SHERYL E.

PAQUIDAO
RELATIONS
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G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
versus
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
FACTS:
The respondent, Cipriano Orbecido III was married to Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States with their son Kristoffer in 1986 and later on he discovered that she
had been a naturalized American citizen.
In year 2000, the herein respondent learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley, who is now living with then at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
and there was no opposition filed. The court granted the petition on May 15, 2002 upon finding merit
therein, a subsequent motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but was denied on July 4,
2002.
The Office of the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for review to
assail the decision and resolution dated May 15 and July 4, 2002 respectively
The petitioner contended that (1) Article 26 is not applicable in the present case as it applies only to a
valid mixed marriages (2) the legal remedy would be a petition of annulment of marriage or legal
separation and (3) there is no law governing the respondents case and it is a matter of legislation and not
judicial determination.
On the other respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable in his case however he is
capacitated to remarry by operation as provided in our Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not Article 26 of the Family Code applies a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
subsequently acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried.
RULING
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
RATIONALE
The case at bar is not an ordinary petition for review, it involved a pure question of law involving Article 26
of the Family Code especially the second paragraph which provided that where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
In order to define its applicability the court looked into the legislative intent of the said provision. Records
show that the clear intent in this provision is to avoid discriminating Filipinos who were divorced by their

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alien-spouses and yet remained married to them.

The court ruled in this case, that the said provision should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, subsequently; one of
them becomes a naturalized foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. It would be applied as if the
other party was foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage therefore capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
The court stresses that interpretation of the law should not be limited to its exact and literal meaning if it
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent
It is noteworthy however that even if the interpretation of the court seems to support the case of the
respondent, the petition was still granted. It is because records of the case show that the respondent
lacks sufficient evidence to support his allegations that his wife is a naturalized American citizen, obtained
a valid divorce and remarried a foreigner. It has been an established rule that the one alleging a fact has
the burden to prove it and mere allegations are not evidences.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
versus
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
FACTS:
In a verified petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by herein respondent, Roridel O. Molina
against Reynaldo Molina on August 16, 1990, she sought for the nullification of her marriage on the
ground of the psychological incapacity of her husband. She alleged in the said petition the following:
1. That they were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila and have a son
named Andre O. Molina;
2. That a year after the marriage, Reynaldo had shown signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
3. That since Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila sometime on February 1986; she had been the
sole breadwinner of the family;
4. That they had a very intense quarrel sometime in October 1986 and since then their relationship have
been estranged;
5. That she resigned from her job on March 1987 and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
6. That a few weeks later Reynaldo left his family and abandoned them since then;
7. That Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served;

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8. that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start
Herein respondents evidence consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura
and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison,
a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
On the other hand, Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
The Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet granted respondents petition and declared the marriage
void on May 14, 1991 and the decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals in denying the
appeal of herein petitioner, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
The petitioner contended the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
ISSUE
Whether or not the lower and appellate court made an erroneous/incorrect interpretation and application
of the phrase psychological incapacity
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
RATIONALE
The court declared that the marriage between herein respondent and her husband subsists and remains
valid as psychological incapacity because it appears to court that the psychological defect herein
respondent alleges is more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and not incapacity. It is a (m)ere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (nor physical) illness.
Psychological incapacity must characterized by its gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. As
marriage is defined as a permanent union between a man and woman it should not be declared void just
by merely showing that the spouses could no longer get along with each other. It should be proven that
there is an actual illness existing at the time of marriage and it is incurable.
Also in this case at bar, the Supreme Court with the help of two amici curiae laid down the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
It may be observed from these guidelines, that in order for psychological incapacity be used as a ground
for nullifying a marriage it should not merely be alleged but should meet the following:
1. its burden of proof to show the existence of such belongs to the plaintiff
2. its root cause should be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts and clearly explained in the decision
3. it must be proven to be existing at the time of celebration of marriage

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4. it must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable

5. it must grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage which are embraced by Article 68 -71, as well as Article 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
6. interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
7. the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney of fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state