CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISION CASES

LUEGO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G. R. NO. L-69137)

FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983.
The appointment was described as permanent but the Civil Service
Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the
Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better
qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and
accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of
petitioners position. The private respondent was so appointed on
28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The
petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as
well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order and the
private respondents title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of
the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light
of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service
Commissions resolution is set aside.

MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil
Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil Mills,
respondents. ALEX
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport
Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage
or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with
Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing
Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment
Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk
through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF
companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
as administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either
party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month
advance notice was given to the other party. However, in August
1996, or prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies
with their new President, respondent Oscar A. Torralba, terminated
the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF
companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag,
operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation. miso
On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice
President of ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba.
The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices
allegedly committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract; (b) bad faith falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT
Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to disqualify

MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e)

double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f)
engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp.
which is not the owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived
and whose paid-up capital is only P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing
in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to
Cocochem.[1]
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda,
Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A.
Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned
alleged irregularities and corrupt practices. spped
On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint
based on its finding that
The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which
should have been filed in the regular court. This Office has no
jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of
the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities
involved are private corporations (over) which this Office has no
jurisdiction.[2]
On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint
was denied. The Ombudsman was unswayed in his finding that the
present controversy involved breach of contract as he also took into
account the circumstance that petitioner had already filed a
collection case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila-Br. 15,
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-83354. Moreover, the Ombudsman
found that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on 31 March
1998 was beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days from
notice of the assailed resolution on 19 March 1998.[3] miso
Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public
respondent in dismissing his complaint. He submits that inasmuch as
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG[4]
and Republic v. Sandiganbayan[5] have declared that the coconut
levy funds are public funds then, conformably with Quimpo v.
Tanodbayan,[6] corporations formed and organized from those
funds or whose controlling stocks are from those funds should be
regarded as government owned and/or controlled corporations. As
in the present case, since the funding or controlling interest of the
companies being headed by private respondents was given or
owned by the CIIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate
Secretary,[7] it follows that they are government owned and/or
controlled corporations. Corollarily, petitioner asserts that
respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Sdaadsc
Petitioner alleges next that public respondent's conclusion that his
complaint refers to a breach of contract is whimsical, capricious and
irresponsible amounting to a total disregard of its main point, i. e.,
whether private respondents violated The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act when they entered into a contract with Southwest
Maritime Corporation which was grossly disadvantageous to the
government in general and to the CIIF in particular. Petitioner
admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have
relaxed its rules in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the
delay was just a matter of days and he, a layman not aware of
technicalities, personally filed the complaint. Rtcspped
Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly
organized and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their
stockholders are private individuals and entities. In addition, private
respondents contend that they are not public officers as defined
under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but are private
executives appointed by the Boards of Directors of the CIIF
companies. They asseverate that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a learned
counsel. They then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he

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had similarly filed a case for collection of a sum of money plus

damages before the trial court.

as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fiftyone (51) percent of its capital stock. Sclaw

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman

approved the recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss
the complaint because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient
basis for the criminal indictment of private respondents. spped

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF
companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF
owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT.[15]
Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes
this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled
corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and
UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.
Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT
and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike
PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF
companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations
not within the scope of its jurisdiction. Sclex

We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the

Ombudsman. COCOFED v. PCGG referred to in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan reviewed the history of the coconut levy funds. I
These funds actually have four (4) general classes: (a) the Coconut
Investment Fund created under R. A. No. 6260;[8] (b) the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 276;[9] (c) the
Coconut Industry Development Fund created under P. D. No.
582;[10] and, (d) the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund created
under P. D. No. 1841.[11]
The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in
1976. On 21 October of that year, P. D. No. 961[12] was
promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was amended by P. D. No.
1468[13] by inserting a new provision authorizing the use of the
balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the
acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the
purpose of engaging in the establishment and operation of
industries x x x commercial activities and other allied business
undertakings relating to coconut and other palm oil
indust(ries)."[14] From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of
stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were
purchased. miso
We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised
by the State's police and taxing powers such that the utilization and
proper management thereof were certainly the concern of the
Government. These funds have a public character and are clearly
affected with public interest.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL
was a government owned or controlled corporation the employees
of which fell within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for
purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We upheld the
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a
government-owned or controlled corporation, after it was acquired
by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled corporation,
PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its
private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in
fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to government
programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life
of the nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent
adjunct to perform essential government or government-related
functions, as the marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the latter in
selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and
maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply. Korte
But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of
his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or
controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the
definition of "government owned or controlled corporation"
contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned
by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The
definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable

With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the

other issues raised by petitioner.
A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping.
Executive Secretary v. Gordon[16] is instructive that forum shopping
consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent
that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action
herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is
different from the cause of action in the case pending before the
trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages. miso
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which
dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as well
as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

FRANCISCA S. BALUYOT, petitioner,

vs.
PAUL E. HOLGANZA and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(VISAYAS) represented by its Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
ARTURO C. MOJICA, Director VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, and
Graft Investigation Officer I ANNA MARIE P. MILITANTE,
respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, seeking the reversal
of the Orders dated August 21, 1998 and October 28, 1998 issued by
the Office of the Ombudsman, which denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration, respectively.1wphi1.nt
The facts are:
During a spot audit conducted on March 21, 1977 by a team of
auditors from the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
headquarters, a cash shortage of P154,350.13 was discovered in the
funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner
Francisca S. Baluyot, was held accountable for the shortage.
Thereafter, on January 8, 1998, private respondent Paul E. Holganza,
in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of the Bohol
chapter, filed an affidavit-complaint1 before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging petitioner of malversation under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was docketed as OMB-VISCRIM-98-0022. However, upon recommendation by respondent
Anna Marie P. Militante, Graft Investigation Officer I, an
administrative docket for dishonesty was also opened against
petitioner; hence, OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0063.2

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On February 6, 1998, public respondent issued an Order3 requiring

petitioner to file her counter-affidavit to the charges of malversation
and dishonesty within ten days from notice, with a warning that her
failure to comply would be construed as a waiver on her part to
refute the charges, and that the case would be resolved based on
the evidence on record. On March 14, 1998, petitioner filed her
counter-affidavit,4 raising principally the defense that public
respondent had no jurisdiction over the controversy. She argued
that the Ombudsman had authority only over government-owned or
controlled corporations, which the PNRC was not, or so she claimed.
On August 21, 1998, public respondent issued the first assailed
Order5 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. It further scheduled a
clarificatory hearing on the criminal aspect of the complaint and a
preliminary conference on its administrative aspect on September 2,
1998. Petitioner received the order on August 26, 1998 and she filed
a motion for reconsideration6 the next day.
On October 28, 1998, public respondent issued the second assailed
Order7 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
recourse.
We dismiss the petition.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a
private voluntary organization. The following circumstances, she
insists, are indicative of the private character of the organization: (1)
the PNRC does not receive any budgetary support from the
government, and that all money given to it by the latter and its
instrumentalities become private funds of the organization; (2)
funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments
come from yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and rentals
from its properties; and (3) it is not audited by the Commission on
Audit. Petitioner states that the PNRC falls under the International
Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-based organization, and that
the power to discipline employees accused of misconduct,
malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC Secretary General
by virtue of Section "G", Article IX of its by-laws.8 She threatens that
"to classify the PNRC as a government-owned or controlled
corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose its
neutrality, independence and impartiality . . . .9
Practically the same issue was addressed in Camporedondo v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.,10 where an almost
identical set of facts obtained. Petitioner therein was the
administrator of the Surigao del Norte chapter of the PNRC. An audit
conducted by a field auditor revealed a shortage in the chapter
funds in the sum of P109,000.00. When required to restitute the
amount of P135,927.78, petitioner therein instead applied for early
retirement, which was denied by the Secretary General of the PNRC.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and damages against PNRC before the National Labor Relations
Commission. In turn, PNRC moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, averring that PNRC was a government
corporation whose employees are embraced by civil service
regulation. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint, and the
Commission sustained his order. The petitioner assailed the
dismissal of his complaint via a petition for certiorari, contending
that the PNRC is a private organization and not a governmentowned or controlled corporation. In dismissing the petition, we
ruled thus:
Resolving the issue set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion,
we rule that the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government owned and controlled corporation, with an original
charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to
determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its

employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service

Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government
Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to
a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended to
vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment
of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all
importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its
disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund
raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw a year by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster
relief operation in addition to its existing lottery draws for blood
program.
Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter,
pursuant to Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", to wit:
Sec. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in ever
case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.11
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS SECRETARY

