Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (HITACHI-GE) ABWR

Form10/00
UK ABWR
Document ID
Document Number
Revision Number
:
:
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GA91-9901-0032-00001
XE-GD-0126
2
UK ABWR Generic Design Assessment
ABWR General Description
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UK ABWR
Page i/ii
DISCLAIMERS
Proprietary Information
This document contains proprietary information of Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd. (Hitachi-GE), its
suppliers and subcontractors. This document and the information it contains shall not, in whole or in part,
be used for any purpose other than for the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of Hitachi-GEs UK ABWR.
This notice shall be included on any complete or partial reproduction of this document or the information it
contains.
Copyright
No part of this document may be reproduced in any form, without the prior written permission of
Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd.
Copyright (C) 2014 Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd. All Rights Reserved
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Foreword
1. Objective
This document provides a general systems level description of Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd.s
(Hitachi-GE) Advanced Boiling Water Reactor design in Japan (hereafter referred to as ABWR General
Description). The document provides descriptions on the purpose, function (and/or safety roles), and
systematic configuration (structure and constitutive components) of corresponding systems and facilities.
2. Scope
The descriptions in this document are based on Hitachi-GEs general ABWR design concept, for its
Japanese customers, and do not necessarily reflect the design concept of the UK ABWR to be described
during the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process. In addition, systems or system details that depend
on site conditions are excluded from the descriptions.
The systems and/or the details of the corresponding systems described in the document are selected,
based on the following criteria.
(1) Details that would help capture the entire system configuration of the ABWR general design.
(2) Main systems and facilities in the nuclear and the turbine island that form the boundary to contain
the reactor coolant during normal operation.
(3) Systems and facilities that contain radioactive materials within the nuclear island in the event of an
accident.
(4) Systems and facilities that play important roles and functions in safe operation, and shut down of the
reactor.
(5) Systems and facilities used to monitor the condition of the plant, notify the operators, or actuate
corresponding systems to prevent or mitigate any abnormalities.
(6) Systems and facilities used to monitor radiation and radioactive materials during normal operation
and in the event of an accident.
(7) Systems and facilities used to treat radioactive waste within the nuclear power plant.
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Table of Contents
Chapter
Section
1 Plant Overview, Nuclear Island and Nuclear Boiler Systems

1 Plant overview
Section
2 Reactor and Reactor Internals
Section
3 Nuclear Boiler System (NB)
Section
4 Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV)
Section
5 Reactor Recirculation System (RRS)
Section
6 Control Rod Drive System (CRD)
Section
7 Reactor Water Clean-Up System (CUW)
Section
8 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System (FPC)
Section
9 Atmospheric Control System (AC)
Section
10 Drywell Cooling System (DWC)
Section
11 Suppression Pool Clean-Up System (SPCU)
Chapter
Safety Systems
Section
1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Section
2 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
Section
3 High Pressure Core Flooder System (HPCF)
Section
4 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)
Section
5 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)
Section
6 Standby Liquid Control System (SLC)
Section
7 Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)
Section
8 Flammability Control System (FCS)
Section
9 Remote Shutdown System (RSS)
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Chapter
3 Turbine Island and Turbine Auxiliary Systems
Section
1 Main Steam System (MS)
Section
2 Extraction Steam System (ES)
Section
3 Turbine Auxiliary Steam System (AS)
Section
4 Condensate and Feedwater System (CDFS)
Section
5 Feedwater Heater Drain System (HD)
Section
6 Turbine Gland Steam System (TGS)
Section
7 Off-Gas System (OG)
Section
8 Circulating Water System (CW)
Chapter
4 Auxiliary Systems
Section
1 Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW)
Section
2 Reactor Building Service Water System (RSW)
Section
3 Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning System (HVAC)
Section
4 Instrument Air System (IA)
Section
5 Sampling System (SAM) / Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
Chapter
5 Electrical Power Supply
Section
1 Station Electrical Power Supply System
Section
2 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G)
Section
3 DC Power Supply
Section
4 AC Power Supply System for Instrumentation
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Chapter
6 Instrumentation and Control Systems
Section
1 Control Panels
Section
2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Instrumentation
Section
3 Recirculation Flow Control (RFC)
Section
4 Feedwater Control (FDWC)
Section
5 Multichannel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)
Section
6 Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)
Section
7 Rod Control and Information System (RCIS)
Section
8 Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Section
9 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS)
Section
10 Neutron Monitoring System (NMS)
Section
11 Automatic Thermal Limit Monitor (ATLM)
Section
12 Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System (CAMS)
Section
13 Automatic Power Regulator System (APR)
Section
14 Area Radiation Monitoring / Process Radiation Monitoring System (ARM/PrRM)
Section
15 Process Computer
Chapter
7 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems
Section
1 Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS)
Section
2 Solid Waste Treatment System (SWTS)
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
ABWR
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
AC
Atmospheric Control System
ADS
Automatic Depressurisation System
AO
Air-Operated
APR
Automatic Power Regulation System
APRM
Average Power Range Monitor
ARI
Alternate Control Rod Insertion
ARM
Area Radiation Monitoring System
ARM/PrRM
Area Radiation Monitoring / Process Radiation Monitoring System
AS
Auxiliary Steam System
ATLM
Automatic Thermal Limit Monitor
ATWS
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
DBE
Design Basis Event
BG
Background
BOP
Balance of Plant
BWR
Boiling Water Reactor
C/B
Control Building
CAMS
Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System
CFDW
Condensate and Feed Water System
CI/O
Console Input / Output Device
CPS
Condensate Purification System
CPU
Central Processing Unit
CR
Control Rod
CRD
Control Rod Drive
CRDA
CR Drop Accidents
CRGT
Control Rod Guide Tube
CRT
Cathode Ray Tube
CSP
Condensate Storage Pool
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
CUW
Reactor Water Clean-Up System
CW
Circulating Water System
CWP
Circulating Water Pump
(E)D/G
(Emergency) Diesel Generator
D/W
Drywell
DC
DC Power Supply System
DISK
Magnetic Disk Device
D-PRNM
Neutron Monitoring System Power Range Monitor
DTM
Digital Trip Module
DWC
Drywell Cooling System
ECCS
Emergency Core Cooling System
ED/G
Emergency Diesel Generator
EHC
Electro Hydraulic Controller
ES
Extraction Steam System
F/A
Flow Auto
F/D
Filter Demineraliser
F/M
Flow Manual
FA
Fuel assembly
FCS
Flammability Control System
FCV
Flow Control Valve
FD
Flat Displays
FDW
Feedwater System
FDWC
Feedwater Control System
FMCRD
Fine Motion Control Rod Drive
FPC
Fuel Pool Cooling Clean-Up System
FWH
Feedwater Heater
G/A
Gang Auto
GEN
Generator System
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
GSC
Gland Steam Condenser
HCU
Hydraulic Control Units
HCW
High Conductivity Liquid Waste
HD
Feedwater Heater Drain System
HEPA
High-Efficiency PArticle
HPCF
High Pressure Core Flooder System
HPCP
High Pressure Condensate Pump
HPDP
High Pressure Drain Pump
HPDT
High Pressure Drain Tank
HPIN
High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply System
HP-T
High Pressure Turbine
HS
House Steam
HTr
House Transformer
HVAC
Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
HVH
Heater Ventilating Handling Unit
I-131
Iodine-131
IA
Instrument Air System
IC
Ion Chamber Detector
ILW
Intermediate Level Waste
IPB
Isolated Phase Bus
L/A
Local Auto
L/M
Local Manual
LCD
Liquid Crystal Display
LCW
Low Conductivity Liquid Waste
LD
Laundry Drain
LDS
Leak Detection System
LLW
Low Level Waste
LN2tank
Liquid Nitrogen tank
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
LOCA
Loss Of Coolant Accident
LOOP
Loss Of Off-site Power
LOPA
Loss Of Power Accident
LPAP
Low Power Alarm Point
LPCF
Low Pressure Coolant Flooder
LPCP
Low Pressure Condensate Pump
LPCRD
Locking Piston Control Rod Drive
LPDP
Low Pressure Drain Pump
LPDT
Low Pressure Drain Tank
LPFL
Low Pressure Flooder system
LPRM
Local Power Region Monitor
LPSP
Low Output Configuration Point
LP-T
Low Pressure Turbine
LSTr
Low Voltage Start-up Transformer
LWTS
Liquid Waste Treatment System
M/C
Metal-Clad Switchgear
M/D-RFP
Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump
M/T
Magnetic Tape Device
MCC
Motor Control Centre
MCR
Main Control Room
MG
Motor-Generator
MRBM
Multichannel Rod Block Monitor
MS
Main Steam System
MSIV
Main Steam Isolation Valve
MSLBA
Main Steam Line Break Accident
MSR
Moisture Separator Re-heater
MTr
Main Transformer
MUWP
Make Up Water System
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
MVP
Mechanical Vacuum Pump
NB
Nuclear Boiler system
NMS
Neutron Monitoring System
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NSSS
Nuclear Steam Supply System
OG
Off-Gas System
OLU
Open Logic Unit
P/C
Power Centre
PASS
Post-Accident Sampling System
PCIS
Primary Containment Isolation System
PCS
Process Computer System
PCV
Primary Containment Vessel
PI/O
Process Input / Output Device
PRNM
Output Region Monitor
PrRM
Process Radiation Monitoring System
PWR
Pressurized Water Reactor
R/B
Reactor Building
RC&IS
Rod Control and Information System
RCCV
Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel
RCIC
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
RCW
Reactor Building Cooling Water System
RFC
Recirculation Flow Control System
RFP
Reactor Feedwater Pump
RFP-T
Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine
RHR
Residual Heat Removal System
RHR Hx
RHR Heat Exchanger
RIP
Reactor Internal Pump
RMC
Recirculation Motor Cooling system
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
RMISS
Recirculation Motor Inflatable Shaft Seal system
RMP
Recirculation Motor Purge system
RPS
Reactor Protection System
RPT
Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip
RPV
Reactor Pressure Vessel
RRPS
Reference Rod Pull Sequence
RRS
Reactor Recirculation System
RSS
Remote Shutdown System
RSW
Reactor Building Service Water system
Rw/B
Radwaste Building
RWM
Rod Worth Minimizer
S/C
Suppression Chamber
S/P
Suppression Pool
SAM
Sampling System
SAM/PASS
Sampling System/Post-Accident Sampling System
SCIN
Scintillation Detector
SCRRI
Selected Control Rod Run In
SFP
Spent Fuel Pool
SGTS
Standby Gas Treatment System
SJAE
Steam Jet Air Ejector
SLC
Standby Liquid Control System
SPCU
Suppression Pool Clean-Up System
SRNM
Startup Range Neutron Monitor
SRV
Safety Relief Valve
SSCs
Structures, Systems and Components
SSD
Semiconductor Detector
SW
Switch
SWTS
Solid Waste Treatment System
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List of Acronyms
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
Description
T/B
Turbine Building
T/D-RFP
Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump
TAF
Top of Active Fuel
TBS
Turbine Bypass System
TGS
Turbine Gland Steam System
TIP
Traversing In Core Probe System
TLU
Trip Logic Unit
UHS
Ultimate Heat Sink
UO2
Uranium Dioxide
UPS
Uninterruptible Power Supply System
VAC
Vital AC power system
VAS
Voice Announcement Device
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CHAPTER 1
Plant Overview, Nuclear Island and
Nuclear Boiler Systems
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Section 1 Plant Overview
1. Introduction
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is a generation III+ light water reactor that was developed
based on operational experience, utilising tested and proven technology of previous Boiling Water Reactor
(BWR) generations and designs, as well as further simplification in the design of reactor systems and
containment.
The two fundamental differences between BWRs and the other common light water reactors, the
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), are (i) bulk boiling of water occurs in the reactor core; and (ii) steam
produced from boiling in the reactor core is sent directly to the turbine used to turn the generator to produce
electricity. This highly contributes to simplification in design, and the systems required for both operation and
safety of the plant.
2. System Configuration of the ABWR

Figure 1-1-1 shows a schematic configuration and the main systems of the ABWR. Each of the major
systems (including those not shown in this diagram) will be described in the following sections and chapters of
this document. As an example, some of the main systems shown in the figure are described in the following
chapters.
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
Chapter 1 Section 2
Main Steam (MS) Piping
Chapter 1 Section 3
Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV)
Chapter 1 Section 4
Reactor Internal Pump (RIP)
Chapter 1 Section 5
Fine Motion Control Rod System (FMCRD)
Chapter 1 Section 6
Reactor Water Clean-Up system (CUW)
Chapter 1 Section 7
High Pressure Core Flooder System (HPCF)
Chapter 2 Section 3
Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)
Chapter 2 Section 4
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Figure 1-1-1 Schematic Diagram showing the Configuration and Main Systems of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
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3. Main design features of the ABWR

As previously mentioned, the ABWR was designed with the aim of simplifying the design and operation
of the plant as well as enhancing the safety and reliability of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs).
Simplification, safety and reliability enhancements have been, and remain to be, a continuous effort since the
initial introduction of the BWR technology in the 1950s. Some of the major ABWR improvements and
differences relative to previous BWRs include:
Improvement of safety and reliability
Improvement of capacity factor
Reduction of radiation dosage to which workers are exposed
Improvement of operability
Additionally, the ABWR was developed based on demonstrated technology from both domestic and
overseas construction and operational experience. The main improvements in systems and equipment applied to
ABWR are as follows.
(1)
ABWR RIPs are directly attached to the bottom of the RPV to directly circulate the flow of water(coolant) inside
the reactor. In the earlier BWR designs the recirculation loop is located outside of the RPV, and the recirculation
pump, in combination with the jet pump inside the reactor, provides circulation flow of the coolant. The RIP is
characterised as follows:
(a) There are no external pumps for recirculation, therefore, the installation position of the Primary
Containment Vessel (PCV) is lower. Hence, the centre of gravity of the reactor is lowered, thus improving
resistance to earthquakes.
(b) The RIP uses a wet motor which is immersed in water in the casing, and has no shaft seal. Therefore,
possibility of core water leakage is reduced, and reliability in leak tightness is further enhanced.
(c) As the external pipes used in the conventional method are eliminated, the amount of radiation exposure to
workers during maintenance inspection work is reduced.
(2)
Fine Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD)

In the ABWR the Control Rod Drive (CRD) mechanism uses an electric motor during normal operations
and the hydraulic drive during emergency Control Rod (CR) insertions instead of the Locking Piston
Control Rod Drive (LPCRD) used in previous BWR designs.
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The FMCRD is characterised as follows:

(a) The FMCRD has 2 power sources, hydraulic drive and electric motor drive. Scram is achieved with the
hydraulic power. After scram, all electric motor drive mechanisms act as back up for CR insertion.
(b) The FMCRD is designed to let the water flow into the reactor, a system to discharge scram water is
unnecessary. Therefore, exposure of workers to radiation can be mitigated.
(c) Only 1 CR could be activated at maximum with the LPCRD, but the adoption of an electric motor drive
enables the operation of 26 CRs at maximum (gang mode operation), shortening start-up time.
(3)
Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV)

ABWR uses a cylindrical RCCV which is integrated with the Reactor Building (R/B), instead of the
conventional steel containment vessel. This containment vessel is composed of a concrete part which is
pressure-resistant and a steel liner (lining) which prevents leakage.
The RCCV is characterised as follows:

(a) There is greater freedom in shape selection compared to steel containment vessels, due to the adoption of
the reinforced concrete containment vessel, enabling equipment to be positioned in a rational manner
inside the containment vessel.
(b) The strength of reinforced concrete allows for the direct support of equipment and pipes, and the space
inside the containment vessel can be used more effectively.
(c) The pedestal that supports the RPV can include the vent pipe in the horizontal vent configuration,
therefore, space efficiency of the containment vessel is increased and the number of vent pipes can be
reduced compared to the conventional steel pipe vertical vent configuration.
(4)
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is characterised as follows:

The ECCS of the ABWR is composed of 3 independent divisions which are composed of the HPCF and
the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC), and Low Pressure Core Flooder (LPCF) systems. It is
designed to secure submergence of the core during a LOCA with single failure.
(a) The large diameter pipes are not connected below the TAF due to the adoption of the RIPs. The ECCS is
designed with a focus on LOCAs from medium and small-diameter pipes. Each individual division of
ECCS is installed with its own HPCF.
(b) Each of the LPCF systems installed in the 3 independent divisions of ECCS have a heat exchanger,
therefore, offering sufficient core cooling functions for both the short to long term after a LOCA.
(5)
New control panel in the Main Control Room (MCR)

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Based on performance of and experience with previous control panels, the third-generation control panel
with higher levels of safety and reliability was chosen. This control panel is composed of the main control
panel and a large display panel(screen). Utilizing a flat touch-screen display, the main panel integrates
monitoring and operational functions, and makes it possible for everyone in the MCR to share information
on its large display panel (screen).
The control panel is characterised as follows:
(a) Along with the streamlining and enhancing of operations, accident operations are handled easily and
accurately, and start up times can also be shortened.
(b) The large display panel encompasses information to be monitored during times of normal operation and
accidents. Also, it improves the ability of all operators in the MCR to share information.
(c) New human-machine interface such as general digitalization, large-display equipment and touch operation,
has been adopted for the new control panel in the MCR. It also has sufficient operation support functions
such as automation of sequential operation. Since the system allows more leeway for monitoring and
operation by operators than the conventional system, it contributes to safety in terms of prevention of
human errors.
(6)
Turbine Equipment is characterised as follows:

Turbine equipment has been designed to increase efficiency and to enhance plant performance.
(a) 52-inch long blade turbine, Moisture Separator Re-heater (MSR) and heater drain pump-up systems are
used to improve plant thermal efficiency.
(b) The forged mono block rotor is used in the steam turbine. The rotors transmit the power of the turbine to
withstand not only the torque during normal operation, but also the greater torque resulting from unusual
events such as generator short circuits.
4. Key specifications of ABWR Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)

The table below shows typical key specifications of a standard ABWR power plant.
Table 1-1-1 Key Specifications of ABWR
Item
Specification
Plant Gross Electrical Output
Approx. 1,350 MWe
Reactor Thermal Output
3,926 MWt
Output
(Continued)
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Table 1-1-1 Key Specifications of ABWR
Item
(Continued)
Specification
Reactor rated pressure
Approx. 7.1MPa (abs)
Reactor
Fuel Assemblies
872
Core
Control Rods
205
Reactor
Recirculation System
Internal pump method
Equipment
Control Rod Drive (CRD)
Hydraulic / electric motor drive method
Primary Containment Vessel (PCV)
Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel
ECCS / PCV cooling System
3 divisions / 2 divisions
Residual Heat Removal System
3 divisions
Turbine (blade length at final stage)
52 inches
Moisture Separation Method
Reheat type
Turbine System
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5. Main Plant Buildings

The main buildings of an ABWR power plant are shown in Figure 1-1-2, and a summary of each of their
functions is given below:
(1) Reactor Building (R/B)
The R/B is a reinforced concrete structure that forms the Secondary Containment which houses the PCV, and a
RCCV integrated with the R/B within which the RPV, the drywell, the wetwell and the Suppression Pool (S/P)
are located. Additionally, the major portions of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS), the steam tunnel, the
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), the refuelling area, the Emergency Diesel Generators (ED/G), the essential power, the
non-essential power, the ECCS, the Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems (HVAC) and other
support systems are located within the R/B.
(2) Turbine Building (T/B)

The T/B houses all the components associated with the power conversion and auxiliary systems. This includes
the portion of the Main Steam system (MS) belonging to the turbine side, the turbine-generator, the main
condenser, the turbine bypass system, condensate demineralisers, the air ejector, the Off-Gas system (OG), and
the condensate and feedwater pumping and heating equipment.
(3) Control Building (C/B)

The C/B includes the MCR, the computer facility, the cable tunnels, some of the plant essential switchgear, some
of the essential power and the essential HVAC system. The MS tunnel from the R/B to the T/B is located in the
ground floor of the C/B.
(4) Radwaste Building (Rw/B)

The Rw/B houses all equipment associated with the collection and treatment of radioactive waste generated in
the plant.
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Figure 1-1-2 Typical Arrangement of Main Buildings in an ABWR Plant Site
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Section 2 Reactor and Reactor Internals

1.
(1)
(2)
Purpose
To Maintain appropriate water coolant flow so that power operation can be achieved.
To fix and support Fuel Assemblies (FAs), CRs, neutron monitor and reactor internals, and enable
the removal of these components for maintenance.
2.
Function / Configuration
The reactor is composed of the pressure vessel, the core which is placed at the centre of the vessel,
the core support internals and other reactor internals, as shown in Figure 1-2-1 below. Brief descriptions of
the reactor structures follow.
Core
Control rod guide tube
Reactor internal
pump
In-core housing
Control rod drive

housing
Figure 1-2-1 Internal Structures of the RPV
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(1)
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)

The RPV is a cylindrical steel vessel that contains the core and reactor internals. The RPV consists
of a removable hemispherical top head, cylindrical shells, a bottom head, and some nozzles. The
RPV is installed vertically on the pedestal inside the containment building. The RPV is about 21
metres in height, 7.4 metres in diameter and with a steel wall thickness of about 17 centimetres.
The RPV functions as the pressure retaining barrier to retain light water coolant and as the barrier to
isolate radioactive material generated in the core from outside the RPV.
RPV
RPV
Feed water
Top head
inlet nozzles
RPV Shells
RPV
Bottom
head
Figure 1-2-2 Diagram of the RPV
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(2)
Core
The core is in the shape of an upright cylinder, with a height of approximately 3.7m and a diameter
of approximately 5.2m. It contains 872 FAs and 205 CRs (see Figure 1-2-1).
(3)
Core Shroud
The core shroud supported by the shroud support is a stainless steel cylinder that encircles the core.
The core shroud separates the downward flow outside the core from the upward flow inside the core.
The shroud head is installed above the core shroud and the top guide. The shroud head forms one
part of the plenum above the outlet of the core and serves as the mixing chamber for steam and water
before they enter the steam separator.
High pressure
(HPCF) sparger
Core shroud
core
flooder
Reactor pressure vessel

Core
Lower plenum
Photo of the core shroud
(RPV)
Diffuser
Reactor internal pump
(temporary structures
(RIP)
included)
Figure 1-2-3 Flow of Water Inside Reactor (diagram of Core Shroud)
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(4)
Steam Separator
The pipes and the turbine could be damaged by water drops if the mixture of steam and saturated
water generated in the core is directly sent to the turbine, therefore, water is separated from the steam
by the steam separator and the steam dryer (see Figure 1-2-4).
The steam separator guides the mixture of steam and saturated water into the upper plenum of the
core through the stand pipe, introducing a spiralling motion with the propeller-like inlet nozzle, and
whirls the steam and water mixture up the tube. At this time, water is separated from the steam by
centrifugal force and discharged into the downcomer.
(5)
Steam Dryer
Steam emitted from the steam separator enters the steam dryer. In the steam dryer, steam changes its
direction as it passes between the corrugated plates shown in figure 1-2-5 below. Every time the
direction changes, moisture within the steam hits the surface of the corrugated plates, thereby
removing moisture. Afterwards, steam goes through the dome at the upper part of the RPV and is
discharged to the outside of the RPV through the MS nozzles where it is guided to the turbine.
Steam
Separated
Water
Water Level
Separated
Water
Mixed
flow
Drain
Vane
Steam flow
Water
discharged to
the down comer
Stand pipe
Mixture of steam and saturated water
Figure 1-2-4 Structure of the Steam Separator
Figure 1-2-5 Structure of the Steam Dryer
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(6)

