Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
224
xxxx
The payment of COLA was not among those listed as benefits in Exhibit "F."
In 1998, the Supreme Court promulgated a Decision5 declaring DBM CCC No.10
ineffective for failure to comply with the publication requirement. Consequently, MWSS
partially released the COLA payments for its employees, including members of MWSA,
covering the years 1989 to 1997, and up to year 1999 for its retained employees.
In 2002, MWSA filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter praying for the payment of
their COLA from the year 1997, the time its members were absorbed by Maynilad, up to
the present. MWSA argued that since DBM CCC No. 10 was rendered ineffective, the
COLA should be paid as part of the benefits enjoyed by their members at the time of
their separation from MWSS, and which should form part of their salaries and benefits
with Maynilad.
In a decision dated 10 November 2006, the Labor Arbiter granted MWSAs claim and
directed Maynilad to pay the COLA of the supervisors retroactive to the date when they
were hired in 1997, with legal interest from the date of promulgation of the decision. It
also directed Maynilad to take necessary measures to ensure that the benefit is
incorporated in the employees monthly compensation.6
On 11 December 2006, Maynilad appealed the decision before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Reduce
Bond.
The NLRC granted Maynilads motion and reversed on appeal the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. On 28 September 2007, MWSA filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
denied by the NLRC in its 23 October 2007 resolution.
Aggrieved, MWSA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on 11 January 2008.
In a Decision7 dated 31 May 2010, the CA Ninth Division annulled and set aside the
decision of the NLRC. It thus reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Maynilad filed a motion for reconsideration of the 31 May 2010 CA Decision.
On 31 January 2011, the CA Ninth Division reconsidered its earlier Decision. The
decretal portion of the amended decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Consequently, the Courts 31 May 2010 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
07 September 2007 Decision and 23 October 2007 Resolution of the NLRC are
AFFIRMED, and are thus REINSTATED.8
MWSA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the amended decision. Pending resolution 225
of the Motion for Reconsideration, MWSA moved for the inhibition of the members of
the Ninth Division of the CA. The members of the division recused from the case in a
Resolution dated 3 June 2011. Thereafter, the Second Division of the CA, to which the
case was raffled, issued a Resolution9 on 12 September 2011 denying MWSAs Motion
for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in not holding that the MWSA members are entitled to COLA
under the Concession Agreement.
Whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC when
the latter granted Maynilads appeal despite insufficiency of the appeal bond.
OUR RULING
Simply stated, the main issue in this case is whether Maynilad bound itself under the
Concession Agreement to pay the COLA of the employees it absorbed from MWSS. A
careful review of the Concession Agreement led us to conclude that both MWSS and
Maynilad never intended to include COLA as one of the benefits to be granted to the
absorbed employees.
The benefits agreed upon by the parties are stated in Exhibit "F" of the Concession
Agreement, to wit:
Existing MWSS Fringe Benefits
A. ALLOWANCES
PERA - P500.00 Salary Grade 1 to 23 except those with RATA
ACA P500.00 Salary Grade 1 to 25
RATA- 40% of basic Supervisory Level, Section Chiefs and up or equivalent ranks.
Technical and Executive Assistants
Medical 2,500/year
Rice 500/month
Uniform 2,000/year
Meal 25.00/day (for medical personnel P30.00/day)
Longevity 50.00/year of service/month
Children 30.00/child/month, maximum four (4) children below 21 years old
Hazard 50.00/month
B. BONUSES
Year-End Financial Assistance One (1) month Gross pay (Basic Salary plus PERA, ACA, 226
rice, meal, longevity, Children and RATA
Mid-Year One (1) month Gross Pay Christmas Bonus and Cash Gift One (1) month
Basic salary plus P1,000 cash gift
Anniversary (Bigay-pala) 4,000.00 or 50% of basic, whichever is greater
Productivity as of December 1995 Amount equivalent to P5,000 or 60% of gross pay,
exclusive of RATA, whichever is higher
C. PREMIUMS
Graveyard 50% (12MN 6:00 AM)
Nightwork 25% (6PM 6AM)
Holiday 125%
Sunday 150%
Overtime 125%
Distress 25% of basic pay (For Sewerage Department only)
D. PAID LEAVES
Vacation 15 days/year
Sick 15 days/year
Maternity 60 calendar days
Paternity 7 working days
Emergency Leave - 3 days/year
(Birthday/Funeral/Mourning/Graduation/Enrollment/Wedding/
Anniversary/Hospitalization/Accident/Relocation)
E. STUDY LEAVE
- Study now pay later scheme
- Grant (with contract to serve MWSS)10
It is clear from the aforesaid enumeration that COLA is not among the benefits to be
received by the absorbed employees. Contrary to the contention of MWSA, the
declaration by the Court of the ineffectiveness of DBM CCC No. 10 due to its nonpublication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country,11 did not give rise to the employees right to demand payment of the subject
benefit from Maynilad.
227
As far as their employment relationship with Maynilad is concerned, the same is not
affected by the De Jesus ruling because it is governed by a separate compensation
the law between the parties, and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so
long as it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Otherwise,
courts would be interfering with the freedom of contract of the parties. Simply put,
courts cannot stipulate for the parties or amend the latters agreement, for to do so
would be to alter the real intention of the contracting parties when the contrary function
of courts is to give force and effect to the intention of the parties.