OF EDUCATION, G. R. NO. 95445, AUGUST 6, 1991
FACTS:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the
so-called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in
both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" the
teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention.
On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other
cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at
the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands. No response was
made by the respondent Secretary of Education, despite the
demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing protest mass
actions on September, 17,1990.
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular
school day. There is no question that the some 800 teachers who
joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day;
instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590, they converged
at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to
the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the right to strike.
2. Whether or not the Court should take cognizance of the case.
RULING:
1. No, the petitioners dont have the right to strike. this court had
already definitively ruled that employees in the public (civil) service,
unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike,
although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition
Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions
and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. The
court also found out that it was prima facie lawful and within his
statutory authority for the respondent Secretary of Education to

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take the actions complained of, to wit: issue a return-to-work order,

prefer administrative charges against, and place under preventive
suspension, those who failed to comply with said order, and dismiss
from the service those who failed to answer or controvert the
charges.
2. No, This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the
Supreme Court, especially when numerous parties desperately
situated as far as the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella
of a common plea, and generalization of what should be alleged
with particularity becomes unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious
remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the
contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see
those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty,
appeal to the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said
proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed
necessary because the respondent Secretary or those acting under
him or on his instructions were acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly
to the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there
would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting
corrective relief.
WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to
any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to
the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of. The
motions to withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition
rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM VS THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

85279, JULY 28, 1989
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and
order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is
whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have
the right to strike.
HELD:

No, the court resided on the intent on the framers of the

constitution that When we proposed this amendment providing for
self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to
strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about
organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike,
everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision
that the right to form associations or societies whose purpose is not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of
the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising
government functions, that could be done because the moment that
is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal
union.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be
any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs
and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As
now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to SelfOrganization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose,
"[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

BITONIO, JR. VS COA, G.R. NO. 147392, MARCH 12, 2004

FACTS:
Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., petitioner, was appointed Director
IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and
Employment. He was designated by Acting Secretary Jose S.
Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment to be the
DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine
Economic Zone Authority. Due to his designation, he receives per
diems from PEZA for every meeting he attended. On July 31, 1998,
COA, the respondent, disallowed the payment due to the principle
established in Civil Liberties case stating that Cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their
primary office and to receive compensation therefore is
unconstitutional.
On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration to the COA on the following grounds:
1.
The SC Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for
clarification filed by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling
in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their assistants. Officials
given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant
Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant
Secretary are not covered by the prohibition;
2.
Section 11 of RA No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the
movant to receive per diem. Said law was enacted in 1995, 4 years
after the Civil Liberties Union case became final. In expressly
authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to
have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition
as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.
The motion was denied by COA, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received
by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors
meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

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RULING:
YES. The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely
by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Since the Secretary is prohibited from receiving compensation for
his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise
applies to the petitioner who sat on behalf of the Secretary. We
cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the
Secretary of Labor in PEZA to have a better right than his principal.
The contention that RA 7916 as a legal basis has no merit since such
law was amended by RA 8748 where provisions in conflict with the
law, specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.

CAYETANO VS. MONSOD, 201 SCRA 210

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides
in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava,
stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in
or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In
the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in
Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The
former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had
the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the
bitter contest between the two came to a head when several

followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by

the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador,
are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed
were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation,
the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the
canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this
Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by
a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of
the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have
held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice
where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

CANISOCA VS. COMELEC, DEC. 5, 1997

FACTS:
RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates
for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections.
After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes[1] Lajara was
proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 15
May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare
Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged
widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes,
preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote
buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of
election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred that:
(a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of
voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate
registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their
stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually received;
(d) control data of the election returns was not filled up in some
precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking
metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of election
returns. But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the
ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of
failure of election.

