Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173423
March 5, 2014
Elsa M. Canete|2 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title
over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however,
was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession
should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073
was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25,
1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11,
1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts ruling in
Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and
the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17,
1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the
30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastoras
possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this
does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before
1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving possession
earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the
Provincial Assessors Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond
recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the
spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora
possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not
contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the annotation
found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration
cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in
1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in
1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of the lot
before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC
No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to
register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally owned
by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified
that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters from the three
lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way to school
since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the
Elsa M. Canete|3 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land
as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are
not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the
President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and
disposable.29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a
positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortunas claim of title
through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the
alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient
ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to
continue to address the other important legal issues raised in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of
alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of
the public domain may be disposed of, among others, by judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of title
is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Elsa M. Canete|6 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety- four, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis
supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year
period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as
amended by RA No. 1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession
by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years from
1945 up to its enactment in 1977 is required. This effectively impairs the
vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession
required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose possession
commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by
the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v.
Nabasa30 that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-ininterest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977,
Elsa M. Canete|7 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543
both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at the
earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a
sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23,
1947.34 While these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of
1947, none proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947.
Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show
the nature of Pastoras possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks
of possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in
Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession
and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot
was described as "cogonal."36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No.
8366 by relying on Macarias testimony in a separate land registration
proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastoras lots
on her way to school, and she saw Pastoras family construct a house, plant
fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced
that Macarias testimony constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence" required in cases of this nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of
land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These
parcels of land were covered by three separate applications for registration,
to wit:
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of
2,961 sq. m., commenced by Emeteria;
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a
total area of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total
area of 2,597 sq. m.
Elsa M. Canete|9 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the
same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final
rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastoras ownership, be
taken into account in resolving the present case.
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have
previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the
Court to consider that Pastoras claimed acts of possession and occupation
(as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the
size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently
assess and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw
acts of possession and occupation in what must have been but a limited
area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as
"cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457
when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding
Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the
spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and
2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as
alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of
Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to
convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their merits.
In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De las Santos:38
Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a
failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care
applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be
grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no
such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such
claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever
classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it
retains its rights over the same as do minus.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and
the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and
Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis of the
grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna.
Elsa M. Canete|10 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
In December 1994, spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union. They claimed that the land
was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded
by her heirs who later on sold the subject land to Sps. Fortuna in 1984. Sps.
Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors -ininterest, have beenin quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession
of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots
survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. Republic of
the Philippines opposed the application.
The trial court granted the application for registration. The Republic appealed
to the CA arguing that there is no official proclamation from the government
that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land. The CA reversed the RTC decision for failure to comply with the length
of possession that the law requires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps. Fortuna has complied with the requisites for
acquisition of title to alienable lands of public domain.
HELD: No. CA decision affirmed
Civil Law: There must be a positive act from the government
reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain
Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the
existence of apositive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
Petitioners rely on the notation in the survey plan stating the land is
alienable and disposable. They likewise argue that the certification from the
DENR that there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor
title previously issued for the subject parcel. However, neither of these
Elsa M. Canete|11 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|12 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
October 8, 2008
Elsa M. Canete|13 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
October 8, 2008
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation
of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island
had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of
parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with
coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had
heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less
fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with
the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners
and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein;
and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
Elsa M. Canete|16 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA
141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring
supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondentsclaimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775)
have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin
petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure
title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874
and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
Elsa M. Canete|19 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may
be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified
under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has
been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of
their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land,
Elsa M. Canete|20 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information
title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a
title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one
year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo
real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion
con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase;
and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines
under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into
three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established
a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was
sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
Elsa M. Canete|21 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These
cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the
land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on
proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This
was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through
Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
Elsa M. Canete|23 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.
Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof
that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption.
In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one
class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of
the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals.
While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the
land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular
land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be
a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is
a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It
may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside
and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Elsa M. Canete|25 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that
the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of
the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
Elsa M. Canete|27 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local
and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso
beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its
forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will
destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and
"forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and
not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments,
it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
Elsa M. Canete|28 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and
Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as
tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open
for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part
of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of
the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open
to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest
land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads
and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of
the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within
her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or
RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They
claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo
can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of
Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Elsa M. Canete|30 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay
Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No.
705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence
of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification"
of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law.
We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section
4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the
Elsa M. Canete|31 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing
need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment
of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of
adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds
dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The
fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to
function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is
washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded
floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock,
houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13687
Elsa M. Canete|35 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
actual fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in fact an
accretion to a titled parcel of land; that the present petition for review under
the principle of res judicata is undeniably improper, unwarranted and illegal;
that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to review or nullify a final and
irrevocable judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals; that the issue raised
in their appeal to and passed upon by the Court of Appeals is the same as
the one raised by the Solicitor General in its petition for review; that
petitioner's petition for review does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action; that during the pendency in the Court of Appeals of the
appeal on Lot No. 4, the Solicitor General as counsel for the Director of Lands
filed a pleading entitled "Comments" recommending that the registration of
the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled lands of the
then applicants-appellants be decreed in their names; and that the Solicitor
General is deemed to be in estoppel to make allegations in the present
petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the aforesaid
"Comments."
On 18 September 1956 without hearing and presentation of evidence the
lower court entered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the
Philippines has appealed.
In its brief, petitioner-appellant assigns two (2) errors claimed to have been
committed by the lower court, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO EXTRINSIC OR
COLLATERAL FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTSAPPELLEES IN COLLUSION WITH OTHERS, AGAINST THE PETITIONERAPPELLANT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN EFFECTING THE
REGISTRATION OF A PORTION OF THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
INSTANT CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT THEREFORE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AT
BAR WITHOUT AFFORDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO THE PETITIONERAPPELLANT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE SAME.
The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud committed
by the respondents, then applicant, and was filed within a year from the
Elsa M. Canete|37 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|39 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on the same
area;
That the parties are waiving their respective claims for moral damages, as
well as attorneys fees as appearing in the Complaint and Counter-Claim
appearing in their Answer in order to totally have this case amicably settled.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that
Judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court base[d] on the terms and
conditions of this Compromise Agreement.
Midsayap, Cotabato, August 10, 1989.
On August 10, 1989, the MTC rendered a judgment, approving the
Compromise Agreement, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the Compromise Agreement to be in accordance with
law and equity, the same is hereby approved and judgment is rendered
pursuant to, and in accordance with the terms and conditions therein
stipulated.8
On July 17, 1990, then Deputy Sheriff Benedicto F. Flauta issued the Sheriffs
Return in the above Ejectment case, viz:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Midsayap, Cotabato the herein attached original copy of the writ of Execution
issued in the above-entitled case with the information that:
1. Defendants Jesse and Bema is (sic) found to be out of the real estate
property of the plaintiff;
2. The boundary of the defendants and the plaintiff is distinct; and
3. The improvements introduced by the defendants fronting the
residence of the plaintiff is already outside the lot of the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned had nothing to do except to return the said
Writ of Execution for whatever the Honorable Court may deem necessary and
appropriate for both parties.9
Elsa M. Canete|40 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
However, as the portion of the house beyond Celestials lot was not
demolished, Celestial filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution, with a prayer to cite the Deputy Sheriff in Contempt for not
executing the Writ of Execution issued on May 17, 1990.10
Since the MTC had not yet received the Sheriffs Return, it ordered the
Deputy Provincial Sheriff to comment on the Motion and on August 16, 1990,
the latter complied. The pertinent portions of said Comment are quoted as
follows:
That on May 30, 1990, the undersigned met one of the defendants at the
premises of the subject area and three days after, the same met the plaintiff
in the same area; the same informations were obtained which are top
confidential except that their boundary is distinct;
That the defendants are no longer within the metes and bounds of the
plaintiffs property;
That Lot No. 25[8]6-[G]-28 is the only base (sic) of this case and no
other lots more; and,
That the defendants had complied [with] the Compromise Agreement
which was the basis of the Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully submit,
that he has fully complied with the Writ of Execution issued by the Honorable
Court in this case.11
Based on the above, the MTC denied the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution on August 30, 1990. The MTC likewise denied Celestials
Motion for Reconsideration on November 20, 1990, and highlighted the fact
that the agreement was for the spouses Cachopero to vacate Celestials lot,
which was the land subject of the Ejectment case. The MTC further said that
it had no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.12
Celestial filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 18, of Midsayap, Cotabato, praying that the MTC be ordered to issue
an Alias Writ of Execution in the Ejectment case and that the Sheriff be
directed to enforce such Alias Writ of Execution. Celestial furthermore prayed
for the RTC to order the spouses Cachopero to pay her damages, attorneys
Elsa M. Canete|41 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit. This was docketed as Special Civil
Case No. 051.13
In response, MTC Judge Nestor Flauta said that the old house constructed on
Celestials lot had already been demolished. Whatever remained
undemolished were owned by the spouses Cachopero, and were not put in
issue in the Ejectment case. Thus, Judge Flauta averred, "to order the
demolition of the undemolished improvements outside of the property of
[Celestial] would be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the [MTC]."14
On July 27, 1992, the RTC conducted an ocular inspection to determine
whether or not the Compromise Agreement was executed in accordance with
its terms.15
On March 20, 1997, the RTC issued an Order16 dismissing the petition for
mandamus for lack of merit. The RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
Mandamus does not lie where there was no right of petitioner which was
excluded from exercising and there is no duty on the part of respondent
Judge to perform (Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Bello, 10 SCRA 238).