In fine, contrary to the allegation of MWSA, there is no ambiguity in the Concession
Agreement.1wphi1 Thus, there is nothing to be construed.
Anent the issue of the insufficiency of the appeal bond posted by Maynilad, we agree
with the NLRC that there was merit in the arguments forwarded in support of the prayer
for the reduction of the appeal bond. Maynilad sought the reduction of the appeal bond
to ten percent (10%) for the following reasons: a) that it had filed a Petition for
Rehabilitation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and b) that as a result
thereof, the Rehabilitation Court issued a Stay Order prohibiting it from selling,
encumbering, transferring or disposing in any manner any of its properties making it
impossible for it to fully comply with the appeal bond requirement.24 Our ruling in
Garcia, et al. v. KJ Commercial25 that the requirement on appeals may be relaxed when
there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the
appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. Here, we note that Maynilad s
appeal was accompanied by an appeal bond in the amount of Twenty Five Million Pesos
(P25,000,000.00) with an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Reduce Bond on the
ground that the labor arbiter failed to specify the exact amount of monetary award from
which the amount of the appeal bond is to be based.
In University Plans v. Solano,26 this Court reiterated the guidelines which the NLRC
must exercise in considering the motions for reduction of bond:
The bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been and may be
relaxed in meritorious cases. These cases include instances in which (1) there was
substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and circumstances
constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the
requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their
willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.
It is evident that the aforesaid instances are present in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the 31
January 2011 Amended Decision and 12 September 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101911 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189404
In a decision7 dated March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter (LA) Elias H. Salinas partially ruled
in favor of the petitioners. The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential, service
incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. In awarding these claims, the LA stated
that the burden of proving the payment of these money claims rests with the employer.
The LA also awarded attorneys fees in favor of the petitioners, pursuant to Article 111
of the Labor Code.8
However, the LA denied the petitioners claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and
premium pays. The LA observed that the petitioners failed to show that they rendered
overtime work and worked on holidays and rest days without compensation. The LA
further concluded that the petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from
employment because they did not show any notice of termination of employment. They
were also not barred from entering the respondents premises.
The Proceedings before the NLRC
Both parties appealed the LAs ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission. The
petitioners disputed the LAs denial of their claim for backwages, overtime, holiday and
premium pays. Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the LAs ruling on the ground
that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
The respondents insisted that they were not personally served with summons and other
processes. They also claimed that they paid the petitioners minimum wages, service
incentive leave and thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied and
computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal.9 They further
maintained that the petitioners were validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners
repeated defiance to their transfer to different workplaces and their violations of the
company rules and regulations constituted serious misconduct and willful
disobedience.10
On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They
attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated
teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the
amounts allegedly deposited in the employees ATM cards.11 They also attached
documentary evidence showing that the petitioners were dismissed for cause and had
been accorded due process.
On January 22, 2003, the petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion12 where
they asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it
allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified.
Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents notice of
appeal with memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed
to the respondents filing of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002.13 Third
the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners
forged signatures.
They reiterated these allegations in an Urgent Motion to Resolve Manifestation and
Motion (To Expunge from the Records Respondents Supplemental Appeal, Reply and/or 232
Rejoinder) dated January 31, 2003.14 Subsequently, the petitioners filed an Urgent
Manifestation with Reiterating Motion to Strike-Off the Record Supplemental
Appeal/Reply, Quitclaims and Spurious Documents Attached to Respondents Appeal
dated August 7, 2003.15 The petitioners argued in this last motion that the payrolls
should not be given probative value because they were the respondents fabrications.
They reiterated that the genuine payrolls bore their signatures, unlike the respondents
photocopies of the payrolls. They also maintained that their signatures in the
respondents documents (which showed their receipt of thirteenth month pay) had been
forged.
The NLRC Ruling
In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially ruled in favor of the
respondents.16 The NLRC affirmed the LAs awards of holiday pay and attorneys fees.
It also maintained that the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents
through their voluntary appearance.
However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time on
appeal on the ground that they had been deprived of due process. It found that the
respondents did not actually receive the LAs processes. It also admitted the
respondents unverified supplemental appeal on the ground that technicalities may be
disregarded to serve the greater interest of substantial due process. Furthermore, the
Rules of Court do not require the verification of a supplemental pleading.
The NLRC also vacated the LAs awards of salary differential, thirteenth month and
service incentive leave pays. In so ruling, it gave weight to the pieces of evidence
attached to the memorandum on appeal and the supplemental appeal. It maintained
that the absence of the petitioners signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable
factor for their authenticity. It pointed out that the payment of money claims was
further evidenced by the list of employees with ATM cards. It also found that the
petitioners signatures were not forged. It took judicial notice that many people use at
least two or more different signatures.
The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds of
serious misconduct and willful disobedience. It found that the petitioners failed to
comply with various memoranda directing them to transfer to other workplaces and to
attend training seminars for the intended reorganization and reshuffling.
The NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April
28, 2006.17 Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA.18
The CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling. The CA held that the petitioners were afforded
substantive and procedural due process. Accordingly, the petitioners deliberately did not
explain their side. Instead, they continuously resisted their transfer to other PLDT 233
offices and violated company rules and regulations. It also upheld the NLRCs findings
on the petitioners monetary claims.
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated August
28, 2009, prompting the petitioners to file the present petition.19
The Petition
In the petition before this Court, the petitioners argue that the CA committed a
reversible error when it did not find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
They reiterate their arguments before the lower tribunals and the CA in support of this
conclusion. They also point out that the respondents posted a bond from a surety that
was not accredited by this Court and by the NLRC. In effect, the respondents failed to
perfect their appeal before the NLRC. They further insist that the NLRC should not have
admitted the respondents unverified supplemental appeal.20
The Respondents Position
In their Comments, the respondents stress that the petitioners only raised the issue of
the validity of the appeal bond for the first time on appeal. They also reiterate their
arguments before the NLRC and the CA. They additionally submit that the petitioners
arguments have been fully passed upon and found unmeritorious by the NLRC and the
CA.21
The Issues
This case presents to us the following issues:
1) Whether the CA erred when it did not find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the respondents appeal;
a) Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before the NLRC; and
b) Whether the NLRC properly allowed the respondents supplemental appeal
2) Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of evidence for the
first time on appeal;
3) Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed and are thus entitled to backwages;
4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to salary differential, overtime, holiday,
premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays; and
5) Whether the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
The respondents perfected their
appeal with the NLRC because the
revocation of the bonding company's
authority has a prospective
application
Paragraph 2, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that "[i]n case of a judgment 234
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from."
Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue of the appeal bonds validity may be raised
for the first time on appeal since its proper filing is a jurisdictional requirement.22 The
requirement that the appeal bond should be issued by an accredited bonding company
is mandatory and jurisdictional. The rationale of requiring an appeal bond is to
discourage the employers from using an appeal to delay or evade the employees' just
and lawful claims. It is intended to assure the workers that they will receive the money
judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employers appeal.23
In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued by Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation (Security Pacific) on June 28, 2002. At that time, Security Pacific
was still an accredited bonding company. However, the NLRC revoked its accreditation
on February 16, 2003.24 Nonetheless, this subsequent revocation should not prejudice
the respondents who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. In Del
Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.,25 we ruled that a bonding companys revocation
of authority is prospective in application.
However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by an accredited bonding
company in compliance with paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. This provision states that "[a] cash or surety bond shall be valid and
effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved
or terminated or the award satisfied."
The CA correctly ruled that the
NLRC properly gave due course to
the respondents supplemental
appeal
The CA also correctly ruled that the NLRC properly gave due course to the respondents
supplemental appeal. Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the
supplemental appeal.26 Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement. It is mainly intended for the assurance that the matters alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not of mere speculation.27 Also, a supplemental
appeal is merely an addendum to the verified memorandum on appeal that was earlier
filed in the present case; hence, the requirement for verification has substantially been
complied with.
The respondents also timely filed their supplemental appeal on January 3, 2003. The
records of the case show that the petitioners themselves agreed that the pleading shall
be filed until December 18, 2002. The NLRC further extended the filing of the
supplemental pleading until January 3, 2003 upon the respondents motion for
extension.
A party may only adduce evidence
for the first time on appeal if he
adequately explains his delay in the
submission of evidence and he
sufficiently proves the allegations
sought to be proven
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time 235
and again, we have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with
the NLRC in the interest of substantial justice.28 Thus, we have consistently supported
the rule that labor officials should use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
236
especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures.
Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to
examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals.
This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents failure to present
the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced.36
It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that "[i]t is of
common knowledge that there are many people who use at least two or more different
signatures."37 The NLRC cannot take judicial notice that many people use at least two
signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves disown the
signatures in the respondents assailed documentary evidence.38 The NLRCs position is
unwarranted and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that the employers cause can only succeed on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employees evidence.39
The petitioners are entitled to
backwages
Based on the above considerations, we reverse the NLRC and the CAs finding that the
petitioners were terminated for just cause and were afforded procedural due process. In
termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee from his employment rests upon the employer. The employers failure to
discharge this burden results in the finding that the dismissal is unjustified.40 This is
exactly what happened in the present case.
The petitioners are entitled to salary
differential, service incentive,
holiday, and thirteenth month pays
We also reverse the NLRC and the CAs finding that the petitioners are not entitled to
salary differential, service incentive, holiday, and thirteenth month pays. As in illegal
dismissal cases, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment of these money claims.41
The rationale for this rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents which will show that differentials, service
incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession
of the worker but are in the custody and control of the employer.42
The petitioners are not entitled to
overtime and premium pays
However, the CA was correct in its finding that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient 237
factual basis for the award of overtime, and premium pays for holidays and rest days.
The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for holidays and
rest days rests on the employee because these are not incurred in the normal course of
business.43 In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence that
would show that they actually rendered service in excess of the regular eight working
hours a day, and that they in fact worked on holidays and rest days.
