The Idealism-Realism Debate In International Relations:

Kissingers Diplomatic Resolution

John D. Thorpe, 2016

Recently Niall Ferguson has begun a major assessment of the diplomatic

career of Henry Kissinger. In his first volume of Kissinger (2015) Ferguson
claims to have exploded the myth of Kissinger as the arch realist of
American foreign policy. Ferguson puts this claim starkly when he asserts:
the young Kissinger was indeed an idealist. (Ferguson, K, 32) This claim
serves to breath more life into the ongoing debate between the proponents
of the so-called realist and the idealist perspectives in international
relations.
This essay will offer a perspective on this debate by using Henry
Kissingers conception of foreign policy as a case study. If any American is
widely supposed to embody the realist perspective it is Henry Kissinger
who was indirectly and directly involved in the formulation of American
foreign policy from the very beginning of the Cold War right through to the
end of the Vietnam War and into the present.
Importantly, this essay does not attempt to justify or validate Kissingers
conception of the relationship between idealism and realism in foreign
policy. Its purpose is, more simply, to outline his understanding of this
relationship as he played out his role as an intellectual, an advisor and a
diplomat in the realm of American international relations.
The essay will begin by citing the statements that Kissinger made that, in
Fergusons opinion, reveal Kissingers idealist conception of American
foreign policy. The essay will then delve into Kissingers book Diplomacy
(1994), and his American Foreign Policy (1974) in an effort to attempt to
understand the intricacies of Kissingers conception of the relationship
between idealist morality and realist strategy. It will turn out that Kissingers
conception of this relationship is highly nuanced and this will serve as a

justification for the suggestion that the effort to explicate a strenuous

dichotomy or polar opposition between the idealist and the realist
conceptions contributes very little to the analysis of the intricacies of
international relations. This outline will demonstrate that Kissinger
expressed four interrelated conceptions of the idealist-realist relationship:
that the moral foundations of foreign policy can be drawn from Kantian
philosophic idealism, that in international relations idealism and realism are
inextricably interwoven, and that the necessity of choice in the midst of
political ambiguity is moral.

First to Fergusons perspective on Kissinger. At the opening of Fergusons

extended analysis if Kissingers conception of American foreign policy, he
outlines what he understands as Kissingers Kantian idealist conception:
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the young Kissinger was an idealist in
the sense that emphasized the subordination of might to supranational
laws and courts. Rather, I am using the term idealism in the philosophical
sense that holds that, in Kissingers Kantian formulation, we can never
be certain whether all of our putative outer experience is not mere
imagining [because] the reality of external objects does not admit of strict
proof. Kissingers reading of Kant had a profound and enduring influence
on his own thought, not least because it made him skeptical of the various
materialist theories of capitalist superiority that U.S. social scientists
devised. (Ferguson, K, 28-29) Ferguson cites a speech given by Kissinger
to the United Nations: Two centuries ago, Kant predicted that perpetual
peace would come eventually either as the creation of mans moral
aspirations or as the consequence of physical necessity. What seemed
utopian then looms as tomorrows reality; soon there will be no alternative.
Our only choice is whether the world envisaged in the [United Nations]
charter will come about as the result of our vision or of a catastrophe
invited by our shortsightedness (sic). (Ferguson, K, 29) In other words,
Kissinger agreed with Kant that world peace was inevitable in the long run
because human destructiveness would eliminate our ability to continue
fighting, or because we would have the moral foresight to appreciate the

fruitlessness of such destructive propensities and would choose to end

such violence through cooperative, moral, international decisions.
From this idealist philosophy, Kissinger formulated an understanding of
the relationship between the individual and the world: Everybody is a
product of an age, a nation, and environment. But, beyond that, he
constitutes what is essentially unapproachable by analysis the creative
essence of history, the moral personality the inner conviction of choice.
Man can find the sanction of his actions only within himself. (Meaning of
History, 127f) The experience of freedom enables us to rise beyond the
suffering of the past and the frustrations of history. In this spirituality resides
humanitys essence, the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of
his life, the self-transcendence which gives peace. (Meaning of History,
348) (Ferguson, K, 241)
Ferguson, then, is asserting that Kissingers foundational idealist
perspective is rooted in Kantian epistemological and moral philosophy. It is
from this foundation that Kissinger elaborates his political conception of the
dynamics of international relations and of the role of the diplomat in that
world. Ferguson emphasizes Kissingers political idealist orientation, but at
the same time he reveals that Kissingers conception of international
relations was a much more nuanced integration of both idealist and realist
perspectives. A clear illustration of this is this passage that Ferguson offers
from Kissingers Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (NWFP): We must
maintain an equilibrium of power. We are certain to be confronted with
situations of extraordinary ambiguity. We should seek to forestall such
occurrences. But once they have occurred, we must find the will to act and
to run risks in a situation which permits only a choice among evils. While
we should never give up our principles we must also realize that we cannot
maintain our principles unless we survive. It would be comforting if we
could confine our actions to situations in which our moral legal and military
positions are completely in harmony and where legitimacy is most in accord
with the requirements of survival. But, as the strongest power in the world,
we will probably never again be afforded the simple moral choices on which
we could insist in our more secure past. To deal with problems of such