The overview of the RIP is shown in Figure 1-2-6. 10 RIPs, arranged at the bottom of the RPV in the
annular region between the core shroud and the RPV, circulate the coolant to the core.
Saturated water discharged from the steam separator and steam dryer at the upper part of the core is
mixed with feedwater and supplied back to the core through the diffuser of the RIPs (see Figure
1-2-3 Flow of water inside reactor).
Figure 1-2-6 Overview of the RIP
(7)
Feedwater Sparger
The purpose of the feedwater sparger is to uniformly mix feedwater entering through the feedwater
nozzle, with the high-temperature coolant that was separated by the steam separator. There are six
feedwater spargers in total. Each feedwater sparger is T-shaped and installed circumferentially along
the inner surface of the RPV (see Figure 1-2-1 Internal structure of the RPV).
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(8) High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) pipe and sparger

The HPCF pipe and sparger are installed at the upper part of the core to flood the core with cooling
water from the HPCF system during an accident.
(9)
Fuel Assemblies (FAs)

The fuel rod is made out of Uranium Dioxide (UO 2 ) pellets with less than 5wt% U-235 enrichment
and a Zircaloy-2 cladding tube, both ends of which have plugs welded on. Its plenum is filled with
Helium gas. At the end of a fuel cycle, the spent fuel will contain radioactive fission products which
remain confined inside the cladding (see Figure 1-2-7).
A fuel assembly has a square array of fuel rods and a hollow pipe (water rod), where water coolant
flows. FAs are placed inside a Zircaloy channel box. Its functions include forming the coolant flow
path and guiding the insertion and withdrawal of CRs between FAs.
Upper tie plate
Channel fastener
Expansion spring
Plenum spring
Fuel cladding
Partial length fuel rod
Pellet
Spacer
Standard fuel rod
Water rod
Channel box
(not a part of fuel bundle)
Lower tie plate
Figure 1-2-7 Fuel Assembly Structure (example of 9 X 9 fuel type)
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(10) Top Guide and Core Plate

The grid plate of the top guide is made from stainless steel forging. The top guide is fixed to the
upper part of the core shroud and supports the FAs from the side.
The core plate is a stainless steel disk reinforced with pins. It is firmly attached to the lower part of
the core shroud and supports the Control Rod Guide Tube (CRGT), the fuel support, the nuclear fuel
and the in-core guide tube.
(11) Control Rod Guide Tube (CRGT)

The CRGT guides the CR. The CRGT extends upward from the top of the CRD housing to the core
plate, and load from the FAs is transmitted to the RPV through the fuel support and CRGT (see
Figure 1-2-1).
(12) In-Core Guide Tube

The in-core guide tube guides the neutron monitor detector. The in-core guide tube, welded to the
top of the in-core housing which is connected to the bottom head of the RPV, extends upward and is
supported by the core plate (see Figure 1-2-1).
(13) Head vent and spray nozzle

The head vent and spray nozzle are installed at the top of the RPV and are connected to the CUW for
cooling the upper part of the RPV in a shutdown operation. They are also connected to the vent pipe
for venting non-condensable gases during normal operation (see Figure 1-2-1).
(14) Start-up neutron source

The start-up neutron source supplies the necessary neutrons to initiate the fission process inside the
initial core.
The device consists of Californium (Cf-252) pins enclosed in a stainless steel tube. The steel tube is
retained between the upper side of the core plate and the lower side of the upper grid plate with
springs.
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Section 3 Nuclear Boiler System (NB)

1.
Purpose
The Nuclear Boiler System (NB) transfers steam and feedwater between the reactor and turbine
facilities during normal operation. The NB prevents overpressure of the reactor at abnormal transients in
operation or during an accident. The NB also provides isolation of the reactor.
2.
Function
(1)
Main Steam System
(a)
During normal operation, steam generated at the reactor is transferred to the turbine facility via 4 MS
pipes.
(b)
In order to prevent overpressure of the reactor following a transient in operation or an accident, steam
inside the reactor is discharged into the S/P by the relief valve function or the safety valve function of
the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs).
(c)
In the case that the reactor cannot be cooled down with the condenser due to condenser failure or
reactor isolation, the SRVs are manually operated to depressurise the reactor to the pressure at which
the RHR can operate in the reactor shutdown cooling mode.
(d)
In the case of a LOCA, the reactor is automatically depressurised with the Automatic
Depressurization System (ADS) of the SRV to enable core injection by the Low Pressure Flooder
System ( LPFL).
(e)
In order to minimise the release of radioactivity outside of the PCV in case of fuel failure, Main
Steam Line Break Accident (MSLBA) or LOCAs, the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) are
automatically closed to isolate the reactor.
(f)
In order to minimise the outflow of reactor coolant and radioactive materials in the case of MSLBA,
a steam flow restrictor is mounted in each MS line at the RPV MS outlet nozzle.
(g)
Vapour condensation, generated inside the MS pipe during reactor start-up, is discharged to the
condenser by use of the MS drain line.
Figure 1-3-1 shows an outline of the MS System.
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To Drain
To Turbine
RPV
To Turbine
To Turbine
To Turbine
S/C
To Main
To Main
Condenser
PCV
Figure 1-3-1 Diagram of Main Steam System
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(2)
Feedwater System (FDW)
(a)
During normal operation, feedwater from the turbine facility is transferred to the reactor through 2
feedwater pipes. Each feedwater pipe is divided into 3 pipes inside the PCV. The 6 total feedwater
pipes are all connected to the feedwater inlet nozzles.
(b)
Returned water from the CUW, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC), and Division A
of the LPFL/RHR is directed to the reactor via the feedwater pipes.
Figure 1-3-2 shows an outline of the FDW.
(3)
Reactor vessel vent system

Reactor vessel vent
During normal operation, any non-condensable gas inside the RPV top head is discharged to the
main turbine side through one of the MS pipes in order to prevent accumulation of any flammable
gases generated by the water radiolysis reaction inside the RPV.
(4)
Reactor vessel flange seal leak-off system

Potential leakage at the RPV flange seal is monitored with the leak-off line which connects the
double rings of the RPV flanges.
3.
Configuration
(1)
Main Steam System
(a)
Steam generated in the reactor is transferred to the turbine facility through 4 MS pipes. These 4 MS
pipes merge at the turbines main stop valve upstream header. A drain pipe is installed at the lowest
point of each MS pipe inside and outside the PCV, all of which combine into 1 pipe connecting to the
condenser hot well. A depressurisation orifice, installed on the downstream side of the last valve of
the condenser hot well, enables continuous drainage of the MS pipes.
(b)
The SRVs for preventing overpressure of the RPV are installed on the MS pipes inside the PCV.
When the SRV is operated, steam is discharged to the S/P through the discharge pipes for
condensation.
(c)
A steam pipe for driving the turbine of the RCIC is branched from 1 MS pipe inside the PCV.
Figure 1-3-3 shows the arrangement of SRVs and MSIVs on the MS lines.
(2)
Feedwater System (FDW)
(a)
The FDW consists of 2 feedwater pipes, each of which is divided into 3 pipes inside the containment
vessel. The 6 total feedwater pipes are connected to the feedwater sparger inside the RPV to
uniformly supply water to the inside of the reactor.
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(3)
Pressure vessel vent system

A vent pipe is installed at the RPV head in order to vent non-condensable gases generated during
reactor operation. Its connected to one of the MS pipes.
(4)
Pressure vessel flange leak-off system

A pressure meter is installed between the rings inside and outside the RPV flange to detect leakage at
the RPV flange.
RPV
From FDW
From RHR
From CRD
From CUW
From
From RCIC
From FDW
PCV
Figure 1-3-2 Diagram of the Feedwater System
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Figure 1-3-3 Arrangement of Major Equipment around the Nuclear Boiler System MS pipe (Example)
4.
Control and Interlocks
(1)
Reactor water level instrument
(a) Water level 8 (L-8)

(i)
The turbine is tripped to protect itself from excess moisture carryover.
(ii) The reactor feed pump is tripped so that excess cooling water does not enter the RPV.
(iii) When the RCIC or the HPCF is in operation, the turbine of the RCIC is tripped and the discharge
valve of the HPCF is also closed.
(b) Water level 7 (L-7)
The high water level alarm indicates the water level when moisture carryover to steam becomes
higher than the prescribed value during rated operation.
(c) Water level 5 (L-5)
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In order to minimise moisture carryover and steam carry-under in the entire steam flow area when
transitional water level change occurs, feedwater control is initiated to maintain this level 5 water
level. The water level can be maintained at any of the levels higher than level 4, including level 4,
and lower than level 7.
(d) Water level 4 (L-4)
The low water level alarm indicates the water level when steam carry-under of reactor water is
higher than the prescribed value during rated operation.
(e) Water level 4 (L-4)
This water level is the water level at which decrease of coolant inside the pressure vessel due to loss
of 1 feedwater pump causes reactor scram. The recirculation system automatically runs back due to
the loss of 1 feedwater pump.
(f) Water level 3 (L-3)
High moisture carryover bypassing the steam dryer is prevented by shutting down the reactor scram.
This level is higher than the bottom of the steam dryer seal and skirt. The amount of coolant at this
water level is enough to keep the water level higher than level 1.5, which is when the HPCF is
activated, even considering the loss of coolant due to steam from the NB system after loss of reactor
feedwater flow. This amount of coolant takes into account the amount that evaporates due to decay
heat. In addition to scram, 4 RIPs that are not connected to the Motor-Generator (MG) set are tripped
and the RHR system shutdown cooling pipe isolation valve is closed at level 3. The containment
vessel isolation valve (excluding the RCW isolation valve and the HNCW isolation valve for the
DWC cooling water supply, the CUW isolation valve, and the MSIV) is closed at level 3.
(g) Water level 2 (L-2)
This water level is set as follows:
(i)
A volume between water level 2 and water level 3 is sufficient to make up for lowered water level
due to the elimination of voids contained within the reactor water after a scram caused by low
reactor water level (water level 3) has occured.
(ii) If the reactor FDW, after a scram, is in normal state, the water level becomes one that does not
cause unnecessary activation of the RCIC.
(iii) A value will not reach water level 1.5, taking into account the supply after a scram at water level 3
and the automatic activation of the supply water function of the reactor core isolation cooling
system at this water level, when feedwater from the reactor feedwater system is lost.
(iv) Remaining RIPs that did not trip at level 3 will be tripped at level 2.
(h) Water level 1.5 (L-1.5)
At level 1.5, the MSIV is closed and the core cooling function of the HPCF and the RCIC is
activated. If the reactor coolant is supplied by the supply water function of the RCIC during loss of
feedwater, level 1.5 must be designed low enough to prevent activation of the aforementioned
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equipment. Under the conditions of feedwater loss and inactivation of the RCIC, level 1.5 must be
set high enough for the HPCF to prevent the level 1 activation signal.
(i) Water level 1 (L-1)
The ADS is activated at level 1 (when the signal for high drywell pressure is simultaneously issued),
and water can be supplied to the RPV by the operation of the LPFL mode of the RHR system. The
LPFL mode of the RHR system is also activated at level 1.
Level 1 must be able to hypothesize the most severe pipe rupture (HPCF pipe rupture or MS pipe
rupture) and must be set high enough to prevent core overheating as a condition of the licensing
basis analysis.
(2)
Reactor pressure instrumentation

In addition to reactor pressure monitoring instrumentation during normal operation as well as during
accidents, the following instrumentation for interlocks are implemented.
(a) Reactor scram.

(b) Closed MSIV scram bypass.
(c) Opened SRV.
(d) Conditions for the opened RHR system shutdown cooling isolation valve.
(3)
RIP flow instrumentation and core support differential pressure instrumentation
(a) RIP flow instrumentation

Core flow rate is measured by adding the pump rotation frequency and flow rate of each RIP to the
pump deck differential pressure.
(b) Core support differential pressure instrumentation
Core flow rate is measured by the core support differential pressure. This flow rate is corrected by
the core flow rate derived from RIP flow instrumentation.
(4)
The MMSIV is closed by any of the following signals.
(a) Low reactor water level (water level 1.5).

(b) High MS pipe radioactivity.
(c) Large MS pipe flow rate.
(d) High MS pipe tunnel room temperature.
(e) High MS pipe turbine area temperature.
(f) Low condenser vacuum level.
(g) Low MS pipe pressure.
A logic circuit for closure of the MSIV is shown in Figure 1-3-6.
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5.
(1)
Relation with other systems

RPV instrumentation
During operation of the RPV, pressure, temperature and water level at start-up and shutdown are
monitored.
(2)
Reactor Protection System (RPS)

The reactor is safely operated and shutdown is ensured during an emergency.
(3)
Reactor Recirculation System (RRS)

Coolant is supplied to the core to achieve the prescribed thermal output.
(4)
Reactor Water Clean-up System (CUW)

Primary coolant is purified and both water quality and radiation levels are kept below prescribed
values.
(5)
Instrument Air System (IA)

Pressurised air is supplied to the air-operated valve.
(6)
High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply System (HPIN)

Nitrogen gas is supplied to the MSIV, SRV and other air-operated valves inside the containment
vessel.
(7)
Leak Detection System (LDS)

Leakage from the MS pipe and valve is monitored.
(8)
Process Radiation Monitor System (PRMS)

Radiation dose rate inside the MS pipe is monitored.
(9)
Remote Shutdown System (RSS)

Reactor shutdown operation is carried out outside the MCR.
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Figure 1-3-6 MS Isolation Valve Logic Circuit
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Section 4 Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel

(RCCV)
1.
Purpose
In the event of LOCA, the purpose of the RCCV is to suppress the release of fission products around
the site, and to keep the public exposure dose around the site sufficiently under the reference value defined
by the applicable regulatory limits.
2.
Function
The RCCV is a type of reinforced concrete pressure suppression vessel lined with a steel liner. The
containment vessel is composed of the upper drywell that contains the reactor primary system, a lower
drywell (D/W) enclosed by the RPV Pedestal structure, a Suppression Chamber (S/C) that stores water
(S/P), a Diaphragm Floor that separates the D/W and S/C, and a number of D/W Connecting Vents that
connect S/C and D/W, Vent Pipes and a Vacuum Breaker (see Figure 1-4-1 for the main components of the
RCCV). The RCCV contains access hatches for personnel and equipment access to the SSCs within the
RCCV. The RCCV, with the metal structure called the D/W head and associated isolation valves comprise
the PCV of ABWR. The PCV has an inert atmosphere of Nitrogen gas during operation.
(1)
The RCCV controls increase of pressure after a LOCA. The following items show the major
functions of the RCCV:
(a) In the event of a reactor primary system pipe break, reactor water and steam are released inside the
D/W, which causes an increase in internal pressure which forces the mixture of Nitrogen, steam and
water into the pool inside the S/C through the D/W Connecting Vent and Vent Pipes.
(b) The PCV and RCCV structures and R/B structure are designed to maintain integrity in the event of
the internal pressure resulting from a pipe rupture.
The steel liner of the containment vessel is not structural or a pressure vessel but acts as a boundary
material for maintaining leak tightness.
(c) Steam released in a LOCA is condensed in S/C to control increase of internal pressure of the PCV.
(d) Non-condensable gas that is transferred to S/C from the D/W during an accident is stored in the free
space of S/C to limit the increase of internal pressure of the PCV.
(e) The D/W Connecting Vent and Vent Pipes, which guide the mixture of coolant and non-condensable
gas that are released to the D/W, into the S/P ensuring maximum condensation of steam to relieve
pressure.
(f) Decay heat generated from the core and from any metal (Zirconium) water reaction will gradually
raise pressure and temperature within the PCV, but pressure can be decreased by spraying S/C pool
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water inside the containment vessel.

(g) Following a LOCA, steam and high temperature coolant water will enter the D/W. The water will
flash off to steam as pressure reduces upon leaving the rupture point. This leads to an increase in
pressure in the D/W, causing the steam / gas mixture to flow to the S/C as discussed above. When
reactor water level is recovered by the ECCS, the cooler water will begin to enter the D/W via the
rupture point which will, with the PCV sprays (mentioned above) condense steam in the drywell and
reduce the internal pressure in the PCV until it becomes negative compared to the S/C. When the
D/W pressure becomes negative compared to the S/C, the vacuum breaker which connects the S/C
and the lower D/W resolves the pressure difference and maintains integrity of the containment vessel
(keeps the difference between the S/C and the D/W within tolerance).
(2)
3.
During a LOCA, the RCCV controls leakage of fission products.
Configuration
(1)
Upper D/W
(a) The Upper D/W is composed of the RCCV wall (reinforced concrete cylinder lined with the steel
liner), the Top Slab (reinforced concrete slab with steel liner), the steel D/W Head, and the lower
flange cylinder, which acts as the interface between the Top Slab and the D/W Head.
(b) The steel liner is not a structural element or a pressure vessel but acts purely as a leak-resistant
boundary.
(c) The D/W Head is bolted to the lower flange cylinder. The contact part of the flange has a double
gasket seal, and is designed to allow for leakage test.
(d) In order for workers and equipment to enter, a single Personnel Air-lock and single Equipment
Hatch are installed. The contact parts of the Equipment Hatch and the Personal Air-lock both have a
double gasket seal and are designed to allow for leakage test.
(2)
Lower D/W
(a) The Lower D/W is enclosed by the RPV Pedestal. The Lower D/W and the Upper D/W spaces are
connected by the D/W Connecting Vent within the RPV Pedestal structure.
(b) Since the D/W Connecting Vent acts as a pipe passage, the D/W cooling system ducts and
instrument pipes are installed in the D/W Connecting Vent.
(c) During a LOCA, most steam flows from the Upper D/W in the S/C and some steam flows to the
Lower D/W, which suppresses the increase of internal pressure of the containment vessel until steam
condensation starts in the S/C.
(d) In order for workers and equipment to enter, the S/C has access tunnels installed through it that
connect the R/B outside the PCV and the Lower D/W.
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(3)
Suppression Chamber (S/C)
(a) The S/C is composed of a bottom slab and cylinder which are made of reinforced concrete, lined
with a steel liner.
(b) The liner is not a structural element or a pressure vessel but acts as a leak resistant boundary.
(c) Water fills the bottom of the S/C (S/P), which condenses steam released during a LOCA.
(d) There is space at the upper part of the S/C, which accommodates the increase of internal pressure
caused by non-condensable gas flowing into the S/P during a LOCA.
(e) To provide access for maintenance and inspection, the S/C Hatch and the Platform are installed. The
contact part of the S/C hatch has a double gasket seal.
(4)
Vent Pipes
(a) The Vent Pipe system is composed of vertical pipes that extend downward from the lower end of the
D/W Connecting Vent in the RPV Pedestal and terminate at multiple levels of horizontal pipes for
discharging steam and gas into the S/C below water level.
(b) The D/W Connecting Vent and vertical pipes are not connected to each other. This is to allow some
of the steam released during a LOCA to flow into the Lower D/W through the gap between the end
of the D/W Connecting Vent and the start of the vertical pipes.
(c) Some of the vertical pipes are installed with a return line or spillover line back into the S/P. Water
injected from the emergency cooling system flows into the Lower D/W from the space between the
D/W Connecting Vent and vertical pipes, but is then allowed to flow back through the return lines to
the S/P to avoid a loss of water source for the ECCS and to prevent increase of water level inside the
Lower D/W above the permissible level.
(5)
Vacuum Breaker
(a) 8 vacuum breakers are installed. Penetrations that connect the S/C and Lower D/W are made through
the RPV Pedestal walls, and the vacuum breaker is installed on the S/C side.
(b) The equipment has a check valve type structure and is activated by the pressure difference of the
disks on both sides.
(c) An opening and closing test using IA (valve fully opened with the lowest normal IA pressure) is
possible in this equipment. The test can be carried out remotely from the MCR.
(6)
Diaphragm Floor
(a) The Diaphragm Floor separates the Upper D/W and S/C. It is a reinforced concrete slab with a seal
plate on the lower surface.
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(b) The inside of the Diaphragm Floor is supported by the top of the RPV Pedestal, and the outside is
connected to the RCCV cylinder.
(c) The diaphragm floor withstands differential pressure between the D/W and S/C at abnormal
conditions, and is designed to withstand other abnormal and earthquake loads.
(7)
Isolation valve
(a)
Isolation valves are installed to prevent release of radioactive materials from the PCV in the event
of an accident.
(b) Isolation valves are installed inside and outside the PCV on all pipes which connect with the RPV
and penetrate the PCV.
(c) Piping that penetrates the PCV and are open ended within the PCV (e.g. ventilation pipes or suction
pipes for S/P water) are fitted with two isolation valves (installed in series) on the outer side of the
PCV (for pipes that are normally filled with water, a single valve is installed).
(d) For piping that penetrate the PCV, but are neither open-ended inside the PCV nor connected to the
RPV, an isolation valve is installed outside the containment vessel.
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Figure 1-4-1 Diagram of the entire Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel
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RCCV
GL
RPV Pedestal
Figure 1-4-2 Diagram of the Structure of the Reactor Containment Facility
4.
Interlock
See Interlock in the explanation of each individual system, for details of interlocks concerning the
RCCV isolation valves.
5.
(1)

Containment vessel spray cooling (PCV spray mode of the RHR system)
This function is for the cooling of non-condensable gas inside the D/W and S/C, the condensation of
steam, the removal of Iodine and the mixing of the atmosphere.
This mode ultimately transfers outflow coolant energy, decay heat and the heat from
waterZirconium reaction following heating of nuclear fuel, all potentially generated during a LOCA,
to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) after going through the S/P cooling system heat exchanger, thereby
keeping the internal pressure and temperature of the PCV below the design value.
(2)
S/P cooling function (S/P cooling mode of the RHR)

This system has a function to keep the temperature of the S/P water below the prescribed value.
This mode ultimately transfers energy, released from the SRV (or from a rupture as described above)
to the S/P during a LOCA, to the sea after going through the S/P cooling system heat exchanger,
thereby preventing the unacceptable increase of the S/P water temperature.
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(3)
Flammable gas concentration control function (FCS)

This function is for controlling concentration of flammable gas accumulated inside the PCV after a
LOCA or reactor isolation incident.
The FCS system recombines O2 and H2 (generated and accumulated due to Water-Zircaloy reaction
or radiolysis of water) to keep flammable gas concentration inside the PCV below the flammable
limit, thereby preventing overpressure and high temperature due to the burning of flammable gas.
(4)
Containment vessel Inerting function (AC)