July 2, 2014
ARIEL L. DAVID, doing business under the name and style "YIELS HOG
DEALER," Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN G. MACASIO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the November 22, 238
2010 decision2 and the January 31, 2011 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 116003. The CA decision annulled and set aside the May 26, 2010
decision4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)5 which, in turn, affirmed
the April 30, 2009 Decision6 of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA's decision dismissed
nature of Davids business as hog dealer supports this "pakyaw" or task basis
arrangement.
The LA concluded that as Macasio was engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis, he is not
entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay.
The NLRCs Ruling
In its May 26, 2010 decision,16 the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling.17 The NLRC observed
that David did not require Macasio to observe an eight hour work schedule to earn the
fixed P700.00 wage; and that Macasio had been performing a non-time work, pointing
out that Macasio was paid a fixed amount for the completion of the assigned task,
irrespective of the time consumed in its performance. Since Macasio was paid by result
and not in terms of the time that he spent in the workplace, Macasio is not covered by
the Labor Standards laws on overtime, SIL and holiday pay, and 13th month pay under
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 13th month pay law.18
Macasio moved for reconsideration19 but the NLRC denied his motion in its August 11,
2010 resolution,20 prompting Macasio to elevate his case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari.21
The CAs Ruling
In its November 22, 2010 decision,22 the CA partly granted Macasios certiorari petition
and reversed the NLRCs ruling for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
While the CA agreed with the LAand the NLRC that Macasio was a task basis employee,
it nevertheless found Macasio entitled to his monetary claims following the doctrine laid
down in Serrano v. Severino Santos Transit.23 The CA explained that as a task basis
employee, Macasio is excluded from the coverage of holiday, SIL and 13th month pay
only if he is likewise a "field personnel." As defined by the Labor Code, a "field
personnel" is one who performs the work away from the office or place of work and
whose regular work hours cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. In Macasios
case, the elements that characterize a "field personnel" are evidently lacking as he had
been working as a butcher at Davids "Yiels Hog Dealer" business in Sta. Mesa, Manila
under Davids supervision and control, and for a fixed working schedule that starts at
10:00 p.m.
Accordingly, the CA awarded Macasios claim for holiday, SIL and 13th month pay for
three years, with 10% attorneys fees on the total monetary award. The CA, however,
denied Macasios claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis.
David filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration24 in
the CAs January 31, 2011 resolution.25
The Petition
In this petition,26 David maintains that Macasios engagement was on a "pakyaw" or 240
task basis. Hence, the latter is excluded from the coverage of holiday, SIL and 13th
month pay. David reiterates his submissions before the lower tribunals27 and adds that
he never had any control over the manner by which Macasio performed his work and he
simply looked on to the "end-result." He also contends that he never compelled Macasio
to report for work and that under their arrangement, Macasio was at liberty to choose
whether to report for work or not as other butchers could carry out his tasks. He points
out that Solano and Antonio had, in fact, attested to their (David and Macasios)
established "pakyawan" arrangement that rendered a written contract unnecessary. In
as much as Macasio is a task basis employee who is paid the fixed amount of P700.00
per engagement regardless of the time consumed in the performance David argues
that Macasio is not entitled to the benefits he claims. Also, he posits that because he
engaged Macasio on "pakyaw" or task basis then no employer-employee relationship
exists between them.
Finally, David argues that factual findings of the LA, when affirmed by the NLRC, attain
finality especially when, as in this case, they are supported by substantial evidence.
Hence, David posits that the CA erred in reversing the labor tribunals findings and
granting the prayed monetary claims.
The Case for the Respondent
Macasio counters that he was not a task basis employee or a "field personnel" as David
would have this Court believe.28 He reiterates his arguments before the lower tribunals
and adds that, contrary to Davids position, the P700.00 fee that he was paid for each
day that he reported for work does not indicate a "pakyaw" or task basis employment
as this amount was paid daily, regardless of the number or pieces of hogs that he had
to chop. Rather, it indicates a daily-wage method of payment and affirms his regular
employment status. He points out that David did not allege or present any evidence as
regards the quota or number of hogs that he had to chop as basis for the "pakyaw" or
task basis payment; neither did David present the time record or payroll to prove that
he worked for less than eight hours each day. Moreover, David did not present any
contract to prove that his employment was on task basis. As David failed to prove the
alleged task basis or "pakyawan" agreement, Macasio concludes that he was Davids
employee. Procedurally, Macasio points out that Davids submissions in the present
petition raise purely factual issues that are not proper for a petition for review on
certiorari. These issues whether he (Macasio) was paid by result or on "pakyaw"
basis; whether he was a "field personnel"; whether an employer-employee relationship
existed between him and David; and whether David exercised control and supervision
over his work are all factual in nature and are, therefore, proscribed in a Rule 45
petition. He argues that the CAs factual findings bind this Court, absent a showing that
such findings are not supported by the evidence or the CAs judgment was based on a
misapprehension of facts. He adds that the issue of whether an employer-employee
relationship existed between him and David had already been settled by the LA29 and
the NLRC30 (as well as by the CA per Macasios manifestation before this Court dated
November 15, 2012),31 in his favor, in the separate illegal case that he filed against
David.
The Issue
The issue revolves around the proper application and interpretation of the labor law 241
provisions on holiday, SIL and 13th month pay to a worker engaged on "pakyaw" or
task basis. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA, the issue is whether the
CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Macasio is
entitled to these labor standards benefits.
