reigning deities, history as farce can
cause a bigger tragedy, which will singe
us all.
References
Irfan, Hakeem (2015): All Financial Powers with
Centre: J&K FM Haseeb Drabu, Economic Times,
21 May.
Jameel, Yusuf (2016): The Non-Lethal Weapon
that Maims and Blinds, Asian Age, 20 June.
JKCCS (2013): Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of
Civil Society Demands Disbanding of VDCs
(Village Defense Committees) and Ikhwans in
India Occupied Kashmir, 16 August.
(2016): Composition of VDCs Has Led to Communal Polarisation, January.
Kashmir Reader (2016): Drabu Gives Break-up of
PMs `80,000 cr Package, 18 June.
Navlakha, Gautam (2008): Jammu and Kashmir:
Winning a Battle Only to Lose the War?,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 43, No 45,
8 November.
(2015): Hubris of Propaganda on Kashmir,
26 December.
Sengupta, Nitish (1996): Enquiry on Amarnath Yatra
Tragedy Committee Report, Department of Kashmir Affairs, Government of India, December.
Sharma, Arun (2016): BJP MLA Who Led Murder
Accused to Ministers House Was Named
in FIR, Indian Express, 15 March.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
Subramaniam vs Subramanian
Has Profit Taken Precedence Over People?
Saurabh Chandra
The private assurances

supposedly given by the Indian
government to the United States
India Business Council that it
would not grant compulsory
licences to Indian drug makers
for commercial purposes
except in cases of public health
emergencies negate the intent
of the Indian intellectual policy
regime to work patents in India
and provide affordable medicines
to people.
Saurabh Chandra (saurabh7678@yahoo.co.in)

is former secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Gas, Government of India.
14
n 22 June 2016, Subramaniam

Swamy tweeted: Who said to US
Cong on 13/3/2013 the US should
act against India to defend US Pharmaceuticals interests? Arvind Subramanian
MOF!! Sack him!!
Expectedly, an animated discussion
followed. In keeping with the traditions
of the Lutyens zone in Delhi, it revolved
around the personalities involved. Not
unexpectedly, in an era of instant news,
the din soon subsided.
On the US Watch List
Lost in the cacophony was the core
messagethe all-out efforts of multinational pharmaceutical companies to bend
Indias intellectual policy regime to extend
their era of monopoly profits. Petitioning
for retention of India on the Special 301
list, prepared by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), is a part of this
effort. This list mentions countries
whose laws and regulations on intellectual property serve as trade barriers to
the United States (US) companies and
products. The most egregious violators
are put in the Priority Foreign Country

category. These countries may be subjected to sanctions. This is followed by
two non-statutory categoriesPriority
Watch List (PWL) and Watch List countries. India has continuously been placed
on the PWL since 2008. Peter Drahos, a
law professor at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at Queen Mary University at Londons School of Law, has
called the Special 301 report a public
law devoted to the service of private
corporate interests.
With the coming into force of the
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 in the US, the pressure
on India to meet the benchmarks set
by the USTR will increase. Imposition of
sanctions for non-compliance will be
a distinct possibility. The act of 2015
requires the USTR to develop an action
plan of certain benchmarks for achieving adequate protection of intellectual
property rights for each country on the
Special Section 301 priority watch list
for at least a year. There is a provision
for unilaterally drawing up this action
plan. The US President is empowered to
take appropriate action if the PWL country fails to meet these benchmarks. The
USTR will be required to draw up such
an action plan for India. Compliance with
the World Trade Organizations (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
not an adequate safeguard against

drawing up of this action plan or figuring on this list.
MNCs Critical of Section 3(d)
The pharmaceutical multinational corporations (MNCs) are some of the most
strident critics of Indian laws and
regulations on intellectual property. In
particular, the sections in the Indian
Patents Act, 1970 which make evergreening of patents difficult and those that
provide for issuance of compulsory
licences attract most opposition. This is
despite the fact that both provisions are
compliant with WTOs agreement on
TRIPS. However, according to pharmaceutical MNCs, these provisions by creating legal uncertainty dampen the flow of
investment into pharmaceutical research.
A long-term deleterious effect on development of medicines to resolve the complex health problems is the natural
outcome. Their real intent appears to
thwart the competitive edge of generic
medicines produced by Indias vibrant
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, which has served both the developed and developing countries well in
the past. To give an example, the supply
of anti-viral generic drugs manufactured
by CIPLA had significantly helped in containing the spread of the HIV epidemic in
Africa. This manufacturing base was
created on the back of the process patent
regime which prevailed between 1970
and 2005 for the pharmaceutical sector.
Consequent to the signing of the WTO
Agreement, this was replaced by the
product patent regime with effect from
1 January 2005.
As mentioned earlier, in the perception
of pharmaceutical MNCs, one of the
amendments to the Indian Patents Act,
1970 (which came into force on 1 January 2005) which poses a big threat to
their bottom line, is Section 3(d). The
portion of this section which makes enhancement of the known efficacy of a
known substance a necessary condition
for patentability is particularly threatening. It is a unique provision and without any precedent in the patent law of
any other country. It was introduced
expressly by Indian lawmakers to check
the tendency to evergreen patents in
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
general and pharmaceutical patents in

particular. Evergreening, a practice neither unknown nor uncommon in the
pharma universe, refers to the attempts
to extend the tenure of patents by making minor changes in existing medicines. The Indian law, primarily in the
interest of affordable public health, set
the standard for grant of pharmaceutical
patents at a level higher than what
prevails in the European Union (EU) or
the US. As a result, a new form of an
existing medicine was patentable only if
it enhanced its therapeutic efficacy or
curative property.
Novartis was the first to raise the
red flag. In 2003, it obtained exclusive
marketing rights (EMR s) for marketing
Glivec, a path-breaking drug to treat
leukaemia. The monthly cost to a patient
was $2,600, while the corresponding
cost of generic versions was about $200.
This was perhaps a harbinger of the
transition from process to product patents!
Having patented a modified form of
the drug in the US, Novartis applied
for a product patent for it in India. The
Assistant Controller of Patents (ACP)
opined that the modified form failed
the test of novelty, non-obviousness,
and efficacy, all necessary requirements
for grant of a patent. In appeal, the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board
(IPAB) held that lack of increased efficacy made it ineligible for grant of a
product patent.
Novartis responded by challenging
the constitutionality of the evergreening
prevention provision and its inconsistency
with the agreement on TRIPS, in the
Madras High Court. The high court
upheld the constitutionality of the legal
provision, but declined to examine its
compliance with the TRIPS agreement.
Novartis preferred not to appeal against
this judgment. Neither has Novartis
taken steps to approach the Dispute
Settlement Body established under the
TRIPS agreement. However, it went to
the Supreme Court against the order of
the IPAB. In a landmark judgment, the
Supreme Court held that for patentability
the modified form of the drug had to
demonstrate increased therapeutic efficacy
or curative propertya requirement not
met by Novartis patent application.
vol lI no 33
Hence, the refusal to grant the product

patent was upheld.
Compulsory Licensing
The other bugbear is the power to issue a
compulsory licence. It can be excercised
both by the Controller General of Patents,
Designs and Trademarks (CGPDTM) and
the government, although under different
conditions. The controller on an application from a private party can issue a
compulsory licence to it if the patented
invention does not satisfy reasonable
requirements of the public or is not available at a reasonably affordable price or is
not worked in the territory of India. The
central government is empowered to
grant compulsory licence to a private
party in circumstances of national emergency or extreme urgency or in case of
public non-commercial use.
On 4 November 2011, the union government notified the National Manufacturing Policy. It provided for setting up
of a Technology Acquisition and Development Fund (TADF). Inter alia, the TADF
was authorised to approach the government for issue of a compulsory licence
for the latest patented green technology
if it was not being provided by the patent holder at a reasonable rate or not being worked in India to meet the domestic
demand in a satisfactory manner. This
was in accordance with the spirit of the
Indian patent law, which required the
patent to be worked in India. In the Bayer
case, the Madras High Court held that
although worked in India did not
necessitate manufacturing in India in
each and every case, in cases where it
was not being manufactured in India,
the patent holder had to satisfy the authorities under the act by providing reasons why it was impossible/prohibitive
to manufacture it in India. The rationale
being that the patent was not granted to
enable its holder to enjoy monopoly rights
to import the product to cater to the
domestic demand. Thus the requirement
to manufacture the patented product in
India is the norm and importing it an
exception. The intent clearly is to boost
domestic manufacturing. This is fully
aligned to the Make in India policy,
announced subsequently by the present
National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
15
COMMENTARY
government, and if used prudently, it

has great potential for domestic manufacturing value addition.
Subsequently on 9 March 2012, on an
application from NATCO Pharma, the
CGPTDM granted the first ever compulsory licence to it for manufacturing
Sorafenib Tosylate, a crucial drug for patients suffering from kidney and liver
cancer. NATCO marketed it for `8,800
per patient per month. Bayer, the patent
holder was selling it under the brand
name Nexavar. Costing `2,84,000 per
month, the drug was unaffordable for a
majority of patients. The demand of a
very small fraction of patients who
wanted the drug was being met by Bayer
through imports. This order was challenged before the IPAB which upheld the
grant of compulsory licence. The writ
against IPABs order was dismissed by the
Bombay High Court. The order to grant
the compulsory licence became final,
with the Supreme Court refusing to
admit the Special Leave Petition against
the order of the high court.
Increasing US Pressure on India
In the perception of pharmaceutical
MNCs, the Indian lawmakers are unlikely
to amend the patent law to meet their
concerns. The legal challenge has not
yielded the desired results. An effective
option is to petition the USTR to exercise
pressure on the Indian executive to
restrict the use of these provisions. The
attempt is to get a commitment from
Indian authorities to use compulsory
licensing provisions only in cases of
public health emergencies and not for
commercial purposes. The recent rejection of the request to issue compulsory
licences for AstraZenecas patented
anti-diabetic drug and Bristol-Myers
Squibbs cancer drug has not gone unnoticed. In early March, news reports
appeared that the USIndia Business
Council (USIBC) had in their submission
to the USTR stated that they have been
privately reassured by the Indian government that it will not issue compulsory
licences for commercial purposes. When
the private assurance became public, the
Indian government refuted this claim of
USIBC. Subsequently, the USIBC issued a
clarification stating that it recognises and
16
supports Government of Indias sovereign right to issue a compulsory licence.

However, in order to attract investments
that are imperative for innovation to
thrive in India, the council and its members seek transparency, consistency and
clarity in the legislation and the circumstances under which such compulsory
licences can be issued so as to enable
well-informed business decisions.
In this clarification, there was no reference to private assurances said to
have been given by the Indian government. This private assurance figures in
the USIBCs written submission made to
the USTR on 5 February 2016. In this
submission, the USIBC has also recommended that India may remain on the
PWL with the caveat that consequent to
release of the National Intellectual Property Right Policy, it may potentially recommend an upgrade to Indias ranking
at that time.
More will be heard on this issue in the
future. The overt and covert efforts to
dilute the requirement of enhanced
efficacy for patentability in Section 3(d)
of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 will
continue. Also, attempts are being made
to create a climate, whereby without

explicitly stating so, the executive foregoes using compulsory licensing for commercial purposes and grants it only in
special circumstances of public emergencies. This would negate the intent of
the Indian intellectual policy regime to
work patents in India, provide affordable
healthcare and a clean environment to
its citizens. And in the bargain also dent
the flagship Make in India programme
of the Government of India. All this notwithstanding the Doha declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health, 2001 which
states, each member has the right to
grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licenses are granted.
As required by the US Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015,
the USTR will be soon drawing up an
action plan containing the benchmarks
to be met by countries on the PWL, including India. This and the Indian governments response will be awaited to
see whether the USIBC has achieved its
objectives, even if partially. This then is
the crux of the warning contained in
Subramaniam Swamys tweet.
Journal Rank of EPW

Economic & Political Weekly is indexed on Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database
of peer-reviewed literature, which is prepared by Elsevier NV (http://tinyurl.com/o44sh7a).
Scopus has indexed research papers that have been published in EPW from 2008 onwards.
The Scopus database journal ranks country-wise and journal-wise. It provides three broad sets
of rankings: (i) Number of Citations, (ii) H-Index and (iii) SCImago Journal and Country Rank.
Presented below are EPWs ranks in 2014 in India, Asia and globally, according to the total
cites (3 years) indicator.
Highest among 36 Indian social science journals and highest among 159 social science
journals ranked in Asia.
Highest among 36 journals in the category, Economics, Econometrics and Finance in the
Asia region, and 36th among 835 journals globally.
Highest among 23 journals in the category, Sociology and Political Science in the Asia
region, and 15th among 928 journals globally.
Between 2008 and 2014, EPWs citations in three categories (Economics, Econometrics,
and Finance; Political Science and International Relations; and Sociology and Political
Science) were always in the second quartile of all citations recorded globally in the
Scopus database.
For a summary of statistics on EPW on Scopus, including of the other journal rank indicators,
please see http://tinyurl.com/qe949dj
EPW consults referees from a database of 200+ academicians in different fields of the social
sciences on papers that are published in the Special Article and Notes sections.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
1966, 1917, and 1818

Let a Hundred Schools of
Thought Contend
Bernard Dmello
Let a hundred flowers bloom,

Let a hundred schools of
thought contendthese might
be the best ways to approach
the anniversary of the Cultural
Revolution and the forthcoming
commemorations of the Russian
Revolution and 200 years since
the birth of Karl Marx.
his year marks 50 years since Mao

and his close comrades launched
the Cultural Revolution in China.
Next year, 2017, will be 100 years since
the February and October revolutions in
Russia. And, 2018 will mark the 200th
birth anniversary of Karl Marx (1818
1883), whose works were a compelling
source of inspiration for the Russian and
Chinese revolutionaries. The three anniversaries will doubtless be occasions
when, illuminated by their vision of a
decent human society, the works of
Marx and his close comrade and friend
Friedrich Engels will be reinterrogated.
Surely questions will be asked as to why
subsequent socialist revolutionaries inspired by that visionmost of all,
Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades in Russia, and Mao Zedong and his
close comrades in Chinadespite their
best efforts, could not lay the basis for a
socialist societya society of equality,
cooperation, community and solidarity.1
Bombard the Headquarters
Bernard DMello (bernard@epw.in) is on the

editorial staff of the EPW and is a member
of the Committee for the Protection of
Democratic Rights, Mumbai.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
The March 1966 issue of Red Flag, the

theoretical political journal of the then
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), carried
an article on The Great Lessons of the
Paris Commune of 1871, explaining how
one can learn from the communards as to
how to prevent the partystate bureaucracy
from repudiating their assigned role of
serving the people and instead become
the masters of the people. This theme of
the Paris Commune was picked up and
communicated on 25 May with a big character poster (BCP) from Beijing University
that boldly declared the need for a
Chinese Paris Commune, the significance
of which, the poster claimed, surpasses
that of the original Paris Commune.
Indeed, this BCP won Maos applause,
and on 5 August, he released his own
BCP, titled Bombard the Headquarters.
vol lI no 33
Then, three days later, on 8 August, the

Central Committee of the CCP adopted
a DecisionConcerning the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which,
in its view, was A New Stage in the
Socialist Revolution, to struggle against
and overthrow those persons in authority
who are taking the capitalist road. The
Cultural Revolution also intended to
transform education, literature and art
and all other parts of the superstructure
not in correspondence with the socialist
economic base.
Indeed, if one goes by this Central
Committee decision, which came to be
known as the 16 points, there was an
expression of the intention to institute a
system of general elections [my emphasis],
like that of the Paris Commune, for electing members to the Cultural Revolution
groups and committees and delegates to
the Cultural Revolutionary congresses,
which were to be permanent, standing
mass organisations. Indeed, the Central
Committee even intended to give the
people the right to recall, a principle of
the Paris Commune. The boldly aroused
masses that it hailed were, of course, the
student-intellectual Red Guards and the
workers. The workers very soon rose up
in early 1967 in Chinas main industrialheartland city, Shanghai, in what came
to be known as the January Storm,
which overthrew the Shanghai municipal
government, and, on 5 February at a
million-strong rally, proclaimed the formation of the Shanghai Commune. Here
was the first time that a post-revolutionary
society was seriously confronting bureaucratism and elitism, or, at least, initiating
radical trial runs in direct democracy to
find a viable solution to these problems.2
Sadly though, this time Mao did
not applaud. Indeed, he summoned the
main leaders of the Shanghai Commune,
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, to
Beijing, called them anarchists, and
ordered them to disband the commune.
Tragically, all the other Paris-type communes in the making also met with premature extinction. Maos alternative to the
commune was the tripartite revolutionary committee, composed of unelected
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) personnel, CCP cadres, and representatives of
the revolutionary masses. Those who
17
COMMENTARY
held on steadfastly to the Paris Commune-like original ways of the Cultural

Revolution were now deprecated and
dismissed as the ultra-left, to be dealt
with harshly by PLA personnel in alliance with rival Red Guard groups.
Clearly, the fresh shoots of radical
democracy were nipped in the bud, and as
for those communards who persisted,
worse was in store. The so-called ultralefts time was up. Unprincipled factional
strife, excessive violence, personal tragedies, a lot of ugly features, and the cult
of Maos thoughtthis last being
ridiculous and harmful to scientific temperhad muddied the waters. Of course,
the context was that of a protracted
political struggle between the capitalist
roaders, headed by Liu Shaoqi and
Deng Xiaoping, and the proletarian
roaders headed by Mao. But, even as
Mao seemed to be in the lead politically,
the LiuDeng faction dominated organisationally, and tactically it even paid
lip service to Maos thought and ideals.
Very soon, the struggle was no longer
about what it was meant to be: the student-intellectual Red Guards and workers (both guided by Maoist intellectuals)
taking on the elites of the party, the
state, and the PLA. The Maoist principles
of handling contradictions among the
people and those of the mass line (the
leadership norm, from the masses, to
the masses) went for a toss.
Had the voyage through the rough
and stormy seas of the Cultural Revolution brought the vessel of the party
state perilously close to shipwreck? Mao
retreated. At the Party Congress in April
1969, he justified the pulling back from
the Paris Commune-inspired agenda he
had himself applauded and decided upon
in the 8 August 1966 Central Committee
meeting. The Cultural Revolution, in its
original form, was over, but Mao promised
that the future would bring more cultural
revolutions. He probably did not think a
Peoples Commune of China with a commune state was, theoretically and practically, a coherent proposition. So, the
powerful and privileged stratum that had
emerged in the party, the government,
the PLA, the enterprises, the communes,
and the educational system, which had
developed a stake in maintaining its
18
favoured position and passing it on to

its progeny, won the day. But, some of
the measures taken to reduce the differences arising from the division of labour
between city and countryside, manual
and intellectual labour, and management
and employees were persisted with,
until, of course, the capitalist roaders
decisively took over and stymied them.
Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolutions
central idea that political, managerial,
and bureaucratic power-holders entrench
themselves as a ruling elite and, over a
period of time, assume the position of a
ruling class, and that the people have to be
constantly mobilised to struggle against
this tendency should never be forgotten.
Even otherwise, and more generally, given
the existence of class, patriarchy, racism
and caste over millennia, power and compulsion are deeply rooted in social reality.
Indeed, they have almost become a part
of the basic inherited (but not unchangeable) human condition, which leads
one to make a very strong case for civil
liberties and democratic rights (gained
through historic struggles waged by the
underdogs) that should not be allowed
to be abrogated, come what may.
At this point, I need to mention that
part of the problem faced by the Chinese
Maoists was because the earlier New
Democratic Revolution had failed to
dismantle the central bureaucratic state.
This state had been inherited from
Chinese history and had thrived under
Chiang Kaishek, whose hierarchical apparatusadministered from the top
down and predicated on separation from
the peoplewas dismantled but reconstructed in another bureaucratic form
after 1949. Like in any other central bureaucratic state, conformity and loyalty
brought promotions, personal well-being, power, prestige and privileges. Even
the Cultural Revolution with its attacks
on Confucian culture had failed to usher in a modern state, let alone one that
could have been a democratic role model as far as the Chinese people were concerned. The agrarian revolution dismantled merely the local institutions of
semi-feudalism without breaking up the
central bureaucratic state, leaving the
seizure of power by the forces of New
Democracy incomplete.
All Power to the Soviets?

What about the 1917 revolutions? In the
first, the February Revolution, the popular masses overthrew the monarchy and
its totalitarian regime, and allowed liberals representing the capitalists and the
nobility to form a Provisional Government. The second, the October Revolution, came on the anvil when the workers and soldiers (the latter, mainly peasants) were convinced that their February demands of a democratic republic,
radical agrarian reform, renunciation of
Russias imperialist war aims, taking the
country out of World War I, and an eighthour workday will not see the light of
day with the propertied classes in power.
In the face of growing counter-revolutionary manoeuvring by those classes,
the workers and peasant-soldiers demanded a transfer of power to a government of the Soviets (councils) of workers
and soldiers deputies who were elected
in the course of the February Revolution.
It was the Bolsheviks who, from Aprilend onwards, repeatedly called for and
worked towards the replacement of the
Provisional Government with Soviet
power, which turned them into a major
force that was able to lead the masses to
victory in October (November by the
Western Julian calendar).
The Transition Period (the period
between the political overthrow of capitalism and the consolidation of socialism)
that followed was a very difficult one;
bloody civil war over four years, imperialist blockades and interventions, massive United States, British, and French
military aid to the White armies up
to late 1919, lack of food, complete
disarray, the workers scattered and decimated. In the face of such circumstances, the Bolsheviks adopted emergency measurespolitical repression,
complete suppression of civil liberties
and democratic rights, centralisation
and monopoly of power, reliance on the
conservative bureaucracy and specialists of the old regime, Taylorism and
one-man management of the enterprisesthat turned the commune state
with the Soviets of 1917 into an authoritarian partystate (dictatorship of the
party and the state over the whole
people) in late 1918.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
Rosa Luxemburg in Germany, though

enthusiastically supportive of October,
was among the first of the revolutionary
socialists to write that the Russian Revolutionin its suppression of what should
have been a democratic role model as far
as the masses were concernedwould not
lead to socialism. But, she still hoped that
October would help ignite social revolutions in the developed capitalist nations,
especially in Germany, though tragically,
these revolutions were nipped in the bud,
leaving the Russian Revolution desperately
isolated in an impoverished, war-ridden
country. Lenin, in his last writingshe
died in 1924, seven years after October
expressed the need to create the basis for
popular self-governance, for which, he
felt, there must be a genuine revolution,
where culture flowers among the people.
A cultural revolution, so that ultimately
an educated, cultured, and enlightened
working class might democratically take
control of the intended workers state?
But, this was not to be. The year 1921
had already witnessed the suppression
of the Kronstadt rebellion and the banning of factions in the Bolshevik party;
1927, the defeat of the left opposition;
192930, the forced collectivisation that
broke the workerpeasant alliance; and
the 1930s saw political trials and purges,
especially the Great Purge of 193738
all of which paved the way for the defeat
of the socialist project.
At this point, I think I need to add
something. Bourgeois revolutions are,
comparatively speaking, less difficult
compared to socialist revolutions. The
former simply put in place a capitalist
superstructureinstitutions of the
capitalist state, law, education, culture
and ideologyto match an already existing capitalist economic base. Moreover,
the original (primitive) accumulation
of capital has already taken place. The
socialist revolution, in sharp contrast,
not only does it have to dismantle the
capitalist superstructure and put in place a
socialist superstructure, but it has no
prior developing socialist economic base
already in place, and therefore has to
create this too, de novo. All this makes
the transition period in the aftermath of
the seizure of power more complex and
difficult to successfully carry through.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
Moreover, in Russia, the February

Revolution was not followed by the institutionalisation of a capitalist superstructure, for it was rapidly surpassed by
October. The subsequent immediate superstructure of the transition period was,
thus, not a capitalistsocialist hybrid, with
the former being rapidly superseded. In
fact, when the transition project following October suffered severe setbacks,
what was left was much of the previous
tsarist superstructure. The envisaged
democratic role model as far as the
masses were concerned was a far cry.
Much of what happened was perhaps
against the will and intentions of most of
the original Bolsheviks, including Lenin.
Revolutionary Practice
About 1818, in desperate brevity, regarding Marxs revolutionary ideas, we need
to articulate the essence of the last and
the third of the Theses on Feuerbach,
penned by the young Marx in 1845.3 The
purpose of struggling to gain a thorough
understanding of the world, which is
what Marx spent his whole working life
doing, and which was a deep struggle,
this through learning truth from practice,
was to lay the basis for revolutionary
change. Learning truth from practice, of
course, means, as Paul M Sweezy once
wrote, learning truth from history, from
economics and politics, from culture in
the broadest sensein a word, from the
real world of social relations and class
struggle, as distinct from the imaginary
worlds of revelation and pure thought.
The creation of a decent human society
might ultimately come about, after many
defeats and setbacks, but only in a process of struggle by people, ordinary people, who may not as yet be ready to emancipate themselves, but who can become
capable of emancipating themselves by
repeatedly launching and sustaining
revolutionary struggles. Marx expected
that the transitional period between
capitalism and socialism would witness
a negation of capitalism, which would
develop its own positive identity through
a revolutionary struggle in which ordinary people would remake society and
in the process remake themselves.
It must, however, be remembered that
the workers, more generally, the masses
vol lI no 33
(the majority), the ones who Marx and

Engels expected would emancipate themselves in the course of remaking society,
are societys foremost productive force,
but the advance of their capabilities is
hindered by the relations of production
(exploitative relations at work, and ownership relations that bestow capitalist control over the forces of production and the
product) and corresponding educational,
health, and cultural deprivations they
are made to suffer. In the circumstances,
the guiding and leading role of middleclass revolutionaries in the vanguard
party is indispensable until an enlightened working class emerges, of course,
with the proviso that the middle-class
educators must themselves be educated
by learning truth from practice.
Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom
The anniversaries of 1966, 1917, and 1818
call for hard questioning. For instance,
why did Lenin and his close Bolshevik
comrades, when the harsh conditions of
civil war and imperialist intervention
had abated, not bring back the Soviets to
fulfil the role Lenin had assigned to the
commune in his State and Revolution?
Why did Mao desert the communards
in the course of the Cultural Revolution,
after, at first, applauding them? Was the
view of Marx and Engels of the Paris
Commune really an embryonic form of a
coherent workers state? Perhaps it is
time we discard the halo around these
three prophetic intellectuals once and
for all. Marx, Lenin and Mao would never
have claimed that they had said the last
word on anything. Did Marx not write,
in part, unadulterated twaddle about the
Chinese Taipings (in Die Presse, Vienna,
7 July 1862) influenced as he seemed to be
by official British propaganda?
But, on a more serious note, though he
was lightheartedly responding to his
daughters Laura and Jenny Marxs questions, Marx once confessed that it was
his favourite motto to doubt everything. Clearly, in approaching all the
serious questions that the anniversaries
throw up, we should ask how Marx himself would have reacted if he were alive,
for here was a brilliant intellectual, passionate about making a contribution to a
worldwide struggle to liberate humanity
19
COMMENTARY
from the miseries of capitalist exploitation,

domination, and oppression. In the spirit
of mutual learning, the best approach to
the three commemorations would be to
let a hundred flowers bloom and a
hundred schools of thought contend. I,
however, do not want to hide the unacceptable under the carpet. Given the vast
divide between Leninist political theory
and the reformist political practice of the
Indian communist parties wedded to parliamentarianism, the necessity of smashing the rotten bourgeois state is being paid
no heed to. Lenin in theory, Kautsky in
20
practice! Bombard the headquarters

might indeed be the need of the hour.
Notes
1
This piece first took shape in the form of what

would have been an unsigned editorial to mark
the 50 years of the Cultural Revolution in China,
but I had to rewrite it as a Commentary. I have
retained part of the editorial form and eschewed
References, but need to add that I draw from
essays in What Is Maoism and Other Essays (edited
and with an Introduction by me; Cornerstone
Publications, Kharagpur, 2010), by Paul M Sweezy,
Ralph Miliband, William Hinton, and my own
essay. The other pieces that I draw from are my
Did Lenin and Mao Forsake Marx? (EPW,
29 May 2010), and Hugh Deanes Mao: A Lamentation (Science & Society, Spring 1995).
AUGUST 13, 2016
Of course, the leaders of the Shanghai Commune were neither democratically elected, nor
were mechanisms put in place for the people to
control them, nor did the people have the
right to recall them; all three being basic
democratic principles of the Paris Commune.
The last, the 11th thesis, the famous one, reads:
The philosophers have only interpreted the
world; the point however is to change it. And,
the third, not that famous but equally important, thesis, in part, reads: The materialist
doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed
men are products of other circumstances and
changed upbringing, forgets that circumstances
are changed precisely by men and that the educator must himself be educated. ... The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of
human activity can only be conceived and rationally understood as revolutionary practice.
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
Karnatakas Changing
Fiscal Landscape
Finances after FFC
Pranay Kotasthane, Varun K Ramachandra
Analysing the second Karnataka

budget since the Fourteenth
Finance Commission award, it
is noted that, as assured, more
fiscal space is made available
to the state government. With
greater untied funds, the state
has budgeted for higher capital
expenditure in some key areas
urban development, police, and
tribal welfareeven as it failed
to build capacity for power
generation, and has introduced
too many schemes with too little
funds allocated to each.
The authors are grateful to M Govinda Rao for

his advice and comments.
Pranay Kotasthane (pranay@takshshila.org.in)
and Varun K Ramachandra (varun@takshshila.
org.in) are with the Takshashila Institution,
Bengaluru.
20
he Report of the Fourteenth Finance

Commission (FFC) recommended
an increase in tax devolution from
the centre to the states from 32% to 42% of
the divisible pool of taxes. This has brought
a sea change in the fiscal relationship
between the union and the states.
The commission had argued for the
increase on the grounds that the union
government was steadily intruding into
state and concurrent subjects, and that it
would be better for state governments
to take expenditure decisions on the
subjects entrusted to them in the Constitution. Although the commission did
not argue for an overall increase in
transfers and did also leave fiscal space
for centrally-sponsored schemes (CSS)
to continue, its recommendations to increase the tax devolution by 10 percentage points were intended to enhance the
fiscal autonomy of states. It also recommended the rationalisation of CSS by
confining them to those schemes which
are meritorious with nationwide externalities to be designed and implemented,
with representations from the union,
state and domain experts.
By and large, the sharp increase in tax
devolution has been welcomed. The
allocation decisions in the aftermath of

the implementation of the commissions
recommendations have been a matter
of debate over three broad issues: the
lack of fiscal space left to the union after
the sharp increase in devolution (NITI
Aayog 2015);1 the apprehension that
social sector spending will be sharply reduced when expenditures on CSS get
compressed; and that states might spend
the additional resources available to them
on populist schemes (Bhattacharjee
2016; FICCI 2015).
There have been a number of analyses
of the changes in the allocations made
by the states based on union and state
budgets for 201516 (Chakraborty and
Gupta 2016; Kotasthane and Ramachandra 2015; RBI 2015). Although the union
government had a little over two months
after the Finance Commissions report
was submitted, reallocation of expenditures, including restructuring CSS, was
always going to be difficult in the short
period. As it happened, the union government appointed a separate committee
of chief ministers via the NITI Aayog to
restructure central schemes under the
chairmanship of the chief minister of
Madhya Pradesh, which submitted its
report only in October 2015.
States had even less time to react to
the recommendations of the FFC. Some
presented their budgets before the union
budget while the remaining states had
very little time to understand and react
to the sharp increase in tax devolution
and the substantial compression of
transfers under the CSS. Thus, during
the course of the year, many states had
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
to come up with ad hoc allocations

in terms of supplementary demand for
grants. Due to these factors, the inferences
drawn on the allocations to various
sectors based on the budget estimates
are at best, tentative, and at worst, misleading. Now that both union and state
governments have had a year to make
a considered response to the new developments, the analysis of the revised
estimates (RE) of 201516 and budget
estimates (BE) of 201617 will present a
clearer picture.
An attempt is made to analyse the
impact of the changed fiscal landscape
arising from the FFCs recommendations
on the budget allocation in Karnataka. This
entails an analysis of the states response to
the increase in untied transfers on account
of higher tax devolution and the compression of specific-purpose grants on account
of the restructuring of CSS. In that sense,
this article takes forward the analysis
we undertook in our earlier article
(Kotasthane and Ramachandra 2015).
Given that the states have now settled in to
the new fiscal landscape, the analysis will
provide more definitive answers on the
priorities of states in spending decisions.
The aims are threefold:
(i) Investigate the changes in tied, untied
and overall transfers from the union
government to Karnataka since the FFC
recommendations came into effect.
(ii) Assess the response of the Karnataka
government to these changes.
(iii) Understand the priorities of the
Karnataka government in the light of
increased fiscal autonomy.
As noted, Karnataka is an average-level
per capita income state and is one of the
states that had gained considerably from
the FFCs tax devolution. Although every
state responds to the changes depending
on its own allocation priorities, insights

gained from this article can be instructive
and could lay the template to analyse
other state budgets.
Union Transfers
The comparison between 201415 (RE)
and 201516 (BE) shows a snapshot of
the 201516 Karnataka budget. As a
result of the inclusion of forest cover as a
criterion (with a weightage of 7.5%) in
the horizontal sharing of taxes between
states, Karnatakas revenue receipts from
tax devolution increased in 201516 (BE).
At the same time, the union government
responded to its reduced fiscal space by
reducing grants for central schemes. The
net effect of these two opposing forces
was that Karnatakas receipts from the
union reduced by 3.3% in 201516 according to budget estimates (Table 1).
However, on inclusion of supplementary grants received through 201516,
we see that the union government released
significant additional grants to Karnataka.
This led to an overall increase of 25.6%
in 201516 (RE) over the actual transfers
of the previous year. This is important
because the corresponding amount received by all states combined over the
same period declined by 6.7% (from
`3,48,027 crore to `3,24,420 crore).
The 201617 (BE) revenue receipts do
not show any significant departures
from the 201516 (RE) estimates, with
an overall increase of 10.7% in union
transfers and a total revenue receipt
increase of 11%.
The overall impact of the FFC recommendations on revenue receipts will
be apparent when we compare 201415
accounts or actuals (the year the
Thirteenth Finance Commission award
ended) to 201617 (BE). Here, we see
that Karnatakas untied funds increased

by 84.1% over the two budgets, and the
overall union transfers increased by
as much as 38.9%. Clearly, states like
Karnataka have gained significantly as a
result of the FFC recommendations.
Restructuring of Grants
The union government reacted to the
substantial increase in tax devolution by
reducing and restructuring CSS in the
201516 budget. The union government
decreased its own support for some CSS
and in a few cases, the government discontinued them, thus bringing down the
total number of CSS from 147 to 66.
The states response to the question of
CSS restructuring was twofold. States
lamented about the proliferation of CSS to
the FFC. Too many CSS, in the states view,
impinged upon their fiscal autonomy
owing to a lack of say in the design of these
schemes and the manifold restrictions
during implementation (Finance Commission 2015: 88). At the same time,
states demonstrated an endowment-effect,
whereby they continued to see CSS an
important source of money that they were
not willing to give up (Kotasthane 2016)
In an attempt to resolve this paradox
on CSS, a subgroup of chief ministers on
the rationalisation of CSSs was constituted as part of NITI Aayog in March
2015. Recommendations made by the
sub-group were accepted in the 201617
budget, which led to two important
changes.
First, the number of CSS was reduced
from 66 to 28. This did not mean that
the 38 schemes were eliminated. Rather,
the reduction was a result of clubbing
multiple schemes into one umbrella
scheme for each sector. Second, a new
funding pattern was formulated for the
Table 1: Composition of Karnataka State Revenue
(`crore)
Type
201415 RE
201415 Actual
201516 BE
201516 RE
201617 BE
Percentage Change
201415 RE vs
201516 BE
States own tax revenue

States own non-tax revenue
Total state revenue (1+2)
Revenue from tax devolution
Non-plan grants
Plan grants
Total union transfers (4+5+6)
Total revenue (7+3)
68,554
4,465
73,019
15,397
3,953
16,525
35,875
1,08,894
70,180
4,688
74,868
14,654
3,635
10,985
29,273
1,04,141
76,445
5,206
81,651
24,790
2,072
7,847
34,709
1,16,360
75,568
5,411
80,979
23,983
3,481
9,287
36,751
1,17,730
83,864
6,220
90,084
26,978
2,796
10,898
40,672
1,30,756
11.5
16.6
11.8
61.0
-47.6
-52.5
-3.3
6.9
Percentage Change
201415 Actual vs
201516 RE
7.7
15.4
8.2
63.7
-4.2
-15.5
25.5
13.1
Percentage Change Percentage Change

201516 RE vs
from 201415
201617 BE
Actual to 201617 BE
10.9
14.9
11.2
12.5
-19.7
17.4
10.7
11.1
19.5
32.7
20.3
84.1
-23.1
-0.8
38.9
25.6
BE refers to budget estimates, RE refers to revised estimates and actuals refer to budget account numbers.
Source: Karnataka State Budget 201617.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
21
COMMENTARY
restructured CSS. The 201617 budget

divides the CSS into three new categories:
(i) Core of the Core Schemessix
umbrella schemes for social protection
such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
which will have the first charge on available funds. No change was implemented
in the funding pattern for such schemes.
(ii) Core Schemes (19 in number), the
allocations for which will be shared
between the union and the states in 60:40
ratio, while in the ratio of 90:10 for the
eight North East and three Himalayan
states. The schemes in this category provide the essential interventions under
the National Development Agenda necessary for realising VISION 2022 (NITI
Aayog 2015: 24).
(iii) Optional Schemes, three schemes
which states can implement if they
choose to. For such schemes, the sharing
pattern would be 80:20 for North Eastern
and Himalayan states and 50:50 for other
states (Chakraborty and Gupta 2016).
This restructuring of CSS translated in
the form of changes to the plan grants
received by Karnataka. The 201617 Union
Budget (in Expenditure Budget Vol I,
p 69) explicitly mentions that on account
of a major consolidation of CSS, it is not
immediately possible to draw a one-toone correspondence between the newly
rationalised scheme(s) with the earlier

ones. However, an estimation of the
trends is important to identify the priorities of union and state governments. We
have tried to map the rationalised
schemes to the equivalent schemes in the
previous budget. Our job was made easier
by the fact that the rationalisation process
has incorporated earlier schemes into subprogrammes under umbrella schemes in
each major sector. Table 2 gives an indication of how the various schemes and
grants at the Karnataka level line up
against each other. To simplify the analysis, we have analysed only the major
schemes that collectively constitute 96.3%
of allocations under the Core of the Core
category and 82.3% in the Core category.
In the Core of the Core category, allotments for the two largest schemes,
MGNREGA and National Social Assistance
Programme (NSAP) have increased marginally at the union level. However,
these increases have not had any effect
on Karnatakas receipts for these schemes.
Although the umbrella Scheduled Castes
(SCs) programme shows a 46% increase
at the union level on account of substantial
increases in scholarships, there is a drop
of 32.8% in the states receipts for this
scheme. Similarly, allocations for the
umbrella Scheduled Tribes (STs) programme have also dropped. It should be
noted that this comparison is not exhaustive owing to the difficulty in mapping
schemes meant for the welfare of SCs/
STs within the Karnataka budget.
In the Core category of schemes,
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
(PMGSY) allocations have increased tremendously, providing an opportunity to
the state to accelerate its rural connectivity efforts. Programmes at the elementary levelsSarva Shiksha Abhiyan and
Mid-day Mealshave also received greater grants at Karnatakas level. The union
governments focus on housing for all
has resulted in greater receipts for this
programme for Karnataka as well. Receipts
under the umbrella Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) have, however,
decreased by nearly 21% in Karnataka.
Overall, we calculate an increase of 56.3%
in the receipts for the Core Schemes.
Given these changes in the receipts, it
would now be prudent to look at the
trends in expenditures over the last two
years since the FFC recommendations
came into effect.
Restructuring Expenditure
The Karnataka governments expenditures
between 201516 (BE) and 201516 (RE)
have seen a marginal increase of 1.4%.
Whereas there has been a significant jump
of 26.6% between 201415 (actuals) and
Table 2: Allocations for Restructured CSS at Union and Karnataka Levels

Scheme Category
Core of the
Core Schemes
Core Schemes
Index
Scheme Name
201415
Actual
MGNREGA
32,456
NSAP
7,084
Umbrella SC programme
2,677
Umbrella ST programme
1,593.7
Sub-total
43,810.9
Green revolution (Krishonnati +
Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana)
18,266
National Health Mission (NHM)
(Rural +Urban +AYUSH)
18,411
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)
9,960
Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana
(PMAY) (Rural + Urban)
11,096
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA)
24,039.1
Umbrella Integrate Child Development Services 17,984.6
Swachh Bharat
12,799.9
Mid-day Meals
10,446.6
Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban
Transformation (AMRUT)
0
Sub-total
1,23,003.1
Union Government allocations (`crore)

Karnataka Receipts (`crore)
201516 RE 201617 BE Share in Percentage 201415 Actual 201516 RE 201617 BE Percentage
category change from
change from
total
201516 to
201516 to
201617
201617
35,754
9,074
2,968
1,957
49,753
38,500
9,500
4,349
1,759
54,108
68.5
16.9
7.7
3.1
96.3
7.7
4.7
46.5
-10.1
8.8
1,716.9
133.4
85.1
6.3
1,941.7
1,359
532.1
210.9
119.4
2,221.4
1,359
532.1
141.7
72.9
2,105.7
0.0
0.0
-32.8
-38.9
-5.2
12,784.3
12,979
7.7
1.5
747.8
589.2
663.4
12.6
19,013
15,188
20,037
19,000
11.9
11.2
5.4
25.1
350.7
494.4
881.1
128
826.2
808
-6.2
531.3
11,231
21,899
16,711.4
9,227
9,185.6
20,075
22,500
16,273
11,300
9,700
11.9
13.3
9.6
6.7
5.7
78.8
2.7
-2.6
22.5
5.6
370.3
668.6
595.1
561
596.8
429.1
256.3
1,137.9
198
347
653.1
1083.7
887.8
337
564.3
52.2
322.9
-21.9
70.2
62.6
3,463.7 7,295.5
11,8703 1,39,159.5
4.3
82.3
110.6
28.1
0
4,384.6
31.3
3,998.1
425.3
6,248.9
1,257.1
56.3
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
BE refers to budget estimates, RE refers to revised estimates and actuals refer to budget account numbers.
Source: Union Government Budget 201617, Karnataka State Budget 201617.
22
EPW
COMMENTARY
201617 (BE). There is a healthy increase in

all the three categories of services, namely,
general services (25.1%), social services
(32.9%), and economic services (24.9%).
However, the social sector has been
the biggest benefactor (jump of 32.85%)
followed by general services (that includes administrative services), and economics services. A cursory look at the BE
versus RE numbers reveals that there are
marginal changes to the estimates, with
general services 201516 (RE) being lower than the budget estimates. That said,
it is essential to delve into the revenue
versus capital expenditure split of these
numbers to arrive at how Karnataka has
utilised the restructured fiscal space.
Assessing Quality: A second-level analysis
of the expenditure numbers provides us
with the granular details of the Karnataka
governments priorities. In general, an increase in capital expenditure can be considered an indicator of a states capacity
building (and therefore growth) priorities.
Last year, we had noted a marginal
decrease in spending on the police within the general services. Although there is a
decrease in allocations between 201516
(BE) and 201516 RE, there is a massive
jump of about 81% in capital outlay, between 201415 (actuals) and 201516 (RE),
largely due to increased allocations for
public works and the police, indicating
capacity building in this critical area. The
chief minister in his speech has announced
construction of new police stations and
large public works within the state.
The expenditure on social services
makes an interesting read. In the education sector there are marginal changes
between 201516 BE and 201516 (RE),
but there is a massive jump in capital
outlay for university education and
secondary education between 201415
(actuals) and 201617 (BE). In fact, the
budget speech announced the establishment of a new government engineering
college in Bidar and a new research
centre in Dharwad to name a few. The
increase in capital outlay in elementary
education is largely because of a lower
base in the previous year and is not necessarily an indication of an increased priority.
In the area of water supply and sanitation there is an overall increase of
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
expenditures in BE when compared to

the 201415 (actuals), but there is a cut
of almost 60% in capital outlay. Social
security and welfare for SCs/STs and
other tribes continues to be the focus of
the present government with increases
in both revenue and capital expenditure.
In fact, capital outlay has increased
significantly on welfare for SCs/STs and
other tribes (84%).
Another noteworthy jump in capital
expenditure is seen in the outlay for
urban developmentan increase from
`226 crore (201415 actuals) to `1,887
crore (201617 BE) that translates to a
733% jumpwhich is in line with the
special focus that the chief minister
announced for urban development.
In the previous year, the focus for the
government in economic services was
clearly on agriculture, irrigation, and flood
control. That said, a look at the 201516
(RE) shows a cut in the capital expenditures in these areas. However, a comparison between budget account numbers and
201617 (BE) show an increase. Commitments to rural spending show an increase
at an overall level. The capital outlay in
this sector has seen a large jump due to
the lower base in the previous year.
The power sector allocation makes for
a confusing read. On one hand, the capital
outlay for 201516 (RE) has seen a large
jump (last year the allocation was merely `22 lakh) but on the other, the 201617
(BE) shows another drastic decline when
compared to the RE. However, these
comparisons can be misleading because
expenditures on the power sector are
paid for from an infrastructure fund.
Restructured CSS: A look at the expenditures for the Core, and Core of the
Core categories of schemes will highlight those CSS which are perceived as
irreplaceable by the Karnataka government. Since Core of the Core Schemes
retain the existing pattern of funding,
Karnatakas own expenditures on these
will remain budget neutral.
However, the bigger impact is in the
case of Core schemes where Karnatakas
contribution will need to increase to
meet states revised commitment for such
schemes, which is now expected to be
40%. As estimated in Table 2, a receipt
vol lI no 33
of `6,248.87 crore from the union for the

most important schemes in this category
directly translates to Karnatakas own
commitments of `4,165 crore (according
to 60:40 funding pattern). Chakraborty
and Gupta (2016) note that this increase
in the states share would result in a
reduction in untied fiscal space, partly
undoing the benefits accrued from the
higher tax devolution.
Assessing Priorities
Based on the analysis, we can broadly
infer Karnatakas priorities for fiscal years
201516 and 201617. In general, the
Karnataka government has increased
capital outlay in most sectors. The only
exception to this has been in social sectors
such as health and water supply and
sanitation. Although a lower base in the
previous year is the reason for some of
the increase, it is fair to conclude that there
is a commitment towards building capacity
in the state. However, one must wait for
actual numbers for both 201516 and
201617 to see if the commitment has actually translated into tangible capacity.
One of the important themes of this
budget has been a focus on development.
For a middle-income state, it is unfortunate
that Karnataka has just one urban agglomeration in Bengaluru (Urban Agglomeration/Cities having Population 1 lakh
and more nd) with a population of close
to a million. The allocation within the
urban development sector reflects this
reality, where `1,338 crore has been allocated towards the development of the
state capital, which constitutes 70% of
the total capital outlay towards urban
development. While this will certainly
help in alleviating the infrastructure
woes of Bengaluru city, the problem of it
being a primate city2 within Karnataka
will continue to persist.
Welfare of SCs/STs and other tribes
appears to be another focus area for the
present government. The construction of
100 new post-matriculation hostels and
125 residential schools, or a comprehensive development plan for nomadic/
semi-nomadic communities are all proposals that have been mooted. In total,
`276.96 crore is committed towards the
construction of hostels and schools. Additionally, the government also plans to
23
COMMENTARY
take action on direct recruitment for

backlog vacancies in the reserved category in the present year.
While several new announcements
were made regarding agriculture (such
as the creation of special agricultural
zones along the lines of special economic
zones), the capital outlay towards agriculture has not witnessed a significant
jump. While the 201516 (RE) decreased,
there is a jump of 19% in 201516 (BE)
when compared to budget accounts (actuals) of 201415. The previous fiscal
years budget estimates indicated an emphasis on irrigation and flood control,
but the capital outlay 201516 (RE) has
seen a reduction of about 19%. The 2016
17 (BE) versus 201415 (actuals) has seen
a tepid increase of about 26%. The chief
minister in his speech has said,
I am glad to inform that with the provision for
the current year, the allocation made by our
Government from 201314 to this sector is
`46,931 crores. Thus, we have almost honoured our 5-year commitment one year in
advance. The requirement of resources arising
for this sector [are] higher than expected.
Keeping this in view, efforts will be made to
mobilize higher resources in the ensuing years.
While the statement might be true in

letter, the increase in total expenditure
on irrigation and flood control appears
to be intended largely to meet shortterm expenses and not long-term capacity building.
There is a marked increase in expenditure towards universities and higher
education in both revenue and capital
outlay. There is, however, a decline in
allocation towards secondary education.
Elementary education does not seem to
be a focus area for the government,
reflected by the meagre `10 crore allocated for new capacity building.
As mentioned earlier, the expenditures for the power sector are met from
the infrastructure fund. When the amounts
met from this fund are added to the capital expenditures, the estimates are as follows: `752 crore for 201415 (actuals),
`827 crore for 201516 BE and RE, which
has finally increased to `861.38 crore in
201617 (BE). This translates to an increase of 14% and is perhaps an indicator of the lower priority for this sector in
the state over the last two years. This is
disappointing for a state which faces
24
huge power cuts on a regular basis. In a

symbolic reminder of the grave power
situation, two power cuts interrupted
the chief ministers budget speech in the
state assembly forcing him to read his
budget speech under a phone torchlight.
Finally, a cursory reading of the budget speech gives us details about the
plethora of new schemes under almost
all the expenditure heads. There are
very few schemes which have garnered
a significant share of allocations, perhaps indicating that resources have been
spread thinly across a gamut of government services.
the divisible pool of resources available

for transfer to the states (Chakraborty and
Gupta 2016).
notes
1
Conclusions
By seeking to provide greater fiscal
autonomy to the states the FFC award
has marked a new phase in unionstate
relations in India. While there were
worries in the aftermath of the award
about cuts by the union in the social
sector, Karnataka has allayed these fears
by increasing its spending in the social
sector. Similarly, there were fears that
increased autonomy would lead to
increases in indiscriminate spending by
states because they were fiscally
irresponsible (Mundle 2016). However,
Karnatakas experience thus far has
largely been positive. The increase in
receipts has been prudently utilised in
the social and economic sectors. The
state has also focused on increasing
capacity (overall capital outlay is up by
31%) since the FFC recommendations
came into effect. That said, there is
much more that the state can do by
cutting down on ill-targeted subsidies
and transfersespecially in sectors like
power, social welfare and agriculture
and focusing on critical growth areas
such as health.
While Karnataka benefited from FFC
recommendations, the union governments response has partly undone these
advantages.3 The restructuring of CSS
and increases in the contribution of
states for some of these schemes has
meant that Karnatakas destiny is still
tied to a number of CSS being run by the
union. This is compounded by the fact
that the union government has continued
the trend of raising money through cesses and surcharges, effectively reducing
The Finance Commissions observations with

respect to fiscal space is worth mentioning
here: the Union Government should continue
to have fiscal space to provide grants to States
for functions that are broadly in the nature of
overlapping functions and for area-specific
interventions (Report of the Fourteenth
Finance Commission: Towards Cooperative
Federalism, p 165).
A countrys leading city is always disproportionately large and exceptionally expressive of
national capacity and feeling. The primate city
is commonly at least twice as large as the next
largest city and more than twice as significant
(Jefferson 1939: 227).
It must be noted that the FFC recommended
autonomy to the states and not necessarily
increased transfers.
REFERENCES
Bhattacharjee, Govind (2016): Will Federalism At
Work Let Populism Thrive? Statesman, 3 March,
viewed on 30 April 2016, http://www.thestatesman.com/news/opinion/will-federalism-at-work-let-populism-thrive/50675.html.
Chakraborty, Pinaki and Manish Gupta (2016):
Evolving CentreState Financial Relations, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 51, No 16, pp 4346.
FICCI (2015): Highlights of 14th Finance Commission Report, February, Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, viewed
on 30 April 2016, http://ficci.in/SPdocument/20563/Highlights_14thFinance_Commission_
Report.pdf.
Finance Commission (2015): Report of the Fourteenth Finance Commission, http://finmin.nic.
in/14fincomm/14fcreng.pdf.
Jefferson, Mark (1939): The Law of the Primate
City, Geographical Review, Vol 29, No 2,
pp 226 32.
Kotasthane, Pranay (2016): The Shifting Political
Economy of Centrally Sponsored Schemes,
Wire, 6 March, viewed on 30 April 2016, http://
thewire.in/2016/03/06/the-shifting-political-economy-of-centrally-sponsored-schemes-24009/.
Kotasthane, Pranay and Varun K Ramachandra
(2015): Impact of Fourteenth Finance Commission, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 50,
Nos 4647, pp 1620.
Mundle, Sudipto (2016): Trust in States Fiscal Responsibility Vindicated, Livemint, 15 April,
viewed on 2 May 2016, http://www.livemint.
com/Opinion/pLACsDUcLIeGjaD0YuLFBO/Trust-in-states-fiscal-responsibility-vindicated.html.
NITI Aayog (2015): Executive Summary, Report of
the Sub-group of Chief Ministers on Rationalisation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes, October,
viewed on 30 April 2016, http://niti.gov.in/
mgov_file/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20
Sub-Group%20submitter%20to%20PM.pdf.
RBI (2015): Issues and Perspectives, in State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 201415, Reserve
Bank of India, viewed on 30 April 2016, https://
rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/0
4CP9ADD1DB443B1449DBE3B0F992C7181F7.
PDF.
Urban Agglomeration/Cities Having Population 1
lakh and More (nd): Table 3, Provisional Population Totals Paper 2 of 2011: India (Vol II), Census of India 2011, viewed on 1 May 2016, http://
censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/
data_files/India2/Table_3_PR_UA_Citiees_1Lakh_and_Above.pdf.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
Marriage Dissolution in India