This function maintains the inert state of the atmosphere inside the containment vessel during plant
operation so that the atmosphere inside the containment vessel does not reach the flammability level
even if flammable gas is generated during a LOCA.
The AC system displaces the atmosphere inside the containment vessel with N2 during normal plant
operation, and prevents intrusion of Oxygen (O2) from outside and makes up for the leaked N2 by
maintaining internal pressure at a low positive pressure.
(5)
D/W cooling function (DWC)

This function prevents the increase of ambient temperature inside the containment vessel (D/W)
during plant operation.
The DWC system cools the atmosphere within the pressure vessel transferring heat from equipment
and pipes during plant operation, and ultimately releases such energy to the sea via the RCW system
heat exchanger.
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Section 5 Reactor Recirculation System (RRS)

1.
Purpose
(1)
To remove the heat from nuclear fuel by forcing recirculation of the coolant in the core.
(2)
To control reactor power output by changing coolant flow which leads to change in density of water
(which also acts as a neutron moderator).
2.
Function
(1)
The RRS forces recirculation of reactor coolant using 10 RIPs.
(2)
The RRS adjusts core flow by changing the rotational speed of the RIPs, thereby controlling reactor
power output. The RIPs rotational speed is controlled by the Recirculation Flow Control (RFC)
system.
(3)
10 RIPs are continuously operated during normal plant operation (including the startup and shutdown
processes).
(4)
Even if one RIP stops during normal plant operation, continuous operation of the remaining nine
units allows operation at a rated core flow.
(5)
A RIP has the appropriate inertia to satisfy the following:
(a) Fuel rods have sufficient thermal margin in case 3 RIPs lose power.
(b) Reactor output is controlled with the reactor Recirculation Pump Trip system (RPT) immediately
after a turbine trip or generator load rejection event.
3.
Configuration
(1)
Reactor coolant discharged by the RIPs reaches the core via the lower plenum of the reactor and core
plate. Some amount of the boiled coolant passes through the steam separator, then becomes main
steam, and is transferred to the turbine facility via the MS pipes.
On the other hand, liquid reactor coolant that was separated with the steam separator joins with
feedwater and returns through the downcomer. the coolant is re-pressurised by the RIPs to and
recirculated inside the core.
(2)
The RRS is composed of the RIPs and the following auxiliary systems
(a) RIP
The RIP increases or decreases the amount of void near the fuel rods to control reactor power output,
by supplying reactor coolant to the core with an impeller and changing the core flow rate.
(b) Recirculation Motor Cooling system (RMC)
Cooling water is forced to circulate between the RIP motor and RIP motor cooling heat exchanger to
cool the RIP motor (See Figure 1-5-1).
(c) Recirculation Motor Purge system (RMP)
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The entry of reactor water into RIP casings is prevented by supplying purge water into the RIPs and
creating a flow from the casing toward the reactor pressure vessel. Purge water is supplied from the
CRD system and water flows into the reactor after passing through the space between the shaft and
stretch tube.
(d) Recirculation Motor Inflatable Shaft Seal system (RMISS)
When the RIP motor is removed during reactor outage, the inflatable shaft seal (secondary seal),
stored in the casing, is inflated by pressurised water so that reactor water does not flow into the RIP
casing side. Pressurised water is supplied from a portable tank and pump.
See Figures 1-5-1 and 1-5-2 below for an overview of the systems and components.
Primary
Containment
Vessel
Shroud
Impeller
From CRD
Recirculation Motor Purge System
Portable Pump
& Tank
Nuclear Reactor Coolant

Pressure Boundary
From MUWP
Recirculation Motor Inflatable Shaft Seal System

To RCW
Motor
Motor Casing
From RCW
RIP Motor Heat Exchanger
Motor Cover
Recirculation Motor Cooling

System
RIP
Figure 1-5-1 Overview of the Reactor Recirculation System
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Figure 1-5-2 RIP Components
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Section 6 Control Rod Drive System (CRD)

1.
Purpose
(1)
The CRD system controls reactivity of the core by changing the position of the CR inside the core in
fine increments with the use of the electric motor drive of the FMCRD.
During abnormal transient conditions of the plant, the FMCRDs are hydraulically driven with high
pressure water from the Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs) and provide rapid insertion of all control
rods into the core (scram) to shutdown the reactor in an emergency.
(2)
During normal operation, the CRD system supplies purge water to the FMCRD, the RIPs and the
CUW pumps, whilst continuously filling the HCU accumulator with high pressure water by means of
the CRD pumps to prepare for scram.
2.
(1)
Function
In normal CR insertion and withdrawal, the position of the CR in the reactor core is controlled by the
motor according to the control signal from the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS).
(2)
The FMCRD engages in scram after receiving the scram signal from the RPS. At the same time, the
FMCRD electric motor is initiated after receiving the scram signal from the RPS, to back up insertion
of all CRs.
(3)
All CRs are rapidly inserted and the reactor is shutdown by opening each scram valve installed at the
outlet of each of the HCU accumulators which supply high pressure water, stored in the HCU
accumulator, to the piston area of the FMCRD to hydraulically drive the FMCRD, when the scram
signal is issued.
(4)
The CR is inserted after receiving an Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) signal if an Anticipated Transient
Without Scram (ATWS) event occurs. At the same time, the motor of the FMCRD is activated after
receiving FMCRD run-in signals from the ATWS to back up all CR insertion.
(5)
In order to prevent clad sedimentation inside the FMCRD on the reactor side, purge water is supplied
from the CRD pumps.
(6)
In order to prevent reactor water from mixing in, purge water is supplied to the RIPs and the CUW
pumps from the CRD pumps.
3.
Configuration (see Figure 1-6-1 for reference)

The CRD system is composed of the FMCRD, which moves the CRs during normal operation, and
the HCU, which supplies purge water and high pressure water during scram to the FMCRD. The main
components are as follows:
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(1)
FMCRD (see Figure 1-6-2 for an overview)
(a) Insertion and withdrawal of the CRs during normal operation is driven by the electrical motors of the
FMCRDs depending on the control signal from RC&IS.
(b) Hydraulic insertion is accomplished by high pressure water supplied from the HCU accumulator
according to the scram signal from the RPS or the ARI signal from the ATWS.
(c) The RC&IS transmits the control signal to the FMCRDs after receiving the control signal from the
RPS. In consequence the FMCRDs actuate the electric motors in order to initiate the scram follow.
(d) CR insertion is driven by the motor according to the control from the signal of the RC&IS which
was received by ARI signal initiated by the ATWS.
(e) The CRs and the FMCRDs are connected via a bayonet coupling structure which cannot be removed
unless either the CR or the FMCRD is rotated 45 around its axis (see Figures 1-6-4 (a) and 1-6-4 (b)
below for a diagram overview of the CR-CRD coupling structure). In the case of a CR drop, of CR
Drop Accidents (CRDA), CRs are coupled with the hollow piston of FMCRD, and the maximum CR
drop speed is limited to 0.7 m/s or lower by dashpot effect to produce a large resistance.
(2)
Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU)
(a) The HCU is composed of a scram solenoid pilot valve, a scram valve, an accumulator and a nitrogen
gas bottle. It stores enough high pressure water to scram 2 FMCRDs with 1 HCU (only 1 FMCRD is
scrammed with 1 HCU) (see Figure 1-6-5 below for an overview of HCU).
(b) The air-operated scram valve is installed to ensure scram when scram operation is required.
(c) The three-way double solenoid single diaphragm electromagnetically-operated valve (scram pilot
valve) is installed above the scram valve to open or close.
(d) The scram valve and scram solenoid pilot valve are designed to become fail-safe against the loss of
air and electric power when they are used in combination.
(e) In normal operation, the scram valve actuator is subjected to air pressure and the scram valve is
closed while the scram solenoid pilot valve is excited. In an emergency, the scram valve is opened
by discharging air from the scram valve actuator due to non-exciting the scram solenoid pilot valve.
(f) Compressed air is discharged from the scram valve actuator and the scram valve is opened with one
of the following operations:
(i)
Both of the two scram pilot valve solenoids are non-excited.
(ii) Depressurisation of the scram pilot valve air line is achieved with the backup scram pilot valves
or the ARI solenoid valves (electromagnetic valves).
(3)
Control Rod Drive (CRD) Water Pump

The pump has enough flow volume and head required for filling the HCU accumulator during
normal operation and after scram is completed. During normal operation, it is continuously operated
with purge operation rated flow and pressure.
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Two pumps are positioned in parallel; one unit is used during normal operation and the other one
works as a backup.
(4)
CRD Pump Suction Filter

Two units of the filter are arranged in parallel in order to protect the CRD pump by removing foreign
materials contained in the condensate water. One unit is used during normal operation and the other
one works as a backup.
(5)
CRD Drive Water Filter

Two units of the filter are arranged in parallel in order to protect equipment on the downstream side
by removing foreign materials contained in condensate water supplied from the CRD pump. One
unit is used during normal operation and the other one works as a backup.
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Figure 1-6-1 Diagram of the CRD

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Figure 1-6-2 Overview of the FMCRD
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Figure 1-6-3 Diagram of Scram Operation
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Figure 1-6-4 (a) Diagram of the CR-CRD Coupling Structure
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Figure 1-6-4 (b) Diagram of the CR-CRD Coupling Structure
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Figure 1-6-5 Diagram of the HCU
4.
(1)
Control & Interlocks

The scram valve is opened by activating the scram pilot valve of the HCU (air discharge) after
receiving the scram signal from the RPS.
(2)
The rear emergency shutdown valve of the scram pilot valve air line is activated (air discharge), after
receiving the scram signal from the RPS, to open the scram valve and go into scram.
(3)
The Filling water line pressure low-low signal is issued to the RPS to go into reactor scram before
loss of scram functions.
5.
Other necessary information

CRs are explained as follows:
(1)
Purpose of CRs
Reactor start up, shut down and power distribution shaping are controlled during operation of the
reactor by manipulation of the CRs. The CRs can also make the reactor go into a sub-critical state
and maintain that state in the case of an emergency.
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(2)
Function of CRs
(a)
Power distribution shaping

Power distribution is regulated by appropriate adjustment of CR insertion patterns during reactor
operation.
(b)
Reactivity control
Reactivity control is performed by insertion and withdrawal of the CRs. In case of an emergency,
CRs are inserted into the core rapidly to shut down the reactor and maintain a sub-critical steady
state.
(3)
CR Design requirements
(a) To provide, mechanically, the required strength to maintain the materials used for reactivity
control.
(b)
To prevent interference during operations when inserting and withdrawing the CRs.
(4)
CR Structure
Typically, the CRs have a cruciform shape containing stainless steel tubes in each blade of the
cruciform. The following constitute the different parts that make the CR:
(a)
Handle
(b)
Tie rod (Centre post)
(c)
Sheath
(d)
Neutron Absorber Rods
(e)
Connector
(f)
Roller
(g)
Cooling hole
(h)
Coupling Socket
See Figure 1-6-6 for an overview of a CR.
(5)
CR Neutron Absorber Rod materials
(a)
Conventional type:
(b)
Hafnium type:
Boron Carbide (B 4 C) powder

Hafnium
For (1) and (2), see Figures 1-6-7 and 1-6-8 below for an overview of the CR cross section and CR type.
(6)
CR Coupling structure
The coupling connections between the CRs and CRD mechanism have a rotary connection (bayonet
coupling) structure in which these cannot be removed unless it is rotated 45. Thus, the CR and drive
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mechanism (hollow piston) can stay connected in withdrawal and insertion operations during plant
operation.
See Figures 1-6-4 (a) and 1-6-4 (b) for an overview.
(7)
Number of CR units and form
(a)
Number of CRs
205
(b)
Form
Cruciform.
Handle
Roller
Tie Rod
Cooling Hole
(Centre Post)
Absorber Tube
Sheath
Connector
Coupling Socket
Figure 1-6-6 Overview of the CR
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End Plug
Absorber Tube
Sheath
Iron Wool
Roller
Boron Carbide (B4C)
Dimple
Active
Absorber Zone
Ball
Tube
Tie Rod
Fuel Channel
Iron Wool
(Centre Post)
End Plug
Absorber Tube
Figure 1-6-7 Diagram of the CR Cross Section
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For Shutdown
For Power Shaping
(Boron Carbide Type)
(Hafnium Type)
Absorber Tube
Hafnium Flat Tube
Figure 1-6-8 Main Purpose of CR by Type
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Section 7 Reactor Water Clean-Up System (CUW)

1.
Purpose
The CUW is installed for the following purposes:
(1)
To remove impurities contained in the reactor water and maintain the core water quality within the
specified range in order to control:
(a) Corrosion of equipment and pipes composing the reactor primary system.
(b) Heat-transfer efficiency due to the accumulation of impurities on the fuel surface.
(c) Radioactive contamination of the reactor primary system and relevant equipment due to
accumulation of irradiated impurities floating in the coolant.
(2)
To discharge excessive reactor water (blow down) in order to maintain normal water level of the
reactor at start-up and shutdown.
(3)
2.
(1)
To cool the upper area inside the RPV if it is necessary to open the RPV early during an outage
Function
Reactor water is purified to maintain the core water quality during normal plant operation, at plant
start-up, at plant shutdown and during refuelling.
(2)
Removal of corrosive products and fission products inside the reactor primary system.
(3)
Removal of dissolved inorganic materials that flow into the reactor from the FDW.
(4)
After purifying reactor water at reactor start-up, shutdown and during hot standby, the excess water is
discharged.
(5)
Reactor water is drained from the bottom of the RPV and re-circulated through the feedwater system.
(6)
If it is necessary to start refuelling early during outage, the CUW cools the RPV by spraying reactor
water from the inside of the RPV head.
3.
Configuration
(1)
CUW pump
2 units
(2)
Regenerative heat exchanger
1 unit
Heat loss is reduced through the heat exchange between reactor water drained out and water
returning to the reactor.
(3)
Non-regenerative heat exchanger
2 units
Cooling is achieved, through the heat exchange of reactor water and RCW, to a temperature that does
not damage the resin of the Filter Demineralisers (F/Ds).
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(4)
Filter demineraliser (F/D)
2 units
See Figure 1-7-1 below for a schematic diagram of the CUW.
PCV
From FDW
R
P
V
To RHR
Regenerative Hx
Non-Regenerative Hx
Non-Regenerative Hx
RCW
RCW
CUW Pump
Filter
Demineralizer
To S/P
To LCW
Figure 1-7-1 Diagram of the CUW
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Section 8 Fuel Pool Cooling Clean-Up System (FPC)

1.
Purpose
The FPC keeps the spent fuel pool water temperature below the prescribed value and maintains the
spent fuel pool water quality.
2.
Function
The FPC has the following functions:
(1)
Decay heat from spent fuel is removed and spent fuel pool water temperature is kept below
approximately 50C.
(2)
The following impurities are removed and spent fuel pool water quality (purity, transparency) is
maintained:
(a) Impurities in the air above the pool water surface.

(b) Impurities attached to fuel stored in the pool and equipment.
(c) Corrosion and fission products emitted from the core during refuelling.
(d) Other impurities introduced during maintenance works.
Configuration
3.
(1)
The FPC is structured with the following equipment (See Figure 1-8-1):
(a) Spent fuel pool
1 unit
(b) FPC pump
2 units
(c) FPC heat exchanger
2 units
(d) FPC filter demineraliser
2 units
(e) Skimmer surge tank
2 units
(2)
The FPC is operated as follows in order to achieve the functions of the system. (during normal
operation mode)
(a) Pool water that flows to the skimmer surge tank is pressurised with the FPC pump.
(b) Various impurities within the pool water are continuously filtered and demineralised using an
ion-exchange resin of the FPC F/D system.
(c) Pool water temperature is kept below the prescribed temperature with the use of the FPC heat
exchanger.
(d) Pool water discharged from FPC heat exchanger is returned to the pool through the water spray pipe
of the SFP.
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From MUWC
(5)
(1)
MO
From RHR
Skimmer
Surge
Tank
MO
From SPCU
D/S Pit
Reactor Well
MO
Make-up
Water
SFP
Alternaive
make-up water
To RHR
(4) (2)
(1)
(2)
To Radioactive Waste System

FPC Heat Exchanger
FPC Heat Exchanger
RCW
MO
RCW
FPC Pump
MO
AO
FPC F/D
AO
MO
MO
MO
AO
AO
(3) (2)
AO
AO
SPCU
AO
Figure 1-8-1 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up System outline
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Section 9 Atmospheric Control System (AC)

1.
Purpose
(1)
To maintain Oxygen concentration inside the PCV below the specified value by inerting the inside of
the PCV (D/W, S/C) with nitrogen gas during normal reactor operation, and dilute hydrogen and
oxygen accumulation levels (in the PCV) below flammability level, in the event of a LOCA.
(2)
2.
To keep the pressure inside the PCV within the specified range during normal reactor operation.
Function
(1)
Normal reactor operation mode (constant nitrogen gas supply operation)
(a) During normal reactor operation, nitrogen supplied from the Nitrogen supply facility is heated by the
Nitrogen gas heater and supplied into the PCV (see Figure 1-9-1 below).
(b) To maintain pressure inside the PCV at the specified level (a relatively high positive pressure) by
compensating leakage from the PCV.
(c) To prevent the rise of Oxygen concentration in the containment due to the inflow of air from outside
by maintaining the inside of the PCV at a relatively higher positive pressure.
(2)
PCV vent operation mode

If the PCV pressure rises due to thermal expansion at plant start-up or if PCV pressure rises due to a
leakage from the Nitrogen gas activation equipment during normal plant operation, gas inside the
PCV is vented as required to maintain the prescribed level of pressure.
3.
Configuration
Nitrogen gas supply machine
It is composed of the liquid Nitrogen tank (LN 2 tank), evaporator and heater, as the N 2 gas supply
source of the AC.
See Figure 1-9-1 below for a diagram overview of the AC.
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PCV
Nitrogen
Gas Supply
Facility
HVAC
Nitrogen Gas Heater
SGTS
HVAC
HVAC
Figure 1-9-1 Diagram of AC
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Section 10 Drywell Cooling System (DWC)

1.
(1)
Purpose
To maintain the required thermal environment and humidity so that the components in the D/W
operate in a proper manner during plant normal operation.
(2)
To cool the atmosphere in the D/W to retain a good working environment (temperature) during plant
inspection and maintenance.
2.
(1)
Function
DWC Coolers and DWC Cooling Dehumidifiers supply the bulk head, inner D/W and pressure
vessel skirt areas with cooled air (N 2 during normal plant operation) through ducts (See Figure
1-10-1).
(2)
The circulating air is returned to the DWC Coolers once collected at the upper D/W area. Each DWC
cooler mixes, circulates and cools the air for each part of the D/W (See Figure 1-10-1).
(3)
3.
This system is not operated in the event of LOCA.
Configuration
(1) Components (See Figure 1-10-1)

(a) DWC Coolers (DWC Cooling Units and DWC Supply Fans) 3 units (1 unit for standby)
(b) DWC Cooling Dehumidifiers
2 units
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Upper Drywell
Cooling
Water
EL.25300
Cooler (C)
Cooler (A)
Cooler (B)
Fan (C)
C
C
Fan (A)
Fan (B)
EL.19600
Cooling
Water
C
Cooling
Cooling
Dehumidifier (B)
Cooling
Dehumidifier (A)
EL.16500
Water
EL.16300
Lower Drywell
EL.-2600
Figure 1-10-1 DWC
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Section 11 Suppression Pool Clean-Up System

(SPCU)
1.
Purpose
The SPCU is installed for the following purpose:
(1)
To purify the S/P water and use it as the water source for the reactor well during refuelling, for filling
up the temporary equipment storage pool, and as the water source for tests of the ECCS during
normal plant operation.
2.
Function
(1)
Impurities are removed with the F/D, and the S/P water is purified so that it satisfies the water quality
standard.
Water is sucked in from the S/P, passed through the F/D of the FPC using the SPCU pump, and
returned to the S/P.
(2)
The steam dryer/steam separator pool and reactor well are filled with water before refuelling, using
the S/P as the water source.
3.
Configuration
The configuration and operation mode of the SPCU are shown below:
(1)
SPCU mode
(a) 1 F/D of the FPC is separated from the SFP clean-up mode and is used with the SPCU mode.
(b) Water sucked in from the S/P with the SPCU pump is returned to the S/P after being treated with the
F/D.
(c) Since this operation mode is not normally operated, it is designed to use 1 of the 2 F/Ds of the FPC
and operate it at the same time as the SFP water purification.
(d) This operation mode is to be continued until it satisfies the prescribed water quality.
.
(2)
Water filling operation mode

This operation mode is a mode that transfers water from the S/P to the upper pool before refuelling.
(3)
Water removal operation mode

This operation mode is a mode that directly discharges water to the S/P via the S/P return line of the
SPCU after purifying the FPC F/D when discharging upper pool water after refuelling.
See Figure 1-11-1 for a diagram overview of the SPCU.
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Figure 1-11-1 SPCU outline
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CHAPTER 2
Safety Systems
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Section 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

1.
Purpose
In case of a LOCA, the ECCS injects cooling water into the RPV, and removes the decay heat
generated in the core over a long period of time, retaining integrity of fuel cladding.
2.
(1)
Function
Low Pressure Flooder System (LPFL)
The LPFL can operate in coordination with the HPCF, the RCIC and the ADS to cool the core in
case of a LOCA. The LPFL is one of the operating modes of the RHR which is generally used for
removing the decay heat during reactor shutdown.
The LPFL has a separated loop for each of the 3 low pressure coolant injection pumps. The pumps
are activated by the signal for low reactor water level (L-1) or high D/W pressure, and injects water
from the S/P to the outer side of the core shroud cooling the core.
(2)
High Pressure Core Flooder System (HPCF)

The HPCF can operate in coordination with the LPFL, the RCIC and the ADS to cool the core in
case of a LOCA.
The HPCF is activated by the signal for low reactor water level (L-1.5) or high D/W pressure. In
order to cool the core, water from the condensate storage pool (CSP) or the S/P is injected to the fuel
assemblies from the sparger nozzle installed in the upper part of the core.
(3)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

The RCIC can operate in coordination with the LPFL, the HPCF and the ADS to cool the core as a
function of the ECCS, in the case of a LOCA.
The RCIC is activated by the signal for low reactor water level (L-1.5) or high D/W pressure, and
injects water from the condensate storage pool or S/P into the RPV via the FDW. The RCIC also has
the function to supply water in order to maintain the reactor water level by preventing abnormal drop
during loss of feedwater from the condensate water system and the FDW, which is activated at low
reactor water level (L-2).
(4)
Automatic Depressurisation System (ADS)

The ADS is composed of 8 of the 18 SRVs which are part of the MS system, and it can operate in
coordination with the LPFL, the HPCF and the RCIC to cool the core during a LOCA.
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The ADS is activated after receiving signals for both low reactor water level (L-1) and high D/W
pressure, and helps achieve core cooling by compressing the reactor steam using S/P water and
promptly reducing the reactor pressure to a sufficient level to allow water injection with the LPFL.
The ADS cannot cool the core on its own, and it is designed to be activated with a specified delay as
it decreases the coolant quantity once it is activated.
3.
Configuration
The ECCS is designed with sufficient margin in redundancy and independency of active and static
components, and has the objective of maintaining the required safety functions upon assumption of
various pipe ruptures in the primary system and single failure of active components in some of the systems
of the core standby cooling system, or in case of Loss Of Off-site Power (LOOP).
The ECCS is composed of the following 4 systems:
(1)
RCIC
- Composed of 1 system and 1 turbine driven pump activated with high D/W pressure or water level
L-1.5
- Feedwater function to be activated automatically with low reactor water level (L-2) signal
(2)
HPCF
- Composed of 2 independent systems and 1 pump for each system
- Activated by high D/W pressure or low reactor water level (L-1.5)
(3)
LPFL
- Composed of 3 systems and 1 pump for each system
- Activated by high D/W pressure or low reactor water level (L-1)
(4)
ADS
- Composed of 8 SRVs
- Activated with high D/W pressure and L-1, in AND conditions
The definitions of reactor water levels L-xx are indicated in Chapter 1 Section 3.
An overview of the structure is shown in Figure 2-1-1.
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Core
To A
CSP
Suppression Pool
RCIC: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
HPCF: High Pressure Core Flooder System
RHR:
Heat Removal
LPFL:Residual
Low Pressure
Flooder System
ADS:
ADS:Automatic
AutomaticDepressurisation
DepressurizationSystem
System
Figure 2-1-1 Schematic diagram of the ECCS
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4.
Interlock
An overview of the start-up signals of the core standby cooling system (ECCS) is shown in Figure
2-1-2 below. (See Chapter 2 Section 7 for the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)).
Figure 2-1-2 ECCS activation interlock
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5.

