G.R. No.

112331 May 29, 1996

ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.
Easements; Right of Way; Words and Phrases; Easements and Right of Way, Defined.As
defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby
the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allow somebody else to do or something to be
done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena,
inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of
way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of
persons to pass over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging
to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate
can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner
thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
Same; Same; Conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way.The
conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b)
the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the
acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial
to the servient estate.
Same; Same; Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen but if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest
the criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance.Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of
shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures
obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of
obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the
easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However,
as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the
test.
Same; Same; As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to
provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.In
applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the

extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared
to the suggested passage through the property of Yolandas father which would mean
destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings
and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this
Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although
longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benedicto L. Nanca for petitioner.
Armando A. San Antonio for private respondent.
[Quimen vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 163, G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996]
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the way is shortest and will cause
least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way where damage will be least shall be used even if not the shortest route. 1 This
is so because least prejudice prevails over shortest distance. This means that the court is not bound
to establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient
estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round about way, or
to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the way
on a dangerous decline.

Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her
brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in
Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did,
with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road.
The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B-1. It is
bounded on the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 14413-B-2. Adjoining
Sotero's property on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina
and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located
directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated
as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A
and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind
Anastacia's Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father
of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her
aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner
offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road.

But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a
right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the
public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the
use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred
by Anastacia from passing through her property.2
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B,
located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et
amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda
behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of
strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and
nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for
ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the
store to reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way
through Anastacia's property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of the presiding judge was
conducted by the branch clerk of court. The report was that the proposed right of way was at
the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of
Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left
for about five (5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road 3 and
the way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle. 4

But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action;
explaining that the right of way through Sotero's property was a straight path and to allow a
detour by cutting through Anastacia's property would no longer make the path straight. Hence
the trial court concluded that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public
road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the
public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacia's
property. 5
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that
she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property and that the way proposed by Yolanda
would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. 6 The appellate court however
did not award damages to private respondent as petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the
claim.

Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent Court of Appeals: (a) in

disregarding the agreement of the parties; (b) in considering petitioner's property as a servient
estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent; and, (c)
in holding that the one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed by private respondent is the
least prejudicial and the shortest distance to the public road.
Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a right of way. She claims
that her agreement with private respondent was to provide the latter with a right of way on the

other lot of Antonio Quimen under her administration when it was not yet sold to private
respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more
accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado
tree standing thereon.
Petitioner
further
argues
that
when
Yolanda
purchased
Lot
No.
1448-B-6-B in 1986 the easement of right of way she provided her (petitioner) was ipso
jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient
estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private
respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.
Petitioner strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the
public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as
she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree,
and considering that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a
substantial earning from it. 7
But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right
of way to private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as between petitioner
Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as
it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary easement in
favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to
believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law.8
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. 9 It is jus in
re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A
right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law 10 to a person or class
of persons to pass over another's property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to
others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can
demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the
beneficial use of his property. 11

The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not
due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. 12
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of way

13

readily shows

that

[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff was
reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed with permanent
improvements like a concrete fence and store and have (sic) no egress
leading to the road but because of the assurance of the defendant that
plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long right of
way in the sum of P200.00 per square meter to be taken from Anastacia's lot

at the side of a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her father's land,
plaintiff was induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land . . . That the
aforesaid right of way is the shortest, most convenient and the least onerous
leading to the road and being used by the plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest
from the very inception . . .
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates
of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter
for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of
her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. 14 These facts are

Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the

plaintiff made of?
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of
the lot in question, what right of way does (sic) he use in
reaching the public road, kindly point to this sketch that
he is (sic) using in reaching the public road?

confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself
declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda
Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need
for an easement of right of way to the public highway." 15

Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way
proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article
650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily
imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and
the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. 16 This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this
plan, kindly go over this and please point to us in what
portion of this plan is the house or store of the father of
the (plaintiff )?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located
near the proposed right of way).
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you will agree with me . . . that this portion is the
front portion of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff
and which was (sic) occupied by a store made up of
strong materials?
A. It is not true, sir.

A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me . . . the main reason why
your brother is (sic) using this property is because there
was a store located near this portion?
A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no
other way than this, sir. 17
The trial court found that Yolanda's property was situated at the back of her father's property
and held that there existed an available space of about nineteen (19) meters long which could
conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda's
father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Sotero's store which was made of strong
materials; that this explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an
opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public
highway. But notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court concluded, although
erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property since a
detour through it would not make the line straight and would not be the route shortest to the
public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the
extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared
to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean
destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings
and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this
Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although
longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence
presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole
evidence considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the
situation. 18 In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly
backed up by law and the evidence.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition is DENIED and the decision subject of review is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Remedial Law; Judgment; A decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to
said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been
commenced or filed in court.A decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to
said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been
commenced or filed in court. In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley
Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the
spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register
of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it
from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For,
although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action in court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Law Firm of Chan, Robles & Associates for petitioner.
Pedro I. Rodriguez for private respondents.
[Villanueva vs. Velasco, 346 SCRA 99, G.R. No. 130845 November 27, 2000]
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

G.R. No. 130845

November 27, 2000

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY
LORILLA, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Easement; A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public
use or for private interest and becomes a continuing property right; Essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory.A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public
use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement,
it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the
Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

This petition for certiorari assails (1) the decision 1 dated December 27, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, dismissing petitioners petition for review under Rule 65 with
prayer for the issuance of a cease and desist order and/or temporary restraining order, and (2)
the resolution2 dated August 14, 1997 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from
Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the
spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner
bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one
meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the
Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right
of Way. The pertinent portion of the contract dated November 28, 1979, states:
. . . in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their houses are
constructed and to have an outlet to Tandang Sora Ave. which is the nearest public road and
the least burdensome to the servient estate and to third persons, it would be necessary for
them to pass through spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA CAPUNOs land and for this
purpose, a path or passageway of not less than two (2) meters wide of said spouses property
is necessary for the use of ROMEO, RODOLFO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and for all
their needs in entering their property.

xxx

No costs considering the failure of private respondents to file their comment, despite notice. 8

WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that the property of the ESPINOLA had been bought by them
from MAXIMO CAPUNO, father of MAXIMO GABRIEL, spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL and
JUSTINA CAPUNO hereby agree and permit RODOLFO, ROMEO, NENITA and AURORA
ESPINOLA and their families to have a permanent easementof right of way over the
aforementioned property of said spouses limited to not more than two meters wide, throughout
the whole length of the southeast side of said property and as specifically indicated in the
attached plan which is made an integral part of this Contract as Annex "A";

Hence, this instant petition.

This Agreement shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs, successors, assigns,
without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the circumstances. 3
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was
also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8,
1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. 4 As successors-ininterest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of
way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On August 15, 1991, the
Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On March 26, 1992, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision became final and executory on July 31, 1992. 5
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 88, issued an
Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house
pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of
Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was
not a party to the civil case. His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition
was denied for lack of merit on August 16, 1995. 6 The motion for reconsideration as well as the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995 were denied on October
19, 1995.7
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 39166, asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not
annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, hence the
contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not be enforced
against him. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied the
reconsideration, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed by this court for lack of merit.

Petitioner now avers that the appellate court erred in declaring,

(1)
THAT
FOLLOWING
THE
ESSENCE
OF
INHERENCE
AND
INTRANSMISSIBILITY OF AN EASEMENT, A RIGHT OF WAY CAN EXIST EVEN IF
THEY ARE NOT EXPRESSLY STATED OR ANNOTATED ON THE TORRENS TITLE;
(2) THAT PETITIONER, AS PROSPECTIVE BUYER, SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
ORDINARY PRUDENCE BY TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO DETERMINE THAT AN
EASEMENT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE PROPERTY HE INTENDS TO
BUY; AND,
(3) THAT IN AS MUCH AS THE HEREIN PETITIONER IS NOT A PARTY TO CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-91-8703, HE CANNOT BE BOUND BY ANY JUDGMENT OR ORDER
RENDERED THEREIN.9
Primarily, the issue is whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
Petitioner argues it could not be enforced against him. First, he says that a right of way cannot
exist when it is not expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title. According to him, even if
an easement is inherent and inseparable from the estate to which it actively belongs as
provided in Art. 617 of the Civil Code, 10 the same is extinguished when the servient estate is
registered and the easement was not annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the
Land Registration Law. Second, petitioner points out that the trial court erred when it faulted him
for relying solely on the clean title of the property he bought, as it is well-settled that a person
dealing with registered land is not required to go beyond what is recorded in the title. He adds
that it is private respondents who should have made sure their right of way was safeguarded by
having the same annotated on the title with the Register of Deeds. He adds that Section 76 of
P.D. No. 152911 also requires that when a case is commenced involving any right to registered
land under the Land Registration Law (now the Property Registration Decree), any decision on
it will only be effectual between or among the parties thereto, unless a notice of lis pendens of
such action is filed and registered in the registry office where the land is recorded. There was
no such annotation in the title of the disputed land, according to petitioner. Lastly, since he was
not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, petitioner argues that he cannot be bound by the writ
of demolition and be forcibly divested of a portion of his land without having his day in court.
Private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla, for their part, adopted the disquisition of the
appellate court as their Comment and asked for the dismissal of the petition and P100,000.00 in
damages. In its decision the appellate court, citing the decision of the lower court, stressed that
unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a right of way can exist even
if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in aTorrens title because
servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong.
Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement
but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless

its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed
before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 12 in accordance with Article
61713 of the Civil Code.
At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily
constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by
the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement
is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a
continuing property right.14 As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which
it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.15 The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said
easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on this
Court,16 hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small
house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private
respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement.17 Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the
easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate.
Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the
same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce
the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As
already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is
legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from
and egress to the public highway.
1wphi1

Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he had
not been given his day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules of
Court:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or
his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to
the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis ours).
Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and
those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in
court.18 In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case
No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, 19 against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina
Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds 20 on March 24,
1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels.
Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although not a party to
the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in
court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 77628

March 11, 1991

TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE
SAGUN,* respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Oscar Gozos for private respondents.
Property; Easements; Right of Way; It is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the passage; and these needs may vary from time to time.Article 651
of the Civil Code provides that (t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to
time. This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do
with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it
the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manuel hauling of plants
and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically
taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to
the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer
pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the
people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery
business.
Same; Same; Same; Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a
continuous and permanent nature the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.We are well aware that an
additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient
estate to only about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange
an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it
would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless and until that
option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient
estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute
the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner
is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of
the Civil Code.

PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6
(Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width
of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit to the
highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the
lower court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint. It ruled:

[Encarnacion vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 74, G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991]
FERNAN, C.J.:
Presented for resolution in the instant petition for review is the not-so-usual question of whether
or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way. Both
the trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that petitioner is not so entitled, hence the recourse
to this Court. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda
de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay,
Batangas. ** Petitioner owns the dominant estate which has an area of 2,590 square meters
and bounded on the North by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino, on the south by Taal
Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo and on the West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents
co-own the 405-square-meter servient estate which is bounded on the North by the National
Highway (Laurel-Talisay Highway), on the South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by
Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the servient estate
stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons
going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in
1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter widewas constituted to provide access to the
highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other
one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No
compensation was asked and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway.
1

It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where
he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family
and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became
more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery
and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an
owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not
pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de
Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half
(1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for
his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by the two widows and
further attempts at negotiation proved futile.

It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff at present has two outlets to the highway: one,
through the defendants' land on a one meter wide passageway, which is bounded on
both sides by concrete walls and second, through the dried river bed eighty meters
away. The plaintiff has an adequate outlet to the highway through the dried river bed
where his jeep could pass.
The reasons given for his claim that the one-meter passageway through defendants'
land be widened to two and one-half meters to allow the passage of his jeep,
destroying in the process one of the concrete fences and decreasing defendants'
already small parcel to only about 332.5 square meters, just because it is nearer to
the highway by 25 meters compared to the second access of 80 meters or a
difference of only 65 meters and that passage through defendants' land is more
convenient for his (plaintiffs) business and family use are not among the conditions
specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code to entitle the plaintiff to a right of way for the
passage of his jeep through defendant's land.
3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987 and
rejected petitioner's claim for an additional easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals opined that the necessity interposed by
petitioner was not compelling enough to justify interference with the property rights of private
respondents. The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a dried river bed only
eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate and conjectured that petitioner might have
actually driven his jeep through the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only
reason why he wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was more
convenient for his business and family needs.
After evaluating the evidence presented in the case, the Court finds that petitioner has
sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way, contrary to the
conclusions of the courts a quo.
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access
is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is
absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or
dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is traversed
by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to
reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover,
during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used
at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make
passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
1wphi1

Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.

xxx

xxx

xxx

With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route to the highway, we transfer
our attention to the existing pathway which straddles the adjoining properties of the De Sagun
heirs and Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against petitioner his candid admission in open court that he
needed a wider pathway for the convenience of his business and family. (TSN, August 2, 1985,
pp. 24-26). We cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting that which is convenient. But certainly
that should not detract from the more pressing consideration that there is a real and compelling
need for such servitude in his favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be
that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed
from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant
property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from
time to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could
easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business
grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual
hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome
and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the
elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counterproductive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide
enough to accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant
nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the
pathway will reduce the servient estate to only about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has
expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private
respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of
petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that
petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from
whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since
the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature,
the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage
caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code which states in part:
5

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons
and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous
for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.

WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion, the appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated January 28, 1987 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Tomas
Encarnacion is hereby declared entitled to an additional easement of right of way of twenty-five
(25) meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide over the servient estate or a total area
of 62.5 square meters after payment of the proper indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175510

July 28, 2008

SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, represented by their Attorney-InFact, VIRGILIO VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD TABISULA, Respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Servitudes; Easements; An easement or servitude is a real right
constituted on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the
same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for
the benefit of another thing or person; Two kinds of easements according to sourceby law or
by the will of the owners.An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on anothers
property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain
from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another
thing or person. The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which
the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the
servient estate. There are two kinds of easements according to sourceby law or by the will of
the owners.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is not included
in this sale could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose.From the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is clear that what

they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading:
they shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but
which is not included in this sale. Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing. The stipulation harped upon
by petitioners that they shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western
side of their lot but which is not included in this sale is not a disposition of real property. The
proviso that the intended grant of right of way is not included in this sale could only mean that
the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose. The use
of the word shall, which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be
construed as merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right
requires it to be given an imperative meaning.
Same; Easements; A document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the
Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties.A document stipulating a voluntary
easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So
Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for.
Same; Same; Requisites to be Conferred a Legal Easement of Right of Way under Article 649;
The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate.To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is
not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate, herein petitioners.
Damages; Moral Damages; To merit an award of moral damages, there must be proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like; It is not enough that one suffers sleepless nights,
mental anguish, serious anxiety as a result of the actuation of the other party.To merit an
award of moral damages, there must be proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the
like. It is not enough that one suffers sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as a
result of the actuation of the other party. Invariably, such actuation must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill-motive. In respondents
case, they predicated their Counterclaim for damages on general allegations of sickness,
humiliation and embarrassment, without establishing bad faith, fraud or ill-motive on petitioners
part.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edmundo Z. Rimando for petitioners.
Abraham F. Datlag for respondents.

[Valdez vs. Tabisula, 560 SCRA 332, G.R. No. 175510 July 28, 2008]
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of
Absolute Sale1 (the deed) from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a
200 square meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in
San Fernando, La Union, which 380 sq.m. parcel of land is more particularly described in the
deed as follows:
A parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on the North by Lot No. 25569, on the
East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot No. 223-A,
declared under Tax Decl. No. 52820, with an area of 380 square meters, more or less, and
assessed at P 17100.00 for the current year. It is not registered under Act 496 nor under the
Spanish Mortgage Law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pertinent portions of the deed read:
xxxx
That for and in consideration of the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currencyp [sic] paid to us at our entire satisfaction by spouses VICTOR and
JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of 148 P. Burgos St., San
Fernando, La Union, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby SELL, CONVEY and
TRANSFER by way of absolute sale unto the said spouses Victor and Joecelyn Valdez, their
heirs and assigns, the TWO HUNDRED (200) SQUARE METERS, EASTERN PORTION of the
parcel of land above-described, free from all liens and encumbrances.
xxxx
That now and hereinafter, said VENDEE-SPOUSES VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ
shall be the absolute owners of the said 200 sq. meters, eastern portion and that we shall
warrant and forever defend their ownership of the same against the claims of all persons
whomsoever; they shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western
side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.
x x x.x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject
property.2 Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed,
petitioners, through their representative, reported the matter to the barangay for mediation and
conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay,
however, drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or more than six years after the execution of
the deed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages 3 against respondents before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property on the strength
of respondents assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that
respondents be ordered to provide the subject property with a 2-meter wide easement and to
remove the concrete wall blocking the same.4
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages and attorneys
fees),5 averred that the 2 -meter easement should be taken from the western portion of the
subject property and not from theirs; 6 and petitioners and their family are also the owners of two
properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining properties have access to two public
roads or highways the bigger one which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller
one which abuts an existing barangay road on the north.7
Respondents further averred that they could not have agreed to providing petitioners an
easement "on the western side of their lot" as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their
lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected long before the subject
property was sold to petitioners.8 In support of this claim, respondents submitted a February 20,
2003 letter from the City Engineers Office.9
Branch 26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners complaint and granted
respondents Counterclaim by Decision10 of March 18, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
defendants as against the plaintiffs and hereby orders the Complaint dismissed for being
unmeritorious and plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay the defendants, the following:
1) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4) P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

Petitioners motion for reconsideration15 having been denied by the Court of Appeals by
Resolution of November 15, 2006, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari faulting
the trial [sic] court
I. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT PART OF THE ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 11, 1993;
II. . . . IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE
GRANTING A RIGHT OF WAY IS VAGUE AND OBSCURE;
III. . . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND
RESPONDENTS.16 (Underscoring supplied)

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO

THE

An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on anothers property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person." 17 The
statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source by law or by the will of the owners. So
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are
called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
From the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is clear that what they seek to enforce is an
alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: "they shall be provided a 2
meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this
sale."

5) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.11 (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 29, 2006, 12 affirmed that of
the trial court, it holding that the deed only conveyed ownership of the subject property to
petitioners, and that the reference therein to an easement in favor of petitioners is not a definite
grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of way.13
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory
easement of right of way as they failed to present circumstances justifying their entitlement to it
under Article 649 of the Civil Code.14

Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of
real property must be in writing. 18 The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they "shall be
provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not
included in this sale" is not a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant of
right of way is "not included in this sale" could only mean that the parties would have to enter
into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose. 19 The use of the word "shall," which is
imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive
where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an
imperative meaning.20

Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of

Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for,
viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the inscription or annotation of acts and
contracts relating to the ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be
entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors own
acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites
must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not
the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. 21 The onus
of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, 22herein
petitioners.

and that the Interior Street-Exhibit "1-H," which petitioners via this case seek access to with a right of way,
was still a creek,25as reflected in the earlier-quoted particular description of respondents parcel of land from
which the subject property originally formed part.
Respecting the grant of damages in favor of respondents by the trial court which was affirmed by the
appellate court, the Court finds the same baseless.
1avvphi1

To merit an award of moral damages, there must be proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the
like. It is not enough that one suffers sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as a result of the
actuation of the other party.26 Invariably, such actuation must be shown by clear and convincing evidence 27 to
have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill-motive.
In respondents case, they predicated their Counterclaim for damages on general allegations of sickness,
humiliation and embarrassment, without establishing bad faith, fraud or ill-motive on petitioners part. 28
More importantly, respondents are precluded from filing any counterclaim in light of Article 199 of Rule XXVI
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 reading:
xxxx
ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Witness to Appear before the Lupon or
Pangkat. Refusal or willful failure of any party or witness to appear before the lupon or pangkat in
compliance with summons issued pursuant to this Rule may be punished by the city or municipal court as for
indirect contempt of court upon application filed therewith by the lupon chairman, the pangkat chairman, or
by any of the contending parties. Such refusal or willful failure to appear shall be reflected in the records of
the lupon secretary or in the minutes of the pangkat secretary and shall bar the complainant who fails to
appear, from seeking judicial recourse for the same course of action, and the respondent who refuses to
appear, from filing any counterclaim arising out of, or necessarily connected with the complaint.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While respondent Caridad Tabisula claimed that she always appeared, when summoned, before the
barangay lupon,29 the following Certificate to File Action30 belies the claim.
xxxx
This is to certify that respondents failed to appear for (2) Mediation Proceeding before our Punong Barangay
thusthe corresponding complaint may now be filed in court.
Issued this 24th day of November 1998 at the Multi Purpose Hall, Barangay 1 City of San Fernando (LU).

As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch 23 (Exhibit "B"; Exhibit "1")
of the location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining them, a common evidence of the
parties, petitioners and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject
property which have access to two public roads or highways.24
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to demand
the grant by respondents of an easement on the "western side of [respondents] lot."
It may not be amiss to note at this juncture that at the time the deed was executed in 1993, the barangay
road-Exhibit "1-G," by which petitioners could access Burgos Street-Exhibit "1-F," was not yet in existence;

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The award for moral damages being thus baseless, that for exemplary damages must too be baseless.
As for the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, respondents have not shown their entitlement
thereto in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision and November 15, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of respondents, Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad
Tabisula, is reversed and set aside. In all other respects, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106082 June 27, 1995

LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR and NESTOR BALTAZAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DANIEL PANGANIBAN, respondents.
Easements; Requisites before the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way.In
light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the underlying issue begging resolution is
whether or not respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim an easement of right of way over the
Baltazars property. In Locsin v. Climaco, this Court said: By express provision of Articles 649
and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way
only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietors own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Humphrey D. Tumaneng for petitioners.
Antonio E. Dollete & Associates for respondent.
[Vda. de Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 333, G.R. No. 106082 June 27, 1995]
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, of Malolos and ordered petitioners to grant the right of way
claimed by private respondent.
The instant petition for review on certiorari presents two issues for resolution, namely: (1)
whether or not an easement of right of way can be granted to a person who has two other
existing passageways adjacent to his property which he is using in going to and from his
property; and, (2) whether or not an easement of right of way can be established through the
alleged continuous use thereof in light of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case

of Ronquillo v. Roco 1 which held that an easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature since
the dominant estate cannot be continually crossing the servient estate but can do so only at intervals.

Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land consisting of 117 square meters
denominated as Lot no. 1027 located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Immediately to the front of said land
is Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind is the
Sta. Ana River. On either side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and Jose
Legaspi, respectively. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots 1025,
1026 and 1028.
Sometime in 1989, Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who are owners
of Lot 1026 for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way for
him to have access to the provincial road. In said complaint, he prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
In their answer, petitioners opposed the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction arguing that there exists two other rights of way adjacent to private respondent's
property. They likewise argue that private respondent had abandoned the alleged right of way.
The court a quo, after conducting an ocular inspection and hearings for the issuance of the writ
prayed for, dismissed the complaint based on the following findings:
Immediately in front of the plaintiff's aforedescribed property is Residential
Lot 1026 with an area of 119 square meters belonging to herein defendants.
On this lot is constructed the residential house of the defendants,
immediately in front of which is the provincial road. Running along one side
of this property is a 1.20-meter wide, 10.40 meter long passageway which
the plaintiff claims to have previously made use of as an ingress to and
egress from his property in going to or coming from the provincial road, until
some three (3) years before he instituted the instant action when the
defendants somehow prevented him from using the same.
It is significant to note that, aside from the passageway which the plaintiff
seeks to be established as a permanent easement, the property of the
plaintiff is accessible to and from the provincial road via two (2) other
passageways, viz:
1) a passageway running immediately alongside the
concrete fence of the properties of plaintiff and the
defendants, over the properties of Loreto Bernardo and
Jose Legaspi. This passageway ends in a gate which
serves as a point of entry into or exit from the property of
the plaintiff; and
2) a passageway similarly running alongside the opposite
concrete fence of the properties of the plaintiff and the
defendants, over the properties of Encarnacion Calimon
and Ricardo Calimon. This passageway, which ends in a

gate leading into the plaintiff's property, is the right of way

presently availed of by the plaintiff.
Daniel Panganiban appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that the court a quo erred in
dismissing the complaint for reasons of pragmatic considerations and in flagrant and clear
violation of Articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed decision, 2 reversed the order of dismissal of the court a
quo and granted respondent's right of way. The dispositive portion of said decision states:

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to grant the right of
way of plaintiff-appellant, designated as Lot 1026-B, after payment of the
proper indemnity, to be determined after hearing in the Court below.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings.

6) That appellant was compelled to request for a temporary pathway on the

eastern side, Lot 1025, and when it was closed, on the western side, Lot
1028, of his Lot 1027.
It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy in the findings between the court a quo and the
Court of Appeals regarding the existence of two passageways from respondent Panganiban's
property to Braulio Street. The courta quo ruled that while the passageway through petitioner
Baltazar's property is the least prejudicial to the servient estate and the shortest distance
between respondent Panganiban's property and the provincial road, the claimed easement
cannot be granted due to the strained relations between the parties. 3 The court a quo added that
if the other two passageways will no longer be available to respondent, then the claimed easement of
right of way over petitioner's property would be granted. 4 It appears that the two passageways are
simultaneously existing as alternative pathways for respondent Panganiban.