The Courts Ruling
task basis, then he is not entitled to SIL, holiday and 13th month pay. Second, we
consider it crucial, that in the separate illegal dismissal case Macasio filed with the LA,
the LA, the NLRC and the CA uniformly found the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.37
In other words, aside from being factual in nature, the existence of an employeremployee relationship is in fact a non-issue in this case. To reiterate, in deciding a Rule
45 petition for review of a labor decision rendered by the CA under 65, the narrow
scope of inquiry is whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. In concrete question form, "did the
NLRC gravely abuse its discretion in denying Macasios claims simply because he is paid
on a non-time basis?"
At any rate, even if we indulge the petitioner, we find his claim that no employeremployee relationship exists baseless. Employing the control test,38 we find that such a
relationship exist in the present case.
Even a factual review shows that Macasio is Davids employee
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, four elements
generally need to be considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to
control the employees conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-called
"four-fold" test of employment relationship. Macasios relationship with David satisfies
this test.
First, David engaged the services of Macasio, thus satisfying the element of "selection
and engagement of the employee." David categorically confirmed this fact when, in his
"Sinumpaang Salaysay," he stated that "nag apply po siya sa akin at kinuha ko siya na
chopper[.]"39 Also, Solano and Antonio stated in their "Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay"40 that "[k]ami po ay nagtratrabaho sa Yiels xxx na pag-aari ni Ariel David
bilang butcher" and "kilalanamin si xxx Macasio na isa ring butcher xxx ni xxx David at
kasama namin siya sa aming trabaho."
Second, David paid Macasios wages.Both David and Macasio categorically stated in
their respective pleadings before the lower tribunals and even before this Court that the
former had been paying the latter P700.00 each day after the latter had finished the
days task. Solano and Antonio also confirmed this fact of wage payment in their
"Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay."41 This satisfies the element of "payment of
wages."
Third, David had been setting the day and time when Macasio should report for work.
This power to determine the work schedule obviously implies power of control. By
having the power to control Macasios work schedule, David could regulate Macasios
work and could even refuse to give him any assignment, thereby effectively dismissing
him.
And fourth, David had the right and power to control and supervise Macasios work as
to the means and methods of performing it. In addition to setting the day and time 243
when Macasio should report for work, the established facts show that David rents the
place where Macasio had been performing his tasks. Moreover, Macasio would leave the
workplace only after he had finished chopping all of the hog meats given to him for the
days task. Also, David would still engage Macasios services and have him report for
work even during the days when only few hogs were delivered for butchering.
Under this overall setup, all those working for David, including Macasio, could naturally
be expected to observe certain rules and requirements and David would necessarily
exercise some degree of control as the chopping of the hog meats would be subject to
his specifications. Also, since Macasio performed his tasks at Davids workplace, David
could easily exercise control and supervision over the former. Accordingly, whether or
not David actually exercised this right or power to control is beside the point as the law
simply requires the existence of this power to control 4243 or, as in this case, the
existence of the right and opportunity to control and supervise Macasio.44
In sum, the totality of the surrounding circumstances of the present case sufficiently
points to an employer-employee relationship existing between David and Macasio.
Macasio is engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis
At this point, we note that all three tribunals the LA, the NLRC and the CA found
that Macasio was engaged or paid on "pakyaw" or task basis. This factual finding binds
the Court under the rule that factual findings of labor tribunals when supported by the
established facts and in accord with the laws, especially when affirmed by the CA, is
binding on this Court.
A distinguishing characteristic of "pakyaw" or task basis engagement, as opposed to
straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a
task-basis work, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is
reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the number of time spent
in the completion of work.45 Once the work or task is completed, the worker receives a
fixed amount as wage, without regard to the standard measurements of time generally
used in pay computation.
In Macasios case, the established facts show that he would usually start his work at
10:00 p.m. Thereafter, regardless of the total hours that he spent at the workplace or of
the total number of the hogs assigned to him for chopping, Macasio would receive the
fixed amount of P700.00 once he had completed his task. Clearly, these circumstances
show a "pakyaw" or task basis engagement that all three tribunals uniformly found.
In sum, the existence of employment relationship between the parties is determined by
applying the "four-fold" test; engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis does not determine
the parties relationship as it is simply a method of pay computation. Accordingly,
Macasio is Davids employee, albeit engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis.
As an employee of David paid on pakyaw or task basis, we now go to the core issue of
whether Macasio is entitled to holiday, 13th month, and SIL pay.
On the issue of Macasios entitlement to holiday, SIL and 13th month pay
The LA dismissed Macasios claims pursuant to Article 94 of the Labor Code in relation 244
to Section 1, Rule IV of the IRR of the Labor Code, and Article 95 of the Labor Code, as
well as Presidential Decree (PD) No. 851. The NLRC, on the other hand, relied on Article
82 of the Labor Code and the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851.
Uniformly, these provisions exempt workers paid on "pakyaw" or task basis from the
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage
during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing
less than (10) workers[.] [emphasis ours]
xxxx
SECTION 1. Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxxx
(e)Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised
by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for performing work
irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof. [emphases ours]
On the other hand, Article 95 of the Labor Code and its corresponding provision in the
IRR48 pertinently provides:
Art. 95. Right to service incentive. (a) Every employee who has rendered at least one
year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
(b) This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit herein
provided, those enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days and those
employed in establishments regularly employing less than ten employees or in
establishments exempted from granting this benefit by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment after considering the viability or financial condition of such establishment.
