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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila

College of Engineering and Technology


Department of Chemical Engineering
UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE DISASTER
Supremo, Journel Ann T.
2011-20456

BS CHE III
5 February

2014
I. Executive Summary
The Upper Big Branch (UBB) mine disaster occurred on April 5, 2010,
roughly 1,000 ft (300 m) underground in Raleigh County, West Virginia at
Massey Energys Upper Big Branch coal mine located in Montcoal. Twentynine out of thirty-one miners at the site were killed. The explosion occurred
at 3:27 pm. In a report to President Obama released on April 27, 2010,
MSHA officials offered the opinion that the UBB explosion was caused by the
combustion of accumulations of methane, combined with combustible coal
dust mixed with air. Investigations lead to a conclusion that the explosion
was mainly caused by the accumulation of methane as well as coal dust.
Aside from that, this disaster could have been prevented if Massey Energy
followed the mining regulations facilitated by Mining Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) and the federal state. Massey Energy is also faulted
for not providing adequate training for their miners and for prioritizing
production over safety. Rock dust, or crushed limestone, has long been
regarded as a vital safety component in underground mines because it

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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
dilutes the explosive nature of coal dust. Rock dust was not spread
throughout the UBB mine properly because of a faulty equipment (that had
not been replaced over the years) and because there is no assigned people
to do it in a full-time basis. If only this was done accordingly, the explosion, if
not prevented, could have been minimized. All the investigations conducted
points Massey Energy, as well as MSHA responsible for the said explosion.
Gary May, a former superintendent of UBB, was also said to be guilty of
conspiring to impede the MSHAs enforcement method. Massey Energy has
this production over safety belief. Thus, miners safety is overlooked and
they are forced to work in a dangerous environment without the proper
ventilation, rock dusting, equipment, as well as training. MSHA, on the other
hand, is faulted because it was not able to act early in righting Massey
Energys violation of the Mine Safety Regulations. Gary May, well, he did not
listen to the complaints of the miners when it comes to what wrong they
experience that lead to the blast.
It is highly recommended to follow all the mining safety regulations.
Also, safety over production is better. After all, without the miners, there
would be no coal. MSHA and the other agency for mining should adapt the
latest regulations regarding mining and make sure to implement it however
powerful the company is. People who work in the mine should also be
involved in regulating safety rules; they must have a daily record (journal)
about what they observe when they work in the mine. Equipment that is
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College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
used should be replaced if it is too old to function properly. As the saying
goes, prevention is better than cure. After all, it does not hurt to follow the
regulations that are meant to keep people safe and sound.
II. Statement of the Problem
Massey Energy is the main reason for the blast that took the lives of
twenty-nine miners at UBB. Because of this, Massy Energy had to pay a large
sum of money as fine and for the destruction that the blast caused. Massey
Energy was forced to take responsibility for all the liabilities that it caused.
MSHA, because of lack of implementation of the regulations, was very much
at fault too. It werent able to look deeply into the mining operation of UBB.
Gary May, who is the superintendent at that time, did not listen to the
miners complaint about the faulty environment. Because of this, he
undergone trial and was proven guilty for impending MSHAs implementation
of the regulations.
There is lesser and inconsistent spreading of rock dust in the vicinity of
the mine. The equipment used for dusting is not working properly; thus, the
assigned people had no choice but to do it manually. Also, air ventilation is
questionable.

Workers

have

been

complaining

about

it

since.

