New Generic Leak Frequencies

for Process Equipment

John Spouge
DNV Consulting, London SE1 9DE, United Kingdom; john.spouge@dnv.com (for correspondence)
Published online 13 October 2005 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.10100
The likelihood of leaks from process equipment is a
key input to any quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of
process plant. This paper describes a new source of
generic leak frequencies and reviews the challenges in
using it for QRA.
Established leak frequencies for onshore process
equipment are poor in quality because they are based
on old data sources of unknown provenance, judgmentally modied. Recent data from offshore process
activities provide a high-quality data set, which appears to show that the established frequencies are much
too low. Much of this discrepancy arises from the QRA
practice of modeling only the most hazardous leak
scenarios. Recognizing the practical difculty of
changing QRA practice to match new data, the present
paper therefore describes a method of analyzing the
new data to obtain leak frequencies for specic modeled scenarios.
Leaks are divided into three scenarios, allowing analysts to use frequencies for only those scenarios that
are compatible with their QRA outow modeling. Standardized leak frequencies have been developed for different types of process equipment, using leak frequency
functions to ensure that consistent, nonzero frequencies are available for any equipment type and hole size.
The results are consistent with traditional onshore leak
frequencies, while also being traceable to specic incidents among the modern high-quality offshore leak
data. 2005 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Process Saf Prog 24: 249 257, 2005
Keywords: leaks, leak frequencies, process equipment, quantitative risk assessment
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Role of Leak Frequencies

Modern safety management practice commonly
makes use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) to
make informed decisions concerning the safety of process plants [1]. These decisions may concern the pro 2005 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

vision of safety features, the level of inspection and

maintenance, the permitted inventories of hazardous
materials, and the separation from nearby populations.
The overall risk management approach is beyond the
scope of this paper, whose focus is on one small but
highly signicant input, that is, the frequencies of leaks
from different types of process equipment.
Leak frequencies, which represent the long-term average number of leaks per year of operation, may
differentiate between different sizes of leak, from small
to catastrophic. In their simplest form, they refer to
individual equipment items. Generic leak frequencies
apply to an average of all equipment of this type, as
opposed to specic frequencies for particular equipment manufacturers or operating circumstances. This
paper refers to the types of steel equipment used in the
process industry to contain liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons.
The role of leak frequencies in a process plant QRA
is illustrated in Figure 1. Multiplying the generic leak
frequencies by a plants numbers of equipment items
yields a simple estimate of the likelihood of leaks that
reects the size and complexity of the plant. This can
be combined with estimates of leak consequences to
obtain the overall risk. The dominant sources of leaks
can then be identied and appropriate management
controls adopted.
The aim of QRA is to give guidance on managing the
risks of rare events, unlikely to be seen in the direct
experience of most engineers and individual plants.
Precisely because of their rarity, establishing the frequency of such events is difcult, requiring systematic
data collection, covering not only leaks but also the
exposed equipment population, over many plants for
many years. Such data collection is time-consuming
and thus unusual. Alternative methods such as fault
tree analysis are possible for plant-specic applications, but have not yet delivered generic leak frequencies suitable for routine use in QRA studies. Because
they require data for calibration, they are normally used
in combination with generic frequencies, rather than as
an independent alternative.
December 2005

249

Figure 1. Role of leak frequencies in QRA.

1.2. Existing Onshore Leak Frequencies

What data collections underpin the generic leak frequencies in current process QRA? Although there are
numerous sources available that cite generic leak frequencies [2], few reveal what data underlie them. Most
can be traced back to rst publication in the 1970s and
1980s. Many have been judgmentally modied to apply
to different hole sizes. In almost no case can it be
determined what equipment population and hole sizes
underlie the leak frequency. In some cases, it is not
even clear what industry the values came from, and
whether they are based on data or expert judgment.
For example, consider what data underlie the frequency of leaks from steel pipes, a key element of most
process plants. A typical modern QRA might start with
the AIChE/CCPS guide to QRA [1]. The current edition
refers to a previous review of sources published in 1989
[2]. Its example of a distillation column used generic
frequencies for pipes and vessels from a study of process plants in The Netherlands published in 1982 [3],
known by its Dutch acronym COVO. The COVO report
gave six separate values for different pipe diameters
and leak scenarios, as shown in Table 1, which were
based on synthesis of earlier studies, mainly the USNRCs WASH-1400 [4]. That source is the rst in this
historical trail to acknowledge some real data: that is,
four breaks and four minor leaks from pipes in U.S.
nuclear plants during 1972. However, its frequencies
were blended with earlier sources, whose origins in the
nuclear industry of the 1960s and 1970s are now practically untraceable.
Other sources use values of similar quality and age.
An authoritative IChemE monograph [5] makes a judgmental synthesis of various sources from 19711985. A
widely used loss prevention textbook [6] quotes a
range of leak frequency data, mainly drawn from
WASH-1400. The Netherlands Purple Book [7] gives
values based on the COVO study, while acknowledging
that subsequent reviews indicate a tendency for higher
frequencies, but no complete update is yet available.
In the case of pipes, it is concluded that the most
widely accepted leak frequencies are in reality judgments, resting on a data set of eight leaks in U.S.
nuclear plants in 1972, or earlier collections whose size
and origin are now unknown. Investigation of other
250