[emphases ours]
xxxx
Section 1. Coverage. This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission
basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the
time consumed in the performance thereof. [emphasis ours]
Under these provisions, the general rule is that holiday and SIL pay provisions cover all
employees. To be excluded from their coverage, an employee must be one of those that
these provisions expressly exempt, strictly in accordance with the exemption. Under the 246
IRR, exemption from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay refer to "field personnel and
other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer
including those who are engaged on task or contract basis[.]" Note that unlike Article 82
of the Labor Code, the IRR on holiday and SIL pay do not exclude employees "engaged
on task basis" as a separate and distinct category from employees classified as "field
personnel." Rather, these employees are altogether merged into one classification of
exempted employees.
Because of this difference, it may be argued that the Labor Code may be interpreted to
mean that those who are engaged on task basis, per se, are excluded from the SIL and
holiday payment since this is what the Labor Code provisions, in contrast with the IRR,
strongly suggest. The arguable interpretation of this rule may be conceded to be within
the discretion granted to the LA and NLRC as the quasi-judicial bodies with expertise on
labor matters.
However, as early as 1987 in the case of Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople49 the
phrase "those who are engaged on task or contract basis" in the rule has already been
interpreted to mean as follows:
[the phrase] should however, be related with "field personnel" applying the rule on
ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the
particular terms that they follow xxx Clearly, petitioner's teaching personnel cannot be
deemed field personnel which refers "to non-agricultural employees who regularly
perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty. [Par. 3, Article 82, Labor Code of the Philippines]. Petitioner's claim
that private respondents are not entitled to the service incentive leave benefit cannot
therefore be sustained.
In short, the payment of an employee on task or pakyaw basis alone is insufficient to
exclude one from the coverage of SIL and holiday pay. They are exempted from the
coverage of Title I (including the holiday and SIL pay) only if they qualify as "field
personnel." The IRR therefore validly qualifies and limits the general exclusion of
"workers paid by results" found in Article 82 from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay.
This is the only reasonable interpretation since the determination of excluded workers
who are paid by results from the coverage of Title I is "determined by the Secretary of
Labor in appropriate regulations."
The Cebu Institute Technology ruling was reiterated in 2005 in Auto Bus Transport
Systems, Inc., v. Bautista:
A careful perusal of said provisions of law will result in the conclusion that the grant of
service incentive leave has been delimited by the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Labor Code to apply only to those employees not explicitly excluded by Section 1
of Rule V. According to the Implementing Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall not apply
to employees classified as "field personnel." The phrase "other employees whose
performance is unsupervised by the employer" must not be understood as a separate
classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be granted. Rather,
it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field personnel
under the Labor Code as those "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty."
The same is true with respect to the phrase "those who are engaged on task or contract
basis, purely commission basis." Said phrase should be related with "field personnel,"
applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained
and limited by the particular terms that they follow.
The Autobus ruling was in turn the basis of Serrano v. Santos Transit which the CA cited
in support of granting Macasios petition.
247
In Serrano, the Court, applying the rule on ejusdem generis50 declared that "employees
engaged on task or contract basis xxx are not automatically exempted from the grant of
service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the classification of field personnel."51
The Court explained that the phrase "including those who are engaged on task or
contract basis, purely commission basis" found in Section 1(d), Rule V of Book III of the
IRR should not be understood as a separate classification of employees to which SIL
shall not be granted. Rather, as with its preceding phrase - "other employees whose
performance is unsupervised by the employer" - the phrase "including those who are
engaged on task or contract basis" serves to amplify the interpretation of the Labor
Code definition of "field personnel" as those "whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
In contrast and in clear departure from settled case law, the LA and the NLRC still
interpreted the Labor Code provisions and the IRR as exempting an employee from the
coverage of Title I of the Labor Code based simply and solely on the mode of payment
of an employee. The NLRCs utter disregard of this consistent jurisprudential ruling is a
clear act of grave abuse of discretion.52 In other words, by dismissing Macasios
complaint without considering whether Macasio was a "field personnel" or not, the
NLRC proceeded based on a significantly incomplete consideration of the case. This
action clearly smacks of grave abuse of discretion.
Entitlement to holiday pay
Evidently, the Serrano ruling speaks only of SIL pay. However, if the LA and the NLRC
had only taken counsel from Serrano and earlier cases, they would have correctly
reached a similar conclusion regarding the payment of holiday pay since the rule
exempting "field personnel" from the grant of holiday pay is identically worded with the
rule exempting "field personnel" from the grant of SIL pay. To be clear, the phrase
"employees engaged on task or contract basis "found in the IRR on both SIL pay and
holiday pay should be read together with the exemption of "field personnel."
In short, in determining whether workers engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis" is entitled
to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or absence) of employer supervision as regards
the workers time and performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on
pakyaw or task basis, then the general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and
SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions specifically provided under Article 94
(holiday pay) and Article95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the worker
engaged on pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of "field personnel"
under the law, then he is not entitled to these monetary benefits.