Evidence from Census 2011
Suraj Jacob, Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
Although Indias divorce rate is

low in cross-national perspective,
the separation rate is three
times as large as the divorce
rate. There is striking variation
across states, with marriage
dissolution lower in the North
compared with the South and
North-east, consistent with
previous arguments regarding
relative female autonomy across
regions. Surprisingly, there is very
little difference between rural
and urban rates of dissolution of
marriage across states.
lthough marriage dissolution

greatly impacts families, there are
few estimates of the extent and
correlates of marriage dissolution in India
(Amato 1994; Pothen 1989).1 The Census
2011 data provides a good opportunity to
understand some macro-level aspects of
the phenomenon because, unlike previous censuses, it separately enumerated
individuals who were divorced from those
who were separated. It reports about
13.6 lakh individuals as being divorced,
equivalent to 0.24% of the married population and 0.11% of the total population.
To put this in international perspective, in
Greenstein and Daviss (2006) study of 71
countries for 199598, the divorce rate
ranges from a low of 0.04% of total population in Georgia to a high of 0.46% in
Belarus.2 And yet Gujarats divorce rate
is greater than that of Belarus, and
Bihars is close to Georgia, suggesting a
striking level of regional diversity in
India.3 Further, the separated population is almost treble the divorced population, and, to the extent that divorce is
more likely to be reported as separation
in India than elsewhere, this brings Indias
figures closer to the centre of the global

distribution.
This article explores marriage dissolution in India and state-level diversity using descriptive statistics from Census
2011 data and points to the need for a
deeper understanding of underlying correlates, particularly the importance of
womens autonomy in observed rates of
marriage dissolution.4
Separation and Divorce
Census 2011 reveals that the population
that is separated is almost treble the divorced population: 0.61% of the married
population and 0.29% of the total population is reported as separated, compared to
0.24% and 0.11% respectively for divorced
individuals. Figure 1 plots divorce and separation rates in large states.5 Several interesting points emerge. First, unsurprisingly
there is a positive correlation between
the two rates.6 Second, barring the curious case of Gujarat (GJ), all large states
have separation rates that are at least as
large as divorce rates.7 That separation rates
are typically higher than divorce rates is
not surprising, given the stigma associated with reporting divorce (Belliappa
2013) and given the length of time it typically takes for cases to be tried and resolved in Indian courts (Kumar 2012). Third,
Southern states along with the curious
case of Chhattisgarh (CG) together have
the largest separationdivorce gaps, and
Northern states have relatively low gaps.
Figure 1: Divorce and Separation Rates across Large States

1.5
Separated Individuals (%)
KL
CG
TN
AP
KA
OR
.5
JH RJ
UP
Suraj Jacob (suraj.jacob@gmail.com) and

Sreeparna Chattopadhyay (sreeparna.
chattopadhyay@apu.edu.in) teach at the
School of Development, Azim Premji
University, Bengaluru.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
MH
WB
MP
PB
UK
DL
HR
AS
GJ
JK
BR
0
0
.2
.4
.6
Divorced Individuals (%)
vol lI no 33
25
COMMENTARY
Interstate Variations
The rest of the article uses the aggregate
of divorce and separation as an indicator
of marriage dissolution. Figure 2 maps
this aggregate figure across states and
union territories. It reveals large spatial
variations in overall marriage dissolution
rates. The North-east region appears to
have relatively greater rates overall. The
rest of the country shows a striking North
South division, with the region to the south
of the Vindhyas having distinctly greater
divorce and separation rates than the region to the north. This corresponds with
other NorthSouth distinctions made in
the demography literature, most notably
that of Dyson and Moore (1983) who argue that the Southern region has relatively greater female autonomy. Among
Northern states with relatively low rates
of marriage dissolution, Bihar (BR), UP,
and Haryana (HR) stand out. Among
Southern states with relatively higher
rates, Kerala (KL) and Tamil Nadu (TN)
stand out, along with the curious case of
Chhattisgarh.
Figure 2: Map of Divorce and Separation Rates (Aggregated), by States
(2.5,7)
(1.5,2.5)
(1,1.5)
(.5,1)
Focus on the North-east
26
(0,.5)
Figure 3: Divorce Rates, Separation Rates, and Gender Differences in the North-east States
women (%)
Separated Individuals (%)
The states of Indias North-east (Meghalaya (ML), Mizoram (MZ), Sikkim (SK),
Tripura, Nagaland (NL), Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam) deserve a special focus for at least two reasons. First,
tribal customary laws allow for unions
which are informal and where cohabiting
couples are deemed married (Nongbri
2003; Xaxa 2004). Second, conventional
wisdom attributes relatively higher status of women in this region, partly due
to the practice of matrilineal kinship systems and matrilocal residence among
some tribes. However, traditional sociological markers of autonomy such as the
participation of women in the labour market, economic decision-making, freedom
of movement and access of and control
over economic assets (Bloom, Wypij and
Gupta 2001; Dyson and Moore 1983; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001) may not be the
best indicators to assess womens agency
in the North-east, given the limitations
imposed by geography, livelihood patterns, out-migration, and insufficient
political participation (Nongbri 2001).
The mapping exercise of Figure 2 had
suggested that marriage dissolution rates
Divorced Individuals (%)
Men (%)
in North-east states were relatively higher

than elsewhere in India. In fact, Mizoram
(MZ) has the highest divorce rate (4.08%),
over four times the state with the second
highest rate (Nagaland, NL 0.88%) and

over five times the highest non-North-east
state (Gujarat, 0.63%). And Meghalaya
has the highest separation rate (3.42%),
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
compared especially to
the North calls for deeper
scrutiny to explore the
underlying factors. The
regional variation in marriage dissolution reported
here overlaps with regional
variation in female autonomy made previously in
the literature (Dyson and
Moore 1983 and others),
and it will be useful to explore this connection. It
will also be important to
understand why urban
rural differences in marriage dissolution
are not particularly stark, and the implications for relative cultural change.
rural (%)
Figure 4: Marriage Dissolution across Large States, by RuralUrban

Status
urban (%)
more than double the highest nonNorth-east state (Kerala, 1.28%).

However, there are considerable variations even within the North-east region, as
evidenced by Figure 3 (p 26). Meghalaya
and Nagaland have similar divorce rates
(0.88%), and yet Meghalaya has almost
three times Nagalands separation rate
(left graph). Sikkim (SK) and Meghalaya
have similar mens aggregate rates (combining divorce and separation), and yet
Meghalaya has well over double Sikkims
womens rate (right graph). This particular
pattern suggests the influence of the matrilineal structure of Meghalayas numerically
preponderant communities. This is consistent with the work of Leonetti and Nath
(2009) which suggests that marriage
breakdowns are significantly higher in
matrilineal communities in the North-east.
notes
1
Absence of Substantial
RuralUrban Differences
Figure 4 shows the difference in aggregate rates of marriage dissolution for
rural and urban areas in large states.
While one might expect urban rates to
be substantially greater than rural rates,
it is striking that this is not the case. In
fact, the states with the relatively higher
ruralurban gaps (Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, and Kerala) have higher rates
in rural rather than urban areas.
For Future Work
This article has reported divorce and
separation rates recorded in the Census
2011 and explored the considerable degree
of variation in these rates across states.
The fact that marriage dissolution rates
are higher in Indias South and North-east
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
However, the qualitative literature discusses

several factors affecting marriage dissolution,
including domestic violence, infertility, infidelity,
real or perceived excessive interference from
in-laws or a womans natal family (Ghosh 2015;
Grover 2009; Mand 2008; Palriwala and Uberoi
2008; Unisa 1999).
The international literature uses two alternative definitions of the divorce rate. The first,
Crude Divorce Rate, is the number of divorces
per 1,000 population. The second, Refined
Divorce Rate, is the number of divorces per
1,000 married population. We use the latter,
although the patterns reported here do not
change if the former is used instead. Note, also,
that we prefer using percentages (that is, per 100
population) instead since this is more intuitive.
Since Greenstein and Daviss (2006) study is
based on data for the late 1990s, this is meant
merely as a broad brush comparison rather
than a careful analytical one.
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/
age_structure_and_marital_status.aspx (accessed on 16 March 2015). To check on the reliability of census data, consider another source,
the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS).
However, unlike the census it is a sample survey focussed on maternal and child health,
limited to the population aged 1549, and disproportionately focused on women. From
NFHS-3 (200506), we estimate 0.28% divorced
individuals among the married population, and
0.78% separated individuals, figures that are
broadly consistent with the census figures (0.24%
and 0.61%, respectively). The difference between the census and NFHS figures could be
due to the following reasons: (a) the NFHS surveys 1549 year olds and therefore with a
younger cohort, the rates of marriage dissolution are higher; (b) divorce and separation
rates could be systematically underreported in
the census because unlike the NFHS surveys
which are longer, repeated, detailed surveys
with many sensitive questions (for instance
around HIV status and domestic violence) requiring building of rapport and more time, the
census is conducted once every decennium and
has no scope for eliciting such sensitive information. Note also that separation in the census figures appears to include instances of desertion; the NFHS-3 estimates these separately.
These are states with over 1 crore population:
Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir, NCT of
vol lI no 33
Delhi, Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Punjab, Assam,

Jharkhand, Kerala, Odisha, Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh,
Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh.
Although this is not statistically significant
when the 20 states with over 1 crore population
are considered, that may be due to the small set
of observations. When all 35 states and union
territories are considered, the positive association is statistically significant at the 99% level.
This can be seen by comparing observations
against the dashed line (line of equality):
states above it have separation rates greater
than divorce rates, and states below it have
separation rates lower than divorce rates.
References
Amato, P R (1994): The Impact of Divorce on Men
and Women in India and the United States,
Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Vol 25,
No 2, pp 20721.
Belliappa, J (2013): Gender, Class and Reflexive
Modernity in India, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
Bloom, S S, D Wypij and M Das Gupta (2001): Dimensions of Womens Autonomy and the Influence
on Maternal Health Care Utilization in a North
Indian City, Demography, Vol 38, No 1, pp 6778.
Dyson, T and M Moore (1983): On Kinship Structure,
Female Autonomy, and Demographic Behavior
in India, Population and Development Review,
Vol 9, No 1, pp 3560.
Ghosh, S (2015): The Political Economy of Domestic
Violence in a Mumbai Slum: An Ethnographic
Analysis, Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics,
Vol 27, No 2, pp 124.
Greenstein, T N and S N Davis (2006): Cross-National
Variations in Divorce: Effects of Womens Power,
Prestige and Dependence, Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Vol 37, No 2, pp 25373.
Grover, S (2009): Lived Experiences Marriage,
Notions of Love, and Kinship Support amongst
Poor Women in Delhi, Contributions to Indian
Sociology, Vol 43, No 1, pp 133.
Jejeebhoy, S J and Z A Sathar (2001): Womens
Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence
of Religion and Region, Population and Development Review, Vol 27, No 4, pp 687712.
Kumar, V A (2012): Judicial Delays in India: Causes
and Remedies, Journal of Law, Policy and
Globalization, Vol 4, pp 1621.
Leonetti, D L and D C Nath (2009): Age at First
Reproduction and Economic Change in the
Context of Differing Kinship Ecologies, American
Journal of Human Biology, Vol 21, No 4, pp 43847.
Mand, K (2008): Marriage and Migration through
the Life Course: Experiences of Widowhood,
Separation and Divorce amongst Transnational
Sikh Women, Rajni Palriwala, and Patricia
Uberoi, Marriage, Migration and Gender (eds),
New Delhi: Sage, pp 286302.
Nongbri, T (2001): Democracy, Gender and Tribes: A
Critical Appraisal of Indias Constitutional Policies, Indian Anthropologist, Vol 31, No 2, pp 114.
(2003): Development, Ethnicity and Gender:
Select Essays on Tribes in India, New Delhi,
Rawat Publications.
Palriwala, R and P Uberoi (2008): Exploring the Links:
Gender Issues in Marriage and Migration, Rajni
Palriwala and Patricia Uberoi (eds), Marriage,
Migration and Gender, New Delhi: Sage, pp 2362.
Pothen, S (1989): Divorce in Hindu Society, Journal
of Comparative Family Studies, Vol 20, No 3,
pp 37792.
Unisa, S (1999): Childlessness in Andhra Pradesh,
India: Treatment-Seeking and Consequences,
Reproductive Health Matters, Vol 7, No 13,
pp 5464.
Xaxa, V (2004): Women and Gender in the Study
of Tribes in India, Indian Journal of Gender
Studies, Vol 11, No 3, pp 34567.
27
COMMENTARY
Ambedkar Bhavan Controversy

The Enemy Within
Anand Teltumbde
The contentious razing of the

Ambedkar Bhavan and the
Buddha Bhushan printing press
started by Babasaheb Ambedkar
in Mumbai has shown how wide
the gap is between the Dalit
class and mass.
Anand Teltumbde (tanandraj@gmail.com)

is a writer and civil rights activist with the
Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, Mumbai.
28
The struggle of man against power is the

struggle of memory against forgetting.
Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and
Forgetting
he controversy over the demolition

of the iconic Ambedkar Bhavan in
Mumbai, associated with Babasaheb Ambedkar has brought to the fore the
class divide among Dalits in the ugliest
possible manner. Upper middle class Dalits
covertly or overtly supported the demolition of the old building in order to pave
the way for construction of a swanky
17-storey building. The Dalit masses
however came out on the streets to protest against it and demanded that those
responsible should be arrested.
The demolition on 25 June targeted
the Ambedkar Bhavan and the Buddha
Bhushan Printing Press started by
Ambedkar on behalf of the Peoples
Improvement Trust (PIT). Janata and
Prabuddha Bharat, two of Ambedkars
important publications, were printed and
published from this press and the premises
served as the centre of the Ambedkarite
movement from the 1940s onwards. This
continued even after his death and various
movements and campaigns, including the
one for renaming of the Marathwada University after Babasaheb, were planned and
executed from here.
Babasaheb bought the 2,332 square
yards plot for `45,095 which had been
collected from his supporters and followers and transferred it to the Bombay
Scheduled Caste Improvement Trust in the
1940s. The objectivess of the trust were
listed as advancement of adult education,
provision of legal aid for securing and
safeguarding civic and social rights;
eradication of evil customs and spread of
general knowledge and enlightenment so
as to remove superstitious practices and
beliefs from among the Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and the establishment and maintenance of as well as support to institutions
engaged in these kind of activities. As the
press was owned by him, Babasaheb considered himself a tenant and paid a rent of
`50 per month to the trust. It came to be
occupied by bhangarwallas and it was a
challenge to evacuate them when the
trust wanted to build a hall there in the
1970s. But due to the concerted efforts of
one of the trustees, P L Lokhande and
Yashwantrao Ambedkar (Babasahebs
son), the plot was vacated. A small hall
was built in 1975 which housed some offices and provided shelter to poor Dalit
visitors to Mumbai.
Later, in the 1990s, the Ambedkar
Bhavan came up and it soon became a
centre for Dalit and progressive activists
who held meetings, conferences and other
programmes there. It also provided shelter
to needy Dalits who came for medical
treatment or other work to Mumbai. It
also served as the community hall where
marriages took place. Among its many
rooms, two were occupied by Prakash and
Anandraj Ambedkar as offices of their
Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha and the Republican Sena, respectively. The other
rooms were in the possession of the trust.
The press housed the antique machines
of the press; old issues of the Janata and
Prabuddha Bharat, and important pamphlets and documents of various movements, and the office of the Bharatiya
Bauddha Mahasabha (Indian Buddhist
Society). During the demolition, many
of these historical documents were reportedly lost, stolen or destroyed.
Land Grab Intrigues
Ratnakar Gaikwad, ex-IAS officer who
retired as chief secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and holds the post of
state information commissioner after retirement submitted a change report to
the Charity Commissioner which was
challenged by the chairman of the trust
and is pending with the Charity Commissioners office. As a result, the changes
could not be incorporated into Schedule I
and the property card.
Gaikwad says that building a 17-storey
building would be the fulfilment of
Babasahebs dream. He has already submitted the building plans to the municipal
authorities and reportedly got their
approval. What Gaikwad revealed with
pride to the public is that the building will
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
have a multistorey car park, a vipassana

centre, a skill development centre, conference halls and offices for the Dalit
movement. This amounts to sheer commercialisation of the sacred property
Babasaheb bequeathed to the Dalits. The
entire intrigue is sought to be passed off
as fulfilment of Ambedkars dream. In the
matter of running a trust, there is nothing
like fulfilling someones dream; the solemn
duty of the trust is to fulfil the objectives
outlined in the trust deed. Gaikwads plan
is in clear contravention of Ambedkars
dream. He wanted an educational centre
where ordinary Dalits would be educated
in rational thinking and prepared for
radical action. It was not meant to be a car
park for the elite, nor a club or vipassana
centre (repugnant to Ambedkars conception of Buddhism). Gaikwads mention of
building the headquarter of the Dalit
movement only exposes his complete disconnect with it.
Larger Conspiracy
Gaikwads greed is abetted by the current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)Shiv
Sena government in the state and the
Hindutva forces at large in order to completely erase the real Ambedkar and reconstruct him in the shape that would
suit their purpose. The Buddha Bhushan
press building and antique machinery reminded Dalits of the struggles Ambedkar
waged during the early phase of the
movement and inspired them anew. In its
place a high-rise will only reinforce a
false consciousness that the Dalits have
arrived and may even inspire them to
collaborate with the ruling classes to
extract further gains. Two years ago, the
Siddharth Vihar in Wadala was demolished, and with it was decimated the space
for ordinary Dalit youth to come together,
discuss issues, articulate ideas, and agitate
against the forces that reproduced their
misery. Its demolition did not create ripples perhaps because it was not seen as
directly associated with Ambedkar. The
demolition of the Ambedkar Bhavan and
Buddha Bhushan Printing Press however
is another matter.
Likewise, the Ambedkar family, though
it has little influence in the political
sphere, is immensely respected by the
Dalit masses. Politically, they reflect a
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
pro-people stance lending support to

peoples struggle. Howsoever weak, they
represent the only Ambedkarite establishment today that is firmly against Hindutva
forces. A section of middle class Dalits
has slowly spread propaganda that the
Ambedkar heirs are not Ambedkarites
and are Maoist supporters.
Class Polarisation
This episode has exposed clearly the
endemic class divide among Dalits. While
the masses were angry at the demolition,
the classes, comprising well-off Dalits
including senior bureaucrats, politicians,
businessmen and their ilk overtly/covertly supported it. Ambedkar Bhavan
had, over the years, become a natural
hub of Dalit and progressive activists. Its
Spartan look and the people it sheltered
would repel them. They would not even
be aware that this humble structure has
seen many agitations being planned in its
benign shadow and the many activists
who were shaped by these protests. Arguably, it came closer to serving the purpose Ambedkar had in mind. But these
classes would think otherwise; they
would like to have a swanky structure
that they consider more becoming of their
stature, where they could network with
civilised people; could flaunt to the
world that they have arrived. Gaikwad
only voiced their aspirations. They would
hate being called Dalits, the dilapidated
ones. Ambedkar for them just serves as
an abstract identity marker. Described
in superlatives and lately made much of,
he lends them pride. They would not
like to remember any other Ambedkar,
particularly not the one who struggled
during 1920s and 1930s. They would be
proud to see him rubbing shoulders
with the ruling class but would not like
to remember the obstacles he faced and
so bravely overcame. They would hate
to recall his lament that educated people like them had cheated him or that
whatever he had done, only benefited
the relatively better off urban Dalits of
their ilk and that he could not do much
for the vast majority of Dalits living in
rural areas.
The class divide among the Dalits has
existed in an incipient form but remained dormant under the leadership of
vol lI no 33
Ambedkar. It raised its ugly head soon

after his death. The split in the Republican Party of India (RPI) over of the issue
of constitutional versus agitational mode
of struggle (the former being claimed as
the Ambedkarite method and the latter
as communist), was a mere manifestation. The educated class represented by
B C Kamble claimed Ambedkars legacy
and castigated B D Gaikwad, the rustic
mass leader, as being unworthy of it.
This division went on expanding over
the years even as the number of reservation beneficiaries grew. The thin layer
of the better off urban Dalits went on
widening, separating the have-nots
among them from the haves. Although,
this class could not completely rid itself
of the caste stigma, its class transition
prevented it from identifying with the
Dalit masses that were left behind.
Being visible and vocal, they completely
overshadowed the Dalit masses that
paradoxically, followed them as role
models. It is this class that helped the
ruling classes decimate the radical content of Ambedkars exhortations; isolate
those who show concern for the poor
Dalits as anti-Ambedkarites, goons and
Maoists, thereby abetting their repression by the state.
The Dalit movement has always had its
headquarter on the streets. The mass
fury against the demolition and Gaikwads
plan was exhibited in the form of a
protest rally on 19 July. Thousands of
Dalits from all over Maharashtra came
to Mumbai to march in protest. The rally
refused the BJP governments offer to rebuild the Ambedkar Bhavan and decided
that they would restore the demolished
building through voluntary donation and
labour. The display of this kind of selfrespect and self-reliance of ordinary Dalits
is what perhaps Babasaheb Ambedkar
dreamed of.
The Ambedkar Bhavan issue has
since slipped into the cobweb of legal
cases like the other trusts and institutions he founded. But the class divide
among the Dalits that this episode has
brought to the fore constitutes a critical
lesson. Unfortunately, the Dalit masses
blinded by their blinkers of caste identity
may not see it and fail to identify the
enemy within.
29
BREXIT EFFECT
Britains Global Chickens

Coming Home to Roost?
Radha DSouza
The British political establishment

has juggled to keep three balls
in the air: an internationalised
economy, international politics
and internal cohesion. Every now
and then a political party may
drop one and trigger a national
crisis. This time around it appears
that all the three may have
been dropped at the same time.
National debt, war, austerity,
falling wages and regional
disparities were issues central
to the leave or remain decisions.
They were overtaken by one
single issue: immigration.
Radha DSouza (R.dsouza@westminster.ac.uk)

is with the School of Law, University of
Westminster, London.
30
rexit is a multifaceted event. It

signals deep divisions within the
conservative Tory party in the
neo-aristocratic democracy that is the
United Kingdom (UK) (DSouza 2016a).
This article argues that Britains global
chickens coming home to roostfour
decades of liberalisationprivatisation
globalisation (LPG) reforms begun by
Margaret Thatchernow threaten to
unravel the state.
Euroscepticism in Britain
Euroscepticism has dogged British

politics throughout the post-World War
era. The foundations of the European
Union (EU) were laid without Britain.
Winston Churchill favoured a European
community in 1946, but did not wish to
put Britain at its centre. Britain stayed
out of the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which
was formally known as the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). Later ECSC became
a part of the EU.
Britain did not sign the Treaty of Rome
establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1957. By the mid1960s, against the backdrop of a stagnating economy, Britain under a Tory
government sought membership of the
EEC, but was prevented from joining
because the French vetoed Britains
membership. Then, as now, the EEC
membership has always divided the
British political establishment. It was an
election issue in 1970.
Britain joined the EEC in 1973 under
the Labour partys watch after the
French veto was lifted. It introduced the
European Economic Community Act,
1973 under which the EEC laws prevailed, if there was a conflict between
the British and EEC laws in matters
covered by the Treaty of Rome. The
European question did not die down. In
the 1974 elections, the ruling Labour

party promised renegotiation of the EEC
membership and a referendum if voted
into power. In 1975, a divided Labour
party held a referendum. Two-thirds of
the Labour party and a majority of the
trade unions opposed the EEC membership. The divisions within the Labour
party notwithstanding, 67.2% of the
electorate voted to remain in the EEC.
Tory and Liberal parties voted to stay in
the EEC. The divisions within the Labour
party on the referendum brought a segment of the Labour party closer to the
Tories and Liberals, and away from the
trade unions, their main social base.
The Tory party faced the same divisions after Thatcher came into power in
1979. Thatcher signed up to the Single
European Act in 1986 which set a timetable for merger and a common currency,
but turned against the project later.
Arguments over agricultural subsidies,
food standards and regulations over
various items of trade continued. In
1985, Britain stayed out of the Schengen
Agreement on border controls. In 1990,
Britain joined the monetary union much
later than the other states only to withdraw within two years in 1992, following
an intense speculation in the currency
markets. It remains outside the eurozone.
In 1992, Europe expanded the European
project to incorporate political union with
the economic union under the Maastricht
Treaty (the Treaty on European Union). It
provoked a rebellion in the Tory party.
Thatcher, no longer Prime Minister,
opposed the treaty. The Labour party too
was divided. The Tory government signed
the Maastricht Treaty without a referendum. The opposition within the party
forced the government to negotiate several opt-out clauses and exemptions.
The Labour party under Tony Blair
was an enthusiastic supporter of the
European project. In 2001, Blair promised
a referendum on the Treaty of Nice,
which introduced governance structures
to sync the institutions of memberstates, but backtracked. As there was no
constitutional obligation to hold a referendum, the need for it became a constitutional debate with many arguing that
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
it undermines the principle of parliamentary supremacy as practised in Britain.

Other EU states, in contrast, had held
referendums on key milestones in the EU
project. As several EU member-states had
rejected the Nice Treaty, it was replaced
with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2006. Britain
signed the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 which
was ratified by its parliament without a
referendum despite persistent divisions.
David Cameron as a member of the opposition promised a referendum and argued
for leaving the EU. After announcing the
referendum in 2013, he switched his position and argued in favour of remaining.
Many politicians in Tory and Labour
parties alike have prevaricated on the
European question. The last word on
Brexit may not be over yet. Already constitutional lawyers are arguing that the
referendum is advisory and parliament
could refuse to repeal the EEC Act of
1975. While legally possible, it will take
a brave political party to withstand the
backlash that will undoubtedly follow.
What divides Britain so much over the
European question?
The British political establishment has
juggled to keep three balls in the air: an
internationalised economy, international
politics and internal cohesion. Britain
has championed free trade throughout
history, engaged in wars around the world,
and periodically conducted a jolly good
class war at home. Every now and then a
political party may drop a ball and trigger a
national crisis. This time around it appears
that all the balls may have been dropped
at the same time. National debt, wars,
austerity, falling wages and regional disparities were issues central to the leave
or remain decisions. They were overtaken
by one single issue: immigration.
Economy
The Tory government came to power in
2010 promising to cut down public
spending, wipe out budget deficits, keep
Britains triple A ratings by the financial
rating agencies, and introduce humane
conservatism, whatever that may mean. In
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and
clamour for greater regulation of the financial sector in the EU, the City of London, the most deregulated financial capital of the world, was naturally sensitive
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
to Brexit. Equally, to keep the triple A

ratings, the government argued, it had
to cut deficits and introduce austerity.
National debt is not a new issue, but for
a country frequently at war, defence
budgets are difficult to cut down beyond
a point.
Wars and public debts have a close
nexus historically. In March 2015, a
hundred years later, Britain paid off the
last instalment of money it borrowed to
finance World War I. Britain mobilised
men and material from home and the
empire and won World War II militarily,
but lost it economically. Under the Lend
Lease Agreements with the United States
(US), Britain had to cede political leadership of the post-war world to the US and
became economically indebted to it.
Britain was the recipient of 25%, the
largest share, of the US aid to rebuild
Europe under the Marshall Plan (the
European Recovery Programme initiated
by the US to aid Western Europe).
By the mid-1960s, the post-war
recovery funded by loans and aid began
faltering and Britain faced balance of
payment deficit, falling value of the
poundsterling, unemployment and economic stagnation. The army was sent
to Northern Ireland to put down the
troubles, Scotland won the referendum
on devolution, and the government faced
a Winter of Discontent (197879) from
trade unions against falling wages, unemployment and working conditions.
Britain went cap in hand to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance, a moment that deeply
scarred the national pride of a country
that was until two decades ago the worlds
largest empire. The British membership of
the EEC in 1975 was born from that crisis.
Britain turned to Europe, away from
the Commonwealth nations, its traditional zone of economic influence. Under
Thatcher, the LPG reforms ripped up the
industrial and production infrastructure
and Britain laid its bets on becoming the
worlds financial capital by offering a deregulated financial market and ancillary
market services like legal innovations and
skills, and international market institutions. For example, the City of London was
a big beneficiary of the sovereign debt
crisis throughout the 1980s, brokering
vol lI no 33
agreements between the private sector

and indebted developing countries, and
offering financial, banking and arbitration services. While London boomed,
other parts of the country trailed, incomes
and employment fell. Class polarisation
created divided geographies that are
mirrored in the Brexit voting patterns.
In 1991, Britain faced another economic
meltdown caused by the financial sector
in London. The political establishment
blamed the EU, the exchange rate mechanism and high interest rates set by the EU.
However, getting out of the EU exchange
rate mechanism and staying out of the
euro did not ward off the 2008 crisis.
By 2008, the BITs (bilateral investment
treaties) revolution was underway and
offered new opportunities. As the multilateral trade negotiations under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) saturated and
the Doha round of negotiations stalled,
the US and EU began pursuing BITs. The
number of BITs increased from 309 by
the end of 1988, to 2,181 by 2002 and
2,926 by 2015. In this scenario, would
Britains old Commonwealth connections
have offered better opportunities, if it
abandoned the EU? Why get stuck with a
bilateral EU agreement when Britain has
long historical ties with so many other
states around the world that it could
pursue if it went alone?
Indeed, throughout the Brexit campaign
the leave camp was vocal about its Commonwealth connections. It was bizarre
to hear extreme anti-immigrant, racist
parties like the UK Independence Party
(UKIP) praising India, which, according
to its leader Nigel Farage, has much more
in common with Britain than Eastern
Europe. The points-based system followed
in Australia was held up as a model for
Britain to follow. India, South Africa,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada were
presented as desirable partners for Britain
after leaving the EU. The underlying thread
that connects these countries is, of course,
the empire! The leave camp hopes to
pursue bilateral trade agreements with
individual Commonwealth countries. The
points-based system will open immigration to a wealthy few who will take the
best jobs, properties and privileges,
leaving locals without basic services
that low-paid migrants provide.
31
BREXIT EFFECT
The remainers argued over the size of

the EU markets and Londons special
place as the financial capital. However,
the economy does not operate in a political vacuum. Rosy pictures of Britain resurrecting its Commonwealth connections were thrown into doubt by an unscheduled visit by John Kerry, the US
Secretary of State, within days of the
referendum results, highlighting another
facet of the divisions over Europe.
Troublesome Wars
After the City of London, arms sales and
manufacture forms an important pillar
of the British economy. It is not possible to
be an arms broker without becoming
involved in financing wars. Since the end
of the Cold War, Britain has played a lead
role in the wars in Afghanistan, Somalia,
Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and many
other places. Its involvement with every
major war in the world is rarely discussed
in the same breath as budget deficits. Wars
cost money, however. Britains membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is crucial to its war and
weapons programme around the world.
The EU has a common foreign policy and
discussions on closer integration of defence policies are underway. Where does
greater defence integration leave Britain?
Throughout the Brexit campaign neither
the leave nor the remain camps mentioned
NATO but the US was not about to let it go.
Barack Obama exhorted Britons to vote to
remain in the EU for security cooperation
(Rampton and Maclellan 2016). It set the
cat amongst the pigeons in the referendum. During the campaign, the remain
camp put out the story that the leave
campaign was supported by President
Vladimir Putin, who would be the main
beneficiary of a leave victory. Hostility
towards Russia has been pervasive in the
government and the media in recent
years. We do not know if Putin financed
or supported the leave camp. If he was
indeed sympathetic to their cause, he was
diplomatic enough to not say anything.
Nevertheless, it is true that without Britain,
the USs most hawkish warmongering
ally in Europe, its own ambitions for
eastward expansion and taking on Russia
require at least a rethink of the ongoing
militarisation of Poland and Ukraine.
32
Leavers and remainers assumed that

whatever the result, it would not affect
NATO. That is not how the US saw it.
Kerry announced the referendum result
could be walked back (Rankin and
agencies 2016). He made it clear that the
US would pursue what was in its own
national interest, whether that be NATO or
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) deal under negotiation.
It is often forgotten that the EU project
was a US-sponsored, Central Intelligence
Agency-supported project after the world
wars, continuing from the Harry Truman
to Richard Nixon presidencies. A united
Europe was the key to US rivalries and
engagement with the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. At a time when
the US seeks to use NATO to encircle Russia,
foment trouble in Ukraine, and generally
push for eastward expansion, Britains
untimely leave vote presents new problems which neither leavers nor remainers
can afford to ignore.
Tony Blair is amongst the most-hated
politicians in Britain because he was
perceived as being joined at the hip with
the US, and that he reduced Britain to a
secondary partner in the special relationship with the US (DSouza 2016b). This
special relationship will no doubt give
more ammunition to all sides. Kerrys advice to walk back the Brexit results makes
it more difficult to pick up the economic
and political balls at the same time.
Impending Class War?
During each round of the crisis, Britain
turned outwards for solutions to the US, to
the EU, and now to the Commonwealth.
British people were told that globalisation
would bring prosperity and wealth for all,
but they were not told that it would come
with wars, and that prosperity would be
limited to the tip of the social pyramid. The
Equality Trust reported in 2012 that the
bottom 10% of the people earned on an
average 8,468, whereas the top 10%
earned ten times more. At the top-end of the
top 10%, wage disparity was the highest.
The top 1% earned 2,59,917, while the top
0.1% earned 9,41,582. Each crisis was
accompanied by a class war and each class
war exacerbated the disparities. If the
Labour party in the 1960s was indecisive,
Thatcher launched a full-scale class war,
smashed unions, brought down wages,

cut back social welfare, introduced stiffer penal sentencing, sent the army into
Northern Ireland, privatised essential
services and much more. Labour under
Blair did likewise, as did the Tories under
Cameron after the 2008 crisis.
Some things did not change. The leave
vote and the economic uncertainties
portend another class war far bigger than
the previous ones. Brexit shows that
market mantras do not work, and proselytising the virtues of the free markets
ad nauseam do not stop regional disparities. In Northern Wales and Scotland,
where the nationality question and union
with Britain remain contentious, it stokes
separatist embers. London, which is closely
integrated with European markets, voted
to remain. Mayor Sadiq Khan called for
greater devolution of economic and
political powers for London. In England,
it unleashed the expectation amongst
leavers that leaving the EU would reduce
income gaps and create employment
opportunities; desires that could invite
another class war. Whether the class war
will take on racial overtones or lead to a
new type of politics is a moot question.
Since the results, reports of racist attacks
against immigrants keep coming in from
around the country, including London.
One of Camerons first decisions after
the referendum was to increase funding
for the police to deal with racist attacks.
Britains global chickens are indeed coming home to roost and threaten to unravel
the internal cohesion of the state!
Postscript
Since this article was written, NATO held
its summit in Warsaw, Poland on 89 July
2016. As argued herein, Brexit was on
the summits mind at a time when NATO
focuses on arms build-up against Russia.
Obama called for an orderly and smooth
transition on Brexit that would not imperil
Europes determination to take on Russia
(Agencia EFE 2016). Notwithstanding
Brexit, we cannot lose sight of the extraordinary achievement that European integration continues to be, Obama said
(Office of the Press Secretary 2016).
Cameron on his part was at pains to
emphasise that exiting the EU did not
change Britains commitment to NATO or
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
against Russia. He warned that the EU

faced grave threats from Russia, if it
allowed Brexit to affect its relations with
Britain. Indeed, Britain has stationed
troops in Poland, Estonia and Ukraine as
part of the wider preparations underway
to draw Russia into an armed conflict. It
remains to be seen how Britain can remain outside the EU on everything else
except a common EU defence policy!
Theresa May, the new Prime Minister
has tried to convince the nation, the EU
leaders, and the world beyond that it
is possible for Britain to have the cake
and eat it too; that it is possible for
Britain to leave and remain, have the
best of both worlds. Whether this logicdefying stance is possible at all remains
to be seen. More importantly, whether
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
former colonies will continue to dance to

Britains tunes is moot. Tanzania has
already signalled that it will pull out of
the Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA) between the East Africa Community and the EU following Brexit. Campaign groups and critical intellectuals in
other African countries have called upon
their leaders to see Brexit as an opportunity to revisit and renegotiate EPAs, effectively, as an opportunity to pull back
from the neoliberal rampage that now
threatens to recoil on Britain and the EU.
Is it time for India, and indeed, South
Asia, to follow the Tanzanian example?
References
Agencia EFE (2016): President Obama: A Smooth
Brexit Process Is in Everyones Interest, 8 July,
http://www.efe.com/efe/english/portada/
vol lI no 33
president-obama-a-smooth-brexit-process-isin-everyone-s-interest/50000260-2980109.
DSouza, Radha (2016a): From Great Britain to
Little England, Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 51, No 28, pp 2022.
(2016b): Chilcot Report and How Democracy
Actually Works in the West, Vol 51, No 29,
http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/28/web-exclusives/chilcot-report-and-how-democracy-actually-works-west.html.
Office of the Press Secretary (2016): Remarks by
President Obama, President Tusk of the European
Council, and President Juncker of the European
Commission after USEU meeting, 8 July, The
White House, Washington DC, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/08/
remarks-president-obama-president-tusk-european-council-and-president.
Rankin, Jennifer and agencies (2016): John Kerry:
Brexit Could Be Walked Back, Guardian,
29 June, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jun/29/john-kerry-brexit-could-bewalked-back-david-cameron.
Rampton, Roberta and Kylie Maclellan (2016):
Obama Exhorts Britain to Stay in EU, Warns
on Trade If It Leaves, Reuters, 22 April, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-obamaidUSKCN0XH2U6.
33
BREXIT EFFECT
Brexit Exposes Moral Hypocrisy

Freedom of Movement Restricted
Kaustav Bhattacharyya
The intransigence of the

European Union with respect to
freedom of movement of people
now lies exposed as morally and
ethically hollow in the light of its
conduct with India. The same
insistent EU refuses to actively
apply similar rules of the game of
free movement of people in the
global arena, which raises the
question of solidarity and
principled conduct.
Kaustav Bhattacharyya (Kreisb12@gmail.com)

is a corporate director interested in business
history and global free trade.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
ritain has voted to leave the

European Union (EU), or what is
known in common parlance as
Brexit, in a widely attended referendum.
The turnout was higher than the national
electionsroughly 72% and the verdict, a
rather decisive one with 51% in favour
of Brexit. The results sent tremors
through the United Kingdom (UK), the
EU, and the entire world. At the heart of
this referendum campaign and the concomitant disenchantment of the British
leave voters was the issue of unfettered
immigration.
Let us ponder on what exactly the
issue of immigration is and what lies
behind it. The UK, like most Western
countries, has a restricted and selective
process of accepting migrants. However,
in the case of the EU, it has to accept
every EU citizen who is willing to
work and live, and grant the permission
to do so. The EU extended its frontiers
and expanded its borders through a
process called accession between
2004, till about 2007, and 12 new member states joined the EU. The citizens
vol lI no 33
of these new member states were granted

free, unrestricted access to the UK labour
market since the UK is a member of
the EU.
This unrestricted immigration where
individuals from new member states
can enter the UK and stay back and
work had a cascading effect on the
number of new migrants entering the
UK legitimately. To offer an idea of
the scale of this European migration,
between 2004 and 2014the 10-year
period since the accession of these Eastern
Bloc countriesthe population of Eastern
European migrants in the UK rose
from around 1,50,000 to about a million,
which is an unprecedented scale for the
British society.
In 2015, the number of immigrants
from Eastern European countries rose
further, nearly by 23%, according to the
Office for National Statistics, and there
was nothing the UK establishment could
do about it. Clearly, immigration from
Eastern Europe was perceived to be a
major irritant for most of the British
voters and being part of the EU or membership of the bloc was seen as something undesirable and negative. Political
parties and the politicians who were
campaigning for Brexit championed
slogans like take back control of our
borders, and some posters even depicted
doomsday scenes of millions of migrants
marching into the UK. For the people
33
BREXIT EFFECT
outside of the UK, it is important to

grasp the dimension of the issue of
migration from newer member states of
the EU and the angst it has created, with
which we may agree or disagree, but
which certainly made an impact on the
voters mind.
Sacred Law for EU
Among other factors, the referendum
was triggered by the refusal of the EU to
allow the imposing of restriction on
European workers having access to the
UK labour market through any conditions or limits. The then British Prime
Minister David Cameron had stated,
following the results, that the referendum was lost over the principle of unrestricted access to travel and the right to
work among the EU citizens. The free
movement (Brown 2002) of workers is a
fundamental principle enshrined in
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Freedom
of movement of workers being a right
includes the specific rights of movement
and residence for workers, the rights of
entry and residence for family members, and the right to work in another
member state and be treated on an
equal level with nationals of that
member state.
Interestingly, the EU has actively promoted and facilitated this free movement of workers through the recognition
of professional qualifications, enabling
the citizens to practise their professions
without any obstacles. This has been
ensured through a legislative instrument
of a Directive 2005/36/EC (as modernised by Directive 2013/55/EU) which
reformed the system of recognition of
professional qualifications. Besides, the
European Employment Services, an
EU-funded cooperation network, involving none less than the apex body of
the European Commission is the one
responsible for facilitating and arbitrating any disputes concerning inter-EU
member state recognition of professional qualifications.
As a matter of fact, what strikes as
an unkindest cut for the Brexit camp
is the fact that countries which are
formally not part of the EU but enjoy
access to the single market as members
34
of the European Economic Arealike

Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and even
Switzerland, which is a member of the
European Free Trade Association and
has access to the single market in some
areas of tradehave to concur with the
principle of free movement of workers.
Several EU leaders have put their foot
down and stated unequivocally that if the
UK wishes to have access to its single
market, then it has to permit the free
movement of EU citizens within its borders and their right to be engaged in
employment (James and Taylor 2016). In
other words, free market implies free
movement of persons.
Apparently there seems to be an EU
legislationfree movement of capital,
goods, services and workerswhich is
part of the very essence of the EU. In the
post-Brexit scenario the European leaders, including the European Council
President Donald Tusk (BBC 2016) along
with the French and German heads of
state, warned Britain that it cannot engage in cherry-picking, and if it wished
to enjoy access to the single market then
it has to accept freedom of movement of
the EU citizens, which is clearly nonnegotiable. Hence, what can be concluded is that the freedom of movement
of people is inextricably linked to the
single market and the philosophy of free
trade for the EU leadership. In the postBrexit negotiations, it is evident that the
EUs key decision-making elites will not
yield in this stance to the UK.
Global Free Movement of People
Since the EU has so emphatically and
forcefully linked the idea of free trade
with free movement of people, one needs
to speculate if the same rules apply in
the global arena where EU countries are
prominent actors. The creation of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) occurred in the same year, 1995,
as when the World Trade Organization
(WTO), located in Geneva, came into
being as an international organisation
responsible for arbitrating free and fair
trade, armed with legislations and the
power to penalise erring nations which
are member states. Hence, in the global
arena, we do have legislative instruments which are supposed to link free
trade in services with free movement

of people, and the EU elites are not
clamouring for anything unusual or
radical. The fundamental guiding principle of GATS was the distinguishing
of four disparate and distinct modes of
providing services: cross-border trade,
consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons.
Most importantly, Mode 4, presence
of natural persons, is confined to temporary movement of labour to supply
services in a foreign market without any
rights or access to long-term residency or
citizenship (Mukherjee and Goyal 2013).
It would be prudent to consider the
record of EU enthusiasts of free movement of persons in the global arena while
dealing with non-EU member states of
the WTO,1 and it is needless to mention
that this is nothing but distressing. We
are all well aware of the collapse of the
Doha round of talks due to the duplicitous
position of the developed world with
regard to free trade, including that of
services apart from agriculture.
For a proper perspective, let us focus
on the specifically adopted EU position
with regard to India in our Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) negotiations and, here
Mode 4 means of liberalisation of services
remains one of the most contentious
issues. According to the Delhi Policy
Group think tank, the free movement
of Indian professionals through the EU
remains the biggest stumbling block in
liberalisation and access to the EU services sector, which is a priority for the
IndoEU FTA.
It would be worthwhile to state here
clearly that Indias case is only an
instance of a developing countrys relationship with the EU in terms of providing
market access to the services sector
through Mode 4, and is representative of
the moral hypocrisy of the current
position of the EU vis--vis the UK. The
full-blown market access through Mode 4
for India is curtailed through measures
like work permits, visa regulations and
recognition of professional qualifications.
India had insisted that the EU adhere to
binding promises on liberalising trade in
services through Mode 1 and Mode 4.
Ironically, France and Spain, the two
most vocal countries in the post-Brexit
AUGUST 13, 2016
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EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
scenario, hammering on free movement

of people as linked to free trade, have
instilled nationality and local language
knowledge requirements as criteria for
availing of positions in the services sector,
which have adversely affected opportunities for Indian service providers.
One of the most disputed issues is that
of the recognition of professional qualifications for Indian professionals intending to provide services. The instruments
and mechanisms which have been
deployed by the EU in hindering India
are in the form of visa restrictions, economic needs test, and quotas on the
movement of professionals. Similarly, it
must be a poor testimony to our strategic
intelligence and astute thinking not to
recognise the contradictions of this.
Mode 4 of the GATS (Paragraph 4 of the
Annex) notes that the GATS shall not
prevent a Member from applying measures to regulate the entry of natural
persons to ensure that orderly movement of natural persons across.
What more clearer statement of intent
do we need to understand that Western
developed countries, like the EU, were
not serious towards global free movement of persons, when we have sanctioned and endorsed instruments to ensure orderly movement of natural persons which would be evoked constantly?
Plainly, we have to recognise that the
GATS Annex on movement of natural
persons has integrated and wired-in
limitations, which impede the free trade
in services for developing countries. This
clearly lets us conclude, based on its
interactions with India with regard to
Mode 4 means of services, that the
current EU intransigence on linking free
movement of persons and free trade
indicates of outright moral hypocrisy
and double standards.
Insular Solidarity of EU
The intransigence of the EU with respect
to freedom of movement or people,
especially workers across the entire
zone linked to free trade rules of single
market in the post-Brexit scenario, now
lies exposed as morally and ethically
hollow in the light of their conduct with
India. The same insistent EU refuses to
actively apply similar rules of the game
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
of free movement of people in the global

arena, which raises the question of solidarity and principled conduct. In other
words, the principles are to be adhered
to only when it concerns the citizens of
the European geographical area, who incidentally share the same ethnicity and
race to a large extent. However, I am
careful to not accuse the EU elites of
being discriminatory on ethnic grounds
since many of the societies are multiethnic and multi-cultural. This demonisation of the developing world citizens
swarming Europe can have harmful
consequences for the EU in the long run,
since opening borders selectively will
encourage prejudiced thinking.
Routinely and actively, EU institutions
and its associated intellectuals deride
and depict the developing world or the
emerging world as sweatshops filled
with low-cost workers who are threats to
its fabled social welfare state prosperity
and ever willing to jump on the next
ship or bus to the EU. Many of us are
aware of the distasteful video campaign
promoting EU unity where the emerging
world was depicted as menacing male
figures threatening the chastity of helpless, innocent women symbolising the EU.
This video campaign2 launched sometime in 2012 by the European Commission to promote EU unity and enlargement cost a whopping sum of money and
had to be withdrawn after protests over
the racist overtones.
When EU member states revoke the
GATS clause of orderly flow as an alibi
for restrictive visa practices and nontariff barriers, the message emanating is
that of deep-seated anxiety and prejudice
towards human beings who hail from
different societies. Now, EU elites should
explain to the Brexit voters why the
orderly flow logic is not to be pursued
in the case of the UK being a recipient of
the largest number of migrants in
recent history from eastern Europe.
Or, the logic does not apply when it
comes to similar Europeans from new
member states, who albeit share traditions, culture and identity with their
western counterparts, but only for
Asians and Indians.
I recollect a presentation made on
Mode 4 GATS services liberalisation in
vol lI no 33
Brussels where finally I thought of

appealing to the sensible and practical
nature of European policy elites. There
is strong belief in the soft power
of the EU in the global theatre where it
is jostling for the high seat among the
old, traditional powers like the United
States and Japan, and emergent ones
like Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa (BRICS). The most fundamental essence of European soft power,
which is its raison dtre, lies in the
belief of playing by the rules, enforcing
and adhering to global regulations rather
than being the imperial bully. The EU
emerged as a powerful entity from the
smouldering ruins of World War II
through its moral and cultural leadership making it attractive for countries
to join the club. Amidst the brouhaha
and cynicism of Brexit it is a historical
chance for the EU to implement fair and
equitable rules of freedom of movement
of people cutting across the narrow confines of its geographical entity on a
global scale.
Notes
1
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B General

Agreement on Trade in Services. These are official
documents that can be found at https://www.
wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf.
Watt (2012); the video campaign can be
watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=WQREDQjfzC4.
References
BBC News (2016): Brexit: EU Says No Compromise
on Freedom of Movement, 29 June, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36659900.
Brown, Enos (2002): The Jamaican Experience
with the Movement of Natural Persons in the
Provision of Services, paper presented to the
Joint World Trade OrganizationWorld Bank
symposium on Movement of Natural Persons
(Mode 4) under General Agreement on Trade
in Services, Geneva, Switzerland, 1112 April,
http://www.revistainterforum.com/english/
articles/042902artprin_en1.html.
James, William and Paul Taylor (2016): EU Tells UK
Single Market Access Requires Full Free Movement, Reuters, 29 June, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-britain-eu-wrapup-idUSKCN0ZF29S.
Mukherjee, Arpita and Tanu M Goyal (2013):
Examining Mode 4 Commitments in India and
the EUs Agreements: Implication for the IndiaEU BTIA, Working Paper No 396, February,
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore,
http://www.iimb.ernet.in/research/sites/default/files/WP%20No.%20396_0.pdf.
Watt, Nicholas (2012): European Commission
Criticised for Racist Ad, Guardian, 6 March,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
mar/06/european-commission-criticised-racist-ad.
35
BREXIT EFFECT
Spoils of Brexit for India