December 2005

types of process equipment yields similar conclusions.

This is consistent with an earlier review [8], which
concluded that most frequency sources either quoted
from other sources or assumed the values.
Validation of the frequencies is surprisingly difcult.
In part this is because they are so low that most available data are inconclusive. Furthermore, there is no
clear denition of what sizes of leaks have been included in the data. Even validation against the original
data, where obtained, is problematic. For example,
reanalysis of the leaks and equipment population in the
WASH-1400 study yields a frequency of 4.3 105 per
meter year [8], which greatly exceeds the COVO values
that are supposedly based on it. Thus it appears that the
judgmental modications for pipe and leak diameter
dominate over the data content in the generic frequency. This may be preferable to the use of unmodied 30-year-old data from a different industry, but it
begs the question of why the process industry has not
obtained any data of its own during this period.
1.3. Offshore Leak Frequencies
Until the 1990s, the same generic leak frequencies
were used for process QRAs in both offshore and
onshore industries. The inquiry into the Piper Alpha
accident in the North Sea [9] recommended that the
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should collect a
database of hydrocarbon leaks from offshore installations in the UK Sector, and provide it to operators to
support QRA. The resulting hydrocarbon release database (HCRD) has collected all signicant releases in the
UK Sector since October 1992. In addition, the HSE has
estimated the exposed population of equipment items,
and from these has determined leak frequencies and
size breakdowns for each equipment type. These frequencies were rst published in 1997, and most recently updated in 2002 [10], at which time the database
contained 2071 leaks. In the future, the offshore industry will have access to the data through the World Wide
Web. HCRD is now the primary source of process leak
frequencies for offshore QRA [11].
The quality of the HSE offshore data set is exceptionally high, particularly compared to the existing onshore frequencies. For each leak underlying the frequency values, it is possible to establish the hole
diameter, the system and equipment type, the hydrocarbon type and pressure, the estimated quantity released, and many other parameters. Figure 2 shows the
leak size distribution for all the leaks in the database up
to 2001. Convexity in the plot for large hole sizes results
from the limited capacity of small-diameter equipment
to create large holes. Convexity for small holes in this
type of plot would suggest underreporting, which
tends to be greater for smaller holes. In this case, the
long, relatively straight section of the plot indicates
comprehensive reporting.
1.4. Comparison of Offshore and Onshore Leak
Frequencies
What are the differences between the established
onshore and the new offshore frequencies? Figure 3
shows the ratios of the offshore frequencies as analyzed
by DNV in 2004 compared to the onshore frequencies
Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

Table 1. Pipe leak frequencies from COVO study [3].

Pipe Diameter
50 mm
50 150 mm
150 mm

Mode of Failure
Catastrophic rupture
Signicant leakage
Catastrophic rupture
Signicant leakage
Catastrophic rupture
Signicant leakage

Leak Frequency
(per Section Hour)
(per Meter Year)
9
1 10
8.8 107
8
1 10
8.8 106
10
3 10
2.6 107
9
6 10
5.3 106
10
1 10
8.8 108
9
3 10
2.6 106

Figure 2. Leak size distribution for HSE offshore data.

Figure 3. Ratios between offshore and onshore generic leak frequencies.

that were current in 1993 before the offshore data became

available. Some are reduced, but most are increased,
sometimes by more than an order of magnitude.
The overall effects depend on the equipment types
in the study and on the hole sizes used for the comparison. Figure 4 compares results for an example installation, showing the total leak frequency on a base of
Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

hole size. The overall frequency is similar for both data

sets, at about one leak per year, but the slopes of the
distributions show two key differences produced by
the new offshore values:
1. The most frequent holes are smaller. The overall
frequency refers to a minimum hole size of 1 mm
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251

Figure 4. Comparison of overall installation leak frequencies.