The Court of Appeals, however, found that the two passageways mentioned were mere
temporary pathways which respondent Panganiban requested successively from his two
neighbors Calimon and Legaspi when petitioner Baltazar closed the passageway through his
property. When the path on the eastern side (Lot 1025) was closed to the respondent, he was
granted the use of the other on the western side (Lot 1028). 5

SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals found the following based on the evidence on record:
1) Plaintiff-appellant's Lot 1027 (Exh. D) is bounded on the south by Lot
1026-A, owned by defendants-appellees; on the north by Sta. Ana River; on
the east, by Lot 1025 (Legaspi's property); on the west, by Lot 1028
(Calimon's property) [Exh. 3-T.D. No. 10998];
2) The only accessible road from Lot 1027 is Braulio Street. This road runs
across the frontage of Lot 1025, Lot 1026-A and Lot 1028;

The finding of the Court of Appeals that the existence of the two passageways was not
simultaneous and was granted by respondent's neighbors, Calimon and Legaspi only upon
respondent's request when petitioner Baltazar closed the claimed passageway is supported by
the evidence on record. 6
In light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the underlying issue begging resolution is whether or
not respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim an easement of right of way over the Baltazars' property.
In Locsin v. Climaco, 7 this Court said:
By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an
estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence
of four (4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.

3) The shortest, direct and convenient way to gain access as an egress and
ingress to said Braulio Street from the appellant's dominant Lot 1027 is to
pass through the appellees' servient estate Lot 1026-A (Exhs. 4-G, A, B, B1, and C);
4) That Lot 1026-B (Exh. 4-l) which is a strip of land and a portion of
appellees' Lot 1026-A, with steel gates (Exhs. I-1 and F-2), has been
existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by the appellant as
a right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of appellees'
grandfather, Fidel, and his father, Onisimo Baltazar;
5) That it was closed and obstructed by the appellees when it closed the
gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B, when appellees
constructed their present residence;

For respondent Panganiban to claim a compulsory easement of right of way, he must, therefore, first
establish the existence of the four requisites stated above.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established by the court a quo in its Order dated May 22,
1990. 8Respondent Panganiban's property is indeed surrounded by immovables on three sides and a river on the
fourth.

As for the second requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court 9 states:

There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a reading of the law which
would impute to it a strict requirement to pay "proper indemnity" in advance of a suit
the purpose of which, in addition to creating an easement, is precisely to fix the
amount of the indemnity to be paid therefor.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it ordered the remand of this case to the lower court for the
purpose of fixing the proper indemnity. 10
With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was likewise able to establish that the isolation of
his property was not due to his own act for he merely bought Lot 1027, which was formerly part of the
Baltazars' Lot 1026-A, 11 from petitioner Nestor Baltazar's predecessors-in-interest. The Court of Appeals found
that Lot 1026-B 12 which the respondents have been using as a right of way, has been "existing, recognized,
acknowledged, tolerated and used by the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of
petitioner's grandfather, Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar." 13 It was also established that the right of way was
"closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they closed the gate 14 and placed plants across the gate of Lot
1026-B when petitioners constructed their present residence." 15

As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by respondent as his right
of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest distance from respondent's lot to Braulio
Street. 16
Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway for, as borne out by the records, the
same is separate and distinct from the gate used by them to enter their lot and residence. Such being the
case, we conclude that respondent is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right of way over
petitioners' Lot 1026-B.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160613

Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

February 12, 2008

APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA and PERFECTA C. QUINTANILLA, petitioners,

vs.
PEDRO ABANGAN and DARYL'S COLLECTION INTL. INC., respondents.
Property; Easements; Right of Way; Requisites.It should be remembered that to be entitled to
a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.
Same; Same; Same; As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials
to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which, although longer, will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.Such
pronouncement by the CA is in line with this Courts ruling in Quimen v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 163 (1996), where we held that as between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which, although

longer, will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
Appeals; Factual Findings; Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial
court, are generally final and conclusive on the Supreme Court.As a rule, findings of fact of
the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive on this Court. While
this Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule, none of these exceptions finds
application in this case. Ergo, we find no cogent reason and reversible error to disturb the
unanimous findings of the RTC and the CA as these are amply supported by the law and
evidence on record.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Bernardito A. Florido for Daryls Collection International.
Paterno S. Compra for Pedro Abangan.
[Quintanilla vs. Abangan, 544 SCRA 494, G.R. No. 160613 February 12, 2008]
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated April 21, 2003,
which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Cebu City, dated
June 21, 2000.
This controversy flows from a case for Easement of Right of Way filed by petitioner Apolinardito
C. Quintanilla (Apolinardito) and his mother, petitioner Perfecta C. Quintanilla (Perfecta) against
respondent Pedro Abangan (Pedro) and respondent Daryl's Collection International, Inc.
(DARYL'S).
Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244 square
meters, located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who
formerly owned all the properties therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to
Apolinardito, who is now the registered owner thereof. 4 Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the
conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished
products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their property
(the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, containing an area of
1,164 square meters5 (the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, sold the same to

DARYL'S on March 24, 1994,6and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the
servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence.
Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width,
or a total area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate.
On June 21, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners
failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the servient
estate. The RTC noted that there is already a concrete fence around the area and that six (6)
meters from the said concrete fence was a concrete warehouse. Thus, substantial damage and
substantial reduction in area would be caused the servient estate. Moreover, the RTC observed
that petitioners' insistence on passing through the servient estate would make for easy and
convenient access to the main thoroughfare for their vans. Otherwise, if the right of way were to
be constituted on any of the other surrounding properties, their vans would have to make a turn.
On this premise, the RTC opined that mere convenience to the dominant estate was not
necessarily the basis for setting up a compulsory easement of right of way.
Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA on appeal.
In its Decision dated April 21, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding that the criterion
of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest distance. A longer way
may, thus, be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way,7 as in this case. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 8 but the same was denied in the CA Resolution 9 dated
September 24, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
a) IN A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, AS SET FORTH IN THE
PRECONDITIONS UNDER ARTICLES 64910 AND 65011 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE,
THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEAST PREJUDICIAL OR LEAST DAMAGE TO
THE SERVIENT ESTATE SHOULD BE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND NOT AFTER THE FILING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE IS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
CONSIDERED AS THE GREATEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WRONGS OR BAD FAITH
BY CONSTRUCTING A CONCRETE FENCE AND WAREHOUSE THEREON
THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE CEBU CITY
BUILDING OFFICIAL THAT IT HAD GRANTED A RIGHT OF WAY OF SIX (6)
METERS TO PETITIONERS; AND
b) WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET FORTH
IN ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS SUPERIOR TO THE
"MERE CONVENIENCE RULE AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE DOMINANT
ESTATE."
Petitioners claim that DARYL'S constructed the concrete fence only after petitioners filed the
case for an Easement of Right of Way against Pedro on May 27, 1994. They submit that the

criterion of least prejudice should be applied at the time of the filing of the original complaint;
otherwise, it will be easy for the servient estate to evade the burden by subsequently
constructing structures thereon in order to increase the damage or prejudice. 12 Moreover, they
pointed out that a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on Pedro's title. Thus, petitioners aver
that DARYL'S is in bad
faith and is guilty of abuse of rights as provided under Article 19 13 of the New Civil Code.14
On the other hand, DARYL'S counters that petitioners belatedly imputed bad faith to it since
petitioners' pre-trial brief filed with the RTC contained no allegation of bad faith or
misrepresentation. Moreover, DARYL'S reiterates its position that establishing a right of way
over the servient estate would cause substantial damage, considering that a concrete fence has
already been erected thereon. Most importantly, DARYL'S submits that petitioners can have
adequate ingress to or egress from the dominant estate by passing through other surrounding
vacant lots. Lastly,
DARYL'S points out that when Perfecta bought the dominant estate from Dionisio Abasolo, the
surrounding lots were also owned by the latter.15
For his part, Pedro manifests that he is adopting all the defenses invoked by DARYL'S in the
belief that he is no longer a party to the instant case as he had already sold the servient estate
to DARYL'S and a title already issued in the latter's name.16
The instant petition lacks merit.
We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta failed to
discharge the burden of proving the existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to
validly claim a compulsory right of way against respondents.17
It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. 18
The fourth requisite is absent.
We are in full accord with the ruling of the CA when it aptly and judiciously held, to wit:
As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established
on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
as in the instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should be used,

even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish
what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a
round-about way, as in the case at bar.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide
ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although
longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should
be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law
as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it
can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened
public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only
shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not
been met to establish a compulsory right of way.
Such pronouncement by the CA is in line with this Court's ruling in Quimen v. Court of
Appeals,19 where we held that as between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which, although
longer, will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
As a rule, findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are generally final and
conclusive on this Court.20 While this Court has recognized several exceptions 21 to this rule,
none of these exceptions finds application in this case. Ergo, we find no cogent reason and
reversible error to disturb the unanimous findings of the RTC and the CA as these are amply
supported by the law and evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision, dated April 21, 2003, and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132964

February 18, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Donations; Three Essential Elements of a Donation.There are three (3)
essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made
in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance
is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an
authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
Same; Same; Same; When the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of property the
document that evidences the acceptance should also be recorded.In Santos v. Robledo we
emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of property the document
that evidences the acceptanceif this has not been made in the deed of giftshould also be
recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of the acceptance
as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate
instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that if the notification and notation are not complied with,
the donation is void.These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied
with, and no proof of compliance appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the
conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does
not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no
other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in an
authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and notation are not complied with, the
donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied with, there was
no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bocobo, Rondain, Mendiola, Cruz & Formoso for private respondent.