Abhijit Sarkar
Following the United Kingdoms

exit from the European Union as
a result of the recent referendum,
Indian big capital is dismayed in
anticipation of the contraction
of the monolithic EU market.
However, the focus must veer
from the losses for big business to
the gains for the average Indian.
The pounds depreciation in the
aftermath of Brexit can be helpful
in combating domestic inflation
in India. To some extent, Brexit
is likely to put a brake on capital
exodus and on brain drain from
India to the UK. It would also
mean cheaper and unrestrained
arms trade between India and the
UK. It makes the EU less weighty
as a cohesive politico-economic
bloc, thereby reducing its pooled
leverage against India.
Abhijit Sarkar (myabhijit@gmail.com) is an

Oriental Studies research scholar, University of
Oxford, United Kingdom.
36
y the referendum held on 23 June

2016, the majority of the British
people had democratically mandated in favour of the United Kingdom
(UK) leaving the European Union (EU). An
intriguing facet of the referendum, popularly dubbed as the Brexit referendum, was
that in addition to the UK citizens, the
citizens of the Commonwealth countries
currently living in the UK with long-term
UK visas were eligible to vote. Though
much debate as well as cantankerous
pettifoggery are inundating the press and
social media following the outcome of
the referendum, there has been only scant
discussion about the benefits or damages
of Brexit for the Commonwealth countries.
One Size Does Not Fit All
Four factors make such discussion particularly convoluted and, therefore, have been
bypassed by commentators. First, there
are 53 member countries in the Commonwealth, almost twice the number of the
28 member countries in the EU. Such a
colossal number of members makes it
indisputable that there are enormous
intra-member differences in the economic, political, and military interests and
calculations within the Commonwealth
vis--vis the UKs exit from the EU.
Second, the large number of member
countries also guarantees disparity in
the general state of development in the
member countries, which in turn, shapes
their calculations vis--vis Brexit. The
Commonwealth has developed countries
such as Canada and Australia, developing
countries like India and Malaysia, as
well as least-developed countries such
as Malawi and Mozambique as members.
Obviously, compared to the countries in
the global South, the politico-economic
fate of the developed Commonwealth
countries, which have historically been
part of the developed West, is much
more knotted with that of the UK.
Third, many Britons are oblivious to the
crucial distinction between Commonwealth voters currently staying in the
UK on temporary visas, and British

citizens with racial origin in the Commonwealth countries, who now possess
UK passports. Fourth, in relation to
this last distinction, a further subdistinction is imperative to grasp the multilayered intricacy in deciphering the
effects of Brexit on the voters from even
the same Commonwealth country. It is
necessary to recognise that those who
do not nurture any longing to settle
down permanently in the UK, indubitably have different arithmetic vis--vis
Brexit from those from the same Commonwealth country who cultivate such
a yearning.
Epistemological Imperialism
By now, it might seem to the readers that
it must have been conspicuous to the
Britons, and the continental Europeans,
that either the UK remaining in or leaving the EU cannot simply be in the interest of all Commonwealth voters alike.
But, even before the referendum had
actually taken place, I was not very sure
about the Britons or the continental
Europeans cognisance of the complexity,
or disposition in the first place, to accept
that there is multifarious intricacy in
persuading the Commonwealth voters
to vote in any unidirectional way. In fact,
in the UK, many Indians on a quotidian
basis experience a demand of loyalty
from them to the UKs interests, and an
unremitting pressure to flaunt their
gratitude to the UK as a price for the
British education or work that they have
received. Therefore, in the run-up to the
referendum, I ran an experiment on
social media, whereby I announced
publicly that I am going to vote leave as I
find that advantageous for India, a major
Commonwealth country.
What followed was revealing as well
as appalling. It turned out that for many
of the British, continental Europeans
and the citizens of developed Western
Commonwealth countries, the interest
of the UK (or Europe) automatically means
the interest of the rest of the world. They
failed to accept the basic premise of the
argument that in the postcolonial era
each country in the Commonwealth has
context-specific and unique interests and
calculations vis--vis Brexit.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
The conviction that the UKs interest is

essentially the interest of the world and
the mulish refusal to accept the existence of mutually-opposed interests that
a developing economy like India might
have is nothing but epistemological imperialism. This empire-building domination has been an inseparable constituent of Britains material imperialism in
the past. Notably, many westerners who
are now otherwise quite critical, even
apologetic about Britains imperial past,
do not realise how epistemologically imperialist their thought is when it comes
to their refusal to accept that what they
deem good for themselves vis--vis the
UKs membership of the EU might not be
good for many countries outside the
West. Their expectation that the Indian
voters in the UK would follow them in
their respective choice in the referendum, echoes the voice of the self-styled
benevolent Western rulers of the bygone
days who would think on behalf of the
people of the non-West, and determine
that what was beneficial for them was
thus logically beneficial for everyone.
Some hysterical dissenters even went to
the extent of calling me Hitler for refusing to accept their interest as all
Indians interest, and for insisting that
Indias interest might well be mutually
opposed to that of the UK. What conditions such a frenzied reaction in the 21st
century? The answer lies, to a considerable
extent, in the Eurocentrism of Western
schools and university curricula, which, in
turn, contributes significantly in retaining the residues of this epistemological
imperialism. British nationalism was at
the fulcrum of the squally debate around
the referendum. In connection, those who
campaigned to keep the UK in the EU, were
strategically using the term nationalist
as a blanket libel to delegitimise the separation of the fate of the Commonwealth
voters from that of the Britons.
Given Europes ghoulish past experience with Hitler-type nationalism, such
use of the word nationalist is expected.
But, on a deeper level, such a strategic use
of the term nationalist vis--vis the referendum also reeks of many Westerners
ignorance about nationalism outside
the West, which is often fundamentally
different from the genocidal nationalism
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
in the Europe of the past, and the immigrant-phobic nationalism in presentday Europe.
The Eurocentric understanding of
nationalism fails to recognise that outside
the West, in many countries, including
India, nationalism is primarily a handiwork of the necessity to unshackle the
vestiges of colonialism. In these countries,
despite occasional aberrations, nationalism is still predominantly conceived as
a nation-building apparatus, and in the
current neo-liberal world increasingly as
an ideological commitment to shield the
most vulnerable from the onslaught of
global capitalism. This ilk of nationalism
is sans any centrifugal imperialist aspirations. The overbearing insistence on
retaining a monolithic understanding of
nationalism that emerges in the sole
light of Europes grisly history amounts
to a failure, or flagrant refusal, to accept
the multiplicity of nationalisms roots,
contexts, aims, journeys and destinations
outside the West. Ignorance is tolerable
when admitted, but insufferable when
wrapped in the arrogance of awareness.
In the aftermath of my experiment on
social media, many Western commentators whose familiarity with the Indian
case was minimal, became India experts
in minutes, and felt confident enough to
utter strong judgments about Indias
gains in the case of the UK remaining in
the EU. It is West-centric education that
arms them with this confidence, which
may well be construed as epistemological hubris.
and the Tory party, in other words,

between the left and the right in campaigning for the UK to remain in the EU. Similar
convergence was noted among those
who campaigned for the UK to leave.
Disturbingly, on the economic front,
the whole debate was eclipsed by calculations of the effects that Brexit would
have on globalist big capital. Indian big
business is now an inalienable constituent
of the global capital that seeks a common
supranational market. Most of the big
Indian capitalists treat the UK as the
springboard to the European market.
Quite understandably and expectedly,
as always, they tried overtly to project
their business interest as Indias national
interest. Their ownership over a significant segment of the Indian media proved
particularly helpful in this endeavour.
The extent of Indian crony capitalism
is such that some even felt brazen enough
to publicly suggest that the Indian Prime
Minister should step in to inveigle the
Indian voters to vote remain (De Sarkar
2016). Big business was joined by the
rich and middle-class non-resident Indians, predominantly belonging to upper
castes, who have traditionally been a
solid vote bank for the Tories, and who
have also been the core support block for
the Indian right.
Aftermath of Referendum
Against this alarming backdrop, in the
aftermath of the Brexit referendum, we
must insist that feeding the insatiable big
Indian capital is not, and cannot be, the
obligation of the Government of India.
Hunger for Supranational Market

Of course, talk of national economic
interests, particularly in the non-West, is
the eyesore of supranational capitalism.
As such, national interest stands in the
way of its ambition to have a monolithic
global market. This directly brings us to
Indias economic gains vis--vis Brexit.
Obviously, the difference between the
Indian right and the Indian left is the
key in this discussion; things do look
different depending on which side you
are standing. The recent referendum has
blurred the ideological border between
the right and the left in the UK. There
was noteworthy convergence between a
sizeable faction of both the labour party
vol lI no 33
Big Indian Capital: Many Indian companies, such as Tata Motors, are not
merely tapping the UK market, they have
actually shifted primary manufacturing
to the UK. They are treating India as a
market for the finished products.
The core capital of many of these
Indian capitalists has been amassed
primarily in India through crony capitalism, through forcible eviction of farmers, through extirpating legitimate business competition by extralegal means.
Capital thus amassed in India is then
being invested in the UK, generating jobs
in the UK. The resemblance between this
current process and the process of 19th
37
BREXIT EFFECT
century British economic imperialism in

India is impossible to miss.
Indian Immigrants: On a related note,
by the standards prevailing in India, the
overwhelming majority of the Indian
immigrants in the UK, as well as aspiring
Indian immigrants, belong to the upper
layer of Indians, as well as to the upper
castes. Of course, there are working
class Indians in the UK too, such as the
chefs and bus drivers. This section has
been adversely affected by the preferential treatment of continental European
labour in the UK under the scheme of
free movement of labour within the EU.
Nonetheless, in this connection, we
must not lose sight of the fact that an
Indian chef or a bus driver in the UK is
indisputably in a privileged and more
secure position when compared to a chef
or driver working in India.
Therefore, the current Indian government must get rid of its ide fixe with the
better-off and upper-caste Indian immigrants abroad, and must accept vis--vis
Brexit that the interest of the nonresident Indians cannot be its priority at
the cost of the working class living in
India. With regard to economic aftereffects of Brexit, the government must
turn its eyes inward to the interest of the
impecunious multitude living permanently in India.
On many accounts, the UK outside the
EU is beneficial for labour in India. The
financial wobbliness in the UK and contraction of the European market in the
post-Brexit era can be expected to
attenuate capital export from India,
which in turn might lead to the return of
some capital to India, and to inward investment. Currently, there are over 800
Indian companies in the UK (UK Trade
and Investment 2016). Deceleration of
capital exodus would augment the Indian
federal and provincial governments
bargaining power with private capital in
terms of tax exemption, free land, and
interest-free loans. However, even the
Indian big capitalists should not feel too
perturbed by the Brexit triumph, as it
has paved the path for the UK to sign
bilateral free trade agreements with
India, which she was hitherto prohibited
from by EU rules.
38
Pounds Depreciation: Further, a cheaper

pound as an outcome of Brexit has made
Indian imports cheaper, aiding Indias
import-extensive trade. The biggest political (more than economic) challenge
to all the recent Indian governments has
been domestic inflation. The single-most
important factor for domestic inflation
in India is the expenditure on crude oil
import. India pays for imported oil by
converting the rupee and the foreign
currency reserve (of which the pound
is a notable constituent) into dollars. A
cheaper pound vis--vis the Indian rupee
would mean larger pound reserves in Indias hand. The larger pound reserves
would, on the whole, set off the negative
impact of the pounds depreciation
against the US dollar. Thus, a cheaper
pound would eventually mean less spending on oil imports. If the federal government so desires, savings on oil import
can, in turn, be used in subsidising
fuel prices for commodity transport,
thereby bringing down inflation for
items of quotidian consumption such as
grains. In a country with widespread
malnutrition and chronic hunger, only a
crony capitalist of the crudest kind can
ignore this positive chain effect of a
cheaper pound.
In addition to the potential impact
on the welfare of the Indian poor, there
are macro-level military boons in question, too. The UKs egress from the EU
would allow India to have cheaper and
unrestrained arms trade with the UK, free
from EU restrictions. Such a development
would contribute to a reduction in defence
expenditure, without warranting actual
scaling-down of Indias arsenal.
Again, savings on defence expenditure can be used to upgrade the armoury
or even redirected to the civil sector.
Since the first term of the United Progressive Alliance government starting
in 2004, India has built a strategic partnership with France as a bargaining
counter against the UK. Brexit would
boost that bargaining power. On a related note, after Indias nuclear bomb
test explosions in May 1998, the UK led
the EUs economic offensive against
India. Though all the sanctions had negligible impact, the existence of such a
cohesive politico-economic bloc is, quite
understandably, undesirable from Indias

viewpoint.
In addition to the wider impact of the
pounds depreciation, at a more individual level, thousands of Indian students
in the UK who transfer Indian rupees to
their UK bank accounts for tuition fees
and personal maintenance would benefit from the pounds devaluation. However, in this connection, it must be taken
into consideration that unlike the West,
the overwhelming majority of worthy
educational institutions in India are
either fully funded, or considerably
subsidised by either the central or state
governments. The Indians who succeed
in going to the UK are almost invariably
educated at these institutions. Therefore, from the standpoint of common
taxpayers in India, the exodus of welleducated, brilliant Indian students and
staff to the UK on a permanent basis is a
brain drain and money drain. Unlike
affluent Western countries, the poor of
India cannot afford to keep paying for
the grooming of the countrys best minds
and then losing them to Western countries. The little educated, poor Indian
taxpayers are justified in expecting that
the bright minds educated with their
money would eventually help them, or
take part, in their struggles against
the discriminatory economic and sociopolitical structures.
Unbridled Mobility: Finally, unbridled
mobility between the UK and the EU
countries was one of the cardinal concerns for the British voters in the recent
referendum. However, all the Indian
voters currently residing in the UK on
visas without UK passports have always
needed Schengen visas to step out into
continental Europe. Naturally, Brexit is
irrelevant for their mobility between
the UK and continental Europe.
References
De Sarkar, Dipankar (2016): Why Indians Wont
Vote for Brexit, Livemint, http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/NVYj7jO9MvDu6iWcJBoiwK/Why-Indians-wont-vote-for-Brexit.html,
accessed on 1 July 2016.
UK Trade and Investment (2016): UK-India Explore
Opportunities and Collaborations in Creative
Industries, Government of the UK, https://
www.gov.uk/government/world-locationnews/uk-india-explore-opportunities-and -collaborations-in-creative-industries, accessed on 1
July 2016.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
Can Income Transfers Help

Explain Brexit?
Rahul Menon
Notwithstanding the
conventional narratives of the
anti-immigrant sentiments
holding sway during the
referendum for Brexit, an
empirical investigation of the
possible factors leading to Brexit
does not show any significant
correlation between the share of
migrants from European Union
countries and the regions that
voted for Brexit. Share of social
security transfers in income was
most important in determining if
a region voted leave. Decreased
employment opportunities and
increased hardships that
necessitate reliance on welfare
payments could have fuelled
the anti-immigrant and
anti-European sentiment.
Rahul Menon (menon.rahul@gmail.com)

teaches Economics at St Xaviers College,
Mumbai.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
he United Kingdoms (UK) decision

to exit the European Union (EU)
dubbed Brexithas dealt another
hard blow to the global economy. The effects on trade and investment flows as a
result of this decision cannot be foreseen
with any precision. How will short-term
and long-term growth in Britain be
affected if the decision to withdraw from
the EU is institutionalised and operationalised? What effects will the depreciating pound and the flight to safe
assets have for future monetary policy
decisions of the United States (US), and
by extension the world economy?
While fervent forecasts are being made
about the future, just as much debate has
been directed towards the causes motivating voters decisions to leave the EU.
Around 52% of voters in the UK chose to
exit the EU. Many pollsters and writers
have pointed out the fact that a majority
of older voters preferred to leave. While
the young were largely in favour of staying in the EU, the relatively smaller
turnout amongst younger voters saw to
it that the leave vote carried the day.
Two of the major factors influencing the
voteas reported by many online publicationswere education and incomes;
regions with higher incomes and a higher
percentage of voters with advanced
degrees voted remain (McGill 2016).
Thus, while some theories highlight
the influence of racist and xenophobic
rhetoric of parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in motivating
the decision to leave the EU, others hold
that the stagnation of incomes and
living standards are much to blame for
the fact that a politically alienated
populace saw no benefits to staying in
the EU (Davies 2016). The data is still
being sifted through, and this event will
no doubt generate a large amount of
academic discussion.
While several studies look at current
data and attempt a correlation with the
vol lI no 33
results of the referendum, this article

looks at the basic data in household
incomes over the last 17 years to study its
possible impact on the vote. The results
show that one of the major factors determining whether a region voted leave
unreported by many studies so faris
the share of social security transfers per
household.
This brief study is confined to England
and not Scotland, Northern Ireland or
Wales. Data on voting percentages from
over 300 voting constituencies in England
were gathered from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) website, and
then organised by areas conforming to
the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics (NUTS) codes so as to be in
concordance with income and migration
data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The data set consists of 122
regions of England, classified according
to the NUTS 3 scheme.
Rhetoric against Immigration
The involvement of the UKIP and the uptick in racist events following the vote
led many to conclude that the vote was
largely a referendum on immigration,
and that a violent conservative backlash
against the ideals of modern cosmopolitanism was what explained the vote.
The UKIPs campaign urged voters to
leave the EU, displaying photographs of
Syrian refugees who according to them
would now be let into Britain given that
free movement of labour is allowed
through Europe.
The rhetoric may have been tilted
against immigrants, but do we find
evidence that supports the claim that
leave voters were motivated by antiimmigrant rhetoric? On the face of it,
there is nothing to support this assertion.
When data from 122 regions of England
were considered, one notices a strong
inverse relationship between the number
of EU-born residents and the probability
of leave votes being cast (Figure 1, p 40);
regions with a high number of foreignborn residents were more likely to
vote remain. This does not completely
negate the possibility of a strong antiimmigrant sentiment, as we shall hypothesise later, but it should question the
narrative of anti-immigration sentiments
39
BREXIT EFFECT
Figure 1: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and EU to UK Population Ratio by NUTS 3 Regions
40
relationship is not very strong, statistically speaking.
35
Social Security Benefits
R2 ==0.4115
R
0.4115
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-5
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates number of EU-born residents per 100
UK-born residents in each region.
Figure 2: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and CAGR of Disposable Income Per Head, 19972014
5.5
5
4.5
2 ==0.2311
0.2311
RR
4
3.5
3
A Tale of Two Englands?
2.5
2
1.5
10
The one variable that does tend to have a

significant correlation with whether a
region votes leave or not is the share of
social security benefits and transfers
received by a household. The share of
benefits received (as a share of gross disposable income) by households rose
from 25% in 1997 in both the UK and
England to 28.4% and 27.8%, respectively.
As Figure 3 and Figure 4 (p 41) indicate,
there is a significant correlation between
the share of leave votes in a region and
the share of social security transfers in
gross disposable income per household
in 2014, as well as the difference in the
share of social security per household
between 1997 and 2014.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates the CAGR disposable income per head for
each region over the period 19972014.
Figure 3: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and Social Benefits Received Per Household as a
Share of Gross Disposable Income, 2014
50
2 = 0.5419
RR
= 0.5419
40
30
20
What the Brexit vote reveals is a sharply

divided England. A look at the regional
share of votes reveals that the bulk of
the remain votes were concentrated in
areas whose residents enjoyed higher
incomes and educational prospects; the
cities of Manchester, Liverpool, London,
Oxford and Cambridge all voted remain,
while former industrial areas in the
north polled heavily in favour of leaving.
In statistical terms, there exist significant
differences between the regions that
voted remain and those that chose to
stay, as Table 1 indicates.
Table 1: t-Tests by Voting Region
10
Share of
Difference in
CAGR of
Benefits, Benefits Share,
GDHI
2014
19972014
Per Head
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates the share of social benefits received per
household in gross disposable income of each region in 2014.
as the major cause of the high number of

leave vote.
Incomes and Income Growth
According to the ONS, only two regions of
the UK recorded positive income growth
relative to average gross disposable household income per head; these regions
were London and Scotland, both regions
that voted remain. If the average disposable income per head of London was
22% higher than the UK average in 1997,
it was 31.4% higher in 2014. Regions that
40
were poor tended to vote leave, but the

relationship between leave votes and income growth has not been discussed.
When applied to the sample, the relationship between income growth and
leave votes tends to be weak. Figure 2
outlines the relationship of leave votes
with the compound annual growth rate
(CAGR) of disposable income per head.
While there does seem to be a negative
relationship, implying that regions with
low income growth tended to vote leave,
the low R-squared indicates that the
Remain (35 regions)

Leave (87 regions)
Difference
t-statistic
Degrees of freedom
p-value
23.29
31.26
-7.98
-8.10
120
0.000
-0.15
4.84
-4.99
-9.26
120
0.000
3.32%
3.07%
0.25%
3.02
120
0.0015
Regions divided according to whether a majority of votes

were for remain or leave. GDHI stands for gross disposable
household income.
Regions that voted remain were, on

an average, more likely to have a lower
share of benefits per household to gross
income in 2014, than to have a higher rate
of growth of income per head, and have
a reduction in the share of benefits over
the period 19972014. All these differences are also statistically significant.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
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the odds of voting leave by 2%. This result has to be treated carefully, for these
are nominal figures and do not take into
account real changes. Nevertheless, this
is a finding that deserves a lot more scrutiny and investigation.
Figure 4: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and Change in the Share of Social Benefits
Received Per Household to Gross Disposable Income, 19972014
15
R = 0.5613
10
So Why Did Britain Leave?
-5
-10
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates the change in the share of social benefits
received per household in gross disposable income of each region over the period 19972014.
What is important to note is that on an

average, the regions that voted leave
saw the share of social security transfers
increase by nearly 4.84% or 484 basis
points over the last 17 years.
The importance of social security
transfers in determining the outcome of
the referendum is seen by a logistic regression. The dependent variable was
coded 0 if a region decided to stay in
the EU, and 1 if a region decided to
leave. The independent variables considered were (i) the number of EU-born residents per 100 UK-born residents, (ii) the
CAGR of gross disposable income per
head, and (iii) the share of social security transfers per household in disposable
income for 2014. The CAGR of income per
head was converted into terms of basis
points for a more meaningful interpretation of the results.
Table 2: Logistic Regression
Dependent variable: Whether region displayed majority vote for leave
Odds Ratio p-Value
Social security share, 2014

EU-born per 100 UK-born
CAGR of disposable
income per head
Constant
1.30358
0.8874
0.001
0.060
1.0118
0.0000974
0.173
0.042
Number of observations: 122; Chi-squared: 54.67.
What one notices immediately is that

the share of social security transfers seems
to be the main indicator in determining
whether or not a region displayed a
majority vote for leave (Table 2). Regions that had a higher share of social
security benefits per household (higher
by 100 basis points) displayed a 30% increase in the odds of voting leave; this is
highly significant at the 1%. Somewhat
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
counter-intuitively, those regions that

had a higher number of EU-born residents showed a reduction in the odds of
voting leave, yet this is not significant at
the 5%. What is surprising is that there
is no statistically significant relationship
between the CAGR of income per head
and the decision to vote leave.
The regression (Table 2) checked whether regions that had a high level of social
security benefits had higher odds of voting
leave. The same regression was now run
to see whether the growth in the share of
social security transfers could have had
a role to play in voting leave. (Table 3).
Table 3: Logistic Regression
Dependent variable: Whether region displayed majority vote for leave
Odds Ratio p-Value
Difference in social security share,

19972014
EU-born per 100 UK-born
CAGR of disposable
income per head
Constant
1.9715 0.000
0.8808 0.036
1.0216 0.037
0.00111 0.050
Number of observations: 122; Chi-squared: 69.51.
This regression shows that regions

with a higher increase in the share of
benefits per household in income over
the last 18 years displayed a much higher
increase in the chances of voting leave;
the odds ratio now registers a 97% increase
in favour of voting leave. This also shows
strong statistical significance.
What is surprisingand more than a
little confusingis to note that now the
CAGR of disposable income per head is
significant, but in the opposite direction
to what one would have originally theorised. An increase in the CAGR of disposable income by one basis point increases
vol lI no 33
What is undeniable, though, is the fact

that the major determinant of the decision to vote leave amongst the British
populace is the share of social security
transfers, both as a share in 2014 and in
terms of its increase over the last 18 years.
Without access to data as to the precise components of social security benefits, one can only hazard a guess. It might
possibly be that an increase in social
security payments reflects growing
dependence of residents on the state
owing to a disappearance of well-paying, sustainable employment alternatives.
The collapse of manufacturing in the
northern regions might have adversely
affected several regions, leading to a
possible increase in reliance on benefits
and income transfers such as Employment
Assistance Programmes (EAPs). The entry
into the EU has seen no revival of manufacturing, for much of the growth since
then has been in services, particularly
financial services. It is no wonder then that
major financial centres like London have
voted remain, simply because they have
seen tangible benefits to an EU membership. Avenues for further study include a
mapping of the benefits of EU membership, and the regional concentration of
incomes and growth since opening up to
the EU, in order to better understand the
factors causing the leave vote.
It must be emphasised that this article
does not believe that a spread of benefits
could have contributed to making the
population less inclined to seek work. The
spread of benefits such as EAPs, etc, must
be seen as a symptom, not a cause, of
economic distress.
The increase in transfers might also
reflect pensions and old age benefits, in
which case the results above can be
interpreted as a backlash of older voters
in favour of an imagined notion of sovereignty and prosperity. In that case, the
role of structural transformation, the
loss of manufacturing, etc, and the
41
BREXIT EFFECT
reduction in gainful employment cease

to be meaningful explanations.
How does one explain anti-immigrant
rhetoric in this scenario? Just because
immigration does not turn out to be significant in a statistical sense in these exercises, it cannot be assumed that it did
not play a role. If the former hypothesis
is correct, and the increase in social security transfers does indicate a slowing
down of employment and livelihood
opportunities, then migrants become
more visible as an explanationhowever
wrongof ones economic distress.
When incomes are falling across the
42
board, domestic populations might turn

on migrants and hold them responsible
for reduced access to jobs, instead of
questioning the objective factors leading
to a loss of jobs in the first place.1
The point of this essay, however, is to
point to future avenues of research, having identified an important factor determining the leave vote. Discussions so far
have pointed to falling incomes, education, and the age of voters as possible
explanatory factors. The role of benefits
transfers is something that must now be
considered. The avenue for future research
lies in examining the precise mechanisms
by which benefits transfers influenced a

nation into making the decision to turn
its back on the European ideal.
Note
1
I am indebted to Gayatri Nair for making this

point clear to me.
References
Davies, Will (2016): Thoughts on the Sociology
of Brexit, Political Economy Research Centre,
24 June, http://www.perc.org.uk/project_
posts/thoughts-on-the-sociology-of-brexit/.
McGill, Andrew (2016): Who Voted for the Brexit?,
The Atlantic, 25 June, http://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2016/06/brexit-votestatistics-united-kingdom-european-union/
488780/.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
Fall of Market Democracy

in Europe
Shamba Dey
With the exit of Britain from the

European Union, this ambitious
supranational project now faces
a seemingly intractable political
crisis and a debate has ensued
over the legitimacy of the union
as a whole. As the sovereign debt
crisis unfolded in Europe,
neo-liberal economists and
politicians offered to solve
the problem by cutting back
spending. But, advocating
cutbacks according to the
principles of market democracy
created further political and
constitutional risks in Europe.
Shamba Dey (s.dey.8788@gmail.com) is at the

Indian School of Business, Hyderabad.
42
ean Monnet, considered the founding father of modern Europe, had

famously argued that economic
integration would be vital to eliminating
intercontinental conflict and, as Franco
Pavoncello put it, that the way to build
the new union was by taking steps toward
economic integration that would in turn
lead to political integration (Alessi and
McBride 2015). However, with the exit of
Britain from the European Union (EU),
this ambitious supranational project now
faces a seemingly intractable political
crisis and a debate has ensued over the
legitimacy of the union as a whole. This
article is an exposition of the failure of
the ideas that underlay not only the EU,
but much of the rest of the world.
After World War II, Europe adopted neoliberalism, which reposed full confidence
in market rationality. According to neoliberalism, markets are self-correcting
and self-stabilising, and they can allocate resources efficiently. Therefore, the
problems of market fluctuations have been
eliminated. It was also assumed that markets alone can serve the public interest.
Since markets can suo motu deliver such
results, there is no need for centralised
state planning. Planning was seen as
totalitarian. To borrow the words of Noam

Chomsky (1999: 20), under the neo-liberal
world order, the government should
get out of the wayhence the population too, insofar as the government is
democratic, though the conclusion remains implicit. The role of the state is
only to guarantee that markets can function efficiently, and markets, in turn,
will decide the distribution of goods and
services and wealth among all people.
Free Market Agenda
It was this thought process that underpinned the economics of Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the
so-called 10 principles of the Washington
Consensus (spearheaded by the United
States [US] Treasury, the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund
[IMF]), which propagated the mantra of
stabilize, privatize, and liberalize. The
political leaders who were the prize students of economists, like Friedrich von
Hayek (who strongly opposed social justice and state interventionism) and the
many advocates of the Washington Consensus, thus, leaned heavily towards privatisation, liberalisation, financialisation, deregulation, massive tax cuts for
the rich, corrosion of the bargaining
power of trade unions, and outsourcing
of public services. They let market forces
determine prices of commodities and let
central banks become independent with
a laser-like focus on inflation.
Thatchers shadow cabinet had ideologues like Keith Joseph, who persuaded
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
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her to adopt the free-market agenda and

even state that there is no alternative
(known as the TINA effect). Other libertarian economists like Milton Friedman
and the monetarists of the University of
Chicago also showed that inflation can
be tamed by monetary policy alone. They
paved the way for getting the government out of the way, leading to deregulation of financial and securities markets, thereby leaving economic policy to
the dictates of bankers and large corporations. The central banks, in turn,
allowed the process of diversification of
financial risks and ignored the role of
capital controls on banks.
As Tony Blair had unwittingly commented in support of liberalisation,
Success will go to those companies and
countries which are swift to adapt, slow
to complain, open and willing to change.
The task of modern governments is to
ensure that our countries can rise to this
challenge (Belisa and Hughes 2009:
32). Across Europe, this led to policies
that displaced Keynesianism in the 1970s,
encouraged competition among firms
causing a gradual decline of the appeal
of a welfare state, and helped the resurgence of Social Darwinism into the fabric
of Europe, perhaps more so after 11 September 2001. The greatest failure of neoliberalism, however, came in 2008 when
the world discovered, albeit painfully,
that instead of efficient allocation, there
has been an excessive misallocation of
resources to the housing market (for
example, in Spain). The repercussion of
this led to a widening gap between social
returns and private returns in Europe.
Neo-liberals had ignored the fact that
markets can create asset bubbles and
that the markets self-correcting mechanism may not deliver immediately.
Unequal Distribution
It would also not be hard to understand
the other ways in which neo-liberalism
led to distortions in income distributions.
In both the US and Britain, tax rates for
the high-income population started falling drastically as neo-liberalism gained
ground. Through the notions of supplyside economics, Reagan popularised the
idea of tax cuts for the wealthy, and the
top marginal tax rate was cut down from
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
70% to 28%. Likewise, Thatcher also cut

down the top marginal income tax rate
from 83% to 40% (Economist 2011).
Today, the bottom 20% in Britain pays
about 37.8% of their income in taxes,
while the top 20% pays about 34.8%
(Office for National Statistics nd).
If we look further, we can find that
free trade, which was the promise of
the EU, was nothing but an essential condition of neo-liberalism. The EU was
formed on the argument that instead of
treating Europe as a single market, firms
had been treating the continent in a segmented way, with local small producers
serving local zones, and that if unification
can be achieved by consolidation, there
will be substantive gains in productivity.
What they failed to see was that segmentation of the markets had existed because
of differences in cultural and consumer
preferences between people in the different countries of Europe.
It is true, however, that free trade raises
all boats and cooperation is beneficial to
all trading partners. As trade increases
by taking full advantage of economies of
scale and of comparative advantage,
there is economic growth and rising income. It is also true that it is always better to live in open societies than closed
ones, but it must be noted that this is not
enough. The question is perhaps not
whether free trade is better for everyone
than no trade, but the often ignored
question of whether there is a fair division of the benefits of free trade. In other
words, it is easy to overlook the fact that
free trade may result in distributing income across classes in an unequal way,
even though everyone benefits a little.
In the EU, free trade made labour mobility easier between high-income countries like Britain and low income countries like Greece and Portugal. This led
to convergence or equalisation of wages
across trading partners. In other words,
workers from poorer countries got a rise in
wages, but those in the richer countries
faced either a decline in wages or a rise
in unemployment. This is true both of
Britain and the US (in the US, wages of
unskilled workers have fallen because of
free-trade agreements with Mexico).
Youth unemployment in Britain among
males has risen since 2004 to about 18.4%
vol lI no 33
of the male labour force in 2014 (World

Bank nd). The corresponding figures for
the female workforce have also increased
2002 onwards to about 14% in 2014
(World Bank nd). Even in Germany, a
large percentage of the population has
experienced decline in their incomes.
Clearly, this has been a bad idea for
the working class, but it definitely benefited the designers and the corporate
elites. In Britain, London became a city
of people with a very high-income, with
very high real-estate prices, whereas the
rest of the country did not see such rises
in income or wealth. This was, in fact,
reflected in the voting pattern for Brexit,
with people from outside London voting
in favour of the exit, while those in London voting against it.
Debt Crisis
When the euro was created, the idea of a
single market made a lot of sense to neoliberal economists and their political
disciples. However, this idea assumed
perfect information and ignored that in
the real world, information is imperfect.
It can be easily argued that the problem
of moral hazard was pronounced in the
case of the southern states like Greece.
Prior to the Greek debt crisis, many German banks helped finance Greeces debt
(New York Times 2012), and Greece knew
very well that the IMF and the western
states would have to use bailout funds to
bear the cost of Greeces failure. This led
Greece to behave in fraudulent ways by
hiding the real size of its debt. The credit
markets also lent to Greece because they
assumed that the western states would
bear the costs and enable creditors to exit
without losses. Ultimately, taxpayers in the
western states, who had less information about the markets than these risktaking elites, were left at a disadvantage.
As the sovereign debt crisis unfolded
in Europe, neo-liberal economists and
politicians offered to solve the problem
by cutting back spending. But, advocating cutbacks according to the principles
of market democracy created further political and constitutional risks in Europe.
Austerity measures and cutbacks in welfare schemes affected the poor sections
of the population in Britain more than in
most other Organisation for Economic
43
BREXIT EFFECT
Co-operation and Development countries. On 9 December 2010, spending for

higher education and tuition subsidies
and assistance in English universities was
cut by 80% (Mulholland 2010). Students
in Britain took to the streets. As Brexit
has shown, it ruined the confidence in
the political class to solve the countrys
problems. It is the same sorry story elsewhere in Europe.
Germany favours austerity, but austerity has not delivered growth in Germany
or in the other countries. Germany
demanded austerity measures to curb
Greece, again through planned privatisation and cuts in the minimum wage, pensions, and the public sector workforce,
health care reforms, etc (in other words,
a smaller role for the government in line
with the neo-liberal views of the IMF).
Similar austerity measures were imposed on social protection expenditure,
public service pensions and the minimum wage for Ireland, and public sector
wages and employment, pensions, education, and health spending for Portugal.
By doing so, the EU, as well as Germany,
demonstrated that they could pressurise
and take away the sovereignty of other
member states over their budgetary and
fiscal policies, merely in exchange for
access to debt capital.
Deviation of Basic Rights
Solidarity and commonality of goals is
missing among Europes national governments because of the debt they
owe to each other. Germany felt that
the EU was not a transfer union and,
therefore, it had no obligation to help.
Somewhere in this bickering, the idea
that all EU countries are equal had lost
weight. First, while some parliaments
have been marginalised in the course
of these rescue measures, others like
Germany and France have been able
to maintain or even strengthen their position in EU affairs.
Second, in the attempts to protect the
European common good, the national
governments of the smaller members have
had to defend policies agreed on at the
European level and present their national parliaments with a fait accompli
... the national parliaments representation
claims are thwarted as particularistic and
44
parochial (Riekmann and Wydra 2013).

The role of the governments of the
smaller member states is reduced to a
level where they only have to ensure
balanced budgets through implementation of austerity reforms, and to act as a
debt collection agency for world capital
markets. Meanwhile the administration
of the union lies in the hands of the
more powerful states, and a group of
unelected European institutions and
technocrats (who are none other than
the bureaucrats).
German Constitutional Court
The budgetary reform measures enacted
by the EU institutions and handed out to
the member states during the sovereign
debt crisis have increasingly been subject to judicial reactions and to the scrutiny of courts. The courts have naturally
become critical of the dominance of the
executive branches over legislatures and
courts, and the prolonged violations of
national constitutions. Among the European courts, the most active one has
been the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany. German citizens had challenged the constitutionality of the reform measures as a violation of the right
of the Bundestag, the German Parliament to make decisions about the budget. It was alleged that the measures interfered with the right to democracy.
The Federal Constitutional Court
warned that if the German Bundestag
relinquishes its parliamentary budget
responsibility with the effect that it or a
future Bundestag can no longer exercise
the right to decide on the budget on its
own responsibility, then there will be a
violation of the German constitutional law
(German Federal Constitutional Court
2014). According to the court, [t]he
decision on public revenue and public
expenditure is a fundamental part of the
ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself (German Federal
Constitutional Court 2014). The court
repeatedly voiced concerns over the
reform measures and attempted to
strengthen the role of the Bundestag, by
stating that it is the only legitimate authority vested with the constitutionally
reserved powers to make decisions on
budgetary issues (Wendel 2013).
Portuguese Constitutional Court

Portugal received financial assistance
from the EU and the IMF, but the lenders
argued that the Portuguese public sector
was oversized and that it should be
reduced as a part of the conditions which
had to be fulfilled in order to obtain
bailout funds. Wage cuts in the public
sector were needed to guarantee recovery
(Directorate-General for Economic and
Financial Affairs 2011: 17). Soon after the
bailout, the Portuguese Constitutional
Court was asked to decide upon the constitutionality of the national budget law,
particularly with respect to provisions
for imposition of a retrospective tax, and
in another instance, on the reduction of
salaries of civil servants. The court held
that the Portuguese Constitution forbade
retrospective taxation and that the suspension of the holiday allowance payments and salary reductions of civil
servants was in breach of the principles of
equality and proportionality (Pires 2013).
While the court agreed that emergency
measures are needed to ensure economic
recovery, it also warned that the measures were justified only as long as the
situation demanded it, but anything beyond would be unjustified and unconstitutional. Again, in July 2012, nine out of
the 12 judges of the Portuguese Constitutional Court declared the provisions of
the 2012 Budget Law unconstitutional
(Tribunal Constitucional Portugal 2012).
This related to salary cuts and suspension of subsidies in the salaries of public
workers. The court pointed out that the
cuts had an adverse effect on the economic stability of the people. In April
2013, the same court again struck down
four austerity measures introduced in the
2013 National Budget Law, this time a tax
on unemployment and sickness benefits,
and cuts in wages and pensions (Pires
2013). In August 2013, and thereafter in
December 2013, the court further disagreed with the economic policy of the
Portuguese government (Economist 2013).
The Greek court, however, has deferred
to the Greek executive branches and upheld the austerity measures, giving enough
room for the emergency doctrine being
used to cut down constitutional rights.
The court considered the necessity of
austerity measures, but did not consider
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
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BREXIT EFFECT
the constitutionality of the reforms.

This, in turn, triggered violent protests.
Similarly, the Spanish courts also ignored the right to collective bargaining of
the public workforce as enshrined in their
constitutions and International Labour
Organization treaties, while in Belgium
and the Netherlands no legal proceedings were initiated. This gave these governments a chance to block the collective bargaining mechanism at the national levels, violating the very Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which
states explicitly that collective bargaining is considered a fundamental right in
the framework of the EU. And, the European Court of Justice has also failed to
factor in these elements in reviewing and
upholding the budgetary reforms within
the union. The dominant argument here
is that deviations of basic rights must always be prescribed in law and these
measures should be temporary and proportionate, which Europes leaders have
ignored in an attempt to defend and protect the operation of the markets.
It would not be wrong to state that the
managers of the EU have not yet struck a
balance between guaranteeing social
rights and implementing long-term

economic reforms. They have displayed
a remarkable disregard towards their
own Charter of Fundamental Rights and
a shift in attitude is necessary to overcome this democratic deficit and the distance between the people and the decision-makers. With Brexit, the EU and the
IMF need to recognise that its malfeasance with its idea of market democracy
has ultimately led to the instability of
the continent and generated more insecurity among large sections of people,
instead of the prosperity that was
promised through political unification
and economic cooperation.
References
Alessi, Christopher and James McBride (2015):
The Eurozone in Crisis, CFR Backgrounders,
February, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York/Washington DC, http://www.cfr.org/eu/
eurozone-crisis/p22055.
Bielsa, E and C Hughes (eds) (2009): Globalization,
Political Violence and Translation, London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Chomsky, Noam (1999): Profit Over People: Neo
liberalism and Global Order, New York: Seven
Stories Press.
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (2011): The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal, Occasional Papers 79,
June, European Commission, Belgium.
Economist (2011): Taxing the Wealthy: Diving into

the Rich Pool, 24 September, http://www.
economist.com/node/21530093.
(2013): Portugals Constitutional Court Creates
New Problem for the Euro, 13 April.
German Federal Constitutional Court (2014): Judgment of the Second Senate of 18 March 2014, 2
BvR 1390/12, paras 1-245, http://www.bverfg.
de/e/rs20140318_2bvr139012en.html.
Mulholland, Hlne (2010): Lib Dem Parliamentary
Aide Quits over Tuition Fees as MPs Prepare
Prepare to Vote, Guardian, 9 December.
New York Times (2012): In Euro Crisis, Fingers Can
Point in All Directions, 24 August.
Office for National Statistics (nd): The Effects of
Taxes and Benefits on Household Income,
2013/14 - Reference Tables,, http://www.ons.
gov.uk/ons/rel/household-income/the-effects-of-taxes-and-benefits-on-household-income/2013-2014/data--the-effects-of-taxesand-benefits-on-household-income--financialyear-ending-2014.xls.
Pires, Martinho Lucas (2013): Private versus Public
or State versus Europe? A Portuguese Constitutional Tale, Michigan Journal of Internation
al Law, Emerging Scholarship Project.
Riekmann, Sorja Puntscher and Doris Wydra (2013):
Representation in the European State of Emergency: Parliaments against Governments?
Journal of European Integration, Vol 35, No 5,
pp 56582.
Tribunal Constitucional Portugal (2012): Judgement no 353/2012, Case no 40/12.
Wendel, Mattias (2013): Judicial Restraint and the
Return to Openness: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM
and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012,
German Law Journal, Vol 14, pp 2132.
World Bank (nd): Unemployment, Youth Male
(% of Male Labor Force Ages 1524) (Modeled
ILO Estimate), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS?locations=GB.
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW AUGUST 13, 2016 vol lI no 33
45
BREXIT EFFECT
Losers Poker
A Negative Institutional Disruption
Sumit K Majumdar
The Brexit decision has been an

act of self-marginalisation by
Britain, with an anti-immigrant
stance having driven Brexit.
Economically and politically,
this catastrophe may involve
rethinking of the need for union
among the different components
making up the United Kingdom.
The purveyors of Brexit were
playing a game of losers poker,
which they have won. They have
achieved Brexit and potentially
destroyed a nation, now in a state
of extremely high institutional
disruption.
Sumit K Majumdar (majumdar@utdallas.edu)

teaches Technology Strategy at the University
of Texas, Dallas, US.
46
he Brexit decision to leave the

European Union (EU) has been a
collective act of complete selfmarginalisation. Britains strategy has
boomeranged. The political economy of
the United Kingdom (UK) is on life
support. Britain is in a state of high institutional disruption.
To understand why Brexit has happened, it is useful to appreciate the sociology of political leadership in Britain. By
and large, political leadership in Britain
has emerged from the rosters of Oxford
University, where students are instructed
to go forth and govern, and that the entire
world needs their leadership. Even if
physically colonies no longer exist, Oxford
students are taught to go forth and colonise less fortunate minds that belong to
the rest of the world.
The imagined world is one of a demographically pure and glorious past when
Britain, run by the ancestors of this
group, was the worlds source of manufactured output, technology, capital, and
ideas. Into this romantic idyll, the little
matter of immigration, fuelled by globalisation, has intruded and altered the
human composition of Britain by creating
a vulgar heterogeneity. Additional vulgarities have included dealing with the
diversities of processes that go with being a part of a globalised world, and one
way to lessen the dissonances of diversity
and heterogeneity-driven vulgarities is
to state: Stop the world; I am getting
off! Hence, Brexit.
Human beings are mobile creatures,
and this mobility has meant the diffusion
of numerous ethnicities over the world.
The simple fact is that one lot of ethnicities that might have got to a place a bit earlier becomes resentful of another ethnicity subsequently usurping its place. This
turf protection is a simple, straightforward and repetitive biological phenomenon in which perceived losers in an
evolutionary race engage.
Today is the social media age. There is

instant diffusion of rage. This particular
contingence of high-speed angst delivery
has been very well used by the purveyors
of Brexit to whip up ethnically oriented
sentiments in the favour of the losers
turf protection by means of a departure
of Britain from the EU.
However, there is no resetting the
clock of human evolution. Brexit purveyors have not realised that they have
been playing a game of high-stakes losers poker. In this game, a result for exit
might be construed as a cultural victory.
It would, however, be an institutional
disruption leading to major political and
economic catastrophe; a loss of mega
magnitude.
The economic catastrophe for Britain
will occur in 10 categories: (i) the loss of
trade preferences, (ii) the loss of community funding, (iii) the loss of jobs, (iv) the
loss of manufacturing capacity, (v) the
loss of scale economies, (vi) the loss of
institutional scope, (vii) the loss of
market access, (viii) the loss of solidarity
in political economy, (ix) the loss of
international credibility, and (x) classification downgrading it from a major important global player to a humble local
country player.
The political components of this catastrophe would involve the engendering
of complete rethinking of the need for
union among the different components
of the nation that is the UK today.
Globalisation and Immigration
An anti-immigrant stance has been the
leitmotif of the Brexit movement. While,
now, it is no use suggesting to those
who supported Brexit to show that free
trade has been excellent for prosperity,
immigration is one major aspect of
trade. In trade, it is not just goods and
services that cross borders, but also capital. It is the free flow of capital, as we
know it, which has brought prosperity
to the world.
Capital has many manifestations. The
key type of capital that has made the
world what it is has been human capital.
The history of humanity is the record of
the flow of people from one place to
another in the course of the last 1,00,000
to 2,00,000 years. It has been the
AUGUST 13, 2016
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BREXIT EFFECT
free flow of people that has generated

innovation and productivity everywhere.
It has been the free flow of people
that has brought about the richness of
lifes experiences, as we know it today,
and enhanced the scope of all human
activities.
Immigration creates its own tensions.
One tension is that as a system becomes
more integrated, its constituent parts
seek to be more differentiated. Hence,
the greater the immigration and integration via globalisation, the greater the
propensity of ethnic natives to seek differentiation. These have been the tensions
between global integration and local
assertiveness. Since our advent on earth,
mankind has attempted to resolve these
tensions. In the broadest sense, advances
in human civilisation have been about
harnessing the creativity engendered by
individual variety via integration and
interdependence.
What ensures integration and interdependence is assimilation. Immigration
is a law of nature, an expression of a
biological urge associated with the
human condition, and assimilation has
meant the diffusion of human species to
enrich the world. In all melting pots,
the assimilation of different varieties of
humanity into a common social framework has ensured that differences are
minimised, and that commonalities are
accentuated. Societies thereby become
integrated and people interdependent
on each other.
To deny the human logic of immigration, as the Brexit purveyors have done,
is to deny the existence of the natural
process inherent in human evolution. To
cap it all, economists have established a
clear, positive, and significant correlation
between immigration and economic development. Globalisation, of the movement
of people, has been good for growth.
In a recent survey, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD 2014) has established that immigrants have accounted for 70% of workforce increase in Europe in the last decade. These immigrants have been better
educated than those retiring and have
provided flexibility to labour markets.
Immigrants have contributed more in
taxes and social security contributions
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AUGUST 13, 2016
than they might have received in benefits. They have boosted the population of
working-age individuals and have arrived with skills contributing to the human capital of countries where they
have resettled.
Evaluating the impact of immigration
on Britains labour markets, which has
been the principal economic factor driving the pro-Brexit broadcast, the British
governments Home Office and the
Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (2014) have found little evidence
that migration has caused significant
displacement of natives from the British
labour market in periods when the economy is strong. There has been little evidence so far of a significant impact from
European migration on native employment. Where displacement effects have
been observed, these have tended to be
concentrated on lower-skilled natives.
Where there has been a displacement
effect from a particular cohort, this dissipates over time, as immigrants are
assimilated into the economy.
A survey (Kerr and Kerr 2011) of the
academic literature on migration impact
established that immigrants do not have
it as good as the natives, and they experience lower employment and wages at
entry. Even though these differences
diminish, migrants experience permanently weakened labour market success.
Thus, the likelihood of adverse labour
market effects from immigration are
much weaker for natives than perceived
and quite overstated.
The common man in Britain might
feel put out because much of the states
resources go to support newcomers. This
fear has been used to make their case by
Brexit purveyors. As immigrants are
often outside the labour market, it is
assumed that they spend more time on
welfare and social assistance relative to
natives. This assumption is not confirmed. Immigration is viewed negatively as a burden on public finances as
well; however, the empirical estimates
of the scale of fiscal impact of immigration show trivial impact.
All of these arguments have not mattered to the purveyors of the Brexit campaign. They have sought to engender a
social structure based on a medieval
vol lI no 33
ethnic exclusivity unconscionable in the

21st century.
Economic Consequences
Much of the debate as to whether the
referendum vote should have been in
favour of staying in the EU has hinged on
economic consequences. Immigration,
as noted, has broadly positive and not
negative consequences.
A focus on economic consequences is
correct, since living standards and the
quality of life matter. The line consistently taken by agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
the Bank of England and the treasury
have extolled the positive economic consequences of staying in. Given the decision to leave, just a month later Brexits
negative economic consequences are being felt. In the banking sector, a key driver
of the British economy, the Lloyds Banking Group has announced plans to eliminate 3,000 jobs and close 200 branches
to save 400 million annually, as Brexit
would reduce the capital generated.
An important sector in Britain is automobile manufacturing. This sector contributes heavily to the British balance of
trade as well as to high quality jobs.
Also, all of the sectors key players are
global firms, such as Ford and General
Motors from the United States, Honda and
Nissan from Japan, and Jaguar Land Rover,
now owned by Indias Tata Group.
Already Ford, the largest British brand,
has stated that it plans on closing factories and raising prices in Britain, in the
light of Brexit. All automotive firms have
made Britain a manufacturing hub because
of access to the European market. Ford
and General Motors possess manufacturing facilities in Europe, to which all
production can be transferred immediately. Other economies will be the beneficiaries of the manufacturing jobs transferred from Britain.
Companies such as Honda and Nissan
have set up world-class and scale manufacturing facilities in Britain. These companies were attracted by the benefits of
participating in the European economy
by locating themselves in a member of
the EU. Were these economic benefits
to disappear, after Brexit, there are
no historical ties holding back these
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BREXIT EFFECT
firms from transferring their manufacturing plants to European countries.