The

management takes note of it but do not make any adjustments. The miners
are forced to work till exhaustion. They are not given adequate time for rest.
The level of oxygen in the mine is low, and carbon monoxide as well as
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College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
methane is present in the atmosphere in a not so acceptable amount. MSHA,
although facilitates regulations, failed to really search the UBB mine of
violations. If it did, there are no precautionary measures done. Coal dust,
which is an explosive substance that should have been dusted and removed,
was present in high amount inside the mine. The management did not make
sure that the mine is free or of tolerable amount of any toxic chemicals
before proceeding with the mining. One time, a miner stopped the operation
because there is no enough air to breathe in. One of the management head
then threatened the miner that he will be fired if do not continue the
operation. Leaving him no choice, the miner continued mining even if he,
together with the other miners, found it hard to breath. These are the causes
of the blast as investigated by the federal government.
There are a number of short term as well as long term problems that
can arouse from these conditions of the working environment. For the short
term, we have the difficulty of the miners in functioning properly because of
(1) exhaustion, (2) lack of breathing air, (3) faulty equipment, (4)inadequate
training, and of course, (5) not enough rest. If the miners, do not function as
they as supposed to, the coal mined would be lesser. The faulty equipment
for rock dusting also causes a short term problem: the rock dust will not be
spread properly or not at all. For the long term problems, we have quite a
few. Firstly, the health of the miners is at risk. Because of the toxic
environment that the miners are working in, they are found to have a certain
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College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
lung problem (almost all of them) and they find it hard to breathe properly.
The equipment that they are supposed to use for dusting but werent able to
is supposed to cause only a short term problem. But, because the substance
that needed to be dusted (rock dust) is very much needed to negate
whatever explosive substance there is inside the mine, it also poses a long
term problem. Without proper dusting because of faulty equipment,
explosion is most likely to happen. This is a long term problem the
explosion and the disaster it causes.
For the management of Massey Energy, the MSHA, as well as Gary
May, they faced the consequences of their actions (or lack of). Massey
Energy paid a large amount of money for all the liabilities that the blast
caused. Their operation is also affected greatly. All the mines owned by
Massey undergone a thorough safety search that is all the possible
loopholes are examined greatly. Massey was found to have a lot of violations;
it was greater than the acceptable percentage. MSHA was evaluated
accordingly. Together with the other regulatory committee in mining, they are
ordered to adapt the 2011 regulatory act which is by that time the latest
version of the Mining Safety Regulation. Gary May, was summoned in the
court and was proven guilty of impending MSHAs operation and was
punished accordingly.
III. Causes of the Problem

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College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
Violation of Mining Safety Regulations is the main cause of the
problem.
The ventilation system is one of the most important requirements
when it comes to mining safety. Massey Energy failed to comply. Yes, they do
have airlock doors, but it was not enough to provide breathing air. Also,
because of lack of ventilation, the atmosphere inside UBB mine got
accumulated with methane. This is because there is no circulation of air
which the ventilation could have provided. Methane is a toxic and flammable
gas. Accumulation of such gives way to explosion if there is any ignition.
Coal dust accumulation is another cause of the explosion. This dust
aided in the ignition of the explosive methane gas. Massey did not adhere to
the federal and state rock dusting standards. Removal of the coal dust
should be done as frequent as possible, this is as stated in the standards. It
is acceptable to have coal dust presence in the mine but only in tolerable
percentage. UBB mine exceeded the acceptable amount of coal dust allowed
to be in the area. This is another violation on their part.
Rock dusting, which is the spreading of crushed limestone that dilutes
the explosive nature of coal dust, was not done properly. It was just done
three times a week when it should have been every day. There is also no
employee or worker assigned to do the dusting in full time. The workers
assigned in the job are merely part timers because theyve got other things
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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
to do such as aiding in the construction. Massey overlooked this very
important matter.
Proper maintenance of safety features on mine machinery is also an
issue here. The machine used for rock dusting is not working properly.
Nathaniel Jeter, a former miner at UBB said that he always complained about
the machine. He was the one responsible for dusting, him alone. This is
another mistake. There must be at least two full time workers assigned for
rock dusting, the regulation states. So, as he complained about it, Gary May
took note of it and even listed all the parts that needed refurbishing and etc.
But, it was just on paper. No action was done. This is also the reason why
rock dusting was done only three times a week. The miners cannot really
dust the whole mine it was such a big place. Aside from that, workers are
only able to dust the ground and conveyor belts, not the ceiling. The rock
dust that is scattered there is carried from the entrance up to the depth of
the mine mechanically. And when it is not enough, workers have to go back
all the way to the entrance just to get another batch of rock dust. Massey
failed to comply again. There is supposed to be a sort of entrance at the
middle part of the mine wherein the remaining supply of rock dust should be
placed. This is to make the dusting easier since the source of the dust is not
that far. UBB mine do not have one of those entrances.