The law concedes to judges and courts the right to decide questions
according to their judgment and their understanding of the law and if their
decision in that regard is not correct or contrary to law, appeal, not
Mandamus, is the remedy. (Santiago Labor Union vs. Tabique, 17 SCRA
286.)17
Acting on Celestials Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC on September 1,
1997, rendered an Order granting such motion, and setting aside its earlier
Order of March 20, 1997.18
Meanwhile Jesse Cachopero had already instituted a petition, docketed as
Special Civil Case No. 070, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the orders
of the Department of Environment and Natural resources (DENR), which
denied his Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) over a portion of the
subject land. This petition and Jesse Cachoperos subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration, were denied by the RTC for lack of merit and nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. Undaunted, Jesse Cachopero assailed
Elsa M. Canete|42 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the above orders in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, filed
before the Court of Appeals. This was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 45927. 19
On February 3, 1999, the RTC rendered a Resolution,20 again dismissing
Celestials petition for mandamus, but on the ground that the issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 711 depended on the outcome of
Special Civil Case No. 070, which involved the subject land that Jesse
Cachopero had applied for.21 The RTC said that the foregoing "circumstance is
a supervening cause necessitating refusal to issue an alias writ of
execution."22
Celestial brought this matter to the Court of Appeals and claimed that the
RTC itself found that part of the old house, subject of the compromise
agreement, was still standing or undemolished. Thus, she posited the
following issues for the Court of Appeals resolution:
1. Can the Honorable Regional Trial Court set a condition other than that
provided in the Judgment itself for the implementation and execution of the
said judgment in Civil Case No. 711?
2. Was it legal, lawful and proper and did the Honorable Regional Trial Court
act without or in excess and/or grave abuse of discretion when it ordered and
directed the execution of the Judgment in Civil Case No. 711, subject to the
outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which is never a condition in the said
judgment sought to be executed in full? or
3. Did the Honorable Regional Trial Court, act without and in excess or abuse
of discretion and against the law and jurisprudence, in dismissing the petition
for Mandamus and making the issuance of a Writ of Execution subjected to
the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which is never a condition made
in said Judgment sought to be executed?23
On September 4, 2000, the Court of Appeals came out with its Decision in
favor of Celestial. The fallo reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution in Special Civil Case No. 051 dated
February 3, 1999 is hereby set aside. As prayed for by petitioner, respondent
Judge is hereby directed to issue an alias Writ of Execution in Ejectment Case
No. 711 ordering the full and complete implementation of the judicially
approved compromise judgment.24
Elsa M. Canete|43 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|46 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides for the effects of a compromise
agreement, to wit:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
Expounding on the concept of compromise agreements, this Court, in Air
Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr.,36said:
[W]e have time and again ruled that a compromise agreement, when not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a
valid contract which is the law between the parties. It is a contract perfected
by mere consent, whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law
and is conclusive between the parties, and courts will not relieve parties from
obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to
be unwise. x x x.37
Likewise, in Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation (PNOC-EDC) v. Abella,38 this Court pronounced:
Prevailing case law provides that "a compromise once approved by final
orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and
should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, a
decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory. Such
agreement has the force of law and is conclusive on the parties. It
transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties
thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance
with the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to
implement and enforce it." Hence, compromise agreements duly approved
by the courts are considered the decisions in the particular cases they
involve.39
The terms of the compromise agreement involved herein are clear and
unequivocal. The spouses Cachopero agreed to vacate Celestials lot and
transfer the old house to the land at the back of Celestials lot. While it has
been shown that the spouses Cachopero had already removed part of the old
house, Jesse Cachopero himself admitted, during the ocular inspection done
by the RTC, that part of the old house beyond Celestials lot were not
demolished nor removed, to wit:
Elsa M. Canete|47 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
COURT:
Q This house here which is now remain standing in the lot enclosed with
bamboo fence, was it existing at the time of the filing of the complaint
between you and defendants at the time the decision was rendered?
JESSE CACHOPERO:
A Yes, your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. AGDEPPA:
That the roofing is a part of the old house that was brought down when the
second story was destroyed, your Honor.
xxxx
COURT:
There is a structure which has been destroyed and above the remaining
structure of which a shade of galvanized iron was made. Yes
JESSE CACHOPERO:
A part of the second floor which was lowered down.
COURT:
Another questions This structure here was already existing during the time
of the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court?
JESSE CACHOPERO:
Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. AMPARO:
When the two story building was demolished, how did the remaining portion
looks like?
Elsa M. Canete|48 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
JESSE CACHOPERO:
It looks like a bahay kubo, sir.
ATTY. AMPARO:
When the building was demolished, what improvement did you introduce?
JESSE CACHOPERO:
The walling made of rough wood, sir.
ATTY. AMPARO:
How about this wall on the other side of the remaining structure?
JESSE CACHOPERO:
It is part of the old building, sir.
xxxx
COURT:
In other words it has already been paid for the expenses of the demolition.
Why was the other parts of the building not included in the demolition which
was made at the instance of the plaintiff?
RACHEL CELESTIAL:
Because he objected and according to him (Jesse Cachopero) it is beyond my
property, your Honor.40
It is clear from the records and the facts of this case that the real reason
Celestial wanted to eject the spouses Cachopero from the subject land is to
reclaim the use of such land for herself. This can be gleaned from the fact
that in their compromise agreement, she was willing to shoulder the
expenses of transferring the old house to the area at the back of her own lot.
This fact runs counter to her claim that she was ejecting her brother and his
wife from the old house due to its dilapidated and uninhabitable condition.
However, Celestials intention has nothing to do with the validity of the
Elsa M. Canete|49 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
CUEVAS, J.:
These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of
Appeals 2 have been consolidated in this single decision, having arisen from
one and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case No. N-283, Laguna), and
presenting as they do issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of
the trial court and ordered the registration of the land in favor of applicant,
now private respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R.
No. L-43105 claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public
domain and therefore not registerable. Petitioners private oppositors in G.R.
No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by
dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have been in possession of
the same for more than twenty (20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311
square meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty
(20) meters therefrom (Exh. D), 3 in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was
purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed
of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the
year 1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When
Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate
and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's
share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for
registration of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by
the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190.
Elsa M. Canete|52 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|53 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year during the rainy
season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of
the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the
submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a
year) than the level of the water at which the is completely dry, the latter
should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay.
Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for
the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore
land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water
and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides... 11
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of
the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into
Laguna de Bay from different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a portion of
the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a
foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner
Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed
or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of
Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.
This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or not applicant private
respondent has registerable title to the land.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already
possesses over the land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was never
intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts
ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of
his title to a public instrument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from
whom he inherited said land. In addition to this muniment of title, he
presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering the land since 1918 and
also tax receipts (Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back to 1948.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership
Elsa M. Canete|55 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
possession can never ripen into ownership. Only possession acquired and
enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by
prescription. 21 As correctly found by the appellate court, the private
oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the
permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of
them at one time or another did not pay rent cannot be considered in their
favor. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were
merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the
character of the latter's possession 22 which has already ripened into
ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his
registerable title over the parcel of land described in his application, he is
clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and the registration in favor of applicant private-respondent of the
land described in his application is hereby ordered.
Costs against private petitioners.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 194336
Elsa M. Canete|57 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure are the March 5, 2010 Decision1 and October 29, 2010
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which
affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision3 of the Las Pias Regional Trial Court,
Branch 197 (trial court) dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.
On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for accion publiciana with
damages against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without
its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at
Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las
Pias City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space of Pilar Village
Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for
subdivision residents.5 In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 respondents
denied the material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it
is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority
over them.
Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and the trial
court additionally conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property.
On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint, finding
that the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping area
going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the
three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of
public dominion under Article 5027 of the New Civil Code (Code), which could
not be owned by petitioner. The court held:
x x x The land title of [petitioner] only proves that it is the owner in fee
simple of the respective real properties described therein, free from all liens
and encumbrances, except such as may be expressly noted thereon or
otherwise reserved by law x x x. And in the present case, what is expressly
reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter
strip of the lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved
Elsa M. Canete|58 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
for public easement purposes. (From OCT 1873/A-50) and to the limitations
imposed by Republic Act No. 440. x x x"8
The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the
occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement
purposes and that only the local government of Las Pias City could institute
an action for recovery of possession or ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
trial court in its Order dated August 21, 2007.9 Consequently, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on March 5, 2010,
sustained the dismissal of the case.
Referring to Section 210 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99-21 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the appellate
court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek
which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public
dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact,
which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved
for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming
ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however,
the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of
the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to
Section 10111 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 (otherwise known as The
Public Land Act).
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the CA per
Resolution dated October 29, 2010, hence, this petition.
Anchoring its pleadings on Article 63012 of the Code, petitioner argues that
although the portion of the subject property occupied by respondents is
within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains
ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion.
As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful
possession, hence, the proper party to file an action for recovery of
possession against respondents conformably with Articles 42813 and 53914 of
Code.
We deny.
Elsa M. Canete|59 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the technical description
and annotated in the title.
xxxx
2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision Surveys for
Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes:
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes the segregation of the three
(3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed
and be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.
The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to subsequent
subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter
strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case,
is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.20 Said law is
explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."
Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the
Philippines21 which provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest
areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person
shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, the above prove that petitioners right of ownership and possession
has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the
banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the
trial courts opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents
have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they
Elsa M. Canete|61 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
city government units shall prevent the construction of any kind or illegal
dwelling units or structures within their respective localities. The head of any
local government unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise tolerates
the construction of any structure in violation of this section shall be liable to
administrative sanctions under existing laws and to penal sanctions provided
for in this Act.
Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action for mandamus to
compel the local government of Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable
dispatch the eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and any
other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed
policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly
those that adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology.28
Indeed, as one of the basic human needs, housing is a matter of state
concern as it directly and significantly affects the general welfare.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 5, 2010 Decision and
October 29, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Las Pias RTC,
Branch 197, dismissing petitioner's complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Elsa M. Canete|63 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
October 4, 2002
Elsa M. Canete|66 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit "K")."7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6,
1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991
confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a
copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land
registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the
necessary decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered
a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of
the land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on
February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order
directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129
on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity)
under its Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed with the
Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-InIntervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the
Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is
inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot
pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF
for tree planting purposes.
Elsa M. Canete|69 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels
agreed that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is
part of the public domain.8
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition
and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec.
1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of
the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part
of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
(Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is
confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a
Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in
private respondent Collados application that "said parcel of land known as
Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land
application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8,
Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not have
missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the
Elsa M. Canete|70 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|71 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR
INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated
July 26, 190410 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for
brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim
over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private
rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the
reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there be."
Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to
1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim
and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then
prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was
that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that
private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33,
thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 The
Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias12 which laid the foundation that
"all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
Elsa M. Canete|72 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
by grant, belong to the public domain."13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as
well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of
all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine
Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act
No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands."16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Elsa M. Canete|73 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After
the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141"
for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this
day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system.18 The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the
title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of
title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land
are quieted upon issuance of the certificate.19 PD 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,20 amended and
updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources
of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was
seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept
of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved
the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Elsa M. Canete|74 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated
by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed
areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the
heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict
with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger
the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge
detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the
Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as
recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people
have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures
they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected
by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact
of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
Elsa M. Canete|76 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985.30 As amended, Section
48 (b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land
Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either
be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land,
by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued."31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of
EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been
Elsa M. Canete|78 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South
1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of
beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty
(3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of
alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a
point marked "1" on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less,
from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4;
thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to
point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00
m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence
Due North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13;
thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to
point 15; thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33
m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E
1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning.
Containing an area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225)
Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Elsa M. Canete|82 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637
issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and
location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor
O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed
by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR
coverage.34 Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY
INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED
OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS
RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to
the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974
which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo
and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and
revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to
private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly
described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation
amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan
Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by
the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the
Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-3233-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation.
Beginning at a point marked "1" on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of
1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
Elsa M. Canete|83 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
xxx
xxx
xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future
survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely
within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is
needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.35 Unless and until the land classified as such is released in
an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private
character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
Elsa M. Canete|84 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|86 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|87 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may
be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply."40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics
petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of
the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The
land registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the
Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991.41 Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP
Blg. 12942 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become
final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor
General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court
issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to
issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground
that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically,
over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
Elsa M. Canete|88 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves
private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning
the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic
participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of
the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the
alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for
annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court
never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land
registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as
regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the
State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the
Statute of Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override
concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,44 which involved the registration of public
lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res
judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The
Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not
apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental
rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application
would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality."
Elsa M. Canete|89 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the
State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government,
they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to
take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS
AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED
THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS
SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation
of Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein
situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under
the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment
Elsa M. Canete|90 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
xxx
xxx
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that
the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30,
1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a
copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for
new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the
land registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor
General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals
which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-inintervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial
court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago
vs. Court of Appeals48 reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when
the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the
movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been
concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is
Elsa M. Canete|92 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and,
manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12
of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is
simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts
are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the
validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors
allegedly possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In
fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration
that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We
cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to
provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This
case has already claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute
between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the
DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases
between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and
arson. A strict application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more
important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30,
1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A,
LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 120.0766
hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro,
Elsa M. Canete|93 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|94 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL
ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST
EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN
OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
Elsa M. Canete|95 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui,
petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a
portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land
was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the
public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion
of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed
that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold
whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan.
The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CAG.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that
have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the
northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was
Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the
heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be
considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants
have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition
and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application
Elsa M. Canete|97 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted
that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after
that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license
to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of
Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as
indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates,
and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the
application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District
Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public
forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even under
Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this
case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be
able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the
application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the
applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty
(30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a
registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the
application, he had been in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all
throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants
and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must
be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the
private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a
better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go
all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be
as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed;
the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the
Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more
pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
Elsa M. Canete|98 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private
persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act
No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of
title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known
as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review
on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for
the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them
in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the
basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the
public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed
lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public
domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not
capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp."
Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the
land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because
the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
Elsa M. Canete|99 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and
title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the
instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest
as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as
late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime
Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the
appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants
or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of
his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions
implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that
Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Elsa M. Canete|100 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as
forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute
of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is
part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need
for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this
finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Elsa M. Canete|101 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses
as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen
(16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of
the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no
more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of
virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire
land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
Elsa M. Canete|105 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|106 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|107 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege
in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary
for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not
reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative
branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
Elsa M. Canete|109 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter,
it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta
and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Elsa M. Canete|112 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment
of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of
the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
Elsa M. Canete|115 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for
the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that
the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing
upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed
for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated
and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph
of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
Elsa M. Canete|116 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
23
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would
have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and
the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read
Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People
vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
Elsa M. Canete|118 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect
to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
Elsa M. Canete|120 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses
on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of
Elsa M. Canete|121 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|123 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN
and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their
father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN
and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their
father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be
found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made
be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they
pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land
filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on
behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold
Elsa M. Canete|124 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime
Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to
Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of
Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they
had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to
have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She
testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his
mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and
his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and
was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix
Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the
land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and
the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in
1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering
Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest
of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by
its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and
its payment of annual taxes thereon.9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21
of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
Elsa M. Canete|125 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|128 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural
on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting
on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The
farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below
and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How
deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the
sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral
and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long
as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did
not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137,
providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any
purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor
the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found
on or under the surface.
Elsa M. Canete|131 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural
land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all
such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are
granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even
private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land
does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the
rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss
sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under
the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly
acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands
of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have
been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
Elsa M. Canete|132 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is
SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be
half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the
land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of
land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on
behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold
to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime
Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to
Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of
Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they
had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to
have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering
Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest
of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land.
Elsa M. Canete|133 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by
its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and
its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing
that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed
to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial
court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of
Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at
the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue
of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court,
invoking their superior right of ownership.
Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de
la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface
rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the
property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they
validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not
have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
Elsa M. Canete|134 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the
subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in
Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the
stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands
of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from
the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such
as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land
had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to
transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals
justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has
rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the
land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral
and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
Elsa M. Canete|135 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even
private land devoted to agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land
does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the
rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss
sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under
the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Here, the Court is confronted with a case
commenced before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Rizal in Pasay City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back, that has spanned
six administrations of the Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the
Decision, dated January 29, 1992 and Amended Decision, dated April 28,
1992, of the Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed with modification the Decision
of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) in Civil
Case No. 2229-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Pasay City and
Republic Real Estate Corporation".
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June 22, 1957,
authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and
municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:
Elsa M. Canete|137 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
for the
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order 6 the
dispositive portion of which was to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their
agents, and all persons claiming under them, to refrain from
"further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or
dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila
Bay Beach Resort", until further orders of the court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction 7 which enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their
agents, and all persons claiming under them "from further reclaiming or
committing acts of dispossession."
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene 8, dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L.
Bautista, Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen
Gonzales, Norma Martiner, Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M.
Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises,
Inc., Industrial and Commercial Factors, Inc., Metropolitan Distributors of the
Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that they were buyers
of lots in the Manila Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would
be affected by whatever decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion was
granted by the trial court and the Answer attached thereto admitted. 9
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss 10 the Complaint
of the Republic, placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which
reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx xxx xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway
from the south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to
the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north,
including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged
areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall be
given to any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to
Elsa M. Canete|139 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|141 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|142 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|144 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158
dated April 21, 1959 and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay
City and RREC, we rule in the negative.
Sec. 1 of RA 1899, reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and
carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation
with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there
are no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City 15; that what Pasay
City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man
which could not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay
City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National Park,
known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41,
dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be
considered "foreshore land" through the following disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in
response to a request for an opinion from the then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications as to
whether the term, "foreshore areas" as used in
Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is that
Elsa M. Canete|146 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|150 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|151 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|152 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases,
"Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake
or stream); the part of a seashore between the lowwater line usually at the seaward margin of a lowtide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high
tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing,
we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the
intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
haveprovided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify
the exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands".
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court
dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of
Cebu (L-22669) despite the enactment of Republic Act No. 5187 ("RA 5187"),
the relevant portion of which, reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx xxx xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access
highway from the south boundary of the City of
Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the
north boundary of the City of Manila to the
municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the
north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and
submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the
construction of such seawalls, highway and
attendant reclamation works shell be given to any
corporation and/or corporations that may offer to
undertake at its own expense such projects, in which
case the President of the Philippines may, after
competitive bidding, award contracts for the
construction of such projects, with the winning bidder
Elsa M. Canete|155 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|156 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Dece
mber
22,
1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
xxx xxx xxx
I. Facts
1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1899, the Municipality of Navotas
enacted Ordinance No. 1 authorizing the Municipal
Mayor to enter into a reclamation contract with Mr.
Chuanico.
2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was
concluded between the Municipality of Navotas,
represented by the Municipal Mayor, and Mr.
Chuanico in accordance with the above ordinance.
Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the attorney-infact of the Municipality in prosecuting the
reclamation project and shall advance the money
needed therefor; that the actual expenses incurred
shall be deemed a loan to the Municipality; that Mr.