Many Eastern European countries, new
EU members, have advanced automotive
infrastructure. For such countries to gain
substantial jobs and investments, because of the Brexit embarrassment that
Britain has caused itself, is an indication
of Britain having played losers poker.
Political Geography Consequences
The Brexit winners will compromise the
political integrity of the UK. Many latent
groups are going to be emotionally emboldened to demand their perceived
competence and seek autonomy that celebrates their individuality. The Brexit vote
will generate a domino effect with unexpected and unforeseen consequences.
Scotland: Emboldened by the Brexit
result, Scotland will want to be free from
the UK. In the referendum, Scotland
wanted to stay in Europe. The 2014
Scottish independence referendum was
a close-run thing, and since then the
Scottish National Party (SNP) has gone
from strength to strength. The SNP-led
government in Edinburgh has already
demanded a seat at the Brexit negotiation table, and, in less than a few years,
the Scots will clamour to leave the UK.
London: For all purposes, those of original native origin are now a numerical
minority in London. The population of
London is driven by immigrants, contributing to the fabric of society. Almost
all of Londons wealth is generated by
immigrants, and London contributes
much of the British gross domestic
product (GDP). If Londoners want to enjoy their own created wealth, it will be
logical for London to seek to become a
city state. After all, Londoners wanted
to stay on in Europe. Londoners did not
want Brexit.
There are numerous instances of small
city states that work well, generating
wealth. Singapore is a good example.
Hong Kong, though not the same any
more, works equally well. Hence, it is
likely that Londons political leadership
will want a seat at the negotiating table,
and will have set in motion processes
leading to the city states creation.
48
Ulster: The Irishs troubles are simmering below the surface. Peace is recent and
fragile. The borders between Northern
and Southern Ireland have only recently
been opened.
Ireland was partitioned into the separate countries now called Ireland and
Northern Ireland, the latter being a part of
Great Britain and also called Ulster. Ireland is a part of the EU. In the referendum,
Northern Ireland voted to stay on in the EU.
The Irish see themselves as Europeans.
Should Brexit happen, then Northern
Irelands borders with Southern Ireland
will close, and standard border control
processes will apply. Given an Irish
predilection to be European, this may
motivate Northern Ireland and Southern
Ireland to get together. This can happen as
a result of a merger, such that all of Ireland
is one country within Europe. A United
Ireland can be Brexits consequence.
Alternatively, Northern Ireland can
wish to go solo, detach from Great Britain,
re-invent itself as Ulster, and get back
into Europe. Then, both parts of Ireland
can be self-governing entities as members of the EU.
Bradfordistan: Perhaps the deep-rooted
desire of the British to go solo emanates
from the heart of England. At this heart
of England, the domino effect may have
its most evocative outcome.
In every major British city, such as
Birmingham, Bradford, Chesterfield,
Luton, Coventry, Derby, Hull, Leeds,
Leicester, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oldham, Sheffield and Wolverhampton, there is a sizeable non-native
immigrant population from all over the
world. This group of urban humanity
contributes the bulk of the economic
product of the regions. The immigrants
have their own individual identities, and
contribute materially to a collective
identity for the region. At some point,
the collective ethnic identity across the
urban areas will demand scope for
political self-expression and desire to be
autonomous. This region has GDP of a
compelling magnitude, and the desire
for the residents to be masters of their
own destiny cannot be denied.
Collectively, the urban centres and the
rural hinterlands making up these cities
can desire to go solo as Bradfordistan.

The capital of Bradfordistan can be
Oldhamabad. This city, once known as
Oldham, will be at the centre of the conurbations joining hands together.
As London becomes a city state, the
political geography will change. London
comprises not just the traditional postal
districts, but also the outer areas. Hence,
the new political boundaries of the
London city state will be London, plus
Middlesex, the western part of Essex,
the northern part of Surrey, the eastern
part of Buckinghamshire, the southern
part of Hertfordshire, and the northern
part of Kent.
The 15 major cities that will be part of
Bradfordistan will be located in the
counties of Leicestershire, Derbyshire,
Durham, Nottinghamshire, Warwickshire,
Staffordshire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Lancashire and Bedfordshire. These counties,
where much of the non-London British
GDP is now generated, will make up
Bradfordistan.
England: What remains of England that
was the Brexit purveyors dream? England
will comprise of Wales, because the Welsh
wanted to leave Europe, and the following counties: the southern part of Kent,
Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Oxfordshire,
Sussex, the southern part of Surrey,
Somerset, Norfolk, Suffolk, Dorset, Devon,
Lincolnshire, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Shropshire, Herefordshire, Northumberland,
Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, the eastern part of Essex, the northern part of
Hertfordshire, Somerset, Devon, Cornwall and the western part of Buckinghamshire. The Brexit purveyors dream, in
the sense of territory, will have been fulfilled. They will have won a geographic
battle. But, they will have lost the economic and political war. Outcomes of
playing losers poker will strike at the
heart of all human living conditions.
The Balkanisation of Britain is now
done. The Brexit domino effect is coming into play, with Scotland already
making moves to go solo, and, the way
that modern communications discourses
work, the process will commence accelerating soon.
In two generations, or even one, what is
now Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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will have become many separate nations,

such as Scotland, Ulster, London and
Bradfordistan. The bit that remains
will be England. England will still be a
reasonable country, and would be able
to sustain itself and survive; just as
numerous small EU countries do.
A Great Institutional Disruption
Those who have yelled Brexit have set in
motion a domino effect to destroy the
very fabric of English and British civilisation and political organisation that,
hitherto, had been painstakingly evolved
into something which, while not perfect,
was a useful model of tolerance and
innovation. As it stands, Brexit has been
a negative institutional disruption of
severe magnitude.
It is important to spell out what an
institutional disruption is. Institutions are
societal rules influencing behaviour and
outcomes, and they delineate a particular context (Majumdar 2016). Cognitive
factors (Meyer and Rowan 1977) define the
way institutional forces impact behaviour,
because their logics shape behaviour via
effects on perceptions (North 2005). The
constraints of institutional rules influence
social interactions by providing incentives
for regularity of behaviour (Greif 1998).
The role of institutional logics is to shape
the behaviour of individuals by the provision of social norms (Jackall 1988),
where behaviour is driven by the appropriate logic (March and Olsen 1989).
Radical changes in the underlying
assumptions of institutional frameworks
trigger radical changes in behaviour as a
consequence of responding to institutional changes (North 2005), since brandnew rules are being formulated and
applied. Such institutional changes can
be classified as institutional disruptions.
An institutional disruption is equivalent
to a phase transition that drives social
physics. Institutional disruptions as events
lead to powerful reactions (Hagen 1962),
and to a break in existing social symmetry (Ball 2004), so that a tipping point
occurs after which things are never the
same (Gladwell 2000).
Economically, the rules of the game
have changed with Brexit, as Britain
may no longer remain a part of the EU.
What relationships will endure, after
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AUGUST 13, 2016
withdrawal, and what new ones are put

in place are as yet not known? What
regulations and laws will apply, and what
logics will develop are also unknown?
Such uncertainties have created an economic upheaval that has disrupted growth.
The first victim of the great negative
institutional disruption has been the relative standing of the British currency,
which has dropped in value sharply.
Since the institutional uncertainties
are so great, and institutional rules, regulations, and laws have to be very wellestablished for the all-important financial sector of London to prosper, and be
the key global location of choice for businesses, there may be a rapid mass migration of financial sector entities, agencies
and organisations to congenial homes.
The institutional disruption may have
claimed a major victim. The more welcoming financial sectors of Europe such
as Frankfurt, Paris and Zurich can
immediately attract business and talent.
Londons loss will be their gain. Such
transfers of activities can be carried out
very fast in a digital age.
The great institutional disruption that
is Brexit can very rapidly cripple the
existing British economy by fatally compromising the health of its most important constituent, the financial sector.
In the automotive sector, Ford has
announced departure intentions. It is not
long before others follow suit. There are
numerous countries in the EU that will
be glad for the new jobs and associated
manufacturing capabilities that will accompany the establishment of new plants.
With Brexit, the potentially altered
immigration rules and regulations will
have caused a major institutional disruption, since no investor will be sure of
what new visitation, employment, or
settlement rules will be.
Brexit will alter the social physics so
dramatically that Britain, as currently
politically organised, may no longer be an
attractive destination. The toxic miasma
of failure will put off most persons from
doing business with Britain. Complex
behavioural uncertainties will lead to
the drying-up of all future investments,
especially in services, where the assets
are human ones. Other people will no
longer tolerate British egregiousness.
vol lI no 33
Radical changes in the underlying

assumptions of institutional frameworks
affecting the political organisation of
the UK can lead to the emergence of five
nation states: Bradfordistan, England,
London, Scotland, and Ulster. The fundamental question a current British resident
will ask is: do I want to be Bradfordistani? English? A Londoner? A Scot? Or
an Ulsterperson? This will be an existential identity crisis to hit the institutionally disrupted post-Brexit society.
What Now?
Britain has stood on the brink of
an abyss. And, it has leapt into it. The
outcome has been a ghastly negative
institutional disruption. The purveyors
of Brexit were playing a game of losers
poker, which they have won. They
have achieved Brexit and potentially
destroyed a nation.
Going ahead, if the requisite notice
under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon
is not given soon, and the desire to withdraw intimated to the EU, the British
government will have lost all domestic
credibility with the voting public that
makes up the present-day UK, and with
all other EU countries. No one will trust
the British government any longer. No
one will do business with the new government. Nor will the British government have the ability to make further
credible commitments. This will be a
British government that does not implement the wishes of a majority of the nations population. There will be a government in office, but not governing. It
cannot give its word, because it will not
be believed that it keeps its word.
If the British government does invoke
Article 50 to negotiate departure, they
are damned. The British economy will
plummet like a stone in water. Millions
of livelihoods will be compromised. The
UK will break up into five countries. Of
these, will Ulster be more material
because it will rejoin and be a part of
the EU? Scotland too, because it will get
to be a part of the EU? London as well,
because it will have the financial sector
and be a part of the EU?
The present British counties that generate economic value will have gone on
to become Bradfordistan, and other
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BREXIT EFFECT
nations will deal with this new nation.

The residual England and Wales will be
inconsequential. It will be a trivial collection of counties with no economic
product of any value.
The Way Forward?
So, what does it all mean? Can selfdestruction be avoided? The British, by
winning, have lost so comprehensively that
there might be no getting out of the predicament. Only once in the history of mankind might a nation collectively commit a
biological impossibility. So far, it seems
that Brexit could be such an occasion!
Is there a way forward? The Brexit referendum result was a non-binding recommendation to government that Britain
exit the EU. The actual withdrawal act
would have substantial constitutional and
international ramifications, and would
have to be ratified by Parliament. Engaging in the war against Iraq in 2003 had
required parliamentary approval.
Brexit would be an act of much greater
constitutional consequence, and the act
of withdrawing from the EU would have
50
to be put to the British Parliament. Not

doing so, but giving the Article 50 notice
might be an act that was ultra vires the
unwritten British constitution. Should
the notice be accepted by the EU and the
exit process undertaken, in the absence
of British parliamentary approval, the
EU would have perhaps acquiesced in an
illegal and unconstitutional act.
The resulting international institutional,
legal and constitutional mess would be
horrendously difficult to unravel. It might
thus be that a new, and this time binding, referendum is needed to activate
the Brexit process.
If it seems, prima facie, that the current
Brexit result may have been based on inadequate or false premises, it is rendered
invalid in the first place. Hence, it is vital
that any way forward be only based on
the detailed evaluation of the exact constitutional position as to how Brexit can
be achieved.
References
Ball, P (2004): Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads
to Another, London: Arrow Books.
Gladwell, M (2000): The Tipping Point: How Little

Things Can Make a Big Difference, Boston:
Little, Brown.
Greif, A (1998): Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis, American Economic Review,
Vol 88, No 2, pp 8084.
Hagen, E E (1962): On the Theory of Social Change:
How Economic Growth Begins, Homewood,
IL: Dorsey Press.
Home Office and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2014): Impacts of Migration on
UK Native Employment: An Analytical Review
of the Evidence, Occasional Paper 109, March,
Government of the United Kingdom, London.
Jackall, R (1988): Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate
Managers, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kerr, S P and W R Kerr (2011): Economic Impacts
of Immigration: A Survey, Working Paper
16736, January, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA.,
Majumdar, S K (2016): Pricing Regulations and
Network Technology Investments: A Retrospective Evaluation, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol 87, No 1, pp 2353.
March, J and J P Olsen (1989): Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics,
New York: Free Press.
Meyer, J W and B Rowan (1977): Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and
Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology,
Vol 83, No 2, pp 34063.
North, D C (2005): Understanding the Process of
Economic Change, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
OECD (2014): Is Migration Good for the Economy?,
Migration Policy Debates No 2, May, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
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The Big Exit and

Its Global Bricolage
Sachin Nikarge
The overall ramifications of Brexit

are broadly reminiscent of the
fault lines of culture and politics
that marked Francis Fukuyamas
The End of History and Samuel
Huntingtons The Clash of
Civilizations. An examination
of the effect and quality of
the existence of the liberal
democratic state vis--vis the
cultural geography of the world.
Sachin Nikarge (sachinikarge@gmail.com) is a
former development sector professional. His
interests lie at the intersection of political
philosophy, aesthetics, and cultural studies. He
currently manages the Fulbright Program.
50
ost the shocking exit of the United

Kingdom (UK) from the European
Union (EU), the media has been
afloat with voices from a wide spectrum
of dispositionspoliticians, columnists,
opinion makers and intelligentsiataking
stock of the phenomenon, even while attempting to chart a future course of action.
Notwithstanding the expression of a
multitude of predicaments and scenarios,
assessments in the public sphere are
largely confined to the economic and
political domains. However, to eschew
the cultural inflections of the split would
be tantamount to avoiding playing with
a straight bat.
Brexit has bubbled up during a period
of slow-but-steady growth, high inequality, and wage stagnation; economic
conditions that rankle voters, but do not

obsess them. So, when the world tries to
make sense of Britains vote to leave the
EU, one invariably ponders over the
plausibility of a link between racist and
intolerant attitudes in Britain and its
animosity towards the EU.
Such a link is not unfamiliar. Accusations of racism have followed the anti-EU
movement for some years. In the days
preceding the referendum, the man alleged to have shot and stabbed British
Member of Parliament Jo Cox, a proremain campaigner, had reportedly
raised the Britain first slogan and had
links with the United States (US) white
supremacy groups. Data from Google
trends show a sudden spike in searches
for Brexit racist and Brexit xenophobia on the day the results of the referendum became known. There was no
shortage of people on social media suggesting a link between these factors and
the results of the referendum.
In the heated atmosphere before the
referendum, the lines between antiimmigration rhetoric and pure racism
AUGUST 13, 2016
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BREXIT EFFECT
might have become blurry. But after the

referendum, even the continued existence of the UK itself became suspect.
While a substantial majority of people in
England voted for Brexit, a large majority
of Scots voted to stay in the EU. Some
early reports suggested that Scots may
now vote to secede from the UK in order
to rejoin the EU. Secession was defeated
in a Scottish referendum in September
2014, but still got a solid 45% of the vote.
Brexit might tip Scottish opinion in the
direction of independence.
Fukuyama and Huntington
The immediate practical question that
emerges is whether an adroit statesmanship could have plausibly curtailed the
British split from the EU. But the overall
ramifications of Brexitthe ethnic
racial pulls and the inability of parliamentary processes to manage these tensionsare broadly reminiscent of the
fault lines that marked Francis Fukuyamas The End of History? (1989) and
Samuel Huntingtons The Clash of Civilizations? (1993). Both propositions were
put forth in the context of the termination of the Cold War. Fukuyama argued
for a wide-ranging consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy
as a system of government throughout
the world.
He claimed that such global consensus
for liberal democracy denoted the end
point of mankinds ideological evolution
and this final form of human government, therefore constituted the end of
history (Fukuyama 1989: 4). In his
analysis, the injustices or social problems confronting erstwhile democracies
were only a result of the incomplete
implementation of the twin principles of
liberty and equality.
Although a teacher to Fukuyama,
Samuel Huntington fundamentally disapproved of Fukuyamas thesis. The essential condition of Huntingtons broad
argument was that the end of the Cold War
would usher in solidification of regional
entities, leading to sustained conflicts
centred around peoples cultural and religious identities. Approximately over two
and a half decades since the end of the
Cold War, the world has witnessed internecine national and international conflicts,
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AUGUST 13, 2016
spearheaded by 9/11, and an unprecedented rise in the scale of and rhetoric

against what has been termed as global
terrorism. Now, the UKs impending exit
from the EU signals another most significant event since the end of communism, and its global implications will
continue to unfold in the months and
years to come.
It would be imprudent to take sides
with either of the cultural or political
meta-theoretical propositions put forth
by Fukuyama and Huntington. Yet, one
would be hard pressed to dismiss the
argument that the prevalent conflicts
across the world can be delineated precisely at the fault lines of culture and
politics. In other words, it is still very
insightful to probe the questions and
categories that seemed to validate these
two germane post-Cold War propositions. I propose a typology of three global
cultural narrativesrevivalist, transformative, and hybrid, and only surmise
a hypothetical novel fourth vignette
that provides a handle on the extant
cultural flows.
To be fair to Fukuyama, one cannot
deny the expanding consensus on the
legitimacy of liberal democracy. After
the Cold War, there has been significant
increase in the number of states taking
up the liberal democratic model. However, to be accurate, it is also important
to note that the uptake of democracy
has tapered since 2006. According to
Larry Diamond, a democracy expert at
Stanford,
Around 2006, the expansion of freedom
and democracy in the world came to a prolonged halt. Since 2006, there has been no
net expansion in the number of electoral
democracies, which has oscillated between
114 and 119 (about 60% of the worlds states)
... The number of both electoral and liberal
democracies began to decline after 2006
and then flattened out. (2015: 142)
Liberal Democratic State

Nonetheless, in a multipolar and hyperconnected world, the presence of the liberal democratic state does not guarantee
that conflicts would necessarily be kept
at bay. The scene and plot of contemporary
conflicts are spread geographically, both
across the countries that are embroiled
in sectarian conflicts (like Syria) and as a
vol lI no 33
result are struggling to set up institutions

of governance, as well as countries that
have a strong tradition and set-up of democracy. This is not to discount the positive spread of democracies, but only to
ponder over the effect and quality of
their existence.
Even the strongly entrenched and
established democratic states fall short
of curtailing the effects of terror borne
on completely foreign soil. The state and
its various mechanisms of governance
can only (if at all, and at best) act as
after-effects for the entirely fluid crossnational influences that easily populate
global popular culture through a variety
of mediated environments and interfaces,
including the world wide web. Confused
Orlando shooter Omar Mateen, Sallah
Abdeslam and his associates in Molenbeek
(Belgium), and John Walker Lindh
(American Taliban) are only select examples among countless others, driven
by geographically distant yet mediated
phenomena that ultimately transform
the mediated populace in the throes of
fluid global cultural flows.
At the outset, one could be compelled
to agree with Huntington (even hesitatingly) that contemporary conflicts across
the world are increasingly centred around religious, national, ethnic, or cultural grounds. Yet, the mediated ecology
of cultural production and consumption
brings together such differences in unforeseen ways so as to construct hyphenated artefacts and hybridised identities
that are not necessarily conflicting. Closer
to home, post-1990s Bollywood has
repeatedly fashioned cinematic products
that are shot in far-flung locales, from
Cairo to Corsica and Switzerland, etc.
The Bollywood audience is equally at
home in consuming these cinematographic acts in the closed confines of
movie theatres, even while reconciling
with the pedestrian realities of their
lives outside the cinema halls.
Brexit is undoubtedly a product of
such mediated realities. Primarily caught
in the spiral of an ongoing war in distant
West Asia and faced with the prospect of
an influx of refugees from the war-torn
nations, Brexit is a quintessential example
of a polity that has turned inward in the
face of only a looming potential threat.
51
BREXIT EFFECT
From Nigel Farage to Donald Trump and

Marine Le Pen, Brexit is a loose case of
an archetype termed as revivalism, this
time in the name of national interest,
and even paradoxically under the banner of sovereignty and freedom itself.
With Brexit, the EU is done for. It has
provided a decisive jolt to a pragmatic
yet most modern and ambitious transnational project of open borders; even as
52
Britain itself has curled into a revivalist

cul-de-sac. Irrespective of the content,
the tropes of revivalism, transformation,
and functional hybridisation remain
widely prevalent across the cultural geography of the world. One could only
wish that the lessons from the failure of
this transnational experiment, combined with a seasoned and strategic cognisance of the extant cultural tropes
would lead to constructing truly novel

and genuinely robust cosmopolitan
futures for the world.
References
Diamond, Larry (2015): Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, Journal of Democracy, Vol 26,
No 1, pp 14155.
Fukuyama, Francis (1989): The End of History?
National Interest, Summer, pp 318.
Huntington, Samuel (1993): The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Vol 72, pp 2249.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
Europe after Britains Departure

Community to Nation State
Bharat Wariavwalla
Britains vote to leave the

European Union on 23 June 2016
will no doubt form the subject
of books, doctoral theses and
articles for years to come. Like
9/11 which witnessed planes
crashing into the World Trade
Centre in the US, the dropping
of bombs on 6 August 1945 on
Japan, and even the storming
of the Bastille by the French on
14 July 1789, the day the British
made this historical decision is a
richly symbolic date.
Bharat Wariavwalla (wariavwalla@yahoo.com)

is an Honorary Fellow at the Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.
52
t is difficult to understand a historical

event in its entirety.
Britains exit from the European
Union (EU) has multiple causes and many
consequences. Gender, sex, race and immigration, economic welfare, globalisation, and something as elusive as national
pride all went into the exit vote. Geographically, the exit votes came largely
from north England, the rust belt as the
Americans call it, where all old industries (steel, forging, shipyards, etc) are
located and where people feared loss of
jobs to the immigrants besides not experiencing much benefit from Britains
association with the EU. The south,
southwest and London City all voted
remain. This part of the country lives on
services, banking and finance and is
well integrated into the EU economy.
The young, especially those between
the ages of 18 and 24, solidly voted
remain as did the Scots and Irish from
Ulster. The leave voters were predominantly over 65 years old.
Nostalgia for Britains glorious past
was also at play. Boris Johnson, who led
a populist, rhetorical, jingoist campaign,
talked of 23 June as independence day.
Pax Britannia would once again rule the
oceans, Johnson often said during the
campaign. Immigration was another issue
that figured centrally in the exitremain
referendum. Johnson evoked the spectre
of a million Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians
landing in the United Kingdom (UK),
playing on the real fear among Europeans

of massive immigration from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Nearly 10% of the
UKs workforce consists of immigrants,
and a large influx of immigrants from
other countries is a major European concern. This brings to mind the Assam
elections in India that turned on the
question of illegal Bangladeshi migrants.
And, intimately connected with immigration from Muslim countries is the
fear of terrorism. Both these issues are
linked in European minds, as numerous
surveys show. Most Europeans believe
that Islam is an intolerant religion and
therefore breeds terrorism, according to
these surveys. An event like the recent
one in Nice, where a French Tunisian
drove a truck through a crowd celebrating Bastille Day (14 July 2016), or the
Brussels bombings on 22 March 2016
feeds the existing animosity towards the
Muslims settled in Europe and the Islamic world in general.
The real problem now for Britain and
other EU members is how they can work
out the separation in ways that will still
leave space for economic cooperation,
and a possibility, remote at the moment,
of Britains return to the EU on different
terms. Both need each other. Britain is
the second largest economy of Europe and
London is the most important financial
centre of the world. It provides invaluable financial services to the EU, which
in turn is very important for Britain as
over half its exports go there. Sometimes, a messy marriage is better than a
clean separation
But, the new Prime Minister Theresa
May wants the separation to take place.
On assuming her new office, she said,
exit means exit, full stop. An exit entails
huge losses for the British economy, and
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BREXIT EFFECT
she knows it. Some influential opinionmakers on both sides of the channel say
that perhaps a Norway-type arrangement may be possible. Norway is outside
the EU but has full access to the EUs single
market, since it accepts the main principle
of the EUfreedom of movement. However, this is the sticking point for Britain.
In the remainleave referendum this was
the main point of contention. Johnson
who led the leave campaign frightened
citizens with the spectre of a million
Turks descending on Britain. But, on this
issue of freedom of movement, there is
no meeting ground between the EU and
Britain. The German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, often called, and rightly so, the
Chancellor of Europe, warned against
cherry-picking: if Britain wants access to
the European single market, it must also
accept the EU principle of free movement
of peoples.
The referendum also put the focus on
a problem that the occupants of 10
Downing Street did not seem to have
taken seriouslythe dissolution of the
UK. The Scots agreed to stay in the UK
in the 2014 referendum provided that
England stays in the EU. The same is the
case with Northern Ireland. Both Scottish
and Irish leaders have talked of leaving
the UK in order to join the EU. What an
irony of history then that the UK
emerged from the union of England and
Scotland in 1707 and today this ancient
kingdom faces dissolution. What will
remain will be a little England.
The referendum has raised questions
in the minds of citizens of those countries where issues of immigration, globalisation and terrorism are of concern.
Asia too is faced with the same issues.
Members of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)Canada, US
and Mexicotoo are contending with
the same problems.
Of course there are terrible simplifiers
(as the French say) who argue that there
are clear solutions to these problems. US
presidential candidate Donald Trump
says he would build a wall between the
US and Mexico to keep Mexicans out. This
referendum has deeply disturbed the
politics of many EU countries. Marine Le
Pen, leader of the anti-immigrant, racist
party, the National Front, has asked for
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
a similar referendum. Say Non or Oui,

Le Pen tells the French. So does Geert
Wilders of the Dutch anti-immigrant
party and other such parties in Austria,
Italy and Portugal. Even the peaceful,
prosperous Scandinavian countries, the
civilised outposts of the West, as Arthur
Koestler once called them, have a growing anti-immigrant racist right.
It is important to understand something not understood in India at all. This
right is not a right in the economic sense,
for a free market economy and minimal
state. It is a right that valorises race and
ethnicity, and ensures the state control
of the economy. To view it in the Indian
context Rajagopalachari, Minoo Masani
and J B Kripalani were against Nehru and
the licence-permit raj but were solidly
for a constitutional liberal democracy.
The Indian right that corresponds to the
European right is the Hindu right, the
Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang
Dal, Shiv Sena and a part of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP).
The National Socialist Party of Germany,
popularly known as the Nazi party was a
model racist ethnic party, of the 1930s.
Many of the European anti-immigrant
parties that exist today are shades of
the Nazi party. But what a remarkable
political and philosophical transformation
of post-war Germany! It is today the most
liberal country in Europe, free of racism,
and the only country that has built a
monument to the Holocaust. The Jewish
population in Germany is increasing and
it is today the best place for the study of
Hebraic culture. The German description
of itself as a social democracy is most apposite. The late Gnter Grasse spoke in
elegant words of the catharsis the Germans experienced after the war.
This right in Europe is against the EU,
and not only because the latter prevails
over the nation which it values as the
unit of peoples identity and loyalty. By
the Schengen Agreement of 1985, the EU
countries are committed to the freedom
of movement of people. This right
threatens the level of integration that
prevails today among the 28 sovereign
states of Europe. This is the EU that risks
being undone by the right.
Should the rightist National Front come
to power in the next presidential election
vol lI no 33
in France, it would ask for an exit from

the EU. Already, Marine Le Pen has asked
for a referendum in France and President
Franois Hollande has firmly rejected it.
France is now the third largest economy
in the EU, and a founder member of the
European Unity project. Its departure from
the EU will be a severe blow to the EU.
What remains of the idea of Europe as
it was conceived by its authorsJean
Monnet, Robert Schumann and their
ardent supporter President Roosevelt
at the end of World War II? The idea was
that European nations must be ultimately
united into a community of nations. The
authors of the idea of Europe felt that it
was the nation that was the root cause
of the two world wars. The nation state as
a form of political, social and economic
organisation that first arose in Europe in
the late 18th century became the repository of coercive powers. The state with its
monopoly of coercive power is in a constant state of rivalry with other nation
states. This is a rather crude summary of
the long and complex process by which
the nation state first arose in Europe. It is
this nation state that became the model of
political organisation for the leaders of
developing countries after their liberation
from colonial tutelage. Here, one must
mention that the two foremost thinkers of
India, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma
Gandhi, profoundly rejected the idea of the
nation state. For them, the modern nation
was destructive of civilisations.
The planners of post-war Europe
thought that the way to tame the inherently violent nation states of Europe
was to tie them together economically.
First, the creation of the European Common Market in 1956, then, greater economic and social integration in the form
of the European Economic Community,
and at last the European Union were the
stages by which the European nations
ultimately came to be banded together
into a union.
Again, this is a highly simplified account of the long, complex and by no
means smooth transition of the nation
states to a union of states in Europe since
the end of World War II.
This Europe is on the whole peaceful
and cooperative. Is 23 June 2016 the
beginning of its undoing?
53
BOOK REVIEW
Songs at the Confluence

Shraddha Kumbhojkar
ral history in South Asia has a

rich tradition. The Vedas are
collected songs of the Sanskritspeaking pastoralists whose culture was
evolving about three and a half thousand
years ago. Under conditions of colonialism
and orientalism, and even thereafter, the
Vedas held the haloed position of being
the sacred books of the East. It was indeed
a happy day for a number of academic disciplines, including History, when Gunther
Sontheimer, inspired by the unorthodox
ideas of D D Kosambi, thought of recording the oral narratives of another, albeit
less haloed group of pastoralists, the
Dhangars of Maharashtra. Performers of
the Dhangar caste sang their traditional
songs called ovis in the 1970s for Sontheimer to record. They are now preserved
in the Sontheimer Archives in Pune as
also in Gurgaon and Heidelberg. Noting
the increasingly normative Sanskritization of popular beliefs, and the fast disappearing lifestyle of the world depicted
by the Dhangars, I M P Raeside had hailed
Sontheimers study (1976, translated 1989)
based on some of these recordings as a
significant exercise in rescue archaeology. In the post-globalisation Indian
cultural landscape, heterogeneous traditions are facing a greater challenge of
sanskritisation and hinduisation. Hence,
a book on the oral history of pastoral deities serves to make an important statement about Indias multicultural past.
56
Say to the Sun, Dont Rise, and to the Moon,

Dont Set: Two Oral Narratives from the
Countryside of Maharashtra edited and translated
by Anne Feldhaus with Ramdas Atkar and Rajaram
Zagade, Primus Books, 2015; pp 632, `2,395.
Two Oral Narratives from the Countryside of Maharashtra takes off from where
the work was halted due to Sontheimers
untimely death in 1992. These ovis along
with a few others were first published in
Marathi and edited by Sontheimers collaborators Ramdas Atkar and Rajaram
Zagade and his colleague Anne Feldhaus
in 2006. In the present volume, Feldhaus has edited with Atkar and Zagade
two of the ovis from the Marathi publication, one dedicated to god Biroba and
the other to god Dhuloba, translated
them with extensive notes and provided
a scholarly introduction. The book is
divided into three parts. The Introduction examines the relationship the
Dhangars share with their ovis. Based
on an empathetic understanding of the
ovis, it describes the pastoralists way of
life that is so important in formulating
their world and their ideas of gender,
purity, chastity, their very identity. The
second and the third part consist of translations of the ovi of Biroba and ovi
of Dhulobatwo important Dhangar
deities. The translated ovis form a significant contribution to published primary source materials for understanding
the Indian society.
The ovis were traditionally performed

by a group of performers at night in
Dhangar households called vaada. Verses
were sung by the lead performer and were
followed by the accompanying performers
offering a mildly dramatised prose exposition of the verses. The stories in this collection have certain parallelsdivine births,
adopted parents, miraculous feats of power displayed by Biroba as well as Dhuloba
to win their respective brides, defeat of
demons by the gods with assistance from
human and animal allies. The performers
and the audience were quite familiar with
the stories which kept evolving along with
the communities that enjoyed them.
Ethics from the Ovis
Novelty, however, was not what a
Dhangar audience sought as it assembled after a day full of shepherding duties to enjoy the nocturnal performances
in the rural world before the 1970s. They
wanted and got a mixture of entertainment, history, mythology, humour and
ethics from the ovis. These retellings of
the deeds of popular deities could be
counted among the oral epics of South
Asia. The authors, however, choose to
steer clear of the nationalistic or regionalistic discourse by avoiding any such
labelling recognising that it cannot enhance the aesthetic pleasure derived
from the ovis. However, they are aware
that the present work is an important
contribution to scholarship on Oral Epics
in South Asia and beyond whose cognitive geography had so far rarely extended
to the land and culture of the Dhangars.
From the oral history and methodology
perspective, the book is an exemplar of
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
how a responsible social scientist can

deal with her source materials in a
transparent and non-partisan manner.
The Introduction is a fine example of
academic rigour and literary appreciation.
Great care has been taken, especially in
the second and third part consisting of
translations of the actual ovis, to cite the
original source and its classification
number, to indicate whether it is the lead
singer or the accompanying singer who
is narrating the story, to indicate if there
is any interruption or a digression in the
performance, thus minimising the loss
of data for the readers as compared to
the live audience before whom the ovis
were performed. Whenever an insight
has been provided by colleagues in the
field, the authors have given them due
credit. They have even acknowledged
the possible loss of evanescence due to
the act of recording as also the possibility of dumbing down of the narratives
as the performers must have been aware
of the non-Dhangar background of the
scholars. This transparency and integrity
makes the work an exemplary exercise
in cross-cultural understanding.
The stories deal with events in the life
of Biroba and Dhuloba and take us from
the heavenly durbar of Indra to the little

villages and vaada dwellings of the
Dhangars in Southern and Western
Maharashtra. The fantastic stories of
birth, miraculous journeys, lavish weddings give us a glimpse of the reality
and fantasy of the shepherds living
somewhere in the 19th and 20th century
Maharashtra. The Introduction has a
section on the time period of the ovis
where the authors draw our attention to
the lack of references to any rulers
which might have been helpful in this
regard. They also argue that the ovi
performers were more concerned with
the place rather than the time of the
stories. Based on the ovis silence about
the material aspects of colonial presence such as tea and railways, they conclude that the stories were imagined to
have happened sometime before the
British material culture had penetrated
rural Maharashtra. One might add that
some references within the text could
have been used to strengthen this argument. There is a mention of Shindeshahi
Todaa bracelet made according to the
fashion in the court of the Scindias of
the 18th century (p 503)being worn
by Dhuloba. There is a conversation
between Rajaram Zagde (Sakharam

Lakde as per the Marathi text) in the
audience and Daji Rama Pokale, the
lead performer which is given in the
Marathi text of 2006 but is only partially included in the present text. The
omitted part of the intermission (p 442)
mentions that Kambalu Shinde was
the Holkar Raja of Phaltan. These references to the Scindias and Holkars
could have been used to substantiate
the argument about the period of the
ovis. These are, however, just minor
additions. As the authors have argued,
the performers imagined the events
as having happened in an undifferentiated past.
The authors have exhaustively reviewed
the nature and material culture that figures in the ovis. They have even added
maps that explain the routes and places
mentioned in the stories. The flora, fauna,
places, routes, castes and professions as
known to the ovi singers have been
reviewed in the Introduction. It certainly
helps the reader understand the changes
and continuities in the life of the Dhangars. Even within the text, the authors
have given excellent footnotes wherever
necessary. At one place (p 180), however,
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vol lI no 33
57
BOOK REVIEW
they express disagreement with the text

saying that Chaitra being a summer
month does not witness sprouting of
new leaveswhich goes against the local
ecology, as indeed in the months of
Chaitra, one witnesses new leavesa
phenomenon which even has a name in
Marathi, Chaitra Paalavi. Barring such
very rare exceptions, the notes add a
great deal of value to the readers understanding.
Suggestions
Just to make the picture even more textured, a couple of things could have
been added to the list. A comment on
the foods known to the ovis could have
thrown more light on their culture. The
regular food items like milk, rice and
curds are juxtaposed in the ovis against
the elaborate menu consumed by the
richsewai, bhatwadi, kurwadi, puran
poli and gul poli. The process of making
ghee is elaborately described when
Suravanti appeases the Sun by offering
ghee lamps before him. Another area
that could have merited the authors
attention is the use of uncommon words
by the performers. Colloquial use of
English words such as time, court, button, pack, duty, miles and radio among
others indicates the changes which the

Dhangar culture was familiar with. If
we remind ourselves that the 1970s
when the ovis were performed was the
period when propaganda about the five
year plans was sure to have reached
even the remote villages, we can look at
phrases such as Yojana complete from
a different perspective. The authors
have acknowledged that the ovis are
human products, not perfect and an art
form that was alive at least when it was
recorded. Some discussion on unusual
words could have been useful to further
substantiate this point.
The word ovi has been used as the
generic name for the long song that
consists of smaller verses which are also
called ovi. Had the authors mentioned a
line or two about the etymology of the
wordthat it comes from the verb
ovnem, to string togetherthe meaning
would have been clearer. Similarly, the
word sumbaran is translated as memory
by tracing its etymology to the Sanskrit
word smaranto remember. A professor familiar with the Dhangar lifestyle
offered a different and non-Sanskrit
meaning of the term.1 According to him,
sumbaran comes from sumb or sumbha
which is a rope plaited together and
hence the word sumbaran might

indicate bringing together of different
strands of a story.
The importance of this book is manifold. Studies of ancient cultures of South
Asia based largely on literary sources
in Sanskrit have traditionally enjoyed
academic glamour. Kosambi, Sontheimer
and Feldhaus form a lineage of scholars
whose efforts have made people realise
the significance of studying the culture of
South Asia in its heterogeneous variety. It
is not only about the so-called high
culture of a few deities who have shiny
shrines dedicated to them. It is also
about folk deities that have given meaning to the lives of different communities
over centuries. The book documents and
historicises the different shades of the
Dhangar way of life as it stands on the
confluence of a fluid tradition and an
equally fluid modernity. This transition
is beautifully present even in the title of
the book.
Shraddha Kumbhojkar (shraddha@unipune.
ac.in) is with the Centre for Asian Studies,
Savitribai Phule Pune University.
note
1
I thankfully acknowledge my personal communication with B H Dudhbhate in this regard.
Books Received
A Prasanna Kumar, M Jagadeswara Rao and
R Sudarsana Rao (eds) (2015); Selected Works
of Prof Sarveswara Rao: A Humane Economist,
Visakhapatnam: Bhavaraju Family, pp xvi +
274, price not indicated.
Ahmed Mubarki, Meraj (2016); Filming Horror:
Hindi Cinema, Ghosts and Ideologies, New Delhi,
London, California and Singapore: Sage Publications, pp xvi + 197, `695.
Ali, Zaheer (ed) (2016); Secularism Under Siege: Revisiting the Indian Secular State, Delhi: Aakar
Books, pp 416, `1,195.
Arthur, C J (ed) (2014); Marxs Capital: A Student
Edition, Delhi: Aakar Books, pp xxviii + 384, `325.
Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp xvii + 264,

Fraser, Thomas G and Monika Aggarwal (eds)
(2016); Ethics Governance and Corporate Social
Responsibility in India, Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, pp 258, `850.
Hingorani, Aman M (2016); Unravelling the Kashmir Knot, New Delhi, California, London and
Singapore: Sage Publications, pp xxiii + 387,
`995.
Hoare, Quintin (ed) (2016); Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Political Writings (19101920),
Delhi: Aakar Books, pp xvii + 393, `395.
Baijal, Pradip (2016); A Bureaucrat Fights Back: The

Complete Story of Indian Reforms, Noida: HarperCollins Publishers, pp xvi + 336, `499.
Jadhav, Narendra (ed) (2016); Ambedkar: Writings

& Speeches (Volume I: Political Writings), New
Delhi and Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers, pp lii + 515, `3,500 (for set of 5).
Brimnes, Niels (2016); Languished Hopes: Tuberculosis, the State and International Assistance in
Twentieth-century India, New Delhi: Orient
Blackwan, pp xiv + 318, price not indicated.
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume II: Scholarly Writings), New Delhi and
Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers, pp vii
+ 454, `3,500 (for set of 5).
Curnow, Trevor (2016); Wisdom: A World History,

New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, pp 239, `399.
Dasgupta, Abhijit (2016); Displacement and Exile:
The State-Refugee Relations in India, New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, pp xxi + 233, `750.
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume III: Autobiographical, Social Speeches and
Speeches on Guidance to Followers), New Delhi
and Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers,
pp 519, `3,500 (for set of 5).
Dhanagare, D N (2016); Populism and Power: Farmers Movement in Western India, 19802014,
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume IV: Speeches on Economics, Religion and
58
Law and Constitution), New Delhi and Seattle,

Washington: Konark Publishers, pp 586, `3,500
(for set of 5).
`895.
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume V: Political Speeches), New Delhi and Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers, pp 411,
`3,500 (for set of 5).
Jal, Murzban and Zaheer Ali (eds) (2016); What Ails
Indian Muslims, Delhi: Aakar Books, pp 302,
`895.
Jha, D N (ed) (2013); Contesting Symbols and Stereotypes: Essays on Indian History and Culture,
Delhi: Aakar Books, pp viii + 247, `550.
Khan, Zeeshan (2016); Right to Passage: Travels
Through India, Pakistan and Iran, New Delhi,
London and Singapore: Sage Publications,
pp xii + 390, `595.
Kohli, Kanchi and Manju Menon (eds) (2016); Business Interests and the Environmental Crisis,
New Delhi, California, London and Singapore:
Sage Publications, pp xxxviii + 244, `845.
Kumar, Rajiv and Omita Goyal (eds) (2016); Thirty
Years of SAARC: Society, Culture and Development, New Delhi, California, London and Singapore: Sage Publications, pp xxii + 257, `695.
Lal, M B (2016); Indian Family Planning, Kolkata:
Power Publishers, pp 224, `330.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
Meeting the Unmet

Valuable Lessons in Family Planning
Charumita Vasudev
amily planning has had a long, diverse and tempestuous history in

our country. After independence,
India was one of the first countries to implement a state-sponsored family planning programme, with concerted efforts
towards reduction of fertility and population growth rates. Various strategies
were applied over time in this direction.
These ranged from contraceptive-specific
incentives to the infamous target-based
coercive sterilisation approach, and, more
recently, the integrated reproductive and
child health approach.
This reduction in total fertility and population growth rates, however, has stagnated over the past decade. The population momentum has driven about 70% of
the population growth. Hence, the declines have not been as they would have
been expected, to be concomitant with
developments in society. India has missed
the Millennium Development Goals target
of reduction in infant and child mortality,
and has barely met the maternal mortality
reduction targets. It becomes imperative,
in this context, to discuss womens access
to family planning choices while determining the gaps leading to unplanned and
unsafe pregnancies.
It is at this opportune time of taking
stock and moving forward that Innovations in Family Planning: Case Studies
from India provides us with 16 case studies of successful innovations, which spell
out what works in the field of family
planning. The central argument of the
book revolves around provision of quality family planning care at decentralised
levels, and adoption of right, workable,
sustainable, and, most importantly, scalable strategies towards the attainment
of this goal.
In the introductory chapter itself,
which delves into the demographic situation of the country, we are faced with
54
book reviewS
Innovations in Family Planning: Case Studies
from India edited by Jay Satia, Kavita Chauhan, Aruna
Bhattacharya and Nirmala Mishra (2016); New Delhi: Sage
Publications; pp 292, `850.
certain startling facts. The authors point

out that nearly a quarter of the population
growth in the country is likely to occur
from unwanted fertility, thereby stressing the urgent importance of fulfilling
the unmet need for contraception. This
response, however, has to be (a) comprehensive: to cover all states and include
both spacing and limiting needs; (b) varied
so as to address social and method-related
barriers and meet the special needs of
young people; and (c) crafted to be
locally and context specific (p xxxvii).
To meet these requirements, the authors
suggest both product innovations and
process innovations to improve the
quality, safety, outcomes, and efficiency
in healthcare service delivery.
Using web-based search, desk reviews,
and key informant interviews, 106 innovations were shortlisted. Depending
upon their scalability and sustainability,
16 innovations have been discussed in
detail in this book, divided into seven
sections. An analysis of these sections
can be grouped under three broad heads:
enhancing demand, ensuring supply,
and strengthening linkages towards
creation of comprehensive programmes.
Enhancing Demand
Indias family planning goal (FP2020) of
providing contraceptive services to additional 48 million users by 2020
rightly contextualised by the authors in
the light of the London summit on family
planning, 2012should be seen as
embedded in the continuum of care that
programmes like RMNCH+A (reproductive,
maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health) seek to provide. This is because family planning is not only important for population growth control, but
also for averting unplanned and unsafe
pregnancies, thereby, reducing maternal, infant, and child mortality, and improving reproductive health. However,
there are many social and physical barriers to contraceptive use. The authors attempt to deal with these barriers by using a two-pronged approach: Creating
an Enabling Environment through Advocacy (Section 5) and Creating Demand
through Behaviour Change Communication, Awareness Generation and Incentives (Section 6).
In Section 5, the authors stress the
need for advocacy by bringing to the
fore two facts. First, the family planning
methods have been disproportionately
skewed in favour of female sterilisation.
Second, the use of intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUCDs; the only longterm reversible contraceptive choice
available) is marred by various misconceptions and myths. Thus, advocacy is
essential to expand the access to and
choice of contraceptive methods by dispelling myths, analysing local contexts,
community-level participation, incorporating the role of media and advertising,
and, lastly, effective monitoring.
The cases under study are those of the
Advocating Reproductive Choices (ARC;
a coalition of like-minded organisations,
both at national and state levels), Family
Planning Association of India, and Population Foundation of India (with focus
on Bihar and Uttar Pradesh [UP]). All three
of these represent a paradigmatic shift
in approach, from population stabilisation
to one where gender equality and a clientcentred approach are given priority.
Section 6 of the book focuses on behavioural changes and awareness generation among people by looking at initiatives like Pehel, which have been successful in creating demand for quality
family planning and reproductive health
services, with a special stress on safe and
affordable IUCD implants. The reason for
their success has been that they have
successfully embedded themselves in
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
the social values, norms, prejudices,

stereotypes, and gendered roles and expectations. Campaigns like Phir se Dulhan (A bride once again; for advocating post-partum IUCDs), Mujh pe chod
do (Leave it to me; promotion of male
sterilisation), and Mard ki daad (Mark
of a man; delaying first birth), thus,
have greater chances of success by virtue of being rooted in the sociocultural
context and banking on the social magnetic fields that pull people towards
certain behavioural directions.
An essential component of this would
also be enhancing the skills of the frontline worker for effective behaviour change
communication (BCC) and reaching out
to the maximum number of people. In
addition to Pehel, the Odisha Urban Reproductive Health Project, as well as similar innovations in UP, Uttarakhand, and
Jharkhand have been discussed. These,
in addition to creating demand, are instrumental in increasing the acceptability of various family planning methods.
Adequate and Continuous Supply
Apart from creating demand through
awareness generation, BCC and advocacy,
it is important to maintain a sustained
and adequate supply of a basket of available contraceptive choices, taking into
account multiple factors of age, relationship status, number of children, etc.
Various strategies have been suggested
in the book for this. To begin with, the
authors suggest maintaining quality of
care and logistics management by ensuring better implementation of Government Programmes (Section 2). Case studies from Maharashtra and Odisha suggest local-level solutions to plug the gaps
in addition to improved teamwork for
better coordinated service delivery and
supply-line management through the
use of both web- and mobile-based applications, especially SMS. Also important in
this regard is the involvement of the
community in ensuring quality assurance
through handholding and capacity building of a wide range of health workers.
Two different approaches of increasing
supply are discussed under two different
sections: (a) method based, Increasing
Access, Availabilty and Quality of Services
for Specific Methods (Section 4); and
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
(b) target audience based, Meeting the

Contraceptive Needs of Special Groups
(Section 7).
As far as increasing the supply of specific contraceptives is concerned, the authors reiterate that the principle of informed choice lies at the heart of voluntary family planning and the sexual and
reproductive rights agenda. In India,
however, this has always been a grey area,
with female sterilisation being the mainstay of all family planning efforts. Successful case studies of the introduction
of new contraceptive methods, like the
injectable depot medroxyprogesterone
acetate (DMPA), IUCDs for better spacing,
non-scalpel vasectomy for males, and
fertility awareness based methods have
been discussed.
It becomes pertinent here to mention
the importance of enhancing the social
acceptability of these newer methods
through concerted efforts towards advocacy, since, in addition to individual apprehensions, the implications of these
methods might involve sociocultural
connotations. The case of DMPA is the
most glaring example, where, though its
usage has been declared safe by numerous agencies, there have been low rates
of use. This is because cessation of menstruation has wide-ranging implications
in a culture where fertility is celebrated
and womens menstrual health has wide
socio-religious implications.
In addition to increasing choices available, the supply also has to be targeted
towards special groups. These include
adolescents, young married women
(1525 year olds), young unmarried couples, etc. Addressing their needs for contraception are important to avoid unwanted pregnancies and other health
risks, thereby improving maternal and
child health on the one hand, and enhancing life skills and ability to fulfil
both short-term and long-term goals on
the other hand. The Drishti-Jeevan

Kaushal programme in Rajasthan and
addressing the special needs of the tribal
population by capacity training of front
line workers (Accredited Social Health
Activists (ASHAs), auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs) and anganwadi workers)
are the cases discussed in the text.
Involvement of the private sector to
enhance accessibility and timely supply
of contraceptives as well as the basket of
choices has been discussed in Section 3.
The success stories of ASHAs in reducing
the total fertility rate in Assam have
been discussed in detail, along with the
strategies adopted and the problems
faced, so as to offer valuable lessons that
could be emulated in other areas after
adapting to local contexts.
Strengthening Comprehensive
Programmes
It has been reiterated that stand-alone
family planning is neither desirable, nor
feasible. Thus, the importance of integrating services and comprehensive programmes of the government has been
discussed in substantial detail. This includes inclusion of family planning in
the wider health for all agenda, as in
the case of Ananya in Bihar and the
Urban Health Initiative in UP (Section 1).
Thus, the success of family planning initiatives, as discussed, can only be possible if they are addressed in their wider
sociocultural contexts, have broader
health policy agendas like reduction in
maternal, infant, and neonatal mortality, and, lastly, are advocated through
rigorous BCC. Hence, an integrated approach involving all the stakeholders is
an essential determinant of success.
This is the first book in the country
that documents innovations in family
planning service delivery. Besides this,
the most important feat of the book is
that it brings micro-level innovations to
Attention ContributorsI
The EPW has been sending reprints of articles to authors. We are now discontinuing the practice.
We will consider sending a limited number of reprints to authors located in India when they make
specific requests to us.
We will, of course, continue to send a copy of the print edition to all our authors whose contributions
appear in that particular edition.
vol lI no 33
55
BOOK REVIEW
the level of national and global policy

discussion forums, and integrates fieldlevel experiences with broader discourses in family planning and reproductive
health. It, thus, offers important lessons
to be emulated on the one hand, while
engaging with questions of scalability
and addressing peculiar needs of local
contexts on the other.
In addition to this, the book, by stressing
innovations and analysing their challenges, encourages more effective grassroots level implementation of healthcare
56
related policies by learning from particular experiences and adapting them to suit
specific contexts. These innovations focus on meeting the priority needs of
family planning, ranging from individuallevel interventions like delaying first
pregnancy to policy-level interventions
like improving the quality of healthcare
service delivery.
The book, thus, can serve as an important document for anyone involved
in programme planning, health policy
formulation, healthcare service delivery
and programme implementation, students and researchers in the field of

reproductive health, and anyone passionate about the achievement of the key
policy objectives of equity, universality,
accountability, affordability, inclusivity,
and adaptability in healthcare service
delivery, as was recently laid out in the
Draft National Health Policy, 2015.
Charumita Vasudev (charumita.vasudev@
gmail.com) is at the Department of Humanities
and Social Sciences, IIT Delhi.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
INSIGHT
How Zakir Naik Appropriated