[Republic vs. Guzman, 326 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000]

The Government appealed6 the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court affirmed the
court a quo.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII of the Constitution which provides
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of the 5 March 1998 Decision of
the Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 77, Malolos,
Bulacan, of the petition for escheat filed by the Government. 2
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon
Guzman,3 a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In
1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several
parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M),
T-146839 (M), T-146840 (M), T-146841 (M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to
the estate of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through their
attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were
accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in
undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying
to her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document
appeared not to have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed
another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in the
Philippines.4
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that
he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen
on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots.
On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor's taxes to
facilitate the registry of the parcels of land in the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General
and furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the
estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of
David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994
David Rey Guzman responded with a prayer that the petition be dismissed.
On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim
executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the
property subject thereof remained with her.5

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines. The only
instances when a foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David
does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts that David being an American citizen
could not validly acquire one-half (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of
the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. It also reasons out that
the elements of donation are present in the conveyance made by Helen in favor of David: first,
Helen consented to the execution of the documents; second, the dispositions were made in
public documents; third, David manifested his acceptance of the donation in the Special Power
of Attorney he executed in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed with
the intention of benefiting David; and lastly, there was a resultant decrease in the assets or
patrimony of Helen, being the donor. Petitioner further argues that the payment of donor's taxes
on the property proved that Helen intended the transfer to be a gift or donation inter vivos.
David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion and not
by way of donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen's intention to renounce
her share in the property and not an intention to donate. He further argues that, assuming there
was indeed a donation, it never took effect since the Special Power of Attorney he executed
does not indicate acceptance of the alleged donation.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality
or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further
requires that the donation be made in a public document and that there should be an
acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. 7 In
cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor
should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. 8
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case.
The transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the
reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the patrimony of David as
donee. However, Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not
sufficiently established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended
to convey to her son David certain parcels of land located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the

quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise declared a waiver and renunciation of her rights
over the parcels of land. The language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a
donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her deposition
which indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not possible
since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement. 9 She reasoned that if she really
intended to donate something to David it would have been more convenient if she sold the
property and gave him the proceeds therefrom.10 It appears that foremost in Helen's mind was
the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where they
originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by reason of her
renunciation.11 The element of animus donandi therefore was missing.
Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a
public document but they lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required
by law to make the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner's argument that the Special
Power of Attorney executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela manifests his implied
acceptance of his mother's alleged donation as a scrutiny of the document clearly evinces the
absence thereof. The Special Power of Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the
property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no
intimation, expressly or impliedly, that David's acquisition of the parcels of land is by virtue of
Helen's possible donation to him and we cannot look beyond the language of the document to
make a contrary construction as this would be inconsistent with the parol evidence rule. 12

Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her
son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of
owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be
impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an
unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made through any of
the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by
Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of
revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property from
Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after she had
accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res
nullius18 to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the
parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is
qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the petition for escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of the
acceptance must be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance but also in the deed of
donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 13 came Manresa said: "If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not
necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept . . . . it is necessary that formal notice thereof be
given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both instruments. Then and
only then is the donation perfected.14
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of
property the document that evidences the acceptance if this has not been made in the deed of gift
should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of the
acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth. 15 Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is
either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance, the
donation is null and void.16
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance
appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in
favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of
Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice thereof
to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and notation are not complied
with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied with, there was no
effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.17
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of David
valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance
when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the property in

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 77425

June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE
CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450

June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE
CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.
Civil Law; Donation; Rescission; Article 764 of the Civil Code not applicable in the case at bar;
The deed of donation expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in

case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
necessary.Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of
violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering
into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even
without court intervention.In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the
rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract
provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It
called attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its
cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured
party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial
action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of
cancellation.

committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet
prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our
view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not
agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Validity of a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the
automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition
was upheld in the recent case of De Luna et. al, vs Abrigo, et. al.The validity of such a
stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property
to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et
al. vs. Abrigo, et al. It was held therein that said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement
granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of
going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with
the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial
declaration to that effect.

Same; Same; Same; The prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the
property for an entire century should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition
in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared
as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be
considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory
paragraph in the deed of donation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention
is necessary in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.The rationale for
the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judical intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already
deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
Same; Same; Same; When the deed of donation expressly provides for
automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the
general rules on prescription should apply and not Article 764 of the Civil Code.When a deed
of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and
not Article 764 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation without prior judicial action for that purpose is valid subject to the determination of the
propriety of the rescission sought.Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least,
that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without
prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
Same; Same; Prescription; Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of
action of private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written
contract prescribed in ten (10) years.On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals

Same; Same; The condition imposed in the deed of donation in this case constitutes a patently
unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property
donated.Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain
conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the
case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the
donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of
ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or
for an unreasonable period of time.

Remedial Law; Appeal; Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters even if they are
not assigned as errors on appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just decision of the case.This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if
they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case: Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to
assign it as error.
Same; Same; Same; Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence
not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it.Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower
court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
[Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 300, G.R. No.
77425, G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991]
REGALADO, J.:

These two petitions for review on certiorari seek to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05456 which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as the order of said respondent
court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
1

On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of
deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages
against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus,
Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein.
3

In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio
de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of
therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626,
Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters,
more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell
the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of
donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed
of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to
dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly
transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the
donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of
P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner
spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision.

On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no
legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of the
motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the cause of
action has prescribed.

of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the
main action for reconveyance of real property.
6

On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet
prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants' complaint is
SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings. No Costs.
7

Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separate motions for
reconsideration which were denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
February 6, 1987, hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
8

It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has
already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation
shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the
conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after
four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the
donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein
expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the
condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly
stated by the Court of Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the
condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are
of the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the donation
judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself
declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee
contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation to have the
donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be
violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and void" would not
appear in the deed of donation.
9

On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does
not state a cause of action against him.

In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called attention to the holding that
there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a
violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court
intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for
rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when
there is absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation.
10

After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and the
petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private
respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint
on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
5

11

12

Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on (a)
whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has
prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed

It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no
reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the
Civil Code provides that donationsinter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on

contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now,
said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory
condition and which is subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso
facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is
the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal
rulings to the present controversy is consequently justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of
the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the
recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al. It was held therein that said stipulation is in the
nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of
breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition
or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked
without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was
an onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the rules on
contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also subject to the same rules because of its
provision on automatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of
reasons said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.
13

The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
14

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and
reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription
should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes
the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that,
at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the
propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court
will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the
cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce
a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that Article 764 was intended to
provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in
the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of
such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the
situation in the case at bar.
15

Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be
dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that private
respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the
resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within
a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said
condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of
petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the

absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in
the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us
constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose
of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a
prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable
period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered
applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit
partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares
that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
twenty (20) years are void.
1wphi1

It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve, in the
main, the devolution of property by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations,
being an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of prohibition to alienate the
property should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of either the donor or
testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to prevent an
unreasonable departure from the normative policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and
870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of
the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is
that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for
the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of
cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation was not
specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or
inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land
for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation.
At the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion to dismiss the
case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court,
both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was
assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of the validity of the same provision
was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error
since both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of
the case: Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, will
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.
16

17

18

Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and

for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice,
would not be subserved by the remand of the case. The aforestated considerations obtain in
and apply to the present case with respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory
condition in question.
19

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX,
Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE
LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.
Donations; Onerous Donations; Words and Phrases; An onerous donation is one executed for
a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself.We find it
difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation
executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his donation
was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent of
the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the
donation. A gift of land to the City of Manila requiring the latter to erect schools, construct a
childrens playground and open streets on the land was considered an onerous donation.
Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed
an obligation upon the latter to establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be for an
onerous consideration.
Same; Same; Obligations; Conditional Obligations; When a person donates land to another on
the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.Under Art. 1181 of the

Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or
loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes
the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If there is no fulfillment or compliance with the resolutory condition,
the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it
shall be deemed lost and extinguished.It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be
constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become the
owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The donation
had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment or compliance
with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked
and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and
extinguished.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statute of Limitations; Prescription; Where the time within which
the condition should be fulfilled depends upon the exclusive will of the donee, its absolute
acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation are
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action for annulment of donation.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is
unavailing. The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the
land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall be
fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the condition
thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended upon the
exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and the
acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to prevent the
statute of limitations from barring the action of private respondents upon the original contract
which was the deed of donation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; A cause of action arises when that which
should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done, and in
cases where there is no special provision for such computation, recourse must be had to the
rule that the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could
have been instituted.Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the
revocation of the donation and recovery of the property donated cannot be specifically
determined in the instant case. A cause of action arises when that which should have been
done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done. In cases where there is no
special provision for such computation, recourse must be had to the rule that the period must
be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could have been instituted. It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of
the period. In this case, the starting point begins with the expiration of a reasonable period and
opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the obligation does not fix a period but
from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may
fix the duration thereof.Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art.