Macasio does not fall under the classification of "field personnel"
Based on the definition of field personnel under Article 82, we agree with the CA that
Macasio does not fall under the definition of "field personnel." The CAs finding in this
regard is supported by the established facts of this case: first, Macasio regularly 248
performed his duties at Davids principal place of business; second, his actual hours of
work could be determined with reasonable certainty; and, third, David supervised his
time and performance of duties. Since Macasio cannot be considered a "field
personnel," then he is not exempted from the grant of holiday, SIL pay even as he was
engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis.
Not being a "field personnel," we find the CA to be legally correct when it reversed the
NLRCs ruling dismissing Macasios complaint for holiday and SIL pay for having been
249
CA-G.R. SP No. 61552 dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed before it; and
the Resolution[2] dated November 28, 2002, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 8, 1992, the Letran Calamba Faculty and Employees Association (petitioner)
filed with Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a Complaint[3] against Colegio de San Juan de Letran, Calamba, Inc.
(respondent) for collection of various monetary claims due its members. Petitioner
alleged in its Position Paper that:
xxxx
2) [It] has filed this complaint in behalf of its members whose names and positions
appear in the list hereto attached as Annex A.
3) In the computation of the thirteenth month pay of its academic personnel,
respondent does not include as basis therefor their compensation for overloads. It only
takes into account the pay the faculty members receive for their teaching loads not
exceeding eighteen (18) units. The teaching overloads are rendered within eight (8)
hours a day.
4) Respondent has not paid the wage increases required by Wage Order No. 5 to its
employees who qualify thereunder.
5) Respondent has not followed the formula prescribed by DECS Memorandum Circular
No. 2 dated March 10, 1989 in the computation of the compensation per unit of excess
load or overload of faculty members. This has resulted in the diminution of the
compensation of faculty members.
6) The salary increases due the non-academic personnel as a result of job grading has
not been given. Job grading has been an annual practice of the school since 1980; the
same is done for the purpose of increasing the salaries of non-academic personnel and
as the counterpart of the ranking systems of faculty members.
7) Respondent has not paid to its employees the balances of seventy (70%) percent of
the tuition fee increases for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992.
8) Respondent has not also paid its employees the holiday pay for the ten (10) regular
holidays as provided for in Article 94 of the Labor Code.
9) Respondent has refused without justifiable reasons and despite repeated demands to
pay its obligations mentioned in paragraphs 3 to 7 hereof.
x x x x[4]
The complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-10-4560-92-L.
On January 29, 1993, respondent filed its Position Paper denying all the allegations of
petitioner.
250
251
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; that before a party may ask that the CA or this Court
review the factual findings of the NLRC, there must first be a convincing argument that
the NLRC acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner; and that in its
petition for certiorari filed with the CA, herein petitioner failed to prove that the NLRC
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent argues that Agustilo is not applicable to the present case because in the
former case, the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC are at variance with each
other; while in the present case, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the LA
and the NLRC are the same.
Respondent also avers that in a special civil action for certiorari, the discretionary power
to review factual findings of the NLRC rests upon the CA; and that absent any findings
by the CA of the need to resolve any unclear or ambiguous factual findings of the NLRC,
the grant of the writ of certiorari is not warranted.
Further, respondent contends that even granting that the factual findings of the CA,
NLRC and the LA may be reviewed in the present case, petitioner failed to present valid
arguments to warrant the reversal of the assailed decision.
Respondent avers that the DOLE Order is an administrative regulation which interprets
the 13th-Month Pay Law (P.D. No. 851) and, as such, it is mandatory for the LA to apply
the same to the present case.
Moreover, respondent contends that the Legal Services Office of the DOLE issued an
opinion dated March 4, 1992,[12] that remunerations for teaching in excess of the
regular load, which includes overload pay for work performed within an eight-hour work
day, may not be included as part of the basic salary in the computation of the 13thmonth pay unless this has been included by company practice or policy; that petitioner
intentionally omitted any reference to the above-mentioned opinion of the Legal
Services Office of the DOLE because it is fatal to its cause; and that the DOLE Order is
an affirmation of the opinion rendered by the said Office of the DOLE.
Furthermore, respondent claims that, contrary to the asseveration of petitioner, prior to
the issuance of the DOLE Order, the prevailing rule is to exclude excess teaching load,
which is akin to overtime, in the computation of a teacher's basic salary and, ultimately,
in the computation of his 13th-month pay.
As to respondent's alleged non-payment of petitioner's consolidated money claims,
respondent contends that the findings of the LA regarding these matters, which were
affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, have clear and convincing factual and legal bases to
stand on.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
As to the first and third assigned errors, petitioner would have this Court review the 253
factual findings of the LA as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, to wit.
With respect to the alleged non-payment of benefits under Wage Order No. 5, this
Office is convinced that after the lapse of the one-year period of exemption from
compliance with Wage Order No. 5 (Exhibit 1-B), which exemption was granted by then
Labor Minister Blas Ople, the School settled its obligations to its employees,
working day, such overload compensation shall be considered part of the basic pay for
the purpose of computing the teacher's 13th-month pay. Overload work is sometimes
misunderstood as synonymous to overtime work as this term is used and understood in
the Labor Code. These two terms are not the same because overtime work is work
rendered in excess of normal working hours of eight in a day (Art. 87, Labor Code).