Liberalisms Flawsand Won
Shireen Azam
If Islamic televangelist Zakir

Naik is symptomatic of religious
fundamentalism, we have to
pin which part of his rhetoric
accounts for it, and how it is
different from other secular
affirmations of truths. Any
attempt to rerun the old narrative
of the irrationality of religion,
and of Naiks supporters being
blinded by unexamined religious
passion, falls flat on its face.
Naiks religion, in fact, is an
embarrassingly evolved version
of how a rational religion was
conceived post-Enlightenment,
and his justification of
punishment and justice in Islam
strikingly mimics the operation of
the modern secular world. This is
also how he has been able to gain
legitimacy amidst an audience
which sees itself as modern.
Shireen Azam (shireen@epw.in) is Assistant

Editor (Digital), Economic & Political Weekly.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
Suddenly, an average Muslim could argue

why polygamy is allowed and why we dont
eat pigs through logic rather than just saying
its gods will when arguing with people of different faiths (SU, email interview with the
author, 2013).
akir Naiks media trial could or

could not set forth a chain of
events which define how the lines
between the extremist and moderate
Muslim will be redrawn in the nations
imagination. When news of a Dhaka
terrorist having quoted Naiks lectures
on his Facebook wall spreadand terrorists being inspired by Naik changed to
Naik inspiring men to be terrorists
within seconds, there was a scramble to
make sense of Naik with familiar labels:
does he support terrorism or peace, are
his views fanatical or not, is he modern
or regressive? Probes into Naiks muddled speeches evaded an easy attempt
at fitting him into these boxes: that
he had no interest in criticising the Indian state and said that he believed in
coexistence of religions, while affirming
the absolute truth of Islam over all other
religions; that on his channel Peace TV,
Naik tries to find commonalities between
Islam and other religions, but the common is always on the side of Naiks version of Islam; that he talks about womens rights and then justifies polygamy;
that he congratulates the atheist for not
believing what his father taught him,
and then says every tenet of Islam is
compatible with modern science.
From the beginning of July, listicles
from digital native sites, free of the burden of creating a system of logic, framed
their responses by plucking out meaty
bits of Naiks hundreds of videos with
the 5 most ridiculous things, or dangerous things Naik has said: how pigs
should not be eaten because they cheat
on their partners, how it is alright to beat
your wife lightly with a toothbrush, how
vol lI no 33
suicide bombing might be okay if it is

done as a last resort and not for personal
interests, etc.
However, Naiks immense popularity
among Indian and Bangladeshi Muslims,
especially among people who are educated
under modern formal education systems,
and many of whom think of themselves
as liberals and modern, makes it mandatory for us to understand the structure in
which he has earned legitimacy.1 One has
to attempt to understand why people
who inhabit modern sphereseducation,
democracy, and enchanted by ideas of
progress, industrialisation, and scientific
discoveriesare simultaneously enchanted by Naik. Any attempt to rerun the
old narrative of the irrationality of
religion and the naivety of Naiks supporters, that they are fanatics, brainwashed and blinded by their religious
passion, falls flat on its face in understanding Naik and his fan-following.
Naik, the Islamic evangelist, is a complete product of the modern, secular
world (I use the term secular in the
sense of its West-European trajectory
as distinct from the sacred, not the
communal, as discussed in Section 3), who
has earned legitimacy from incorporating religious unbelief as a valid option,
who values the exercise of what he calls
logic and reason over feeling, arrived
truths over justice, and sees religion as
a system of injunctions, and practices as
mere products of peoples cognitive
propositions. What counts as logic and
rational argument in Naiks speeches
could be contested for authenticity, but in
using the form, Naik is already within the
domain of public sphere.
Clearly if contemporary analyses of
Naik think of him as symbolic of and
symptomising religious fundamentalism, we have to pin which part of his
rhetoric accounts for it, and how it is different from other secular affirmations of
truthshis insistence that Islam is the
best religion in the world, his attempt to
bombard scientific terminology to show
logical inconsistencies in other religions,
or his relativisation of violence, that is, the
justification that violence can be allowed
under some conditions. To point out the
59
INSIGHT
exact problem with Naiks rhetoric is crucial, for many of the forms of Naiks dangers, notably Naiks justification of crime
and punishment, strikingly mimic the operation of the modern world. This is also
how he has been able to gain legitimacy
amidst an audience which is more modernised than not.
The fact that he wears a three-piece
suit, talks in perfect English and invokes
science and logic are only motifs. Naiks
charm is in the form of his speeches, the
premises of unbelief from which he persuades, his employment of conspiracy
theories of scientific facts and statistics,
and the discourses of modernity that he
draws from. These together play with the
anyway murky division of the secular
and the sacred in the modern world and
make it surprisingly simple for him to
fool a generation of Muslims left to deal
with insecurities coming from crimes
they did not themselves commit.
1 Helping Muslims Frame
a Response
It is a matter of deep irony to the current
situation that Naiks first claim to fame on
cable TV in the 2000s was through talking
about misrepresentation of Islamic terrorism in the media. In his talk Islam and
Media: Peace or War, and in many others
with similar names, Naik would say that
international media is projecting Islam as
though it is a religion of terror, they are
picking a few black sheep and projecting as if Islam is asking them to do these
illegal activities (YouTube 2012b). His advice to Muslims was not to be apologetic
when pestered by others with questions
regarding terrorism and Islam. We should
not become defensive and say, Oh no some
Muslims do it, not me we should know
how to turn the tables over should use
the force of the opponent to throw him
over (YouTube 2012b). A well-prepared
opening sentence Muslims should keep
ready to handle jibes about Islamic terrorism, Naik has said in multiple lectures, is to
ask which human being killed the most
number of people in the world. Who is the
man who has killed the maximum number of human beings in the world? ... Hitler,
you dont get an award for guessing, it is
common knowledge. So which Madrasa
did Hitler pass from? (YouTube 2012b).
60
Naik would go on to list other nonMuslim violent organisations in the world

whose actions are not called terrorism by
the media. He would then take a detour
to question the meaning of the term
terrorist, an argument that has understandably come in the scanner now for
showing sympathy to terrorism. Naik
made ordinary Muslims comfortable
about not belonging to the most violent
community in the world, and simultaneously, through examples of freedom
fighter Bhagat Singh, let questions linger
about whether certain cases of violence
could be justified. He would then return
to his initial stand and reiterate the same
thingIslam is a religion of peace.
In other lectures, Naik made fun of
maulanasthat they go around shouting
haram haram and make others wonder
what is this religion that isnt allowing
a sportsman to play (regarding Sania
Mirzas fatwa) (YouTube 2010). Unfortunately we are like sitting ducks. We have
made ourselves a laughing stock (YouTube 2010). There was only one solution, he said on his one-hour slot on
Q-Tv: have a fully-English channel which
both shows misguided Muslims and the
Western world the real meaning of Islam.
He compared it to the kind of money
God TV gets from Christian donors. He
wondered aloud if Muslims could raise
this kind of money. It was important for
it to be in English, for us to change perceptions, he insisted. In January 2006,
Peace TV went on air. The stage on which
Naik spoke was suddenly manyfold
grander and brighter, comparable to any
Filmfare award set we have seen, albeit
still fully Islamic in its grandeur.
Born in 1965 in Mumbai, India, Naik
obtained a Bachelor of Medicine and
Surgery from Mumbai University. The
fact that he is a doctor by profession who
gave up practice for the sake of Islamic
preaching, is emphasised time and again
in his talks, both by him and people who
introduce him. While defending madrasas,
he would readily point out that he did not
go to one and had a normal education
(YouTube 2012b). In 1991, he founded
the Islamic Research Foundation (IRF)
whose aim is to promote Islamic Dawah
and proper presentation, understanding
and appreciation of Islam, as well as
removing the misconceptions about Islam

amongst less aware Muslims and NonMuslims.2 He borrows his style of scriptural hermeneutics and secular criticism
from South African televangelist Ahmed
Deedat (19182005), who confessed to
start preaching Islam because he was bothered by Pentacostal Christian evangelists
knocking on his door and politely quizzing him about Quran (YouTube 2012c).3
Over the years, Naiks IRF organised
many live events in major Indian cities
as well as other cities of the world, published 10 booklets with condensed versions of Naiks lectures (which were
handed out free to me in his Dongri
office in 2013, albeit after I was ushered
into the ladies wing), sells DVDs of his
talks, and also launched a Peace mobile
which again, came pre-installed with
Naiks videos. Naik introduced himself
as a student of comparative religion
and his method as use of reason, logic
and scientific facts. He quotes from the
Bible as well as Sanskrit verses from the
Vedas, Puranas and Upanishads, of
which he displays erudition. A reference
to any of these texts is always made with
the exact verse number, and a ticker at
the bottom of the TV screen highlights it.
His talks are mostly in interaction with a
live audience and a long question and
answer session where non-muslim brothers and sisters would be encouraged to
ask questions over Muslims, even if it
meant breaking the queue. Naik would
greet his question-askers with cordiality,
sometimes appreciating that the sister
has asked a very good question, his tone
always even, with programmed pauses
for rhetorical humour and not losing
temper or appearing angry at a question. The title of his talks were reactionaryMisconceptions about Islam, Is
Quran Compatible with Modern Science?,
Is Terrorism the Monopoly of Islam?,
among others like similarities between
Hinduism and Islam and the concept of
god in Christianity.
It was clear that Naik was not there
to talk of the beauties of following
Islam, neither was he interested in telling Muslims the ideals of living a good
life, and how to best read the namaz or
go to heaven. Instead, he was there to
answer all those questions about Islam
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
INSIGHT
that had come up in a world where the

Muslim had started doubting her identity and her religion. Naik was speaking
to a post 9/11 world. Naik was not interested in a political Islamic state. His
guidance was for individuals who will
continue to live within liberal states,
operating within the freedom to propagate religion in these states.
I personally prefer asking the nonMuslim upfront, what he feels is wrong
in Islam, insisting that most will only
have five or six questions about the
Quranpolygamy, polygandry, hijab for
women, if Islam spread by the sword,
that Muslims are fundamentalists and
terrorists, on non-vegetarianism and so
on (Naik 2000: 5). In his speeches, Naik
would teach Muslims to give a foolproof
response to the insistent questions of
the world about Islam. It was like livecasting a rehearsal. I request that if
every Muslim memorises the answer to
these questions, even if he is not able to
convince a non-Muslim to accept Islam
or make him realise the (inaudible), at
least inshallah he will be able to remove
the animosity in the mind, at least he
will be able to neutralise him (ZakirNaik.net 2015). It is not enough for the
Muslim to be convinced of the truth of
Naiks answer once; the point was to be
able to reproduce it when the time of
need arises, when confronted by a colleague, friend, security guard, arguably
daily spheres where Muslims were constantly ambushed to give a defence
about violence done in their names halfway down the globe. Indeed the idea of
reproduction is so central, that arguably
every new Naik lecture that one would
hear now are replicas of an argument he
would have developed 15 years ago,
with the same intonation and pauses for
humour. A lecture by a person from IRF,
that I attended in 2014 in Manipal, replicated not only Naiks argument but
the pauses and modulations in Naiks
intonation as well.
2 Reading Naiks Arguments
The Islam Naik was propagating, was
not centred on going to heaven, and conversion, even though occasionally mentioned was only a secondary concern.
Naik was an apologetic, where with
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
dawa, defending Islams position in

the real world is the core part of religion.
However, unlike other religious apologetics, there is a remarkable mixing of
the worlds of the transcendental and the
secular in Naikin thinking of Islam as a
divine system of truth with a benevolent
god, and in defending the position of
Muslims in a post 9/11 world. Naik seems
considerably less interested in the former
than in the latter. If one looks at it, the
motivation of dawa is not primarily to
gain brownie points from god in the
transcendental world, or convert others,
but for the Muslim himself, who has
silently come to doubt his faith. His audience is not convinced of the truth of Islam
but in profound doubt about their position
as Muslims. They have internalised both
the good and true of what Naik calls the
Western world as well as the humiliation
meted out to Islam in it. Working with
this paradox, Naik then both attacks and
affirms these ideas of the Western world.
Naik plays with modernitys division of the
sacred and the secular, between the supernatural and the material, and between
teleological and rational, and uses it to
his advantage. He turns the model of
separation on its head by attaching the
reverence of the secular to religion.
Naik first rides on the idea of a European scientific revolution of the 17th
century, which is widely understood as
having changed the world and having
brought a leap from the world of faith to
the world of observation and reason
(Shapin 1996: 1). Naik reads vague lines
from the Quran to force the meaning that
it already mentions the Big Bang Theory
which scientists found only recently
(YouTube 2011c). He quotes other lines
to say Quran mentions that the earth is
egg-shaped, that the light of the moon is
reflected, that interstellar matter exists,
that the universe is expanding, that atoms
can be divided, etc (Naik nd). His claims
are made in a syntactical structure of
three parts: (i) earlier it was believed
that, (ii) now modern science has told
us this, (iii) but Quran said it 1,400
years ago.
In one of his shows, a man asks in the
questionanswer session, How can I
convince a non-Muslim that Islam gives
permission to have more than one wife,
vol lI no 33
how do I convince them that it is the

best? (YouTube 2011b). In yet another
video, a woman says, For me its one
man one woman and I dont see any
logic in polygamy (YouTube 2011a). Naik
would get up from his chair smiling and
his rehearsed 10-minute answer would
always be exactly the same:
Sister Islam is the only religion and Quran
is the only religious scripture on the face of
the world which says marry only one. There
is no religious scripture besides the Quran, I
am a student of comparative religion. There is
no verse in the Bible, no verse in the Bhagavad
Gita, no verse in the Veda which says marry
only one except the Quran Sri Krishna, according to Mahabharata, how many wives did
he have? ... Not unlimited you dont know your
scriptures well Now, lets analyse what the
Quran says, the Quran says in Sureh Nisa
Chapter 4, verse 3: Marry a woman of your
choice in twos, threes or four, but if you cant
do justice marry only one. (YouTube 2011a)
It is only after diligently following his

steps of turning the table over, he
would get to his niche of applying logic
and scientific facts, technical jargon
and throwing statistics:
Now what are the logical reasons that a person
can think that why Islam has permitted
certain men to have more than one wives
By nature, if you ask any medical doctor he
will tell you that male and female are born
in equal proportion [but he] will tell you
that the female child is stronger than the
male child, thats the reason there are more
deaths in the male children than the female
children. As life goes on, there are people dying
due to accidents, due to alcoholism, due to war,
there are more males dying as compared to
females. Today if you analyse in the world,
there are more females in the world as compared to males. There are some few thirdworld countries like India where the male
population is more than the female population, and do you know why? Because of female foeticide and female infanticide If
you stop this evil practice, in India, our beloved country the population of female
will be more than the male population. If
you see the rest of the world, in New York
alone there are 1 million females more than
males, in USA alone, there are 7.8 million females more than male. In UK alone, there are
4 million females more than males; in Germany alone, there are 5 million female more
than male, in Russia alone, there are 9 million female more than male Suppose, I
agree with your philosophy sister, you said
one man one woman, if I agree with you sister, your philosophy, and suppose my sister
happens to live in America and suppose
the market is saturated; one man one woman saturated! And yet there will be 7.8 million females who will not find life partners.
(YouTube 2011a)
61
INSIGHT
Several questions can be, and indeed

must be immediately raised upon this
farcical explanation. Even if we ignore the
several logical leaps Naik takes to come to
his conclusion, one has to engage with
what Naik has efficiently done here with
using systems of logic that we are familiar
with. This also gives insight into a generation which idolises science and scientific truths, is bothered when Islam is
seen as a religion of terror, and its simultaneous want to be scientific and its ready
acceptance of Naiks answers.
It should be noted that Naik needs the
reference to science, the detour to speak
against female infanticide to make his
point. He covers all these grounds which
have become important campaigns in
the modern world. It is noteworthy that
Naik does not attempt to explain the
legitimacy of polygamy as a practice by
itself, and instead frames it as an effect
of natural law. That biologically women
are stronger than men, and that it is a
consequence of this that there are and
there will be more women in the world
than men, are the facts that enable
Naik to offer the validity of polygamy.
He does not attempt to explain how the
instance of a man marrying four wives
can be right within a certain world view.
He does not attempt to give a different
view of gender relations or marriage.
Instead, he makes the question a problem
of the natural world and polygamy as a
response to a set of natural laws. Naiks
god then is limited by natural laws,
bound by the laws of the secular world.
God, here, is subservient to the natural
world, god like the woman asking the
question, would ideally like to have one
woman for a man, but god is bound by
the natural worlds restraint of the female
zygote being stronger and there being
more women. God according to Naik, has
no essential reason, wisdom or intelligence
for allowing four women for a man. There
is a characteristic loss of divinity in god
that is seen across his other arguments
of justifying the Quran as well. God, instead of being the all-powerful, is instead
trying his best to devise a just system
within limits of (supposed) natural law, as
humans have found at this point of time.
Robbing god of his divinity in this argument, as in many others (Section 5), is
62
surely something Naik does not do on

purpose, neither does he or his followers
seem to note the paradox in it. However,
a religion without divinity is an indispensable feature of the religion that
Naik is trying to create.
Naiks religion in fact is an embarrassingly evolved version of how a rational
religion was conceptualised by advocates of liberal thinkers while conceptualising liberal democracy post-Enlightenment. Naiks Islam demonstrates not
fanaticism, or religious passion but a
secularisation of religion.
3 Naiks God without Divinity
Naiks religion of tenets, which feels
correct to the believer because they are
similar to other commonsensical things in
the world, has to be traced to a long history
of secularisation of religion. Unlike it is
often seen in retrospect, the scientific
revolution of 17th century Europe did not
entail a complete overthrow of teleological
explanations and reference to the divine,
for methods of observation and reason
(Shapin 1996; Bala 2006; Osler 2010).
Most natural philosophers of the 17th
century were believers and the entire
enterprise of studying the natural world
was embedded in a theological framework that emphasised divine creation,
design, and providence (Osler 2010: 81).
Isaac Newton, citing the intelligence and
design in the natural worldhow come
the Bodies of Animals be contrived with
so much Art and for what ends were
their several Parts? insisted that it
appears from Phenomena that there is
Being incorporeal, living, intelligent,
omnipresent (Osler 2010: 8081). God
was the upholder of the natural world.
Naiks premise of the transcendental
and natural, however, is not similar to
Newtons. For Newton the divinity of god
is to be inferred from the design of the
world which is perfect. Naik does not see
the natural world as a perfect creation,
whose beauty inspires wonder about the
divine. What must be remarked in Naiks
conception of god and his relation to the
natural world is Naiks absolute lack of
divinity in talking about god, the uninterest in magic, beauty, wonder, incorporeality and the supernatural in his
idea of religion, and his insistent need to
bring down god to a set of tenets and

mundane objects of the secular world.
Religion here is a set of rules which can
be made to look reasonable with reference to the world around us. It is different from other secular rule books, only
as much as in that they might have parts
of the truth, while it has the whole.
Naik hardly invokes god as a mystical
being who must be revered. The primacy
of the text remains, god cannot be possibly reached or felt without it. There is almost no interest in Islam as a form of
truth in relation to god, the interest in establishing the truth of Islam is purely secular, that is, in terms of the current material world as we know it. God happens to
be the author of the book for whose confirmation Naik is probing the natural world.
Naiks natural world too is not perfect
and god is intelligent insomuch as he
can solve the problems that the faulty
material world has set upon the world.
Further, Naiks talks are not addressed
to a community of Muslims. There is little or no invocation of a Muslimhood in
a conventional sense of a religious community, of parables or historical events
that would invoke a sense of communitarian memory. Naik, wittingly or unwittingly, is playing upon a series of divisions about the sacred and the secular
that was conceived in Enlightenment and
post-Enlightenment liberal theorisation.
This line between secular and sacred, in
its many manifestations, is an undertone
in many spheres in our modern worlds,
whose origins can be traced to the Protestant reformation, and of which the
most relatable version today is the theorisation of a secular statethe wall of
separation between state and religion
and which, it must be emphasised, continues to influence our understanding of religious violence and extremism as a tussle
between irrationality and rationality, fanaticism and liberalism, and as inspired
by a believers unexamined passion for
god. The idea of separation of religion and
state, as that of belief and practice, and rationality and irrationality comes from a set
of theological and metaphysical assumptions of dividing the world into spheres of
secular and sacred which have been normalised globally to a large extent without
realising the underlying assumptions.4
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
INSIGHT
4 A Rational Religion
Naik then walks on lines that Enlightenment thinkers envisaged for religion,
and the divisions they formulated, and
comes across as charmingly transgressive when he is able to use its flaws to his
advantage, for example, by simply showing that he can make an attempt justifying polygamy, however contorted, without invoking any religious obligation.5
The idea of a rational religion emerged
from the premise of distinguishing sacred
and profane time. Charles Taylor, in his
monumental work A Secular Age, shows
that the idea of the secular developed
with Latin Christendom as one term of a
dyadthe secular had to do with the
centurythat is, with profane time
and it was contrasted with what related
to the eternal, or to sacred time (Taylor
2011: 32). Certain times, places, institutions and actions were seen as related to
sacred or higher times, while others were
for profane time alone (Taylor 2011: 32).
Thus, in initial understandings of secular
spaces and times, even when the temporal
and celestial can be conceived separately,
they function in a dyad where both are
necessary to understand the meaning of
the other. The reference to secular is distinct from but not opposed to sacred and
eternal time (Taylor 2011: 32).
With people like Newton however, we
see a partial move where the natural world
begins to be seen as a whole functioning
independently, but nevertheless held from
above by gods will. It is a further development of this, from the 17th century on,
where the secular went from being
what is different from the sacred, to the
sphere which is natural, and the bare
minimum, and thus fundamentally opposed to the sacred, which is the supernatural and thus excessive to meaning
in the natural world. In the new version
of social life, secular was all there was.
As Taylor points out, the word secular
was still the same, but its meaning had
changed, the contrast was no longer with
another temporal dimension, in which
spiritual institutions had their niche;
rather, the secular was, in its new sense,
opposed to any claim (Taylor 2011: 33).
Thus all goals now had to be thiswordly and justified only if it involved
human flourishing, peace, prosperity, etc.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
An unproductive religiosity came to be

seen as superfluous, characterised with
un-arrived beliefs which neither added to
prosperity and ran the risk of hindering the
authority of the state. The deist template,
helped to define good or acceptable religion
for much of the Western discussion of the
last few centuries. A good or proper religion
is a set of belief in God or some other transcendent power, which entails an acceptable,
and in some versions, a rational morality. It
is devoid of any elements that do not contribute to this morality and thus of superstition.
(Taylor 2011: 35)
Religious practices were seen as mere

products of beliefs without any value in
themselves, and religion, came to be
solely defined as a state of mind that
produces practice, as something with
external manifestations that can be ultimately traced back to an inner assent to
a cognitive proposition (Sherwood 34).
Thus, Enlightenment onwards, religion
solely got its identity from being belief and
faith, which was potentially dangerous in
a public sphere because of being a series
of propositions that come from divine
sanction and not through reasons independent of religious sources. A common
theme in the writings of people theorising
liberal democracy in the 17th century,
for example,
is that a good citizen of a liberal democracy
will impose certain epistemological restraint
[and]specifically refrain from allowing religious reason be determinative when
deciding or debating political issues of certain
sortsor perhaps any sorts whatsoever,
unless perchance, those religion reasons are
themselves held for reasons of the acceptable sort. (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997: 69)
These acceptable reasons have been

described by different scholars as being
publicly accessible reasons, as secular
reasons as derived from the shared political culture of ones democracy, and
others like Rawls have said that they
should not come from any comprehensive
perspective (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997:
74). The idea is that religious authority
has a unique potential for undue influence, and in contrast, secular reasons
are not commonly regarded as having
the same kind of authority as religious
ones (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997: 126).
Understanding religions core to be
belief and inward faith, of which enthusiasm and superstition were manifestations,
vol lI no 33
the attempt was to deride religion of its

excessive features, and make acceptable
that part of religion which could be
deemed acceptable by reasonably believed or those that overlapped with
secular sources of obligation.6 John
Locke, for example, held that by appealing
solely to the deliverances of our generic
human nature applied directly to things
themselves we could arrive at a rational
religion and prove the reliability of the
New Testament (Audi and Wolterstorff
1997: 85).
The idea was that unsubstantiated
claims to the divine pose threat to the
states sole authority and thus a rational
religion would not pose these problems.
But in Naiks case, devoid of magic or
invocation of divinity, it is the rational
religion which poses threat to the state,
because it has found a way to be sure of
its truth in the grammar of the state.
The grammar itself may be flawed, but
in being able to incorporate it, it is both
legitimate and real.
This brings us to Taylors theorisation
of the third step of the dyad of secular
sacred. Taylor remarks that modern unbelief is not understood simply as a condition of absence of belief or merely indifference. It is a historical condition that
requires the perfect tense, a condition
of having overcome the irrationality of
belief (Taylor 2007: 169). This consciousness, of unbelief being seen as a coming
of age, of having overcome past irrationality, is ingrained in Naiks rhetoric. Naik
plays a double chequered game with these
categories. He uses the secular stadial
consciousness,7 the understanding in
people that secular arguments have overcome religious ones, to double prove to
his audience the validity of his version of
Islam. As Larkin (2008: 105) contends
with the case of Deedat, the very idea of
a public has been imagined to be forged
against the idea of religion, and thus using
that form itself is a transgressive act.
Naik uses this thrill of transgression.
Thus Naik walks backwards on the same
dyad that liberals constructed and leeches
the reverence of secular to attach it to
religion. He begins his argument from a
non-religious premise, taking his listener
to hate Islam. Naik finds popularity amidst
a Westernised audience because of his
63
INSIGHT
and their inhabitation of the secular

public sphere (as Deedat did according to
Larkin). Naiks authority comes from the
fact that he eschews religious authority.
5 Borrowing Logical Premises
Further, when Naik cannot hurl scientific
facts and conspiracy theory statistics to
prove random injunctions, he takes help
by borrowing logical premises from institutions of the modern world. Consider a
reply that he gave in a lecture about Is
Allah so unmerciful that he will send otherwise good people, who have done good
deeds but dont follow Islam, to hell:
by references to modern systems. There

is absolutely no attempt to think of Islam
as a metaphysical system on its own
merits, or to think of it as a way of life
forgetting other prevalent views, what
one would expect from fundamentalist and extremist belief in a system.
Even his much touted, and now infamous argument against disallowing the
building of churches and temples in
Saudi Arabia, is done using the reality of
mathematical numbers:
Now, I ask these non-Muslims, will you allow
the candidate to teach in your school who says
that 2 plus 2 equals 3 or that 2 plus 2 equals
6? Theyll say, no. I ask, why? Theyll say, because he does not have correct knowledge of
mathematics. Similarly, as far as matters of
religion are concerned we know for sure that
only Islam is a true religion. (YouTube 2011d)
If I get 10% marks in Hindi and 99% marks

in five other subjects, will I pass 10th standard or not? Sister, tell me[No]... Just like
that to go to heaven four conditions need to
be fulfilled. (YouTube 2012a)
One can come out of this analogy by

saying that modern education system is
not flawless in its judgment of merit and
education, neither is it universal. However, it is difficult to come up with a critique if one takes the modern education
system with its system, of examinations,
marks, passing and failing for granted,
which many of his supporters do. To a
similar question by a Hindu person, as
to why is the god in Islam so egoistical to
punish people who do not believe him,
why are we attributing human nature
to god, Naik says Suppose tomorrow
there is a student studying with you, he
writes wrong answers, you stay awake in
the night, this person plays hooky, enjoys,
writes everything wrong, and teacher says
both get first class first. Will you be happy
with the teacher? No says the respondent (YouTube 2013). Because you believe in justice, Naik said. Naiks premises
of justice and punishment are borrowed.
In another speech, when justifying the
mention of killing the enemies in the
context of a particular war mentioned in
the Quran (and after spending a lot of
sentences showing that the Muslims tried
their best to avoid the war), he says, Imagine there is a war between America and
Vietnam today, now any army general to
boost the morale of his soldiers will say
wherever you find an enemy kill him, he
wouldnt say get killed (YouTube 2012b).
Thus like in the case of polygamy, or the
act of killing soldiers, or sending nonbelievers to hell, Naik justifies the dictums
64
Naiks justification of controversial

Islamic tenets is not by invoking a special
metaphysical order of thought, a clash of
civilisations. Instead, absurd ideas are justified by referring to other absurd ideas in
the secular world we have taken for granted.
It is in their relatability to arguments we
are used to hearing in the modern world
that their apparent truth lies.
This by itself: by proving religion by
showing its similarity to common-sense
that Quran is like other things in this
worldan utter stripping of divinity,
should not ideally be reason sinister
enough to make men feel so inspired
and fanatic as to pick up arms. If it
does, then surely the problem lies somewhere outside the logic of the dyad.
Notes
1
2
3
5
6
7
See Samuel and Rozario (2010) for interviews

of Naiks followers in Bangladesh.
www.irf.net.
Larkin (2008: 101) traces the form of Deedats
Islamic Evangelism which not only used the
rhetoric of missionary evangelism to his benefit but also its infrastructure; circulating pamphlets and audio-videocassettes of public lecture tours.
Several Indian scholars, notably Ashis Nandy and
T N Madan, have pointed that Indian cultures
might not share the same lines of separation
between the material and the transcendental.
Audi and Wolterstorff (1997: 10) note five kinds
of religious obligations.
See Audi and Wolterstorff (1997: 13) theorisation of mixed obligations.
See Jose Casanova (2011: 59).
References
Audi, Robert and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1997): Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Bala, Arun (2006): The Dialogue of Civilizations in

the Birth of Modern Science, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Casanova, Jos (2011): The Secular, Secularisations,
Secularisms, Rethinking Secularism, Craig
Calhoun et al (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, pp 5474.
Larkin, Brian (2008): Ahmed Deedat and the Form
of Islamic Evangelism, Social Text, Vol 96,
No 3, pp 10121.
Naik, Zakir (nd): Quran and Modern Science:
Compatible or Incompatible, www.irf.net, accessed on 30 July 2016.
(2000): Answers to Non-Muslims Common
Questions about Islam, www.irf.net, accessed
on 30 July 2016.
Osler, Margaret (2010): Religion and the Chaning
Historiography of the Scientific Revolution,
Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives, Thomas Dixon et al (eds), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp 7186.
Samuel, Geoffrey and Santi Rozario (2010): Contesting science for Islam: The Media as a Source of
Revisionist Knowledge in the Lives of Young
Bangladeshis, Contemporary South Asia, Vol 18,
No 4, pp 42741.
Shapin, Steven (1996): The Scientific Revolution,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sherwood, Yvonne (2015): On the Freedom of the
Concepts of Religion and Belief, Politics of Religious Freedom, Winnifred Fallers et al (eds),
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, Charles (2007): A Secular Age, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
(2011): Western Secularity, Rethinking Secularism, Craig Calhoun et al (eds), New York:
Oxford University Press, pp 3153.
YouTube (2010): Dr Zakir Naik on Sania Mirza,
posted on 2 August, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=gHDHQez80xo, accessed on
30 July 2016.
(2011a): Woman Challenging Zakir Naik on
Polygamy, posted on 11 June, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQaPBU5ppsk, accessed on
30 July 2016.
(2011b): Why Polygamy Is Allowed in Islam
Dr Zakir Naik, posted on 2 August, http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=c2bDkw57xRE, accessed
on 30 July 2016.
YouTube (2011c): FULLNew: Dr Zakir Naik
Quran & Modern Science, posted on 24 August,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= r5h6CNhtVls, accessed on 30 July 2016.
(2011d): Truth About Intellect Level of Islamic
Scholar Zakir Naik Who Holds a Degree in
Medicine and Surgery, posted on 7 August,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXwjhJhaVck, accessed on 30 July 2016.
(2012a): Why All Muslims Will Go to Heaven,
posted on 1 January, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1w U7eBQjSCU, accessed on 30 July
2016.
(2012b): , Media & Islam
War or Peace? posted on 29 March, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vb1iiSxf3W4, accessed on 30 July 2016.
(2012c): Combat Kit Course Against Bible
ThumpersSheikh Ahmad Deedat, posted on
10 April, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
uT5HCFVGaAM, accessed on 30 July 2016.
(2013): Zakir NaikIs God Egotistical for Punishing Us If We Believe in Other Gods?, posted on
12 April, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=
5WvMI47gRyw, accessed on 30 July 2016.
ZakirNaik.net (2015): Twenty Most Common Questions About Islam, posted on 15 November,
http://www.zakirnaik.net/20-most-commonquestions-about-islam-dr-zakir-naik/, accessed
on 30 July 2016.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Living Together Separately

Dalits in an Emergent Collectivity in a Rajasthan Village
Shashi Bhushan Singh
This is the story of a village where Dalits have become

economically and politically powerful, and are trying to
raise their status in the local social hierarchy, but
encounter fierce resistance from the upper castes. As a
result, social life becomes complex and complicated to
the extent that almost the entire institutional
framework, which brings order and stability in
society, is being questioned and contested with
different castes living in a hostile social environment.
Such an emergent collectivity gives birth to caste and
communal conflicts, honour killings, and has
implications for the functioning of democratic
institutions and implementation of
development programmes.
Thanks are due to the anonymous referee for his/her illuminating

comments.
Shashi Bhushan Singh (shashi_dse@yahoo.co.in) teaches sociology at the
Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
ampur village (in Rajsamand district, Rajasthan) is

situated in the Aravalli mountain system. The Rajputs,
who were the political representatives of the princely
state of Udaipur (of which the village was a part), and local
rulers provided the nucleus and political stability to the villages sociopolitical life. As the area is mountainous and the
quality of agricultural land is poor, people prefer to settle near
their agricultural plots. Thus, the village has many satellite
settlements locally known as bhagals.
There are 14 castes in Rampur. The Brahmins, Rajputs, and
Mahajans are the upper castes. The backward classes are divided into two groups: Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and
Most Backward Classes (MBCs). There are Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the village (Table 1, p 66).1
Agriculture has traditionally been the mainstay of economic
activities (Table 2, p 66). However, undulating topography, poor
quality of soil, and low availability of water mean that agriculture is only at the subsistence level. Though there are some
families who own more than 30 acres of land, only less than a
fourth of that land is arable, the rest being mountainous and
only useful for grazing. As the land is not able to sustain the
livelihood of the people, there is migration from the village.2
Thus, the main source of generation of wealth is not the village
agricultural land, but secondary and tertiary occupations, mostly
located outside the village. This has led to the breakdown in the
relation between castes and occupations, with the result that
except for the most pure, like priestly functions, and the most impure, like removing dead cattle, there is no hard and fast rule
about this relation. Market mentality has acquired priority over
social obligations.
The Brahmins act as priests in the village, own substantial
land, are educated, and live in a separate bhagal. Though their
numerical strength is not much in the village, they have an
important place in the village power structure, mainly due to
their contact within the Brahmin faction of the Congress party.
The post-independence economic and political order has not
been very favourable to the Rajputs political dominance in the
village. Some of the Rajputs are economically better off, but
others are poor. Still, the Rajputs enjoy high social status in
the village. There are two rawlas (small fort like structures) of
Rajputs; one located in the east, and the other in the west. It is
the western rawla that is economically more developed now,
though traditionally the seat of power was with the eastern
rawla. Among the Rajputs, the grand old man Nahar Singh
had undisputed hold over his caste men. Now, one of his
65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
grandsons, Ram Singh, is their leader. One can observe some

sort of political rivalry between the two rawlas. The Rajputs
are generally the supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), but a section is with the Congress (particularly those
from the eastern rawla).
Due to numerical superiority in the village and the statutory
panchayat, for the last two decades, the members of the Gurjars
from Rampur have been the sarpanches of the panchayat. After
the death of the highly respected previous sarpanch, Rooplal Gurjar, his son Ramdharilal is the leader of the main faction of the
Gurjars. They are mainly the supporters of the Congress party.
However, there is
Table 1: Distribution of Caste Groups in Rampur
Castes and Their Traditional Occupations
No of Households an intra-caste fac1 Brahmins: priest (UC)
4
tion among them,
2 Rajputs: warrior (UC)
40
though both the
3 Mahajans: trade (UC)
10
groups swear alle4 Gurjars: pastoral/agriculture (OBC/UC)
140
giance to the Con5 Kumhar: pot maker (MBC)
6
gress.
6 Darjee: tailor (MBC)
6
The Khatiks, who
7 Suthars: carpenter and barber (MBC)
6
are
economically
8 Lohar: blacksmith (MBC)
3
9 Khatiks:goat sacrifice and trading (SC)
25
and politically pow10 Balai: menial work (SC)
12
erful, are descend11 Bhambi: menial work (SC)
6
ants of a single
12 Bunkar: menial work (SC)
8
family. They are
13 Sargara: menial work (SC)
2
mostly landless, but
14 Bhils: pastoral and labour(ST)
12
1 UC (upper caste), OBC (Other Backward Class), MBC (Most
have made money
Backward Class), SC (Scheduled Caste), (Scheduled Tribe).
from secondary and
Note: The Gurjars are classified as OBC in the government
tertiary occupations.
scheme. But, in the village under study, the Gurjars are
treated as near equal to the upper castes. So, when upper
In Rampur, a large
castes are mentioned in the text, until the caste is specified,
number of Rajputs
this also includes the Gurjars.
Source: Fieldwork.
and Gurjars are
Table 2: Occupational Structure in Rampur
Caste
Brahmins (4)
Rajputs (40)
Mahajans (10)
Gurjars (140)
MBCs (21)
Khatiks (25)
Other SCs (28)
Bhils (12)
Land Structure (Figure in Acres)

Secondary and Tertiary Occupations
>30 1030 310 13 <1 Government Job Business/Trade Migration
3
8
-
1
22
2
52
-
3
10
5
56
6
3
-
5
3
20
5
12
2
1
4
10
10
26
11
1
2
3
5
-
2
25
10
40
5
15
3
-
1
28
8
75
16
1
5
3
Source: Fieldwork.
economically indebted to the Khatiks. Lalchand Khatik is the

most powerful individual among the Khatiks. Now, his son Mahesh has taken over the mantle from him. The Khatiks are vertically divided between the Congress (the Mahesh group with
the Congress) and the BJP.3
Khatiks: A New Social Contract
The Khatiks, traditionally a community of butchers, were landless and lived in perpetual poverty. As the local village economy
was not able to sustain their livelihoods, some of the Khatiks
started working outside the village. A few of them started their
careers as labourers, saved some money, and utilised that money
to take on small contracts. Slowly, some of them became big contractors. With urbanisation, the trade in goats became more
66
profitable, and a section of Khatiks benefited from the positive

integration of their traditional occupation (buying and selling
of goats) with the market. The second generation Khatiks acquired modest education and have been the prime beneficiaries
of the protective discrimination policy of the state. In the course
of time, the politically ambitious Khatiks invested money in
acquiring political power. Lalchand Khatik contested an assembly election (reserved for SCs) on a BJP ticket in 1980. This resulted in some of the Khatiks having better connections within
the political and bureaucratic world, which in turn further
helped them become economically and politically stronger.4
These developments have had positive effects on their social
status in the village. They have shed many of the social disabilities that were the hallmark of their low social status in the local
caste hierarchy. The upper castes do not use any derogatory
language against them during everyday social intercourse.
They visit the Khatiks houses, particularly when they need
money, or some help in the government offices. The Khatiks are
counted as significant political players in any collective decision-making in the village. Their children play in the main
school playground and in the statutory panchayat meetings,
they are the most active.
But, as the Khatiks are becoming economically better off,
intra-caste differentiation has taken place. The economically
better-off families consider themselves superior to their poorer
fellow caste members, resulting in intra-caste political cleavage. While Lalchand, who is the richest and politically the
strongest among the Khatiks, almost every day visits the houses
of the Thakur (a title bestowed to the local Rajput chieftain by
the Udaipur Principality) families, where he is provided a
wooden bench to sit on, he hardly visits Khatik families, except
briefly on some special occasions. Lalchand keeps wooden
benches in his house so that the upper castes can come and sit
over there. This creates heartburn among the poor Khatik
families. One of the reasons why some Khatiks have aligned
with the BJP and the anti-Mahesh faction in the village is due
to what they call the arrogant behaviour of Mahesh Khatik.
Moreover, as more and more families are becoming better off,
many have staked their claim for caste leadership, and this has
divided the Khatiks vertically into two political groups: one
associated with the Congress (Mahesh faction) and other with
the BJP. In spite of these differences, the Khatiks as a whole are
united when the issue of their social status is concerned. They
have adopted various strategies to raise their status in the local
social hierarchy.
Sanskritisation as an idiom of social mobility still remains
probably the most important source of upward social mobility,
particularly, when the question pertains to social relations between the upper castes and the untouchables.5 As part of sanskritising their social life, the Khatiks have given up what are
considered to be degrading occupations (particularly sacrificing goats), their women do not work in the upper castes agricultural fields, and they observe various rituals. However, two issues
need to be mentioned regarding sanskritisation and its role in upward social mobility, particularly when the actors are Khatiks
(untouchables). First, sanskritisation is not a homogeneous
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process. There is early impact of sanskritisation on occupation

and religion, and only late impact on marriage and other
symbols. Even the rich Khatiks, who have given up impure
occupations, continue to practise remarriage of women, a trait
of the lower castes. Second, there is differential impact of
sanskritisation on the community, whereas the poor Khatiks
in and around the village continue to engage in the so-called
impure traditional occupations (goat sacrifice and goat trade).
Religious ceremonies have been used by the Dalits to raise
their social status (Svl 2001). In Rampur, the Khatiks wanted
the Brahmins to perform puja in their homes, but were not
successful. In fact, the pujari (priest) of the temple tosses prasad
(gods offerings) into their hands. The Khatiks worship their
caste god, Kardhar bavji, and every year on a particular day they
perform rituals in which every Khatik family of the village participates. As part of the strategy to enhance their social status, the
Khatiks requested the upper castes to accept the prasad they
had offered to their caste god, but the upper castes refused.
However, many upper-caste families are economically indebted to the Khatiks, and another section of the Rajputs and Gurjars need the Khatiks support in government offices and in the
market. The Khatiks reasoned that they themselves would
bring all the materials needed for the preparation of the prasad, and the upper castes could prepare their own prasad. The
upper castes accepted the offer and participated in the event.
However, after the ceremony was over, a rumour started doing
the rounds in surrounding villages that the upper castes of
Rampur have started sharing food with the Khatiks. It was not
only the opponents of the Rajputs, but also the Khatiks who
spread the rumour. This forced the upper castes to excuse
themselves from participating in the ceremony in the future.
In another illustrative incident in the village, a Ramlila party
(performance around the life of Lord Ram by a group of
people) had to perform for 10 days, and every day someone
from the village had to arrange food worth `350 for the
Ramlila party. After four days nobody was willing to finance
them, and the Ramlila party announced that from the day
after, the party would stop performing in the village. There
was pin-drop silence in the gathering. The compere of the
Ramlila party started challenging the dignity of the village:
This is such a big village and has been the seat of Thakur [a
designation for the erstwhile local Rajput rulers in the area],
but we will have to discontinue the show from tomorrow as no
one is coming forward to pay for tomorrows expenditure.
Lalchand Khatik, who was sitting in the lower part of the
temple, stood up and said loudly: Well, our sarpanch who
looked after the honour of the village is no more, but I [Lalchand] am alive. Lalchand announced that, not only for the
day after, he would bear the entire expenditure of the Ramlila
party for the next six days. He paid `2,000 for the six-day stay
of the Ramlila party in the village. He had wanted to take up
the role of the previous sarpanch, but there was contempt
among the people and they were of the opinion that Lalchand
was just trying to flaunt his wealth.
One of the strategies the Khatiks are using to enhance their
social status is to acquire symbolic goods. Their houses are
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better than those of the upper castes in the village. They own
modern cars, television sets and telephones. They have government jobs. Most of the political personalities of the area visit
their homes. They have connections in the bureaucratic world.
Lalchand keeps a licensed gun in his drawing room. The Khatiks indulge in what T Veblen (1912) calls conspicuous consumption of goods. But, all these symbolisms have only limited
use in enhancing their social status in the village, since the importance of status symbolism does not help much in the village,
where the past history and present position of the Khatiks is
known to everyone. Their quick economic and political rise has
only complicated the situation.
The biggest issue in the village today is the mismatch between the status, role, and the position of Khatiks below the
pollution line in the local caste hierarchy. The important point
is that they have not achieved the type of status upper castes
would have at a similar level of economic and political standing. They say that though they have everything and are willing
to contribute to the collective life of the village, they are still being stigmatised by other castes.6 Thus, the Khatiks remain secluded from the social life of the village. Though they keep their
frustration under wraps, the moment they get a chance they are
more than willing to express it. They try to compensate their
deprivation in social life by overreacting to certain issues,
particularly, if the issue has the potential to portray the social
position of the upper castes in poor light.
Exchange of Conflict
By the 1990s, the internal contradiction in the village was

growing, but Rooplal (a Gurjar) somehow managed it. He was
sarpanch, and got Mahesh (a Khatik) elected as the deputy
sarpanch of the panchayat, and Ram Singh (a Rajput) the
chairman of the pasture user committee. In 2000, there were
panchayat elections, and Rooplal, due to poor health, wanted
to withdraw from active politics. He wanted his son Ramdharilal to succeed him as the panchayat sarpanch. However,
this was not acceptable to a group of people, including a section of the Gurjars. The biggest reason for this intra-caste tension and sociopolitical division among them was the perceived
closeness of Rooplal and his son Ramdharilal to Mahesh Khatik.
Ramdharilal used to drive Mahesh Khatiks car. Maheshs
opponents thought that if Ramdharilal became sarpanch,
Mahesh would become even more powerful.
A section of the Gurjars accused the Khatiks of indulging in
womanising in the village by alluring girls with their money.
Rooplals opponents from Rampur and other villages of the
panchayat united and rallied behind Heeralal Gurjar, who had
personal enmity with Rooplal. A bitter election was fought
among the supporters and opponents of Rooplal, wherein Ramdharilal lost by a narrow margin. This was a huge psychological
blow to the authority of Rooplal who withdrew himself from
public life. It is being said that Rooplal was never able to reconcile to the defeat of his son, as it was his personal defeat, and
within six months of the panchayat election Rooplal passed away.
Ramdharilals defeat in the panchayat election was basically
a personal defeat not only for Rooplal, but for Mahesh too,
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since both Ramdharilal and Mahesh were from the same political faction. It was said that Mahesh was the main financier
of Ramdharilals election campaign. The Mahesh group had
never reconciled to its defeat in the panchayat election and he
was waiting to settle the score. Soon, Mahesh found his
chance. The government had allotted some revenue land to a
barber family. The Khatiks, who were already using this site
for garbage disposal (one of the methods to capture common
land) refused to vacate the land. The barbers called the villagers, including the newly elected sarpanch Heeralal to arbitrate
the matter. Though in the new panchayati raj scheme the sarpanch has no judicial power, people generally call the sarpanch to enhance the legitimacy of the decision being taken.
The sarpanch reached the site and told the Khatiks to vacate
the land. There were arguments between the sarpanch and
the Khatiks in which the sarpanch used some foul language
against the Khatiks. In retaliation, Mahesh slapped the
sarpanch. Maheshs opponents advised the sarpanch to lodge a
first information report (FIR) against Mahesh, but the Gurjars
said that the FIR would confirm that a Khatik had slapped a
Gurjar. Maheshs father (Lalchand) requested Nahar Singh to
step in and resolve the matter within the village. Though the
matter was resolved within the village and the sarpanch did
not file an FIR, it gave rise to more bitterness between these
groups.7
What follows is another instance of conflict in the village.
The village hospital had a doctor, a compounder, and two lady
nurses. The compounder, a local person, had been with the
hospital for 12 years, and was also running his private clinic
and a medical shop in the village. The doctor too had a private
practice, and it is difficult to pinpoint the reason, but there was
tension between the doctor and the compounder. The doctor
was unmarried and, since there was no restaurant in the village, he used to share food with the nurses. Sometimes the
doctor used to watch television at the nurses house till late in
the night, since their house was located near the doctors residence. The doctor learnt that some villagers had written to the
sarpanch that he had illicit relations with the nurses. The
doctor saw the hand of the compounder and a section of the
Khatiks in this allegation. The compounder wanted the doctor
to leave the village so that, alleged the doctor, the compounder
could continue with his private practice.
The doctor, who earlier used to stay in a house belonging to
one of the Khatiks, but later on had shifted to a Mahajans
house, alleged that when he was staying with the Khatiks,
they were constantly talking to the doctor about these nurses.
The Khatiks took the shifting of the doctor from their house as
an insult and were waiting to settle the score with the doctor.
Very soon the Khatiks got a chance to do so. The compounder
was transferred to the district headquarters and approached
the villagers, the Khatiks in particular, for assistance in getting his transfer revoked. The villagers were told to meet the
chief medical officer (CMO) and demand that a compounder be
appointed in the hospital. But, in front of the CMO, the Khatiks
started accusing the doctor of having illicit relations with the
hospital nurses. An application was written in which the
68
doctor was designated a charitrahin aadmi (immoral person).