(1) System separation
Considering the RCIC as an ECCS, each division assumes a simple structure arranged with a high
pressure system and low pressure system per division to improve redundancy and reliability, as
shown in Table 2-1-1.
Table 2-1-1 System separation
Division
ECCS Arrangement
Electric Supply
High Pressure
Low Pressure
System
Division A
RCIC
LPFL (A)
ED/G (A)
Division B
HPCF (B)
LPFL (B)
ED/G (B)
Division C
HPCF (C)
LPFL (C)
ED/G (C)
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Section 2 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

1.
Purpose
In the case of a LOCA, the SRVs open when the reactor water level cannot be maintained due to high
pressure. A prompt depressurisation of the RPV and injection of water with the LPFL is carried out to cool
the core and retain integrity of fuel cladding.
2.
Function
The SRVs are installed in the MS pipes inside the PCV and between the RPV and the inboard MSIVs.
The objective of the SRVs is to prevent excessive pressure inside the RPV and promptly depressurise the
reactor when necessary. The discharged steam is guided to the S/P through the discharge pipe for
condensation.
3.
Configuration
(1)
SRVs
The SRVs are safety related components and perform various functions: as a spring-loaded safety
valve self-actuated by inlet steam pressure, or as an actuated valve supplying nitrogen to a
piston-type pneumatic actuator following an automatic or manual external signal.
There are 18 SRVs, with the following functions:
(a) Relief valve function

The piston-type pneumatic actuator is activated by the supply of Nitrogen following a high pressure
signal inside the RPV. This forces the SRV to open in order to prevent excessive pressure build up in
the RPV. All 18 SRVs have this function.
(b) Safety valve function
When the pressure inside the RPV exceeds spring force, it lifts the valve stem. The valve disc is
lifted by steam inlet pressure. All 18 SRVs have this function.
(c) ADS function

The ADS function is installed in 8 of the 18 SRVs and works in coordination with the RHR, the
HPCF and the RCIC to cool the core. It is activated about 30 seconds after receiving the signals for
both low reactor water level (L-1) and high D/W pressure. The reactor pressure is then promptly
reduced to allow water injection with the LPCF to achieve core cooling.
(d) Other functions
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The SRV can be manually and remotely operated from the MCR to control reactor pressure in order
to remove steam generated by residual heat. This function is used if for some reason the condenser is
unavailable as heat sinks after an automatic reactor shutdown. All 18 SRVs have this function.
(2)
Discharge pipe
Activation frequency is high for the functions of the SRVs, therefore, radioactive contamination of
the PCV and surrounding equipment and a pressure rise in the PCV are assumed. In order to prevent
these situations, steam is discharged through the discharge pipe into the S/P water where it is
condensed.
(3)
Accumulator
Accumulators contain nitrogen (N2) gas for the following purposes:
(a) Relief valve function (18 units installed)

(b) ADS function (8 units installed)
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Section 3 High Pressure Core Flooder System

(HPCF)
1.
(1)
Purpose
To inject water into the core so that the temperature of the fuel cladding does not exceed the
specified criteria (1200C) in the case of a LOCA (accident mode).
(2)
To substitute for the RCIC to maintain the reactor water level during the reactor isolation process
(reactor isolation mode).
2.
Function
The HPCF is activated by a low reactor water level signal (L-1.5) in the case of a LOCA with the
purpose to keep the core submerged. In the case of a transient event of loss of feedwater accident, it
recovers the reactor water level as a backup of the RCIC.
(1)
Accident mode
In the case of a LOCA, the HPCF pump starts the injection of the coolant within 35 seconds after
receiving the start-up signal of low reactor water level (L-1.5) or high D/W pressure.
This mode is also used for long-term cooling after LOCA.
(2)
Reactor isolation mode

This mode automatically starts up at a low reactor water level (L-1.5) signal, as backup equipment of
the RCIC, and the injection valve automatically closes with high reactor water level. Later when
reactor water level drops and reaches L-1.5, the injection valve automatically opens. When the
injection valve is closed, the HPCF pump uses the minimum flow bypass operation.
3.
Configuration
This system forms the ECCS together with the RCIC, RHR (LPFL mode) and ADS. It is composed
of 2 independent subsystems and it cools the core by injecting into the RPV the cooling water from the CSP
or the S/P through the core injection spargers installed inside the plenum in the upper part of the core.
The pump has two design flow rates:
Low flow rate
182m3/h (at approximately 8.2MPa)
High flow rate
727m3/h (at approximately 0.7MPa)
An overview of the system is shown in Figure 2-3-1.
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Figure 2-3-1 Schematic Diagram of the HPCF
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Section 4 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)

1.
Purpose
In order to remove residual heat during reactor shutdown and reactor isolation and to cool the core
during LOCA, the RHR uses valves to switch between the following modes:
(1)
LPFL mode
(2)
Containment vessel cooling spray mode
(3)
S/P cooling mode
(4)
Shutdown cooling mode
(5)
Fuel pool cooling mode
2.
Function
The RHR has the following 5 basic functions:
(1)
The LPFL cools the reactor core by removing the decay heat in the case of a LOCA. The LPFL cools
the core (together with the HPCF, RCIC and ADS) to keep the fuel cladding temperature below the
specified criteria in the case of all the design-basis LOCA.
(2)
The containment vessel spray cooling mode removes decay heat released into the gas phase inside
the D/W, W/W, and condenses steam, after a LOCA, in order to prevent overpressure of the PCV.
(3)
The S/P cooling mode cools the S/P water below a specified temperature during normal operation.
(4)
The shutdown cooling mode removes the decay heat of the fuel to make refuelling activities and
maintenance operations possible after reactor shutdown.
(5)
The fuel pool cooling mode supports cooling of the FPC when the heat load of the spent fuel pool
exceeds the maximum cooling capacity of the FPC.
3.
(1)
Configuration
RHR pump
Number of units
(2)
3 units (954m3/h/unit)
RHR heat exchanger (RHR Hx)

(a) Purpose
To remove decay heat from the reactor core after reactor shutdown.
To cool the S/P water.
To cool the spent fuel pool water during periodic inspections, and to remove decay heat generated
at the spent fuels in the spent fuel pool.
(b) Number of units:
3 units
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4.
(1)
Operation modes
LPFL mode
This mode has the objective, like the other ECCS during LOCA, to recover and maintain reactor
water level and retain integrity of fuel cladding.
This mode is automatically activated by low reactor water level (L-1) or high D/W pressure and S/P
water is injected from the LPFL sparger to the outer side of the core shroud and feedwater sparger, in
case of a LOCA. This mode is prioritised over other operation modes of the RHR.
The LPFL can keep the core submerged by the activation of both the RCIC and the ADS even in the
case that a single failure of the ED/G, which powers the HPCF and a complete rupture of the other
HPCF pipe occurs.
After recovery of the reactor water level, 1 unit of the LPFL pump is sufficient to maintain the
reactor water level even if the HPCF pipe is completely ruptured, since it only needs to make up the
amount of water decreased due to steam produced from decay heat. In the event of a small rupture
accident, the LPFL injects cooling water after the pressure is reduced using the ADS.
(2)
Containment vessel cooling spray mode

This mode sprays water (cooled with RHR Hx) into the PCV during accident conditions to allow
steam condensation, cooling of non-condensable gases, and to control the rise of pressure inside the
PCV. It also removes Fission Products (FP) released inside D/W.
(3)
S/P cooling mode

This mode cools S/P water so that the steam inside the PCV can be completely condensed in the case
of a LOCA.
(4)
Shutdown cooling mode

This mode cools reactor water temperature to approximately 50C and keeps it at that temperature
during reactor shutdown.
This mode is used when the reactor pressure becomes lower than approximately 0.9 MPa during
reactor shutdown.
(5)
Fuel pool cooling mode

This mode supports cooling of the fuel pool when heat load exceeds the cooling capacity at the FPC.
This mode uses the RHR pump and RHR Hx to keep the fuel pool temperature below the prescribed
value.
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Figure 2-4-1 below shows an overview of the RHR.
PCV
Drywell
To FPC
From FDW
NB
RHR
To CUW
RPV
To FPC
Wetwell
S/P
RHR Hx (B)
From FPC
From FPC
RHR Pump(B)
RHR Pump(C)
RHR Hx (C)
RHR Pump(A)
RHR Hx (A)
Figure 2-4-1 Diagram of the RHR
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Section 5 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

(RCIC)
1.
Purpose
The RCIC operates in the following modes to cool the core and maintain the reactor water level, to
retain the integrity of fuel cladding:
(1)
When the reactor is isolated from the turbine system and cooling water cannot be supplied from the
feedwater system (Reactor isolation process)
(2)
In case of a complete pipe break in one of the two HPCF pipings, or in case of any other accidents,
including LOCA, together with the HPCF, the LPFL mode of the RHR and the ADS, since the RCIC
is part of the ECCS.
2.
(1)
Function
The RCIC automatically starts up at low reactor water level (L-2) or high D/W pressure signed and
injects rated flow into the reactor within the specified time. None of the equipment in this system
requires AC power, IA or auxiliary cooling water.
(2)
The RCIC starts up at low reactor water level (L-2) at a loss of feed water, but when low reactor
water level (L-1.5) or high D/W pressure is achieved, start-up signal corresponding to ECCS function
is issued.
(3)
3.
(1)
Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the S/P (See the diagram of Figure 2-5-1).
Configuration
RCIC turbine
Saturated steam generated from the decay heat of the reactor core is supplied from the MS line to
drive the RCIC pump directly connected to the shaft. Exhaust steam is discharged to the S/P.
(2)
RCIC pump
CSP or S/P water is injected into the reactor.
The injected flow is 182m3/h
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To
Main Steam
PCV
RCIC
MO
MO
MO
RCIC
MO
RPV
From FDW
AO
RCIC
MO
RCIC Turbine
RO
MO
RO
MO
MO
HO
RCIC
Pump
RCIC
CSP
RCIC CST
RCIC S/P
MO
MO
Figure 2-5-1 Schematic Diagram of the RCIC
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Section 6 Standby Liquid Control System (SLC)

1.
Purpose
The Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) is an emergency system designed to safely bring
the reactor from a full power operation status to sub criticality by a continuous injection of a sodium
borate solution in a situation where CRs cannot be inserted.
2.
Function
The SLC has the following functions:
(1)
When it is judged that the reactor cannot achieve cold shutdown status using CRs, an aqueous
solution of boric acid is injected into the reactor by activating the SLC pump remotely from
the MCR.
(2)
Functional tests can be undertaken without injecting aqueous solution of boric acid into the
reactor.
(3)
As a backup of the CRD, the SLC is designed with high redundancy and reliability, and in a
way that erroneous operations leading to the injection of aqueous solution of boric acid are
prevented.
(4)
3.
(1)
The SLC shares a reactor injection pipe with the HPCF.
Configuration
SLC pump (100% capacity2, 1 spare unit)
Aqueous solution of Sodium Borate can be injected into the reactor for the entire pressure
range (from high reactor pressure to low reactor pressure).
(2)
SLC storage tank (1 unit)

The electric heater is installed to facilitate the dissolution of the chemicals. During normal
operation, it is used to control the tank water temperature.
Agitation sparger: Air holes are made to thoroughly mix the solution.
(3)
SLC test tank (1 unit)

It is used for functional tests during normal reactor operation and core injection tests during
reactor shutdown.
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Reactor Primary
PCV
Containment
Vessel
AO
Air Supply Line
MO
Demineralised Water
Supply Line
From HPCF
RPV
SLC Test
Tank
MO
MO
SLC
Pump
MO
MO
SLC
Storage
Tank
SLC Heaters
SLC Pump
Figure 2-6-1 Schematic Diagram of the SLC
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Section 7 Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

1.
Purpose
(1)
The Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) is designed and installed to reduce the release of
radioactive materials in the case of a LOCA or a fuel drop accident. The system keeps the inside of
the reactor secondary containment (reactor area of the R/B) at a negative pressure and filters
radioactive materials to prevent direct release to the environment.
(2)
The SGTS is installed to treat the air discharged from the PCV and from the reactor area to reduce
public exposure at site periphery in cases other than LOCA when it is necessary.
(3)
The following actions are taken to control the release of radioactive materials to the site periphery
when the signal for reactor area isolation is issued:
(a) Air is filtered inside the reactor area and discharged using the stack.
(b) The pressure inside the reactor area is kept negative to prevent direct leakage outside the building.
2.
(1)
Function
SGTS fan
Because the SGTS fan is an active component, the system is composed of two 100% capacity units
for redundancy. When the signal for reactor area isolation is issued, the SGTS fan keeps the pressure
inside the reactor area negative to prevent direct leakage of air outside the building. The treatment
capacity of the single SGTS fan is 50% of spatial volume of the R/B area per day.
(2)
Filter equipment
Filtration is carried out combining several types of filters so that radioactive materials are not
directly released into the environment. The following filters are used:
High-efficiency particle filter (HEPA)
This is installed to sandwich the iodine charcoal filter to keep the release of radioactive particles
to the site periphery at a minimum and prevent clogging of the iodine charcoal filter.
Charcoal filter
A charcoal filter is installed to remove radioactive Iodine (which is a fission product).
(3)
Heater Unit
Since the heater unit is an active component, the SGTS is composed of two 100% capacity units for
redundancy.
The heater unit is composed of a moisture separator and a heating coil and is used to maintain the
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efficiency of the HEPA and iodine charcoal filters.
3.
Configuration
This system is composed of the following major equipment:
(1)
SGTS Filter Train
1 unit
This contains the HEPA filter and the Iodine charcoal filter. The rated treatment capacity is
2000m3/h.
(2)
SGTS Heater Unit
2 units
This is installed on the upstream side of the SGTS fan and contains the moisture separator. The rated
treatment capacity is 2000m3/h.
(3)
SGTS fan
2 units
This is installed on the upstream side of the SGTS filter. The rated treatment capacity is 2000m3/h.
(4)
Pipes and valves

The exhaust pipe guides treated gas from the reactor area and PCV to the main stack.
An overview of the SGTS is shown in Figure 2-7-1.
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From PCV
To Main Stack
From Operation Floor
SGTS Heater Unit
SGTS Fan
SGTS Heater Unit
SGTS Filter Train
SGTS Fan
Figure 2-7-1 Schematic Diagram of the SGTS
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Section 8 Flammability Control System (FCS)

1.
Purpose
The Flammability Control System (FCS) is installed to keep the concentration level of the
combustible mixture of Hydrogen and Oxygen below the flammability limit in the event of a LOCA, and
therefore preventing drastic pressure and temperature increases inside the PCV.
2.
Function
The FCS has the following functions:
(1)
Concentration control of flammable gas

The concentration level of Hydrogen and Oxygen generated and accumulated in the PCV during a
LOCA is kept below the flammability limit* by using the hydrogen and oxygen thermal recombiner.
* Below 4% Hydrogen concentration or below 5% Oxygen concentration
(2)
Start-up time requirement

Preheating is completed within 3 hours after system start-up, and functions of the system can be
fulfilled after this phase.
(3)
Power source
Power is supplied by the emergency power source (ED/G) to allow the system to fulfil its functions
in the case of a LOOP.
(4)
Redundancy
The FCS is one of the indirect engineered safety features. Two redundant Hydrogen and Oxygen
recombiners are installed to allow the system to fulfil its functions with the assumption of a single
failure of an active component.
3.
Configuration
The FCS configuration is shown in Figure 2-8-1. The entire system is composed of 2 recombination units,
pipes, valves and measurement and control instrumentation. The components of the FCS are listed below.
(1)
Entire system
System capacity
255 m3/h [normal]
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Recombination
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
FCS Recombiner
Type
Thermal reaction type
Number of units
2 units
FCS Blower
Type
Canned centrifugal type
Number of units
2 units
FCS Heater
Type
Electric type
Number of units
2 units
FCS Cooler
Type
Spray type
Number of units
2 units
When the FCS starts up, the gas inside the D/W is sent with the blower to the S/C via the FCS
heater, FCS recombiner, FCS cooler and FCS steam separator. The gas is heated up to approximately
720C and the Hydrogen and Oxygen present in the gas reacts in the recombiner forming steam. Part of
the gas discharged from the recombiner is returned to the blower inlet via the recirculation line and the
rest is returned to the S/C after being cooled. When the S/C pressure becomes high, the vacuum breaker
valve is opened and the gas is set to the D/W. Concentration of flammable gas inside the PCV is
controlled by repeating this process.
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From MUWP
From RHR
FCS Heater
FCS Blower
Drywell
FCS
Recombiner
FCS
Water
Separator
FCS Cooler
Suppression
Chamber
Figure 2-8-1 Configuration Diagram of the FCS
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Section 9 Remote Shutdown System (RSS)

1.
Purpose
In the event that the MCR becomes inaccessible, the RSS can be used as an emergency system which
aims for safe, cold shutdown of the reactor by remote operation from an appropriate location other than the
MCR.
2.
Function
The RSS is a system that shifts the reactor in scram from hot shutdown to cold shutdown by remote
operation outside the MCR when an accident that requires evacuation from the MCR occurs.
3.
Configuration
The RSS comprises the following systems including operation switch, monitoring equipment and
control panels for pumps and valves:
(a) HPCF
(b) RHR
(c) NB, 3 safety relief valves
(d) AC
(e) RCW
(f) RSW
(g) D/G
(h) On-site Power System
(i) MUWC
(j) FCS
4.
(1)
Interlock and relation with other systems

Relation with the main control room
The RSS is an additional system to the system, normally used in the MCR. Groups of equipment
shared between the MCR and the RSS are switched with the remote shutdown transfer switch of the
RSS panel.
The relationship between the RSS and the MCR is shown in Figure 2-9-1.
During normal operation, information like the operation status, pressure and other plant parameters
are transferred to the MCR via the RMU. In the MCR, operation status is displayed and process
parameters are indicated on instruments. Onsite equipment are operated with the operation switch
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(CRT or FD) in the MCR.