1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof
because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed
the period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when more than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been
allowed the donee to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition in the donation.This
general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing
in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed
petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to
make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is
no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a
mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an
unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rescission; When obligor cannot comply with
what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission, and in the absence of any just
cause for the court to determine the period of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the
court to decree the rescission claimed.Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one
of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing
of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of the
compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of rights and interests.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts
referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the
least transmission of rights and interests.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

Donations; Obligations; Conditions as used in donations and as used in the law of obligations,
compared.There is no conditional obligation to speak of in this case. It seems that the
conditions imposed by the donor and as the word is used in the law of donations is confused
with conditions as used in the law of obligations. In his annotation of Article 764 of the Civil
Code on Donations, Arturo M. Tolentino, citing the well-known civilists such as Castan, Perez
Gonzalez and Alguer, and Colin & Capitant, states clearly the context within which the term
conditions is used in the law of donations, to wit: The word conditions in this article does not
refer to uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment of a juridical relation depends, but
is used in the vulgar sense of obligations or charges imposed by the donor on the donee . It is
used, not in its technical or strict legal sense, but in its broadest sense.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Modal Donation, Explained.Clearly then, when the law
and the deed of donation speaks of conditions of a donation, what are referred to are actually
the obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon the donee and which would

characterize the donation as onerous. In the present case, the donation is, quite obviously,
onerous, but it is more properly called a modal donation. A modal donation is one in which the
donor imposes a prestation upon the donee. The establishment of the medical college as the
condition of the donation in the present case is one such prestation.
Same; Same; Statute of Limitations; Prescription; The mere fact that there is no time fixed as to
when the conditions of the donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the statute
of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes
imprescriptible.Although it is admitted that the fulfillment of the conditions/obligations of the
present donation may be dependent on the will of the donee as to when it will comply therewith,
this did not arise out of a condition which the donee itself imposed. It is believed that the donee
was not meant to and does not have absolute control over the time within which it will perform
its obligations. It must still do so within a reasonable time. What that reasonable time is, under
the circumstances, for the courts to determine. Thus, the mere fact that there is no time fixed as
to when the conditions of the donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the
statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes
imprescriptible.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in
any way encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said
college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name.
Any net income from the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be
known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be used for
improvements of said campus and erection of a building thereon. 1
On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an
action for annulment of donation, reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that since
1939 up to the time the action was filed the latter had not complied with the conditions of the
donation. Private respondents also argued that petitioner had in fact negotiated with the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property with another land owned
by the latter.
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had
prescribed; that it did not violate any of the conditions in the deed of donation because it never
used the donated property for any other purpose than that for which it was intended; and, that it
did not sell, transfer or convey it to any third party.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Juanito M. Acanto for petitioner.
Santos B. Aguadera for private respondents.
[Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511, G.R. No. 112127 July
17, 1995]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals which reversed that of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City directing
petitioner to reconvey to private respondents the property donated to it by their predecessor-ininterest.
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Central Philippine College (now Central Philippine University [CPU]), executed
a deed of donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the
subdivision plan Psd-1144, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-3910-A was issued in the name of the donee CPU with the following annotations
copied from the deed of donation
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the
establishment and use of a medical college with all its buildings as part of
the curriculum;

On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the conditions of the
donation and declared it null and void. The court a quo further directed petitioner to execute a
deed of the reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of the donor, namely, private
respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June 1993 ruled that the annotations at
the back of petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory conditions breach of which should
terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition mandated petitioner to utilize the
donated property for the establishment of a medical school, the donor did not fix a period within
which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the
condition, petitioner could not be considered as having failed to comply with its part of the
bargain. Thus, the appellate court rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision and
remanding the case to the court of origin for the determination of the time within which petitioner
should comply with the first condition annotated in the certificate of title.
Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that the quoted
annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner are onerous obligations and resolutory
conditions of the donation which must be fulfilled non-compliance of which would render the
donation revocable; (b) in holding that the issue of prescription does not deserve "disquisition;"
and, (c) in remanding the case to the trial court for the fixing of the period within which petitioner
would establish a medical college. 2
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the deed of
donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his

donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the
equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the
value of the donation. A gift of land to the City of Manila requiring the latter to erect schools,
construct a children's playground and open streets on the land was considered an onerous
donation. 3 Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner but
imposed an obligation upon the latter to establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be for
an onerous consideration.

Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the
event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the
condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. 4 It is not correct to say that
the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before the
donee could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the
donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. 5 If there was no fulfillment
or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be
revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and
extinguished.

The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is
unavailing.
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the
land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition
shall be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with
the condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled
depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute
acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation
were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private
respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation. 6
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the donation
and recovery of the property donated cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A
cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which
should not have been done is done. 7 In cases where there is no special provision for such
computation, recourse must be had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on which
the corresponding action could have been instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action
which determines the starting point for the computation of the period. In this case, the starting point
begins with the expiration of a reasonable period and opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been
charged upon it by the donor.

The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the necessary buildings and
improvements on the property cannot be quantified in a specific number of years because of
the presence of several factors and circumstances involved in the erection of an educational
institution, such as government laws and regulations pertaining to education, building
requirements and property restrictions which are beyond the control of the donee.

Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code
applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance
therewith and such period has arrived. 8
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances
existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been
allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be
burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so.
Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such
procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay
or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. 9 Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the
Civil Code, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee
may seek rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of the
compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.

Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts
referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the
least transmission of rights and interests.10 Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since
the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed
to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable
length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already
ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated
property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 34, of 31 May 1991 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 18 June 1993 is
accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, petitioner is directed to reconvey to private respondents
Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-3910-A within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Marbibi & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.

Puno & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
[Castro vs. Castro, 542 SCRA 379, G.R. No. 140484 January 28, 2008]
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

G.R. No. 140484

January 28, 2008

ISABELITA SEVILLA CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
LAMBERTO RAMOS CASTRO; RTC of Valenzuela, Branch 75 JUDGE JAIME F.
BAUTISTA, respondents.
Actions; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Due Process; Even assuming that a party
did not receive the summons, she is deemed to have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court when she filed a motion to set aside/declare judgment null and void.Petitioner was
afforded due process and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her person. Even assuming
that petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed to have submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when she filed a motion to set aside/declare judgment null and void.
After the trial court had granted her motion and she was given the opportunity to present
contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on the scheduled hearings for this
purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Death of A Party; Section 24 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that if the party dies after the
entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and
their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.The trial
courts decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was entered on
October 29, 1999. For this reason and on account of private respondents death on January 14,
2004, the judgment is binding on both parties. Section 24 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides: Sec. 24. Effect of
death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court.(b) If the party dies after the
entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and
their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 75.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is a petition for certiorari1 seeking the nullification of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 75, on August 19, 1998, and its Orders issued
respectively on May 5, 1999, July 1, 1999 and September 20, 1999, in Civil Case No. 180-V-98
entitled "Lamberto R. Castro v. Isabelita S. Castro."
The facts are as follows:2
A petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was filed by private respondent Lamberto R. Castro against petitioner
Isabelita S. Castro on July 1, 1998.
Summons, along with a copy of the petition for annulment, was allegedly received by
petitioners nephew on her behalf at her residence.
For failure of petitioner to file an answer, the RTC ordered the state prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and to submit to the court a report thereon.
The state prosecutor submitted a report stating that no collusion existed between the parties in
the filing of the petition. The petition was set for hearing on August 18, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. For
failure of petitioner to appear and to file any responsive pleading to contest the petition, the trial
court allowed private respondent to present his evidence ex parte in the presence of the state
prosecutor.
At the ex-parte hearing, private respondent stated that he married petitioner in 1958. They have
four children but they have been living apart for a number of years prior to the filing of the
petition. Private respondent alleged that their relationship did not last because petitioner was
irresponsible, violent, and had failed to show love and affection towards him and their children,
and had an illicit affair with the family driver which prompted him (private respondent) to file an
adultery case against her. He added that petitioner had neurotic and psychotic tendencies, and
was always mad at him for no apparent reason.
To support private respondents petition, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to testify on petitioners psychological incapacity based on the psychological tests
that she conducted on both parties. According to her, the tests revealed that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated, hence, unable to perform her marital obligations.