When the villagers were asked to sign the application, some of
them refused, as they were not comfortable with the doctor
being called an immoral person.
The doctor was transferred to a different village. The Khatiks opponents, Mahesh in particular, were not reconciled to
this development. Once the doctor was transferred from the
village, it was seen as the victory of the Khatiks. However, the
Khatiks opponents were not willing to directly be identified.
They provoked one Bhur Singh, who then organised Rajput
women under the banner of self-help groups, and met the
district collector demanding that the doctor be brought back to
the village. For the Khatiks, it was an act of backstabbing by
the Rajputs. After sometime, the doctor came back to the village. This was seen as a victory for those who were anti-Mahesh.
But, the doctor was scared that the Khatiks might beat him up
if he stayed at a Mahajans house. So, a Rajput rented his room
to the doctor and doctor started staying there. This cemented
the perception of the Khatiks that it was the Rajputs who were
behind the Rajput women approaching the higher officials.
There are different types of cleavages within the village based
on caste, occupation and party. But, a new type of cleavage has
arisen in the village due to the rise of Khatiks as a power. In the
village, the biggest sin for an upper-caste person is his association with the Khatiks. The greatest premium of ones bravery
is the ability to restrain the Khatiks in the village. But, the same
people who are Maheshs biggest enemies do not want to confront
him directly. Rather, they incite some deviant people in the village to fight with the Khatiks and Mahesh. Basically, the political
identity of the Rajputs and Gurjars to some extent is defined by
their relation and opposition to the Khatiks, and vice versa.
Crisis of Representation
During Rooplals term as sarpanch, a new hospital building

was sanctioned. The Rajputs and a section of the Gurjars wanted
the hospital to be located on the west side of the village, closer
to their houses and agricultural land. The Khatiks wanted it to
be constructed on the east side of the village, closer to their
habitation. The Gurjars are scattered and Rooplals house is
very close to the Khatiks habitation. The Khatiks (read
Mahesh), who had better access within the bureaucracy, with
tacit support from Rooplal, got the hospital constructed on the
eastern side of the village. However, the new hospital building
was not inaugurated. In the meantime, Heeralal became the
sarpanch of the panchayat. The anti-Mahesh group, which had
supported Heeralal during the panchayat election and wanted
the new hospital building to be constructed on the western side
of the village, advised Heeralal to prevent its inauguration.
There was another problem: who should and should not be
invited to the inauguration ceremony? Heeralal, the current
sarpanch, was politically close to Raghubir Singh, the pradhan
(head) of the panchayat samiti, and Mahesh was close to the
Gunsagar group, which was anti-pradhan. The main reason for
the tension between the two intra-Congress factions was that
Raghubir Singh became the pradhan by splitting the Congress,
and taking the support of the BJP panchayat samiti members.
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Raghubir Singh was expelled from the Congress. Now, the Gunsagar group, with which Mahesh was aligned, would not share
the dais with Raghubir Singh. But, Heeralal would not allow the
inauguration of the building in the absence of Raghubir Singh.
What is the nature of the dispute-settling mechanism in this
type of emerging collectivity? One of the institutions through
which the collective issues of the village are decided is the village panchayat, composed of the village elders. How is this
panchayat constituted? In the panchayat meeting held on Holi,
when the issue of a Balai was being deliberated, somebody
screamed from the audience, Call the village! Then, came a
prompt reply from another person sitting in the same audience, that the village is already there, though not more than
a hundred people were physically present. The truth is that the
panchayat is constituted in such a manner that it includes in its
decision-making body the heads of different castes, clans and
bhagals of the village. It is the duty of those present in the panchayat to convince the members of their respective clans and
castes to accept the verdict of the panchayat.
The traditional panchayat met on Holi. One of the issues the
panchayat resolved was that the elder brother of Heeralal (current
sarpanch) had accused Rooplal (previous sarpanch) of playing a
role in the premature burning of the Holika (bonfire lit on Holi).
Rooplal indulged in this act, alleged Heeralals brother, with the
intention to capture the common land located near his house.
Rooplal had passed away, and his son Ramdharilal had brought
the Holika issue to the notice of the panchayat. However, now
there was an altered power equation in the village. After the panchayat election, Heeralal had become the sarpanch of the panchayat. The elders who were part of the panchayat did not want to
antagonise any of the parties to the dispute, and advised both Ramdharilal and Heeralal to forgive each other and forget the issue.
The second issue the panchayat dealt with was the case of a
Balai, whose children had refused to perform some customary
calling. The old Balai was threatened with dire consequences, if
he refused to perform the traditional calling. The Balai accepted
the verdict of the panchayat with folded hands and assured the
panchayat that though he could not force his children to engage
in this work, he would do his job until death. In the cases
mentioned above, the panchayat was able to resolve the issues
because the parties concerned were not only present at the
panchayat meeting, but were very much willing to accept the
verdict of the panchayat. But, this was the limit of the panchayat. The panchayat could not take up the most contentious
issue, the inauguration of the new hospital building, because it
has been losing its representative character. There are different reasons for this, but I shall point out only those that have
direct bearing upon the issue I have been discussing here.
In Rampur, the panchayat becoming non-representational
has a lot to do with the conflict between the status and role of
the lower castes, of the Khatiks in particular. The dominant
Khatiks do not participate in the panchayat meetings as they
do not want to sit separately on the lower part of the platform
(the panchayat is held on the higher part of the platform at the
Charbhuja Temple). In the panchayat meeting that was held on
Holi, the Khatiks were neither present, as was the case with
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Ramdharilal and Heeralal, nor could they be called by force,

as in the case of the Balai. Then, the panchayat had an
idea about the irreconcilable differences among the parties
involved, and it did not put up any serious effort to engage
with the issue (the inauguration of the hospital building).
Even the presence of caste and clan heads in panchayat
meetings does not make the panchayat representative. For example, when the Rajput women went to petition the district
collector during the doctorcompounder dispute, the Khatiks
were feeling cheated because people from all the castes and
bhagals were present in front of the CMO. Thus, in any representative gathering, representations from many groups are
only formal, and the moment people disperse the real politics
start. Then, there is the issue of the changing authority pattern
within the family. There is separation between the ritual head
of the family, who is generally the eldest member of the household and participates in panchayat deliberations, and the real
head of the family, who may be much younger. With the diversification of occupations, in most cases, it is the younger members of the family who earn and have the ability to relate with
the outside world. Thus, the decision taken by the panchayat
(where the elders participate) does not carry weight in the
eyes of the people, since they know that the real head of the
family might have a different opinion on the issue.
As far as the modern panchayat is concerned, it can be effective only if the sarpanch is a politically strong personality.
Though Heeralal is the sarpanch, he does not have the support
of even the Gurjars, having been accused by them of breaking
their unity. Though Heeralal won in the panchayat election, the
Gurjars had lost. When it comes to the honour of the caste, the
Gurjars do claim that one of their caste men is sarpanch of the
panchayat, but that is the end of Heeralals recognition as sarpanch among them. After Mahesh slapped Heeralal, no one came
out in his support openly, and this dampened Heeralals spirit
that further eroded his authority. In Rampur, the defeated
group (Mahesh and Ramdharilal) does not attend panchayat
meetings, as this group can get its work done through connections in the higher-level political and bureaucratic circles.
Emergence of an Enfeebled Collectivity
The faction leaders in Rampur are attached to some political parties or factions and there is compulsion on their part to bring their
respective leaders to the village. The middle-level leaders need
an audience so that they remain relevant among the people, as
well as in the higher political establishment. Heeralal invited the
MLA (member of the legislative assembly) and pradhan to inaugurate the water pump set he had got installed near his house.
Both the local MLA and pradhan visited Rampur. However, the
inauguration ceremony was not held at the Charbhuja Temple or
in the school, but near Heeralals house. The sarpanch had fulfilled his ambition. Thereafter, it was Ram Singhs turn to get his
leader to the village. There was drought in the state, and for the
BJP the main role as an opposition party was to expose the inefficiency of the state government in providing drought relief
to the people. Gulabchand Kataria, a leading leader of the BJP,
visited the village. The meeting venue was the government school,
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where BJP workers from nearby villages attended the meeting.

But, the leaders were offered snacks in one of the Rajputs houses.
Now, probably, it was Maheshs turn. Mahesh had more
stakes in the inauguration of the hospital building so that he
could bring his leader to the village. For Heeralal, not allowing
the hospital building to be inaugurated in the absence of the
pradhan was a victory. Basically, Heeralals world does not go
beyond his good rapport with the pradhan and the local MLA.
Heeralal was aware that ultimately it was the pradhan who
would play a decisive role in any affair related to the panchayat.
Girija Vyas, the president of the Rajasthan Congress Committee was not against sharing the platform with the pradhan, as
her prime consideration was to get re-elected as a Member of
Parliament (MP) from the constituency and take care of the
larger interests of the party. Finally, a compromise was arrived
at, and Heeralal and Mahesh decided that leaders from both
the Congress factions would be invited for the inauguration of
the hospital. For the anti-Mahesh and BJP groups, including
some Khatiks, it was a catastrophe. The anti-Mahesh Khatiks
knew that the inauguration of the hospital would only enhance the stature of Mahesh and not that of the entire Khatik
community.
A day was fixed for the inauguration of the hospital building. Vyas accepted the invitation to inaugurate the hospital.
While the informal decision had already been taken, it was
necessary to get the decision ratified formally by the village
panchayat. The villagers initially assembled near Terapanthi
Bhawan and moved towards the Charbhuja Temple, the main
venue where the traditional panchayat is held. When they
neared the temple, there was ambivalence about sitting at the
temple, because the Khatiks could not sit there along with the
upper castes. So, somebody in the gathering suggested that
the meeting take place in the school located just across the
road, and people accepted it. There was also the compulsion
that without the involvement of Mahesh and Lalchand Khatik
the meeting would not have served any purpose as Mahesh
had a stake in the inauguration.
But, the inauguration ceremony took place as per the tenets
of the traditional social order and it was the Rajputs and Gurjars who sat on the main dais. Though the social structure was
reasserted by excluding the Khatiks from the main dais, a new
emerging structure was visible because Vyas had raised Maheshs status in the village by calling him her younger brother.
One could see him sitting in a corner on the dais, and probably
nobody objected, though many people did not like it. Of course,
the ritual was held to forge some sort of solidarity in the highly
factionalised village, but it could not create social solidarity.8
People were sitting together, but it was a forced collectivity.
The BJP group and other anti-Mahesh forces, including some
Khatiks, were not reconciled to Mahesh having his way in getting the hospital inaugurated, calling his leader, and enhancing
his social status within and outside the village. The ritual did
not represent the real nature of the emerging social structure.
The harmony which was visible on the surface was manufactured, mainly for the honour of the village. The seeds for the
next round of politicking were sown.
70
Living Together Separately

The societal developments that Rampur is experiencing are not
new. This type of social churning has been documented in different regions of the country.9 However, the present study deals
with a different type of phenomenon that has become important in recent years, and there is every possibility that it would
remain important in the following years. After independence,
the economic and political developments that helped the OBCs
become politically powerful could not bring any significant
gain to the SCs, though it helped them gain some sort of liberation from the sociopolitical environments in which they were
placed. Certain segments of the SCs, in some parts of India, whose
traditional occupations got positively integrated with the market (Lynch 1968; Bailey 1957), became economically better off,
but these achievements were too little to make them a political
force. The social effects of these developments were even more
disastrous because when these SC groups attempted to raise their
social status, they failed miserably. Under the circumstances, as in
one of the cases described by F G Bailey (1957: 227), they voluntarily excluded themselves from the traditional social system.
Though a large section of Dalits even today is competing
with the dominant sections of society for the control of limited
economic and political resources (Delige 2011), a section
among them, who have become better off economically, is also
aspiring for esteem, high social status and social recognition.10
This has injected altogether a new dimension in the way the
emerging collectivity is constituted.
In Rampur, most traditional institutions that provided meaning to life and livelihood, and formalised social relations among
castes and individuals stand disintegrated. In these circumstances, different castes and individuals are not sure about
their place in the emerging social order. The upper castes are
not willing to acknowledge the upward mobility of lower castes
by selectively citing some of the traditional traits lower castes are
still associated with. The lower castes downplay the social superiority of upper castes by citing upper castes engagements in certain
acts (particularly for economic benefits) and deeds not becoming
of an upper caste. Questioning and downplaying the achievements of rivals remain the defining feature of gossip in public
spaces. Contestation of status and identity comes not only by engaging on certain issues with the rivals, but also by withdrawing
from those institutions and spaces where customary rules and
roles are important in the social ranking of castes and individuals.
The new identity, particularly of the lower castes, is built on
a simple principle: how much they can separate themselves
from those rituals and social institutions that traditionally
placed them in a subservient position vis--vis the upper
castes. On many occasions, the lower castes are forced to participate in these institutions and rituals, but they do it either
for the economic benefits or due to coercion. They neither
legitimise these relations, nor do they want to continue with
these in the future if other options are available to them.
In Rampur, due to dispersion of power across multiple institutions and social groups, the control over political institutions that bestow power to caste groups and individuals is becoming more difficult. A section of the upper castes want to
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control these institutions, only to realise that their own caste

men are not very supportive of their endeavour. The upper
castes themselves are disintegrated and disorganised, and
criticise their own caste men for the declining glory of their
castes. Simultaneously, a section of Dalits has become economically better off, and a section of the upper castes needs
various types of favours from them. This has opened up a
channel of communication, along a principle different from
the traditional one, between a section of the upper castes and
Dalits. However, social complexities increase during social
gatherings from where Dalits are excluded. Friends in political
and economic spheres become alien to each other in social
matters. There is a limit to the social interaction between the
upper castes and the Dalits, and it cannot go beyond a point.
Thus, the new generation of Dalits, in spite of having better
economic, educational and political achievements, encounter
a situation where their social status continues to be low, and
their achievements are ridiculed. Once the Dalits are denied
the desired social status and recognition, they are also seething with anger. Excluded from traditional social spaces, statecentric institutions provide the Dalits with enough opportunities to flex their muscles. Here, they try to compensate the
deprivation they encounter in traditional social spaces by reacting in a manner that defies the logic of their action. This
type of sociopolitical processes operating in society produces
heroes. The heroes from among the upper castes are those
who can tame the assertion of the Dalits, and the heroes from
among the Dalits are those who have the ability to withstand
the might of the upper castes. There is social fencing all
around. While the exclusion of others becomes the sole
motive of these caste groups, creating solidarity amongst ones
own group is equally important.
As these castes are vertically divided along class and political lines, social issues provide a binding force for the Dalits as
well as the upper castes against each other. However, creating
solidarity on social issues remains not only a difficult, but a
fragile and short-lived exercise. In the end, it is not the entire
caste, but a vocal section from within a caste, having antagonistic relations with vocal sections of other castes, that is most
visible and active during any conflict.
Still, people know that, as members of a social collectivity, a
minimum working relation is necessary. As they are aware that
raking up certain issues may invite trouble to the parties concerned as well as to the wider collectivity, they just want these
contested issues to be pushed under the carpet, as far as is possible. The building blocks of the emerging collectivity seem to be
avoidance, non-involvement, delay, retreat, abstention, nonparticipation, and withdrawal from issues of collective importance. This makes political institutions non-representative, which
ultimately affects the potential for collective action. Though, in
general, people try to avoid each other, there are enough sites
where these caste groups are forced to confront as social and
political adversaries. This happens since these sites have enormous symbolic value in placing a caste group in its rightful
place in the emerging structure. Every struggle or tension centred on these sites does not have the potential to raise or bring
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down the status of these castes, but running away from an issue
becomes the marker of the declining status of the caste concerned.
The victory of a particular caste on a particular issue does
not solve the problem, but is only a step forward in the
ongoing social struggle, where those who feel defeated try to
get their revenge in the next round. In between the two
struggles, these caste groups analyse past issues and plan for
the future. There is always a possibility that a small issue or
an argument may turn into a bigger one, and sometimes
engulf the entire community. Conflict is inbuilt in this
collectivity. People live together, but separately. This is the
way life goes on.
Honour of the Village
But, to think that Rampur is just a physical habitation for its

inhabitants will be a mistake.11 Within all sorts of complexities
one can see some form of togetherness. Privately people criticise fellow villagers; this is the worst village in the area is a
general refrain of the villagers. But, in public, they defend
their village. Helping fellow villagers is considered a virtue.
When the honour12 of the village is at stake, people narrate
how certain big men of the yesteryears safeguarded it (the
honour), and cite various instances in nearby villages (often
exaggerated) about how someone stands up for the village during crises. The weaker sections of the village look towards the
powerful with hope and expectation when the honour of the
village is at stake. This puts moral pressure on powerful individuals and social groups, and if they fail in performing their
dharma, they face disapproval from the people (though often only muted). People opine that one can enjoy high status
and power in the village, only if one is willing to stand up for
the honour, of the village.
Perhaps, Mahesh knows this logic unconsciously, though he
may not be overtly aware about it. One day, I was sitting with
Mahesh, and a Gurjar was passing by. Mahesh murmured, See
this man. He is my worst enemy in the village, and indulges in all
sorts of conspiracies against me. But during crunch situations,
particularly in the market or in the government offices, he would
approach me for help. I have no other option but to help him,
since he is from my village. I was amused as to why Mahesh, who
faces so much social stigma in the village, would help his bitter
critic. However, after five years, when the post of sarpanch
was reserved for an SC woman, people of Rampur, many of
them bitter critics of Mahesh, helped Maheshs mother get
elected as sarpanch (though many did so under compulsion),
while being aware about the fact that Mahesh would act as
proxy for his mother.
The type of hatred that other factional leaders felt for
Mahesh that I had observed during my fieldwork was not in
consonance with this development, since people were fully
aware of his arrogance. But, perhaps, this is what society (a
moral entity having its own logic of action) is, where you end
up doing something that you do not like, and do not do something that you like. Villagers say it is due to the compulsion of
living together. However, there may be many other reasons.
This is the essence of living together separately.
71
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Notes
1 This study is the product of the doctoral dissertation I wrote at the University of Delhi (2000
07). The major part of the fieldwork was conducted during 200002, but subsequently I revisited the field. Most of the events described
here occurred during the years I stayed in the
village. To make the paper easily readable, I am
cataloguing the names of the main players here.
Mahesh is a dominant young Khatik, having a
Robin Hood image in the village. Rooplal Gurjar
was a highly respected sarpanch of the panchayat.
Ramdharilal is his son, claiming Rooplals legacy.
Nahar Singh was a dominant Rajput, who
passed away when I was doing fieldwork, and
Ram Singh, his grandson, claims his legacy.
Heeralal Gurjar is presently the sarpanch of the
panchayat. Though there are 14 castes in the village, due to space constraints I have dealt with
only three politically significant castes.
2 Migration has affected the everyday power
structure in the village. There is more migration from among the Rajputs and Gurjars
(Table 2), and minimally from among the Khatiks. Thus, in the village, the Khatiks are more
visible and politically active. But, they know
their limitations: if the situation becomes unmanageable, other castes may take revenge,
particularly during some festival when most of
them are present in the village. This curtails
the Khatiks political power and they cannot go
beyond a point against other castes.
3 A clarification is necessary to understand the
complexities that exist between the political
and social aspects of caste. There are intracaste divisions among all the politically significant castes. While a majority of the members
from a particular caste support a particular
political party, a reflection of the relation between traditional caste and modern politics, a
section from among them has crossed over to
the rival political camp. But, when it comes to
social matters, particularly those issues which
have the potential to upgrade or downgrade
the social status of a caste group, the entire
caste unites against the rival caste. One can see
this situation among the Khatiks who are vertically divided politically, but when it comes to
an issue that has the potential to raise their status, they unite behind Mahesh. Thus, the political anatomy of a caste changes as per the context. However, this type of fluidity in sociopolitical relations produces various types of intercaste and intra-caste complexities, and caste
solidarity remains fragile and elusive.
4 This point may be contested, but the truth is
that those SCs whose occupations got positively integrated with the market are better developed economically than other SCs. Once the
SCs had money from this positive integration,
they gave up their traditional occupations. The
social differentiation among the SCs has its
root in this positive integration of a section of
the SCs traditional occupations with the market. In Uttar Pradesh, the Jatavs (Lynch 1968)
and Khatiks (Bellwinkel-Schempp 2005), and
in Bihar, the Chamars (Singh 2005) are more
developed because their traditional occupation
became positively integrated with the market.
5 Sanskritisation, which is the process by which a
low Hindu caste, or tribal or other group,
changes its customs, ritual, ideology, and way of
life in the direction of a high, and frequently,
twice-born caste (Srinivas 1966: 6), has remained an important source of social mobility in
pre- and post-independence India. However, this
method of social mobility is not very helpful to
those castes whose position in the caste hierarchy is below the pollution line (Bailey 1957).
6 A lot of literature by Dalits has mushroomed in
recent years (Sattanathan 2007; Valmiki 2003;
Kamble 2008) where these writers narrate how
and in what manner they faced various types of
prejudice, hurdles and discrimination not only
72
10
11
when they were trying to break the caste barriers, but even when they had achieved considerable success in their lives.
L Coser (1968) makes a distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflicts. In a realistic
conflict, the conflict is viewed by the participants as a means towards the achievement of
specific goal, a means that might be abandoned, if other means appears to be more effective. A non-realistic conflict allows no
functional alternative of means, since it is not
aimed at the attainment of a concrete result,
but an expression of offensive impulse. It
seems that the behaviour of the Khatiks during
the conflict has a lot to do with hostility, aggression, resentment, hatred and like, which
is the product of their exclusion from social
spaces in everyday life. Thus, sometimes it becomes difficult to understand why the situation
went out of control on some trivial matter.
Ritual and mythology represents an ideal
version of the social structure. It is the model of
how people suppose their society to be organised, but it is not necessarily the goal towards
which they strive. It is a simplified description
of what is, not a fantasy of what might be. But
the statements made in rituals are vague statements; they have not the quality of scientific
descriptions (Leach 1954: 286).
Numerous studies describe the way traditional
social institutions are disintegrating in the
post-independence social order. Some notable
studies include Bteille (1971), Bailey (1957),
Chakravarti (1975), Srinivas (1966), Chauhan
(1967), Gupta (2005), and Nagaraj (2010).
These studies present the various dimensions
of social changes and the way different caste
groups formalise their relations with others.
Way back in 1964, H R Isaacs (1964: 174) commented about the economically better off Dalits
in Maharashtra: Many more ex-Untouchables
want not to leave Hindu fold but to achieve
touchability inside of it. Let each one remain in
his caste, but let every caste be touchable. Variations of this formula appeared frequently in the
talk of ex-Untouchables [ex, since Isaacs says
that in theory caste untouchability has been
abolished] who were not followers of Ambedkar,
who never dreamed of being anything but Hindus, who wanted to live in caste groups as they
always had, but only to cease being partials, to
become touchables. Ambedkar was probably
emphasising this point when he warned that in
politics we will be recognising the principle of
one man one vote and one vote one value. In our
social and economic life, we shall, by reason of
our social and economic structure, continue to
deny the principle of one man one value. How
long we shall continue to live this life of contradiction? (GoI 1950: 979).
Society is not a material entity, it is a sentiment. Society, as Durkheim understood it is
not identical with the group of individuals that
compose it and their dwelling place. Rather, it
is above all a composition of ideas, beliefs, and
sentiments of all sorts which realise themselves through individuals. Foremost of these
ideas is the moral ideal which is its principle
raison dtre. To love ones society is to love this
ideal, and one loves it so that one would rather
see society disappear as a material entity than
renounce the ideal which it embodies. Not only
is society not identical with an external material entity, it is something deeply inner, since
for Durkheim it is the source of morality, personality, and life itself at the human level. It is
something on which we all depend whether we
know it or not (Bellah 1973: ix). This phenomenon finds its expression in urban villages located within the heartland of metropolitan cities for decades, where the rules of interaction
among its inhabitants are different from those
of neighbouring modern colonies.
12 People are not very clear what they mean by

the ijjat (honour) of the village. But, they know
what acts would be considered as causing loss
of honour to the village. For example, if someone from the other village beats up someone
from this village and no one from this village
comes out in their support; if cultural and religious functions are not performed; if someone
goes to the other village for help, even if people
in this village are capable of helping them; if
the women of the village are abused by outsiders; if a villager does not help a fellow villager
outside the village, etc.
References
Bailey, F G (1957): Caste and the Economic Frontier:
A Village in Highland Orissa, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Bellah, Robert N (1973): Introduction, Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society, Robert N Bellah (ed), Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, pp ixlv.
Bellwinkel-Schempp, M (2005): Pigs and Power:
Urban Space and Urban Decay, Urbanisation
and Governance in India, E Hurst and M Mann
(eds), New Delhi: Manohar, pp 20126.
Bteille, A (1971): Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Chakravarti, A (1975): Contradiction and Change:
Emerging Patterns of Authority in a Rajasthan
Village, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Chauhan, B R (1967): A Rajasthan Village, New
Delhi: Vir Publishing House.
Coser, L (1968): Conflict: Social Aspects, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 3, David L Sills (ed), New York: Macmillan
and Free Press, pp 23236.
Delige, Robert (2011): Caste, Class and Untouchability, A Companion to the Anthropology of
India, Isabelle Clark-Dces (ed), West Sussex,
UK: Wiley-Blackwell, pp 4561.
GoI (1950): Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol 11,
New Delhi: Government of India.
Gupta, D (2005): Whither the Indian Village: Culture and Agriculture in Rural India, Economic
& Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 8, pp 75158.
Isaacs, H R (1964): Indias Ex-Untouchables, New
York: Harper Torch Books.
Kamble, Baby (2008): The Prisons We Broke, Trans
Maya Pandit, Chennai: Orient Longman.
Leach, E R (1954): Political Systems of Highland
Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lynch, Owen M (1968): The Politics of Untouchability: A Case from Agra, India, Structure and
Change in Indian Society, M Singer and
B S Cohn (eds), Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company.
Nagaraj, D R (2010): The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: The Dalit Movement in India, P C Shobhi
(ed), Ranikhet: Permanent Black.
Svl, Minna (2001): Low Caste But Middleclass: Some Religious Strategies for Middleclass Identification in Hyderabad, Contribution to Indian Sociology, Vol 35, No 3,
pp 293318.
Sattanathan, A N (2007): Plain Speaking: A Sudras
Story, New Delhi: Permanent Black.
Singh, Shashi B (2005): Limits to Power: Naxalism
and Caste Relations in a South Bihar Village,
pp 316775.
Srinivas, M N (1966): Social Change in Modern
India, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Valmiki, Omprakash (2003): Joothan: A Dalits Life,
Trans Arun Prabha Mukherjee, Calcutta:
Samya.
Veblen, T (1912): The Theory of the Leisure Class: An
Economic Study of Institutions, New York:
Macmillan.
AUGUST 13, 2016
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Child Malnutrition in Rajasthan

Study of Tribal Migrant Communities
Pavitra Mohan, Kumaril Agarwal, Priyanka Jain
Remote parts of southern Rajasthan such as Udaipur,

Dungarpur, Banswara and Rajsamand are characterised
by a predominance of tribal groups and a high
prevalence of unskilled, male, seasonal outmigration. A
study conducted in these parts in 2014 shows high levels
of malnutrition among children in this region. It also
discusses how socio-economic characteristics translate
into severe resource limitations at the household level,
primarily in the availability of nutritious food. Mothers
are faced by time and energy constraints in providing
adequate care to young ones, especially in migrant
households. Normalisation of malnutrition in
community perception, rooted in the structural
deprivations experienced by these communities, further
entrenches the problem. The study argues that
implementing local solutions and adopting strategic
policy reforms can offset these constraints to child
nutrition in such tribal areas.
We acknowledge the financial support provided by the EdelGive

Foundation and the contribution of the research staff at the School of
Public Health, SRM University (Chennai), especially Bala Ganesh, for
helping us with the analysis of the survey data. We are grateful to Jean
Drze, Vani Sethi, Benoy Peter, Rajesh Kumar, Rajiv Khandelwal and
Amrita Sharma for their valuable suggestions. We are responsible
for any remaining errors.
Pavitra Mohan (amrit@aajeevika.org) is the Director of Aajeevika
Bureaus Health Services and the co-founder of Basic Healthcare
Services. Kumaril Agarwal (kumaril_msw@yahoo.com) was a research
associate with Aajeevika Bureau during this study. Priyanka Jain
(priyanka.jain@aajeevika.org) is with the Centre for Migration and
Labour Solutions, Aajeevika Bureau.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
he Rapid Survey on Children (GoI and UNICEF 2014a)

has highlighted that India continues to face a severe crisis of rampant child malnutrition, especially in rural
areas where 42% of children are stunted, 15% are wasted and
32% are underweight. These numbers are highly distressing, if
one appreciates the far-reaching consequences of child malnutrition. Malnourished children would have an inadequate
growth, physically and mentally. They also might have an early death in childhood itself. Jha et al (2009) provide evidence
that persisting low levels of nutrition among adults translate
into lower labour productivity. It would further reduce the
chances of such households crawling out of destitution and
confine them to a povertynutrition trap.
On this barometer of nutritional deprivation, tribal children
fare the worst among all social groups in the country. Stunting
and wasting is most common among tribal children. The
prevalence of being underweight is 13% higher among them as
compared to the children that fall under the other1 category
(GoI and UNICEF 2014a). More alarming is that reduction in
child malnutrition among tribal children is slower than those
from other social categories (Thorat and Sabharwal 2011).
While tribal status is strongly related to poor nutritional
outcomes, the combination of being tribal and from a high outmigration area potentially adds to the vulnerabilities faced by
families, further compromising the nutrition and growth of
their children. This linkage emerged as a salient point while
we were studying the dynamics around child malnutrition in
southern Rajasthan, which includes the districts of Udaipur,
Dungarpur, Banswara and Rajsamand. In this region, the
tribal and migrant compound signifies a geography that
has undergone a near complete loss of traditional forestdependent livelihoods, high levels of water scarcity, mercilessly
unproductive land tracts and an absence of alternative employment opportunities. Pushed out by distress, large numbers of
young males in the area migrate for seasonal, unskilled and
often exploitative jobs, typically in urban areas.
Sixty-one percent of these households in southern Rajasthan
are tribal (mainly belonging to the Bhil and Meena communities), and they account for 53% of the total tribal population of
the state. These parts, constituting hilly, remote villages, also
form the least developed region in the state. The average human development index (HDI) score of the region is 0.5, the
lowest in Rajasthan (GoR 2008). Traditionally bound to their
land and forests, these communities have started sending at
least one member (typically a male person) to the labour
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
markets in Gujarat and beyond out of sheer economic distress

(Sharma et al 2014). The meagre incomes earned from such
jobs are inadequate to pull these households out of poverty
(Sharma et al 2014). This paper throws light on the levels and
factors behind the poor nutritional status of the children growing up in such areas. These factors, we argue, are shaped by
the tribal, seasonal migrant characters of the region.
Our paper fits into the larger discussion on the causes and
appropriate responses to malnutrition that has been gaining
momentum in India. Numerous reasons have been put forth as
causal factors of child malnutrition. Environment, cultural
practices around feeding, food habits, low status of women,
limited access to education and even low social capital have
been argued as shaping nutritional outcomes for children
(UNICEF 2013; Deaton and Drze 2009). The dominant discourse in this area stresses on the multifactorial nature of malnutrition, tending towards a universalised, thinly spread set of
policy interventions. Unsurprisingly, uniform explanations
and solutions that are not customised to local dynamics have
significantly failed to combat child malnutrition, which is
shaped by the specific features of a given context. This has encouraged commentators such as Arvind Panagariya (2013), the
Vice Chairman of the National Institution for Transforming
India (NITI) Aayog to propose that malnutrition is not very responsive to policy interventions, at least in the medium term.
It has led him and others to question the prudence of devoting
large public resources to addressing this problem. It is probably
the same stream of thought that has led to the national budget
cuts in the nutrition sector (Bhalla 2015; Hindu 2015).
While the universal frameworks are useful to understand
the breadth of the problem, they lack the depth to identify specific solutions. We believe that high impact interventions in
this sector must be based on a deep appreciation of the socioeconomic attributes of the community and region involved.
We have addressed this knowledge gap through a focused
study on tribal communities, which are known to have high
levels of child malnutrition. Our presence and practice in
southern Rajasthan, providing services (including those related to health and nutrition) to seasonal migrants and their families for last several years, suggested to us that migration adds
to the problem of nutritional deprivation. This provided us
with the motivation to do a deep dive into studying the factors
responsible for child malnutrition within this community,
with the aim of identifying context-specific solutions. We believe that this study should hold relevance for other areas of
the country that are characterised by large tribal populations
and are witnessing high levels of seasonal outmigration.
Srivastava and Sasikumar (2003) argue that seasonal outmigration is widespread in some of the chronically-poor tribal
pockets of the country, such as those in eastern Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, southern Madhya Pradesh, and western Odisha (besides
southern Rajasthan). A report of the United Nations Development Programme (Deshingkar and Akter 2009) estimated
that about 100 million people in India, dominated by tribal
and low-caste groups, depend on seasonal migration as an
essential form of livelihood, working in the vast, amorphous
74
informal economy as casual labour. The vulnerability of this

group has many economic, legal and political dimensions.
While these aspects have been studied to some extent, the
nutritional level of children growing up in outmigration areas
is not even minimally understood. Our paper throws light on
this issue by demystifying the contextual dynamics of child
malnutrition among the migrant, tribal communities of southern Rajasthan.
This paper is structured as follows: first an overview of the
methodology adopted by the study, followed by a description
of our findings; in the discussion section, we explore key pathways that can be adopted to engage with the crisis of child
malnutrition in this region. We weave together existing literature with our study, to throw light on possible ways through
which these gaps can be addressed towards better nutritional
outcomes for children in the region. The final section concludes, bringing together the various insights and arguments
made throughout the paper.
1 Methodology
The study was conducted in MarchMay 2014 in Salumbar

block of Udaipur district, where the Aajeevika Bureau provides
a range of services to seasonal migrants and their families. According to the latest census data, about 53% of the population
in the block consists of tribal persons (GoI 2011). We conducted
a household survey in the block to profile the levels and patterns related to migration. This survey highlighted that about
45% of households have at least one male member who migrates to a city or town for work, mainly on a temporary basis
for poorly paid, casual labour (Aajeevika Bureau 2008). Based
on this migration profile, we stratified Salumbars 48 panchayat areas into low and high migration panchayats. We then randomly selected one panchayat from each strata, so as to be
able to draw some comparative insights between migrant and
non-migrant households.
In order to provide an estimate of wasting with 5% precision, with a power of 80% and a confidence of 95%, we needed
to enrol 640 children under three years of age. We randomly
selected eight out of the 28 villages, and identified all the
households in these villages with at least one child under the
age of three years. We enrolled 610 families with at least one
child under three, which allowed us to conduct anthropometry of 695 children. We also conducted detailed interviews
with 500 of these families.
A team of surveyors conducted the anthropometry of children and their mothers. Their weight was measured using a
commercially available weighing scale with a sensitivity of
+/- 20 grams for children and +/- 50 grams for their mothers.
The length of children was measured using a standardised
infantometer, with a sensitivity of +/- 0.1 cm, and that of mothers
with a stadiometer, with a sensitivity of +/- 0.1 cm. We analysed the anthropometric data using the World Health Organization (WHO)-Anthro. We used internationally-accepted indicators and criteria to estimate the levels of malnutrition.
Levels of stunting (inadequate length/height for age), wasting
(inadequate weight for height) and low weight (inadequate
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
weight for age) were used as indicators for childhood malnutrition. For mothers, we calculated the body mass index (BMI),
and used the standard cut-off of 18.5 to classify malnutrition
status among them.
In addition to the anthropometry, we developed a pretested
questionnaire to capture the social, economic and demographic status of these families, as well as to understand the illness
and care-seeking history of the children. The survey collected
data on food availability at household level through on-spot
checks; food intake levels of children and mothers through a
semi-quantitative, 24-hour food recall method; and utilisation
of schemes such as the public distribution system (PDS) and
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Gaurantee
Act (MGNREGA). In addition to these interviews, we conducted
six focus group discussions (FGDs) with mothers and grandmothers to understand social norms, perceptions, constraints
faced by them and their experiences surrounding food availability, dietary practices, and caregiving of young children.
2 Results
Profile of the Population
Of the 500 families surveyed, over 75% were tribal and another
5% belonged to low-caste groups. The male heads of about
40% of them were migrants, and 42% of them worked in unskilled
jobs. Out of the 695 children studied, about half of them were
girls. About 50% of the mothers did not receive any formal schooling. Twenty percent of the total mothers interviewed reported
the death of at least one of her children in the past, and more than
50% of the mothers did not receive any formal schooling.
The study found very high rates of malnutrition among the
children. On comparison, the nutritional status of these children was found to be significantly worse than their counterparts from other areas in the state and in the country (Table 1).2
Over half of the children we met were stunted and underweight, whereas about one-third of them were wasted. We
found no significant differences in malnutrition among
migrant and non-migrant households or between boys and
girls. However, the malnutrition levels among the tribal children
we studied were significantly higher than the non-tribal children, with the incidence of wasting being 26.7% versus 7.3%,
respectively. We also found high levels of malnutrition among
mothers: as many as 54.6% of them were malnourished.
Table 1: Comparison of Malnutrition Rates among Children under Study
(n = 695) with State and National Level Data for Rural Areas
Indicator
Prevalence of Malnutrition
among Children
(under three years)
in the Study Area,
Dominated by Tribal,
Migrant Communities (%)
Prevalence of
Malnutrition
among Children
(under five years)
in Rural
Rajasthan (%)
Prevalence of
Malnutrition
among Children
(under five years)
in Rural India (%)
Stunting
53
39
42
Severely stunted
28
19
19
Wasting
33
15
15
Severely wasted
Underweight
53
34
32
Severely underweight
26
12
11
Source: GoI and UNICEF (2014a, 2014b).

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AUGUST 13, 2016
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Figure 1: Percentage of Children (between 6 and 35 months) Who Consumed

Listed Food Items in Last 24 Hours
Namkeen (fried snacks)

Daliya (porridge)
Food Intake among Children
The food intake of the children under study was highly inadequate. Figure 1 shows the results from a 24-hour food recall for
children between 6 and 35 months. Only about 28% of the
children consumed milk. Almost none of them had consumed
egg, meat or fish over last 24 hours. Fewer than 10% of the
children reported consuming appropriate and nutritional food
items such as daliya (porridge), rice, pulses and vegetables or
fruits, and even those who consumed these items, had it in
very small quantities (Table 2). A significant proportion of children were given tea, biscuits, and some namkeen (fried snacks).
While many of them were reported to have been given roti
(bread), in absence of active feeding and inability of children
(especially of six to 24 months) to bite and chew, the median
number of rotis consumed in last 24 hours was less than one.
In addition to inadequate quantities, the eating and feeding
habits were also found to be suboptimal. One tribal shared, If
the child is young, (we) give him some milk. If he is older, we
give (him) a roti (he) keeps wandering around, breaking
(and eating) one-one piece. In FGDs, many mothers reported
that it was commonplace for them to feed young children rotis
mashed with water and chilli, or, in season with kairi (raw
mango) chutney.
Table 2: Median Amounts of Food Consumed by Children (by age in months)
in Last 24 Hours
Food Item
Milk (ml)
Tea (ml)
Chapattis (number)
Biscuits (number)
Cooked rice (grams)
Vegetables (grams)
Daal (grams)
05
611
1223
2435
90
0
0.25
0
0
0
0
75
55
0.5
2
25
0
0
120
70
0.5
2
25
40
37.5
100
75
0.75
3
50
32
32
Food Intake among Mothers
We also asked mothers for information on their food consumption in last 24 hours. While 90% of them reported having eaten a roti (median number of rotis: 2), less than half had
consumed any pulses (49%), and less than two-thirds (65%)
had consumed any vegetables in the past 24 hours. Only about
5% had consumed any milk, and none had consumed any egg
or meat. These findings made it clear that the children and
their mothers in these communities were eating extremely
75
SPECIAL ARTICLE
poorly, and that was the most immediate cause for low nutrition levels.
Food Availability at Home: Missing Fulcrum
Our spot assessments of food availability at the household level revealed a glaring reality of lack of food, especially nutritious food. While most households had some cereals (87%),
more than half (56%) did not have any pulses and about a
quarter (26%) did not have any cooking oil at home on the day
of visit. Even those families that were found to have these
items had them in small amounts (a median of 1 kg of pulse
and half a litre of cooking oil). Very few households had any
vegetables (14.4%), fruits (2.4%), and almost none had any
milk, eggs or meat.3
In our interviews and FGDs, mothers cited two key reasons
for non-availability of nutritious food. First, they stressed on
high levels of water scarcity, which significantly reduce the
quantity and variety of food that households are able to grow
on their small plots of land. Lack of water also prevents them
from rearing cattle, further restricting the availability of milk:
Cattle also need to eat and fodder requires water to grow
those who have water can rear (cattle), one mother opined on
the subject. Second, families repeatedly highlighted the unfeasibility of purchasing vegetables, fruits, milk, eggs or other nutritious foods from the market, given their meagre incomes
from casual manual labour, and high prices of the food. Stressing on their inability to purchase food items, one mother
shared with us: Only when our children fall ill do we go and
buy some milk worth `510 otherwise we cannot afford to
buy milk. The study made it evident that the two key assets
that these families possess are land and their bodies (labour),
and neither generates enough resources to ensure adequate
nutritious food.
Migrant households were slightly better-off economically
than the non-migrant households (27% of the migrant households fell in the highest economic quartile as compared to 22%
of the non-migrant households in our sample), though that did
not significantly affect the availability of food at the household
level and the reported improvement in purchasing power was
limited. However, non-tribal households had higher availability of food at the household level as compared to tribal families.
The absence of food in tribal families was further compounded by lack of knowledge on appropriate feeding practices. We asked the mothers to provide estimates of how much a
child (with a similar age as their own child) should be eating
every day, if there were no constraints on availability of food.
Most mothers reported highly suboptimal amounts: the
median number of katoris (small bowl or cup) of milk that a
child should consume as reported by mothers of children of
611 months was 0 (interquartile range or IQR: 0,1). Whereas,
the response of mothers with children that were 1236 months
old was 1 (IQR: 1,1).
We also asked the mothers whether they considered their
children as normal or weak. We then compared their
responses with the childs malnutrition status as per anthropometry. The analysis revealed that in 66% of the cases where
76
the mother reported her child to be normal, the child was in

fact found to be malnourished. This result, with our experience of providing health and nutrition services in the area,
suggests that there is a widespread normalisation of child
malnutrition in the area, such that mothers fail to recognise
malnutrition as a problem. While the lack of food and other
resources at the household level seem to be the fundamental
reason behind poor food intakes, such community perceptions also appear to play a significant role in reproducing suboptimal feeding practices.
Resource-constrained Mothers as Caregivers
After food, incapacity of households to provide adequate care

for young children emerged as the second biggest crisis. Children under three have a high requirement for care, as they are
entirely dependent on adults for a range of needs: to eat well,
for mental stimulation that in turn affects appetite, for their
safety and to inculcate healthy habits. One of the most significant factors that determines care of these young children is the
capacity of the caregiver. Herein lay the crisis of care in these
communities. Mothers, the primary caregivers in the context
were found to be extremely stretched for time and overburdened with work. They reported spending an average of four
hours outside home on the previous day, for chores such as
collection of firewood, drawing of water or working in the
farms. A substantial amount of time was also spent within the
household, cooking, looking after animals and caring for elders.
As reported above, about 58% of them were malnourished
themselves, reducing their capacity to cope with such heavy
demands on their time by the multiple roles they fulfil as
wives, daughters-in-law, homemakers and mothers.
Overtaxed and exhausted from (almost single-handedly)
managing household chores, farm work, collecting firewood,
as well as caring for the elderly, children and animals, women
were found to have no time to attend to the well-being of their
own bodies or that of their children.
Figure 2: Primary Caretaker When the Mother Is Away
Child goes with mother
or stays alone
Any other realtive
Neighbour
Elder Sister
Grandparent
Elder brother
Father
During the time that mothers spent away from their home,
the duty of care typically fell on other members of the family
such as elderly grandparents or elder siblings (Figure 2). In a
significant proportion (16%) of households, the elder girl sibling, barely a teen herself, would have to take care of the
younger children during her mothers absence, forcing them
out of school. In many cases, children under three years were
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left to fend for themselves. Clearly these care options are inadequate and unacceptable.
The study found that such deficient care practices were far
more common among migrant families. The absence of male
member(s) due to seasonal migration was found to significantly reduce the human resources available at home to manage
children and all the other labour-intensive facets of rural life
in this region. Moreover, the absence of male heads of family
also appeared to reduce the overall social capital available to
women in seeking help and cooperation from other family
members or neighbours to care for children. Many mothers reported feeling extremely anxious about these childcare problems: Yes, we are always worried. My mind is always there
he may be crying; an animal could trample over him; he may
be eating soil ... his feet might be burning ... (but) we have to
go to collect firewood. Everyone has to.
It is hardly suprising that children brought up on very limited resources and inadequate care faced a high and recurrent
incidence of illness. The study found that a large proportion of
children (64%) fell ill at least once in last one month. Twenty
percent of them were ill on the day of the survey, and 12% reported falling ill more than once in the past one month. Fever,
diarrhoea, cough and difficulty in breathing were the most
common symptoms reported. While most of the mothers
(94%) reported having sought care when their children fell ill,
more than half of them went to private informal providers,
and another 10% sought care from a traditional healer. They
incurred a median cost of `150 for each illness episode. Only
one-fourth reported seeking care from a public facility. Our
study suggests that poor nutrition and lack of care predisposes
these children to illnesses. Moreover, illness is seen to further
suppress the appetite of these children as well as lead to the
loss of minimal amounts of nutrients consumed by them.
low as well. Only 3.6% of the women reported working under

the scheme, that too only for about 15 days in most cases.4 Currently, anganwadis (government-sponsored childcare and
mother-care centres) do not have the mandate to provide shelter and care services to children below three years of age, under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) scheme.
It only provides take-home ration for these children. This
policy denies support to families at a time that is crucial for the
growth of children and which is stressful for mothers.
Our study found that even this service of supplementary
food provision was highly infrequent and of poor quality. Only
about 44% of the children had eaten any food received from
the anganwadis in the last one week (Table 3). Interviews with
mothers and spot assessments of the anganwadis in the area
suggest that their low utilisation rate can be explained by
infrequent, unpredictable and abrupt opening and closing
hours as well as by the infrequent distribution and poor quality of food provided by them. Children from migrant households were even less likely to have benefited from the anganwadis, because the absence of men reduces the capacity of the
family to access and benefit from public schemes.
3 Discussions on Potential Pathways
Any set of solutions that seek to address the high levels of child
malnutrition in southern Rajasthan must be based on a full
appreciation of the dynamics surrounding the factors of food
and care, which in turn, are shaped by the areas tribal, high
seasonal migration character. As for children specifically from
migrant households, our study did not find any significant difference in their nutrition levels as compared to children from
non-migrant, tribal households in the region.
Table 3: Utilisation of Anganwadis by Children between 6 and 35 Months
and Lactating Mothers
Information
Public SchemesWeak Safety Nets
The resource constraints faced by these households in terms of

food and care could have been partly compensated for by a
well-functioning system of government support schemes.
However, the study suggests that such schemes, both due to
their design and implementation, offer limited support to
these families currently. The study highlighted that about 25%
of the families studied did not possess a ration card at all.
Many of the households that did hold cards reported difficulties in accessing any or the full amount of their entitlements.
Only 56% of the families reported receiving any wheat in the
last one month, whereas only about 13% received any sugar.
The PDS in Rajasthan does not include pulses and oil, and
hence, they were not asked whether they received these food
items from ration shops. Nutritional support offered by the PDS
to these families remains very low, both due to poor functioning
and the scope of the scheme being limited to grains and sugar.
The findings suggest that even the existing entitlements of
grain and sugar were found to be reaching households in trickles.
The utilisation by these households of MGNREGA, which is
meant to boost rural incomes and with the potential effect of
enhancing their purchasing power, was found to be abysmally
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
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Number
Children between 6 and 35 months who are registered at any

anganwadi (n = 407)
244 (60)
Mothers who received food for their child from the anganwadi in
the last week* (n = 407)
125 (30.7)
Children who ate food received from the anganwadi in the last week,
at least once (n = 407)
55 (13.5)
Children who were reported to have gone to the anganwadi at
least once in the last week (n = 407)
50 (12.2)
Lactating mothers received food from anganwadi (n = 107)
26 (24.2)
Figures in parenthesis indicate percentages.
*Median number of days for which anganwadi food received in last one month: 2
However, the former group exhibits greater vulnerability

around care, and their families struggle more to access public
entitlements due to the absence of male members. This probably, to some extent, explains why their limited marginal
income gains from migration do not have an overall effect in
improving the nutritional status of their children. Moreover,
the study results suggest that our understanding needs to go
beyond a migrant and non-migrant household comparison,
and to view the larger tribal community from southern
Rajasthan as unusually vulnerable, and its high outmigration
character as symptomatic of this deep level of deprivation.
The findings of this study highlight that there are two underlying issues that programmatic interventions in this area
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must engage with. First of all, there is a need to recognise that

poor nutritional outcomes for children mainly emerge out of
resource constraints, primarily of food availability at home,
but also of those required for providing adequate care. Policies, therefore, must be geared at supplementing the endowments available at the household level and expanding the
capacities of families to take care of children. Second, there is
a need to address practices and community perceptions that
adversely shape the nutritional outcomes of children. Our understanding is that these habits and attitudes have probably
been shaped by the lack of resources itself. However, they
seem to have undergone a degree of normalisation and habituation over time. Engaging with these therefore requires a
process of transformation at the community level, which
needs to be encouraged in parallel to policies that augment
household resources. Based on this understanding and
secondary review of evidence and experience, we propose
three complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches to
address this critical situation.
(1) Growing Nutritious Food for Familys Consumption: A
large part of the communitys narrative on the resource crisis
they face revolves around water. As highlighted above, water
was cited as the reason for poor agricultural produce, low
yields of milk from livestock and therefore, diminishing
amount of food available at home. Migration from these arid,
unproductive lands has emerged as a survival strategy, yet it
has not increased their income levels enough to purchase adequate food for the family. We argue that in this tribal, unskilled migration context of southern Rajasthan, the most
promising pathway for improving the food intake of children
is to invest in simple, innovative technologies to overcome
water scarcity, which in turn, would allow families to grow
more food that has higher nutritional content, such as fruits
and vegetables, for their own consumption.
Agriculture is the most proximate and direct source of nutrition for families engaged in farming. Therefore, supporting
the households farm activity and boosting their outputs nutritional content can have a significant effect on the nutritional
intake of family members, including of the children. There is
evidence for this association at the macro level. Gulati et al
(2012) have shown a strong negative correlation between agricultural production and child malnutrition through a 20-state
study. There is also an increasing recognition that the disconnect between nutrition and agriculture in policy and practice
in India is particularly severe (Gillespie and Kadiyala 2011: 1).
Haddad (2013: 1) has argued for the need to unleash the
elusive potential of agriculture in India towards better nutrition for deprived groups in the country. Based on such pieces
of evidence, key organisations and initiatives including the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and Leveraging
Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia (LANSA) are now advocating homestead farming for household consumption as one
of the key and most direct pathways to reducing childhood
malnutrition.5
78
Admittedly, it is very challenging to promote homestead

farming of fruits and vegetables in wate-scarce areas, with
small landholdings and limited human resource due to male
migration. Fortunately, there are a few initiatives emerging
from similar contexts that have developed innovative solutions to overcome some of these constraints, in order to dovetail homestead farming with nutritional improvements at the
household level. One of them is BAIFs Wadi programme, which
demonstrates the feasibility and potential of homestead farming in high migration, tribal areas with water scarcity. The
programme is operational across nine states in India, covering
over 1,80,500 tribal families. It supports their family-farm operations focused on growing nutritious fruits and vegetables,
mainly for the households consumption, but also for livelihood enhancement where possible. We visited their operations
in Banswara district in southern Rajasthan, where the resource
constraints were very similar to the ones in our study area
small plot size of one acre or less; limited availability of water
(since the chosen families were from the non-command areas
of the nearby Mahi dam); and high male migration such that
the workload of the farm falls disproportionately on women.
The Wadi programme has been managing these constraints
through innovative strategies: (i) the programme uses local
materials to build low cost, easy to maintain and simply designed irrigation systems as a substitute for the costlier drip
irrigation system; (ii) the alternative watering system requires
households to headload water from community handpumps to
the field, potentially increasing the workload on women. To
prevent this, the Wadi programme funded the building of
community bathrooms near handpumps, enabling women to
bathe and wash clothes there. This reduced their existing burden of carrying water to their homes for these activities, limiting the overall increase of workload on them due to the programme; and (iii) the programmatic training on growing new
crops was accompanied by recipe demonstrations, since local
tribal populations have little experience in cooking and eating
a wide variety of vegetables. While the programme has not
been rigorously evaluated, case studies from the project suggest that despite the water and labour constraints prevalent in
southern Rajasthan, it is possible to successfully pursue homestead farming in the region, by innovating and adopting simple, but effective technologies and local solutions.6 The homestead farm productionconsumption improved nutrition impact pathway is promising, and must be explored. Efforts in
this direction, however, should build in tracking systems to
assess its impact on nutritional outcomes of children, and be
designed to overcome any potential barriers such as intrahousehold allocation bias against girl children or unsustainable depletion of ground water.
(2) Moving from Food Security to Nutrition Security:
Homestead farming could potentially provide a significant
proportion of the nutritious foods required by tribal families in
the long run, but the PDS must play an important supportive
role in buttressing the food endowments at home, especially
during lean or bad seasons. The PDS in India is well-positioned
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to offer a critical form of assistance to poor, tribal households