When the remote shutdown transfer switch is switched to the RSS side, information about switched
equipment and plant parameters, are displayed and indicated on the RSS panel side. Successively,
information is not transferred to the MCR anymore.
Equipment switched to the RSS side are operated only with the remote operation switch installed on
the RSS panel.
Figure 2-9-1 below shows the relationship between the RSS and MCR described above.
(2)
Systems necessary for reactor shutdown

As shown in paragraph 3 above, the RSS is composed of the minimum necessary operation switches,
monitoring instruments, pumps and valves, in order to safely shut down the reactor. The RSS
systems allow cold shutdown of the reactor even if feedwater cannot be used due to isolation of the
RPV and loss of normal turbine and condenser heat removal functions.
5.
Supplementary information
Shift to reactor cold shutdown
After reactor scram, the SRV and HPCF systems are activated to put the reactor in hot shutdown
status. At this point, the RHR system is operated in S/P cooling mode and cools the S/C.
The SRV releases steam generated from reactor decay heat and other heat sources to the S/C to
control the increase of reactor pressure. The HPCF system injects water from the Condensate Storage Pool
CSP or the S/C into the reactor to maintain the reactor water level.
These functions help to cool the reactor and also depressurise the reactor while the reactor pressure is
under control. The reactor is depressurised to the adequate level for the RHR system shutdown cooling
mode. Ultimately, the RHR system is operated in the shutdown cooling mode to bring the reactor into cold
shutdown status.
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Figure 2-9-1 Relationship between RSS and the MCR
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CHAPTER 3
Turbine Island and Turbine
Auxiliary Systems
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Section 1 Main Steam System (MS)
1.
Purpose
The MS supplies steam generated in the reactor to the steam turbine. The Turbine Bypass
System (TBS) is designed to send the reactor steam directly to the condenser during reactor start-up,
shutdown, normal operation, and transient stages.
2.
(1)
Function (see Figure 3-1-1 below for a structure overview)

The steam system is connected to the high pressure turbine (HP-T) via a MS header, main stop
valves and control valves from the turbine side MS pipe.
(2)
The steam system branches from the MS header and connects to the condenser via the turbine
bypass valve (TBV).
(3)
The MS header is installed upstream of the main stop valve for pressure equalisation of the
MS pipes, and to decrease pressure fluctuation during main stop valve operation tests, making
it easy to supply turbine auxiliary steam. The turbine bypass line lets excess steam bypass the
main turbine at turbine start-up, and as the generator load changes rapidly, the steam is sent
directly to the condenser in order to prevent increase in reactor pressure. The TBV capacity is
approximately 33% of the total steam flow rate at the rated generator output.
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Figure 3-1-1 Structure of the systems

3-1-2
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Section 2 Extraction Steam System (ES)
1.
(1)
Purpose
The ES heats the condensate water and the feedwater in the Feedwater Heater (FWH) using
the steam extracted from the turbine and the cross-around pipe in order to improve plant
thermal efficiency.
(2)
This system supplies the heating steam to the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) and the
Gland Steam Evaporator (GSE).
(3)
2.
(1)
This system supplies the driving steam to the Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine (RFP-T).
Function
Forms the cross-around pipe connecting the High Pressure Turbine (HP-T) outlet to the
Combined Intermediate Valve (CIV) through the MSR, and the extraction lines that are
connected to the 2 stages of high pressure FWH (HP FWH) and the 4 stages of low pressure
FWH (LP FWH).
(2)
Forms heating steam line that is routed from the HP-T outlet to the MSR 1st stage reheater.
(3)
Forms the low pressure steam line from the cross-around pipe to the RFP-T and the exhaust
system that is routed to the condenser.
(4)
Forms the heating steam line that is routed from the 2nd extraction pipe to the GSE.
(5)
Forms the steam line that is routed from the GSE heating steam pressure control valve for
start-up/shutdown and for low-load operation to the extraction steam pipe.
(6)
Check valves are installed on No. 1, 2, 3, 4 extraction lines to prevent heater drain flushing,
steam reverse flowing and turbine overspeed.
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Section 3 Turbine Auxiliary Steam System (AS)
1.
Purpose
The AS supplies heating steam to the MSR 2nd stage reheater and the GSE, and supplies the
drive steam to the RFP-T and the Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) from the MS header. The house
steam system supplies the drive steam for the start-up SJAE.
2.
(1)
Function
The SJAE inlet pressure is reduced from the MS pressure to the required pressure by the
pressure control valve, and used as the SJAE driving steam.
(2)
The start-up SJAE driving steam is supplied in order to get the required condenser vacuum
when the MS pressure is not high enough, such as during plant start-up/shutdown operation.
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Section 4 Condensate and Feedwater System

(CDFS)
1.
(1)
Purpose
The condensate water in the condenser is pressurised by the Low Pressure Condensate Pump
(LPCP), the High Pressure Condensate Pump (HPCP), and the Turbine Driven Reactor
Feedwater Pump (T/D-RFP) or the Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (M/D-RFP) before
it is supplied into the reactor.
(2)
The condensate water is supplied from the LPCP to the SJAE condenser and the Gland Steam
Condenser (GSC), and the processed gas is then cooled and the heat is recovered as
condensate water.
2.
Function
In the condensate system, the condensate water extracted from the condenser is pressurised
by the LPCP, purified by the Condensate Purification System (CPS), and transferred to the
HPCP. The condensate re-pressurised by the HPCP is heated in the 4 stages of the LP FWH
and is transferred to the Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP).
In the feedwater system, T/D-RFP or M/D-RFP pressurise the feedwater sent from the HPCP,
and it is then supplied to the reactor through 2 stages of the HP FWH.
The LP FWH drain is recovered in the condensate system by the Low Pressure Drain Pump
(LPDP), and the HP FWH drain is recovered in the RFP suction side by the High Pressure
Drain Pump (HPDP).
The control signal from the Feedwater Control System (FDWC) controls the feedwater flow
rate. The flow rate is controlled by adjusting the RFP-T rotation speed for T/D-RFP; or by
adjusting the discharge Flow Control Valve (FCV) opening for M/D-RFP.
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3.
(1)
Major equipment
Low Pressure Condensate Pump (LPCP)
Three 50% capacity LPCPs are installed. Normally two of the three LPCPs are operated while
the third LPCP is on standby.
(2)
High Pressure Condensate Pump (HPCP)

Three 50% capacity HPCPs are installed. Normally two of the three HPCPs are operated while
the third HPCP is on standby.
(3)
Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (M/D-RFP)

The M/D-RFP installed downstream of the LP FWH and in parallel to the T/D-RFP supplies
the feedwater to the reactor at plant start-up and low load operation. Two 25% capacity
M/D-RFPs are installed and both of these are on standby during rated operation.
(4)
Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (T/D-RFP)

The T/D-RFP installed and in parallel to the M/D-RFP supplies feedwater to the reactor at
rated operation. Two 50% capacity T/D- RFPs are also installed.
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Section 5 Feedwater Heater Drain System (HD)
1.
Purpose
The turbine extraction steam heats the FWH, thus raising the feedwater temperature. The
drain pump up system improves the plant thermal efficiency by directly injecting the high
temperature drain into the condensate system.
2.
Function
(1) High Pressure Drain Pump (HPDP)

Three 50% capacity HPDPs are installed. The HPDPs supply the High Pressure Drain Tank
(HPDT) drain to the condensate system between 50% and 100% of plant output. Normally,
two HPDPs should operate and one HPDP should be on standby.
(2) Low Pressure Drain Pump (LPDP)
Three 50% capacity LPDPs are installed. LPDPs supply the Low Pressure Drain Tank (LPDT)
drain to the condensate system between 50% and 100% of plant output. Normally, two LPDPs
are operated while the third LPDP is on standby.
(3)
MSR drain system

The No. 1 FWH or the condenser collects the drain of the MSR 1st/2nd stage reheaters. The
HPDT or the condenser collects the moisture separator drain.
(4)
HP FWH drain system

The HP-T extraction steam and the MSR drain flow into the No. 1 FWH.
The HP-T extraction steam flows into the No. 2 FWH.
The HPDT or the condenser collects the No. 1 FWH drain.
The HPDT collects the No. 2 FWH drain.
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The drain in the HPDT is collected as follows:

- When the plant output is less than 50%: to the condenser.
- When the plant output is higher than 50%: to the RFP suction by the HPDP.
(5)
LP FWH drain system

The Low Pressure Turbine (LP-T) extraction steam and the GSE drain flow into the No. 3
FWH.
The LP-T extraction steam and the No. 3 FWH drain flow into the No. 4 FWH.
The LP-T extraction steam and the No. 4 FWH drain flow into the No. 5 FWH.
The LP-T extraction steam flows into the No. 6 FWH.
The No. 5 FWH and the No. 6 FWH drains flow into the LPDT.
The GSE drain and the No. 3 to 5 FWH drains can also be collected to the condenser.
The drain collected in the LPDT is collected as follows:
- When the plant output is less than 50%: to the condenser.
- When the plant output is higher than 50%: to the CD inlet or outlet by the LPDP.
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Section 6 Turbine Gland Steam System (TGS)
1.
Purpose
The TGS uses steam to prevent leakage of steam from the HP-T shaft packing and the main
valves gland, and to prevent air in-leaks from the LP-T and the shaft packing of the RFP-T.
2.
Function
(1) Steam Supply System

The seal steam supply method depends on the plant operation condition as follows:
(a)
When reactor pressure is less than 0.7MPa: The seal steam from the house boiler is supplied
as the gland seal steam.
(b)
When reactor pressure is higher than 0.7MPa: the AS from the MS header or the ES from the
HP-T is supplied to the GSE as the heating steam, and the seal steam generated by heating
makeup condensate water is supplied to the gland.
(2)
Steam Return System

The return steam that contains air from each gland of the HP-T and LP-T is guided to the GSC
and is condensed. The gland steam exhauster extracts and discharges air into the atmosphere
from the exhaust stack.
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Section 7 Off-Gas System (OG)
1.
Purpose
The OG recombines flammable gases (Hydrogen (H2) and Oxygen (O2)), which are
generated from the radiolysis of reactor cooling water, into steam. The OG sufficiently reduces the
emission rate of radioactive particles before discharging them to the environment. The OG transfers
the off-gas from the Gland Steam Exhauster and the Mechanical Vacuum Pump (MVP) to the stack.
The OG is designed to perform the required functions during all operating modes based upon the
established environmental design conditions.
2.
Function
The OG Recombiner recombines the Hydrogen and the Oxygen in the off-gas diluted with
the steam of the SJAE. The OG Preheater is installed to improve the recombination efficiency. The
recombined moisture vapour is cooled below 50oC by the OG Condenser in order to condense and its
volume is reduced, and the off-gas temperature is decreased below 10oC by the OG Cooler
Condenser to reduce moisture. This off-gas is cooled and dried, and sent to the OG Charcoal
Adsorbers to reduce radioactivity where Xe and Kr decay.
The off-gas passing through the OG Charcoal Adsorber is removed from the radioactive
particles and solid substances by the OG Filter before being discharged into the environment through
the stack.
The off-gas monitor and the stack monitor observe the level of radioactivity in the off-gas.
3.
Configuration
Figure 3-7-1 shows the system schematic diagram. The outline of the main equipment is as
follows:
(1)
OG Preheater (1 unit)
This preheater heats the off-gas by House Steam (HS) to prevent water drops that would
adversely affect the performance of the catalyst.
(2)
OG Recombiner (1unit)
This recombiner recombines explosive gases H2 and O2 in the off-gas from the SJAE, and H2
concentration at the OG Recombiner outlet is reduced to below the flammability level.
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(3)
OG Condenser (1unit)
This condenser cools off-gas from the OG Recombiner, and condenses moisture vapour in the
off-gas. The drain generated in the OG Condenser is returned to the condenser.
(4)
OG Cooler Condenser (1unit)

This cooler condenser cools off-gas from the OG Condenser, and condenses and removes
water content to reduce moisture.
(5)
OG Charcoal Adsorber (4 units)

This charcoal adsorber absorbs radioactive noble gas contained in the off-gas, and decays its
radioactivity.
(6)
OG Filter (1 unit)
This filter removes radioactive particles and solid materials in the off-gas and prevents
radioactive particles and solid materials from being released into the environment.
(7)
OG Ejector (1 unit)
This ejector maintains the operating pressure behind the OG Charcoal Adsorber in the
condition of negative pressure, and discharges the off-gas to the environment.
(8)
OG Blower (1 unit)
This blower is utilised to treat a large amount of the off-gas, and is operated only during the
vacuum-up of the condenser. During normal operation, this blower is available as a backup to
the OG Ejector.
(9)
OG Charcoal Adsorber Room Heater Ventilating Handling Unit (HVH) (2 units)

The HVH is installed in the OG Charcoal Adsorber room to control the off-gas relative
humidity within the specified range. The cooling water in the HVAC Normal Cooling Water
(HNCW) is used as a cooling resource, and the electric heater is used as a heating resource.
(10) Instrumention Air (IA) Bleed

While the OG is in warming-up operation, during plant start-up, IA is supplied for the
stabilisation of the system during operation. IA is supplied to prevent H2 retention if the
off-gas flow is low.
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4.
(1)
Other necessary information

In this system, the Hydrogen concentration is always controlled in 4vol% or less to prevent
hydrogen explosions.
(2)
To prevent off-gas leakage outside the facility, the OG Charcoal Absorber room is operated at
a negative pressure.
Figure 3-7-1 Structure of the OG
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Section 8 Circulating Water System (CW)
1.
Purpose
This system supplies service water (sea water) into the condenser tube as cooling water. The
system is also designed to remove scales in each cooling tube of the condenser by ball cleaning and
backwashing during the plant operation.
2.
Function
The CW runs continuously during the generation of power, including start-up and shutdown,
supplies the cooling water (service water) to the condenser water box by the Circulating Water Pump
(CWP), and condenses steam (the main turbine exhaust and the RFP-T exhaust) flowing into the
condenser. The steam is indirectly cooled through surface contact with the cooling water flowing in
the condenser tubes. During abnormal operations, the system shall be designed so that the CWPs
continue supplying cooling water to the condenser, even in transient operating states such as load
rejection and turbine trip. The power cycle heat sink is designed to maintain the temperature of the
water entering the CW. The service water is discharged into the sea through the discharge canal.
The CW has a condenser tube cleaning system which continuously cleans condenser tubes
to remove bio-fouling and water stain from the tubes, thereby preventing degradation of the
condenser cooling efficiency, and corrosion in the condenser cooling tubes.
The CW consists of the following components:
-
Multiple motor-driven pumps with no standby pump
Condenser water box drainage system which consists of a pump and a sump
Condenser tube cleaning system (as a supporting facility)
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CHAPTER 4
Auxiliary Systems
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Section 1 Reactor Building Cooling Water System

(RCW)
1.
Purpose
The RCW removes the heat generated within equipment or rooms with cooling water. The removed
heat is transferred into the sea or the ultimate heat sink through the Reactor Building Service Water System
(RSW).
2.
Function
(1)
To cool and remove the heat generated in the ECCS equipment.
(2)
To cool and remove the heat generated in the ED/G equipment.
(3)
To cool and remove the heat generated in the RHR Heat Exchangers.
(4)
To cool and remove the heat generated in the reactor normal auxiliary system equipment, waste
treatment system equipment and auxiliary system equipment inside the T/B that handle radioactive
fluid.
3.
Configuration
The RCW is composed of three systems: a closed loop corresponding to Division A, Division B and
Division C of the ECCS.

Each system consists of two cooling water pumps, two heat exchangers, one surge tank and one
chemical injection tank (one unit shared between two divisions).
(1)
RCW pump:
Number
(2)
6 units (two per division)
RCW heat exchanger:

Number
4.
Operation modes
(1)
Normal operation mode
During normal plant operation, cooling water is provided to each auxiliary equipment of normal
operation systems, upon operating one RCW and Reactor Building Service Water system (RSW)
pump, as well as one RCW heat exchanger for Division A, B and C, respectively.
During this operation mode, one RCW and RSW pump, and one heat exchanger are in standby mode,
and a backup unit is available in each system at all times.
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(2)
LOCA operation mode

In the case of a LOCA, the engineered safety features, which are normally in standby, initiate
operation. Therefore, all RCW, RSW pumps and RCW heat exchangers are in operation and provide
cooling water to the necessary auxiliary equipment.
See Figure 4-1-1 for an overview of the RCW.
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Figure 4-1-1 Diagram of the RCW
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Section 2 Reactor Building Service Water System

(RSW)
1.
Purpose
In order to cool and remove the heat from the RCW, the RSW supplies service water via the RCW
heat exchanger.
2.
Function
The RSW takes in service water from the water intake pit, removes heat within the RCW heat
exchanger, and discharges the water to the water discharge pit. The RSW consists of three independent
divisions (i.e. Divisions A, B and C) corresponding to those of the RCW.
3.
Configuration
The RSW is composed of the following equipment, per division.
RSW pump:
Number
Rated capacity
1800m3/h/unit
4.
Operation Modes
(1)
Normal operation mode

During normal plant operation, this system indirectly removes heat from auxiliary equipment such as
the RIP heat exchanger, the CUW non-regenerative heat exchanger and the D/W cooler, through
the RCW. This mode can be remotely and/or manually controlled from the MCR, and one of the two
RSW pumps, in each division, is operated while the other pump is set on standby as a backup.
(2)
LOCA operation mode

This mode is automatically actuated by a LOCA signal. Both of the two RSW pumps in each division
are operated.
See Figure 4-2-1 for a system overview of the RSW.
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From RCW
From FEI
RCW Heat Exchanger
MO
To RCW
MO
RSW Strainer
MO
From RCW
RCW Heat Exchanger
MO
To RCW
From FEI
RSW Strainer
MO
RSW Pump
Water Discharge Pit
Water Intake Pit
Figure 4-2-1 System Overview of the RSW (one division)
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Section 3 Heating Ventilating & Air Conditioning

System (HVAC)
1.
Purpose
(1)
To adjust indoor temperatures for normal operation of on-site equipment.
(2)
To adjust indoor temperature and humidity in order to provide a workable environment for operators
and workers.
(3)
To limit the leakage or spread of radioactive materials from devices or equipment to the room, during
operation or maintenance/inspection, and confine such radioactive materials locally. At the same time,
to carry out the necessary ventilation to maintain the cleanliness of indoor air. Additionally, to process
contaminated air with the exhaust system filter as necessary.
2.
(1)
Function
To prevent spread of contamination
HVAC in areas which may be subject to contamination by radioactivity shall maintain the area to a
negative pressure to prevent spread of radioactive materials to other areas in the event of
contamination. At the same time, the HVAC must possess functions to dilute the indoor contaminated
air by securing appropriate frequency of ventilation. Additionally, the HVACs shall be fitted with
appropriate filtering.
(2)
Heat removal
Functions to remove heat release from electrical/equipment facilities and heat emission equipment
such as high-temperature pipe shall be available.
(3)
Ventilation
Functions to supply fresh air to operators and workers shall be available.
(4)
Air conditioning
Functions to maintain appropriate indoor environment (temperature, humidity) for operators, workers
and equipment shall be available.
3.
(1)
Configuration
Each HVAC facility is composed of the following:
Fans, air conditioners, louvers, filters, cooling/heating coils, ducts, humidifiers, control
instrumentation devices, etc.
(2)
Air is supplied from clean areas. Clean areas are maintained at a positive pressure relative to areas
that may be subject to contamination, and exhaust is conducted from areas that may be subject to
contamination. Exhaust from areas that may be subject to contamination shall be emitted from the
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exhaust stack after passing through the filter.

(3)
Regarding rooms with high heat generation amounts, the cooling of the atmosphere is performed
locally by installing air conditioners. When room temperature is low, the heater shall be used as
necessary to maintain the prescribed temperature.
(4)
The R/B areas (R/A) and T/B area (T/A) fan/exhaust fan, as well as the supply/exhaust process
devices, which are major systems, shall be shared facilities. Four units, each with a capacity of 33%,
R/A and T/A fan/exhaust fans shall be installed, and one for each shall be a backup unit (see Figures
4-3-1 and 4-3-2 for an overview of the R/A and T/A HVAC system).
(5)
Cooling of rooms that require heat removal during loss of normal power is conducted by
fans/exhaust fans that receive supply from an emergency power supply, or air conditioners.
(6)
As for the MCR area, two units, each with a 100% capacity, MCR supply/exhaust and recirculation
supply fans shall be installed, and one of each of the two units shall be a backup unit (see Figures
4-3-3 for an overview of the MCR HVAC system).
(7)
As for the Rw/B area, two units, each with 100% capacity, Rw/B supply/exhaust fans shall be
installed, and one of each of the two units shall be a backup unit (see Figures 4-3-4 for an overview
of the Rw/B HVAC system).
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(8)
Schematic flow diagram of each area
Figure 4-3-1 Reactor Area HVAC
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Figure 4-3-2 Turbine Area HVAC System
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Figure 4-3-3 MCR HVAC System
Figure 4-3-4 Rw/B HVAC System
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Section 4 Instrument Air System (IA)

1.
Purpose
The purpose of the IA is to supply compressed air to the Air-Operated (AO) Valve for plant
operation control, and to the AO instrumentation and control equipment.
2.
Function
Two IA compressors with 100% capacity are installed in parallel (1 backup). To prevent drain
blockage of the instrumentation pipings, and in order for the AO valve and AO instrumentation and control
equipment to operate smoothly, oil-less, dehumidified and dust-less compressed air is supplied. The IA
schematic flow chart is shown in Figure 4-4-1.
3.
(1)
Configuration
IA Compressor (100% capacity2 units, 1 backup)
The air compressor compresses atmospheric air and supplies compressed air to the equipment.
(2)
IA Air Reserver (100% capacity 1 unit)

Mitigates ripples from the air compressor and provides a stable supply of compressed air. Also,
consider an event of loss of air compressor functions due to loss of power, and ensure that the
required amount of air and air pressure is supplied for 10 minutes following the shutdown of
functions.
(3)
IA Dryer Tower (100% capacity2 sets, 1 backup set)

In order to supply air of permissible dryness for use in air operated instrumentation and control
equipment, this dryer is used to dehumidify compressed air.
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IA Dryer Tower (D)
IA Dryer Tower (C)
IA Dryer Tower (A)
IA Dryer Tower (B)
T/B
To T/A
To S/B
To R/B
SA
To RW/B
Others
IA
Compressor
(A)
R/B : Reactor Building

Rw/B : Radwaste Building
IA
Compressor
(B)
S/B : Service Building
IA Air
Reserver
Figure 4-4-1 IA Schematic Flow Chart
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Section 5 Sampling System/Post-Accident Sampling

System (SAM/PASS)
Purpose
1.
(1)
The Sampling System (SAM) is used to confirm the performance of the plant, systems, and
equipment to ensure precise operation and maintenance of the plant. This is carried out by either of
the following two approaches: measurement of conductivity, hydrogen ion concentration, or
dissolved oxygen in process fluids with pre-installed instruments, or chemical analysis of extracted
samples from each system.
(2)
The Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) provides a sample of reactor coolant and containment
atmosphere in order to confirm the soundness of radioactive barriers and FAs following an accident.
Function
2.
(1)
SAM
This system monitors the process fluid of the plant by chemical analyses and process instruments,
and is composed of a sample cooler rack, a sample analysis rack, a sampling rack, a transmitter panel,
and a sampling sink or sampling tap.
(2)
PASS
This system consists of a device which collects samples outside the secondary containment and a
local (on-site) control panel.
Configuration
3.
(1)
SAM
(a) Sampling sink or sampling tap

Used in sampling of materials of low radioactivity at points where reduction of the temperature or
the pressure of the samples is not necessary, where frequency of analysis is low, or for taking
Background (BG) samples.
(b) Sampling rack

Applied to all the other samplings that do not use the sampling sink or the sampling tap. Sampling
racks allow simple sampling, maintenance of analysis instruments and equipment, as well as
inspection. They are also separately installed according to functions taking into account dose
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exposure reduction, as shown below.

(i)
Sample cooler rack (reduce temperature with cooler).
(ii) Sample analysis rack (contains continuous measurement instruments).

(iii) Sampling rack (manual analysis).
(iv) Transmitter panel (contains transmitters, switches, and so on).
(v) Auxiliary rack (sinks and so on).
Sampling racks with hoods are installed to lead the gas to the HVAC, taking into account internal
dose exposure by non-condensable gas during manual analysis sampling.
(2)
PASS
(a) Reactor coolant sampling (liquid sampling)

In order to estimate fuel damage and environmental impact, this system collects liquid samples to
analyse soluble iodine amongst radioactive substances released by the fuel damage. This system can
collect liquid samples from the pipes of the RIP differential pressure measurement line and the RHR
heat exchanger outlet whenever necessary.
(b) PCV atmosphere sampling (gas sampling)

In order to estimate fuel damage and environmental impact, this system collects gas samples to
analyse diffusible noble gases amongst radioactive substances released from damaged fuel.
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4.
Major sampling items

Table 4-5-1 Overview of Major Sampling Items
Item
Sampling point
Purpose
RPV bottom
Monitoring of reactor cooling water quality

when the CUW is isolated
F/D inlet
Monitoring of reactor cooling water quality
F/D outlet
Monitoring of F/D performance
Main steam
Main steam pipe
Monitoring of carry over
S/P water
S/P water recirculation pipe
Monitoring of corrosion and radioactivity
Boric acid solution
SLC storage tank
Monitoring of Boron concentration
RHR water
RHR heat exchanger outlet
Monitoring of water quality
OG recombiner inlet
Monitoring of Hydrogen concentration
OG cooler condenser outlet
Monitoring of performance
Hotwell outlet
Detection of leakage from condenser tubes
Reactor coolant
CUW F/D inlet and

outlet water
Off-gas
Main condenser
Condensate demineraliser inlet Monitoring of water quality

Condensate
outlet
Discharge water
demineraliser
Discharge canal
Monitoring of demineraliser performance

Monitoring of discharged water radioactivity
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CHAPTER 5
Electrical Power Supply
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Section 1 Station Electrical Power Supply System
1.
Purpose
The Station Electrical Power Supply system transmits electrical power to the external grid,
supplies the electrical power to the equipment needed for the power plant operation, and ensures the
power plant safety without any loss of power during the normal operation and the design basis
accident.
2.
(1)
Function
The electrical power generated by the generator is transmitted to 500kV external grids (4
lines) through the Main Transformer (MTr). This system also supplies the auxiliary power
through the House Transformer (HTr). The 500kV transmission lines can transmit the
electrical power corresponding to the sum of four power stations even if one line is not
available.
(2)
The auxiliary power supply can be supplied through a Low Voltage Start-up Transformer
(LSTr) from the 66kV bus, other than that of via the HTr.
(3)
An emergency power supply is provided through LSTr from 66kV to ECCS and to the
equipment to shut down the reactor, the turbine, and the generator safely at the time of a Loss
Of Off-site Power (LOOP) or a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in combination with
LOOP.
3.
Configuration
(1) General configuration (see Figure 5-1-1)

(a)
6.9kV common bus (SA-1,2 , SB-1,2)
4 buses in 2-line
(b)
6.9kV normal bus (A-1,2 , B-1,2)
4 buses in 2-line
(c)
6.9kV emergency bus (C,D,E)
3 buses in 3-line
(d)
Isolated Phase Bus
(e)
480V Power Centre (P/C)
(f)
Motor Control Centre (MCC)
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Figure 5-1-1 Overall configuration of Station Electrical Power Supply System
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(2) System overview

(a)
6.9kV common bus (Common M/C)
4 buses in 2-line
This bus receives the power through the LSTr from the 66kV switchyards bus, and No. 6 and
No. 7 units use the power in common.
(b)
4 buses in 2-line
6.9kV normal bus (Normal M/C)
The loads required for the normal operation are distributed to 4 buses, and the generator
supplies the power directly through the HTr to the 6.9kV normal bus while the plant is under
operation. At the time of the plant start-up (until the generator can feed power through the
HTr) or at plant shutdown, the 66kV switching station supplies power through the LSTr to the
6.9kV normal bus. The load exceeding 300kW is directly connected to the 6.9kV medium
voltage bus, and a lower load than 300 kW is supplied from the low voltage bus.
(c)
6.9kV emergency bus (emergency M/C)
3 buses in 3-line
The bus supplies power to engineered safety systems and its auxiliary equipment that are
connected with three independent buses respectively. During normal operation, the bus
receives power from the LSTr through the common bus. In the event of a design basis accident
(loss of power), the ED/G supplies power to the emergency bus.
(d)
Isolated Phase Bus (IPB)

This bus is an electrical circuit connecting the generator to the MTr or the HTr, and consists of
conductors separated by a metal box in each phase. This bus transmits power generated by the
generator.
(e)
480V Power Centre (P/C)

The load directly connected to the 480V P/C is in general over 90kW but not greater than
300kW. Power to loads with a capacity less than 90 kW is supplied from the MCC that has
power supply from the P/C.
(f)
Motor Control Centre (MCC)

The MCC receives power from the 480V Power Centre and supplies power to loads not
greater than 90kW.
(g)
Main Transformer (MTr)
1 unit
The MTr steps up the 3-phase and 3-line voltage 27 kV generated by the generator to 525kV
via the Isolated Phase Bus from the three bushings installed in the generator bottom, and
supplies it to the ultra-high voltage switching station.
(h)
House Transformer (HTr)
2 units
This transformer is directly connected to the generator. This transformer steps down the
voltage from the generator voltage to the voltage corresponding to the station medium voltage
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system in order to supply power to the normal load in the power plant while the generator is in
operation.
(i)
Low Voltage Startup Transformer (LSTr)
2 units (common to 6 and 7)
This transformer steps down voltage of the 66kV bus to the voltage corresponding to the
station medium voltage system in order to supply power to the auxiliary common bus,
emergency bus, and the normal bus during the plant outage period.
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Section 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G)
1.
Purpose
The ED/G is an emergency AC power supply equipment which provides power to engineered
safety systems and to the necessary loads required to shut down the reactor in the event of a LOOP
accident or in the event of a combination of a LOOP and a LOCA.
Function
2.
(1)
The Diesel Generator (ED/G) supplies Alternative Current (AC) power to the necessary load
in the event of a LOOP or in the event of a combination of a LOOP and a LOCA. Therefore,
the ED/G should have features that allow a rapid automatic start-up and a rapid load
connection.
(2)
The ED/G should be able to perform start-up automatically and to maintain the voltage and the
frequency within the specified value in the rated output until the generator stops manually.
(3)
To operate at the time of a LOCA in combination with a LOOP
(a) In short-term cooling

Two out of the three ED/G systems should be able to start automatically and operate
continuously even if a single active component breaks down.
(b) In long-term cooling
Two out of the three systems should be able to operate after the LOCA even if a single active
component of the ED/G (in addition to LOCA) breaks down.
(4)
Amount of fuel storage

The amount of fuel necessary for the operation period for items (3)(a) and (3)(b) is stored. The
light oil tank has a capacity corresponding to 7 days of continuous operation at maximum. The
day tank has a capacity corresponding to 8 hours of continuous operation with the rated output
at maximum.
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3.
Configuration
(1) System classification (Relation with engineered safety systems)

ED/G (A): DIV-I (LPFL (A))
ED/G (B):
DIV-II (LPFL (B), HPCF (B))
ED/G (C):
DIV-III (LPFL (C), HPCF (C))
RCIC(DC)
RHR(LPFL ) (A)
ED/G
Div-
ADS
HPCF (B)
RHR(LPFL ) (B)
ED/G
Div-
HPCF (C)
RHR(LPFL ) (C)
ED/G
Div-
Figure 5-2-1 Three divisions of ECCS
(2) Equipment and components

(a)
Diesel engine
(i) The ED/G should be able to start-up automatically using compressed air.
(ii) The ED/G should be able to start-up and shut down by the local control panel or by a remote
control operation from the MCR.
(iii) The ED/G should start-up automatically by an automatic start-up signal except when the
lockout relay for ED/G is operating.
(b)
System for diesel engine
(i) Fuel oil system

The fuel oil system consists of Light Oil Tanks, Fuel Transfer Pumps, and Day Tanks (see
Figure 5-2-2).
A Day Tank is installed in each ED/G.
A Day Tank is supplied with fuel from the Light Oil Tank by the Fuel Transfer Pump.
There are two outdoor Light Oil Tanks (A and B), and their capacity allows the two ED/G
to operate for 1 week or more with the rated output.
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Day Tank
A
FQ
A
A
Ou tside
R/B
Light Oil Tank
Inside
R/B
B
B
ED/G Engine
Fuel Transfer Pump
Figure 5-2-2 Fuel Oil System

(ii) Lube oil system
The lube oil system consists of a lube oil filter, lube oil pump equipped with engine, lube oil
cooler, lube oil generator bearing, lube oil thermostatic valve, prelube oil pump, and lube oil
heater.
This system is used to lubricate and cool down sliding parts such as pistons, crank pins, piston
pins, and main bearings. The lube oil is supplied to each part of the engine and the generator
bearing by the engine-loaded pump through the lube oil cooler, and is returned to an oil pan
depending on its level head.
The prelube oil pump is operated intermittently in preparation for the engine start to
perform a pre-lubrication of the sliding parts during engine stop. When the lube oil
temperature is low, the engine is warmed up by the lube oil heater to facilitate the engine
start-up.
The oil-pan is equipped with the level switch, and the oil transfer pump is operated
automatically.
(iii) Diesel cooling water system

The diesel cooling water system consists of a cooling water pump equipped with an engine,
cooling water cooler, cooling water thermostat valve, cooling water expansion tank, cooling
water heater and cooling water heater pump.
The RCW is used to provide the cooling water.
The cooling water heater and the cooling water heater pump are operated intermittently
depending on temperature and warmed up while the engine is stopped in order to facilitate
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engine start-up.
The cooling water cools the engine while the engine is in operation.
(iv) Air system for start-up

The air system for start-up consists of an air receiver, air compressor, non-return valve which
prevents a backflow to the air compressor from the air reservoir, two solenoid valves for
start-up and two solenoid valves for stop.
The air system for start-up is utilised in the start-up and stop of the diesel engine. Also this
system sends the compressed air into the cylinder through the solenoid valve for start-up, the
distribution valve and the starting valve in order to operate the engine by piston movement.
When stopping the diesel engine, the fuel lever is set to the fuel shut-off position by the stop
piston through the stop solenoid valve of the air reservoir.
There should be two air receiver units installed; one for automatic start-up and the other
for manual start-up.
Two air compressors are installed for the two air receivers. Therefore one air compressor
can charge air even if the other air compressor fails. The air compressor is able to start,
stop and operate with load depending on the air receiver pressure.
(v) Air intake and exhaust system

This system consists of an exhaust silencer and inlet-exhaust pipe.
The air intake system cools air with the cooler after compressing it with a supercharger, and
supplies the combustion air into a cylinder. The exhaust system drives the supercharger and
discharges the exhaust gas into the atmosphere through the exhaust silencer.
The exhaust silencer and the piping from the engine to the exhaust silencer are designed so
that the exhaust pressure becomes as low as possible.
The intake air for the fuel combustion is the external intake air.
(c)
Generator
The generator is a synchronous generator of an air-cooling, protection, drip-proof, forced
lubrication, and rotary-field type.
The generator stops automatically for protection when a generator internal failure, engine
overspeed, or generator reverse power is detected. However, the generator does not stop in the
event of a generator reverse power in case of LOCA.
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4.
Control and Interlock
(1) Start-up/stop interlock

(a)
The generator should be able to automatically start-up and remain in standby operation during
LOCA (reactor water level low or RCCV pressure high) signal.
(b)
The generator should be able to automatically start up and continuously operate in the event of
LOOP.
5.
(1)

The generator bearing lube oil cooler, lube oil heater, cooling water cooler, lube oil cooler,
and air cooler utilises the RCW as a cooling water source.
(2)
The make-up water to the cooling water expansion tank of the diesel cooling water system is
supplied from the Make Up Water System (MUWP).
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Section 3 DC Power Supply System (DC)
1.
(1)
Purpose
The DC power supply system provides the power for equipment and the control /
instrumentation during normal plant operation.
(2)
The DC power supply is used to power the auxiliaries which perform plant shutdown, and
control in the event of loss of onsite AC power or a LOCA.
2.
(1)
Function
Battery capacity
The battery should have an adequate capacity to operate the following equipment:
(a) Circuit breaker control
(b) Emergency load necessary for safe plant shutdown
(c) Instrumentation control load
(d) DC lighting
(e) Initial excitation of the ED/G
(2)
(a)
Load configuration to each power supply system

DC125V system
-DC lighting
-RCIC vacuum pump and condensate water pump
-RCIC motor valves
-Panel, annunciator, multiplex transmission equipment
-Uninterruptible Power Supply System (UPS)
-Circuit breaker control (Metal-Clad Switch Gear (M/C), Power Centre (P/C))
-ED/G initial excitation
(b)
DC250V system
-Emergency oil pumps, etc.
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3.
Configuration
(1) System outline

(a)
There are four individual 125V emergency DC power supplies of A, B, C, and D types, and a
250V normal DC power supply (See Figure. 5-3-1 and Figure 5-3-2).
(b)
Each system consists of a battery and a battery charger configured with a Silicon dropper and
a rectifier (See Fig. 5-3-1 and 5-3-2).
(c)
The 250V DC power supply system supplies power to the DC load that is not categorised to a
safety system of a relatively large capacity such as DC motor.
(2) Configuration of battery and charger

(a) DC125V battery A
1 set
(b) DC125V battery B
1 set
(c) DC125V battery C
1 set
(d) DC125V battery D
1 set
(e) DC250V battery
1 set
(f) DC125V A charger panel
1 panel
(g) DC125V B charger panel
1 panel
(h) DC125V A/B standby charger panel
1 panel
(i) DC125V C charger panel
1 panel
(j) DC125V D charger panel
1 panel
(k) DC125V C/D standby charger panel
1 panel
(l) DC250V normal charger panel
1 panel
(m) DC250V standby charger panel
1 panel
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MCC
MCC
MCC
MCC
Interlock
DC125V
Battery (B)
DC 125V
Battery (A)
DC 125V
Backup
Charger
(A)(B)
DC 125V
Charger
(A)
Interlock
Interlock
DC 125V
Charger
(B)
Interlock
Silicon
Dropper
Silicon
Dropper
DC 125V Main Bus Panel
DC 125V Main Bus Panel (A)
Figure 5-3-1 DC125V (A-D) Single Line Diagram

((C), (D) is same as on the above)
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UPS
Emergency D/G
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
P/C
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
M/C
UPS
Emergency D/G
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
P/C
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
M/C
DC 125V
Distribution
Panel
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DC250V
P/C
P/C
P/C
Battery
MCC
Interlock
DC 250V Charger Panel (Main)
DC 250V Charger Panel (Backup)

Silicon Dropper
DC 250V Main bus panel
80
Spare
Motor
Figure 5-3-2 DC250V Single Line Diagram
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Section 4 AC Power Supply System for

Instrumentation
1.
Purpose
The AC Power Supply system supplies AC power to the instrumentation, controller, and
plant process computer.
2.
(1)
Function
Uninterruptible AC Power Supply System (UPS)
This system supplies AC power to the safety protection system (4 divisions), and to the
control and instrumentation requiring continuous monitoring.
(2)
Power supply for instrumentation

This power supply supplies AC power to each instrument of the MCR, the R/B and the T/B.
(3)
UPS for plant process computer

This system supplies stable AC power to the plant process computer.
3.
Configuration
(1)
Uninterruptible AC power system (UPS) (Figure 5-4-1)
(a)
This system receives electrical power from the emergency 480V power supply system and the
DC power supply system, and supplies stable AC power to the safety protection system.
Normally, the UPS converts the emergency AC power supply to DC in the UPS, and reverses
it to AC again. Furthermore, this system receives power from a DC power supply when the
emergency AC power supply is not available due to a LOOP, and supplies power to each load
after converting DC power into AC power with an inverter. The power is supplied from the
emergency AC power again after the emergency AC power supply is re-established by the
ED/G. This changeover is performed automatically without any loss of power.
(b)
Each division of the UPS has a standby transformer, so that power can be supplied to the load
in the event of UPS failure or during maintenance period.
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(2) Instrumentation and Control power supply system (Figure 5-4-2)

(a)
This system steps down normal or emergency AC 480V motor control centre voltage to AC
120V through the transformer, and supplies power to each load from a distribution panel. It
consists of the three subsystems.
(b)
Normally, the system receives power from the emergency AC 480V MCC, but this can be
manually switched to the normal AC MCC when the emergency AC power supply is not
available.
(c)
1 power supply for normal use instrumentation equipment in the turbine building and reactor
building) is the tapped from emergency AC power line.
(3) UPS for plant process computer (Figure 5-4-3)

(a)
This system receives electrical power from the emergency 480V power supply system and the
DC power supply system. Normally, the UPS converts emergency AC power supply to DC by
rectifying it in the UPS, and reverses it to AC again. At the time of a LOOP, this system
receives power from the DC power supply of the battery by switching a thyristor, and supplies
the power to each load after converting it into AC with an inverter. Power is supplied from the
emergency AC power supply when the emergency AC power is reinstated. This changeover is
performed automatically without momentary loss of power.
(b)
The two UPSs shall be installed to supply power to the plant process computer.
(c)
Each UPS has a standby transformer, so that power can be supplied to the load, even in the
event of UPS failure or during maintenance period.
(4) UPS
(a)
The UPS receives power from the AC power, converts it into DC with the rectifier, and
supplies stable AC power supply to the load through the inverter.
(b)
The UPS closes the thyristor switch on the DC power supply connection circuit immediately
after the AC power supply blackout, and supplies AC power to the load from the
uninterruptible power supply.
(c)
When the AC power supply is reinstated and its condition is confirmed, the thyristor switch of
the DC power connection circuit is automatically opened and the equipment returns to normal
operation.
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MCC
MCC
DC125V
52CI
52R
72B
Thyristor switch
Rectifier
UPS AC Power Equipment
Inverter
52CL
Thyristor switch
52C2
Thyristor switch
52CS
Mechanical
Interlock
52I
52L1
AC 120V
UPS
Distribution
Panel
52L2
AC 120V
UPS
Distribution
Panel
Figure 5-4-1 UPS AC Power Single Line Diagram
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(DIV-)
125V DC
480V MCC
(DIV-)
480V MCC
480V MCC
125V DC
480V MCC
DC-AC
(DIV-)
480V MCC
480V MCC
125V DC
480V MCC
DC-AC
120V UPS A
120V
(DIV-)
(DIV-)
480V MCC
480V MCC
125V DC
480V MCC
DC-AC
120V UPS B
120V
Instrumentation
Bus A
480V MCC
DC-AC
120V UPS C
120V
Instrumentation
Bus B
120V UPS D
Instrumentation
Bus C
Instrumentation
Bus
Process Instrumentation
Figure 5-4-2 Single Line Diagram of Power Supply System for Instrumentation
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Neutron Monitoring
120V/240V
ECCS Circuit
480V MCC
Isolation valve control system
480V MCC
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
(DIV-)
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
ECCS Circuit
Neutron Monitoring
Neutron Monitoring
ECCS Circuit
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
Turbine Control System
Process Radiation
Monitoring System
ECCS Circuit
Neutron Monitoring
(DIV-)
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DC
UPS
forComputer
Plant Process Computer
UPS for
Inverter
Thyristor
switch
Thyristor
switch
Thyristor
switch
Mechanical
Interlock
Rectif ier
Standby
Transformer
Inverter
Thyristor
switch
Thyristor
switch
Mechanical
Interlock
Spare
Spare
AC 210V
Distribution
Panel
AC 210V
Distribution
Panel
AC 210V
Distribution
Panel
AC 105V
Distribution
Panel
Distribution
Panel
Distribution
Panel
Figure 5-4-3 Single Line Diagram of UPS for Plant Process Computer
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UPS
Process Computer
UPSfor
for Plant
Computer
Thyristor
switch
Rectif ier
Standby
Transformer
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CHAPTER 6
Instrumentation and Control Systems
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Section 1 Control Panels (MCR Panels etc.)

1.
Purpose
The operators' accurate and rapid understanding of the plant operating conditions is essential for
operating the plant. As a general rule for nuclear power plants, a centralised monitoring and control system
for all operation controls in the Main Control Room (MCR) is adopted, and the cornerstone of this system
is the main control panel.
The design concept is as follows:
(1)
As long as there are no abnormalities during normal start-up and shutdown and normal operation, as
a general rule, the control panel is configured so that all monitoring operations can be conducted by
the operator.
(2)
As a rule, the control panel design is configured so that monitoring and operations in the event of an
abnormal condition can be conducted by the operator until the plant reaches a stable state.
Function
2.
(1)
CRT and Flat Displays (FD)

Adopting comprehensive digital equipment enables the display and control of large amounts of
information such as process values and equipment status in a compact manner with the use of
modern display screens. The ABWR control panel was one of the first in a nuclear power station to
utilise display screens instead of hard-wired control panels with indicator lights and switches. The
original ABWR used a mixture of Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) display screens and interactive Flat
Display (FD). This makes operation optimally efficient and allows the control panel to be compact.
Where the description in this chapter refers to CRT, this can be taken to mean a modern equivalent
display screen of equivalent reliability such as Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) or plasma screen
technology as appropriate.
Along with enabling easy collection of plant data due to the compacted size, mutual communication
between operators performing close operations has also become easier.
(2)
Large display panel

In order for all staff in the MCR to accurately and quickly understand the plant situation, a large
display panel is installed.
(a) System status display (Fixed mimic)

In order for all personnel within the main control room to understand the plant status at a single
glance during start-up and shutdown times or in the event of an accident, important data such as
important pump operation statuses, important valve statuses, and other important plant parameters
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are displayed on the large display panel.
(b) Variable display unit (Large screen)

Displays and shares information on a large 110 inch screen for all CRT screens.
(3)
Alarms
In order to prevent information overload to operators due to simultaneous outbreak of multiple
alarms at times of plant abnormalities, alarms have been prioritised into Important Alarm and
Individual System Alarm. Further, alarms have been separated into the following ranks: major
failure, minor failure, and status display.
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3.
Configuration
The human-machine interface functional structure chart is shown in Figure 6-1-1, and the appearance
of the main control room panel is shown in Figure 6-1-2.
Large Display Panel

System
Alarms
(Comprehensive)
Important
Alarms
Fixed Mimic
Process Status
Major Equipment Operating Status
Large Screen
FD
CRT x 7
Main Panel
Safety
System
FD
Non-Safety
System
FD
Safety System
Controller Group
Non-Safety System
Controller Group
Process
Computer
System
Figure 6-1-1 Human-Machine Interface Functional Structure

Chartchart
6-1-3
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Fixed-position
Important
Alarms
Mimic Display
System-level
Alarms
Large
Variable Display
Large Display Panel
Main Control Console
Hard
Switches
CRT
CRT
FD
Figure 6-1-2 Main Control Room Panel Appearance
Monitoring / operations are conducted through the use of the main panel and CRT (or equivalent), the FD,
the hard switch panel (hard-wired switches) and display devices in the large display panel
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Section 2 RPV Instrumentation

1.
Purpose
For safe operation, the monitoring and display, in the MCR, of plant parameters such as reactor
pressure and reactor water level is necessary. If abnormal conditions which could impair the safety of the
reactor are detected, the RPV instrumentation provides signals to activate Reactor Protection Systems
(RPS).
2.
Function
In normal operation including plant start-up and shutdown, pressure vessel instrumentation
constantly measure reactor pressure, reactor water level, core flow, and core temperature, and send signals
to the MCR monitoring instruments and related operation systems. During accidents such as the LOCA,
RPV Instrumentation detects abnormal conditions and releases a signal to activate the RPS and ECCS.
3.
Configuration
(1)
Reactor water level instrumentation
(a) Reactor water level detection principles

Reactor water level is detected using the pressure on the reference water level of the Condensing
Chamber within the PCV (Figure 6-2-1) as the reference. The water level is determined from the
differential pressure between the condensing chamber and the Instrument Line Nozzle (Figure
6-2-1).
(b) Types of reactor water level indicators

Reactor water level indicators are classified into the following 5 types:
(i) Narrowband water gauge
Used as the water level indicator for water level monitoring, RPS systems, and Feedwater Control
(FDWC) during normal operation.
(ii) Broadband water gauge

Used as the water level indicator for the ECCS system activation and the water level monitoring
during normal operations and accidents.
(iii) Nuclear fuel range water indicator

Used for monitoring water levels within the reactor core shroud during accidents.
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(iv) Water indicator during shutdown

Used for monitoring water levels during reactor stops.
(v) Water level indicator for water filling during outage