ambiguity presupposes above all a moral act: a willingness to run risks on

partial knowledge and for a less than perfect application of ones principles.
The insistence on absolutes . Is a prescription for inaction. (NWFP, 42729) (Ferguson, K, 372)
This passage reveals that Kissinger seems to be offering a conception of
the role of the United States in foreign relations that clearly integrates
idealist and realist perspectives: The United States must work from
principles but recognize that the bottom line is survival as a nation. This
survival is best achieved through an equilibrium of powers and this
equilibrium must be maintained in an international reality that is
characterized by fundamental ambiguity which allows only a choice
among evils rather than the attainment of absolutes. A complete harmony
between our moral, legal, and military positions or between legitimacy
and the necessities of survival is not possible. They must accept the
necessity of the will to act and to run risks. This necessity to choose in the
midst of ambiguity presupposes a moral act. Choosing among
uncertainties is, in itself, a moral act. It is important to understand that, for
Kissinger, in this passage, the morality or idealism lies not in the principles
which should guide American political decisions, but rather in the act of
choosing in the midst of ambiguity and uncertainty.
Ferguson argues that Kissinger rejected Realpolitik and what Kissinger
called pragmatic perspectives of international interest rooted in
calculations of relative power. Analyzing Bismarcks approach to foreign
relations, Kissinger accused him of trying to manipulate events as they
occurred. Bismarck declared the relativity of all beliefs; he translated them
into forces to be evaluated in terms of the power they could generate.
Bismarck assumed the perfect flexibility of international relationships
limited only by the requirements of national interest a calculus of
strength. He tried to keep all options open until the last moment. He tried
to ERODE the convictions which animate conduct. The insistence on men
as atoms, on societies as forces has always led to a tour de force
ERODING al self-restraint. a doctrine of power as a means may end up

by making power an end. (White Revolutionary, 909, 919; Steinberg,

Bismarck, 263) (Ferguson, K, 696-702)
Ferguson points out that, closer to home, Kissinger continually objected to
the pragmatism shown by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations. For Kissinger this meant that their foreign policy was
rooted in expedience and short-term reaction to events rather than in a
more proactive foreign policy rooted in a well-explicated vision or sense of
national purpose. In addition, he objected to the growth, during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations of huge foreign policy bureaucracies
which reduced individual leadership, reinforced short-term, manipulative
policies and action and generated their own in-house conflicts completely
detached from the realities international events. (Ferguson, K, 728-29) In
his American Foreign Policy, (AFP) (1974) Kissinger outlines his critique of
the tendency of the American elite to opt for bureaucratic-pragmatism in
its foreign policy. Its approach to policy is ad hoc, problems are
segmented into constituent elements, each of which his dealt with by
experts. technical issues enjoy more careful attention than political
ones. Things are done because one knows how to do them and not
because one ought to do them. law and business furnish the core of
the leadership. issues are dealt with only as the pressure of events
imposes the need for resolving them. This explains in part the peculiar
alternation of rigidity and spasms of flexibility in American diplomacy. There
is great reluctance to develop a negotiating position or a statement of
objectives. In short, the American leadership groups show high
competence in dealing with technical issues, and much less virtuosity in
mastering a historical process. (AFP, 1974, 29-34) Kissinger cites the
examples of the Suez, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.
For Kissinger, stability on the international stage is essential. This can be
obtained, he argues in A World Restored, (WR) only from a generally
accepted legitimacy [which] implies the acceptance of the framework of
the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no
state is so dissatisfied that it expresses its dissatisfaction in a
revolutionary foreign policy (WR, KL 102-19). (Ferguson, K, 304) If a