in the region. It can act as a vital safety net against malnutrition by distributing nutritious food items such as pulses and
oils, which can supplement diet diversity within the tribal,
migrant communities of southern Rajasthan.
There is a common and entrenched public view that the PDS
in India is wholly dysfunctional. In line with this, our study
pointed to poor implementation of the scheme in the region. A
quarter of the households we studied did not possess ration
cards; over 40% did not receive any wheat; and almost
90% received no sugar in the last one month. Given the poor
state of implementation of the scheme, a recommendation to
expand the system further runs the risk of being dismissed as
costly, inefficient and imprudent.
However, we argue that it is possible for the PDS to be
reformed and work well in Rajasthan. There is growing evidence of the revival of the PDS and the important contribution
it is increasingly making towards food security and poverty
reduction in different parts of the country (Chatterjee 2014;
Khera and Drze 2013; Himanshu and Sen 2013; Khera 2011).
For instance, Chatterjee (2014) highlights the crucial role
played by the PDS in the predominantly tribal area of Koraput
district in Odisha. The community here, much like the ones in
southern Rajasthan, suffers from high child malnutrition,
and relies on subsistence agriculture as well as income from
causal labour as their main sources of livelihood. Chatterjee
(2014) highlights that the food distributed through the PDS is
so vital for poor households in these parts, that it is not
uncommon to find families that associate the absence of the
PDS with death by hunger.
Respondents to her survey, especially those without land,
highlighted that the PDS often serves to protect these families
from starvation, especially during bad weather or lean season
for manual labour work. According to Chatterjees (2014)
study, households without PDS-access in Koraput reported a
higher incidence of at least one member going without food for
a day. Similarly, Khera (2011) highlighted that Tamil Nadu and
Himachal Pradesh, which have a well-functioning PDS, report
much lower levels of hunger than Rajasthan and Bihar where
the PDS has worked poorly.
The above-mentioned body of evidence points to the fact
that a defeatist attitude towards the PDS is outdated. With appropriate reforms, the PDS has served well to supplement our
food security goals and Rajasthans own performance in this
respect has been improving post-2010 reforms (Khera and
Drze 2013). It points to a real potential that the PDS has to
support efforts in nutrition security as well, by distributing
pulses and edible oils that are important sources of proteins
and essential fats. Indeed, in some states such as Chhattisgarh,
Tamil Nadu (TN), Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Himachal Pradesh
(HP), the PDS fair price shops are providing these nutritious
food items at highly subsidised rates to shield poor households
against food price inflation and to increase their access to
nutrient-rich food (Das 2013; Hindu 2008; Khera 2011).
Some evidence proving the pathway between distribution
and food intake is also emerging. Based on their primary
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AUGUST 13, 2016
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household level study, Jha et al (2011) found significant effects

from the PDS on nutrient intakes in households with PDS utilisation. Kheras (2011) study further highlights that the proportion of households that reported not having consumed any
pulses in the last one week was very high in states such as
Rajasthan and Bihar, where this item is not distributed by the
PDS. Conversely, this proportion was negligible (1%3%) in AP,
HP and TN, where the PDS supplies pulses.
This suggests that the PDS can work efficiently to modify the
food consumed at the household level, such that the provision
of nutritious food can open up a direct pathway to increasing
the nutrient intake within a family. We argue that Rajasthan
should draw from the experiences of such success cases, to
strengthen its own PDS and implement the distribution of
nutrient-rich commodities. We believe that this shift is critical
in southern Rajasthan where fewer than 9% of the children
and less than half of the mothers we studied were consuming
any pulses, even though it constitutes the main source of protein in their diets.
(3) Role of Crches and Womens Collectives: The study
revealed that besides food availability, there are other resource
constraints such as time and energy that mothers face in their
efforts to care for young children, which is further exacerbated among the migrant families, where women, in the absence
of their husbands, are further stretched and forced to prioritise household chores over childcare. These constraints interplay with lack of awareness and unhelpful community perceptions around malnutrition. We argue that community-based
crches, monitored and integrated with village-level womens
collectives can offer a solution to the problem of care, both at
the level of resources and transforming unsuitable habits and
attitudes around child malnutrition.
This argument is based on our own experience of managing
such crches in predominantly tribal, high migration areas of
southern Rajasthan over the last two years as well as that of
other organisations operating in similar contexts such as Jan
Swasthya Sahyog in Chhattisgarh and the Action Against Malnutrition.7 We believe that such crches and collectives can act
as a valuable platform for promoting growth and development
of the most vulnerable children in the community. Moreover,
our experience suggests that proper care and better meals provided at such crches have an effect at reducing the incidence
of illness among children. Currently, anganwadis do not provide such childcare services to children below three years of age.
Extending the ICDS framework to include such communitymanaged crches, which provide care services such as food,
shelter, and a stimulating environment for children, including
those under the age of three years, could strengthen the
anganwadi system and improve its reach to remote, tribal
communities.
Womens collectives are envisioned to function as a focal
point for triggering transformations in community perceptions, attitudes and practices around the issue. As we have
highlighted before, the study found that in 66% of the cases
where the mother reported her child to be normally nourished,
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
the child was actually found to be malnourished. It is important to recognise here that this is not wilful ignorance, but an
indication of high levels of deprivation in the area. Among
tribal, migrant communities of southern Rajasthan, discomfort, illness and undignified life have become normalised. Perceptions related to child malnutrition should be viewed as
part of these structural features that shape the everyday
existence of these families. In this environment of persistent
destitution, weak and underdeveloped bodies of children that
are prone to illnesses have become the prevailing norm. An
important role of womens collectives is to challenge this
world view and to create a community-level vision and discourse around child well-being. Our experience suggests,
that with some support and resources, such collectives can be
powerful agents of change.
Womens collectives also provide an opportunity for empowerment of women, which is widely understood as having a
positive impact on the nutritional outcomes of children. The
Coalition for Sustainable Nutrition Security in India (2012)
brings together evidence from six countries including Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam to highlight the widespread relevance of this aspect. In southern
Rajasthan, the absence of male heads of family in many
migrant households typically reduces the social capital
possessed by women and makes it harder for them to navigate
the public sphere to access their entitlements or to seek cooperation from the community.
However, this vacuum also creates an opportunity for women
to emerge as de facto heads of family, to find their voice, and
engage in actions to improve the nutritional aspects of their
childs life. These collectives could emerge as creative, supportive spaces for women to sit together and identify their
needs in the context of child malnutrition and evolve feasible
local solutions. The collectives could potentially act as an
important convergence point to drive the mutually-reinforcing
solutions proposed in this paper: encouraging homestead
farming of nutritious foods among women in the community;
supporting women in seeking their PDS entitlements; spreading awareness on malnutrition; managing or monitoring the
crches; and devising quick recipes and other solutions for
busy mothers to provide appropriate feed and care to young
children.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that child malnutrition among

tribal, migrant communities of southern Rajasthan emerges
directly from the harsh living conditions prevailing in the
region. Its dry, arid geography with small unproductive landholding translates into scarce resources at the household level.
Our study found many households with low quantities of food,
especially food with no key nutrition at all. Negligible incomes
from casual manual labour were reported as being highly
insufficient for purchasing adequate amounts of nutritious
food. It is hardly surprising that a child growing up in such an
environment are under and inappropriately fed and cared for
according to her/his age. The devastating effect of a highly
80
inadequate diet is compounded by incapacity of households to

provide sufficient childcare due to resource constraints faced
by mothers such as time and energy, especially in migrant
households.
We also found that child malnutrition has become normalised within these communities, such that mothers often perceive their malnutritioned children to be (developmentally)
normal, unless they are very sick or severely malnutritioned.
We ascribe this to the larger phenomenon of extreme and
structural deprivation in the region. Busy, exhausted mothers,
over half of whom are malnourished themselves, were found
to be taking care of their children with extremely limited
resources or opportunities to develop their knowledge on
nutrition. Therefore, we have argued that it is the dual burden
of lack of food and care that is interacting insidiously at the
household level to undermine the nutritional status of children
in southern Rajasthan.
Our position is that overcoming structural shortcomings is
not an impossible task. Solutions, models and experiments
that hold lessons for southern Rajasthan are available. Among
them, investments in nutrition-focused, homestead agriculture, aimed at diversifying diets within households, deserve
immediate attention.
We believe that there is a promising, direct pathway from
family farming to improved food intakes by children in homes
and that the disconnect between these two needs to be
addressed with highest priority. Furthermore, we have highlighted literature and evidence that gives us reason to believe
that with appropriate reforms, the PDS has the ability to
supplement nutrition security of families, by modifying the
food consumed at the household level and increasing its
nutritional content.
We have argued that state-level reforms in some parts of the
country have enabled the PDS to perform well for food security, and even in nutrition security in some cases. We stress on
the need for the PDS in Rajasthan to learn from these cases.
Finally, we have argued that the role of community-managed
crches is doubly important for high migration areas, where
women have limited time and resources to take care of their
young ones. We envision the role of womens collectives to be
crucial in being able to tie all of these efforts on the ground,
enabling the community, led by women, to change perception
and habits that impede nutritional achievements of children;
to promote farming in ones own backyard for family consumption; and to access public entitlements that are essential
support systems for poor, tribal, seasonal migrant families.
EPW Index
An author-title index for EPW has been prepared for the years from 1968
to 2012. The PDFs of the Index have been uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW
website. Visitors can download the Index for all the years from the site. (The
Index for a few years is yet to be prepared and will be uploaded when ready.)
EPW would like to acknowledge the help of the staff of the library of the
Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research, Mumbai, in preparing the
index under a project supported by the RD Tata Trust.
AUGUST 13, 2016
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Notes
1
Other has been used to denote a residual

group of children excluding those from vulnerable categories of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled
Tribe and Other Backward Classes (GoI and
UNICEF 2014a, 2014b).
Prevalence of malnutrition among children between three and five years is typically found to
be lower than children under three years. This
may have exacerbated the gap between child
malnutrition rates found through our study
and that from the RSoC.
The survey was conducted during the pre-harvest period. Therefore, it is possible that the
food stock levels available at the households
under study were not as low as in the non-lean
periods.
Some of the mothers under study were in postnatal stage, which could, to some degree explain the overall low rate of utilisation of MGNREGA scheme.
Information on IFAD, FAO and LANSAs work
on agriculture and nutrition can be found on
the following web-links: http://www.ifad.org/
pub/thematic/nutrition/nutrition_e_web.pdf,
http://www.fao.org/3/a-as601e.pdf and http://
lansasouthasia.org/.
Unfortunately, BAIF has not conducted a systematic review of the nutritional impact from
the Wadi programme on participating households. This, however, seems to be a global
trend. Webb (2013) argues that most agricultural interventions fail to assess the nutritional
impact of their project on participating households, even if improved nutrition was stated to
be one of the goals of the project.
Information about these organisations work
with crches can be found on these web links:
http://www.jssbilaspur.org/activities/creches.
php and http://phrsindia.org/action-againstmalnutrition/.
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Hindu (2008): Take Steps to Sell Pulses, Oil
through PDS in All States, 6 February, http://
www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-tamilnadu/take-steps-to-sell-pulses-oilthrough-pds-in-all-states/article1193615.ece.
(2015): Budget Cuts for Mid-day Meal Scheme
Draw Flak, 27 March, http://www.thehindu.
com/news/cities/Kochi/budget-cuts-for-midday-meal-scheme-draw-flak/article7038301.ece.
Jha, Raghbendra, R Gaiha and A Sharma (2009):
Calorie and Micronutrient Deprivation and
Poverty Nutrition Traps in Rural India, World
Development, Vol 37(5), pp 98291.
Jha, Raghbendra, Sambit Bhattacharyya and Raghav Gaiha (2011): Social Safety Nets and Nutrient Deprivation: An Analysis of the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Program and
the Public Distribution System in India, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol 22.2, pp 189201.
Khera, Reetika (2011): Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and Explanations,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XLVI, No 4445,
pp 3649.
Khera, Reetika and Jean Drze (2013): Rural Poverty and the Public Distribution System, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XLVIII, Nos 4546.
Panagariya, Arvind (2013): Does India Really Suffer from Worse Child Malnutrition Than SubSaharan Africa?, Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 48(18), pp 98111.
Sharma, Amrita, Santosh Poonia, Zaineb Ali
and Rajiv Khandelwal (2014): Their Own
Country: A Profile of Labour Migration from
Rajasthan, Aajeevika Bureau, Udaipur, http://
www.shram.org/moreArticle.php?cat=15&id=
20141014050600.
Srivastava, Ravi and S K Sasikumar (2003): An
Overview of Migration in IndiaIts Impacts
and Key Issues, paper presented at Regional
Conference on Migration, Development and
Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia, 2224 June,
Dhaka, Bangladesh, http://www.eldis.org/vfile/
upload/1/document/0903/Dhaka_CP_2.pdf.
Thorat, Sukhadeo and Nidhi Sabharwal (2011):
Addressing the Unequal Burden of Malnutrition, India Health Beats, Vol 5(5), New Delhi,
World Bank and Population Foundation of
India.
UNICEF (2013): Improving Child Nutrition: The
Achievable Imperative for Global Progress,
New York, http://www.unicef.org/gambia/Improving_Child_Nutrition_-_the_achievable_
imperative_for_global_progress.pdf.
Webb, Patrick (2013): Impact Pathways from Agricultural Research to Improved Nutrition and
Health: Literature Analysis and Research Priorities, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Rome, Italy, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/
user_upload/agn/pdf/Webb_FAO_paper__Webb_
June_26_2013_.pdf.
Oral History Archives

On behalf of EPW, the Centre for Public History, Srishti School of Design,
Bengaluru, has put together extended interviews of 30 individuals
associated with Economic Weekly and EPW.
These are interviews with present and former staff, readers, writers
and trustees, all closely associated with the journal.
The interviews cover both the EW and EPW years, some are of the
1950s, others the 1960s and some even later. Each interview lasts for
at least an hour and a few are multi-session interviews.
The interviews maintained in audio files (with transcripts) are available
at the EPW offices in Mumbai for consultation by researchers.
Individuals interested in researching those times and the history of
EW/EPW may write to edit@epw.in to explore how the files may be
heard and used.
vol lI no 33
81
NOTES
Multiplier Effect of
Self-help Groups
Disha Bhanot, Varadraj Bapat
This article measures financial

inclusion performance on three
dimensionsbranch penetration,
credit penetration and deposit
penetration and in the process
of quantifying the contribution
of self-help groups towards
macro-level financial inclusion
dimensions, reveals the multiplier
effect of SHGs. Since it enables all
group members to access savings,
credit and other financial services
from bank, efforts to promote
financial inclusion through SHGs
should continue.
Disha Bhanot (disha.bhanot@iitb.ac.in)

is a Postdoctorate Fellow, Tata Centre for
Technology and Design, Indian Institute of
Technology Bombay. Varadraj Bapat teaches at
the Shailesh J Mehta School of Management,
IIT Bombay.
82
here is a symbiotic relationship

between financial sector development and economic growth. Financial inclusion is an important process in
enabling people to exit poverty by transforming their production and employment activities (Banerjee and Newman
1993; Aghion and Bolton 1997; Yunus
1998; Burgess and Pande 2003; Basu
and Srivastava 2005). Financial inclusion is defined as the delivery of banking services at an affordable cost to the
vast sections of disadvantaged and low
income groups (Leeladhar 2006).
The National Bank for Agriculture
and Rural Development (NABARD) pioneered the idea of mobilising small,
cohesive and participatory groups,
known as self-help groups (SHGs) (Fernandez 2007). The economic activities of
SHGs comprise accumulating member
savings, providing internal loans to
group members and availing bank loans.
As on March 2014, there were 74.3 lakh
SHGs, of which 56% were credit-linked
and 84% were all women groups
(NABARD 2014). The SHG-bank linkage
programme has proved to be cost-effective for banks as group loans lower the
operational costs and delinquency rates.
This programme has been regarded as
the worlds largest and fastest-growing
microfinance programme that goes beyond mere financial services provision
to encompass wider goals of securing
livelihoods, reviving local economies
and empowering women through trainings, confidence building and leadership
development (Fischer and Sriram 2002;
Seibel 2005).
This study puts forth a fresh perspective
on financial inclusion by incorporating
the contribution of SHGs in financial inclusion performance and thereby highlights
the multiplier effect of SHGs. The multiplier effect implies that linking an SHG
with a bank goes beyond linking one

entity (SHG) to the formal financial sector,
by enabling all group members to access
savings, credit and other financial services
from the bank. This idea is leveraged to
reflect the contribution of SHG-bank
linkage programme in a manner that
helps to arrive at a grounded and more
realistic picture of the extent of financial
inclusion. Financial inclusion performance is evaluated, inclusive as well as
exclusive of SHG contribution, over the
time period 200012.
Financial Inclusion Indicators
In order to assess the extent of financial
inclusiveness of an economy/state, performance on the set of financial inclusion indicators is monitored. Financial
inclusion performance is measured on
three dimensionsbranch penetration,
credit penetration and deposit penetration, corresponding to access and usage
aspects of financial inclusion. This section
elaborates upon the idea of improving
existing financial inclusion indicators by
incorporating SHG effect.
Branch penetration is a typical measure
of outreach (access) dimension as it
refers to the ease with which banking
services are available to all. Credit and
deposit penetration dimensions reflect
the usage aspect of financial inclusion
(Beck et al 2007). The selected indicators
for credit and deposit penetration dimensions focus on the number of people
being included in the financial system,
rather than the amount of credit/deposit
mobilised as analysis of amounts can
lead to erroneous conclusions since it
can be influenced disproportionately by
a few large value transactions that do
not necessarily reflect the extent of financial inclusion. Further, as low-income population faces higher likelihood of credit
exclusion, for measuring credit penetration dimension we posit that the number
of small borrower accounts (SBAs)1 would
be a more appropriate measure of assessing extent of financial usage.
Under the SHG-bank linkage scheme,
groups are entitled to open savings
accounts and apply for bank loans. This
implies that given an SHG with a group
august 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
NOTES
size of 1020 members, one savings

account and one loan account would be
opened with the bank in the name of
the entire group. The functioning of
SHGs is such that all members contribute equal amount of savings to the
group corpus which is deposited regularly into group savings account with a
bank. Likewise, when the group avails
of bank loan, there is equal right and
opportunity for each member to avail of
a bank loan. In this context, all group
members can be said to be financially
included in terms of having access to
savings and credit facilities from banks.
In the conventional approach to measure extent of financial inclusion, SHG is
counted as having one savings account
and one loan account. We posit that this
is an underestimation of the extent of
financial outreach. Thus, in order to
realistically capture the extent of financial inclusion, it is important to adjust
for SHG membership in the credit penetration and deposit penetration dimensions of financial inclusion.
Incorporating Contribution
of SHGs
To capture the contribution of SHGs to
financial inclusion performance, we
incorporate SHG membership in each of
the credit penetration and deposit penetration dimensions of financial inclusion.
Performance on credit penetration would
be the sum total of the number of SBA s
and the number of borrowers through
SHGs. The number of borrowers through
SHGs is calculated as per the relationship given below:
Number of borrowers through SHG =
Number of credit accounts of SHGs
where = (Average number of members
in a SHG Adjustment factor) Percentage of members who avail bank loans.
Average membership in a group is
considered to be 13 members (NABARD
2013). As loans to SHGs would have
already been counted once in the number of aggregate SBAs, adjustment factor
takes value of 1. With regards to the
percentage of members availing bank
loans, data suggests that about 70%
80% of the members get a share in
the bank loan extended to the group.
Thus, = (131) 0.75 = 9.
EPW
august 13, 2016
Likewise, the extent of deposit penetration would be the sum total of the
number of savings deposit accounts and
the number of deposit account holders
through SHGs. The number of deposit account holders through SHGs is calculated
as per the relationship given below:
Number of deposit account holders
through SHGs = Number of deposit accounts of SHGs
where = (Average number of members
in a SHG Adjustment Factor).
The average membership in an SHG is
taken as 13 members, as per NABARD
(2013) report. The aggregate number of
deposit accounts would include savings
account of the group. Hence, to avoid
double counting, adjustment factor takes
value of 1. Thus, = (131) = 12.
The indicators used to measure performance on financial inclusion, after incorporating for SHG membership data in
relevant dimensions of financial inclusion are listed in Table 1.
In this study, performance on financial
inclusion is separately assessed for rural
and urban areas. Contribution of SHGs to
financial inclusion performance across
rural and urban areas is calculated by
considering the ratio of spread of SHGs in
80:20 (this ratio is reported by Venkatachalam and Jayaprakash 2004). This
ratio is also substantiated by Reddy and
Reddy (2008) as they report that spread of
SHG programme is heavily concentrated
in rural areas.
The methodology discussed above
helps to ascertain the impact of SHGs on
all India financial inclusion performance.
The advantage of the proposed methodology lies in its flexibility to incorporate

the impact of SHGs (and other informal
group based microfinance programmes)
on financial inclusion performance at
state/district level as well.
Data
Data on branch penetration, credit penetration and deposit penetration has
been collected during 200012 from the
Basic Statistical Returns (BSR) of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India, an annual publication by the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI). The data on credit and
deposit accounts of SHGs has been collated from Status of Microfinance in India
(SMFI), an annual publication by NABARD.
Systematic reporting of data on SHG
accounts is available from 2000 onwards,
hence we have chosen the above time
period.
Impact on Financial Inclusion
The impact of SHGs on credit and
deposit penetration is ascertained by
estimating SBA s to total population and
deposit accounts to total population,
inclusive as well as exclusive of SHG
contribution, over the time period
200012.
As on 2012, the percentage of rural
SBA s to population is 4.4%, which
upon including SHG contribution rises
to 8.1%. Likewise, percentage of total
SBA s to total population is 8.97% (as
on 2012) and upon incorporating for
SHG membership, it rises to 12.91%
(Table 2).
Table 1: Financial Inclusion Dimensions and Indicators, Incorporated for SHG Data
Dimension
Indicators
Significance
Branch Penetration
Number of bank branches per 1,00,000

population
(Number of small borrower
accounts + Number of borrowers
through SHGs) per lakh population
Measures the ease of access to banking

services
Measures the extent of access to loans
from banks to small borrowers as well as
the extent of population extended loans
as part of SHG-bank linkage scheme
Measures the extent of access to savings
products from banks as well as the extent
of population having deposit accounts
as part of SHG-bank linkage scheme
Credit Penetration
Deposit Penetration
(Number of deposit accounts +

Number of deposit account holders
through SHGs) per lakh population
Table 2: Impact of SHGs on Credit Penetration in India, 200012

2000
SBAs to Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
Rural
Urban
Total
3.69
10.37
5.57
3.56
10.29
5.45
2004
With SHG
Without SHG
2008
With SHG
Without SHG
4.2
12.52
6.58
7.06
20.49
11.02
3.19
11.89
5.68
3.85
18.57
8.19
2012
With SHG Without SHG
8.1
21.56
12.91
4.4
19.44
8.97
All figures are percentages of total population.

Source of Raw Data: RBI, BSR, 200012 and NABARD, SMFI, 200012.
vol lI no 33
83
NOTES
Figure 3: Number of Small Borrowers in Rural and Urban Areas, 200012
2000
2004
2008
Source of raw data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 20002012.
Considering the impact of SHGs on

deposit penetration (as shown in Table 3),
it is seen that as on 2012, percentage of
deposit accounts to population in rural
areas is 33.44% (exclusive of SHG contribution) which upon including the contribution of SHGs rises to 42.47%.
Impact of SHGs on credit and deposit
penetration dimensions of financial inclusion in rural areas, over the period
200012, is shown in Figures 12.
As on 2012, rural small borrowers show
a hike of 84% (Figure 1) and number of
deposit accounts in rural areas show a hike
of 27% (Figure 2) after incorporating for
SHG membership data. The difference in
impact of SHGs on credit and deposit
penetration (in 2012 versus 2000) is understandable as SHG movement has been
gradually gaining momentum over the
years. From a humble beginning of 500
SHGs in year 1990, in a decades time
there were 1.98 lakh SHGs in 2000 and
this figure rose to 74.30 lakh in 2014.
Performance on Indicators of
Financial Inclusion
The performance on three dimensions
of financial inclusion, over the period
200012 is presented in Table 4.
On the three dimensions of financial
inclusion, performance on credit penetration and deposit penetration has
84
2012
2012
2011
500
2,000
2010
1,258
1,000
4,000
2009
1,387
1,680
Rural
2008
1,277
1,547
Urban
6,000
2007
1,500
2,161
Without SHG Contribution
2,000
8,000
2006
2,831
With SHG Contribution
2005
3,500
10,000
2000
3,595
Number of Deposit Accounts (lakhs)
Deposit accounts in rural areas (lakhs)
Figure 4: Number of Deposit Accounts, in Rural and Urban Areas, 200012
4,000
2,500
2012
Figure 2: Deposit Accounts in Rural India, 200012
3,000
2011
2012
2010
2000
2004
2008
Source of raw data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 2000-2012.
2009
2008
200
2007
100
600
400
2006
200
2005
249
248
Rural
800
2004
257
314
2004
326
Urban
2003
300
372
2002
400
Without SHG Contribution
1,200
1,000
2003
500
1,400
2002
With SHG Contribution
1,600
2001
600
SBAs in rural areas (lakhs)
Number of Small Borrowers (lakhs)
575
2001
686
700
2000
Figure 1: Small Borrower Credit Accounts in Rural India, 200012
improved, while performance on branch

penetration has stagnated, over the
period, 200012. The number of branches per lakh population has come down
from 4.69 (in 2000) to 4.24 (in 2012).
Credit penetration in rural areas has
increased from 3,690 credit accounts per
lakh population to 8,100 accounts per
lakh population. In terms of percentage
growth, credit penetration has increased
by 119% (rural areas), by 108% (urban
areas) and by 118% (all India). Likewise,
deposit penetration has increased by
131% (rural areas), 64% (urban areas)

and 92% (all India).
With respect to region-wise performance on financial inclusion, as on March
2012, the northern region is leading in
rural branch penetration, with 5.76 branches per lakh population compared to
national average of 4.24 branches per
lakh population. Rural credit and deposit penetration in southern region at
19.97% and 59.67% respectively, is
significantly more than national average
(8.10% and 42.46% respectively). A part
Table 3: Impact of SHGs on Deposit Penetration in India, 200012

2000
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
Rural
Urban
Total
18.34
105.53
42.86
18.07
105.36
42.61
2004
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
19.91
103.55
43.84
17.86
102.27
42.01
2008
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
2012
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG Without SHG
26.57
125.11
55.64
42.47
172.88
82.11
20.66
121.57
50.43
33.44
167.71
74.26
All figures are percentages to total.

Table 4: Financial Inclusion Indicators in India, Incorporated for SHG Data, 200012
FI Dimensions
2000
Branch Penetration
(Number of bank branches per lakh population)
Credit Penetration
(Number of SBAs and number of borrowers through
SHGs per lakh population)
Deposit Penetration
(Number of deposit accounts, directly
and through SHGs per lakh population)
Rural
4.69
Urban
12.62
Total
6.92
Rural
3,690
Urban
10,374
Total
5,569
Rural
18,348
Urban 1,05,536
Total
42,863
2004
4.13
11.73
6.3
4,200
12,524
6,581
19,914
1,03,555
43,846
2008
2012
3.79
4.24
13.75
17.54
6.73
8.29
7,067
8,100
20,494
21,561
11,027
12,192
26,579
42,464
1,25,110 1,72,880
55,644
82,110
august 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
NOTES
of this success in financial inclusion performance in the southern region can be

explained by the strong presence of the
SHG movement in that region.
Lastly, the absolute number of small
borrowers and deposit accounts across
rural and urban areas, over the period
200012, is depicted in Figures 34 (p 84).
It is evident from Figures 3 and 4 that
during the period 200012, the rise in
absolute number of rural deposit accounts
(281%) is more than the rise in absolute
number of rural small borrower accounts
(266%).
Conclusions
In this study, financial inclusion performance is measured on three dimensions
that is branch penetration, credit penetration and deposit penetration. The
novelty of the study lies in capturing the
contribution of informal savings and
credit groups (such as SHGs) in measuring macro-level performance on financial inclusion. The concept that has been
put forth can be said to be a methodological improvement in the manner of
studying financial inclusion performance.
The contribution of SHGs towards financial inclusion efforts has been quantified
by adjusting credit penetration and deposit penetration dimensions of financial inclusion for SHG membership. Incorporating for SHG membership in
credit penetration dimension (by accounting for number of borrowers through SHGs) and in deposit penetration
dimension (by accounting for number of
deposit account holders through SHGs)
gives a more grounded and realistic picture of the extent of financial inclusion.
As of March 2012, in measuring the
credit penetration, if SHGs contribution
is incorporated, rural small borrowers
would increase by 84%, from 372 lakh to
686 lakh. Similarly, in measuring the
deposit penetration, if SHG contribution
is incorporated, then the number of
deposit accounts in rural areas would
increase by 27% (from 2,831 lakh to
3,595 lakh). Further, upon scaling absolute number of SBAs and deposit accounts
by population, percentage of credit as
well as deposit accounts show significant
rise, if SHG contribution is incorporated.
As on 2012, rural credit penetration (the
EPW
august 13, 2016
percentage of credit accounts to population) would almost double from 4.4% to

8.1%, if SHG contribution is incorporated.
Likewise, rural deposit penetration (the
percentage of deposit accounts to population) would increase from 33% to 42%
after incorporating SHG contribution.
With respect to rural financial inclusion performance during 200012, branch
penetration has stagnated, while credit
and deposit penetration has improved
by 119% and 131% respectively. At allIndia level, credit and deposit penetration has increased by 118% and 92%
respectively. Thus, despite stagnation in
rural bank branch penetration, SHGbank linkage programme appears to be
a promising conduit for extending financial services to the hitherto excluded
population.
Note
1
Borrowers with sanctioned credit limit of up to

`2 lakh are classified as small borrowers.
References
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton (1997): A
Trickle-down Theory of Growth and Development with Debt Overhang, Review of Economic
Studies, Vol 64, No 4, pp 15172.
Banerjee, Abhijit V and Andrew F Newman (1993):
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 101,
No 2, pp 27498.
Basu, P and P Srivastava (2005): Exploring
Possibilities: Micro Finance and Rural Credit
Access for the Poor in India, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 17, pp 174756, accessed on
6 June 2016, http://www.epw.in/journal/2005/17/microfinance-special-issues-specials/exploring-possibilities.html.
Beck, T, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and R Levine (2007):
Reaching Out: Access to and Use of Banking
Services across Countries, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol 85, Issue 1, pp 23466.
Burgess, Robin and Rohini Pande (2003): Do Rural
Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social
Banking Experiment, American Economic
Review, Vol 95, No 3, pp 78095.
Fernandez, Aloysius P (2007): History and Spread of
the Self-help Affinity Group Movement in India, Occasional Paper No 3, International
Fund for Agricultural Development, accessed
on 6 June 2016, https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/35979b08-2323-487c-a6b6320a3ddee34c.
Fischer, T and M S Sriram (2002): Beyond Micro Credit,
Putting Development Back into Micro-Finance,
New Delhi: Vistaar Publications.
Leeladhar, V (2006): Taking Banking Services to
the Common ManFinancial Inclusion, Reserve
Bank of India Bulletin, Vol 60, No 1, pp 7377.
NABARD (2013): Status of Microfinance in
India, 201213, Annual Report Published by
NABARD, Mumbai.
(2014): Status of Microfinance in India, 201314,
Annual Report Published by NABARD, Mumbai.
Reddy, C S and M B S Reddy (2008): Poverty Reduction and Women Empowerment: Role of
SHG Federations in Urban AreasAPMAS Experiences, Hyderabad: APMAS, accessed on 6
June 2016, http://www.apmas.org/pdf/APMAS%20FINAL%20URBAN%20REPORT.pdf.
Seibel, H D (2005): SHG Banking in India: The Evolution of a Rural Financial Innovation, Working Paper, University of Cologne, Development
Research Centre, No 2005, 9.
Venkatachalam, A and A Jayaprakash (2004): Self
Help Groups in Dindigul District, Kisan World,
Vol 31, No 10, pp 2930.
Yunus, M (1998): Banker to the Poor: The Autobiography of Muhammad Yunus, London: Aurum
Press.
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vol lI no 33
85
DISCUSSION
California Textbooks Issue

A Response
Vamsee Juluri
Countering the criticism of

the organisation Scholars for
People in What Is at Stake in
Rewriting California Textbooks
(EPW, 16 July 2016), the author
explains that the mandate of
the organisation is to debate the
notion that India did not exist
before 1947, and question why
Hinduism alone should be studied
through its inequities.
This article was earlier posted in the

Web Exclusives section of the EPW website.
Vamsee Juluri (juluri@usfca.edu) is Professor
of Media Studies at University of San Francisco.
86
he California textbooks process

which concluded earlier this year
has brought out a slew of dishonest,
poorly informed, and ideologically predetermined articles pretending to lend
expertise on the situation, which is first
of all a debate on the history curriculum in American schools, rather than
Indian history alone. Although Chinnaiah
Jangams article in this journal (16 July
2016) initially attempts to provide a historic overview of Indian immigration to
the United States (US) and situate the
present controversy in that context, it inevitably trickles down into a narrow
course that wilfully ignores several facts
in order to prop up a baseless attack on
Scholars for People, with some personal
presumptions thrown in as well. The
mandate of Scholars for People, which
began with a community petition in
March, protesting the denial of India
and Hinduism in the frameworks, was
the issue of denying Indias existence,
and not caste or even Hinduism, a crucial
fact Jangam omits to mention.
An honest analysis of this issue would
have at the very least laid out the positions of various parties accurately, as
well as the flow of events that took place,
instead of resorting to a sophomoric guessing game based on names and identities
(would Jangam censure Irfan Habib,
say, for writing about Hindu history the
way he takes umbrage at some of us in
Scholars for People?). It should be noted
at the outset that Jangam does not offer a
single link to the letters submitted to the
Instructional Quality Commission (IQC)
by the South Asia Faculty Group (SAFG)
in 2015 and 2016 (Scholars for People
2015, 2016b). These are the documents
in which the SAFG attempted to make a
case for their recommendations, namely
that several references to India be replaced with South Asia, and for the
word Hinduism to be replaced with

religion of ancient India. It was the
acceptance of several of these changes
in March 2016 by the California HistorySocial Science Project (CHSSP) that led to
the formation of Scholars for People,
and it was this issue that dominated the
petition, letters, and articles initiated by
Scholars for People since March.
India Erasure and Caste Erasure
The mandate of Scholars for People
from the beginning was neither Hinduism nor caste, but fundamentally to
debate the fashionable academic notion
that India did not exist before 1947,
and to challenge the belief that the late
Cold War concoction South Asia was
somehow more accurate and inclusive
instead. The SAFG edits led to the
complete erasure of India in several
key places in the curriculum, subsuming
its people into a terra nullius fantasy
devoid of existence and accomplishment;
for example, changing a line about
Central Asian Turks conquering Northern Indian states into expanding into
Northern Indian plains (Scholars for
People nd). A public petition initiated
one week after the CHSSP accepted the
SAFG edits, gained the support of 25,000
people, including several non-Hindus,
and even non-Indian persons (Scholars
for People 2016a).
Several academics and secular public
intellectuals joined the Scholars for
People forum, and some academics also
wrote independently to the IQC to express
their opposition to the SAFG position.
The Social Science and Religion Faculty
Group (SSRFG) with over 40 American
scholars, including Diana Eck and Barbara
McGraw, also joined in the protest.
Unfortunately, beginning in early April,
a concerted media and social media
smear campaign began with the sole
aim of misrepresenting the issues at
stake in California (Juluri 2016). These
reports began to marginalise a real
event, the acceptance of over 30 SAFG
edits denying the existence of India and/
or Hinduism, in favour of the allegation
that various Hindu lobbying groups were
trying to erase the mention of caste in the
August 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
DISCUSSION
textbooks. This was merely a hypothesis,

at least to the extent that virtually none
of the dozens of edits requested by these
groups were even accepted, nor were all
of them about erasing caste. In any
case, the IQC review process concluded
in May with a discussion of 30 edits.
Twenty edits had to do with the India/
South Asia issue, and 18 of these were
broadly settled in favour of what Scholars for People had requested. The remaining edits remained as the SAFG had
recommended, and the language linking caste to Hinduism remained as
strong as it was at first. This version was
accepted by the State Board of Education in July.
Aryans and Hitler
in Hinduism Chapters
While I cannot comment on the hundreds
of suggestions submitted by dozens of
parents and Hindu advocacy groups over
the last two years, I can speak clearly
for myself, and for Scholars for People
which came together later, on these
issues. I submitted my first set of suggestions to the IQC in October 2015 in
which I had added several points that
would enrich students appreciation of
Hindu philosophy and culture to make
the Hinduism content on par with that of
other religions, without asking for any
deletions of caste (none of my suggestions
were acted upon, or even acknowledged
in the December draft). My main concern
then was with the lingering colonisation
narrative about Hinduism left over from
the Aryan invasion theory; language
in the books (which existed so widely in
the US that textbooks in one state even
had photos of Hitler in the ancient India
chapter). I was also concerned about expanding positive content on Hinduism,
to bring it on a par with other religions
(Juluri 2016).
I did believe then, and still believe now,
that there is an issue of inequity in the
depiction of Hinduism when compared to
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the
curriculum. There is clear evidence of
this, not only in terms of the content
of the textbooks, but also in terms of
the testimonies presented by dozens of
schoolchildren who spoke in Sacramento
over the past few years (Bajpai and
EPW
August 13, 2016
Arumuganathaswami 2016; Voice of

California Hindus). Their point was
simple: there is virtually no critical discussion of any other faith (such as their
role in global imperialism, conquest,
genocide and slavery), but Hinduism
alone is studied entirely by its inequities.
Although our main focus was on the India/South Asia question, Scholars for
People did offer, towards the end of the
process, an attempt to evaluate the multiple claims made by different Hindu advocacy groups and parents on some of
these issues (the May letter cited by Jangam), an act which somehow seems to
have lent itself to unsubstantiated taints
of guilt by association by Jangam and
other activists who find it convenient to
lump our position into the same category
as those of certain religious advocacy
groups like Hindu American Foundation, whose mandate and history has
been very different from that of Scholars
for People. He accuses us of replicating
the Hindu right-wing governments
historical narrative without any specific evidence of either this government
narrative or ours. He cites our criticism
of Pollock and Doniger without revealing
where he himself stands on the issue
of Hindus being depicted as fascist
conquerors of their own land. Does he
agree with them? Or with the Aryan
invasion theory, and the sly attempts
by these scholars to somehow blame
Hinduism for the horrors of the Nazi
holocaust?
Outright Lies against Scholars
for People and My Book
In conclusion, I should place on record
that in addition to ignoring or suppressing
the whole range of issues that Scholars for
People has been engaged with, Jangam
also attempts to misrepresent our credentials. His claim that no historians
supported our position is totally false
and suppresses the fact that Ravi Korisettar, one of Indias most respected
archaeologists, supported our May letter
in which we questioned the SAFGs claims
on archaeology and Indus Valley among
other issues (other historians like Michel
Danino and Saradindu Mukherjee support
our letter too, but Jangam would perhaps
prefer to avoid engaging with their work
vol lI no 33
by dismissing them as not credentialed

enough as the SAFG did).
As for caste privilege, I can only try to
be accountable to mine, but would ask
him to introspect whether beneficiaries
ofcolonialism, as he calls us, would
really be struggling so hard to contest ignorant and racist textbook content from
the colonial era in 21st century America.
One of the ironies of the caste debate in
California is that the SAFG position on
Dalits has often been supported by selfidentified Brahmin activists whereas the
much vilified Hindu groups, like the
Hindu Education Foundation, actually
consist of members of underprivileged
caste groups who wish to see a better
depiction of subaltern contributions to
Indian history, than merely as victims
and palace sweepers.1
I also urge Jangam to take a look at
the other important scholarly interventions he skipped mentioning: the Social
Science Faculty Research Group, consisting of over 40 US scholars, including
Diana Eck, Francis X Clooney and Barbara McGraw, who have also called for
a change in how caste and Hinduism
are depicted in the textbooks. I wonder
if he skipped mentioning them because
their castes do not quite lend themselves to his sort of analysis, or simply
because their intervention affirms that
the textbooks issue is an American
minority issue rather than some Indian
right-wing project.
And as for his allegation about my having sworn allegiance to the Brahminical
ideology of sanatana dharma at my book
talk in Hyderabad, it is indeed a very
colourful way of characterising someone
who was simply born a Hindu (as for
what this ideology means to me, he
can also look up my writings on Sathya
Sai Baba, a poor peasant-caste child of
Rayalaseema, whom my family accepted
as guru, daivam, and sarvam).
Finally, I strongly disagree with Jangams presumptuous declaration that my
book Rearming Hinduism is somehow a
scholarly justification for Hindu militancy. It is a very hurtful charge to
make so lightly, and since he has not
offered any evidence from my book to
back up his frivolous allegation, it is
clear that not only has he failed to
87
DISCUSSION
read my book before commenting, he

has studiously avoided reading the
numerous readers comments on my book
on websites like Amazon and elsewhere,
which explicitly point out that my book
has nothing to do with arms, armaments,
or militaristic predilections of any kind.
While I do talk about the need for
righteous anger against todays violently
anthropocentric global modernity, I
have been anti-militant and unapologetically sentimental in my book to the
extent of stating clearly that the right
way to rearm Hinduism is through
kindness and love.
I am also not sure what ferocious
Hindu gods and their actions Jangam
thinks I propitiate in my book. But if it is
a reference to the broken Hampi LakshmiNarasimha Swami on the cover, it is
telling that he sees its broken state not as
a reminder of misogyny, violence and
imperialism against an ancient and indigenous nature-worshipping culture that
ought to be preserved and cherished, but
sees it only through the prejudiced lens
of a colonial-protestant mythology about

Hinduisms dark and dangerous gods.
Surely, the task of decolonising Indian
history demands at the very least an accurate understanding, and then an appropriate critique, before we decide that
only a normative and pure conception of
anti-Hindu ideology will suffice as acceptable in academia? When a subaltern
position makes that claim, accountability
and decency demand that one listens.
But when the very existence of global
anti-Hindu ideologies, institutions, and
forces is denied blissfully, how credible
can academia remain?
What Jangam and other impulsive
commentators have missed out is the
fact that questioning the present form
in which Hinduism and caste are taught
in California (Scholars for People 2016c)
does not mean we oppose a factual, precise, and age-appropriate discussion of
caste in California. Scholars for People
has never supported the view that caste
and Dalit issues should not be taught for
fear of bullying, and I request Jangam to
show any evidence of us having said

this. Our position very simply is that
there needs to be honesty and fairness in
the textbooks, and one cannot simultaneously whitewash imperialism and violence associated with global monotheisms while continuing to demonise Hinduism, and even its liberal interpreters
so viciously. It is remarkable that so
many observers who cannot identify and
eliminate colonial-era missionary propaganda from their critiques believe that
they have a monopoly of knowledge on
the real roots of Hinduism.
The final outcome of the 2016 review
process is this; the slightest mentions of
the spread of Islam through force have
been erased; Hinduism alone continues to
be criticised among all religions (though
a few positive points have been added
compared to the 2005 version), and the
words India and Hinduism have been
reinstated after being initially denied
altogether. What has changed though, is
the fact that 10 years ago there were perhaps no more than two or three scholars
New in EPWRF India Time Series
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With this, the EPWRF ITS now has 16 modules covering a range of macro-economic, nancial and social data.
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88
August 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
DISCUSSION
willing to speak up against the academic

dogma on Hinduism and Indian history,
and now there are at least 50. And no
matter how many devious attempts are
made to misrepresent scholars who
question the current dogma of normative
anti-Hindu fanaticism in academia, the
truth cannot be suppressed forever.
Note
1
See our letter (Degade 2016) for more on this

example.
References
Bajpai, Shiva and Acharya Arumuganathaswami
(2016): Teaching of Hinduism in the California
State School System: Evaluation and Recommendations, June, document, Hinduism Today,
EPW
August 13, 2016
http://www.hinduismtoday.com/education/
California-Textbooks/teaching-hinduism-recommendations_g29.pdf.
Degade, Sandeep (2016): Dont Use Caste to
Erase Indian Civilization, Huffington Post, 2
August, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/
dont-use-caste-to-erase-indian-civilization_us_
5749c113e4b0b52ee776c925.
Jangam, Chinnaiah (2016): What Is at Stake in
Rewriting California School Textbooks,
pp 1821, http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/29/
commentary/what-stake-rewriting-californiaschool-textbooks.html.
Juluri, Vamsee (2016): Letter to IQCMay 18th 2016,
Scholars for People, http://scholarsforpeople.
org/summary-suggestions-may-18th-2016/.
(2016): Framing the California Textbook Debate,
the Hoot, 16 June, www.thehoot.org/research/
media-monitoring/framing-the-californiatextbooks-debate-9432.
Scholars for People (nd): Edits Proposed by South
Asia Faculty Group, http://scholarsforpeople.
vol lI no 33
org/edits-proposed-south-asia-faculty-group/.
(2015): South Asia Studies Faculty Review of
Proposed California Curriculum Framework,
November, document, http://scholarsforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/KamalaVisweswaranSouthAsiaStudies_20151118-1.
pdf.
(2016a): Dont Replace India with South Asia
in California History Social Science Frameworks, online petition, 4 April, Change.org,
https://www.change.org/p/academia-don-treplace-india-with-south-asia-in-californiahistory-textbooks.
(2016b): South Asia Faculty Cover Letter 2,
February, document, http://scholarsforpeople.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2-24-SouthAsia-Faculty-Cover-Letter-2.pdf.
(2016c): unpublished document, https://www.
dropbox.com/sh/yc60n4fl s0xpwe9/AAD3beLln4sCk1VnFLIQl-Cua/ScholarsforPeopleJuly16.pdf?dl=0.
Voice of California Hindus, http://californiahindus.org/.
89
DISCUSSION
Debate or Debasement?
A Rejoinder to Vamsee Juluri
Chinnaiah Jangam
amsee Juluris response to my

article published in EPW on
16 July 2016 starts with an interesting statement:
California textbooks process ... has brought
out a slew of dishonest, poorly informed,
and ideologically predetermined articles
pretending to lend expertise on the situation, which is first of all a debate on the history curriculum in American schools, rather
than Indian history alone.
Not only does this first sentence point

to the authors regrettably intolerant
opinion towards ideas that differ from
his own, it also contains the puerile
argument that the debate on the history
curriculum in American schools can
somehow preclude discussions on Indian
history, even when the representation
of the latter is the moot point in this
debate.
Identity and History
Juluri accuses me of indulging in sophomoric guessing game based on
names and identities. I was born and
educated in India and like any other
Indian I do not have to guess anyones
caste. I am aware of how names and surnames are proudly flaunted by upper
EPW
August 13, 2016
caste Hindus to legitimise intellectual

authority, among other things. In fact,
caste identity is central in this context
because perspectives are rooted in cultural and social experience. Caste Hindus have a nostalgic perception of Hinduism because for centuries their inherited privileges have been sanctioned by
Hinduism; but a Dalit, with his/her everyday experiences of humiliations and violence will not talk about Hinduism in the
same way. Thus my ideas do not stem
from personal presumptions; rather I
read the social and historical implications of Hinduism critically not just as a
historian but also as a Dalit. For Englisheducated caste Hindus, it is easy and
convenient to pretend that they do not
believe in or have a caste, while continuing
to reap the benefits, material and intellectual, overtly and covertly, through
the power of their given names and
caste networks.
Identities of individuals and communities are important because they reflect
historical and social experiences, and
political and ideological agendas also
emanate from them. Very rarely do we
come across people who step outside
vol lI no 33
their inherited privileges to stand with

the oppressed and the deprived. Since I
point out the privileged caste roots of
the advocates of Scholars for People,
Juluri asks would Jangam censure Irfan
Habib, say, for writing about Hindu history the way he takes umbrage at some
of us in Scholars for People? Perceptive
readers would no doubt see the covert
communal orientation of the Scholars for
People behind Juluris picking of Irfan
Habib and not another Indian historian.
To answer his rhetorical question, however, I would contend that no, I do not
subscribe to the dogmatic idea that only
a Hindu should write Hindu history. In
fact, I believe anyone with professional
expertise and empathy for the communities they engage with, are eligible to
write their history.
India and Hinduism
Juluri says,
The mandate of Scholars for People from
the beginning was neither Hinduism nor
caste, but fundamentally to debate the
fashionable academic notion that India did
not exist before 1947, and to challenge the
belief that the late Cold War concoction
South Asia was somehow more accurate
and inclusive instead.
Historically, India as a territorial nation,

for that matter, the idea of nation itself is
a product of capitalism and its avatar,
modernity. It is ahistorical and dogmatic
to argue that in the pre-modern world
there were nations, and India existed as a
nation among others. Benedict Anderson,
89
DISCUSSION
Partha Chatterjee and others have provided fascinating theoretical and historical analyses of this basic historical
process. To further understand how the
territorial imagination of Bharat/Hindu
nation matured during colonial times,
one may refer to Manu Goswamis
Producing India: From Colonial Economy
to National Space (2004). The idea of
imagining ancient India as Hindu is the
product of Orientalism and Brahmin
leaders like Bal Gangadhar Tilak were
inspired by Max Muller, who traced the
roots of the Vedas to the Arctic. This
idea in the course of time became a
potent political weapon in the hands of
Hindu fundamentalists who now claim
a natural right over the nation and its
imagination. This imaginary concept delivered political dividends and continues
to do so. In addition, they have also
attempted to co-opt Afghanistan, Nepal,
Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives as part
of this imagined Hindu India and have
quibble with the entity of South Asia.
Juluri claims that the petition campaign
by the Scholars for People had the
support of more than 25,000 people,
including several non-Hindu, and even
non-Indian persons, and also that
several academics and secular public
intellectuals joined the Scholars for People
forum, and several academics also wrote
independently to the Instructional Quality
Commission to express their opposition
to the SAFG position. Yes, numbers do
speak well, but one needs to ask who are
these people signing and endorsing the
project? The majority of them are caste
Hindus of privileged backgrounds who
have never borne the burden of caste
stigma and never experienced violence
and humiliations imposed by Brahminical
Hinduism. Can Juluri get even a hundred Dalits to sign his petition? This
reflects the problem in the politics of
the majority.
Juluri questions my position on Sheldon
Pollock and Wendy Doniger who were
viciously targeted by the Hindu right in
India and outside. I may disagree with
some of their views but I stand with
them as a South Asian historian, in defending their freedom to write and critically engage with the production of
knowledge. About Hinduism, Juluri says
90
I had added several points that would

enrich students appreciation of Hindu
philosophy and culture to make the
Hinduism content on par with that of
other religions, without asking for any
deletions of caste, as he states that there
is an issue of inequity in the depiction
of Hinduism. Let me address the issue
of Hinduism and the inequity in depiction of its historical context.
First, the consolidation of Hinduism
as a religion was a result of the 19th
century project of colonialism. The problem with Hinduism is that it does not
have one authoritative text or one god
as its focal representation, unlike other
religions. In fact, if there is one thing
which binds all Hindus together like
a spinal cord, it is caste. Historically,
Hinduism as a religion is a newer development, but influenced by orientalism
and Brahminical imaginations, caste
Hindus assume the notion to have come
from antiquity. So inequity of representation is part of the legacy of Hinduism
itself, not an imposition from outside, as
it lacks clarity in terms of origins, beliefs
and ideas. The second aspect of Juluris
edits is about the appreciation of Hindu
philosophy and culture. It is again a
problematic assertion because foundational ethics of Brahminical Hinduism rely
on hierarchy of castes and the principle
of discrimination. If one has to teach
Hindu culture and philosophy it should
start with its ethical fault lines rather
than a distorted version of glory of Hindu
philosophy and culture.
Finally I urge Juluri to relook at the

video of his book launch and talk in
Hyderabad about where he begins his
talk thanking people and says, our
cause is our home, our sanatan dharma is
always home (YouTube 2015). These
words express his world view of sanatan
dharma, which aims to restore the caste
system in the form of chaturvarna. Even
the god-man he claims to believe and
worshipSathya Sai Babahad to bear
the caste as a poor peasant-caste child
of Rayalaseema in his mention.
I write this rejoinder in the backdrop
of a painful reality of unfolding violence
against Dalits by caste Hindus across
India. Finally let me end this rejoinder
by invoking a famous debate on justice
in Platos Republic which says, The only
way really to injure a man is to make
him a worse man (qtd in The Republic
of Plato 1941, 12). It cannot and should
not be overlooked that Hinduism, as
practised as a religion and philosophy,
through its often violent and violating
ideas and practices, has perpetuated injustice and inequality and denied basic
human existence to millions. Moreover
it lacks a moral imagination to recognise
the humanity of fellow humans like
Dalits and Muslims.
[This article was earlier posted in the
Web Exclusives section of the EPW website.]
Chinnaiah Jangam (chinnaiahjangam@cunet.
carleton.ca) teaches at the Department of
History, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
References
PerpetratorVictim Doublespeak
of Diasporic Identity
Juluris chooses to gloss over the cultural
and social (capital) advantages needed
to gain privileged access to education
and resources to migrate to privileged
first world countries like the United
States, and land in privileged positions.
Juluri asks me as to introspect whether
beneficiaries of colonialism as he calls
us would really be struggling so hard
to contest ignorant and racist textbook
content from the colonial era in 21st
century America. This position of victimhood with respect to racism and minority status is simultaneously ironical
and surreal.
Goswami, Manu (2004): Producing India: From