On August 19, 1998, public respondent Judge Jaime F. Bautista granted the petition. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner and the marriage of petitioner and respondent on January 30, 1958 is
hereby declared ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED.3
On September 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside/Declare Judgment Null and
Void4 on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person for failure to
serve summons and a copy of the petition. She averred that the sheriffs return was invalid
because she had no nephew residing with her, and no earnest effort was shown by the sheriff
to serve the summons and a copy of the petition before resorting to substituted service.
Petitioner also claimed that the allegations made by private respondent were false, and that the
real reason for filing the petition for annulment was so that he can marry his concubine.

Upon manifestation of Atty. Zapanta, considering that the respondents counsel, time
and again, has been filing motions to postpone, the respondent is hereby deemed to
have waived her right to present countervailing evidence and the Decision dated
August 19, 1998 is hereby ordered MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner received a copy of the Order on May 7, 1999. She filed a motion for
reconsideration8 on May 19, 1999, asserting that private respondent neither opposed the motion
for postponement nor did she receive any order from the court denying the same. She likewise
pointed out that public respondent should have allowed her the chance to present contrary
evidence in court.
After private respondent filed his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. On July 1, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.9

Private respondent filed an Opposition to Respondents Motion to Set Aside Judgment asserting
that summons was properly served on petitioner. After petitioner had filed her Reply, the trial
court issued an Order on March 2, 1999 declaring that:

Petitioner received the Order on July 16, 1999, and on July 19, 1999, she filed a Notice of
Appeal with the trial court 10 against which a Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed by private
respondent.11

Before this court is respondents Motion for Reconsideration, whereupon the

petitioner, through counsel, filed [his] Opposition.

On September 20, 1999, the trial court issued an Order maintaining its Decision dated August
19, 1998, thus:

Finding the Opposition to be with merit, insofar as the absence of contrary evidence
from the respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED
PARTIALLY, hence, the decision or judgment of this court is hereby tentatively set
aside and the respondent is hereby allowed to present contrary evidence which is
hereby set for March 29, 1999 at 10:00 oclock in the morning.
...

Before this Court are several contrasting pleadings propounded by the contending
parties through their respective counsels. It appears, however, that the petitioners
"Motion to Dismiss Appeal" vis--vis the Opposition thereto as well as the related
pleadings, is with MERIT. In other words, the arguments or reasons propounded
therein by the movant appear to be INDUBITABLE, hence, the Opposition thereto is
accordingly DENIED, and consequently, the said Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby
GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.5

The Decision of this court dated August 19, 1998 is hereby ordered MAINTAINED.

Petitioners counsel filed a motion for postponement which was granted by the trial court. The
hearing was reset to May 5, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
On April 21, 1999, however, petitioners counsel again moved for the postponement of the May
5, 1999 hearing to June 16, 1999.6

SO ORDERED. 12
The decision having become final and executory on October 11, 1999, the trial court issued an
entry of judgment on October 29, 1999.13
Hence, this petition.

Notwithstanding petitioners motion for postponement, the trial court, on May 5, 1999, issued an
Order affirming the Decision dated August 19, 1998, thus:
When this case was called for hearing today, only Atty. Froilan Zapanta was present in
court. Although absent, respondents counsel, Teresita Marbibi, had earlier filed a
"Motion for Postponement."

Petitioner contends that:

One, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her (petitioner);

Two, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued the Decision dated August 19, 1998; and
Lastly, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied her appeal, and
maintained the assailed decision.

Finally, the trial courts decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was
entered on October 29, 1999. For this reason and on account of private respondents death on
January 14, 2004,16 the judgment is binding on both parties. Section 24 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages17 provides:
Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. (b)
If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall
be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the
estate in the regular courts.

Petitioner argues as follows:

First, there was no valid service of summons; hence, the trial court had no right or power to
render judgment against her. The sheriffs return stated that summons was served through
petitioners nephew without an explanation why a substituted service was resorted to. Also,
petitioner does not have any nephew living at her residence;
Second, the finding of the trial court that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity is
devoid of merit. The allegations of private respondent merely showed that they could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of any psychological defect on the part of
petitioner or the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability;
Third, the trial court erred in not setting the case for pre-trial and trial which is a mandatory
requirement under Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. It rendered a decision without any
evidence presented by petitioner. The court merely relied on the fabricated report of the public
prosecutor as the latter did not actually interview her or conduct any investigation on the matter;
and
Lastly, the notice of appeal filed by petitioner on July 19, 1999 was an appeal from the Order
dated July 1, 1999, which was an interlocutory order. This was, however, dismissed by public
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, has no other recourse but to file the present petition
for certiorari.
The petition fails.
This Court finds no reason to set aside the findings of the trial court. The records show that
petitioner was personally informed of the petition for annulment, and as stated by the trial court,
petitioner received the summons and the petition on July 15, 1998. She "acknowledged receipt
thereof by affixing her signature on the original copy of said summons dated July 13,
1998."14 Petitioner neither denied nor refuted this.
Petitioners claim that she was never informed of the proceedings is unbelievable because she
even submitted herself to a series of psychological examination performed by public
respondents expert witness, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist.
Petitioner was afforded due process and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her person.
Even assuming that petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed to have
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she filed a motion to set aside/declare
judgment null and void.15 After the trial court had granted her motion and she was given the
opportunity to present contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on the
scheduled hearings for this purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 75, on August 19, 1998, and its Orders issued respectively
on May 5, 1999, July 1, 1999 and September 20, 1999, in Civil Case No. 180-V-98,
are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Civil Law; Property; Donations; Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be
categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal;
and (4) onerous.Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1)
pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A
pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in
its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for
the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a
demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in
consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or
charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally,
an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be
more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is
equal to or more than the thing donated. Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the
onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the
validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts.
Same; Same; Same; Revocation; Considering that the donees acts did not detract from the
very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of
prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will
not warrant the revocation of the donation.As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein
entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the
donation was intended. In fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in
the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence,
considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation
was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor
would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the
donation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Yulo, Aliling & Associates for petitioner.
Padilla Law Office for respondent.
[C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc. vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., 454 SCRA 279, G.R.
No. 133705 March 31, 2005]
DECISION
G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
C-J YULO & SONS, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC., Respondents.

Appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated
December 19, 1997 and Resolution2 dated April 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 45392, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna,

Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the herein petitionerC-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for
revocation of donation with reconveyance of title, thereat commenced by the petitioner against
the herein respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.
The facts are not at all disputed:
On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in its name under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation which also bears the
acceptance of the donee recites the considerations therefor and the conditions thereto
attached, to wit:
WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in much (sic) humanitarian Christian
work in Laguna and elsewhere, educating and forming the young, caring for the infirm and the
aged in the fulfillment of its mission;
WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately endowed institution that will care for the
homeless and destitute old people in the community, as well as the other senior citizens who for
some reason or other find themselves without family with whom to live the last years of their life:
WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish and support such an institution to
donate the land necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land whereon it may raise crops
for its support and for the sustenance of its residents;
WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted help of Donor and of other benefactors,
to establish, operate and maintain such a home for the aged.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing premises, Donor hereby transfers and
conveys to Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and interest in that certain parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-82803 of the Land Records of Laguna, the technical descriptions of
which are recited above, subject to the following conditions and covenants, each of which is a
material consideration for this Deed:
1. So much of the land as may be necessary shall be used for the construction of a home for
the aged and infirm, regardless of religion or creed, but preferably those coming from
Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna; provided that retired and/or aged priests may be admitted to the
home; and provided further that any senior citizen from the area who has retired from business
or work may likewise be admitted to the home, subject to the payment to the institution of such
sum as he may afford for his support.
2. A Green Belt that is 15 meters wide shall be established and maintained by the Donor along
the length of the land to separate and insulate it from the projected highway.
3. Such part of land as may not be needed for the residence and the Green Belt shall be
devoted by Donee with the help of such residents of the home as are able, to the raising of
agricultural crops for the consumption of the residents of the home, and of such other crops that
may be sold to defray the cost of running the home and feeding its residents; provided, that