society legitimizes itself by a principle which claims both universality and

exclusiveness, if its concept of justice does not include the existence of
different principles of legitimacy, relations between it and other societies will
come to be based on force (WR, KL, 6633-53). (Ferguson, K, 310) Unless
we are able to make the concepts of freedom and respect for human
dignity meaningful to the new nations, the much-vaunted economic
competition between us and Communism in the uncommitted areas will be
without meaning (NFC 311, 318, 328). (Ferguson, K, 453)
As an aside, it is very interesting that, in these passages, Kissinger sounds
very much like John Rawls who, it should be remembered, was teaching at
Harvard at the same time as Kissinger was active at that university. Given
the similarity of the conceptual language that is used by them, and given
that they both were involved in the domain of international relations theory,
it would be very informative to know whether there was any interaction or
influence between these two members of the international relations
intellectual community.
The same integration of idealist and realist perspectives is revealed when
Ferguson refers to Kissingers view on Vietnam, expressed in an interview
with Edward R. Morrow, arguing for the moral legitimacy of the elimination
of a cancerous growth and preserving law, order and justice. We need a
deeper moral purpose and a willingness to run risks. Values, propositions,
concepts supporting policy and supporting mechanisms and tools. Foreign
policy is not an end in itself . We must make policy not be negotiators.
(Ferguson, K, 473-74)
An additional intriguing aspect of Kissingers international relations
perspective is offered by Ferguson when he cites Kissingers admiration for
a system of global or transnational governance. Isolated problems or
states no longer exist. While modern technology has created a community
of peoples, political concepts and tools are still imprisoned in the nation
states. The triumph of national self-determination has come at the
precise moment in world history when the nation state can no longer exist
by itself. What is needed is a worldwide system of security and growth;

a permanent body at the highest level of NATO charged with the

responsibility of developing common negotiating positions and a common
policy for the Wests future. We should not be embarrassed to affirm our
dedication to the goal of making democracy the wave of the future. By
demonstrating to the world a faith which is valid for the realization of human
values everywhere. By measuring its worth in spiritual and not in material
terms. (Draft Foreign Policy Statement, Aug. 18, 1964) (Ferguson, K, 62122) We cannot act as the worlds policeman. We must carefully measure
and allocate our own resources according to well-defined priorities. We
must not find ourselves with a commitment looking for a justification. We
must assure the widest possible international cooperation through the
United Nations. Unilateral U.S. intervention should only be a last resort and
only in response to overwhelming danger. (Ferguson, K, 819) The age of
the superpower is drawing to an end. [There is a] problem of political
legitimacy in regions containing two-thirds of the worlds population. All
modern states [face] problems of bureaucratization, pollution,
environmental control, urban growth that know no national
considerations. (Ferguson, K, 836-37)
Kissingers conception of modern global interrelations appears as early as
his American Foreign Policy (1974). The age of the superpowers in now
drawing to an end. Military bipolarity has not only failed to prevent, it has
actually encouraged political multipolarity. The new nations feel protected
by the rivalry of the superpowers, and their nationalism leads to ever bolder
assertions of self-will. This political multipolarity does not necessarily
guarantee stability. Nationalism may succeed in curbing the pre-eminence
of the superpowers; it remains to be seen whether it can supply an
integrating concept more successfully in this century than in the last. The
greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed
concept of order. In its a absence, the awesome available power is
unrestrained by any consensus as to legitimacy. A new concept of
international order is essential. This problem is particularly serious for the
United States. A new international order is inconceivable without a
significant American contribution. Political multipolarity makes it impossible
to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the

creativity of a pluralistic world. (Kissinger, AFP, 56-58) Again, it is

interesting to find Kissinger using language that is very similar to his fellow
Harvard political theorist John Rawls.
Ferguson therefore understands Kissinger to be an idealist who is suffused
with a gritty sense of the contingency and ambiguity that constitutes the
human experience of real time and space. Kissinger was a Kantian
idealist, not a Wilsonian idealist. To the Wilsonian argument that the United
States should confine our actions to situations in which our moral, legal
and military positions are completely in harmony, Kissinger had a
consistent reply that such harmony was not possible in the international
political world in which ambiguity reigns: To deal with problems of such
ambiguity presupposes above all a moral act: a willingness to run risks
for a less than perfect application of ones principles. The naive insistence
on absolutes, so characteristic of the liberal tradition in American foreign
policy, was a prescription for inaction. the insistence on pure morality is
in itself the most immoral of postures. Yet Kissinger was even more wary of
the realists or the pragmatists: those who would quietly surrender Cuba,
East Berlin, Laos, and South Vietnam to Communist control rather than risk
a confrontation with Moscow or Beijing. Kissinger was never a
Machiavellian. (Ferguson, K, 870) The key point for Kissinger was the
uncertainty that must inevitably surround all strategic choices. For that
reason, it was the philosophical assumptions one makes about the nature
of reality, the nature of historical trends that one is facing [that were] the
determining features in the practice of foreign policy. (Ferguson, K, 871-72)
What is most interesting in Kissingers perspective is his assertion that,
even though we should not give in to delusions of perfect harmony in a
reality shot through and through with ambiguity, we should also recognize
that To deal with problems of such ambiguity presupposes above all a
moral act. Our moral idealism is authentic and legitimate because it
emerges out of our appreciation of the ambiguity of our reality. We are
moral because the ambiguity inherent in reality demands such morality.
This is Kissingers integration of idealism and realism in international
relations.