5|JRCMENDOZA

Indeed, the grounds cited by Canicosa do not warrant a declaration

of failure of election. Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code, reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election
may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of those
enumerated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition should be heard first by a division of
COMELEC, and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for
reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution.
RULING:
No, the petition can be heard by the COMELEC en banc invoking
Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a
right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc:
Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the
Board of Canvassers. - (a) Where it is clearly shown before
proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation
or tallying or election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the
canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one
precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were
tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or
certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a
mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of
canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called
election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the
canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by
any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political
parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed x
x x x (h) The appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission
en banc.

We have already disposed of this issue in Castromayor v.

Commission on Elections [11] thus should be pinpointed out, in this
connection, that what is involved here is a simple problem of
arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the
election returns. In making the correction in computation, the MBC
will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC. Hence, any question pertaining to the
proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en
banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.

ARUELO, JR. VS. CA, 227 SCRA 311

Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from
receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition
(Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed
when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of
motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the
five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his
answer.
Issue:
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the fiveday period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional
Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of
Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not
applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly
mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars,
shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC.
Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all
actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable
by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto
cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution,
Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Canicosa alleged that he was credited with less votes than he

actually received. But he did not raise any objection before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers; instead, he went directly to the
COMELEC. He now claims, after the COMELEC en banc dismissed his
petition, that it was error on the part of COMELEC to rule on his
petition while sitting en banc.

6|JRCMENDOZA

NPC VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

3 consolidated petitions, with the common question: the
constitutionality of 11(b), of RA6646
Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in
the coming May 1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who claim that
their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed. (I will refer to these folks as Petitoners
(P))
Facts: Petitioners argument:

That 11(b), of RA6646 invades and violated the

constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression;

That the prohibition imposed by 11(b) amounts to

censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda
during the election pd. of 1992;

That the prohibition is in derogation of medias role,

function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues;

That 11(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,

and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and tv broadcasts, would
bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of info
concerning candidates and issues in the election, thereby curtailing
and limiting the right of voters to info and opinion.
Issue: WON 11(b) of RA 6646 has gone beyond the permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech & freedom of the
press
SC says: Nope. It has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods.
Ratio:
The assailed statute

The statutory text the P want to strike down as

unconstitutional is 11(b) of RA 6646, aka the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987
Section 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda-in
addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under
Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
(b) for any newspapers, radio
broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person
making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer, or personality who is candidate for any elective public
office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.

11(b) of RA 6646 should be taken together with Sections

90 & 92 of BP 881 aka Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. (for
the full text, see p. 7)
90 refers to the Comelec space- space in the
newspaper to be allocated equally and impartially to all the
candidates within the area of coverage, free of charge
92 refers to the Comelec time air time in radio and tv to
be allocated equally and impartially to all the candidates within the
area of coverage, free of charge.
Objective of the statute

Objective of 11(b)-to equalize, as far as practicable, the

situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the rich from
enjoying undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests.

It prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time

for campaign or other political purposes except to Comelec.

90&92 of the OEC on the other hand, require the

Comelec to procure Comelec space and Comelec time to be
allocated to all candidates for free.

No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance

of the objective sought to be secured by 11(b) of RA 6646 in
relation to 90&92 of the OEC.

The objective is of special importance and urgency in a

country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in
income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of the
society.

It is important to note, that the objective, is not only a

legitimate one, it has also been given constitutional status by the
terms of Art. IX(C)(4) of the 1987 Consti.

Art. IX-C, Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, and
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Flores vs. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of
canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on
the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and
thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of
R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private
respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one
vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in
place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the
latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the
challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes
cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial,
should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided
equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another
candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was
correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on
the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC,
based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a
protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. In
his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking
cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan
Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A.
No. 6679?
Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely
different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section
2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal or
Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive

7|JRCMENDOZA

appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted

section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not
to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it
provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in
a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional.
GARCES VS. CA 259 SCRA 99
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac,
Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace
respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was
transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office.
Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request
for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for
Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do
so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial
Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from
assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service
Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on
construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces
E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which Garces interpreted to
mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC
en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages
against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en
banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be
cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging
that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said
COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the
COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on
certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the
latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution
contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1)
that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or
matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those
involving the conduct of elections.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed

before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs
resolution that triggered this Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be
something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must
pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision,
rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an
appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative
duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy
involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial
administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a
court which the law vests with the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
*Petition denied
PHIL. AIRLINES VS. COA, 245 SCRA 39
Facts:
PAL is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, principally engaged in the air transport business,
both domestic and international. At the time of the filing of the
petition on February 8, 1990, majority of its shares of stock was
owned by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a
government corporation.
To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of
fuel, PAL adopted a system of bidding out its fuel requirements
under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL awarded to the lowest
bidder sixty percent (60%) of its fuel requirements and to the second
lowest bidder the remaining forty percent(40%), provided it
matched the price of the lowest bidder.
Petron, Caltex, Shell were usual bidders
COA told PAL to stop the bidding and only get from Petron
Based on DO 19 requiring GOCC to only get from Petron
PAL sought reconsideration, saying DO 19 should not include PAL
because:
Bidding ensured the best fuel price
Petron alone might not be sufficient for PALs fuel needs
COA denied. Told PAL to just negotiate with Petron. Hence,
petitioner.

CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date
of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not DO 19 should cover PAL
Decision:
SC ruled that:
DO 19 really included PAL (GSIS owns stocks)
HOWEVER, COA committed GADALEJ in not exempting PAL
The reasons that PAL gave were really persuasive. They had more
weight than the policy enunciated in DO 19. It was COAs duty to
exempt PAL because not exempting PAL would lead to unnecessary
spending the very evil sought to be prevented by the creation of
COA
Department Order 19 required all GOCCs to get their fuel from
Petron. In the case of PAL v. COA, COA ordered PAL to follow DO 19
The very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the COA the
irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures of the
government. Thus, it has the power and the duty to exempt certain

8|JRCMENDOZA

branches from any regulation if, obedience to it would lead to those

kinds of excessive expenditures.
Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL's shares of
stock were bidded out early this year, resulting in the acquisition by
PR Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% PAL's outstanding stocks.
PAL having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA..
Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become
moot and academic.
Had it not been for this supervening event, PAL would have obtained
the relief sought in the instant petition. For although COA was
correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a
government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused its
discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom.
The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations
in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties." The authority granted under this
constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive enough,
enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by
reference, without the necessity of repromulgation, already existing
rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage thereof to
agencies or instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction.
NATIONAL HOUSING CORP. VS. COA, 226 SCRA 55
Facts:
The Philippine Government forged an agreement on financial
cooperation with the Republic of Germany. The agreement involved
the Republic of the Philippines as Borrower and the National
Housing Authority (NHA) as Project Sponsor, and the Kreditanstalt
Fur Weidaraufbau (KWF) as the lender, for the Urban Housing
Dagat-Dagatan Project II.
However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the Urban
Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II was not completed as scheduled.
Thus an extension of the contract was made since the NHA did not
appear to have much choice. Several extensions were made which
triggered the difficulties experienced by NHA.
Issue:
WON the COA has authority to disallow a duly entered contract and
substitute its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of
the management or governing body of government entities

LUEGO VS. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described
as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to
the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified
than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly
directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the
petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private
respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the
new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment,
questions the order and the validity of the respondents
appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified
than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.
Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but
permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The
appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him
and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the
Commission shall have inter alia the power to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the
civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and
all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC
Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its
belief that another person was better qualified, which is an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Decision:
The COA has been enshrined by the government with powers to
"promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary,
excessive,
extravagant,
or
unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." It has
been recognized in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. COA, that COA has
authority to disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures.
The nature of the terminal phase of the Dagat-Dagatan project does
not require the expertise of a foreign consultant and that the
finishing stage merely requires simple advisory services that can be
undertaken by NHA or DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most
a local consultant. Our Constitution prohibits unnecessary expenses
of public funds. The postulates of our Constitution are not mere
platitudes, which we should honor only in rhetorics but not in
reality. The power to contract a foreign loan does not carry with it
the authority to bargain away the ideals of our Constitution.

9|JRCMENDOZA