Used for monitoring water levels of the reactor well while water filling during outage.
Figure 6-2-1 Reactor Water Level Instrumentation Schematic Chart
(2)
Reactor pressure instrumentation
(a) Reactor pressure detection

Reactor pressure measures the additional pressure on the reference water level side of the
Condensing Chamber (shared use with reactor water level instrumentation) installed within the PCV.
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(b) Types of reactor pressure meters

(i) Narrowband pressure meter
Used for monitoring pressure during normal operation, as well as the pressure signal for the turbine
EHC.
(ii) Broadband pressure meter
Used as the pressure signal for the ECCS and RPS systems, as well as for pressure monitoring
during normal operation and accidents.
(3)
Core differential pressure / core flow instrumentation
(a) Core differential pressure instrumentation

Through the differential pressure measurement of the core support within the fuel channel bypass
area, the core differential pressure instrumentation monitors pressure loss through two-phase flow
and core internals. Core support differential pressure is converted to core flow in the nuclear
instrumentation system, and is used for the core flow signal in the RPS systems and for the
monitoring of core flow (Figure 6-2-2).
Figure 6-2-2 Core Differential Pressure Instrumentation Schematic Chart
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(b) Core flow instrumentation

Core flow used in core performance calculations is calculated by the differential pressure of the RIP.
Differential pressure is measured in 4 representative RIP units (A, D, F, J), and corrections are
conducted by the number of operation RIP units, rotations, reactor water temperature, and so on (see
Figure 6-2-3).
(4)
Pressure vessel temperature instrumentation

To keep the pressure of each area in the reactor pressure vessel within acceptable limits, pressure
vessel temperature instrumentation monitors the rate of temperature change when the pressure vessel
is heated or cooled.
The following limitations are present for reactor coolant temperature change rates from the
standpoint of pressure vessel thermal stress mitigation:
(a) Coolant temperature change rate during reactor start-up and shutdown
Reactor coolant change rate must be below a predetermined value during reactor start-up and
shutdown.
(b) Pressure vessel upper and lower temperature difference before RIP start-up
In order for the RIP to start-up, the temperature difference between the pressure vessels upper and
lower areas must be less than a predetermined value.
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Figure 6-2-3 Core Flow Instrumentation Schematic Chart
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Section 3 Recirculation Flow Control (RFC)

1.
Purpose
The purpose of the RFC is to control reactor power level by controlling the recirculation flow. In
order to change the recirculation flow, this system changes the rotational speed of the Reactor
Internal Pump (RIP) by changing the frequency and voltage of the AC power supplied to the RIP
driving motor.
For this purpose, the Reactor Internal Pump-Adjustable Speed Drive (RIP-ASD) is connected to each
RIP to change the rotational speed, and to supply the above-mentioned AC power.
2.
Function
2.1
RFC control function

The RFC control function is shown in Figure 6-3-1.
The major function of the RFC consists of 4 functions shown below.
(1)
Master controller
When the RFC is in automatic mode, the master controller receives the load demand error signal
from the Automatic Power Regulation System (APR) and sends the core flow demand signal to the
flow controller. Through the operation of this controller, reactor power is controlled automatically
based on the power set point of the APR.
(2)
Flow controller
The flow controller receives the core flow demand signal and the actual core flow signal to
adjust the demand signal of the RIP speed. Through the operation of this controller, core flow is
controlled automatically.
(3)
Gang speed controller

The gang speed controller has a function that switches between the automatic mode and manual
mode as shown below:
1) Automatic mode
The speed of multiple RIPs is controlled simultaneously based on

the RIP speed demand signal from the flow controller.
2)
Manual mode
The speed of multiple RIPs is manually controlled simultaneously

based on the RIP speed demand from the gang speed controller.
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(4)
Individual Speed Controller

The individual speed controller has a function that switches between the automatic mode and manual
mode as shown below:
1) Automatic mode
The individual RIP speed is controlled based on the gang speed

controller output signal.
2)
Manual mode
The individual RIP speed is controlled manually based on the

respective RIP speed demand from the individual speed controller.
Figure 6-3-1 RFC Control Function

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2.2
Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT)

The RPT has a function that trips the RIPs to mitigate the reactor power increase by reducing the
core flow in the event of the turbine trip or generator load rejection event and the Anticipated
Transient Without Scram (ATWS) accidents.
(1)
Turbine trip, generator load rejection-RPT function

When the Main-steam Stop Valves (MSVs) close due to the turbine trip or the turbine steam control
valves (CVs) rapidly close due to the generator load rejection, the RPT system trips the 4 RIP-ASDs
and opens the RPT breakers. As a result, the RIPs trip and the core flow reduces.
The RPT with the reactor scram can mitigate the transient reactor power increase by use of the
turbine trip or the generator load rejection. The turbine trip, generator load rejection-RPT
function is shown in Figure 6-3-2.
Figure 6-3-2 Turbine Trip, Generator Load Rejection-RPT Function

system configuration chart
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(2)
ATWS-RPT function
The ATWS-RPT function acts as one of the functions that are used to mitigate ATWS events.
By tripping the RIPs, the core flow is reduced and negative reactivity is rapidly inserted. This
effectively mitigates the increase of reactor power in the case of the occurrence of an ATWS event.
The ATWS-RPT function is shown in Figure 6-3-3.
Figure 6-3-3 ATWS-RPT Function
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3.
Power supply
The power supplies for the RIP consist of 10 RIP-ASDs, and while the power supply for 4 of the
RIP-ASDs are directly connected to the bus, the other 6 RIP-ASDs are connected to two
Motor-Generator sets (MG sets) in order to ensure electrical inertia.
The configuration of RIP power supply is shown in Figure 6-3-4.
0
Reactor pressure vessel
RIP
Disconnector
270
Unit transformer
breaker
90
G
F
E
180
Unit transformer
Arrangement of RIP
Auxiliary transformer
Auxiliary transformer
6.9kV M/C
A1
6.9kV M/C
6.9kV M/C
A2
B1
6.9kV M/C
B2
Gen
From start-up
transformer
From start-up
transformer
From start-up
transformer
From start-up
transformer
Input
transformer
DS
RIP-ASD
RIP
A
RIP
F
RIP
B
RIP
E
RIP
H
RIP
D
RIP
J
RIP
C
RIP
G
RIP
K
DS : Disconnection Switch
Figure 6-3-4 Configuration of RIP Power Supply
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Section 4 Feed Water Control (FDWC)

1.
(1)
Purpose
The purpose of the FDWC is to maintain the water level in the reactor pressure vessel by adjusting feed
water flow and/or the Reactor Water Cleanup System (CUW) blow down flow while the plant is
operating.
(2)
The FDWC adjusts reactor feed water flow in order to maintain the pre-set water level determined from
the steam separator performance demands for the pressure vessel water level over the entire power
range of the reactor during normal operation.
2.
Function
The FDWC has the following 4 functions:
(1)
Water level control function (FDWC Master Control Unit)

When the FDWC Master Control Unit is in automatic operation mode, the water level control function
is controlled through either the single-element (Vessel water level) control mode or the three-element
(Vessel water level, Main Steam (MS) flow rate, and Feedwater flow rate) control mode. The MS flow
determines whether to use the single-element control or the three-element control.
(2)
Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (T/D-RFP) flow control function (T/D-RFP Control Unit)
The T/D-RFP flow control function sends a T/D-RFP speed request signal to the reactor feedwater
pump turbine (RFP-T) control instrumentation.
(3)
Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (M/D-RFP) flow control function (M/D-RFP Control Unit )
The M/D-RFP flow control function sends signals to the flow control valve (FCV) or the low flow
control valve (LFCV) installed in each M/D-RFP unit.
(4)
CUW blow down flow control function (CUW blow down Control Unit )
The CUW blow down flow control function sends valve open commands to the CUW valve.
Although this function takes place in the CUW blow down control unit, controls are limited to plant
start-up and shutdown (until reactor pressurisation is completed).
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3.
Configuration
Figure 6-4-1 shows the schematic system configuration of FDWC (outline).
Figure 6-4-1 System Configuration of FDWC (outline)
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Section 5 Multichannel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)

1.
Purpose
In order to retain fuel integrity even in the event of an incorrect continuous CR withdrawal of CR
when the reactor power exceeds 30% of rated power, the Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) signals
surrounding the selected CR are monitored, and CR withdrawal block signal is released.
2.
Function (Unit operation processing function)

Each MRBM unit monitors a maximum of 8 CRs (from 8 independent areas in the core). Each
LPRM has 4 layers, (levels A,B,C,D). The signals are processed into 2 sub-channels, i.e., LPRM A, C level
(as one sub-channel) and LPRM B, D level (as the other sub-channel)..
(1)
MRBM level
In order to monitor local power rise in the event of incorrect CR withdrawal, the output of the LPRM
surrounding the selected control rod are averaged as Multichannel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)
values.
(2)
Control rod selection / initialisation

Selected LPRM and MRBM gain is initialised during control rod selection as shown below.
Control rod selection
(Input control rod
position change)
Gain setting to achieve
RBM value = APRM value
LPRM selection around

control rod
Initialisation
complete
Comparison of LPRM
average value and APRM
Control rod
withdrawal permit
CR position signals are received from the two RC&IS systems. Normally only one signals (from
either of the two RC&IC system) are used. However if a bypass or failure signal (of the
corresponding RC&IS) is detected, signals from the other system are used.
When a CR is not selected, MRBM is bypassed.
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(3)
LPRM monitoring
Regarding the selected LPRM, input values are compared and processed in the following manner.
LPRM value >5%
Average value
calculation
LPRM value 5
Automatic bypass
Action LPRM number

count
Excluded from average

value calculation
Comparison of input values is conducted at control rod selection.
(4)
CR withdrawal condition
(a)
Single mode CR withdrawal

In case of defect in either sub-channels (A or B), it is possible to monitor the CR withdrawal in the
other sub-channel.
(b)
Gang mode CR withdrawal

Each individual CR is monitored as in (a). However, monitoring all CRs using same sub channel
(for example sub channel A) is not permitted.
(5)
Reference signal selection
(a)
Comparison Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

Out of the 4 channels, the higher (value) of the intermediate 2 values is selected as the APRM value
during the MRBM gain setting.
Intermediate values excluding the concerned channel are used during APRM bypass or failure.
(b)
Setting value reference core flow

Out of the 4 channels, the lower (value) of the 2 intermediate values are selected as MRBM trip
setting value for core flow. In case of APRM bypass failure, in one of the APRMs, the intermediate
value is used.
When a predetermined difference in flow for each channel occurs, a core flow abnormal
comparison signal is generated.
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(6)
CR block logic
After the reactor achieves power of approximately 30%, CR withdrawal monitoring is conducted
using the MRBM. When local power rises above setting values due to CR withdrawal, a CR block
signal is sent to the RC & IS to block CR withdrawal.
The MRBM A channel and B channel both have the same input signals and processing contents, and
CR withdrawal will be blocked by either of their operations. Either channel can be bypassed in case
of failure.
3.
(1)
Configuration
Design Standard
(a) Under the worst MRBM input bypass conditions allowed, the MRBM prevents incidence of loss of
fuel integrity from an accidental CR withdrawal.
(b) The MRBM outputs a signal so that operators can evaluate changes in the local power level during
withdrawal or insertion of a CR.
(c) Taking into consideration gang mode CR withdrawal, CR withdrawal of up to 8 rods shall be
simultaneously monitored.
(2)
System Structure
The MRBM is configured with 2 identical function units A and B. Each unit has CR placements by
the RC & IS, APRM units, core flows, and LPRM value inputs. When the output level reaches the
set value, the control rod block signal is released to the RC & IS. Monitoring parameters necessary
for operation are output to other systems.
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Section 6 Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)

1.
Purpose
During low power state (reactor startup and shutdown), CR patterns are monitored so that
the value determined for the reactivity worth of each CR or CR group is not exceeded. When the
CR withdrawal or insertion pattern differs from the preset RWM logic, CR withdrawal or
insertion is blocked.
2.
Function
(1)
Operation of CR restricted as follows near the critical state.

Maximum reactivity worth of the CR group does not exceed a predetermined value of
reactivity
Maximum reactivity worth of one CR does not exceed a predetermined value of reactivity
(2)
During low power states of reactor (start-up and shutdown), the insertion or withdrawal of
CRs and/or CR Group is blocked in case the wrong CR sequence is selected.
(3)
The Operation of CRs in reactor startup and shutdown is performed by CR withdrawal
sequence.
(4)
The CR withdrawal rule is generally restricted as follows to avoid excessive reactivity.

The Inhibition of withdrawal of two or more CR groups at the same time.
CR operation on and after CR group 5 is possible only after CR group 1 to 4 are fully
withdrawn.
The Operation of CRs in reactor startup and shutdown is performed by the predetermined
CR withdrawal sequence.
(5)
Bypass Functionality
As rod worth is low during high reactor power, the RWM is automatically bypassed at a
reactor power output of 20% or more power (LPSP: Low Power Set Point), and at a predetermined
power (LPAP: Low Power Alarm Point) alarm output is also blocked.
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3.
(1)
Configuration
System structure
The RWM is configured with 2 channels. Each channel is independent of the other so that
even if 1 system fails, the other channel can block CR operation. Either of the channels can be
bypassed.
4.
(1)
Interlock
Monitors all CRs, and when even 1 rod violates the criteria, output of the CR operation block
sends a signal to the RC&IS.
(2)
Blocks CR operation with one of the channels (1 out of 2).
(3)
Is automatically bypassed during high reactor power.
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Section 7
Rod Control and Information System

(RC & IS)
1.
Purpose
The purpose of this system is to drive the FMCRD motors to set the position of the Control Rods
(CR) to control the reactor power. This is performed either manually (by the operator) or by the Automatic
Power Regulator (APR). The system also monitors CR position and provides necessary information for rod
control.
2.
Function
This system executes the following functions through control of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) / Fine
Motion Control Rod Drive (FMCRD) motor:

(1)
Moves the CR according to the manual operation signal or the APR automatic control function, and
thereby controls reactor power.
(2)
Presents the FMCRD location or other status information to the operator.
(3)
Presents the FMCRD location or other status information to other systems.
(4)
Conducts automatic insertion of all the operable FMCRD when a scram signal is issued (Scram
follow function).
(5)
Following the Alternative Rod Insertion (ARI) signal from the backup reactor shutdown system in the
case of Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS), conducts automatic insertion for all operable
FMCRD (ARI function).
(6)
Following the Selected Control Rod Run In (SCRRI) signal, inserts selected CR for the purpose
of core thermal hydraulic safety.
(7)
In the case of undesirable core reactivity formation due to CR movement, or when monitoring of the
reactor by the CR drive becomes no longer possible due to instrumentation system failure, the CR
movement shall be blocked.
(8)
The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) is used to verify that CR patterns match their prescribed patterns.
(9)
Conducts gang CR selection based on the Reference Rod Pull Sequence (RRPS).
(10) Conducts necessary surveillance tests for the FMCRD.

(11) While the plant is under automatic control, monitors operation limit values using the core Automated
Thermal Limit Monitor (ATLM), and changes control from automatic mode to manual mode when
necessary.
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3.
Configuration
The RC & IS is configured as a duplex system, with the 2 channels of the RC & IS having the same
function. The 2 channel control output is set to prevent activation unless normal drive and emergency
drive signals match. Regarding CR extraction block functions, extraction block is determined by the
block signal output from 1 channel.
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Section 8 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

1.
Purpose
The purpose of the RPS is to perform safe emergency reactor shutdown (CR emergency insertion:
referred to as scram) at preset conditions, when the reactor is in an unstable state, or in order to prevent
operation under conditions in which there is a possibility of reaching an unsafe state.
In other words, the RPS detects abnormal neutron flux or reactor pressure changes during operation
so as to automatically start the RPS, to maintain the integrity of fuel.
2.
Function
The RPS system is configured with 4 divisions of detectors, trip channels, and main scram circuits
electrically and physically separated.

In RPS systems, the following safety and reliability requirements are included.
(1)
Safety
While satisfying the continuity of operation, the RPS system is configured in the following manner
to ensure high plant reliability.
(a) Configured with 4 independent trip systems, with each trip system provided with at least 4
independent detectors or related equipment for each measured variable.
(b) Use of the 2 out of 4 logical composition. Each trip system will be activated when trip relevant
signals are received from 2 or more trip detectors, and when 2 or more trip systems are in a tripped
state, scram signals are released.
(c) Trip system reset is performed manually by the reset switch.
(2)
Reliability
In order to make the possibility of an accidental scram failure (failure to trip or spurious trip) under
predetermined scram conditions extremely small, the RPS systems shall be designed as follows.
(a) To perform fail-safe type operations, and in the occurrence of power loss or abnormalities such as
failure of equipment relating to safety protection systems, it shall be configured to trip.In order to
minimise interactions increasing the possibility of an accidental scram failure or malfunctional scram,
the 4 trip systems are physically and electrically separated from other functions as well as from each
other.
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(c) In the case of partial sharing between the RPS system and Instrumentation and Control systems, the
two systems are physically and electrically separated so that failure in Instrumentation and Control
Systems does not affect the RPS system.
(3)
Function test
(a) As a principle, together with function being periodically testable during reactor operation, in order to
verify the preservation of soundness or redundancy, the RPS is designed so that each channel can be
independently tested.
(b) The RPS is designed so that the following tests can be conducted without reactor scram during
normal operation.
(i)
Manual scram pilot valve operation test : Verification of scram pilot valve solenoid non-excitation
by means of the manual scram switch (SW).
(ii) Automatic scram pilot valve activation test: Verification of trip channel (ch) and scram pilot valve
solenoid non-excitation by means of the test SW for each trip ch.
(iii) Detector activation test: Verification of trip ch activation by means of inputting calibration
simulation signals from the trip ch test terminal and each detectors calibration tap.
(iv) CR scram test: Verification of 1 group affiliated with the same HCU by means of manual SW or
scram time of 1 CR.
2.
(1)
Configuration
Configuration
The RPS system structure is shown in the Figure 6-8-1. System structure elements hold the following
functions.
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Figure 6-8-1 RPS System Structure Chart

(2) Scram action
(a)
Scram action
As shown in the Figure 6-8-2, each pair of the CRs is connected to an HCU. In each HCU, one
double solenoid activated scram pilot valve and one scram valve are installed. The scram valve is
operated by the IA, whose supply is controlled with the scram pilot valve.
The scram pilot valve double solenoid is connected by the main scram circuits A and B. Normally,
the scram solenoid is in an alternating current energised state and the scram valve is closed using the
IA. When a scram condition (signal) at the main scram circuit A or B is detected, the two scram
solenoids become de-energised, and the IA is discharged from the scram pilot valve thus opening
the scram valve. As a result, high pressure water flows into the CRD, the hollow piston separates
from the ball nut, and the control rod is quickly inserted into the core. When only one of the scram
solenoids becomes de-excited, it assumes the so-called half scram state. In this situation, scram
valves shall not open, and a scram is not performed.
(b)
Backup scram valve action

As a backup when normal scram function is lost due to a failure of the scram pilot valve, there is
scram function by the rear emergency shutdown system backup scram valve. As is seen in the
Figure 6-8-2, the IA supply to the entire HCU system is controlled by two solenoid-activated backup
scram valves. Each backup scram valves solenoid is connected to the backup scram circuits A and
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B. Normally, the solenoid is in a de-energised state. When a scram condition (signal) is detected, the
solenoid undergoes energisation by direct currents, discharges the IA supply to each HCU, and
opens the scram valve irrespective of the state of the scram pilot valve. At this time, even if one of
the two backup scram valves becomes excited, the IA is discharged, leading to a successful scram.
Figure 6-8-2 State of HCU
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3.
Interlock (Control Rod emergency insertion conditions)

Causes of reactor scram are shown in Figure 6-8-3.
Figure 6-8-3 RPS Scram Causes
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Section 9 Primary Containment Isolation System

(PCIS)
1.
Purpose
The Containment Vessel and PCIS prevent release of radioactive materials to the environment by
closing pipes, ducts and access paths which penetrate the Containment Vessel.
2.
Function
For primary systems which have the possibility of releasing radioactive materials directly outside of
the Containment Vessel, the PCIS can perform automatic closure (isolation) of pipes. To enable this
automatic isolation, parameters are monitored for this equipment and when the parameters exceed
predetermined values, automatic isolation operation is initiated. The functions of the PCIS are summarised
as:
(1)
Isolating the RPV in an event of Loss of fuel integrity.
(2)
Closing the radioactive material release routes and trapping radioactive materials within the
containment vessel for a LOCA within the containment vessel.
(3)
Preventing the release of radioactive materials for primary system pipe rupture accidents outside
the containment vessel.
3.
Configuration
The PCIS is configured with a sensor, trip channel, switch, valve and its drive mechanisms, and
classified into A, B, and C types depending on the degree of importance.
(1)
A Type
A type consists of two isolation valves installed in series on either side of the Containment Vessel (as
close as possible to the vessel) for all pipes which directly connect with the reactor pressure vessel
and penetrate the containment vessel. Examples include MSIV, CUW valves, RCIC steam supply
valves and reactor coolant sampling valves.
(2)
B Type
B type consists of two isolation valves in series installed on the outer side of the Containment Vessel
for pipes that do not directly connect to the reactor pressure vessel, but penetrate and are open within
the containment vessel. For example, valves installed on open pipes such as the SGTS (Standby Gas
Treatment System) valves, PCV vent / purge valves, and D/W sump valves.
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(3)
C Type
C type consists of one isolation valve installed on the outer side of the Containment Vessel for pipes
that penetrate the Containment Vessel, but are neither directly connected to the reactor pressure
vessel, nor do they open within the Containment Vessel. Examples include the RCW valves and the
IA valves.
Selected valves within A and B Types are automatically isolated (valve closed) in an incident,
based on the importance of the system and the potential consequences of non-isolation.
(4)
Isolation valve classification

Isolation valves can be classified in the following manner by function or automatic isolation logic
circuit configuration.
(a)
Action isolation valve by MSIV trip logic
(i) Main steam system isolation valve group (MSIV, MS drain line isolation valve, reactor water sample
isolation valve)
(b)
Action isolation valve by PCV isolation logic
(i) Atmospheric Control (AC system) isolation valves

(ii) Reactor low water level (L-3) or drywell high pressure isolation valve group
(iii) Reactor water clean-up system isolation valves
(iv) RCW, HNCW system isolation valves
(v) RHR shutdown cooling mode isolation valves
(c)
Isolation valves closed by manual isolation operations
(d)
Isolation valves closed by signals other than PCIS automatic isolation signals (RCIC, HPCF, RHR
system isolation valves and other test valves, injection valves)
(5)
Isolation valve activation by reactor water level fluctuation

Although each of the isolation valves targeted for automatic isolation have individual and separate
activation signals, isolation actions by reactor water level fluctuation share a common activation signal.
In the event of an accident the plant status changes as time elapses. In particular, for accidents such as
LOCA and Feedwater loss, the reactor water level drops as time passes, and isolation valves that have
reached their configuration values will sequentially close in accordance with this.
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Section 10 Neutron Monitoring System (NMS)

1.
Purpose
The purpose of the NMS is to monitor reactor power levels from start-up to beyond rated
power.
2.
Function
The NMS monitors reactor power in two ranges: the start-up range and the power range. If
concerns of loss of fuel cladding integrity due to excess reactor power are present, this shall be
detected beforehand, sending a signal to the RC & IS or the Reactor Protection System (RPS), from
there CR block or reactor scram shall be conducted, to retain integrity of fuel cladding. The NMS
measures core flow using core plate delta pressure, which is used for calculations of core flow rapid
coast down scram and flow rate dependent setting values.
Also, this system presents the information necessary to conduct power operations to the operator,
process computer system, and so on.
3.
Configuration
This system is configured by subsystems of a SRNM, power range monitor, multichannel rod
block monitor, and traversing in core probe.
(1)
Start up Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM)

The SRNM conducts monitoring of the neutron flux from the neutron source range, the intermediate
range and displays such information. There are 10 SRNM channels, each channel has a fixed position
in-core fission chamber located slightly above the mid-plane of the fuel region. The SRNM possesses
safety protection functions, and each channel is configured with the following equipment/devices:
-
Fission Chamber
Preamplifier
Signal processing unit (count rate, root mean square conversion, and reactor period)
Power Unit
Display and Recorder
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(2)
Power Range Monitor (PRM)

The PRM consists of the local power range monitors using the core-installed 208 (52 areas x 4
divisions) detectors, and core flow measurement function which obtains core flow by means of
average power range monitor and core plate delta pressure. The PRM possesses a safety protection
function.
(a) Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM)

Continuously measures the range of the reactor power local neutron flux, and protects the reactor
from abnormal reactor power rise. The local power range monitor assembly is placed in 52 areas
within the core, and to each of those assemblies, 4 independent detectors are placed in an equally
spaced manner in the axial direction and are configured in 208 channels (52 areas x 4 divisions). The
LPRM is configured with the following equipment:
-
Fission chamber
Signal processing unit
(b) Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

By averaging the LPRM, the APRM detects the average reactor neutron flux levels and monitors
reactor power. When reactor power rises due to abnormal transient changes, a reactor scram signal is
generated. It also generates a core flow rapid coast down reactor scram signal upon detecting reactor
flow used in the Reactor Protection System from the core plate delta pressure.
The APRM is configured with equipment averaging power signals from the local power range
monitors pre-separated into groups, and 4 channels are installed. The APRM is configured with the
following equipment:
-
Signal processing unit
Power unit
Display and Recorder
(c) Core flow measurement function

The core flow measurement function has 4 channels installed, and each channel is included within
the APRM signal processing unit. Core flow is obtained from core plate delta pressure due of this
system. This core flow rate signal is used in the APRM flow dependence setting values and core
flow rapid coast down scram.
(3)
Multichannel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)

The MRBM calculates local core power level signals for the area around the CRs selected for
withdrawal or insertion, and at the time this signal reaches the pre-determined setting values, it acts
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as the CR withdrawal block. (See Section 5 for MRBM details)
(4)
Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP)

The TIP is the system for measuring the local power range monitors calibration and the core axis
direction neutron flux distribution. It is configured with the following equipment:
4.
Fission Chamber
Indexer
Calibration guide tubes
Drive mechanism
Interlock
The trip function of this system is used for protecting fuel cladding and allowing conducting
of reactor scram.
The plant operation state of each reactor scram function (determined by reactor mode switch
position) is set for the following operations:
(a)
(b)
Regardless of reactor mode switch, when the following conditions are met:
(i)
APRM Inop
(ii)
TPM Hi
(iii)
Core flow rapid coast down
When the reactor mode switch is in run and the following conditions are met:
APRM Hi-Hi
(c) When the reactor mode switch is in a position other than run and the following conditions are
met:
(i)
APRM Hi-Hi (set down level)
(ii)
SRNM Hi-Hi period or Inop
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Section 11 Automatic Thermal Limit Monitor

(ATLM)
1.
Purpose
The ATLM monitors the thermal parameters (CPR, LHGR*1) in real time by using a model which
instantly calculates the index values of thermal parameters. When thermal parameters deviate from
the acceptable range, the ATLM releases the automatic stop request signal to the Automatic Power
Regulation System.
2.
Function
(1) The ATLM continuously monitors the index (FLCPR, FLPD*2) of the operational limits of
thermal parameters (CPR, LHGR).
(2) ATLM monitoring sets a maximum of 16 fuel bundles surrounded by four LPRM string (in
some cases 2 or 3 strings) as one region, and monitors core thermal limit values within each
ATLM monitoring region.
(3) Provides information to the process computer to calculate core performance (at a cycle of from
several minutes to tens of minutes). The process computer calculates thermal limit values in
real time using a high-speed algorithm based on LPRM signal.
(4) When calculated thermal limit values (FLCPR or FLPD) deviate from the acceptable range, the
ATLM outputs the signal which serves as a trigger for an automated stop of the Automatic
Power Regulation System.
*1
CPR : Critical Power Ratio,
LHGR : Linear Heat Generation Rate
*2
FLCPR : Fraction of Limiting Critical Power Ratio,
FLPD : Fraction of Limiting Power Density
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3.
Configuration
The ATLM is configured by 2 channels. Each channel links with the RC & IS and RFC, and when
reactor thermal limit value calculation results by ATLM exceed limit values, it outputs those
automatic control exclusion signals to them.
When failure occurs in the ATLM-A system or ATLM-B system (detected through a self-test),
monitoring shall be continuously conducted through ATLM by bypassing the defect channel.
4.
(1)

RC&IS
Inputs control rod position and Rod Action Position Information RAPI failure information by
RAPI.
Outputs automatic mode exclusion directives and displays information to the RAPI.
(2)
Neutron Monitoring System

Inputs APRM, LPRM, core flow and bypass, as well as error signals by the Neutron
Monitoring System Power Range Monitor (PRM).
Outputs a setup permission (exception) signal to the Multichannel Rod Block Monitor
(MRBM).
(3)
Process Computer
Inputs P1 data, setting constants, and failure information from the process computer. Outputs
display information to the process computer.
(4)
RFC
Outputs the automatic mode exclusion signal to the recirculation flow control system.
(5)
Main Control Panel

Outputs annunciator signals.
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Section12 Containment Atmospheric Monitoring

System (CAMS)
1.
Purpose
(1)
The CAMS monitors oxygen concentrations in the D/W and S/C atmosphere during normal
plant operation.
(2)
The CAMS monitors hydrogen and oxygen concentration and radiation levels in the D/W and
S/C atmosphere during LOCA.
2.
Function
(1)
Oxygen / Hydrogen concentration monitor
(a)
The concentration can be monitored during normal plant operation and accident conditions (i.e.
LOCA).
(b)
The CAMS consists of two independent systems.
(c)
Electric power is supplied from an emergency power source during LOCA.
(d)
The system is operable for half a year with an additional 100 days following LOCA.
(2)
Radiation monitor
(a)
Detectors can directly measure Gamma () dose equivalent rates from fission products in the
D/W and S/C.
(b)
The detectors are placed in areas where the radiation from the D/W and S/C can be monitored,
and the direct radiation from the fuel and other sources is at a minimum.
(c)
An ion chamber measures 10-2 to 105Sv/h in a logarithmic scale.
(d)
The detectors are installed in the penetrations of the PCV. Two units on the D/W and two units
on the S/C.
3.
Configuration
(1)
CAMS consists of two independent systems for redundancy.
(2)
The oxygen concentration monitoring system can be performed during both normal plant
operation and in the event of an accident.
(3)
The monitoring system continuously measures hydrogen and oxygen concentrations, which
are generated by metal-water reaction and radiolysis of the water. The FCS starts up to ensure
that hydrogen and oxygen concentrations remain below flammable limits.
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(4)
The radiation monitoring system continuously measures gross gamma radiation levels in the
PCV in the event of an accident in order to verify the scale of the accident and provide
information for recovery.
4.
Operation
The Oxygen monitoring system is always operated to measure oxygen concentration during
both normal plant operation and in the event of an accident.
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Section 13
1.
Automatic Power Regulator System

(APR)
Purpose
The APR automatically conducts plant power controls by means of the control rod (CR) and core
flow regulation to minimize operators workload.
2.
Function
The APR has the following functionalities, from the beginning of control rod withdrawal during
reactor start-up, criticality, reactor pressurization, reactor power rise for turbine start-up, power rise until
generator rated power and power decrease associated with plant shutdowns, and control rod full insertion
operations during reactor shutdown. All power controls from plant start-up to shutdown are conducted
automatically.
(1)
Criticality Mode
Operates the control rods until criticality is achieved. Withdraws control rods while monitoring the
reactor period until the criticality is achieved.
(2)
CR full insertion mode

Inserts control rods automatically to the full insertion state after the main generator is disconnected
from the grid during plant shutdown.
(3)
Heat-up mode
After reaching criticality, the APR raises neutron flux through CR extraction operations, and boosts
reactor heating within the predetermined reactor water temperature change rate range.
(4)
Reactor Power Control

After attaining the rated pressure, control rod positions are controlled so that reactor power is
increased to a target value while keeping the rate of change in reactor power within a predetermined
range. Using this mode, the turbine bypass valves open to predetermined positions prior to the
turbine start-up.
(5)
Generator Power Control Mode (Control Rods)

In the range of 70% or less of generator power output after the generator grid connection, control rod
positions shall be controlled so that generator output is controlled to a target output or to target
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control rod positions (if control rod pattern limitation is activated) while keeping the rate of change
in generator output at a target rate.
(6)
Generator Power Control (Core Flow)

In the power range after the generator grid connection, generator output shall be controlled up to a
target output while keeping a target rate of change in the generator output.
(7)
Thermal Power Control

This mode shall be provided for keeping constant power after the generator grid connection.
3.
Configuration
This system is configured by a triple system digital controller, and executes automatic power control
corresponding to the plant operation modes. It is configured by the error monitoring unit monitoring the
plant status during operation at each control mode, the input and output signal processing unit, and the
control mode managing unit which conducts target load pattern development and so on.
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Section 14 Area Radiation Monitoring/Process

Radiation Monitoring System (ARM/PrRM)
1.
Purpose
The ABWR has radiation monitoring systems, namely ARM and PrRM, which are provided for the
following purposes:
(1)
Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARM)

The purpose of this system is to monitor radiation levels at specified locations within the plant and to
provide information for alarm and record purposes.
(2)
Process Radiation Monitoring System (PrRM)

The purpose of this system is to monitor radiation levels within specified systems and to provide
information for alarm, control and recording purposes. Gross Gamma () radiation levels are measured so
that activity levels of radioactive liquid and gas released to the environment do not exceed the permitted
release levels. Also, the radiation levels are monitored for the purpose of managing the plant operation.
2.
Function
The function of each radiation monitoring system is shown below.
(1)

Radiation detectors are provided in selected areas, which continuously monitor the Gamma () dose
equivalent rate in each area and transmit the information for display and record in the main control room
and at surrounding monitored locations. If the Gamma () dose equivalent rate exceeds a predetermined
value, the system activates an alarm in the relevant location with the measurement indication.
(2)

This system measures radioactive concentrations (gross Gamma () radiation levels) in various liquid
and gas streams in the NPP by radiation monitoring equipment and grabs sampling analyses for the purpose
of plant operation control.
Radiation detectors are placed next to the process pipes, ducts or sample chambers. They
continuously measure gross Gamma () radiations, and the measurements are displayed and recorded in the
main control room. When radiation level exceeds a predetermined value, it activates an alarm.
Radioactive particulates, Iodine and Tritium, are continuously sampled by filters and Tritium
collection equipment. These samples are periodically collected and analysed.
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3.
(1)
Configuration
This system consists of a detector, indicator, auxiliary unit and recorder.
There are four local equipment units: a Semiconductor Detector which includes a pre-amplifier, a
digital transmitter, a local auxiliary unit, and a local alarm unit. The local auxiliary unit and local alarm unit
are provided as necessary.
The MCR equipment consists of a graphic panel and a radiation monitor attached to a radiation
monitor panel, and a recorder attached to a radiation monitor recorder panel.
The Semiconductor Detector is installed with the purpose of integration of pulses proportional to a
surrounding Gamma () dose rate, and continuous measurement of the Gamma () dose rate of a
strategically selected area. The output is transmitted to the radiation monitoring panel in the MCR via the
digital transmitter. The dose rates are indicated on the radiation monitor, and the upper and lower alarm
limits are provided to detect anomalies. When an abnormal state is detected, the system activates an alarm.
The output of the radiation monitor is connected to the recorder, and is constantly recorded.
If a local alarm is required, the local auxiliary unit with a local alarm unit is provided. The local
alarm unit is a buzzer for informing abnormalities to operators, and the local auxiliary unit plays the role of
displaying the dose rate as well as transmitting an alarm signal to the local alarm unit.
An AC vital power source is supplied to the radiation monitors, which are configured with multiple
channels. The other equipment is powered by the AC power source.
(2)

The system consists of the following components:
(a)
Electronic Device
Both analogue-type and digital-type electronic devices are used within the PrRM. Radiation monitors
for safety protection systems and for non-safety systems are configured with analogue-type and
digital-type devices, respectively.
(b)
Detector
There are three types of detectors: the Scintillation Detector (SCIN), the Semiconductor Detector
(SSD), and the Ion Chamber Detector (IC). The most appropriate detector is provided for each
system.
(c)
Recorder
Signals from each detector are recorded. Monitors are categorised in the following manner:
(i)
Liquid radiation monitor
(ii)
Exhaust gas radiation monitor
(iii)
Main steam line radiation monitor
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4.
(1)
(iv)
Reactor area HVAC exhaust radiation monitor
(v)
Gland steam condenser and condenser vacuum pump exhaust gas radiation monitor
(vi)
Main stack radiation monitor
(vii)
SGTS radiation monitor
(viii)
Off gas radiation monitor
(ix)
D/W drain radiation monitor
Interlock
Fail-safe Design
An alarm circuit is activated following a power source or equipment failure.
(2)
Trip
The logarithmic dose equivalent rate module is equipped with adjustable upper and lower limit trip
circuits, as well as an operation inability trip circuit.
(3)
Radiation Monitor Interlock

The radiation monitor has an interlock function, and when set to a mode other than operation, it
outputs operation inability (The operation inability signal can be bypassed).
5.
(1)

HVAC
PrRM discharges sampled air after measurement and ventilates a sample rack of the exhaust gas
radiation monitor and vial sampler, to the HVAC.
(2)
RCW
Coolant of the gland steam condenser and condenser vacuum pump exhaust gas radiation monitor is
supplied from the RCW.
(3)
IA
Purged gas (clean air) is supplied from the IA to the gland steam condenser and condenser vacuum
pump exhaust gas radiation monitor. Diluent gas for vial sampling is also supplied from the IA.
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Section 15 Process Computer

1.
Purpose
The purpose of the process computer is to rationally and safely operate nuclear power plants.
2.
Function
This system is composed of the central processing unit, input / output device, CRT display device,
and consists of the following functions:
(1)
General Data Processing Function
a. Input processing
b. Operator request processing
c. Transmission of data for work computerisation
d. Transmission of headquarter data for display
e. Transmission of LPRM auto correction data
(2)
Performance Calculation Function
a. Core performance calculation

b. Core performance estimation calculation
c. Plant performance calculation
(3)
Logging Function
a. Record/listing
b. Progress value transient phenomenon
c. Trip sequence
(4)
Plant Status Monitor Function
a. CRT display
b. Monitoring alarm
c. Summary status monitor
d. Standby system monitor
e. Emergency response head office data display
(5)
Automation and Guide Function
a. Plant automatic start-up shutdown control

b. Rod control guide
c. Surveillance test guide
d. Standby system monitor
(6)
CRT Touch Control Function
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(7)
Software Recorder Function
(8)
RPV Operation History Data Collection Function
3. Structure
This system is composed of equipment shown in Table 6-15-1.
Table 6-15-1 Process computer system
Components
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
1 unit
Main Storage Device
1 unit
Floppy Disk Device (DISK)
1 unit
Magnetic Disk Device (DISK)
12
Magnetic Tape Device (M/T)
Process Input / Output Device (PI/O)
1 unit
Console Input / Output Device (CI/O)
1 unit
CRT Display Device
Number
13
Notes
Including
one
large
screen
controller
9
CRT Hard Copy
Including colour hard copies
10
Typewriter
Alarm, OD, BOP, NSS typer
11
Line Printer
1 unit
12
Operator Console
13
Engineers Console
14
SPDS Console
Install one of the three CRT hard

copies
15
Relay Terminal Panel
1 unit
16
Computer System Distribution Panel
1 unit
17
Voice Announcement Device (VAS)
1 unit
Install speaker at the main control

room
18
Transmission Device
1 unit
19
Bus Control Device
1 unit
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CHAPTER 7
Radioactive Waste Treatment
Systems
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Revision 2
Section 1 Liquid Waste Treatment System

(LWTS)
1.
Purpose
The LWTS is designed to control, collect, process, handle, and store liquid radioactive
waste generated as the result of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences.
2.
Function
All potentially radioactive liquid wastes are collected in sumps or drain tanks at various
locations in the plant and transferred to collection tanks in the Rw/B. The liquid wastes from various
sources can be segregated and processed separately.
The LWTS components are designed and arranged in shielded enclosures to minimise
exposure to plant personnel during operation, inspection, and maintenance. Tanks, processing
equipment, pumps, valves, and instruments that may contain radioactivity are located in
access-controlled areas, again to minimise exposure to plant personnel.
The LWTS normally operates on a batch basis. Provisions for sampling at important process
points are included. Protection against accidental discharge is provided by detection and alarm of
abnormal conditions and by administrative controls.
3.
Configuration
The LWTS is composed of several sub-systems, so that the liquid wastes from various
sources can be segregated and processed separately, based on the most efficient and economical
process for the type of impurity and chemical content in each waste stream.
Figure 7-1-1 shows an overview of a typical process for treatment of both liquid and solid waste in
ABWR nuclear power plants.
(1) Low Conductivity Liquid Waste (LCW) treatment system

The low conductivity liquid waste is collected in the drain sumps of the various locations in the
R/B, T/B and Rw/B, or the liquid waste may be collected directly in low conductivity waste
collection pools. Then the liquid waste is treated by the low conductivity liquid waste treatment
system.
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This system consists of components such as filters, demineralisers and sampling tanks. Treated
liquid waste which has been filtered and demineralised by this system is transferred to the
condensate storage pool. The treated liquid waste is mainly re-used, or discharged after
confirming radioactivity level.
(2) High Conductivity Liquid Waste (HCW) treatment system

HCW, for example chemical waste water, with high conductivity such that they are not suitable
for demineralising, are collected in HCW collection tanks and treated by the HCW system.
This system consists of components such as concentrating equipment, distilled-water tanks,
demineralisers and sampling pools. Treated liquid which has been purified and demineralised by
this system is recovered in the sampling pools. The treated liquid is mainly re-used, or discharged
after confirming radioactivity level.
The collection tanks for high conductivity liquid waste are also used for neutralising the waste.
(3) Laundry Drain (LD) system

The LD generated from decontaminating protective clothing and shower drain including the drain
generated during hand-washing are collected in LD collection tanks, and treated by the LD
system. The treated liquid is discharged after confirming radioactive level.
This system consists of components such as collection tanks and filtering devices.
Figure 7-1-1 Typical Radioactive Waste and Process Flow for ABWR Power Plant
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Revision 2
Section 2 Solid Waste Treatment System (SWTS)
1.
Purpose
The SWTS is designed to control, collect, handle, process, package and temporarily store
wet and dry solid radioactive wastes prior to shipment or onsite interim storage. These wastes are
generated as a result of normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences.
2.
Function
These wastes are categorised as wet solid wastes (such as spent ion exchange bead resin
and filter backwash arising from the operation of the LWTS, or other treatment, clean-up, or filtering
system) or dry solid wastes (such as HEPA filters, protective clothing, contaminated tools, tissue
paper, or other items arising from operations). Both Low Level Waste (LLW) and Intermediate
Level Waste (ILW) are processed by the SWTS.
3.
Configuration
The SWTS functionally consists of the following four sub-systems. A typical process flow
is shown in section 1 (of this chapter) Figure 7-1-1.

(1) The wet solid waste collection sub-system
(2) The wet solid waste processing sub-system
(3) The dry solid waste accumulation and conditioning sub-system
(4) The container storage sub-system, until the packaged waste is sent off-site for disposal
GA91-9901-0032-00001
7-2-1

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UK ABWR Generic Design Assessment

ABWR General Description

GDA Step-1 Submission

1 Plant Overview, Nuclear Island and Nuclear Boiler Systems

2 Reactor and Reactor Internals

3 Nuclear Boiler System (NB)

4 Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV)

5 Reactor Recirculation System (RRS)

6 Control Rod Drive System (CRD)

7 Reactor Water Clean-Up System (CUW)

8 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System (FPC)

9 Atmospheric Control System (AC)

10 Drywell Cooling System (DWC)

11 Suppression Pool Clean-Up System (SPCU)

1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

2 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

3 High Pressure Core Flooder System (HPCF)

4 Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)

5 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

6 Standby Liquid Control System (SLC)

7 Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

8 Flammability Control System (FCS)

9 Remote Shutdown System (RSS)

GDA Step-1 Submission

3 Turbine Island and Turbine Auxiliary Systems

1 Main Steam System (MS)

2 Extraction Steam System (ES)

3 Turbine Auxiliary Steam System (AS)

4 Condensate and Feedwater System (CDFS)

5 Feedwater Heater Drain System (HD)

6 Turbine Gland Steam System (TGS)

7 Off-Gas System (OG)

8 Circulating Water System (CW)

1 Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW)

2 Reactor Building Service Water System (RSW)

3 Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning System (HVAC)

4 Instrument Air System (IA)

5 Sampling System (SAM) / Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)

5 Electrical Power Supply

1 Station Electrical Power Supply System

2 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G)

4 AC Power Supply System for Instrumentation

GDA Step-1 Submission

6 Instrumentation and Control Systems

2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Instrumentation

3 Recirculation Flow Control (RFC)

4 Feedwater Control (FDWC)

5 Multichannel Rod Block Monitor (MRBM)

6 Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)

7 Rod Control and Information System (RCIS)

8 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

9 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS)

10 Neutron Monitoring System (NMS)

11 Automatic Thermal Limit Monitor (ATLM)

12 Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System (CAMS)

13 Automatic Power Regulator System (APR)

14 Area Radiation Monitoring / Process Radiation Monitoring System (ARM/PrRM)

7 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems

1 Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS)

2 Solid Waste Treatment System (SWTS)

GDA Step-1 Submission

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

Atmospheric Control System