Chuanico shall have the irrevocable option to buy
70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00 per square
meter; that he shall have the full and irrevocable
powers to do any and all things necessary and proper
in and about the premises," including the power to
hire necessary personnel for the prosecution of the
work, purchase materials and supplies, and purchase
or lease construction machineries and equipment,
but any and all contracts to be concluded by him in
Elsa M. Canete|157 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
TEEH
ANKE
E
Secre
tary
of
Justic
e
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate
Justice, and later Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in our considered view,
supersede the earlier opinion of former justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag,
aforestated, as the cases, in connection with which subject opinions were
sought, were with similar facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords with RA
1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been
found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a
public bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had
really reclaimed 55 hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied
upon by RREC is no proof at all that RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said
letter was just referring to a tentative schedule of work to be done by RREC,
even as it required RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its
supposed accomplishment, to secure approval by the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways to the reclamation plan, and to submit to a public
bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for subject reclamation project but
RREC never complied with such requirements and conditions sine qua non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or
specifications of the reclamation project were presented to reflect any
accomplishment. Not even any statement or itemization of works
accomplished by contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and other
relevant papers were introduced to describe the extent of RREC's
accomplishment. Neither was the requisite certification from the City
Elsa M. Canete|160 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Engineer concerned that "portions of the reclamation project not less than 50
hectares in area shall have been accomplished or completed" obtained and
presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done
by RREC, and extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor,
sub-contractor, engineer, surveyor, or any other witness involved in the
alleged reclamation work of RREC testified on the 55 hectares supposedly
reclaimed by RREC. What work was done, who did the work, where was it
commenced, and when was it completed, was never brought to light by any
witness before the court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay
City to show and point out the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly
reclaimed. But this burden of proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to
discharge.
So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the
complaint of plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would
become effective only "as soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the
corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public Work, and
shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding public
bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that will
undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected." (Rollo, pp. 127129, G.R. No. 103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City
never complied with such prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no authority to resume its
reclamation work which was stopped by said writ of preliminary injunction
issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked
Exhibit "21-A" for RREC before the lower court, and Exhibit "EE" for CCP
before the Court of Appeals, it can be deduced that only on November 26,
1960 did RREC contract out the dredging work to C and A Construction
Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to
be reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed
with this Court on July 15, 1997, with reference to CDCP's reclamation work,
mobilization of the reclamation team would take one year before a
Elsa M. Canete|161 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997 pages 127-128). When the CCP Main
Building was being constructed, from 1968 to 1969, the land above sea level
thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of
the surroundings were all under water, particularly the back portion fronting
the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R.
Kasilag stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the ground breaking for the
CCP Main Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp. 320,
324, 325).
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order
and declare that "the requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the
submission of RREC's plans and specification to the Department of Public
Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of
the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic." Said
requirement has never become moot and academic. It has remained
indispensable, as ever, and non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from
lawfully resuming the reclamation work under controversy, notwithstanding
the rendition below of the decision in its favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed
any area with the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much
so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted to file with the former Ministry of Public
Highways, a claim for compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work
allegedly done before the CDCP started working on the reclamation of the
CCP grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to
settle its subject claim for compensation at the same amount of
P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981, guided by the cost data, work volume
accomplished and other relevant information gathered by the former Ministry
of Public Highways, the Solicitor General informed RREC that the value of
what it had accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was only
P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for mobilization of equipment amounted to
P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid evaluation made by the government, through
the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual and realistic, so much so that
on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of
P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost data, etc., as
compensation based on quantum meruit. The least
we would consider is the amount of P10,926,071.29
plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 1962
Elsa M. Canete|163 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|164 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|166 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of
tears, the court, for its herein historic disposition, will be exalted by the
future generations of Filipinos, for the preservation of the national patrimony
and promotion of our cultural heritage. As writer Channing rightly puts it:
"Whatever expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our sympathies
Whatever makes us feel our relation to the universe and all that it inherits
in time and in eternity, and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must
unquestionably refine our nature, and elevate us in the scale of being."
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January 28,
1992, and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals,
are both SET ASIDE; and Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958,
and Ordinance No. 158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation
Agreements entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation
(RREC) as authorized by said city ordinances, are declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires, and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial court a
quo in Civil Case No. 2229-P is made permanent and the notice of lis
pendens issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered
CANCELLED. The Register of Deeds of Pasay City is directed to take note of
and annotate on the certificates of title involved, the cancellation of subject
notice of lis pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay
City and Republic Real Estate Corporation the sum of TEN MILLION NINE
HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTY-NINE
CENTAVOS (P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%) percent
per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which amount shall be
divided by Pasay City and RREC, share and share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Elsa M. Canete|167 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
July 9, 2002
of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the
proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands
of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that
he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that
are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their
Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile,
on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require
PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for
issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing
on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO
dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22,
1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE
MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
Elsa M. Canete|171 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|172 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the
meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private
corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the
duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented,
to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which
seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the
issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening
events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the
instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court
can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the
public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening
events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions
of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural
landssold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private
parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim
the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title
II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case,
AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and
submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No.
1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase.
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because
the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be
reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline
for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on
December 31, 1987.20
Elsa M. Canete|173 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing
Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public
the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated
PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or
from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original
JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a
public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to
make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty,
petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.27 The principal issue in
the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view
of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative
duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has
not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of
the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands
worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA
from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the
public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring
Elsa M. Canete|175 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions
and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without
any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin
provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information,
they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the
right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy. As explained by the Court inValmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and
thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants
in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations
the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intraagency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the predecisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its
contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever,
does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of
the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and
already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction.
Elsa M. Canete|178 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of
the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article
420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18,
1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for
the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine
Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which
authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the
Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals.
CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and
all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the
public domain for public use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed
the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to
the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the
necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
Elsa M. Canete|182 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government
or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or
filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary
streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans
of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General
shall give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so
made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will
be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the
highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and
safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order
prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all
lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the
government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could
lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer
needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the
lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government
reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the
government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were
available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of
the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from
the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the
Public Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands,
were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
Elsa M. Canete|184 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|187 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or
sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes.
x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of
section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that
the same are not necessary for the public service and are open
to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d)
may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of
this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All
these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such
lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only
lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for nonagricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however,
became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the
lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive
purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA
No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for nonagricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No.
141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
Elsa M. Canete|190 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use.
So too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or
other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of
the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The
Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and
lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land
reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must
have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then,
the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated
and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed
land was only by lease. The land remained property of the
State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act
No. 141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first
implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935
Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands,
however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless
reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the
public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of
government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased
and not sold to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government
could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141
does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional
authority before lands under Section 59 that the government previously
Elsa M. Canete|191 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|192 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all
leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still
reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However,
the reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition
under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of
public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the
Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public
dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the
same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State.59 In the case of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their
disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of
public dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public
Elsa M. Canete|193 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national
wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if
not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the
national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise
adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong
to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
(Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with
the exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution
barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural
lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution
encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of
the public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor
mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the
public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore,
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural
lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public
domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation,
ecological, and development requirements of the natural resources,
shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may
Elsa M. Canete|194 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|195 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only
through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well
understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page
3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution,
but this was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits
private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has
not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this
is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated
that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that
the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there
were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a
mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the
Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this
constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against
purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to
equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship
and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of
Elsa M. Canete|198 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|199 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEAAMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended
JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to
perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as
own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full
and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in
accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated
April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged
areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In
its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands
are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain:
Elsa M. Canete|201 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified
as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or
other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President
Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force
concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory
authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands
have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may
validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating the
Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from
holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987
Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has
passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the
State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be
classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some
public or quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared
open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which
Elsa M. Canete|202 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another
location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274of
the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until
formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property
is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v.
Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of
the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special
land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged
areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares
comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9,
1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos.
7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No.
1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land
patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were
partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the
necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no
longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber,
mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily
fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under
the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
Elsa M. Canete|203 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned
by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then
a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated
November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership
of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it
cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the
State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as
follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private
parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim
from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property
of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold
ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea
from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person
reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire
ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public
dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No.
141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as
alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These
lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover,
the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could
not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private
corporation.
Elsa M. Canete|204 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A
declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall
be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the
National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government.
Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the
National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as
the National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation
projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity."
Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation
services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in
kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the
reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to
disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila
Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by
any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these
submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from
the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x
owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged
areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution
are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed
and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
Elsa M. Canete|205 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|206 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084
or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable
and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process
of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges,
rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the
issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements
and such other privileges concerning the development,
exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater,
and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the
country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police
our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges
upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and
for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of
natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the
sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate
agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State,
DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public
lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether
areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should
be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR
before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part
of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of
the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA
Elsa M. Canete|207 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
should be classified as alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141.
Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then
recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On
the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to
PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration
can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83of CA
No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance
with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141,
admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the
government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in
a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed,
Elsa M. Canete|208 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands
could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis
supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals
because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085
would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing
these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA
No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from
holding a public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the
patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084,
"supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an
acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by
law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind
and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does
not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely
authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in
installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable
for any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the
officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or
his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor
concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be
destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold
at public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of
the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of the
auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official
Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any
newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the
property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices
posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality
Elsa M. Canete|211 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the
provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517
issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of
the Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public
Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of
one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters
not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except
when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien
affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate
of title.104Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities
under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their
disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of
the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of
the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of
the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands
can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban
will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as
private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly
from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law,
are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the
National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Elsa M. Canete|216 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529,
without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496,
and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to
the x x x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted,
or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree."