Considering that overload work may be performed either within or outside eight hours
in a day, overload work may or may not be overtime work.
3. Concluding Statement
In the light of the foregoing discussions, it is the position of this Department that all
basic salary/wage representing payments earned for actual work performed during or
within the eight hours in a day, including payments for overload work within eight
hours, form part of basic wage and therefore are to be included in the computation of
13th-month pay mandated by PD 851, as amended.[24] (Underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, the Legal Services Department of the DOLE holds in its opinion of
March 4, 1992 that remunerations for teaching in excess of the regular load shall be
excluded in the computation of the 13th-month pay unless, by school policy, the same
are considered as part of the basic salary of the qualified teachers.[25]
This opinion is later affirmed by the DOLE Order, pertinent portions of which are quoted
below:
xxxx
2. In accordance with Article 83 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the
normal hours of work of school academic personnel shall not exceed eight (8) hours a
day. Any work done in addition to the eight (8) hours daily work shall constitute
overtime work.
3. The normal hours of work of teaching or academic personnel shall be based on their
normal or regular teaching loads. Such normal or regular teaching loads shall be in
accordance with the policies, rules and standards prescribed by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Commission on Higher Education and the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority. Any teaching load in excess of the normal
or regular teaching load shall be considered as overload. Overload partakes of the
nature of temporary extra assignment and compensation therefore shall be considered
as an overload honorarium if performed within the 8-hour work period and does not
form part of the regular or basic pay. Overload performed beyond the eight-hour daily
work is overtime work.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
It was the above-quoted DOLE Order which was used by the LA as basis for ruling
against herein petitioner.
The petitioners claim that the DOLE Order should not be made to apply to the present
case because said Order was issued only in 1996, approximately four years after the 257
present case was initiated before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, is not
without basis. The general rule is that administrative rulings and circulars shall not be
given retroactive effect.[27]
Nevertheless, it is a settled rule that when an administrative or executive agency
Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following
compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of
Instruction No. 174;
b) Profit sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part
of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the
Decree on December 16, 1975.
Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree 851 issued by the then Labor Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and
other remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in the computation of
the 13th-month pay.
The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances under Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of
Instruction No. 174 and profit sharing payments indicate the intention to strip basic
salary of other payments which are properly considered as fringe benefits. Likewise, the 258
catch-all exclusionary phrase all allowances and monetary benefits which are not
considered or integrated as part of the basic salary shows also the intention to strip
basic salary of any and all additions which may be in the form of allowances or fringe
benefits.
Moreover, the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree
851 is even more emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which
are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13thmonth pay.
While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or
earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and
more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically, exclude
from the definition of basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by employer
to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has
hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former rules to
include all remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic salary.
The all-embracing phrase earnings and other remunerations which are deemed not part
of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity
leaves, premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays, pay for regular
holidays and night differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary
and shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-month pay. If they were not
so excluded, it is hard to find any earnings and other remunerations expressly excluded
in the computation of the 13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove
to be idle and with no purpose.
This conclusion finds strong support under the Labor Code of the Philippines. To cite a
few provisions:
Art. 87 Overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided
that the employee is paid for the overtime work, additional compensation equivalent to
his regular wage plus at least twenty-five (25%) percent thereof.
It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other than and added to the
regular wage or basic salary, for reason of which such is categorically excluded from the
definition of basic salary under the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851.
In Article 93 of the same Code, paragraph
c.) work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of
at least thirty percent (30%) of the regular wage of the employee.
It is likewise clear that premium for special holiday which is at least 30% of the regular
wage is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular wage or basic
salary. For similar reason it shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th
-month pay.[30]
In the same manner that payment for overtime work and work performed during
special holidays is considered as additional compensation apart and distinct from an
employee's regular wage or basic salary, an overload pay, owing to its very nature and 259
definition, may not be considered as part of a teacher's regular or basic salary, because
it is being paid for additional work performed in excess of the regular teaching load.
The peculiarity of an overload lies in the fact that it may be performed within the
normal eight-hour working day. This is the only reason why the DOLE, in its explanatory
bulletin, finds it proper to include a teacher's overload pay in the determination of his or
her 13th-month pay. However, the DOLE loses sight of the fact that even if it is
performed within the normal eight-hour working day, an overload is still an additional or
extra teaching work which is performed after the regular teaching load has been
completed. Hence, any pay given as compensation for such additional work should be
considered as extra and not deemed as part of the regular or basic salary.
Moreover, petitioner failed to refute private respondent's contention that excess
teaching load is paid by the hour, while the regular teaching load is being paid on a
monthly basis; and that the assignment of overload is subject to the availability of
teaching loads. This only goes to show that overload pay is not integrated with a
teacher's basic salary for his or her regular teaching load. In addition, overload varies
from one semester to another, as it is dependent upon the availability of extra teaching
loads. As such, it is not legally feasible to consider payments for such overload as part
of a teacher's regular or basic salary. Verily, overload pay may not be included as basis
for determining a teacher's 13th-month pay.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
260