Table 2. Causation factors in HSE offshore data [10].

Category
Design fault
Equipment fault

Operational fault

Procedural fault

Causation Factor

Corrosion/erosion
Mechanical defect
Material defect
Other
Incorrectly tted
Improper operation
Dropped/impact
Left open/opened
Other
Noncompliance
Decient procedure
Other

(based on the data in Figure 2), whereas the traditional onshore values refer to a minimum hole size
of 5 mm (a judgment).
2. The largest holes are much more frequent. For hole
diameters 100 mm, the new offshore values are
more than an order of magnitude higher than the
traditional onshore values.
In many QRAs, the results are dominated by these
large hole sizes. Thus, if the new frequencies are substituted directly into a QRA with no further modication, large changes in the risks can be expected. Although the changes are sensitive to the equipment
types and modeling techniques, typically they involve
increases of around an order of magnitude in calculated risk.
1.5. Implications of the Different Frequencies
The differences in leak frequencies between the
onshore and offshore data sets could be interpreted in
two entirely different ways:
1. Both sets could be considered valid, with the difference arising from genuinely higher leak frequencies
in the offshore industry.
252

December 2005

Instances
321
277
920
76
89
267
495
36
237
81
231
323
34

Category Totals
321
1362

1116

588

2. The offshore data set, being more recent and of

higher quality, could also be considered valid for the
onshore industry.
Are generic leak frequencies higher offshore than
onshore? It is a widely held belief in the onshore industry that the more harsh conditions offshore will
result in higher leak frequencies. However, the causation factors in the offshore data do not provide support
for this interpretation (Table 2). Failure mechanisms
associated with the offshore environment (such as salt
water corrosion, produced sand erosion, dropped objects, etc.) constitute relatively small proportions of the
total and cannot account for the observed order of
magnitude difference in frequencies.
Given that many installations are under common
safety management systems onshore and offshore, it
would be expected that where hazards were greater in
one environment than another, appropriate management controls would be adopted, with the effect of
minimizing any differences between them. This explains why analysts were content to use onshore data
for offshore QRAs before offshore data were available.
Attempts to make detailed comparisons between
Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

onshore and offshore leak frequencies for specic

equipment types have revealed the poor quality of the
onshore values, as discussed above. For example,
where the size of the data set is unknown, it is impossible to establish condence limits on the frequency.
For any new onshore QRA, faced with a simple choice
between the two data sets, the superior quality of the
offshore data would seem to overwhelm concerns
about its lack of applicability.
However, if the offshore data are adopted for onshore QRA, several further possibilities arise:
The offshore frequencies could be substituted

into onshore QRA with no further modication.

This would imply that many existing onshore
risks have been signicantly underestimated, with
severe implications for plants that are to be updated and compared with xed risk acceptance
criteria.
The offshore frequencies could be accepted as the
best available estimates of onshore frequencies,
but necessitating modications to the way they
are used in onshore QRA. Perhaps existing QRAs
incorporated judgmental or fortuitous underestimates of other parameters, such as ignition probabilities, thus counterbalancing the underestimated generic frequencies. This would imply that
the whole QRA methodology should be revalidated to use the new data correctly.
Risk estimates based on the offshore frequencies
could be accepted as the best available estimates
of onshore risks, but changes might be needed in
the acceptance criteria. Perhaps strict acceptance
criteria have evolved to give sensible decisions
when combined with underestimated risks. This
would imply that the criteria for decision making
should be reviewed to use the new data correctly.
Although logical, all these interpretations are somewhat impractical. In reality, analysts and decision makers wish to use the new offshore data in onshore QRAs,
given that these data are the latest and best available,
but they do not want to change other modeling parameters or acceptance criteria and they do not want to see
major changes to results that have been widely scrutinized and found credible. A more pragmatic solution is
therefore required to enable this.
1.6. Challenges in Using Offshore Leak
Frequencies
The key requirement to enable the offshore leak
frequencies to be used for onshore QRA is therefore to
obtain frequencies that are compatible with current
outow, ignition, and consequence modeling methodology.
Inspection of the HSE data shows that the leak
events include many that occurred at zero pressure or
whose recorded sizes, pressures, and released quantities indicate that they were quickly isolated. These are
not compatible with typical QRA outow modeling,
which assumes continuous ow from the full hole
diameter at full system pressure until controlled by
emergency shutdown (ESD), blowdown, or inventory
Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