should the area later become so fully urbanized as to make this limitation on use economically,
impractical, any portion of the land may, with the written consent of the Donor, be put to
commercial use by the Donee by leasing the same for wholesome and socially-acceptable
activities; provided further that the rentals from such commercial leases shall be used, first, to
meet the expenses of the home; second, to enlarge its population and expand its facilities; and
finally for other charitable purposes in Laguna, in that order.
4. Donee acknowledges that Donors generous act will greatly aid Donee in accomplishing its
mission on earth, and, recognizing the generosity of the Yulo family as the reason for such act,
Donee undertakes to cause every year the celebration of masses for the intention of the various
members of the family of Mr. Jose Yulo, Sr., on festive and solemn occasions in the said family.
5. Except with prior written consent of the Donor or its successor, the Donee shall not use the
land except for the purpose as provided above in paragraph 1 hereof, nor sell or dispose the
land for any reason whatsoever, nor convey any portion of the same except in lease for
commercial use as provided above in paragraph 3 hereof, otherwise the said land with all real
improvements thereon shall revert in trust to the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some
other charitable organization that Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged.
(Underscoring supplied).
On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the donor was cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. T-91348 in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the
perimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged
and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said
portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the
donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation.
The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.
The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this
time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it
entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the
electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was
named as "Casa dela Merced." As before, however, the donee executed the lease
contract without the prior written consent of the donor.
After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a
portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening
cattles. The donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of
generating funds for the completion of "Casa dela Merced." Again, however, the donee did not
secure the prior written consent of the donor.
Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president
Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the
donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donees non-compliance with and
material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated. In the same letter, the donor requested
for the turn-over of the donees TCT No. T-91348 over the donated property.

In a reply-letter dated November 5, 1990, the donee, through Bishop Pedro N. Bantigue, D.D.,
denied any material breach of the conditions of the deed of donation and manifested its
continued and faithful compliance with the provisions thereof. In the same letter, the donee
refused the turn-over of its title to the donor.
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on November 19, 1990, in the Regional
Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna the donor, alleging non-compliance with and violation by the
donee of the conditions of the deed of donation, filed its complaint in this case against donee
Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Pablo, Inc., therein reciting the imputed non-compliance
and violations by the donee of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation, as follows:
a) non-construction of the home for the aged and infirmed in the lot despite the lapse of a
reasonable and considerable length of time;
b) present land use of the area is a cattle farm, the owner of which has a lease contract with the
donee; and

Therefrom, donee-defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., went to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 19, 1997,3 the Court of Appeals reversed that
of the trial court and upheld the donation in question, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 22, 1993 is
hereby REVERSED and the donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exhibit C) which conveyed
title to the donated property in the appellees name is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its Resolution of April
30, 1998,4 donor C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., has come to this Court via the present recourse on its
sole submission that

c) no prior written consent of the donor has been obtained for the present and actual use of the
property donated,

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (THAT THE REVOCATION OF THE DONATION
BY PETITIONER WAS IMPROPER) IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE.

and accordingly prayed that the subject deed of donation be adjudged revoked and void and
the donee ordered to return and/or reconvey the property donated.

We DENY.

In its answer, defendant donee alleged that it was doing its best to comply with the provisions of
the deed of donation relative to the establishment of the home for the aged and the infirm,
adding that the leases of portions of the land were with the express, albeit unwritten consent, of
Jesus Miguel Yulo himself. In the same answer, defendant donee interposed the defense that
the donors cause of action for revocation, if any, had already prescribed because the leases
were known to the latter since 1980.
In a decision dated December 22, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment for donor-plaintiff C-J
Yulo & Sons, Inc., thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring
the Deed of Donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exh. "C") REVOKED, affirming plaintiffs
revocation of the same in the letter dated September 20, 1990 (Exh. "D").
Defendant and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to immediately
vacate the premises of the donated property and to hand over to plaintiff the peaceful
possession of the aforesaid premises.
To avoid multiplicity of suits, the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, is hereby ordered to
require the defendant to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91348 (Exh. "B") and
thereafter cancel the same and issue, upon payment of the required fees, a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs, with cost against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that the donation is an onerous one
since the donee was burdened with the establishment on the donated property of a home for
the aged and the infirm. It likewise agreed with the trial court that there were violations of the
terms and conditions of the deed of donation when the donee thrice leased a portion of the
property without the prior written consent of the donor. Likewise upheld by the appellate court is
the ruling of the trial court that the prescriptive period of the donors right to revoke the donation
is ten (10) years based on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, instead of four (4) years per Article
764 of the same Code, and therefore the action for revocation filed by the petitioner is not
barred by prescription.
Even then, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision, the reversal being premised
on the appellate courts finding that the breaches thrice committed by the respondent were
merely casual breaches which nevertheless did not detract from the purpose of which the
donation was made: the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm.
We agree.
Petitioner contends that the case at bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central Philippine
University vs. Court of Appeals,5 where the donee failed for more than 50 years to establish, as
required, a medical school on the land donated, and where this Court declared the donation to
have been validly revoked.
To the mind of the Court, what is applicable to this case is the more recent [2001] case
of Republic vs. Silim,6where respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square meter parcel of land in
favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur with the

condition that the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes
only. Although a school building was constructed on the property through the efforts of the
Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school
building could not be released because the government required that it be built on a onehectare parcel of land. This led the donee therein to exchange the donated property for a bigger
one.
In Silim, the Court distinguished the four (4) types of donations:
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple
donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form.
On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of
rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A
conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee,
the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that
which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing
donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is
because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but
by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:

Thus, in the case of "Ocampo v. C.A." (ibid), citing the case of "Angeles v. Calasanz" (135
SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court ruled:
The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations x x x is not
absolute. In Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court stated that:
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of
the parties in making the agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil.
821,827). The question of whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the
attendant circumstances (Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968).
The above ruling of the Court of Appeals is completely in tune with this Courts disposition in
Republic vs. Silim, supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the donation on the ground that
the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose
only, but this Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the
lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the
release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a
burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property.

As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole
purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was
authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written
consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donees acts did not
detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such
purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the
deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law on contracts instead of the law on
donations because the donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is by a burden
imposed upon the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm. We thus
quote with approval the terse ruling of the appellate court in the challenged decision:

Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for
all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of
the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation, would
constitute undue restriction of the donees right of ownership over the donated property.

First, the violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee were merely
casual breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not detract from the purpose by which
the donation was made, i.e., for the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. In
order for a contract which imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous donation in this
case wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter property in Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to establish a home for the aged
and the infirm (Exhibit C), may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New Civil Code, the breach
of the conditions thereof must be substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the contract
was perfected (Tolentino, "Civil Code of the Philippines," Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562).

Instructive on this point is the ruling of this Court in The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
vs. Court of Appeals,7 viz:

ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.

Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in
the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy.

xxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of
the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is
that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for
the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter, hence, for lack of
cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.
If petitioner would insist that the lack of prior written consent is a resolutory condition that is
absolute in character, the insistence would not stand the validity test under the foregoing
doctrine. What would have been casual breaches of the terms and conditions of the donation,
may, in that event, even be considered as no breach at all when the Court strikes down such
absolute condition of prior written consent by the donor in all instances without any exception
whatsoever. The Court, however, understands that such a condition was written with a specific
purpose in mind, which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was
intended is achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than totally striking it
would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the donation. Thus, for as long as the
contracts of lease do not detract from the purpose for which the donation was made, the
complained acts of the donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and
conditions of the deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor.
Finally, anent petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals failed to consider that respondent
had abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and infirm, the explanation in
respondents comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on Bishop Bantigues letter 8 dated June
21, 1990 as its basis for claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned the idea of

constructing a home for the aged and the infirm on the property donated. Respondent, however,
explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the vernacular, expressed his concern that the
surrounding area was being considered to be re-classified into an industrial zone where
factories are expected to be put up. There is no question that this will definitely be
disadvantageous to the health of the aged and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission
from the donor for a possible exchange or sale of the donated property to ultimately pursue the
purpose for which the donation was intended in another location that is more appropriate.
The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and good judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which
it conforms completely. We cannot accede to petitioners view, which attributed the exact
opposite meaning to the Bishops letter seeking permission to sell or exchange the donated
property.
In Silim, supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does not constitute breach of the terms and
conditions of the donation. We see no reason for the Court to think otherwise in this case. To
insist that the home for the aged and infirm be constructed on the donated property, if the
industrialization indeed pushes through, defies rhyme and reason. Any act by the donor to
prevent the donee from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was intended
would constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.