Colonial Economy to National Space, Chicago:
Chicago University Press.
The Republic of Plato (1941): Francis Macdonald
Cornford (Trans), London: Oxford University
Press.
YouTube (2015): Rearming HinduismIntroduction and Talk by Prof Vamsee Juluri, posted on
14 April 2015, https://youtu.be/8gam7dtmztY,
viewed on 1 August 2016.
August 13, 2016
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal, H. B. Road
Ranchi 834 001,
Jharkhand
Ph: 0651-2205640
vol lI no 33
EPW
CURRENT STATISTICS
Wholesale Price Index
Foreign TradeMerchandise
The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate based on WPI increased to 1.6% in June
2016 against (-)2.1%, a year ago. The index for primary articles rose by 5.5% in
June 2016 against (-)0.5% in June 2015, as the index for food articles grew
sharply by 8.2% compared to 3.1% in the respective month. The index for fuel
and power continued to decline for 20th month in a row, however, at a
decelerated rate of (-)3.6% in June 2016 from (-)8.9%, a year ago. The index for
manufactured products increased by 1.2% in June 2016 against a fall of (-)0.8%
in June 2015.
The merchandise trade deficit narrowed to $8.1 billion (bn) in June 2016 from
$10.8 bn, a year ago. After declining for 19 months in a row, exports registered a
positive growth of 1.3% in June 2016 to $22.6 bn from $22.3 bn in June 2015.
Imports fell by (-)7.3% to $30.7 bn in June from $33.1 bn, a year ago. Exports
declined by (-) 2.1% to 65.3 bn and imports by (-)14.5% to $84.5 bn during April
June 201617, from $66.7 bn and $98.9 bn, respectively, during corresponding
period last year. The trade deficit narrowed substantially by 40.3% to $19.2 bn
during AprilJune 201617 compared to $32.2 bn, during same period last year.
Consumer Price Index
Index of Industrial Production
The CPI inflation rate inched up to 5.77% in June 2016 compared to 5.76% in
May 2016 and 5.4%, a year ago. The consumer food price index rose sharply
by 7.8% in June 2016 compared to 5.5%, in June 2015. The CPI-rural and CPIurban inflation rate increased to 6.2% and 5.3%, respectively, in June 2016
from 6.1% and 4.6%, respectively, in the corresponding month last year. As
per the Labour Bureau data, the CPI inflation rate for agricultural labourers
increased to 6% in June 2016 from 4.5% in June 2015, and the inflation rate for
industrial workers remained at 6.1% in June 2016.
The index of industrial production grew by 1.2% in May 2016 compared to 2.5%, a
year ago, with manufacturing segment registering a fractional growth of 0.7%
compared to 2.1%. Mining segment grew moderately to 1.3% in May 2016 from 2.1%
recorded in May 2015 and electricity generation slowed down by 4.7% compared to
6.0%, a year ago. As per use based classification, the growth rate of capital goods
declined to -12.4% in May 2016, from 3.0% in May 2015. Growth in consumer
durable goods segment rose by 6.0% but that in consumer non-durables segment
fell to -2.2% in May 2016, compared to -3.9% and -1.0%, respectively, a year ago.
Movement of WPI Inflation JanuaryJune
Merchandise Trade June 2016
Year-on-Year in %
2
1.6%
1
June 2016
($ bn)
Over Month
(%)
22.6
30.7
8.1
1.8
7.9
29.4
Exports
Imports
Trade deficit
Over Year
(%)
(AprilJune)
(201617 over 201516) (%)
1.3
-7.3
-25.0
-2.1
-14.5
-40.3
Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

0
Components of Trade June 2016 and June 2015
2016
-1
$23 billion $23 billion

Exports Non-oil Imports
28
2015
-2
$24 billion
$22 billion
-2.1%
-3
January
February
March
April
May*
June*
$7 billion
Oil Imports
* Data (2016) is provisional.
$9 billion
Trends in WPI and Its Components June 2016* (%)

Weights
Over Month
Over Year
100
20.1
14.3
14.9
65.0
1.4
2.9
2.9
3.4
0.2
1.6
5.5
8.2
-3.6
1.2
All commodities
Primary articles
Food articles
Fuel and power
Manufactured products
Financial Year (Averages)

201314 201415 201516
6.0
9.9
12.9
10.3
3.0
2.0
3.0
6.1
-0.9
2.4
-2.5
0.3
3.4
-11.7
-1.1
* Data is provisional; Base: 200405=100; Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
$8 billion
Trade Deficit
-12
2015
$11 billion
2016 JUNE
JUNE
Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
Movement of IIP Growth April 2015May 2016

Year-on-Year in %
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2015June 2016
12
Year-on-Year in %
9
201617
7.8%
2.5%
1.2%
Consumer Food
6
5.8%
CPI
3.9%
3
201516
0
-4
April
A September O
May*
* May 2016 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100.
Miscellaneous
Industrial Growth: Sector-wise May 2016* (%)

0
Jan
2015
Jan
2016
M*
Weights
Over
Month
Over Year
100
14.2
75.5
10.3
3.6
5.1
3.9
0.6
1.2
1.3
0.7
4.7
2.8
1.5
2.3
8.4
2.4
2.2
2.0
5.6
45.7
8.8
15.7
29.8
8.5
21.3
5.3
10.7
4.1
-1.3
-7.4
3.8
3.9
-12.4
3.6
1.1
6.0
-2.2
7.0
6.4
1.7
-3.4
-12.6
2.8
3.6
-2.9
2.4
3.0
11.1
-1.7
J*
General index
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity
* Data is provisional.
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Base: 2012=100.
CPI: Rural and Urban June 2016* (%)

Latest
Month Index
Over
Month
Over
Year
Financial Year (Avgs)

201415 201516
Rural (2012=100)
131.8
1.2
6.2
6.2
5.6
Urban (2012=100)
128.1
1.2
5.3
5.7
4.1
Industrial workers (2001=100)
277.0
0.7
6.1
6.3
5.6
Agricultural labourers (198687=100)
869.0
1.0
6.0
6.6
4.4
CPI: Occupation-wise
Financial Year (Avgs)

201415
201516
Industrial Growth: Use-based

Basic goods
Capital goods
Intermediate goods
Consumer goods
Consumer durables
Consumer non-durables
* May 2016 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100; Source: Central Statistics Office.
* Provisional. Source: CSO (rural and urban), Labour Bureau (IW and AL).
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
91
CURRENT STATISTICS
Indias Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP

201415
` crore | at 201112 Prices
Private final consumption expenditure

Government final consumption expenditure
Gross fixed capital formation
Change in stocks
Valuables
Net trade (Exportimport)
Exports
Less imports
Discrepancies
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Q1
201516
Q2
1406817
294338
832420
48976
42871
-40831
620869
661700
-49687
2534903
(8.2)
(9.0)
(8.3)
(23.0)
(16.3)
Q3
1422029
322557
828754
48434
38194
-55355
625875
681230
-36835
2567778
(11.6)
(-0.6)
(7.5)
(9.2)
(15.4)
(2.2)
(20.6)
(0.3)
(1.1)
(4.6)
(8.3)
1495823
261886
843733
45077
37174
-45813
636468
682281
21305
2659185
Q4
(1.5)
(33.2)
(3.7)
(16.0)
(10.8)
(2.0)
(5.7)
(6.6)
1539614
223826
903344
52521
55036
-13988
625191
639179
29933
2790285
Q1
(6.6)
(-3.3)
(5.4)
(21.6)
(32.2)
1504442
293720
891627
50754
43138
-60253
585324
645577
761
2724188
(-6.3)
(-6.1)
(6.7)
Q2
(6.9)
(-0.2)
(7.1)
(3.6)
(0.6)
1511464
333116
909117
51068
42932
-78201
599264
677465
-7146
2762350
(-5.7)
(-2.4)
(7.5)
Q3
(6.3)
(3.3)
(9.7)
(5.4)
(12.4)
1618333
269808
853858
48547
42192
-59076
579684
638760
78020
2851682
(-4.3)
(-0.6)
(7.6)
Q4
(8.2)
(3.0)
(1.2)
(7.7)
(13.5)
(-8.9)
(-6.4)
(7.2)
1666888
230308
886147
55448
45549
-15520
613471
628991
143210
3012029
(8.3)
(2.9)
(-1.9)
(5.6)
(-17.2)
(-1.9)
(-1.6)
(7.9)
Indias Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

201415 ($ mn)
Q4
Q3
Current account
Merchandise
Invisibles
Services
of which: Software services
Transfers
of which: Private
Income
Capital account
of which: Foreign investment
Overall balance
-7721
-38635
30913
19982
17844
16428
16521
-5497
22864
13194
13182
Q1
-707
-31560
30854
20036
17382
16425
16600
-5607
30085
22993
30149
-6132
-34175
28043
17751
17512
16153
16267
-5861
18637
10226
11430
201516 ($ mn)
Q2
Q3
-8559
-37173
28614
17835
18058
16263
16421
-5484
8121
3150
-856
Q4
-7121
-33975
26854
18013
18556
15250
15305
-6408
10915
11256
4056
201415 (` bn)
Q4
Q3
-338
-24755
24417
16077
17328
14961
15146
-6621
3455
7259
3274
-478 [-1.5]
-2393
1915
1238
1105
1017
1023
-340
1416 [4.5]
817
816 [2.6]
Q1
-44 [-0.1]
-1964
1920
1247
1082
1022
1033
-349
1872 [5.6]
1431
1876 [5.6]
201516 (` bn)
Q3
Q2
-389 [-1.2]
-2169
1780
1127
1111
1025
1033
-372
1183 [3.7]
649
725 [2.3]
-556 [-1.7]
-2415
1859
1159
1173
1057
1067
-356
528 [1.6]
205
-56 [-0.2]
Q4
-469 [-1.4]
-2240
1770
1187
1223
1005
1009
-422
720 [2.1]
742
267 [0.8]
-23 [-0.1]
-1671
1648
1085
1170
1010
1022
-447
233 [0.6]
490
221 [0.6]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.
Foreign Exchange Reserves

Excluding gold but including revaluation effects
` crore
$ mn
Variation
22 July
2016
24 July
2015
31 Mar
2016
Over
Month
Over
Year
2268320
339734
2125240
333270
2229020
337605
-16260
1663
185750
10541
Financial Year So Far

201516
201617
114840
11961
Monetary Aggregates
` crore
Money Supply (M3) as on 8 July

Components
Currency with public
Demand deposits
Time deposits
Other deposits with RBI
Sources
Net bank credit to government
Bank credit to commercial sector
Net foreign exchange assets
Banking sectors net non-monetary liabilities
Reserve money as on 22 July 2016
Components
Currency in circulation
Bankers deposits with RBI
Other deposits with RBI
Sources
Net RBI credit to Government
of which: Centre
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI
Govts currency liabilities to the public
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI
Over Year
Aggregate deposits
Demand
Time
Cash in hand
Balance with RBI
Investments
of which: Government securities
Bank credit
of which: Non-food credit
Capital Markets
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 197879=100)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 198384=100)
S&P BSE-200 (198990=100)
CNX Nifty (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000)
Net FII Investment in equities ($ Million)*
201213
108086
-14361
82800
-485
Variation
201617
Financial Year
201314
251570
16769
201415
201516
322660
40486
218620
16297
Financial Year
201415
Outstanding
2016
Over Month
12058530
142870 (1.2)
1152110 (10.6)
356250 (3.4)
440910 (3.8)
1678470
972450
9394140
13460
-190
2870
140080
100
(-0.0)
(0.3)
(1.5)
(0.7)
239210
96650
813850
2400
(16.6)
(11.0)
(9.5)
(21.7)
53080
-15830
322520
-3530
(3.8)
(-1.8)
(3.9)
(-24.2)
81210
-17380
379060
-1990
(5.1)
(-1.8)
(4.2)
(-12.9)
104760
58760
965330
-1270
(9.2)
(7.8)
(14.9)
(-39.2)
140360
79650
800150
12620
(11.3)
(9.8)
(10.7)
(640.6)
211080
98200
757310
860
(15.2)
(11.0)
(9.2)
(5.9)
3690210
7827630
2580060
2061980
2162840
66260
51590
57080
32770
-2850
(1.8)
(0.7)
(2.3)
(1.6)
(-0.1)
391940
668910
237760
149110
262090
(11.9)
(9.3)
(10.2)
(7.8)
(13.8)
290880
109000
91650
135840
-27710
(9.7)
(1.5)
(4.1)
(7.6)
(-1.4)
451720
24570
46340
82420
-17900
(13.9)
(0.3)
(1.8)
(4.2)
(-0.8)
335850
777430
287280
275010
217860
(12.4)
(13.7)
(17.6)
(16.8)
(14.4)
-37480
604430
326710
-137040
195710
(-1.2)
(9.4)
(17.0)
(-7.2)
(11.3)
231100
753340
283070
202530
252280
(7.7)
(10.7)
(12.6)
(11.4)
(13.1)
1736180
413070
13590
3770 (0.2)
-6960 (-1.7)
340 (2.6)
201516
699620
698370
-12270
2424700
22600
971820
39160
38930
-57430
-13970
690
-28680
(5.9)
(5.9)
(-127.2)
(-0.6)
(3.1)
(-2.9)
248340 (16.7)
20220 (5.1)
-6480 (-32.3)
214250
215890
-20550
177790
2360
111760
(44.1)
(44.7)
(-248.2)
(7.9)
(11.7)
(13.0)
39520 (2.7)
-72710 (-15.6)
5480 (37.6)
120850
121440
-194230
119630
810
74790
(33.2)
(33.6)
(-95.9)
(5.6)
(4.2)
(9.5)
Scheduled Commercial Banks Indicators ( ` crore)

(As on 8 July 2016)
39300
2972
201112
Outstanding
2016
Over Month
201516
9671440
866160
8805280
65900
388450
2796070
2794380
7292300
7188910
29 July
2016
28052
8856
3692
8639
170188
Over Year
(1.8)
(4.3)
(4.8)
(3.1)
(0.5)
117650
-4080
121730
3860
2360
43690
43530
53620
47040
(1.2)
(-0.5)
(1.4)
(6.2)
(0.6)
(1.6)
(1.6)
(0.7)
(0.7)
Month
Ago
26740
8336
3477
8204
168289
841330
89890
751430
11550
25400
158170
158580
650340
654830
(9.5)
(11.6)
(9.3)
(21.3)
(7.0)
(6.0)
(6.0)
(9.8)
(10.0)
Year
Ago
27563
8492
3522
8375
169388
(6.0)
(8.7)
(11.9)
(8.1)
(7.0)
296830
-17760
314590
1000
-10030
146070
146050
105540
92090
201314
1127560 (13.4)
110090 (9.2)
109020 (34.0)
-1280 (-39.5)
147250 (11.3)
35860 (8.3)
12630 (644.4)
215150 (14.9)
36260 (7.8)
860 (5.9)
274630
273810
-316810
41220
700
17640
108120
107150
14070
244460
2000
150810
-334180
-336610
145030
324760
2090
-58050
60470
63520
102030
256200
2470
168910
344150
-22840
366990
8460
1000
170560
170450
42680
44550
(64.6)
(64.5)
(-104.0)
(1.7)
(3.2)
(1.8)
(18.3)
(18.1)
(32.4)
(15.7)
(13.0)
(21.8)
(3.7)
(-2.6)
(4.3)
(14.7)
(0.3)
(6.5)
(6.5)
(0.6)
(0.6)
201516
Trough
Peak
24674
7656
3193
7546
-
22952
7051
2938
6971
-
955110
51620
903480
5380
34080
206720
207540
733640
731610
(14.1)
(7.8)
(14.8)
(13.3)
(12.1)
(10.3)
(10.4)
(13.9)
(14.2)
827720
80110
747620
7480
56740
279010
278560
542320
546340
22386
6707
2681
6704
149745
(10.7)
(11.2)
(10.7)
(16.3)
(17.9)
(12.6)
(12.6)
(9.0)
(9.3)
End of Financial Year

201415
201314
29044
8980
3691
8834
-
(-47.8)
(-48.2)
(0.0)
(18.0)
(12.1)
(-6.9)
Financial Year
201415
201314

Trough
Peak
28209
8875
3697
8666
-
201516
1067450 (10.1)
72710 (4.4)
-88750 (-17.7)
-1860 (-12.0)
Variation
201617
(3.5)
(-2.2)
(4.1)
(1.9)
(-2.7)
(5.9)
(5.9)
(1.6)
(1.4)
1032790 (10.9)
(18.8)
(18.1)
(17.2)
(18.0)
(9.9)
27957
8607
3538
8491
168116
(24.9)
(28.3)
(31.9)
(26.7)
(12.3)
(16.6)
(17.6)
(0.0)
(12.0)
(12.7)
(21.5)
201516
794010
94970
699030
4090
14370
133680
134180
713200
702370
(9.3)
(12.0)
(9.0)
(7.7)
(3.9)
(5.4)
(5.4)
(10.9)
(10.9)
201516
25342
7835
3259
7738
166107
(-9.4)
(-9.0)
(-7.9)
(-8.9)
(-1.2)
* = Cumulative total since November 1992 until period end | Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.
92
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
1 Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions

Settlement
Period
Outright
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
201516*
Repo
Volume
(` Cr)
Number
of Trades
Volume
(` Cr)
172945
80923
443020
312422
2114509
853105
5291454
3415709
14169
11232
54542
42794
1972741
1457379
7178277
5552377
8647
3518
5538
3810
EPW
4 Tenor-wise Settlement Volume of Central

Government Dated Securities
Year
AUGUST 13, 2016

vol LI no 33
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2055
Total
July 2016
201617*
9916
12774
13163
27830
136864
49708
15694
188908
78727
101665
474575
6207
8435
362004
430797
0
4775
2487
11502
3140
1589
0
0
1019
1954
1050
1219
1921
6821
5838
2141
1962723
25729
69183
50552
114154
463990
104772
72431
435309
198760
285550
1074347
34711
16364
752477
968272
0
12525
7016
27720
5585
7652
0
0
1180
5085
2263
4919
6081
19818
18769
5325
4790539
2 Netting Factor
Daily Average (Outright)

Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Cr)
Number
of Trades
105725
37092
66143
41655
13149
15036
13493
33848
369830
8466
42323
187963
1170340
294312
251069
42058
339057
0
107945
0
22167
21150
30
191
1132
0
0
4
6885
4642
7240
10405
25249
4578
0
2992562
616
432
613
437
85771
56053
80655
56657
3 Instrument-wise Break-up of Securities Transactions (` Cr)
a Securities
Net
Netting
(` Cr)
Factor (%)
Gross
(` Cr)
4251970
2310480
12634451
8968081
1446559
876148
4736196
3430389
Gross
(` Cr)
65.98
62.08
62.51
61.75
4381799
2334558
12944400
9158961
b Funds
Net
(` Cr)
Netting
Factor (%)
Central Govt
Dated
531170
410577
1755904
1497437
87.88
82.41
86.44
83.65
1962723
741799
4790539
3022545
a Outright Trades
Treasury
Bills
93145
90963
329000
316202
5 Deal Size Analysis (%)

< 5 Cr
% to Total
Trades
(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.45)
(1.13)
(12.36)
(0.28)
(1.41)
(6.28)
(39.11)
(9.83)
(8.39)
(1.41)
(11.33)
(0.00)
(3.61)
(0.00)
(0.74)
(0.71)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.23)
(0.16)
(0.24)
(0.35)
(0.84)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(100)
July 2016
201617*
3.17
3.28
5 Cr
% to Total
Value
% to Total
Trades
% to Total
Value
50.88
54.40
20.81
22.77
0.43
0.42
> 5 Cr <=10 Cr
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
25.49
23.61
>10 Cr<=20 Cr
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
20.83
19.74
6.89
6.28
> 20 Cr
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
Outright
Cooperative Banks
Financial Institutions
Foreign Banks
Insurance Companies
Mutual Funds
Others
Primary Dealers
Private Sector Banks
Public Sector Banks
Total
5.33
0.27
23.88
0.90
7.99
0.84
16.97
13.29
30.54
100.00
9.71
9.01
Buy
CBLO Lending
Reverse Repo
(Funds Lending)
1.94
0.00
21.60
3.63
23.55
0.00
2.38
10.05
36.85
100.00
Uncollateralised
Money Market
Lending@
Forex
42.81
6.33
0.00
16.80
34.05
100.00
0.08
0.01
42.95
21.31
35.65
100.00
6.19
0.44
3.23
9.36
49.43
9.47
0.01
2.56
19.31
100.00
Outright
Repo
13.57
12.43
Period
5.32
0.75
0.18
0.00
23.83 24.79
0.80
0.17
7.02
0.00
0.51
3.68
17.76
31.93
14.13 29.80
30.45
8.89
100.00 100.00
OTC
1.32
8.53
13.18
0.00
16.61
11.81
6.03
24.34
18.18
100.00
Trades
% Share
9007
4638
26963
5.29
5.73
6.06
Value (` Cr)
Trades
% Share
NDS-OM
Value (` Cr)
% Share
11.44
17.36
16.29
161397
76335
417686
94.71
94.27
93.94
1841820
706436
4442936
88.56
82.64
83.71
237828
148366
864888
Outright
Period
Proprietary
Trades
Volume
152374
73584
387923
Cash
Trades
Tom
Value
(` Cr)
July 2016
201617*
2697
12252
Trades
1881075
776328
4636402
($ Mn)
Spot
Value
(` Cr)
($ Mn)
605227 90083 3828 715627

2704632 404040 17590 3228544
106464
482355
Trades
129225
576105
Proprietary
Trades
Volume
20571
7339
55097
6791
5338
26133
Trades
($ Mn)
1383414
6214650
233434
76778
655052
Forex
1.61
13.59
31.91
34.05
18.85
100.00
0.09
0.00
43.30
21.71
34.89
100.00
Period
275
269
1198
205612
928122
(` Cr)
6484 455255
30109 2188209
Total
Value
($ Mn)
Trades
Value
(` Cr)
Trades
($ Mn)
July 2016
201617*
33.34
33.12
1 mn
% to Total Value
4.42
4.34
% to Total Trades
42.29
41.73
June 2016
June 2015
93
Top 5
29.79
26.85
Top 10
49.87
46.88
Top 15
64.46
60.80
Top 20
73.89
71.82
* Data pertains to April 2016June 2016.
12.83
12.42
> 1 mn <= 5 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
12.33
12.42
9.09
9.02
> 5 mn <= 10 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
0.57
0.53
62213
43270
249068
24674
27397
Gross
($ Mn)
0.75
0.76
201617*
201516*
Settlement Period
< 30 Days
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
> 30 Days & <= 90 Days

% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
201516*
68.26
84.55
89.81
92.56
77.91
88.10
92.17
94.87
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
57.37
87.94
46.97
78.22
63.16
93.51
63.36
84.50
50.72
84.25
68.89
90.14
54.93
87.88
47.02
78.48
63.44
91.70
Cooperative Banks
Foreign Banks
Public Sector Banks
Mutual Funds
Primary Dealers
9 Market Share of Top n Members (%)

Period
Top 5
Top 10
Top 15
Top 20
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
201516*
32.26
46.46
56.56
63.48
31.96
49.45
59.24
66.43
32.05
47.13
56.86
64.06
32.64
49.73
59.59
66.82
1446617
5609772
25424
102694
3.35
3.32
2899
7684
Rate
Security
6.45
6.45
6.40
6.46
6.45
7.88% GS 2030
8.27% GS 2020
7.59% GS 2026
7.68% GS 2023
7.59% GS 2029
69.06
69.77
> 180 Days & <= 365 Days

% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
> 1 Year
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
1733233
6304967
Trades
Value
Rate
529
272
304
199
212
48214
41015
28714
19473
17975
6.20
6.35
6.28
6.31
6.22
16 Category-wise Forex ActivityDeal Type

Category
Foreign Banks
Public Sector Banks
Cooperative Banks
Financial Institutions
Cash
Tom
Spot
Forward
42.95
35.65
21.31
0.08
0.01
43.30
34.89
21.71
0.09
0.00
37.06
37.59
25.02
0.32
0.00
42.78
29.93
27.22
0.07
0.00
20 Forex Trading Platform: FX Clear

(Amount in $)
Period
> 90 Days & <= 180 Days

% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
18805
69780
14 Top 5 SecuritiesSpecial Repo
Value
94.58
95.19
Total
Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Crore)
286616
695195
53954
48475
34016
33389
30633
> 20 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
10.72
11.45
Term
Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Crore)
207
165
138
195
190
Netting Factor: Forex

Net
Netting
($ Mn)
Factor (%)
468812
2136965
> 10 mn <= 20 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
1.24
1.13
201617*
80.32
88.84
92.58
95.01
Trades
19 Tenor-wise Forward Trade Analysis (%)
18 Market ShareForex (%)

Period
% to Total Value
July 2015
72.90
89.70
93.34
95.44
Categories
15906
62096
7.83% GS 2018
7.49% GS 2017
8.07% GS 2017
7.59% GS 2026
8.27% GS 2020
Average
Value
(` Cr)
($ Mn)
66653 142234 3159523 468812 7486 166291

322449 636056 14336036 2136965 8155 183795
July 2016
Spot
Trades
Value
Daily Average
Trades
Value
July 2016
33875
18101
1694
905
28.83
27.75
July 2015
35302
20071
1535
873
49.12
48.08
July 2016
15.99
24.67
23.77
30.54
17.66
15.40
39.51
27.22
3.07
2.16
201516*
151180
80597
1890
1007
63.66
62.75
July 2015
17.56
24.61
20.50
24.13
16.42
14.00
41.85
34.41
3.66
2.84
201617*
17.55
26.90
24.39
29.32
15.62
14.00
38.55
26.97
3.89
2.82
73.34
74.51
201415*
133794
73983
1632
902
@: Call and Term Money Segment. (i) Figures in brackets are percentage to total, (ii) Tables 1 to 11 relate to Government Securities Market, (iii) Tables 12 to 14 relate to Money Market, and (iv) Tables 15 to 20 relate to Forex Market. Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).
< 1 mn
% to Total Trades
July 2016
201617*
51271
2489
169534
12585
Overnight
Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Crore)
Security
Constituent
Trades
Volume
922900
685432
3354347
Uncollateralised
Money Market
Borrowing@
17 Forex Deal Size Analysis (%)

Settlement Period
133292
258040
569263
1031527
13 Top 5 SecuritiesBasket Repo
Repo
Constituent
Trades
Volume
Forward
Value
(` Cr)
800550
468173
2864617
1736061
Top 5
Top 10
Top 15
Top 20
48.23
48.05
15 Forex Settlement
Settlement Period
State
Govt
58641
20343
171916
76962
12 Settlement Volume of Collateralised Borrowing and Lending Obligations (CBLO)
% Share
11 Type-wise Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions (` crore)
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
b Repo
Treasury
Bills
8 Market Share of Top Five Members

(Category-wise) (%)
Sell
CBLO Borrowing
10 Trading Platform Analysis of Outright Trades

July 2016
July 2015
201617*
Central Govt
Dated
Period
7 Intercategory Member Turnover Activity for All Category

Category
State
Govt
6 Market Share of Top n Securities (%)
Settlement Period
201516*
(0.54)
(1.44)
(1.06)
(2.38)
(9.69)
(2.19)
(1.51)
(9.09)
(4.15)
(5.96)
(22.43)
(0.72)
(0.34)
(15.71)
(20.21)
(0.00)
(0.26)
(0.15)
(0.58)
(0.12)
(0.16)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.11)
(0.05)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.41)
(0.39)
(0.11)
(100)
Daily Average (Repo)

Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Cr)
CURRENT STATISTICS
Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities, Forex Market and Money MarketJuly 2016
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS
Picture Postcard Idyll

Most depictions of Kashmir in popular Hindi cinema revolve around stock characters and archetypes in the
ultimate romantic Indian imagination of an idyllic and unperturbed state.
Sreya Dutt
An important paradigm shift is noticed in the representas the quintessential Other, Kashmiras represented
tion of Kashmir with the film Roja (1992), made by Mani
in Bollywood or, rather, in Hindi cinemaappears
Ratnam, which forced Indians to take cognisance of the
rather skewed, from a perception point of view,
rise of militancy or armed freedom movements in the
with little emphasis laid on any subjective attempt to underValley. Roja, which was awarded a prize for national
stand either the people or the landscape. Kashmir was
integration in 1993, marked a significant intervention in
certainly the perfect destination for filming romantic interrendering the burning Kashmir issue in Indias popular
ludes between the hero and heroine as seen in landmark
imagination. The film marked a leap of imagination in
films such as Kashmir ki Kali, for instance. The young and
terms of the sheer geographical movement of the lead
ravishingly beautiful Sharmila Tagore, attired in exquisitely
protagoniststhey are Tamilians who are transported
embroidered pherans and adorned in traditional silver
from the southern extreme of India to the high north domijewellery, amidst the scenes on the shikara on Dal lake,
nated by snow-covered mountains. While Arvind Swamys
embodied the ultimate romantic Indian imagination of an
character is employed by an intelligence agency of the Indiidyllic and unperturbed Kashmir. The tall chinar trees and
an government, Madhoos character, as Swamys wife, is
rolling green meadows of the Kashmir Valley formed the
that of an innocent, god-fearing young girl whose
backdrop for the declaration of love and the
...it may be
sense of wonder at the overpowering beauty of
dramatisation of romance. Indeed, for the audisaid, that the
Kashmir is surely shared by the average Indian
ence, the appreciation would have been not only
representation of
in the audience.
of the beautiful Sharmila Tagore, but also of the
Kashmir in such
The film brings to light the political reality
breathtaking landscapeTareef karu kya uski
films was largely
of Kashmir and the fact that the landscape
jisne tumhe banaya (Do I praise you or the one
on the basis of the
can no longer be seen in terms of scenic beauty
who created you?)
landscape as scenic,
merely but implies the imposition of structures
So, it may be said that the representation of
uninterrupted.
of stateist surveillance. Images of uniformed
Kashmir in such films was largely on the basis of
Stock characters
armed personnel, tanks and a generally grim
the landscape as scenic, uninterrupted. Stock
and archetypes
and sombre atmosphere dominates the urban
characters and archetypes included figures like
included figures
spaces in Srinagar as represented in the film. The
boatmen and tourist guides who are ingratiatingly
like boatmen and
film conveys a foreboding aura in the Valley and
eager to please the tourists from the plains. They
tourist guides who a sense of tensions simmering below the surface
are granted little agency, and should be seen as
are ingratiatingly
which threaten to rupture the veneer of calm
human extensions of a mute landscape that does
eager to please
achieved by a overwhelming military presence
not speak for itself in any way. The narratives are
the tourists from
that relegates the civilian to an anonymous and
mostly geared towards the movement towards
the plains
invisible entity.
the big city where the hero and heroine must
Roja places before us the menacing figure of the terrorist,
actualise the rest of their conjugal lives together. Hence, the
a much-feared and reviled figure who is the actualisation
picture postcard element is retained in the narrative logic
of an opaque hatred for the Indian state. This is the person
of Hindi cinema.
for whom many brave armymen have laid down their lives
Interestingly, the problematic acquisition of Kashmir by
for the sake of Bharat Mataa discourse of nationalism
the Indian state at the moment of independence is largely
that was being framed in the context of the rise of saffron
elided over, and the long history of the suppression of the
politics in the country. This discourse was also part of a
right to self-determination of the people, right from the
pressing need of the Indian state to legitimise its presence in
Mughal era, is not raised at all vis--vis the fetishisation of
Kashmir and the need to rationalise crackdowns and atrocibeauty. This forms the larger discourse of Indian nationalism
ties which were effected on the civilian population to hunt
and the framework of the secular politics of the Indian state.
down terror suspects.
It also indicates the homogenising of Kashmiri identity in
The image of Arvind Swamys characterhis hands tied,
terms of a largely Muslim identity, ignoring the significant
trying to salvage the burning tricolour, with the strains of
presence of Hindu Pandits and the largely Buddhist populaBharat Mata jaan se bhi pyara hai playing in the background
tion in Ladakh.
94
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS
(sung by Hariharan)became symbolic in the national

consciousness of a nationalism besieged by anti-India elements
which were provocatively, and burningly (literally) questioning the integrity of the Indian state. It has been argued by the
likes of Susie Tharu and Tejaswini Niranjana that Roja maps
the trajectory of the constitution of a Hindu male patriarchy
in the face of a Muslim Other, which must be projected as
threatening and then consistently defeated and nullified to
vindicate the puposes of the Indian state and its existence.
Roja also highlights the vindication of the Indian state
through structures of affect in terms of the appeal to the
threat to the family, that is, the state of a newly married
couple. In the light of the logic of this newly emergent
nuclear unit, which is separate from the structure of the
joint family and which enjoys a rare autonomy vis--vis
privacy and articulation outside the joint family, all theses
related to the right to self-determination of a people must
be cast aside, and even the states project of defeating the
Muslim Other must be subsumed within this overarching
logic. The chilling figure of the radical Muslim ideologue,
portrayed by Pankaj Kapur, indicates little attempt to understand the state of oppression a people have been subjected
to vis--vis the denial of their sovereignty. The interpretation of the radical Muslim ideologue and his cry for azaadi is
understood in terms of a blanket assumption related to the
futility of violence, without any attempt to foreground the
ideological debates surrounding the culture of dissent in
Kashmir. This silencing of the Muslim ideologue is to be
seen in the context of the larger silencing of Islam as an
alternative political discourse in the so-called secular
fabric of modern India.
Other potrayals of Kashmir since Roja include films like
Mission Kashmir, Fanaa and Yahaan, which may be said to
have evoked and reiterated the same paradigms of representation in terms of binaries such as peace/violence, state/citizen, terrorist/armyman, good/evil, Kashmiri/Indian, and
Muslim/Hindu, among others. The problematic lies in the
portrayal of Kashmir as a state of idyllic innocence corrupted
by its youth being misguided by anti-India elements, namely,
Pakistan. There has been a consistent denial of the agency of
the Indian state in the dynamics of the situation.
Haider (2014) by Vishal Bharadwaj marks a mainstream
attempt to subjectively render the narrative of Kashmir,
being partly based on Curfewed Night by Mirza Waheed.
Haider also draws from Hamlet and manages to capture, in
many ways, the exteriority of Kashmir as a psychological
state and syndrome. For instance, the scene where a man is
shown to have forgotten his address and appears confused
points to the long-standing effects of structures of surveillance.
The scenes related to the demonstrations of the mothers of
disappeared children and the half-widows point to the terrible losses suffered by the civilian population and the states
inability to account for these human tragedies. The notion of
chutzpah and the state of terror imposed by the Armed Forces
EPW
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
(Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 (AFSPA),

which created a state of exception in Kashmir also highlights
the condition of a people subjected to consistent surveillance.
Haider has been called problematic in terms of the attribution of the state in Kashmir to internal vested interests, as
embodied by characters placed by the police chief and Shahid Kapurs uncle (played by K K Menon), rather than recognising these elements as part of a larger framework. However, it foregrounds the situation in terms of collaborations
between various state and non-state agents who are perhaps
seeking to perpetuate the effects of militancy and the logic
of cracking down on the civilian population and civil society.
Prior to Haider, Onirs series of short films I Am included a
sensitive film on the plight of the Kashmiri Pandits.
While the above discussion is largely related to mainstream
Bollywood representations of Kashmir, mention must be made
of documentary filmmakers such as Sanjay Kak who made
Jashn-E-Azaadi (1996), which is a comprehensive analysis of
the contested notions of azaadi and of Kashmiri society and
the political and cultural manifestations of the effects of the
long-standing crisis in Kashmir. Kak presents footage of the
funeral processions of martyrs and interviews of a wide
cross-section of Kashmiri society, including the JKLF leader
Yasin Malik, psychiatrists, army generals, parents of the disappeared, tourists and various others, to offer a nuanced and
sensitive understanding of the intractable Kashmir issue.
Sreya Dutt can be contacted at sreya.tua@gmail.com.
NE
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Data on bank credit are given for a wide range of sectors and
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95
POSTSCRIPT
MUSINGS
Lingo Bingo
to glamorise, I am aware of the situation within the state, especially between tribals and non-tribals. But perhaps these
should not be seen not as problems but as mere complications
good and bad. In the case of Tripura, Bangla rules; it is still the
Travelling through Kolkata, the overwhelming
language of the marketplace as it is (or was) for much of the
feeling is that language, especially in the markets,
North East. Perhaps its Tripuras ties and proximity to Banglahas changedfor reasons of politics, the
desh have nurtured this. The problems arise when Bangla
economy and hegemony.
and the same might be said for Hindiis no longer confined
to the marketplace but follows the people home as well.
Avner Pariat
For the Khasi, this language shift (from Bangla to Hindi) is
a kind of inimical reminder about what partition did. Living at
am in Kolkata. At least I think this is Kolkata. I was told
the edge of the Shillong plateau, right next to the economically
that I would be journeying into the heartland of the
significant settlement of Shilot (Sylhet), the Wars (a Khasic
bhadralok and the East Bengalis of Shillong coloured my
group), in particular, were quick to take advantage of their
expectations and bias. Upon arrival, though, I feel as though
strategic positions and traded in areca, oranges and other
some things have been missed. Like the city, the information
produce with traders from the plains of Bangladesh. Later on,
seems hardly fresh. It is not current.
they added iron works and limestone to their list. The latter,
As I walked within the various bazaars and commercial
from factories established by the colonials, eventuestablishments, besides the madding drone and
The language of
ally made their way as cement to various parts of
unnecessary cacophony, there was something that
the market has
struck me. The language of the market has changed.
changed. Hindi has Bengal. Kolkata, the then capital of Imperial InHindi has replaced Bangla as the pre-eminent lanreplaced Bangla as dia, would not have materialised but for the calcium carbonate sourced from tribal lands.
guage, as it has replaced Assamese and Khasi. Hindi
the pre-eminent
Post-partition, because of border demarcations
might not be the language of the customersthey
language, as it has
and the wars, many Khasi states like Rambrai
might still (jingoistically, at times) prefer their
replaced Assamese
and Nongstoin lost many haats to East Pakistan
mother tongues and good bania customer care will
and Khasi
and hence revenue. This was perhaps the most
make it compulsory to engage with them along their
compelling reason why Wickliffe Sing Syiem did not want
lines but it is the language of the machinery, that system
his uncle to sign the Instrument of Accession on behalf of
beyond the customerthe manufacture, transport and taxaNongstoin state. It was a business decision in its own way.
tion before a product or service is delivered to a customer.
I think one must be careful in assuming total loss of agenHindi, once upon a time, shared the platform but has now
cy for the Khasis, though. Many elites of Khasi society still
nudged the others clear off it. The most obvious reason for this
continue in the limestone trade with Bangladesh but the
is that most of the production of goods is done in states and
haat as a community space has receded. The market (for
territories that are Hindi-speaking (in the NCR area) or are aclimestone, mostly) exists but participation in the market is
tively involved in peddling Hindi currency (like Maharashtra).
no longer as it once was. It is tighter now and closed off to
The economyso say Marxistsultimately influences everyall but the wealthy. It is no longer about small traders but
thing else. Language, it would seem, is just as susceptible.
big merchants. As far as I have
For the majority, the prima lingua
LAST LINES
seen, one need not even use
is unquestionably Hindi. That, in
Bangla in the transactions. A
itself, does not pose a problem were
phone call in Hindi to the operait not for the fact that there is a
tors on the other side of the borpolitical dimension and a hegemder is readily understood and
ony involved. The case of Kolkata
deals can be closed smoothly. In
reveals this. Imagine two Bengalis
this way, India oozes over interhaggling in Hindi over a dinner!
national borders.
In rural Tripura, I was fortunate
Today most, if not all, of
enough to see how people really
Meghalayas goods and services
negotiated numerous spaces in
come through Assam and yet we
the affairs of their lives. A Halam
dont need Assamese most of
man might have to meet a Reang
the time. It is a peculiar situation
butcher, when Kokborok is used;
that betrays a lopsided power
he might then need to meet a lawrelationship.
yer, when he has to dip into his
bag of linguistic skills to come up
Avner Pariat (abner.pariah@gmail.com) is a
with Bangla. While not wishing
Khasi writer and film-maker.
96
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
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ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
The Missing Periyar and the Curious Tamil Nationalism of

Kabali
Karthick Ram Manoharan (karthickjnu@gmail.com) received his PhD from the Department of
Government, University of Essex.
Rajinikanths Kabali was expected to be a pro-Dalit movie, but the universalist focus on Tamil unity
makes it a product of alternate Tamil nationalism instead. Kabalis radicalism could have been
strengthened by the inclusion of Periyar.
"Every commercial film is actually only the preview of that which it promises and will never
deliver." Theodor W Adorno
The success of Rajinikanth-starrer Kabali was expected. There was considerable hype and
corresponding expectations prior to the release of the movie. Apart from the usual excitement that
a Rajini movie generates in the Tamil public, Kabali was anticipated by intellectual circles as well
because of its critically acclaimed director, P Ranjith, of Madras (2014) fame.
This anticipation was based on an understanding that Kabali would be a pro-Dalit movie. But
contrary to such readings, Ranjiths product has a universalist focus to it, that of an alternate Tamil
nationalism.
The Directors Cut
Ranjiths first movie Attakathi (2012) was a light hearted romantic comedy located in a Chennai
suburb. Madras (2014), which won the director much fame, was based in the predominantly urban
working class area of North Chennai. In contrast to his first movie, Madras had strong political
overtones and dealt with the social and political ambitions of subaltern classes. In interviews,
Ranjith claimed that the movie is about Dalits in an urban scenario.
However, as far as Kabali is concerned, he has denied that it is a Dalit-oriented movie. It is about
the struggles of Malaysian Tamils against repression by the Malaysian state, the racism they face
from the relatively well-off Chinese, and also about internal divisions of caste. The stress
throughout the film is on Tamil unity. The Tamil nationalist subtext is too obvious to miss.
But then, the obvious is always ever elusive.
Kabalis Story
Kabali is the story of a Malaysian Tamil gangster who fights for the rights of the Tamils in that
country. Originally part of an anti-establishment labour movement led by a charismatic Tamil
leader, Tamilnesan, Kabali takes over the leadership of the movement after the leader is
assassinated by other Tamils working for a Chinese mobster.
Later, in the course of a gang war, Tamilnesans son betrays Kabali and gets killed by him. A series
of violent events separate Kabali from his family, and a series of violent events reunites them later
in the movie.
Though little is revealed about the criminal activities of Kabalis gangs, they are shown to be
running several social and welfare services for Malaysian Tamils.
Kabali also attacks other gangs who are involved in drug smuggling and the flesh trade. The
Manichean division between the moral gangster and the immoral gangster is evident. Supporting
the immoral gangster, a Chinese don, are Tamil collaborators who abuse Kabali for his low
origins. In the end, Kabali triumphs over them all, only to get assassinated by a Tamil from his own
side who has gone over to the Malaysian state.
Significance of the Absent Image
Images of significant leaders cross the screen space at various junctures to establish Kabalis antiestablishment tenorAmbedkar, Che Guevara, Malcolm X and Nelson Mandela. However, one
crucial leader who is curiously absent is Periyar (E V Ramaswamy). Incidentally, Periyar had toured
Malaysia and had conducted anti-caste meetings there and his 1929 visit is said to have been
instrumental in the formation of the Adi Dravidar Sangam and the Tamil Self-respect Association.
Perhaps his inclusion may have ruffled Rajinikanth, who is reputed to be a devout Hindu and has
also expressed sympathy for the Hindu right in the past. However, the omission also needs to be
seen in the wake of contemporary Tamil nationalist discourse in Tamil Nadu.
A debate which is being played out in a most unfortunate manner among activist circles in Tamil
Nadu is the question of Tamil Nationalism versus Periyarism, as if there is an inherent
irreconcilable antagonism between the two. The theoretical godfather of a dominant trend of Tamil
nationalism is Arignar Guna, incidentally an intellectual from the DalitParaiyar caste. The
followers of his theory believe in a pure Tamil ethnic entity, that is that certain castes are Tamil,
and others non-Tamil.
This variant of Tamil nationalism is fuelled by ethno-chauvinism, xenophobia, hyper-masculinity,
ressentiment towards those identified as impure Tamils, and implicit casteism (or explicit, in
cases of parties like the Vanniyar dominated Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK).
The accusation of these Tamil nationalists is that Periyarism is politically bankrupt, and in this
criticism, they share a common stage with parliamentary leftists, a few Dalit groups and
Brahminical Hindu nationalists. It is of concern that many of these Tamil nationalist groups are
trying to appropriate the political symbols of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) while
being totally ignorant of the radical emancipatory politics of the Tigers. While they are indeed
opposed to the Sri Lankan state, their position on caste, gender, class, and imperialism leaves much
to be desired.
The social composition of the Tamil nationalist groups by and large consists of lower-middle-class
and intermediate castes, and includes some representation from Dalit castes. These are aggregates
of individuals who feel left out by mainstream Dravidian parties, who have a nave consciousness of
Tamil pride as a resistance to oppression, but are not theoretically acute enough to form a radical
alternative to mainstream political parties.
Given that all left parties in the state have consistently failed to address the class and caste
question in a manner that takes into account the specificity of Tamil Nadu, those who seek an
alternative to the mainstream political parties find it in the rhetoric of the Tamil nationalist
speakers.
While contemporary Tamil nationalist leaders have attracted big crowds at events, the recent Tamil
Nadu state elections show that they have failed to win in a single constituency. Among these Tamil
nationalists are casteist parties like the PMK, which caters only to the Most Backward Class (MBC)
community of the Vanniyars, and to Dalit groups like the Viduthalai Siruthaigal Katchi. These
groups once showed promise but have now turned sectarian and are considerably watered down,
having no significance beyond their limited constituencies.
Such outfits capture considerable attention through flashy events and demonstrations. There is
little or no discussion on ideology or on geo-politics: a crucial question, considering the strategic
location of the Tamil population. What instead is often articulated is Tamil pride and offences
against it, glory of Tamil pasts, and vague promises of a utopian Tamil society.
This Tamil nationalism appears as an alternative to the mainstream, but in effect, does little to dent
it. Often, it ends up degenerating into a particularist caste politics.
A real radical politics, Slavoj Zizek argues, is determined not by what it is fighting against but by
what it is fighting for. What is needed, he says, is the absent third, a strong radical-emancipatory
opposition (Zizek 2014: 121). But the function of an effective ruling ideology lies precisely in the
suppression of that radical core that has the potential to generate such an opposition.
The conscious or unconscious omission of Periyar in a cultural product that seeks to address the
problems of all Tamils prevents the product from achieving its full potential. Kabalis Tamil
nationalism does appear a step in the right direction. But its radicalism could have been
strengthened by the inclusion of the informed insights of Periyar.
This criticism apart, it is of much political interest to consider how the Tamil nationalist subtext has
been handled by Ranjith in his movie.
Reading Kabali
Films that have an exclusive focus on Tamils living outside India are a rare find in Kollywood. While
there have been Tamil nationalistic films, rarely have they addressed the political concerns of
Tamils outside India, or even outside Tamil Nadu for that matter. As Velayutham rightly observes,
The population of the state of Tamil Nadu remains the single largest market for Tamil films.
For these audiences, films depicting diasporic Tamils appear to be less attractive. For them, Tamil
cinema is about Tamils for Tamils in India (Velayutham 2008: 178).
In this, Ranjith has to be lauded for making a film where the plot is centred in Malaysia and where
Tamil Nadu figures only momentarily (albeit significantly, for it is in Chennai that the reunification
of Kabalis family occurs). The Malaysian Tamil community, however, is not shown as a unified lot.
Kabali makes frequent references to how the divisions among the Tamils are their weaknesses.
Kabali emerges as the supreme leader who tries to bring about unity among all Tamils,
irrespective of their particularist caste differences, despite the hurdles posed by the other.
Kabalis self-definition here is important. He says he is a Tamil, from a subaltern background, and
laments that Tamils carry the baggage of caste wherever they go. Only the otherbe it the rival
Chinese don or his supposedly upper-caste Tamil stoogesabuse him for being of a lower social
rank.
It is only in the gaze of the other that Kabali is shown to be inferior. He identifies his own self
primarily as a Tamil, fighting for the rights of all Tamils, a believer in strength through unity. The
other sees a lower caste in Kabali; Kabali sees a Tamil in his self.
Here you have the classic Fanonist position: the racist other (in this case, the casteist) seeks to lock
the oppressed in a particularist, inferiorised identity, but the oppressed seeks his emancipation
through a genuine universalism that unsettles all identities. Partha Chatterjee writes that caste
politics has not found a ground on which it can be superseded by a new universal form of
community (1994: 208).
Kabali is precisely a struggle to find that community in a Tamil nationalism that would sublate
particularist caste identities in a universal Tamil body-politic.
Eelam Tamil nationalists could draw their own parallels from the movie: this was much like the
low caste LTTE leadership that claimed to represent all the Tamils who were being rejected by
liberal high caste Tamils. The latter preferred to collaborate with the Sri Lankan state rather than
accept a vanguard of, by and for the subaltern masses.

Universalism is most offensive and indeed most radical when it is proposed by subalterns who wish
to break particularist identities of their own selves and also of their erstwhile superiors. A Dalit
speaking the language of complete Tamil liberation can unsettle the mechanism of caste far more
than when his concern with the specific welfare of his own caste.
An Eelam Tamil diaspora activist in Canada told this author, This is our story. Of how we were illtreated by racist states here, our fights with established criminal gangs, our struggle for dignity.
Kabali is our guy. For several such consumers, Ranjiths Kabali delivers a universalist Tamil
nationalism instead of a particularist caste politics that some of his overenthusiastic supporters and
critics believed was promised.
References
Chatterjee, Partha (1994): Caste and Subaltern Consciousness, Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on
South Asian History and Society, Ranajit Guha (ed), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp
169209.
Velayutham, Selvaraj (ed) (2008): The Diaspora and the Global Circulation of Tamil Cinema, in
Tamil Cinema: The Cultural Politics of Indias Other Film Industry, Oxon: Routledge, pp 172188
Zizek, Slavoj (2014): Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism,
London: Allen Lane.
Tags:
Kabali
Rajinikanth
Periyar
Self-respect Association
Tamils in Malaysia
Kollywood
Dalits in Kollywood
Dalits in Indian films
Adi Dravidar Sangam
Racism in Malaysia
Caste in Cinema
Tamil Nationalism
LTTE
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Periyar and Tamil Nationalism

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