exhaustion. It appears that this practice of modeling

only the most severe leak scenarios accounts for much
of the discrepancy between the new offshore data and
the older onshore values. In effect, the older values had
been adjusted downward to represent only the scenarios normally modeled in onshore QRA. The offshore
data, by contrast, are based on a complete collection of
all leak events. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain a
subset of leak frequencies of scenarios that are consistent with the way onshore QRA is performed in practice.
In addition, practical application of the HSE data has
revealed the need for several types of adjustments:
Frequencies are available for 89 separate types

and diameters of process equipment (excluding

wellhead equipment, drilling equipment, pipelines, and risers). These groups may need to be
combined to match the QRA parts counts.
Many of these groups do not have sufcient exposure to show reliable leak frequencies and size
distributions. Up to 2003, among the 89 process
equipment groups, only 27 have more than 20
leaks and 18 have no leaks at all. These groups
may need to be combined to avoid large changes
in leak frequency as further data are added.
The Statistics Report [10] gives hole size distributions for seven hole size groups (10 mm, 10
25 mm, 25 50 mm, 50 75 mm, 75 100 mm,
100 mm, and Not applicable). This requires
adjustments if the QRA needs to model different
hole size categories. As a result of the small populations, the frequency is zero for many hole size
and equipment type combinations, especially for
the larger hole sizes that tend to dominate QRA
results. Nonzero frequencies are required to avoid
bias in the risk results.
The many possibilities for adjustments of this type may
result in a wide range of frequencies being derived
from the same original data.
1.7. Project Origin
The challenges described above are relevant for
the offshore industry as well as the onshore industry.
Despite the HSE data being accepted as the standard
for offshore leak frequencies, different analysts have
processed the data in different ways, so that the
results of the QRA depend on the consultant carrying
out the analysis. To resolve this, the Norwegian operators Statoil and Norsk Hydro established a project
to develop standardized leak frequencies. In early
2004, DNV Consulting was commissioned to undertake the work, involving contractors Scandpower
and Safetec in the project. The work was completed
during 2004 [12] with signicant involvement from
Statoil and Norsk Hydro.
2. METHOD

2.1. General Approach

The project decided to make use of the HSE data
from the UK Sector because all three contractors were
already using these data, although in different ways.
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253

Available Norwegian data [13] are suitable for validating the approach but, because of lack of equipment
populations, it does not give generic frequencies per
equipment item. The Norwegian hydrocarbon leak and
ignition probability (HCLIP) database is currently being
constructed and will eventually provide suitable Norwegian data.
DNVs method of obtaining leak frequencies from
HCRD has three main steps:
1. Grouping data for different types and sizes of equipment, where there is insufcient experience to show
signicant differences between them.
2. Fitting analytical leak frequency functions to the
data, to obtain a smooth variation of leak frequency
with equipment and hole size.
3. Splitting the leak frequencies into different leak scenarios, to promote compatibility with different approaches to outow modeling in the QRA.
The leak frequency functions and leak scenarios are
described in more detail below.
2.2. Leak Frequency Functions
A leak frequency function is an analytical representation of the variation of leak frequency with equipment and hole size. The DNV leak frequency function
has been chosen to meet the following general principles:
There should be a smooth variation of leak fre-

quency with hole size and equipment size.

The probability of a given hole size should de-

crease logarithmically up to equipment diameter.

An additional element may be added to represent

ruptures, with a hole size equal to the equipment

diameter.
This leads to the following general leak frequency
function:
F d fDd m F rup
for d 1 mm to D, where F(d) is the frequency (per
year) of holes exceeding size d, f (D) is the function
representing the variation of leak frequency with D, D
is the equipment diameter (mm), d is the hole diameter
(mm), m is the slope parameter, and Frup is the additional rupture frequency (per year).
For pipes, anges, valves, and pig traps, HCRD provides data for different equipment size groups. Analysis
of these showed signicant variations of leak frequency
with equipment size for pipes, anges, and manual
valves, and thus the f (D) term has been dened for
these types. The additional rupture frequency Frup and
the slope parameter m are assumed to be constants,
that is, not to be dependent on equipment size, for any
equipment type.
2.3. QRA-Compatible Leak Scenarios
To promote compatibility with different approaches to leak outow modeling in the QRA, the
DNV method divides the leaks in HCRD into three
main scenarios:
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December 2005