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in
Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public
corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as
provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens
System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however,
is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land
"shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This
provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the
public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from
becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the
public domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48,
Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following:
(1) x x x
Elsa M. Canete|219 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint
venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by
PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the
CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA
is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires
PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title
and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed
lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a
"disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or
alienation under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to
private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain
their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable
lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources,
are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure
such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the
State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of
the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
Elsa M. Canete|221 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts
whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court
must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore
declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the
issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to
the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts,
and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which
is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
Elsa M. Canete|222 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being
reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was
granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation.
Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several
portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to
AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI
of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of
the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is
outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning.
The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Elsa M. Canete|223 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove
swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our
public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are
considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be
judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps
located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the
Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature
and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be
reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private
respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to
this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as
agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine
Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into
three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands.
This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973.
That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include
Elsa M. Canete|225 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
13
the Court
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot
be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but
is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove
swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section
1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found
on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885,
even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said
land was already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable
for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested
lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
Elsa M. Canete|229 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where
this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in
dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not
private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for
a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the
question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the
legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision
classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to
provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of
their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional
duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with
the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the
rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid,
it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive.
Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and
achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the
Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands,
thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
Elsa M. Canete|230 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and
unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with
cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Elsa M. Canete|237 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|238 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two
(2) claim folders (CACF's) to the Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication
Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF's, on
September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before
it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.13
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the
subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition
Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the
parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the
Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and
the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two
issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the
notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on
December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also
supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the
consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for
land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties
interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the subject
parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma.
Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting
for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case because the
records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who
originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the records
of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be contacted. The Board
granted counsel's request and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to
resolve SRRDC's petition for exemption from CARP coverage before any
administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and
subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without objection from
counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of
subject property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as
Elsa M. Canete|239 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked
for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning
Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued on
September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were
classified as "industrial Park" per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89
dated March 29, 1989.14
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the
farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a petition 15 with
DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB
refused to address the issue of beneficiaries.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna,
Branch 24, rendered a decision,16finding that private respondents illegally
entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum
directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust account in favor of
SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby
orders:
"1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the
compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and
84891 with an area of 254.766 hectares) in Barangay Casile,
Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
"2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred
Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four
centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2)
Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a
rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been
Elsa M. Canete|240 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
made, a trust account for said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation;
"3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with
dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new
one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from
liens and encumbrances;
"4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either
through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV,
to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer
certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be
transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the
Philippines;
"5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through
its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate
possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been
transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and
distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents
to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna."17
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. B-233318 ruling that respondents were builders in
bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review of the DARAB decision.19 On November 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal portion
of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated
September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the
Special Agrarian Court on the issue of just compensation."20Hence, this
petition.21
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
Elsa M. Canete|241 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|242 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|243 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court23 of proper jurisdiction for final determination
of just compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners
and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR
shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building
and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor
of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30)
days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner
accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays
the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails
to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from
submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its
decision and the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of
rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall
immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land
shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally
the Supreme Court designated branches of the regional trial court as special
agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Elsa M. Canete|244 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and
the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification
process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued
Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating
procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance
of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the
CARP in his area of responsibility; the masterlist should include such
information as required under the attached CARP masterlist form which
shall include the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT
number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title
(OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP
except those for which the landowners have already filed applications
to avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain
the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report findings
and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicant's Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the
above-mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and
that the same are true and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference meeting shall also
be sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
Elsa M. Canete|245 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|248 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|251 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be
maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental
considerations, among others. Although the 88 families who are the
proposed CARP beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a
larger view of the situation be taken as one should also consider the
adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed
will not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes.
"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an
alternate area be allocated for the affected farmers, and that the
Canlubang Estates be mandated to protect and maintain the area in
question as a permanent watershed reserved."31
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The
most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection
of watersheds is an "intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be
answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB
hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of
18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No.
6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research
and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenent
thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and
penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent
(18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt
from coverage of this Act."
Elsa M. Canete|252 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the
disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition
coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in
the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of
the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation
and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the
issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed
farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining
order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final
decision on the case.
No costs.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156951
Elsa M. Canete|253 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|254 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally
resolved by the Court.
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment2 to the petition in
G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA),
followed by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined
causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The
Court, per its Resolutions dated September 3, 2003,3 and September 29,
2003,4 respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding
petitions-for-intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were
ordered consolidated.
The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following
backdrop:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No.
4235 establishing a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley
later renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The
proclamation "withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and reserve[d] for military
purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] the
[certain] parcels of the public domain [indicated in plan Psu-2031]" situated
in the several towns and a city of what was once the Province of Rizal. On its
face, the proclamation covers three (3) large parcels of land, to wit: Parcel
No. 2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3
with an area of 15,912,684 square meters and Parcel No. 4 with an area of
7,660,128 square meters are described in the proclamation as situated
inside Fort McKinley, Rizal. Specifically mentioned as excluded from Parcel
No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are the American Battle Monument
Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the
Diplomatic and Consular area (100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain
defined areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them
open for disposition. These are Proclamation No. 4616 and Proclamation No.
462,7 both series of 1965, excluding portions of the reservation and declaring
them the AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village, respectively, to be
disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.) 2748 and R.A. 7309 in relation to the
Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation
No. 172 dated October 16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to the same
Elsa M. Canete|255 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which
the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the
Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084
as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and
"B" as its Exhibits "1" and"2," respectively. As the pre-trial order was
written, it would appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due
execution and genuineness of Exhs. "A" and "B."19
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document
Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and
asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit "A" is a forgery. For his part,
Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and
denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding
office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he
could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction,
is inalienable in the first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved
around the absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs application to
acquire, payment of the purchase price and Psd-76057, the plan described in
TCT No. 15084. 20
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in
the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought with him PNP
QDR No. 001-96 and testified that Palads signature in Exhibit "A"(same as
Exh. "1") is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise
testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed
with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis,21 followed by the payment in full of
the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal,
also testified about his having endorsed to Palad a letter-inquiry he received
from SHAI respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads responseletter dated January 23, 1992 (Exh. "10"), according to Atty. Garcia, is to the
effect that TCT No. 15084 must be genuine as it emanated from the
Registrys office on the basis of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale.22
On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit "10" and an LMB official
would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia.
Eventually, in a decision23 dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit:
Elsa M. Canete|259 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|262 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned
October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established
under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would
categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence
that "subject land is within military reservation,"40 and even dared to state
that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se,41 its own
evidence themselves belie its posture. We start with its Exhibit "2"
(petitioners Exh. "B"), a copy of TCT No. 15084, which described the area
covered thereby measuring 399,922 square meters as a "portion of Parcel 3
of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort Bonifacio."
Complementing its Exhibit "2" is its Exhibit "1" - the deed of sale - which
technically described the property purportedly being conveyed to private
respondent SHAI as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of
plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of
Rizal. Xxx (Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private
respondents Exhibits "1" and "2,"formed part of that wide expanse under
Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land
of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These include, inter alia,
the entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan
Psu 2031 located inside the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a
redundant point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation
Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu
203142 prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the
outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also
shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT No.
15084, defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violetcolored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of
the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No.
3 of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA,
DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has maintained all along this
Elsa M. Canete|263 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property
is part of the reservation, the petitioner Republic need only to demonstrate
that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031
have been reserved for military purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact
of reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself,
the contents and issuance of which courts can and should take judicial notice
of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.43
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked
Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the
proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084,
inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and
hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court
seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain
admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those
made in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of
its complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property covered by TCT
No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the
complaint, the truth of the matter being that in the Deed of Sale ,
the Director of Lands Certificate (sic) that he is "authorized under the
law to sell" the subject property and that the "lots were duly awarded
by the [LBM] to the vendee.44 ( Emphasis and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic
alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers denial to such
allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No.
15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules on pleadings,
a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it
is so qualified or termed "specific" by the pleader.45 The defendant must
specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely
denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he will rely to support his denial.46 Else, the denial will be
regarded as general and will, therefore, be regarded as an admission of a
given material fact/s stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what,
under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the Republics
averments that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military
Elsa M. Canete|264 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|265 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
from the reservation because 6,892,338 square meters had already been
withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress,
factual speculations do not make for proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and
quite understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any
proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating the property
covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying the same as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we
earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation
remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is
released from such classification and declared open to disposition.50 The
October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for
the nonce its authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying
medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private
respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in
estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG
area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually
estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. 51
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent
are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the
FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of
the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its
reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still,
such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI. The
reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 352 of the 1987 Constitution
forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas
had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear
under existing jurisprudence,53 the fact remains that private corporations,
like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable
public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this
disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however,
without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30,
Elsa M. Canete|267 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
representatives and/or their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land
immediately upon the finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act.
Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further
thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same.
SO ORDERED.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789 for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Said Decision and
Resolution reversed and set aside the Orders dated April 10, 20073 and
November 22, 200t of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo,
Rizal, in Land Registration (Reg.) Case No. N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619).
The Facts are as follows.
On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of land,
measuring 125 hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San Mateo, Rizal (subject
property), which was docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-5098.5 On November
16, 1965, the CFI rendered a Decision6 evaluating the evidence presented by
the parties as follows:
It has been established by the evidence adduced by Landicho that the parcel
of land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and
possessed by the spouses Felix San Pascual and Juanita Vertudes, Ignacio
Santos and Socorro Santos, Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome,
Gavino Espiritu and Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio Manuel and Justina Ramos, all
of whom in January 1960, executed instruments of conditional sale of their
respective parcels of land in favor of Landicho, x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all
of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded
the conditional sale. Gavino Espiritu, one of the vendors, fifty-five years old,
farmer, resident of Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, testified that he and
his co-vendors have been in possession of the parcel of land since 1930 and
that the possession of Landicho, together with her predecessors in interest,
has been open, peaceful, continuous and adverse against the whole world in
the concept of an owner. It has also been established that the parcel of land
is within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of I.C. Project No. 26 of San
Mateo, Rizal, x x x; that the parcel of land is classified as "montaoso" with
an assessed value of P12,560.00 under Tax Dec. No. 7081, x x x, taxes due
to which for the current year had been paid, x x x; and that the same is not
mortgaged or affected by any encumbrance.