Yet, Ferguson also argues that Kissinger reverted to realism in his

approach to the problem of Vietnam, and yet, Ferguson still asserts
Kissingers conception of an intricate synthesis or integration between
idealism and realism. As Kissinger sought strategic combinations to unlock
the gate that trapped the United States in Vietnam, he found himself
thinking in increasingly Bismarckian terms. There is no single moment that
one can point to and say: that was when the idealist became a realist.
Rather, as John Gaddis suggested it may be better to regard idealism
and realism not as the biographical equivalent of positive and negative
electrical charges either one or the other but rather as the opposite
ends of a spectrum along which we act as circumstances require.
(Ferguson, K, 873-74, my italics) He had learned that the selfunderstanding of actors on the world stage is historically derived. He had
learned that the mental habits of pragmatism and materialism - of taking
the world as one finds it, and basing all decisions on the data could lead
at best to dirty deals, at worst to paralysis. Better by far to acknowledge the
problem of conjecture and to accept that, if I seems historically available,
then bold pre-emption is morally preferable to inert procrastination, even if
the political payoffs are skewed in favor of the latter. (Ferguson, K, 876)
Fergusons reference to Gaddis is very important for an understanding of
the whole idealist-realist theoretical dichotomy in political and international
relations theory. We are not served well when we cast an irrevocable
dualism between idealism and realism in such theoretical domains. Both
theory and the reality which it is used to explicate are far too intricate and
complex, too ambiguous, to be categorized in this way. Gaddis, through
Ferguson, offers the idea of understanding this idealist-realist relationship
as a spectrum along which we act as circumstances require. Kissinger, as
Ferguson has shown us, offers a more nuanced perspective when he
encourages us to conceive of these two perspectives as formatively
integrated in each and every aspect of our interpretations and choices in
politics and international relations a constantly moving, interacting
intricacy of experience and choice.

Now we can turn to Kissingers book Diplomacy (D) (1994) in order to glean
additional insights into his understanding of the intricate interrelationship of
idealist and realist perspectives. Kissinger talks about Trumans approach
to the Soviet Unions expansionism. Even though Truman took a get
tough stance, he did so within the Wilsonian mold. Like Roosevelt,
Truman rejected the balance of power, disdained justifying American
actions in terms of security, and sought to attach them to general
principles applicable to all mankind and in keeping with the new United
Nations Charter. Truman perceived the emerging struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union as a contest between good and evil,
not as having to do with spheres of political influence. (Kissinger, D, 447)
Thus, for Kissinger, the foundation of Trumans tough realist foreign policy
was Wilsonian idealism as it was reflected in the Charter of the United
Nations.
For Kissinger Kennans Long Telegram is another expression of the mix of
idealist and realist conceptions. It provided the philosophical and
conceptual framework for interpreting Stalins foreign policy and the
impetus for the American conception of the Cold War, which Kissinger
regards as an idealist conception. (Kissinger, D, 447) For Kennan the
source of the Soviets expansionist policy was the communist ideology itself
which controlled Stalins approach to the world. Kissinger quotes Kennan:
Stalin regarded the Western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile; his
hostility to the West was inherent in the Soviet Unions perception of the
outside world. The communists were instinctively afraid of the outside
world. Dictatorship was the only government that they understood. They
sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. This was
the inheritance from a long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers
who have relentlessly forced [their] country on to ever new heights of
military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally
weak regimes. (Kissinger, D, 448)
Kissinger argues that Kennans analysis led to an American perspective
that was expressed by H. Freeman Mathews. The Soviets must be

encouraged to understand that its expansionism would lead only to its own
destruction. For Kissinger this idealist conception was closely integrated
with a strategic approach that was grounded in realism. The Americans
must counter this expansionism with diplomacy and military might. It should
use the Charter of the United Nations as its justification for this military
opposition to expansion. Kissinger says that Clark Clifford agreed with this,
and expanded it to proclaim a global American security mission embracing
all democratic countries. (Kissinger, D, 449-50) For Kissinger, then, this
American moral idealism, integrated with a thoroughgoing military strategic
realism, was meant to guide its foreign policy throughout the Cold War
period.
Kissinger argues that the Kennan, Mathews, Clifford perspective was an
expression of a desire to transform the enemy rather than to destroy it.
Therefore the goal of American policy was not so much to restore the
balance of power as to transform Soviet society. A significant Soviet change
of heart, and probably an new set of soviet leaders, was required before an
overall Soviet-American agreement would be possible. (Kissinger, D, 45051) The conclusion was that it was pointless to negotiate with the Soviet
Union. After a Soviet change of heart, a settlement would become nearly
automatic. (Kissinger, D, 451) This integration of the ideal and the realistic
marked for Kissinger the essence of the early American Cold War policy.
America now had the conceptual framework to justify practical resistance to
Soviet expansionism. (Kissinger, D, 451-451)
In order to justify American aid to Greece and Turkey against the Soviets,
Truman needed an American statement of policy with regard to the Soviets.
Dean Acheson provided this policy statement. The United States should
take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression; it
should protect freedom itself. (Kissinger, D, 452) This was a global
struggle between democracy and dictatorship which became the heart of
the Truman Doctrine. (Kissinger, D, 452) It was expressed in Wilsonian
terms of a struggle between two ways of life. In the words of Wilson: one
was the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions,
representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty,

freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The
second is based upon a will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio,
fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. The United
States was acting on behalf of democracy and the world community
guided by the United Nations Charter. (Kissinger, D, 452)
The Truman Doctrine marked a watershed because, once America had
thrown down the moral gauntlet, the kind of Realpolitik Stalin understood
best would be forever at an end, and bargaining over reciprocal
concessions would be out of the question. Henceforth, the conflict could
only be settled by a change in Soviet purposes, by the collapse of the
Soviet system, or both. (Kissinger, D, 452-53) Thus, for Kissinger, even
though Stalins style of Realpolitik was at an end, American policy toward
the Soviets was an integration of both idealism and realism, but a realism
that was not the ruthless Realpolitik of bargaining over reciprocal
concessions, but rather the realism of strategic military containment. Of
course, history shows us that the Truman Doctrine of the rejection of
reciprocal bargaining was abandoned in practice. Bargaining, in fact, did
occur, for example in Kennedys secret deal regarding the missiles in
Turkey in exchange for Khrushchevs removal of the missiles from Cuba,
and as a result, preserved the tense peace. Again, the line between the
idealism and the realism is hard to locate precisely.
For Kissinger the Marshall Plan was another illustration of the idealistrealist synthesis. Once the challenge had been defined as the very future
of democracy, America could not wait until a civil war occurred [within
nations that had been infiltrated by communist elements, as it had in
Greece; it was in the [American] national character to attempt the cure.
(Kissinger, D, 453) This cure took the form of the Marshall Plan, which
committed America to the task of eradicating the social and economic
conditions that tempted aggression [and] which was open even to
governments in the Soviet orbit. (Kissinger, D, 453) In Kissingers analysis,
America had opted for direct aid for European recovery and to impede the
Communist Party and its front organizations which seek to perpetuate

human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise.

(Kissinger, D, 453) Only a country as idealistic as the United States
could have advanced a plan for global economic recovery based solely on
its own resources. The program would be directed not against any
country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.
Just as when the Atlantic charter had been proclaimed, a global crusade
against hunger and despair was found to be more persuasive to Americans
than appeals to immediate self-interest or the balance of power. (Kissinger,
D, 453-54) This Plan would, for over a generation, serve as the bible of the
containment policy. This policy was encapsulated by George Kennans
article in Foreign Affairs of July 1947, The Sources of Soviet Conduct. For
Kissinger, Kennan raised the Soviet challenge to the level of philosophy of
history. (Kissinger, D, 454) Soviet intransigence was now the core of
American policy and justified Americas program of active containment.
Throughout subsequent crises, the American political objective was
deemed to be the preservation of the status quo, with the overall effort
producing communisms final collapse only after a protracted series of
ostensibly inconclusive conflicts. It was surely the ultimate expression of
Americas national optimism and unimpaired sense of self-confidence that
as sophisticated an observer as George Kennan could have assigned his
society a role so global, so stern, and, at the same time, so reactive.
(Kissinger, D, 455) Another manifestation of this political policy was NATO.
Kissinger is clearly recognizing that the United States was now embarking
upon a foreign policy which was self-consciously global in scope. Its
struggle to contain the Soviet Unions proclaimed global expansionism
demanded a global conception that, in the past, was regarded as radical
and unnecessary. This global conception of the role of the United States
has expanded exponentially from the beginning of the Cold War until the
present, even while the global expansionism of the Soviet Union has
collapsed.
This idealist-realist synthesis, however, came with a cost. Americas foreign
policy vision, says Kissinger, was fraught with contradictions. One of the
outstanding features of these noble sentiments was their peculiar
ambivalence. They rallied America to a global mission but made the task so

complex that America would nearly tear itself apart trying to fulfill it.
(Kissinger, D, 456) The result was a confrontation between two military
alliances, and two spheres of influence along the entire length of the
dividing line in Central Europe. (Kissinger, D, 457) This spheres of
influence view was, however, not the public interpretation of this policy in
America. Wilsonianism was too powerful to permit America to call any
arrangement protecting the territorial status quo in Europe an alliance.
(Kissinger, D, 457) The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that
this was not balance of power strategy. The NATO arrangement was,
instead, a balance of principle; it was designed for collective security, an
alliance against war itself. The Atlantic Alliance possessed a claim to
moral universality. For Dean Acheson it was advanced international
cooperation to maintain the peace, to advance human rights, to raise
standards of living, and to promote respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples. (Kissinger, D, 460)
For Kissinger, the European balance of power was being resurrected in
uniquely American rhetoric. American leadership of the Alliance guaranteed
that the new international order would be justified in moral, and
occasionally even messianic, terms. Americas leaders made exertions and
sacrifices unprecedented in peacetime coalitions on behalf of appeals to
fundamental values and comprehensive solutions, instead of the
calculations of national security and equilibrium that had characterized
European diplomacy. (Kissinger, D, 461)
In Kissingers opinion, this stance was sincere. No one acquainted with the
authors of the containment policy could doubt their sincerity. Nor could
America have sustained four decades of grueling exertion on behalf of a
policy which did not reflect its deepest values and ideals. (Kissinger, D,
461-62) Never before had a Great Power expressed objectives quite so
demanding of its own resources without any expectation of reciprocity other
than the dissemination of its national values. and these would be achieved
through global reform, not global conquest, the usual path of crusaders.
(Kissinger, D, 463) Kissingers claim to the sincerity of this American
idealist foreign policy can, of course, be disputed, however, such an

investigation is not the purpose of this essay which is, merely, to outline
Kissingers conception of the interrelation of idealist and realist conceptions
of American foreign policy.
The generation which had built the New Deal and won the Second World
War had enormous faith in itself and in the vastness of the American
enterprise. Only a society with enormous confidence in its achievements
and in its future could have mustered the dedication and the resources to
strive for a world order in which defeated enemies would be conciliated,
stricken allies restored, and adversaries converted. (Kissinger, D, 470)
This position overcame the opposition of Churchill, who wanted a
negotiated settlement with Russia while the Americans held the advantage,
and Lippmann, who thought that containment was too reactive and would
involve America in endless wars at points of the Soviets choosing, Wallace,
who wanted to ignore the Soviets and turn national attention inward to its
own needed reforms, and the Dulleses, who accepted containment but
wanted a far more proactive and aggressive, if covert, and realist,
resistance to Soviet attempts at expansion.
Kissinger argues that in time, however, as America became involved in
distant and inconclusive and ambiguous wars of questionable significance
to its interests, this optimism began to fade and controversy accelerated.
Containment was an extraordinary theory at once hard-headed and
idealistic, profound in its assessment of Soviet motivations yet curiously
abstract in its prescriptions, thoroughly American in its utopianism, it
assumed that the collapse of a totalitarian adversary could be achieved in
an essentially benign way. With all of these qualifications, containment was
a doctrine that saw America through more than four decades of
constructions struggle, and ultimately, triumph. The victim of its ambiguities
turned out to be the American conscience. Tormenting itself in its
traditional quest for more perfection, America would emerge, after more
than a generation of struggle, lacerated by its exertions and controversies,
yet having achieved almost everything it had set out to do. (Kissinger, D,
471-72) Thus, for Kissinger, idealism, to be effective, must be carefully
crafted such that it is not allowed to wander over into an abstract and

utopian prescription in pursuit of some absolute or perfectionism. It must be

formulated with an understanding of the political, economic and social
realities within which its moral principles must work. Again, it must be an
integration of the ideal and the real.
For Kissinger, the end of the Cold War was brought about by two major
factors: one was the military, economic and social collapse of the Soviet
Union, and the other was the foreign policy of the Reagan administration.
If Reagans approach to the ideological conflict was a simplified version of
Wilsonianism, his concept of the resolution of that struggle was equally
rooted in American utopianism. He was convinced that communist
intransigence was based more on ignorance than on congenital ill will,
more on misunderstanding than on purposeful hostility. Hence, in Reagans
view, the conflict was likely to end with the conversion of the adversary.
(Kissinger, D, 769) Reagan pursued both realist geopolitical pressure and
moral ideological pressure. He began a program of rearmament, and he
allowed military programs which countered communist influences. The
ideological pressure was the issue of human rights, and the call for
democratic process. Reagan took Wilsonianism to its ultimate conclusion.
America would not wait passively for free institutions to evolve, nor would it
confine itself to resisting direct threats to its security. Instead, it would
actively promote democracy. (Kissinger, D, 773) The high-flying Wilsonian
language in support of freedom and democracy globally was leavened by
an almost Machiavellian realism. (Kissinger, D, 774) America offered aid to
any group that opposed communist expansion. The results helped to
speed the collapse of communism but left America face-to-face with the
tormenting question it has tried to avoid through most of its history ...: what
ends justify which means?( Kissinger, D, 775)
Reagan had instinctively sandwiched tough Cold War geostrategic policies
between an ideological crusade and a utopian evocation of peace that
appealed simultaneously to the two major strands of American thought on
international affairs the missionary and the isolationist, the theological
and the psychiatric. (Kissinger, D, 784) It even appealed to the leader of
the Soviet Union: When Gorbachev replaced the concept of the class

struggle with the Wilsonian theme of global interdependence, he was

defining a world of compatible interests and underlying harmony a
complete reversal of established Leninist orthodoxy and historical
Marxism. (Kissinger, D, 789)
Kissinger believes that the American idealist-realist synthesis was
successful. The ending of the Cold War was much as George Kennan
had foreseen in 1947. When, under the pressure of the cumulative Western
response that culminated in the Reagan years, the Party Congress
changed the official doctrine from coexistence to interdependence, the
moral basis of domestic repression disappeared. Then it became evident
that the Soviet Union would turn overnight from one of the strongest
to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies. For
Kissinger, America had protected the global balance of power and helped
to rebuild democratic societies even though it did not perceive its role in
terms of the balance of power [and this] served to bring about
unprecedented dedication and creativity. (Kissinger, D, 801)
For Kissinger, the post-Cold War era was, again, a mixture of both an
idealist and realist foreign policy even if this mixture was inadvertent and
not the result of a coherently rationalized foreign policy vision. It included
universal maxims, diplomatic flexibility and ideological militancy, even
to the point of abiding contradictions. The combination of ideological
militancy to rally the American public and diplomatic flexibility was
exactly what was needed in the period of Soviet weakness and emerging
self-doubt. The Cold War had been almost made to order to American
preconceptions. There had been a dominant ideological challenge
rendering universal maxims, however oversimplified, applicable to most of
the worlds problems. And there had been a clear and present military
threat, and its source had been unambiguous. Even then. Americas
travails from Suez to Vietnam - resulted from its application of universal
principles to specific cases which proved inhospitable to them. (Kissinger,
D, 802)

Kissinger believes that these inhospitable contradictions remain in the

present and will be carried into the future. In the post-Cold War world, the
United States is the only remaining superpower with the capacity to
intervene in every part of the globe. Yet power has become more diffuse
and the issues to which military forces is relevant have diminished. The
absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to
pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national
interest. Order will have to emerge much as it did in past centuries from a
reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests. (Kissinger, D,
805) The concept of raison dtat has always been repugnant to
Americans. They have practiced it, but Americans have never been
comfortable acknowledging openly their own selfish interests. American
leaders always claimed to be struggling in the name of principle, not
interest. In the next century, American leaders will have to articulate for
their public a concept of the national interest and explain how that interest
is served by the maintenance of the balance of power. In the twentieth
century, America has tried twice to create a world order based almost
exclusively on its values, but Wilsonianism cannot be the sole basis for the
post-Cold War era. America would not be true to itself if it did not insist on
the universal applicability of the idea of liberty. That America should give
preference to democratic governments and be prepared to pay some
prince for its moral convictions is beyond dispute. If American exhortations
are to go beyond patriotic rhetoric, they must reflect a realistic
understanding of Americas reach. America must be careful not to multiply
moral commitments. The precise balance between the moral and the
strategic elements of American foreign policy cannot be prescribed in the
abstract. But the beginning of wisdom consists of recognizing that a
balance needs to be struck. (Kissinger, D, 810-12)
In this passage, Kissingers reference to the necessary balance in
American foreign policy into the future is not just the traditional balance of
power between major nations, but rather the balance that must be
established and maintained between idealism and realism, between a
commitment to the universal applicability of liberty or to a preference
to democratic government as well as to immediate national interest or

military power. Again, as throughout his analysis, Kissinger rejects the

concept of an elemental conflict between the two purities of idealism or
realism. Rather, he appeals to a careful integration between these two
necessities. This does not mean, however, that America should cease to
pursue a reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests.
This will remain a necessity even though, or even precisely because, the
United States is the only remaining superpower with the capacity to
intervene in every part of the globe. The problem, from Kissingers
perspective is that Americans have never been comfortable
acknowledging openly their own selfish interests. ... American leaders
always claimed to be struggling in the name of principle, not interest. In
Kissingers mind, then, American leaders in foreign policy must
continuously justify its continued need to pursue balance of power
policies.
It should do this, however, by explicating the principles and ideals which
legitimize these policies. But principle, however loft, must at some point be
related to practice. Interest is not necessarily amoral; moral consequences
can spring from interested acts. (Kissinger, AFP, 93) Kissinger offers two
guiding questions for American foreign policy: What is in our interest to
prevent? What should we seek to accomplish? (Kissinger, AFP, 92) A
sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history; to most
Americans, America has always stood for something other than its own
grandeur. But a clearer understanding of Americans interests and of the
requirements of equilibrium can give perspective to our idealism and lead
to humane and moderate objectives, especially in relation to political and
social change. (Kissinger, AFP, 94) The best and most prideful
expressions of American purposes in the world have been those in which
we acted in concert with others. To act consistently abroad we must be able
to generate coalitions of shared purposes. (Kissinger, AFP, 97)
Kissinger believes, however, that, In the twenty-first century, this process
has become even more difficult. Foreign policy must begin with some
definition of what constitutes a vital interest. The controversy surrounding
almost all American military actions in the post-Cold War period shows that

a wider consensus on where America should draw the line does not yet
exist.( Kissinger, D, 813) Through most of its history America knew no
foreign threat to its survival. When such a threat finally emerged during the
Cold War, [that threat] was utterly defeated. The American experience has
thus encouraged the belief that America, alone among the nations of the
world, is impervious and that it can prevail by the example of its virtues and
good works. In the post-Cold War world, such an attitude would turn
innocence into self-indulgence. At a time when America is able neither to
dominate the world nor to withdraw from it, when it finds itself both allpowerful and totally vulnerable, it must not abandon the ideals which have
accounted for its greatness. But neither must it jeopardize that greatness
by fostering illusions about the extent of its reach. For America, any
association with Realpolitik must take into account the core values of the
first society in history to have been explicitly created in the name of liberty.
Yet Americas survival and progress will depend as well on its ability to
make choices which reflect contemporary reality. In the past, American
foreign policy efforts were inspired by utopian visions of some terminal
point after which the underlying harmony of the world would simply reassert
itself. Henceforth, few such final outcomes are in prospect; the fulfillment of
Americans ideals will have to be sought in the patient accumulation of
partial successes. The Wilsonian goals of Americas past peace, stability,
progress, and freedom for mankind will have to be sought in a journey
that has no end. (Kissinger, D, 835-36)

To conclude then, from the above outline, it seems fair to say that Kissinger
expresses four interrelated conceptions of the idealist conception of
international relations:
The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy: The first is that the United States
has demonstrated a foreign policy that emerges out of principles that can
be understood as moral: it has espoused a strong belief in the legitimacy of
democratic government, the rule of law, the primacy of stability, respect for
social values and economic prosperity, peaceful relations with other
nations, the negotiated settlement of differences, respect for pluralism,

support for the United Nations and its Charter, support for global
governance and for global social and economic institutions, the reduction of
nuclear armaments, the protection of and support for nations which resisted
communism and colonialism and for modern developing nations. Kissinger
does not argue that American foreign policy has never strayed from such
idealist stances; but he argues that the United States was founded upon
and has largely held to an international stance that is characterized as
moral.
Choice Amidst Ambiguity is Moral: A second conception is that relations
between nations are moral because they necessitate choice in the midst of
the ineluctable and unavoidable reality of ambiguity, rapid change, constant
political, social and economic turmoil, and tremendous military danger. To
choose in the midst of this ambiguity is the essence of a moral stance.
Philosophic Idealism: Third, Kissingers conception of idealism and realism
is rooted in Kantian philosophy and epistemology. International relations
inescapably occur within the context of human experience. They are
constructions of human interpretation. The ideals and the realities of
international relations intrinsically have been, are, will continue to be
formulated from and embodied in our thoughts, emotions and actions. We
are ineluctably the creatures of lived-in time and space. This cannot be
otherwise.
The Inextricable Integration of Idealism-Realism: Fourth, Kissinger regards
idealism and realism as inextricably intertwined. They cannot be conceived
of as separate. International relations require both idealism as guiding
moral purpose and realism as the expression of that purpose. Foreign
policy that trumpets dominant moral claims leads to dogmatism and
authoritarianism; foreign policy that takes pride in total realism (Realpolitik),
pragmatism manifests mere expedience and inhumane efficiency. In this
regard, Kissinger expresses many ideals that echo those of John Rawls.

Kissingers understanding of international relations cannot be fully

appreciated unless these four realms of his thought are taken into
consideration.
In summary, this essay has drawn from Niall Fergusons work Kissinger
1923-1968: The Idealist, from Kissingers Diplomacy, and from his
American Foreign Policy in an effort to outline Kissingers conception of the
relationship between idealism and realism in realm of international
relations.. This effort leads to the conclusion that Kissinger formulates a
nuanced and intricate synthesis of both idealist and realist perspectives,
and that this intricacy argues against the effort to create any rigid
dichotomy between the idealist and the realist perspectives in the theory of
international relations. We end, then, with the insight offered by Ferguson
when he presents the view of John Gaddis on this issue: There is no
single moment that one can point to and say: that was when the idealist
became a realist. Rather, as John Gaddis suggested it may be better to
regard idealism and realism not as the biographical equivalent of positive
and negative electrical charges either one or the other but rather as the
opposite ends of a spectrum along which we act as circumstances require.
(Ferguson, K, 873-74, my italics)