1. Zero pressure leaks, where the actual pressure inside the equipment is 0.01 barg. This may be
because the equipment has a normal operating pressure of zero (such as open drains) or because the
equipment has been depressurized for maintenance.
2. Limited leaks, where the equipment is under pressure but the outow is much less than that from a
leak at the operating pressure controlled only by
ESD and blowdown. This may be because the leak
is isolated locally by human intervention (such as
closing an inadvertently opened valve) or by a restriction in the ow from the system inventory (such
as leaks of uid accumulated between pump shaft
seals).
3. Full leaks, where the outow is consistent with or
greater than a leak at the operating pressure controlled by ESD and blowdown. This includes:
ESD isolated leaks, presumed to be controlled by

ESD and blowdown of the leaking system.

Late isolated leaks, presumed to be cases where

there is no effective ESD of the leaking system,

resulting in a greater outow.
The method of allocating leak records in HCRD into
the scenarios is as follows. The initial release rate from
the hole is estimated using simplied equations [11],
based on the hole size, pressure, and uid density
recorded in HCRD. A range of plausible release quantities is estimated based on the system inventory recorded in HCRD and possible ESD and blowdown
responses. Where the recorded release quantity in
HCRD is within this range, these are dened as ESD
isolated leaks. Late-isolated and limited leaks are cases
where the recorded release quantity is respectively
above or below this range.
As a simple indication of the relative importance of
each leak scenario using the methods and criteria
above, Figure 5 shows the breakdown of all leaks in
HCRD for the period 19922003. This shows that nearly
10% of leaks are at zero pressure and 59% are limited
leaks. Of the remaining 31% of leaks, 3% are consistent
with late isolation, implying that on average ESD has
been unavailable on 9% of occasions when it was
needed.
The breakdown of leaks in HCRD into the scenarios
is largely independent of hydrocarbon type, but varies
signicantly between equipment types and also with
hole size. It may therefore be misleading to apply the
constant probabilities above for each equipment type
and hole size. Instead, DNV allocates each leak in
HCRD to a single scenario and then ts the leak frequency functions for each scenario and each equipment type.
3. RESULTS

3.1. Steel Pipes

The leak frequency functions obtained by applying
the above method to the HCRD records for leaks from
steel pipes during October 1992 to March 2003 (inclusive) are [12]:
Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

Figure 5. Event tree presentation of leak scenarios.

Figure 6. Leak frequencies for 150 mm diameter pipe.

Total leaks, as included in HCRD:

Table 3. Leak frequencies (per meter year) for

selected hole sizes for 150 mm diameter pipe.

F total 3.7 1051 1000D 1.5d0.74 3 106

Full leaks, suitable for modeling as outow at the

normal operating pressure, controlled by ESD and

blowdown:
F full 8.0 1061 1000D 1.3d1.42
Zero-pressure leaks, occurring with an actual pres-

sure 0.01 barg:

F zero 9.0 106d0.5 1 106

but not exceeding Ftotal Ffull
Limited leaks, where the pressure is not zero but

the outow is much less than that from a leak at

the normal operating pressure, controlled by ESD
and blowdown:
F limited Ftotal Ffull Fzero
where Ftotal is the frequency of total leaks (per meter
year), Ffull is the frequency of full leaks (per meter
year), Fzero is the frequency of zero pressure leaks (per
meter year), Flimited is the frequency of limited leaks
(per meter year), D is the pipe diameter (mm), and d is
the hole diameter (mm).
Figure 6 illustrates the frequency functions for an
Process Safety Progress (Vol.24, No.4)

example 150 mm diameter pipe. Table 3 gives the

frequencies for selected leak size ranges.
It is notable that the total leak frequency from these
results is close to the pipe leak frequency based on the
original WASH-1400 data [8], whereas the full leak frequencies are consistent with the more judgmental values quoted in the COVO study.
A unique feature of the new frequencies is the ability
to access the underlying data set. For example, the
frequency of full leaks above is based on 47 events with
hole size 1 mm in pipes that are 3- to 11-in. in
diameter. The HSE database categorizes the circumstances, causal factors, and consequences of each of
these leaks, thus allowing further analysis of unprecedented detail, which as yet has barely started.
3.2. Other Equipment Types
Table 4 gives the frequencies of the full leak scenario for different types of process equipment. These
are examples of the complete set of generic leak freDecember 2005

255

Table 4. Frequencies of full leaks (per equipment item year) for process equipment.