The oppositor did not present testimonial evidence but presented the report
of investigation of Land Investigator Pedro R. Feliciano dated August 23,
1965, x x x which stated substantially that during the investigation and
ocular inspection it has been ascertained that no public land application is
involved and that no reservation is affected thereby, and therefore, he
Elsa M. Canete|272 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), which acquired TCT No. 344936 in its own
name on November 10, 1971; then to Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT
No. 425582, November 5, 1973; and finally, to herein respondent Philippine
Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), TCT No. 482970, July 15, 1975.12
Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI)13 instituted Civil Case
No. 12044, entitled A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
which was still pending before the RTC, Branch 167, of Pasig City as of 2008.
ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject property, which was a portion of
a bigger tract of land measuring around 513 hectares, covered by TCT No.
42999, dated February 20, 1956, in the name of said corporation. This bigger
tract of land was originally registered in the name of Meerkamp Co. under
OCT No. 301, pursuant to Decree No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429, issued on
November 22, 1906. ADRDI caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens
(as regards Civil Case No. 12044) on TCT No. 344936 of BCPI. Subsequently,
based on the ruling of this Court in A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,14 ADRDI was also able to have its notice of adverse claim over
the subject property annotated on TCT Nos. 344936 and 425582 of BCPI and
WPFI, respectively. ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to
Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued on March 25,
1983.
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic)
over the subject property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez
(Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion
before the RTC, Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal, in Land Reg. Case No. N5098. Rodriguez alleged therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965
and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
which confirmed Landichos title over the subject property has not been
executed. Rodriguez specifically stated that no decree of registration had
been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been ever issued by the
ROD in Landichos name. As Landichossuccessor-in-interest to the subject
property, Rodriguez prayed that:
a. Upon the filing of the instant motion, the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City be commanded to transmit to the
Elsa M. Canete|274 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the subject property, i.e., TCT No. 70589 of Araneta (traced back to OCT No.
301 of Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI (traced back to
Landichos TCT No. 167681); and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in
Landichos name would only further aggravate the problem of double titling.
The LRA also explained that the ROD issued a TCT, rather than an OCT, to
Landicho for the subject property in 1966, following the Order dated July 7,
1966 of then LRC Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas (Noblejas), who took
cognizance of the fact that the subject property, as part of a bigger parcel of
land, was already registered under OCT No. 301 in the name of Meerkamp
Co., pursuant to Decree No. 1480 under GLRO Record No. 2429 issued in
1906. LRC Commissioner Noblejas additionally stated in his Order that:
The new transfer certificate of title to be issued by virtue hereof is deemed
to have been derived from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-1. (Under Decree
No. 1480 dated November 22, 1906) which should be deemed cancelled with
respect to the said property and that the issuance of the same has been
effected without the presentation of the owners duplicate of subsisting
certificate of title.19 (Emphasis deleted.)
At around the same time, PCCAI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, assailing
the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC for
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PCCAI
acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of
execution for a final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued
that when subsequent facts and circumstances transpired which renders the
execution of the final and executory decision/order unjust or inequitable,
then the trial court should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. PCCAI
likewise asserted that the RTC, as a land registration court, did not have the
jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the subject
property. PCCAI lastly maintained that it was an indispensable party in Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by the RTC to
intervene during the hearing of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion for the
execution of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated
December 22, 1965 of the CFI.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated May 26, 2008, found merit in the
Petition of PCCAI. The appellate court gave great weight and credence to the
Manifestation dated February 8, 2008 of the LRA reporting the double titling
Elsa M. Canete|278 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
and conflicting claims over the subject property. The Court of Appeals held
that:
The Land Registration Authority, being the repository of land registration
documents and the administrative agency with the necessary expertise
concerning land registration matters, We cannot but agree with the abovequoted Manifestation. Moreover, from the above facts admitted by the
parties and the LRA, it cannot be denied that there are conflicting claims on
the ownership of the property which cannot be passed upon by the lower
court as a land registration court for lack of jurisdiction.20
The Court of Appeals additionally opined that the intervention of PCCAI in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was proper given the circumstances:
Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of Information Technology of the
Philippines vs. Comelec, G.R. 159139, August 22, 2006, the following
doctrine was enunciated, to wit:
"The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no longer be modified,
except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes, or when the judgment is
void, or if supervening events or circumstances that transpire after the
finality of the decision render its execution unjust and inequitable. In the
interest of substantial justice, this Court has allowed exceptions to this rule.
A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof, may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action."
We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention when the decision of
the case was already final and executory and during the execution stage of
the case. However, the supervening event which is the issuance of a decree
of registration which was already implemented and enforced upon the order
of the Administrator of the LRC way back in July 11, 1966 when the LRC
issued TCT No. 167861 in the name of Purita Landicho instead of an OCT
makes the said intervention proper and well-taken.
From the foregoing, it appears absurd and senseless that an OCT be issued in
favor of Mr. Rodriguez. Furthermore, it is in the paramount interest of justice
that the assailed orders be not implemented, [PCCAI] being an indispensable
party in the execution and/or implementation of the said orders. The nonElsa M. Canete|279 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
execution of the said orders will prevent further disarray, confusion and
complexity on the issue of who is or who should be the real owner of the
subject land which is a matter that can be threshed out in a proper case for
quieting of title between adverse claimants.21
Based on the foregoing, the appellate court adjudged:
All told, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, [Rodriguez, RTC Presiding Judge Josephine ZarateFernandez, the
LRA Administrator, and Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease and desist
from implementing the said orders pending the outcome of a proper case
before an appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the subject land
can be put to rest.22
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 17, 2008.
Aggrieved, Rodriguez sought recourse from this Court through the present
Petition, arguing that:
I
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RENDERED AN OPEN-ENDED JUDGMENT.
A
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ABDICATED ITS JURISDICTION TO
RESOLVE DISPUTES ON THE MERE MANIFESTATION OF THE LRA THAT
THERE WERE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP WHICH HAVE FIRST TO BE
RESOLVED.
B
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED AN ISSUE WHICH WAS
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL OR HAD OTHERWISE BEEN RESOLVED.
II
Elsa M. Canete|280 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
only concerned itself with the proper execution of the November 16, 1965
Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 but, due to the intricacy of the
matter, was compelled to take notice of the controversy between Rodriguez
and PCCAI, both of whom trace back their titles to Landicho. In view of these
conflicting claims, Rodriguez now avers that because ROD Santos issued TCT
No. 167681 for the subject property in Landichos name, the November 16,
1965 Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was not validly implemented
since no OCT was issued.25 Corollary to this, Rodriguez posits that PCCAI is
not a buyer in good faith of the subject property and that the latters TCT No.
482970 is spurious. PCCAI, on the other hand, insists that the issuance of
TCT No. 167681 to Landicho, from which its own TCT No. 482970 may be
traced back, was a valid execution of the said CFI decision.
The LRA, in its Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 filed before the RTC,
explained that a TCT was issued to Landicho because the subject property,
as part of a bigger parcel of land, was already covered by Decree No. 1480
and OCT No. 301 dated November 22, 1906 in the name of Meerkamp Co. In
other words, Landichos TCT No. 167681 is a derivative of Decree No. 1480
and OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co. which were cancelled to the extent of the
subject property.
Complicating the matter further is the pendency of Civil Case No. 12044 in
the RTC, Branch 167, Pasig City. Not only is PCCAI questioning the right of
Rodriguez to the issuance of an OCT pursuant to the November 16, 1965
Decision and December 22, 1965 Order of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N5098, it is also defending the validity of TCT No. 482970 (which is a
derivative of TCT No. 167681 issued to Landicho) against Araneta who holds
TCT No. 70589 (which is a derivative of Meerkamp Co.s OCT No. 301). In
view of the foregoing, issuing an OCT covering the subject property to
Rodriguez would give rise to a third certificate of title over the same
property. Such act would only cause more confusion and complication, rather
than the preservation, of the Torrens system of registration.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop
forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein. A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are
regularly issued and that they are valid.26 In this case, PCCAI is the registered
Elsa M. Canete|282 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970, which could be traced
back to TCT No. 16781 issued to Landicho. As between PCCAI and Rodriguez,
the former is better entitled to the protection of the Torrens system. PCCAI
can rely on its TCT No. 482970 until the same has been annulled and/or
cancelled.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, explicitly provides that "a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands of
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America,27 the Court
declared that a Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on
its validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a
different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action.
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an application for registration of the subject
property instituted by Landicho before the CFI, which was granted by the CFI
in its Decision dated November 16, 1965. Rodriguez, asserting that he was
Landichos lawful successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus
Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 seeking the issuance of
a decree of registration and an OCT in his name for the subject property
pursuant to the said CFI judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of
TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the same property, but he simply brushed aside
said certificate of title for allegedly being spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not
pray that TCT No. 482970 be declared void and/or cancelled; and even if he
did, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land registration
case. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, under the
circumstances, is a collateral attack on said certificate, which is proscribed
under Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree.