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College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
MSHA did find a lot of violations of Massey Energy and all the violations
are taken into account. The only thing is that although there were a lot of
violations, there are no actions. They did not immediately correct those and
they did not even supervise the implementation of the changes for safety if
there is one. Massey Energys got a very large number of violations and no
action was done. Thus, this is another cause of the problem.
Gary May knew all of the things that UBB mine is lacking. He was very
well informed by the miners that there is no proper ventilating system, that
coal dust is accumulating, and that rock dusting isnt done accordingly. He
knew, yet he did nothing. He took note of everything, according to a miner.
But thats just it. He took note, he didnt do anything. He is supposed to be
the one ensuring safety in the workplace because he is the superintendent at
that time but he overlooked everything. After all, Massey Energy believes in
production before safety.

IV. Decision Criteria and Alternative Solutions


Historically, the April 27 report stated, blasts of this magnitude have
involved propagation from coal dust. When methane and coal dust levels are
controlled, explosions from these sources can be prevented. The explosion

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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
that took place at UBB started with the ignition of a small amount of
methane gas and then was fueled by coal dust that had been allowed to
build up for miles through the mine. When a mine explodes suddenly and
with great force, as happened at Upper Big Branch, methane is immediately
suspected as a primary source. Odorless, colorless and highly combustible,
methane is the most common hazardous gas found in underground coal
mines. Created naturally by the decomposition of organic materials the
same process that creates coal methane is lighter than air and tends to rise
to the roofs of mines. It can migrate into voids in the earth created when coal
seams are removed.
Because methane is universally recognized as highly explosive, mine
operators are required to keep levels under one percent of the mines
atmospheric content. Concentrations between 5 percent and 15 percent pose
the greatest threat of explosions, with the most explosive mixture at 9.5
percent. Methane explosions occur when a buildup of methane gas comes
into contact with an ignition source, such as a flame or spark. Because
sparking is common in the mining process, history is replete with methane
explosions.
Small methane ignitions do not have to turn into major explosions if
mine operators adhere to basic safety measures, such as maintaining
adequate ventilation systems, removing explosive coal dust from mining
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College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
operations, spreading required amounts of rock dust and ensuring that water
sprays on mining equipment are kept in good repair and function
properly. Because these basic safety systems failed at UBB, a minor flare-up
of methane led to the nations worst coal mining disaster in 40 years.
The problem is that the 21st century coal mine safety practices have
failed to keep pace with 21st century coal mine production practices.
Improved technology is required to ensure that the lives of miners are
safeguarded. Also, following all the safety regulations is still the best solution
there is. If all the safety regulations are practiced in the mine, these kinds of
disaster will not happen or most likely prevented.
V. Recommended Solution, Implementation and Justification
The disaster at Upper Big Branch was man-made and could have been
prevented had Massey Energy followed basic, well-tested and historically
proven safety procedures. The best recommendation that I could give is for
Massey Energy to adhere to all the standards and regulations of the mining
industry. There should be no loopholes, reasons, or whatsoever. All the
people in the company/workplace must be concerned with the safety of each
and everyone.
It should be required that every mine superintendent be certified by
the state agency in underground mining and in carrying out the mine health