Equipment Type
Steel pipes (2 in.), 1 m length
Steel pipes (6 in.), 1 m length
Steel pipes (18 in.), 1 m length
Flanged joints (2 in.)
Flanged joints (6 in.)
Flanged joints (18 in.)
Manual valves (2 in.)
Manual valves (6 in.)
Manual valves (18 in.)
Actuated valves (6 in.) (nonpipeline)
Instrument (0.5 in.)
Process vessel
Centrifugal pump
Reciprocating pump
Centrifugal compressor
Reciprocating compressor
Heat exchanger (h/c in shell)
Heat exchanger (h/c in tube)
Heat exchanger (plate)
Heat exchanger (air cooled)
Filter

Frequency of Full Leaks

(1 mm Diameter)
5.7E-05
2.0E-05
1.1E-05
3.2E-05
4.3E-05
1.2E-04
1.4E-05
4.8E-05
2.2E-04
2.6E-04
2.3E-04
5.0E-04
1.8E-03
3.7E-03
2.0E-03
2.7E-02
1.4E-03
1.0E-03
6.0E-03
1.2E-03
8.9E-04

quency results that now form the standardized leak

frequencies for offshore projects, and are also considered suitable for onshore QRA studies.
The overall results of using these new frequencies
for an example installation are included in Figure 4.
This shows that the full leaks are roughly an order of
magnitude less likely than the unmodied total leaks
and are consistent with the traditional onshore values
for large hole sizes.
3.3. Sensitivity Tests
Sensitivity tests have been conducted to identify the
main sources of uncertainty in the generic frequencies,
focusing in particular on the full leak scenario. Although there is no evidence of systematic underestimation of the release quantities in HCRD, it is an unavoidable limitation of the approach that the results would
be very sensitive to any such bias. The results are also
sensitive to the treatment of cases where the system
inventory was not recorded, and so the importance of
this parameter should be noted in any future data
collection. The results are very sensitive to the assumed
ranges of isolation and blowdown times, and more
realistic modeling of these aspects would be desirable
in future work.
CONCLUSIONS

The hydrocarbon release database collected by the

HSE in the UK offshore industry contains data of a
quality and quantity that far surpasses any previous
leak data in the process industry. Although becoming
the standard for offshore industry, it has rarely been
used in onshore QRAs because it would tend to give
much higher risks than the established but largely judgmental onshore leak frequencies. The approach de256

December 2005

Frequency of Full Leaks

(50 mm Diameter)
0.0E00
7.7E-08
4.2E-08
0.0E00
3.6E-07
1.1E-06
0.0E00
4.9E-07
2.3E-06
1.9E-06
0.0E00
1.1E-04
2.4E-05
5.2E-04
2.0E-06
1.1E-05
1.3E-04
4.9E-05
3.6E-04
6.9E-05
6.4E-06

scribed here solves this problem by dividing leaks into

three scenarios, allowing analysts to use frequencies
for only those scenarios that are compatible with their
QRA outow modeling. Standardized leak frequencies
have been developed for different types of process
equipment, using leak frequency functions to ensure
that consistent, nonzero frequencies are available for
any equipment type and hole size. The results are
consistent with traditional onshore leak frequencies,
while also being traceable to specic incidents among
the modern high-quality offshore leak data.
Despite the arguments for similarity in this paper, it
remains undesirable to use offshore data for onshore
QRA. This is adopted only because of the poor quality
of available onshore frequency sources. A key longterm aim for the onshore industry should therefore be
to gather leak frequency data of a quality comparable
to the HSE offshore data.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The work reported in this paper is based on data

collected by the Health and Safety Executive, and was
funded by Det Norske Veritas (DNV), Statoil and Norsk
Hydro. The author acknowledges their kind support; in
particular Stine Musus, Brian Bain, Jens Michael
Brandstorp, and Jan Pappas. The author also thanks Art
Dowell of Rohm & Haas and John Covan of Sandia
National Laboratories, who reviewed the paper and
provided helpful comments. Views expressed are those
of the author and not necessarily those of DNV.
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