If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT issued in his (or
even in Landichos name) for the subject property, he should have directly
challenged the validity of the extant TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the very
same property in an action specifically instituted for such purpose (i.e.,
petition for annulment and/or cancellation of title, petition for quieting of
title) and pray the said certificate of title be annulled or canceled. The proper
court in an appropriate action can try the factual and legal issues involving
Elsa M. Canete|283 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
the alleged fatal defects in Landichos TCT No. 167681 and/or its derivative
TCTs, including TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI; the legal effects of Landichos sale
of the subject property to BCPI (the predecessor-in-interest of PCCAI) in 1971
and also to Rodriguez in 1996; and the good faith or bad faith of PCCAI, as
well as Rodriguez, in purchasing the subject property. The resolution of these
issues will ultimately be determinative of who between Rodriguez and PCCAI
is the rightful owner of the subject property.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for according weight and
credence to the Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 of the LRA.
The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and protecting the
Torrens system of land titling and registration.28 In particular, it is tasked with
the following functions:
(1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the
courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the
Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of the corresponding certificates of
title;
(2) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration
of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and
consolidation plans of titled lands; and
(3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings and to the other agencies of the government
in the implementation of the land reform program.29
The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of registration is ministerial in the
sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the
record. They have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt
upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree,
these officials ought to seek clarification from the court. They act, in this
respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their
act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."30
In Ramos v. Rodriguez,31 the LRA filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision and order of the land registration court respectively granting
Elsa M. Canete|284 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated
November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13,
1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while
Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14,
1996. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez
trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the
original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion, filed
before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the
November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the
case only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground that the
subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No. 482970,
which originated from Landichos TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning
of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably
expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and
expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this
reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting
aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of
the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Elsa M. Canete|287 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|290 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|291 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November
6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the
movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation
of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated
October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S.
Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated
November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full
implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution
dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is
hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated
September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the
petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on
December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court
dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on
December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to
its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no
Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by
the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
Elsa M. Canete|292 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds
AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle
No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate
case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried
out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners.
This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated
February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February
12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987
order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2,
1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice
of is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte
motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T111561 and T-111562.
Elsa M. Canete|294 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion
for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case
No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of
Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of
Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the
Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners'
Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an
order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the
reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very
clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos
who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the
names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E"
G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners
Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Elsa M. Canete|296 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|297 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in
the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of
Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v.
Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency
which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while
the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as
for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff
does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and
where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the
case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v.
Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to
the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice
of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571,
Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil
Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting
the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights
of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been
misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in
Elsa M. Canete|298 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No.
15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October
10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with
the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the
various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss
filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the
validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the
Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a
torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of
the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right
to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular
Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA
663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register
instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for
construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the
English Language the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used
to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives
Elsa M. Canete|299 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|300 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Civil Case No. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued
therein had been dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either
to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the
allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for registration. In
compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of
title in the name of the deceased Eusebio Villaseor and issued new ones in
Ledesma's name. On October 8, 1960, again upon Ledema's petition, the
court ordered the cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the
issuance of still new ones, also in his name.
Villaseor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected
this appeal upon their denial.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed
from because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant or to furnish him
copy of the petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No.
5662 and not in the cadastral proceeding; (3) the court had no power to
order the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question when the
same was being contested as fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in
the name of the supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the
Register of Deeds had improperly refused to register the deed of sale, the
proper remedy should have been a suit for mandamus.1wph1.t
We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to
it. To be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5662
was dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's petition the
obstacle to the registration of the deed of sale was removed. The effect of
the dissolution was immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal
had been perfected from the order of dismissal (Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil.
480; Sitia Taco v. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is only as far as the Register
of Deeds was concerned, his duty under the circumstances if the
document was on its face registrable being administrative and ministerial.
The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the dismissal of the petition,
was no authority for the court in the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders
complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant,
considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final. The
court knew of the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought
therein by appellant was precisely to prevent registration. Irrespective of the
propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued, that is, whether or
not mandamus should have been resorted to, the least that the court a
Elsa M. Canete|302 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
quo should have done was to afford appellant proper notice and hearing, so
that he could reiterate his objections to the registration and present evidence
to substantiate them and/or call the court's attention to the fact that the
question had not yet been definitely settled in the civil action since the order
dismissing it was not yet final.
It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial
duties under the law, to register an instrument which in his opinion is
registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to order the
registration. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearing of
interested parties such as are required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with
it the solemnity and legal consequences of a court judgment. The court a
quo, in anticipating the action of the Register of Deeds, unnecessarily took
the matter out of his hands and at the same time preempted the question of
registration still pending in the civil action filed by appellant.
The orders appealed from are hereby set aside, with costs against appellee.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
This was because said Deed of Sale was allegedly fictitious and the
fathers signature was forged. The court then issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Elsa M. Canete|303 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
4.
Thereafter, the RTC eventually dismissed the petition and lifted the writ
on the ground that Ledesma had not been impleaded as a partydefendant and he only intervened in the case.
5.
2 days later, Ledesma filed his own petition asking that the Register of
Deeds be ordered to register the aforementioned Deed of Sale on the
ground that the earlier case was already dismissed and the writ was
dissolved.
6.
On the same day, the court granted the petition without notice to the
Register of Deeds and to Villaseor and issued the order for registration.
7.
8.
ISSUE: Was the RTC correct in issuing the order for registration?
RULING: No.
1.
The court had no authority to issue the orders after just 2 days after
lifting the injunction and dismissing the civil case without notice to the
Register of Deeds or appellant considering that it was not yet final.
2.
The least that the court could have done was to afford appellant proper
notice and hearing as it knew of the pendency of that case and that the
relief sought therein was precisely to prevent registration.
3.
For the Register of Deeds, his duty under the circumstances was
administrative and ministerial. It does not contemplate notice and
Elsa M. Canete|304 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
5.
Elsa M. Canete|306 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent
reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the
petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by
appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of
Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that
"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided
by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the
petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is
whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of
sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere
desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and
transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal
grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or
not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs
properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass,
is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of
competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid
objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their
non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law
on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know
their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of
their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is
merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity
of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
Elsa M. Canete|307 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
1.
2.
3.
It was based on the ground that the said property was conjugal and it
is necessary that both spouses sign the document. However, since the
wife was dead when the sale was made, the husband cannot dispose the
whole property without first liquidating and transferring it in his name and
the heirs by means of extrajudicial settlement. The consent of the heirs
must also be procured.
4.
5.
However, the RTC dismissed the petition saying that the adequate
remedy is the one provided for under Sec. 4 of RA 1151 that is to submit
and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration. Hence,
petition.
Elsa M. Canete|309 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
1.
2.
However, where any party in interest does not agree with the ROD, the
question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration
(Sec. 4, RA 1151).
3.
GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH
PABLA, OJAGAR SINGH, DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO
TAN ENG KIAT, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO, respondents-appellants.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose N. Buendia for appellants.
Eliseo Caunca for appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
Elsa M. Canete|310 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|312 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Thereafter the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order already
mentioned above, directing respondents to surrender the certificates of title
to the Register of Deeds of Manila in order that petitioners-appellees'
contract of lease may be noted thereon. It expressly found that respondentsappellants had knowledge of the lease contract, Exhibit A, but that
respondents' deed of mortgage of March 8, 1949, has priority over
petitioner's amended contract of lease, Exhibit C. As regards the (supposed)
prohibition contained in the contract of mortgage, the court held that the
prohibition gives a right of foreclosure; in other words, that in spite of the
prohibition the amended contract of lease, Exhibit C, may not be considered
as null and void.
In this court on appeal claim is made on behalf of the respondents-appellants
that the court a quo erred in holding that respondents-appellants had
knowledge of the contract of lease, Exhibit A; that it erred in holding that
Tirso T. Reyes is the attorney-in-fact of the respondents-appellants; that it
erred in ordering the registration of the contract of lease, Exhibit A; and that
it erred in not holding that the registration of the contracts, Exhibits A and C,
will prejudice the rights and interest of respondents-appellants.
It should be noted that all that the petitioners demand or pray for is the
surrender of the titles to the Register of Deeds so that their contracts of
lease, Exhibits A and C, may be noted thereon. The only issue, therefore, is
whether petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered. It is not
denied that the contracts have been executed by the registered owner of the
land, or that they have been lawfully executed, or that they have all the
qualities of registerable documents. Indeed, the owner is agreeable to the
registration. The objections interposed by respondents, who are mortgagees
merely, that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, or that their
mortgage has priority, or that they will be prejudiced, are beside the issue.
The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all
persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the proceedings for
registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights
over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights
of these parties, who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when
an instrument is subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects
on other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of
registration. Thus, the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they
had no knowledge of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, before the property was
Elsa M. Canete|313 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|314 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|315 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the
decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
promulgated on May 22, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69946 entitled Meliton
Gallardo and Teresa Villanueva v. Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, et al.
(Rollo, p. 37) affirming the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
Elsa M. Canete|316 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
8th Judicial District, Branch II, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna) dated January 20, 1982, which dismissed the complaint
for Quieting of Title in Civil Case No. SC-1492 and declared the plaintiff's
(petitioner's herein) Re-constituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-6293 (No.
23350) as null and void (Record on Appeal, pp. 215-216).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is in full accord with the
evidence and the law and is hereby therefore affirmed in all its
part. Costs against plaintiff -appellants
SO ORDERED.
The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in
Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially
covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924
owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva (former
Justice of the Peace of the Municipal Court, Cavinti, Laguna), pursuant to
Decree No. 150562 issued in L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 136, Cad. Case No.
1 (Record on Appeal; Answer, p. 28).
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first
cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter
being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva.
On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to
them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog
(Annex "B" of the complaint) that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro
Villanueva conveying and transfering the property in question in favor of the
petitioners (Record on Appeal, Exhibit "B", pp. 9-10) which deed is
reproduced as follows.