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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
and safety laws with regard to individual mines. The state agency should
develop and administer an examination, including an in-mine demonstration
of the superintendents skills, as part of the certification process. A quarterly
report certifying that all safety standards are being complied with shall also
be required. Sanction for knowingly or negligently falsifying the report would
be the revocation of the mine superintendents certification. Aside from the
superintendent, all the miners must undergo proper training and they must
be well informed of all the hazards that they are facing in their job. This
should be done because this is what Massey really lacks.
Electronic records should be maintained regarding methane, intake and
return air levels on all coal producing sections for no less than seven years.
Had this information been available, investigators would have had data
related to the previous methane inundation at UBB. It would have been
easier to know the root of the explosion. The regulatory agencies should use
ventilation simulation models as part of their plan approval and modification
process. After their plan is approved, the ventilation system must be
immediately installed.
Immediate implementation of a computerized, real-time electronic
personnel-recording system to formally identify and locate all personnel who
are underground at a given time, including supervisory personnel should be
done. Each mine must be required to institute a Communication and

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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
Information

Recording

Center

outside

the

underground

portions

of

underground mines and away from the working areas of surface mines.
These communications centers would provide instantaneous communication
to MSHA, to state agencies, to company officials and state and county
emergency

management

officials

regarding

safety

and

health.

Mine

operators should be required to adopt computer-based monitoring of air


quality, quantity and direction of flow throughout a mine. A suitable system
would alert not only the mine operator and miners to impending danger, but
it would also alert the state and federal regulatory agencies. Regulatory
agencies would have the authority to shut down an operation based on data
provided by the system.
Mechanized rock dusting must be conducted in all portions of
underground mines, as well as the installation of passive barriers to help
stop ignitions from turning into large explosions, such as occurred at Upper
Big Branch. This is to ensure that the explosive nature of coal dust is
neutralized and so that it would not be so hard on the worker assigned to do
rock dusting.
Implementing these recommendations would most likely prevent any
disastrous happening in the mining industry. Statistics have shown that those
companies that follow safety regulations tend to have a danger-free
environment. It only proves that if Massey Energy only followed all the

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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
mining safety regulations and acted in accordance to this, the Upper Big
Branch mine disaster would not have happened. To remove the causes of
accidents, discipline of a high order is essential. The compilation of a large
set of rules is not sufficient. Lax enforcement of regulations is a common
cause of failure as well. Rigid observance of a clear and definite code of
requirements is always productive of good results. Without this, discipline is
out of the question.

VI. External Sourcing

Ernie Ross, J. (1997). United States Department of Labor. Mine Safety and
Health Administration. Nonfatal Methane/Air Explosion (Upper Big Branch
Mine-South). Mount Hope, WV.
Labor, D. o. (April 18, 2010). Briefing by Department of Labor, Mine Safety
and Health Administration on Disaster at Massey Energys Upper Big Branch
Mine-South, at the request of President Barack Obama.
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Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila


College of Engineering and Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering
Upper Big Branch Mine - South Disaster. Retrieved on 31 January 2014 from
http://MSHA%20-%20Performance%20Coal%20-%20Upper%20Big
%20Branch%20Mine-South%20Disaster%20Information%20Single
%20Source%20Page.com
Upper Big Branch Mine disaster. Retrieved on 31 January 2014 from
http://Upper%20Big%20Branch%20Mine%20disaster%20-%20Wikipedia,
%20the%20free%20encyclopedia.com
U. S. Department of Labor. Mine Safety and Health Administration. Report of
Investigation (Underground Coal Mine): Methane Inundation, by James R.
Humphrey and Fred Wills, Mount Hope, WV: 2003.
United States Mine Rescue Association website, Mine Accidents and
Disasters, http://www.usmra.com/saxsewell/crandallcanyon.htm. (last visited
October 5, 2010).
U.S. Department of Labor. Mine Safety and Health Administration. Report of
Investigation (Underground Coal Mine): Methane Inundation, by James R.
Humphrey and Fred Wills, Mount Hope, WV: 2003.

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