Ako, Pedro Villanueva, 66 taong gulang, balo at nananahanan sa
municipio ng Cavinti, lalawigang Laguna at Kapuluang Pilipinas,
alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG DAANG PISO (P500.00) salaping
filipino, na sa akin ibinayad ng mag-asawa ni Meliton Gallardo at
Teresa Villanueva, tagarito rin sa nasabing municipio, lalawigang
at kapulwan sa hinaharap ng kasulatan ay sinasaysay ko na
aking inilillwat at pinagbili ng biling patuluyan sa nasabing magasawa Meliton Gallardo at Teresa Villanueva, sampo na sa kanilay
Elsa M. Canete|317 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|320 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|321 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
required counsel for petitioners to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him (Rollo, p. 51).
On February 23, 1985 respondents filed their comment (Rollo, p. 57).
Considering respondents' comment as answer the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda
(Rollo, p. 104).
Private respondents and petitioners filed their respective memoranda on May
18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 117) and on June 7, 1985 (Rollo, p. 143) respectively. On
July 1, 1985, the Court resolved to consider the case submitted for
deliberation (Rollo, p. 168).
Petitioners, however filed a Supplemental Memorandum, with leave of court
on May 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 169) which was noted by the court in its resolution
dated June 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 188).
In its petition petitioners raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBIT B DOES NOT TRANSFER
OWNERSHIP, THE SAME BEING NULL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ARE
NOT GUILTY OF LACHES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF- APPELLANTS CANNOT
ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LAND BY PRESCRIPTION UPON THE
PRINCIPLE THAT NO TITLE TO REGISTERED LAND IN DEROGATION OF THAT
OF THE REGISTERED OWNER SHALL BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT STATUTE OF LIMITATION
HAS SET INTO THIS CASE; AND,
V
Elsa M. Canete|322 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
1.
This case is about an 81,300 sq. m. lot in Laguna owned by the late
Pedro Villanueva. Such land was claimed to be sold to Meliton Gallardo
and Teresa Villanueva through a private document, an unnotarized Deed
of Sale in Tagalog.
2.
3.
The main issue was that the private respondents countered the Deed
of Sale and wanted the titles be declared void ab initio. The RTC of
Laguna ruled in their favor.
4.
Appeal to the CA was made (then IAC) which affirmed the trial court.
Hence, present action.
RULING: No.
1.
As a general rule, Art. 1356 of the Civil Code provides that contracts
are obligatory, in whatever form they may had been entered, provided all
the essential requisites are present.
2.
3.
Sec. 127 of Act 496 the conveyance be executed before the judge of
a court of record or a clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a
justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgement
substantially in form next hereinafter stated.
Elsa M. Canete|327 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
4.
Also, the document was signed by somebody else and not by Pedro
Villanueva.
5.
Elsa M. Canete|328 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the then Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III which upheld the validity of the deed of
sale of a parcel of land executed by petitioner Severo Sales in favor of
respondent Leonilo Gonzales.
Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861, the property had an area of 5,733
square meters more or less. 1 On July 4, 1955, Sales mortgaged said
property, together with two other parcels of land, to Faustina P. Agpoon and
Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P2,240.00
payable on or about July 4, 1956. 2 On October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No.
5861 was canceled and in lieu hereof, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was issued
to Sales but the area of the property was stated therein as 5,229 square
meters more or less. 3
More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the consent of
his wife, Margarita Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900) square meters of the
same property in favor of their daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales
Bermudez. 4 The duly notarized deed of donation was presented to the
Assessor's Office on the day of its execution. Hence, Tax Declaration No.
13647 was replaced by two tax declarations: Tax Declaration No. 13875 5 in
the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez for the 900-square-meter lot
donated to her and Tax Declaration No. 13874 6 in the name of Sales
covering the remaining portion or 4,339 square meters.
Elsa M. Canete|329 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|330 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Elsa M. Canete|331 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Sales and his wife in this case, it could not overthrow the
testimony of the Notary Public ex-oficio Arturo V. Malazo. 15
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. Sales and his daughter
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court
erred in upholding the validity of the deed of sale and in not considering the
unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor thereof. On December 19, 1974,
the Court of Appeals 16 affirmed the decision of the lower court but added
that the petitioners shall pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,000 as
attorney's fees. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners primarily invoke Art. 1332 of the Civil Code which provides that
when one of the parties to a contract is unable to read, "or if the contract is
in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the
person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been
fully, explained to the former." Petitioners contend that respondent Gonzales
failed to prove that the contents of the deed of sale were ever explained to
Sales, an illiterate. They also argue that granting that the deed of sale was
valid, the courts below failed to take into consideration the fact that the deed
of donation was executed ahead of the deed of sale and must not, therefore,
be disregarded considering that with reference to unregistered lands, an
earlier instrument prevails over a later one.
With regard to the issue of whether or not there was compliance with the
provision of Art. 1332 of the Civil Code, before said article may be invoked, it
must be convincingly established that the disadvantaged party is unable to
read or that the contract involved in written in a language not understood by
him. 17 It is the party invoking the benefits of Art. 1332 or Sales, who has the
burden of proving that he really is unable to read or that English, the
language in which the deed of sale was written, is incomprehensible to him.
Only after sufficient proof of such facts may the burden or proving that the
terms of the contract had been explained to the disadvantaged party be
shifted to the party enforcing the contract, who, in this instance, is Leonilo
Gonzales.
The records of this case, however, show that although Sales did not go to
school and knew only how to sign his name, 18 he and his wife had previously
entered into contracts written in English: first, when Sales mortgaged his
property to Faustina P. Agpoon and second, when he donated a portion of the
property involved to his daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales
Elsa M. Canete|332 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Bermudez. 19 The court below also noted the fact that the signatures of the
Sales spouses in the deed of sale showed the "striking features of the
signatures of intelligent" individuals. Coupled with this is the fact that in
court, the Sales spouses themselves admitted that the signatures on the
deed of sale "looked like" their signatures. 20
But more revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the
notarial acknowledgment thereof, contains a statement that its executors
were known to the notary public to be the persons who executed the
instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary public) of the contents
thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public that the instrument
was freely and voluntarily executed. 21 When he testified at the hearing,
notary public Arturo Malazo stated, "I know Mr. Severo Sales and he
appeared before me when I notarized that document." Later, he added that
"the document speaks for itself and the witnesses were there and those were
the persons present" (sic). 22Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners,
specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale pales in the face of
Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys
greater credence than that of an ordinary witness. 23
The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that while
the property subject thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan where the
vendors also resided, the document was executed in San Miguel, Tarlac.
What is important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned
has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial
jurisdiction. 24 A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the
document concerned. 25 It also vests upon the document the presumption of
regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive
proof. 26 Such kind of proof has not been presented by the petitioners.
While it seems improbable that Severo Sales sold the property described in
Tax Declaration 5861 when in fact this had been subsequently cancelled
already by Tax Declaration 13875 in the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez
and by Tax Declaration No. 13874 in Severo Sales' name, one can hardly
ascribe bad faith to respondent, for unlike a title registered under the Torrens
System, a tax declaration does not constitute constructive notice to the
whole world. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only
where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property
is an unregistered land. 27
Elsa M. Canete|333 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
On the issue of whether or not the earlier deed of donation should "prevail"
over the deed of sale or be "recognized", petitioner invokes Nisce
v. Milo 28 and Estate of Mota v. Concepcion 29 which purportedly ruled that
"with reference to unregistered lands, an earlier instrument, be it a sale or
mortgage, prevails over a later one, and the registration of any one of them
is immaterial." 30
The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has not been
registered neither under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The
parties hereto have agreed to register this document under Act
3344." 31Such agreement had to be expressly stipulated in the deed of
donation 32 because under Act 3344, the Register of Deeds is not authorized
to effect any registration unless the parties have expressly agreed to register
their transaction thereunder. A perusal of the records shows, however, that
the deed of donation was not registered at all. Besides, at the hearing,
petitioners failed to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners'
counsel even failed to secure a certification from the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan of its due registration as directed by the trial judge.
Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donee
thereby effectively transmitting the rights to said property from Sales to his
daughter, such deed, however, did not bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party to
the donation. This is because non-registration of a deed of donation under
Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous
transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein which petitioners invoke
that "any registration made under this section shall be understood to be
without prejudice to a third party with a better right" Petitioner Esperanza
Sales Bermudez may not be a considered a third party 33 being the daughter
of the vendor himself and the "better right" possessed by a third party refers
to other titles which a party might have acquired independently of the
unregistered deed such as title by prescription. 34
We take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not registered,
the Deed of Sale was registered as evidenced by the notation made by
Cipriano Abenojar, Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan 35 and the
official receipt issued by the Registry of Deeds. 36
Finally, we cannot be convinced that it is useless to register deeds or
instruments affecting unregistered lands because the books of registration
provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as Amended
Elsa M. Canete|334 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
by Act 3344 continue to remain in force even to this day. In fact, under
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instruments dealing with
unregistered lands can still be registered. 37
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Elsa M. Canete|335 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
G.R. No. 173423
March 5, 2014
G. R. No. 107764
October 4, 2002
Elsa M. Canete|338 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, .
-----------------------------------------------------------------198
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, ,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE
ASSOCIATION, INC., .
----------------------------------------------------------------------237
Elsa M. Canete|340 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
TEODORO ALMIROL, -,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, -.
---------------------------------------------266
GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH
PABLA, OJAGAR SINGH, DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO
TAN ENG KIAT, -,
vs.
HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO, -.
---------------------------------270
Elsa M. Canete|342 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
_______________________________________________
Elsa M. Canete|343 | P a g e
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS