FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |1

INTRODUCTION
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
What is Legal Ethics? It is the embodiment of all principles of morality and ref
inement that should govern the conduct of every member of the bar. Specifically,
it refers to that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an a
ttorney owes to the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession an
d to the public. (Malcom) TERMS Amicus curiae an experienced and impartial attor
ney invited by the court to appear and help in the disposition of the issues sub
mitted to it (Rule 168, Section 36 Rules of Court) Attorney a person who is a me
mber of the Philippine Bar and who, by the warrant of another, practices law, or
who acts professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings, by a
uthority of his client. Attorney ad hoc a person appointed by the court to defen
d an absentee defendant in the suit in which the appointment was made AttorneyAt
torney-atat-law - that class of persons who are licensed officers of the court e
mpowered to appear, prosecute, and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, respon
sibilities, and liabilities are developed by law as consequence AttorneyAttorney
-inin-fact an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appoin
ting him. His authority is provided in the special power of attorney or general
power of attorney or letter of attorney. He is not necessarily a lawyer. Attorne
y of record attorney whose name, together with his address, is entered in the re
cord of a case as the designated counsel of the party litigant in the case and t
o whom judicial notices relative thereto are sent (Rule 7, Section 5 Rules of Co
urt) Bar the legal profession Bar association an association of members of the l
egal profession like the IBP where membership is integrated or compulsory Bench
the judiciary Client one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice f
or purposes of prosecuting or defending a suit in behalf and usually for a fee.
Counsel is an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or managemen
t of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law (Villegas v. Lega
spi, 113 SCRA 39, 1982) Counsel de parte an attorney retained by a party litigan
t, usually for a fee, to prosecute or defend his cause in court Counsel de ofici
o an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in a crimin
al action or to represent a destitute party in a case. (Rule 138, Section 31 Rul
es of Court)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |2 House counsel one
who acts as attorney for business though carried as an employee of that business
and not as an independent lawyer Lawyer general term for a person trained in th
e law and authorized to advice and represent others in legal matters Lawyer of of
counsel counsel an experienced lawyer, who is usually a retired member of the judi
ciary, employed by law firms or consultant Lead counsel the counsel of either si
de of a litigated action who is charged with the principal management and direct
ion of a partys case, as distinguished from his juniors or subordinates. Notary p
ublic public appointed by a Court whose duty is to attest to the genuineness of
any deed or writing in order to render them available as evidence of facts there
in and who is authorized by the statute to administer oath Practicing lawyer one
engaged in the practice of law who by license are officers of the court and who
are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend a clients cause ProPro-se an appe
arance by the lawyer on his own behalf Public prosecutor He is a quasi-judicial
officer and as such, he should seek equal and impartial justice. He should be as
much concerned with seeing that no innocent man suffers as in seeing that no gu
ilty man escapes. His primary duty is not to convict but to see to it that justi
ce is done. He should see to it that the accused is given fair and partial trial
and not deprived of any of his statutory or constitutional rights. Consequently
, the suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishi
ng the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for discipl
inary action. He should recommend the acquittal of the accused whose conviction
is on appeal, if he finds no legal basis to sustain the conviction. Private pros
ecutor A private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution of a criminal actio
n when the offended party is entitled to indemnity and has not waived expressly,
reserved or instituted the civil action for damages. All criminal actions comme
nced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and con
trol of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor
or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be aut
horized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so a
uthorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continu
e to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of the pu
blic prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn Trial la
wyer one who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or board
s which mean engaging in actual trial work, either for the prosecution or for th
e defense of cases of clients
SOURCES OF LEGAL ETHICS ETHICS 1. The 1987 Philippine Constitution 2. Applicable
jurisprudence 3. Code of Professional Responsibility 4. New Civil Code 5. Rules
of Court 6. Revised Penal Code 7. Local Government Code

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |3 NATURE OF OFFICE O
F ATTORNEY (Agpalo) The title Attorney is reserved to those who has: 1. obtained t
he necessary degree in the study of law; 2. Successfully taken the bar exams; 3.
admitted to the IBP; 4. Remain members thereof in good standing; 5. Been author
ized to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is not a natural pr
operty or constitutional right but a mere privilege. It is not a right granted t
o anyone who demands it but a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exerci
se of sound judicial discretion. It is in the nature of a franchise conferred on
ly for merit which must be earned by hard study, learning and good conduct. It i
s a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards o
f mental and moral fitness. Those standards are neither dispensed with nor lower
ed after admission. The attorneys continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred
depends upon his complying with the ethics and rules of the profession. Law is a
profession and not a trade because its basic ideal is to render public service
and secure justice for those who seek its aid. The gaining of a livelihood is on
ly a secondary consideration.

PRIVILEGES OF AN ATTORNEY (Agpalo)
1. Privilege and right to practice law during good behavior before any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunal. 2. Attorneys enjoy the presumption
of regularity in the discharge of his duty. (His statements, if relevant or mate
rial to the case, are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor
. He can speak freely and courageously in proceedings without the risk of crimin
al prosecution.) 3. Other privileges inherent in his status as quasi-judicial of
ficer: a. Passing the bar is equivalent to First-grade Civil Service eligibility
for any position in the classified service of the government, the duties of whi
ch require knowledge of law. b. Second-grade eligibility for any other governmen
t position not requiring proficiency in the law. 4. The court, in admitting him
to practice, presents him to the public as worthy of its confidence and as a per
son fit and proper to assume and discharge the responsibilities of an attorney.
5. Has the privilege to set the judicial machinery in motion. He can stand up fo
r his right or the right of his client even in the face of a hostile court. He h
as the right to protest, in respectful language, any unwarranted treatment of a
witness or any unjustified delay. The rights and privileges which they enjoy as
officers of the court are necessary for the proper administration of justice as
for the protection of attorney and his client. There can be no strong bar withou
t courageous and fearless attorneys. As a man of law, his is necessarily a leade
r in the community, looked up to as a model citizen. Integrity, ability, and lea
rning often make him qualified to administer the Executive Departments or the Le
gislative bodies.
STATE REGULATION
The power of admission to the practice of law is vested by the Constitution in t
he Supreme Court: 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5 (5) The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx 5. Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, an
d procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, law the

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |4 integrated bar, an
d legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplifie
d and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be unifor
m for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodi
es shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The constitut
ional power to admit candidates to the legal profession is a judicial function a
nd involves exercise of discretion (In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562). The power of th
e Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law includes: authority to define th
e term prescribe the qualifications of a candidate to and the subjects of the ba
r examinations decide who will be admitted to practice discipline, suspend or di
sbar any unfit and unworthy member of the bar reinstate any disbarred or indefin
itely suspended attorney ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar punish for
contempt any person for unauthorized practice of law and in general, exercise o
verall supervision of the legal profession
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1987 Philippine Philippine Constitution, Article XII, Section 14 (2) xxx The prac
tice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
, save in cases prescribed by law. IN THE MATTER OF INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, 1973
FACTS: In 1970, convinced that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration f
or the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providi
ng for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
There were oppositions on the integration on the grounds among others, of (1) i
ts constitutionality and (2) the same being outside the power of the Court to do
so. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the integration of the Bar is unconstitutional. 2
. Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Bar. HELD: 1. The cons
titutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on its effects on the lawyer s const
itutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nat
ure of the dues exacted from him. Integration of the Philippine Bar means the of
ficial unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requ
ires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney a
s conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name i
n the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Designed to improve the position o
f the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fost
ers cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant
to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulatio
n by the Supreme Court. It does not in any manner violate the lawyers freedom of
association and freedom of speech. 2. The Court is of the view that it may integ
rate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 1
3 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and p
rocedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |5 May the legislatur
e enact laws to regulate the practice of law? Generally, the legislature cannot
enact laws to regulate the practice of law. The Legislature, in the exercise of
its police power, may however, enact laws regulating the practice of law to prot
ect the public and promote the public welfare. . But the legislature may not pas
s a law that will control the Supreme Court in the performance of its function t
o decide who may enjoy the privilege of practicing law, and any law of that kind
is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise. Any legislative or executive judgme
nt substituting that of the Supreme Court in matters concerning the admission to
the practice of law or the suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of an attorn
ey infringes upon and constitutes an invalid exercise of the legislative or exec
utive power. The legislature may pass a law prescribing additional qualification
s for candidates for admission to practice or filling up deficiencies in the req
uirements for admission to the bar. Such a law may not, however, be given retroa
ctive effect so as to entitle a person, not otherwise qualified, to be admitted
to the bar, nor will such a law preclude the Supreme Court from fixing other qua
lifications or requirements for the practice of law. (In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 543
)
REQUIREMENTS TO THE ADMISSION ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW
Citizenship, Citizenship, Residence, Residence, Age, Age, Good moral character,
character, Legal education RULE 138, RULES OF COURT, Section 2. Requirements for
all applicants for admission to the bar Every applicant for admission as a memb
er of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and tha
t no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pend
ing in any court in the Philippines. IN RE ARTHUR CASTILLO REYES, 1993
(Citizenship)
Petitioner graduated from UP College of Law in 1939, passed the bar in 1939, ind
ucted to and served in the US Armed Forces in the Far East during WWII and thus
became eligible for citizenship under the 1990 US Immigration Act, became a natu
ralized citizen of the US in 1993. His name was struck from the Roll of Attorney
s. Only Filipino citizens may practice law in the Philippines. This requirement
is prescribed by the Constitution, XII 14, and the ROC, 2 Rule 138
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. must be a c
itizen of the Philippines; At least 21 years of age; of good moral character; mu
st be a resident of the Philippines; Must produce before the Supreme Court a sat
isfactory evidence of good moral character; And that no charges against him, inv
olving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Phili
ppines (Sec. 2, Rule 138, RRC); Must have complied with the academic requirement
s; Must pass the bar examinations Take the lawyers oath; and s sign the Roll of A
ttorneys

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |6 What is good moral
character? No definition and criteria in law for good moral character (Agpalo) Go
od moral character is the absence of a proven conduct or act which has been hist
orically and traditionally considered as a manifestation of moral turpitude. The
act or conduct showing moral turpitude need not amount to a crime; and even if
it does constitute an offense, a conviction upon a criminal charge is not necess
ary to demonstrate bad moral character although it may show moral depravity. (Ag
palo) Question of moral turpitude is for Supreme Court to decide which is why ap
plicants are required to disclose any crime which they have been charged. Concea
lment or withholding from the court information about charges and indictments is
a ground for disqualification of applicant or for revocation of license. Even i
f the crime concealed does not involve moral turpitude, the act of concealment m
akes him/her unfit to be a lawyer. (Agpalo) Applicant assumes burden of proof to
establish qualifications in asking admission. But after having presented prima
facie evidence, burden to overcome the prima facie showing shifts to those objec
ting his/her admission. (Agpalo) An applicant must show that no charges against
him involving moral turpitude have been filed or pending in court in the Philipp
ines. The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that an applican
t has been charged with or indicted for an alleged crime is a ground for disqual
ification (Agpalo)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 200
2 BAR EXAMINATIONS
(Good Moral Character)
FACTS: In his failure to disclose in his application that he has pending crimina
l cases, Haron S. Meling was disqualified from taking the bar examination, was n
ot be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys should he p
asses the Bar Examinations, and his membership in the Sharia Bar was suspended. M
eling averred that he did not disclose of the criminal cases filed against him s
ince the retired judge advised him of settlement of the case which would result
in its termination. ISSUE: Whether or not Haron S. Meling is qualified to take t
he Bar Examination. HELD: Haron S. Meling is not qualified to take the Bar Exami
nation. The practice of law, in any court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege which requires that an applicant not only has knowledge of the law bu
t is also of good moral character as a requisite to the admission to the practic
e of law. It is a standard that in the application for bar examination, the appl
icant is required to declare under oath that there is no any pending case or char
ge against him/her. This requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether
there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. In the
case at bar, Meling however, did not disclose that he has pending criminal case
s. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment. This concealment of Melings re
flects of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forf
eiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |7 QUINGWA V. PUNO
(A.C. 389, February 28, 1967) (19 SCRA 439)
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a complaint against Atty. Armando Puno charging him w
ith gross immorality and misconduct. Quingwa alleged that Atty. Puno succeeded i
n having carnal knowledge with her through a promise of marriage but refused to
comply upon learning that she was pregnant. Atty. Puno denied having sexual inte
rcourse with Quingwa and refused to acknowledge Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. as his
child. The Court finds for Quingwa and ruled in her favor. ISSUE: Whether or no
t Atty. Puno be disbarred. HELD: Yes. One of the requirements for all applicants
for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character. If good moral character is
a qualification for the privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essen
tial during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. W
hen his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the r
elator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality an
d integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Atty. Puno did not present e
vidence to defeat the allegations against him.
Rule 138 SEC. 6 of the Rules of Court Pre-Law.No applicant for admission to the b
ar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has sa
tisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he ha
d pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized universit
y or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor s degree i
n arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of conce
ntration: political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics IN R
E: TELESFORO A. DIAO
(Pre-law)
FACTS: FACTS: About two years after being admitted to the bar, Telesforo Diao wa
s charged due to false representation in his application for the Bar examination
, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The Solicitor General, afte
r investigation, recommends that Diao s name be erased from the roll of attorney
s, because he (Diao) had not completed his high school training and never attend
ed Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma there from, before ta
king up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Departm
ent of Education. Issue: Whether or not Diao should be disbarred due to his fals
e representations on his academic qualifications. Held: Diao should be disbarred
due to his false representations on his academic qualifications. He was not def
initely qualified to take the bar exam because he never completed his high schoo
l training and never obtained his A.A diploma, violating Section 6 of Rule 138 o
f the Rules of Court which provides " No applicant for admission to the bar exami
nation shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied
the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursue
d and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or col
lege, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a fouryear high school c
ourse, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor s degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics."

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |8 Rule 138 SEC. 5 of
the Rules of Court Additional requirements for other applicants.All applicants f
or admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, b
efore being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regu
larly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed cour
ses, in a law, school or university, officially approved and recognized by the S
ecretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certific
ate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such fac
ts, and further evidence may be required by the court. No applicant shall be adm
itted to the bar examination unless he has satisfactorily completed the followin
g courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private internation
al law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxa
tion and legal ethics. RE: APPLICATION OF ADRIANO HERNANDEZ, 1993
(Law Proper)
An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not only have studied
law in a local school but must be able to present the certifications required u
nder sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot
submit said certifications, they shall not be allowed to take the bar examinati
ons. CUI V. V. CUI
(G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964)
FACTS: The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don P
edro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased. When the spouses died, the administra
tion passed to Mauricio Cui. When the latter died, Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, a series of controversies an
d court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator. Dr. Teodoro
resigned. Jesus Cui and Antonio Cui averred among themselves that they shall be
the rightful administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili as provided in Sec
tion 2 of the Deed of Donation in the order of preference. It stated that the ad
ministrators shall have the qualification of que posea titulo de abogado among o
thers. Petitioner contended that having the degree of Bachelor of Laws constitut
e titulo de abogado while the respondent Romulo cui who also claimed to be the adm
inistrator contended that it shall mean a member of the bar. ISSUE: ISSUE Whethe
r or not titulo de abogado means a member of the bar. HELD: HELD The Court ruled i
n affirmative. Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" me
ans not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membershi
p in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law
. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term ha
s a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons
who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and de
fend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolv
ed by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule
138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer s oa
th and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being h
is license to practice the profession. Possession of the degree itself is not in
dispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way
. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Proced
ure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in colleg
e were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. Yet certa
inly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo d
e abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some l
aw school or university.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes Page |9 Rule 138 SEC. 10 o
f the Rules of Court Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. P
ersons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the ex
amination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy th
ereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall a
nswer the questions personally without help from anyone. Upon verified applicati
on made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be di
fficult to read his answers without much loss of time, the Supreme Court may all
ow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless
typewriters shall be allowed to be used. The committee of bar examiners shall ta
ke such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or co
mmission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examinati
on papers. No oral examination shall be given. IN RE AMPARO
(Bar Examination)
FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a pie
ce of paper during the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender
the paper until the head watcher threatened to report him to the authorities. Th
e paper contains the list of duration of penalties and formula computing them, w
hich Amparo justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out of his pocket as he
tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an investigation ensued.
ISSUE: Whether or not Amparo is guilty for his actions. RULING: He violated Rule
133, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on prohibiting examinees from bringing pa
pers, books, or notes into the examination room. Amparo committed an overt act i
ndicative of an attempt to cheat by reading notes. The report of the bar showed
that he did not passed the bar thus the court ordered he will not be allowed to
re-take the bar the following year. IN RE VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
(Bar Examination)
FACTS: An administrative case of disbarment is filed against Atty. Victorio Lanu
evo, a Bar Confidant for having took advantage of his position and manoeuvred th
e passing of an examinee in the bar examinations and his admission to the bar. A
tty. Lanuevo allegedly deceived bar examiners to re-evaluate and/or re-correct t
he answers of an examinee, claiming that he acted in good faith believing that t
he same is worthy of re-evaluation and that the matter of whether or not re-eval
uation was in order was left alone to the examiners decision. Petitioners on th
e other hand maintained that Atty. Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, cannot initiate ac
tions for re-evaluation of answers of any bar examinees. ISSUE: Whether or not A
tty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar Confidant, has authority to initiate steps towards
re-evaluation of the answers of bar examinees. HELD: Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a B
ar Confidant, had no authority to initiate steps towards the re-evaluation of th
e answers of bar examinees. The Office of the Bar Confidant has nothing to do in
the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to mak
e the passing mark before or after their notebooks is submitted to it by the Exa
miners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to Atty. Lanuevo by the Exam
iners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in
all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. Any request for r
e-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to
the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. Thus, the Court ruled that Atty.
Lanuevo be disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 10

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
(Lawyers Oath)
(G.R. No. 712, March 19, 1997) (270 SCRA 26)
FACTS: In 1991, Al Caparros Argosino was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resul
ting in Homicide where he was sentenced with two years imprisonment. He was late
r granted by the court with 2-years probation. In 1993, Argosino passed the bar
examinations. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous con
viction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not Arg
osino be allowed to take the lawyers oath. HELD: The lawyer s oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh
his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer s o
ath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer s oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court howe
ver, allow Argosino to take the lawyer s oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and pr
actice the legal profession give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial n
otice of the youths tendency to be rash and uncalculating.
OLBES V. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
(A.C. 5365, April 27, 2005) (457 SCRA 341)
FACTS: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes fo
r security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciem
bre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date.
All checks were dishonoured. Thus, Atty. Deciembre filed a case for estafa agai
nst the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case
against Atty. Deciembre for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his f
ault. HELD: YES. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is cl
early circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary dut
y is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn
to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guard
ian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair an
d impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code
of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 11

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
PRACTICE OF LAW
1. CONCEPT It is a privilege. It is a profession, not a business
ESSENTIAL CRITERIA IN DETERMINING ENGAGEMENT IN THE PRACTICE PRACTICE OF LAW A.
Compensation - implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
practice and that his professional services are available to the public for comp
ensation, as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his said services B.
Applicat Application ion of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which ca
lls for legal knowledge, training and experience; C. Habituality - Implies custo
mary or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer. Practice of la
w is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary a
ction; and D. Attorney Attorney-Client relationship - Engaging in the practice o
f law presupposes the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. Thus, activitie
s like teaching of law or writing law books or articles which involve no attorne
y-client relationship do not qualify a lawyer as being engaged in the practice o
f his profession as a lawyer
WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, a
nd who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. [Sec. 1, Ru
le 138 of the Rules of Court] CAYETANO V. MONSOD
(G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991) (201 SCRA 210)
FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by the then President Corazon C. Aquino as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination alleging that M
onsod does not possess the constitutional requirement of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod maintained that he is a membe
r of the Philippine bar and has practiced the law in various sectors. ISSUE: Whe
ther or not Christian Monsod possesses the constitutional requirement for appoin
tment of having been engaged in the practice of law. HELD: YES. Practice of law
has been defined as any activity, in or out of court, which requires the applica
tion of law, legal principle, practice or procedure, and calls for legal knowled
ge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform tho
se acts which are characteristics of the profession. Atty. Monsod s past work exp
eriences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of indus
try, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor - verily satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been en
gaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 12 AGUIRRE V. RA

NA
(B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003) (403 SCRA 342)
FACTS: Edwin Rana is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath b
ut not to sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of
the Donna Marie Aguirre who charges him with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently, Rana app
eared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of atto
rneys. In his comment, Rana alleges he only provide specific assistance and advi
ce not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He contends that he did no
t sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant finds that Ran
a actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel
for the candidate. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is fit for admission to
the bar. HELD: The court held that Rana did engage in unauthorized practice of l
aw. It held that all the activities he participated during that time involves th
e practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The r
ight to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally up
right and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, o
ne of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that tw
o essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll o
f Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted i
n the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied
admission to the bar.
ALAWI V. ALAUYA
(A.M. SPC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997)
FACTS: Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari a District in Maraw
i City. They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawis agency, a co
ntract was executed for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of a housing unit.
A housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Subsequently, Alauya wrote a letter to the President of Vi
llarosa advising termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of con
fidence by Alawi and proceeded to expound using acerbic language. Alauya also wr
ote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and asking for can
cellation of his loan. Finally, Alauya wrote 3 other letters to officers of the
SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loan from NHMFC. NHMFC also
wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions. Learning of the letters, Ala
wi filed a complaint alleging that Alauya committed malicious and libellous char
ges and usurped the title of attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not Alauya being a memb
er of SHARIA BAR can use the title ATTORNEY. HELD: NO. The title ATTORNEY is reserved
only for those who have been admitted as members of the Integrated Bar. Court h
as already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are no
t full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only before Sh
aria courts Alauyas wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor
s immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use o
f the title attorney.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 13 2. QUALIFICAT

IONS (See discussions, pages 2-5) 3. RIGHT OF PARTY TO REPRESENT HIMSELF A. Natu
ral Person a. A Layman may or may not In Civil Cases before the MTC - Has the ri
ght to conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or a friend app
ointed by him (Sec. 34 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court) In Civil Cases before any
other court - Has the right to conduct his litigation personally but if he gets
someone to aid him, that someone must be an authorized member of the Bar - If s
o, he will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those applica
ble to a party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be unjustifi
ably rewarded - He may not be heard to complain later that he has been deprived
of the right to the assistance of counsel. In Criminal Cases - Involving grave a
nd less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman must always appear by counsel
- He cannot conduct his own defense as his right to counsel may not be waived w
ithout violating his right to due process of law. - in a locality where a duly l
icensed member of the Bar is not available, the judge may appoint a non-lawyer w
ho is a resident of that province, of good repute for probity and ability to the
accused in his defense. [Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court] b. A Lawyer In
Civil Cases may or may not - Has the right to conduct his litigation personally
- If so, he will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those
applicable to a party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be un
justifiably rewarded - He may not be heard to complain later that he has been de
prived of the right to the assistance of counsel. In Criminal Cases may or may n
ot B. Juridical Person - Must always appear in court by a duly licensed member o
f the bar except in MTC where it may be represented by its agent or officer who
need not be a lawyer. The reason is that, by its very nature, a juridical person
cannot appear except through an agent, and an agent is prohibited from represen
ting another in court other than in the municipal trial court unless that agent
is a duly licensed member of the Bar - Reasons are: (1) Nature of the privilege
and on the confidential and trust relation between attorney and client; (2) A co
rporation cannot perform the conditions required for membership in the bar, such
as the possession of good moral character and other special disqualifications,
the taking of an oath and becoming an officer of the court, subject to its disci
pline, suspension or removal; (3) The relation of trust and confidence cannot ar
ise where the attorney is employed by a corporation to practice for it, his empl
oyer and him owing, at best, a secondary and divided loyalty to the clientele of
his corporate employer; and (4) The intervention of the corporation is destruct
ive of that confidential and trust relation

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 14 C. Legal Aid
Program - A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law schools clini
cal education program approved by the Supreme Court may appear before any court
without compensation, to represent indigent clients, accepted by the Legal Clini
c of the law school. The student shall be under the direct supervision and contr
ol of an IBP member duly accredited by the law school. D. Under the Labor code,
non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if a. they represen
t themselves, or if b. They represent their organization or members thereof (Art
222, PO 442, as amended). E. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represen
t a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act no. 2259, Sec. 9). CRUZ V. V MINA
(G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007)
FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Ap
pearance, as private prosecutor in a Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing him
self as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence
that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of
a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with
the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Marian
o Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal ca
se. However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private pros
ecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice
in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court should take precedence ove
r the ruling of the Court in jurisprudence and set the case for continuation of
trial. ISSUE: ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner, a law student, may appear bef
ore an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant. HELD: n the cou
rt of a HELD The Court ruled in affirmative. Section 34, Rule 138 provides that
in justice of the peace, peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, wit
h the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the a
id of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation person
ally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by
a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an in
ferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a membe
r of the bar. The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservati
on, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-17
05, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instit
uted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully
intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
LIMITATIONS IN THE APPEARANCE OF A LAYMAN ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER 1. Layman should
confine his work to non-adversary contentions. He should not undertake purely le
gal work such as examination of witnesses or presentation of evidence. 2. Servic
es should not be habitually rendered. 3. Should not charge or collect attorneys f
ees. (PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Central, 42 SCRA 302)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 15 4. PUBLIC OFF
ICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW A. Public Officials who cannot engage in the private
practice of Law in the Philippines: a. Judges and other officials as employees o
f the Supreme Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC). b. Officials and employees of the
OSG(Ibid.) c. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109). d. Pre
sident, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants (A
rt. VIII Sec. 15, 1987 Constitution). e. Members of the Constitutional Commissio
n (Art IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution) f. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX,
Sec. 8 (2nd par), 1987 Constitution) g. All governors, city and municipal mayors
(R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90). h. Those prohibited by special law B. Public Official
s With Restrictions In The Practice Of Law a. No Senator as member of the House
of Representative may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice a
s before the Electoral Tribunals, as quasi-judicial and other administration bod
ies (Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution). b. Under the Local Government Code (R
A 7160, Sec. 91) Sanggunian members may practice their professions provided that
if they are members of the Bar, they shall not: appear as counsel before any co
urt in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; appear as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local governmen
t is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; collect any fee
for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local governmen
t unit of which he is an official; use property and personnel of the government
except when the Sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the gov
ernment. c. Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receivi
ng pension from the government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which
the Government, or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or i
n a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of
an offense in relation to his office.
5. LAWYERS AUTHORIZE TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT Any official or other person ap
pointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the
Philippines: a. Solicitor General b. Assistant Solicitor General c. Solicitors
and Trial Attorneys d. State Prosecutors or special counsel in the DOJ e. Provin
cial and city prosecutors and their assistants f. Other attorneys in other legal
offices of the government 6. LAWYERS OATH I,__________________, do solemnly swear
that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will supp
ort its constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly c
onstituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not willingly nor wittingly promote or sue any groundle
ss, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the b
est of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without an
y mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Form 28, RRC)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 16 7. LAW STUDEN
T PRACTICE RULE RULE 138138-A of the Rules of Court IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT
STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR
MATTER NO. 730) FACTS: Plaintiff in civil Case was represented by Mr. Cornelio
Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid; UP-College of Law Mr. Carmon
a conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff s evidencein-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questione
d the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not ac
companied by a duly accredited lawyer. Justice Barredo asserts that a law studen
t appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a s
upervising lawyer. On the other hand, UP-OLA, submits that "the matter of allowi
ng a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer
should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at l
east one supervised appearance." For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Cour
t hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 1
38-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Ru
le 138-A provides: Section 2. 2 Appearance. The appearance of the law student au
thorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a me
mber of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed,
must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic
. The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied
by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical
presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance wit
h the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 1. to en
sure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of profess
ional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their o
wn; 2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be a
ble to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some c
ulpable action by their law students; and 3. to ensure consistency with the fund
amental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession
without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by la
w. The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior
court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts
, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides; Section 34. By whom litigation is conduct
ed. In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation i
n person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his liti
gation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either pe
rsonal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervisi
on of a member of the bar.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 17 PROCEEDINGS W

HERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING 1. Proceedings before the Small Claim
s Court No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the hearin
g, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases) However, if the court determines that a party cannot pr
operly present his/her claim or defense and needs assistance, the court may, in
its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist that p
arty upon the latters consent (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases)
. 2. Proceedings before the Katarungang Katarungang Pambarangay During the pre-t
rial conference under the Rules of Court, lawyers are prohibited from appearing
for the parties. Parties must appear in person only except minors or incompetent
s who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. (Formerly Sec. 9
, P.D. No. 1508; Sec. 415, Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160)
REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OF NONNON-LAWYERS 1. Declaratory r
elief; 2. Petition for Injuction; 3. Contempt of court; 4. Criminal complaint fo
r Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney to t
he damage of a party;
8. DUTIES OF A LAWYER Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorney
s.it is the duty of an attorney: (a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of th
e Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippin
es. (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and jud
icial officers; (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as a
ppear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly de
batable under the law; (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and nev
er seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false sta
tement of fact or law; (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every pe
ril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensa
tion in connection with his client s business except from him or with his knowle
dge and approval; (f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance n
o fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless requ
ired by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; (g) Not to encourage
either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay
any man s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (h) Never to reject, for a
ny consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable mean
s, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present
every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived o
f life or liberty, but by due process of law.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 18

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
1. To society a) Respect for law and legal processes b) Efficient and convenient
legal services c) True, honest fair, dignified and objective information on leg
al services d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in legal system e) P
articipation in legal education program f) Lawyers in Government Service 2. To t
he legal profession a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (i) Membership and dues
b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession c) Courtesy, fairness
and candor towards professional colleagues d) No assistance in unauthorized prac
tice of law 3. To the courts a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the cour
ts b) Respect for courts and judicial officers c) Assistance in the speedy and e
fficient administration of justice d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoida
nce of any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influ
ence upon the courts 4. To the clients a) Availability of service without discri
mination (i) Services regardless of persons status (ii) Services as counsel de of
ficio (iii) Valid grounds for refusal b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients
(i) Confidentiality rule (ii) Privileged communications (iii) Conflict of inter
est (iv) Candid and honest advice to clients (v) Compliance with laws (vi) Concu
rrent practice of another profession c) Clients moneys and properties (i) Fiducia
ry relationship (ii) Co-mingling of funds (iii) Delivery of funds (iv) Borrowing
or lending d) Fidelity to clients cause e) Competence and diligence (i) Adequate
protection (ii) Negligence (iii) Collaborating counsel (iv) Duty to apprise cli
ent f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds (i) Use of fair and honest m
eans (ii) Clients fraud

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 19 (iii) Procedu
re in handling the case g) Attorneys fees (i) Acceptance fees (ii) Contingency fe
e arrangements (iii) Attorneys liens (iv) Fees and controversies with clients (v)
Concepts of attorneys fees (a) Ordinary concept (b) Extraordinary concept h) Pre
servation of clients confidences (i) Prohibited disclosures and use (ii) Disclosu
re, when allowed i) Withdrawal of services
TERMS: Acceptance fee It is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer
to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation (Funa, 2
009). Ambulance chasing is an act of chasing victims of accidents for the purpos
e of talking to the said victims (or relatives) and offering his legal services
for the filing of a case against the person(s) who caused the accident(s) Attorn
eys lien a type of lien referring to a right to retain the funds, documents, and
papers against the client until the attorneys fees is fully paid Barratry an act
of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or othe
rwise; lawyers act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal se
rvices to one of them. Champertous contract It is one where the lawyer stipulate
s with his client in the prosecution of the case that he will bear all the expen
ses for the recovery of things or property being claimed by the client, and the
latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the thing or property recovered as
compensation. It is void for being against public policy. Charging lien the righ
t of a lawyer to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, an
d executions issued in pursuance of such judgments which he has secured in a lit
igation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a state
ment of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rende
ring such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written not
ice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his fees and disburseme
nts. (Sec. 37, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) Collaborating counsel Is one wh
o is subsequently engaged to assist a lawyer already handling a particular case
for a client. (Pineda, 2009) Conflict research It is examining the causes of act
ion between the prospective client and the lawyers current clients.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 20 Contingency f

ee arrangement arrangement Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for his servi
ces depending on the success of the case. This applies usually in civil suits fo
r money or property where the lawyers fee is taken from the award granted by the
court. Contingent fee conditioned on securing a favourable judgment and recovery
of money or property and the amount of which may be on percentage basis Crime o
f maintenance A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not to stir up
litigation. Deceitful conduct an act that has the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is
ignorant of the fact, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. (C
PR Annotated, PhilJA) Defenseless persons those who are not in a position to def
end themselves due to poverty, weakness, ignorance or other similar reasons. Dis
honest conduct - the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be
untrustworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, f
airness and straightforwardness. Doctrine of imputed knowledge The knowledge acq
uired by an attorney during the time that hes acting within the scope of his auth
ority is imputed to the client. It is based on the assumption that an attorney,
who has notice of matter affecting his client, has communicated the same to his
principal in the course of professional dealings. Fiduciary duty The principle t
hat an attorney derives no undue advantage that may operate to the prejudice or
cause an occasion for loss of a client. The relationship between the lawyer and
client is one of mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree. Forum shoppi
ng prohibited act of filing repetitious suits in different courts. It may take a
ny of the following forms: Going from one court to another in the hope of securi
ng a favorable relief in one court, which another court has denied. Filing repet
itious suits and proceedings in different courts concerning the same subject mat
ter after one court has decided the suit with finality; or Filing a similar case
in a judicial court after receiving an unfavorable judgment from an administrat
ive tribunal. Gross ignorance transgression of any provision of law which need n
ot be a penal law Grossly immoral conduct one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensi
ble to a high degree, and committed under such scandalous and revolting circumst
ances (Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997) Gross misconduct a
ny inexcusable, shameful, or flagrant, unlawful conduct on the part of the perso
n concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights
of the parties or to the right determination of cause, a conduct by a predetermi
ned, obstinate, or intentional purpose Hot potato doctrine It refers to the proh
ibition from dropping smaller clients (like hot potatoes) in order to pick up mo
re lucrative clients. Immoral conduct a conduct which is wilful, flagrant, or sh
ameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and res
pectable members of the community.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 21 Influence ped
dling an act taken against the lawyer that, he shall not state nor imply that he
is able to influence any public official, tribunal, or legislative body Integra
ted Bar of the Philippines an official national body composed of all persons who
se names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court. (Sec. 1, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court) Integration of the Ba
r The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the en
tire lawyer population, and this requires membership and financial support of ev
ery attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court (Pineda). Mandatory co
ntinuing legal education the means to ensure that throughout the lawyers career,
they keep abreast with the law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the pro
fession and enhance the standards of the practice of law Moral turpitude imports
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one person owes t
o another or to society in general which is contrary to the usual accepted and c
ustomary rule of right and duty which a person should follow. The question as to
whether an offense involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to decide.
Oppressed persons those who are the victims of the cruelty, unlawful, exaction,
domination or excessive use of authority. Quantum meruit means "as much as he d
eserves", , and is used as the basis for determining the lawyer s professional f
ees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client Retaine
r It may refer to two concepts: 1. Act of a client by which he engages the servi
ces of an attorney to render legal advice or to defend or prosecute his cause in
court; or 2. Fee which a client pays to the attorney. Retaining lien the right
of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client which hav
e lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fee
s and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. Unlawful conduct It refers to a transgression of any provision of law
which need not be a penal law. The presence of evil intent on the part of the la
wyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of
this Rule.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 22 1. To society

a) Uphold the Constitution, Obey the laws of the land, Respect for law and lega
l processes CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF T
HE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. BAUTISTA V. GONZALES
(A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990) (182 SCRA 161)
FACTS: Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales was suspended for having violated the provision o
n Article 1491 of the New Civil Code which expressly prohibits a lawyer from acq
uiring his client s property or interest involved in any litigation in which he
may take part by virtue of his profession. This is in view of Atty. Gonzales tran
sferred to himself one-half of the properties of his client which are the subjec
t of litigation, while the case was still pending. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. R
amon Gonzales committed the act of misconduct, hence his suspension. HELD: YES.
The Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, o
bey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process." Moreove
r, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take
an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted aut
horities therein. Any violation of this oath, constitute act of misconduct which
may result to the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer by the Supreme Court. At
ty. Gonzales violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his
client s property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take pa
rt by virtue of his profession.
REDDI V. SEBRIO
(A.C. No. 7027, January 30, 2009)
FACTS: Tanu Reddi asked for the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, for havi
ng committed unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct act of misconduct which c
onstitute violations of the lawyers oath and provisions of the Code of Profession
al Responsibility (CPR) when he offered properties for sale to Reddi on the misr
epresentation that Reddi was dealing with the true owners thereof. It turned out
however, that said properties were either fictitious, not susceptible to sale,
simulated, or inexistent. Sebrio admitted having received the sum amount of mone
y for the purchase of real estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diosdado Sebrio h
as committed act of misconduct, a valid ground for disbarment. HELD: YES. Sectio
n 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the bar may be dis
barred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any dec
eit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx or for any viola
tion of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, xxx.
In the instant case, Atty. Sebrios admission that he received a sum of money fro
m Reddi which he could not properly account for and his taking advantage of the
latters ignorance of the real estate business in the Philippines, constitutes gro
ss misconduct and depicts his character short of the standards required of him a
s a member of the bar and an officer of the court.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 23 ZALDIVAR V. G

ONZALES
(G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988) (166 SCRA 316)
FACTS: Enrique Zaldivar filed a complaint against respondent Raul M. Gonzales fo
r having issued allegedly scornful statements to the media in relation to the pr
oceedings of the former. The Court, in its Resolution, requires Gonzales to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt and be subjected to administra
tive sanctions for making said public statements. ISSUE: Whether or not lawyers
are entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the Cou
rt. HELD: Lawyers are not entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of
speech towards the Court. While the Court may allow criticism it has ruled that
intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. T
he lawyer s duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential t
o the orderly administration of justice. ROBERTO SORIANO V. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON
(AC 6792, January 25, 2006)
FACTS: In one traffic incident Atty. Manuel Dizon shot one Soriano, a taxi drive
r for no justifiable reasons. Consequently, Atty. Dizon was convicted for frustr
ated homicide but was allowed probation, conditioned on payment of civil liabili
ties. However, four years after judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfill
ed his civil obligation. Soriano filed complaint before the Commission on Bar Di
scipline of the IBP for Dizons disbarment. CBD recommended that respondent be dis
barred for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for vi
olating Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IB
P adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their resolution to the Supreme
Court for review. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide co
mmitted by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. 2. Whether or not Atty. Dizons g
uilt warrants his disbarment. HELD: 1. The Supreme Court agreed with the finding
s of the CBD that the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon invo
lved moral turpitude. The court defined moral turpitude as everything which is do
ne contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or t
o society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Mora
l turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver for no justifiable rea
son. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was the a
ggressor because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defendin
g himself when he counter-punched Dizon. Dizons violent reaction to a simple traf
fic incident indicated his skewed morals. 2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon a
lso violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promot
e respect for law and legal processes. Dizon failed to obey the laws of the land
through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect le
gal processes through his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the c
ondition for his probation.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 24 Canon 1, Rule
1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful co
nduct Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d) of Rules of Court - Duties of attorneys. It is the d
uty of an attorney: (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes con
fided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honour, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false state
ment of fact or law
What is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, immoral, or deceitful conduct? Unlawful co
nduct is defined as an act or omission which is against the law. Dishonesty invo
lves lying or cheating. (Agpalo) Immoral or deceitful conduct is that which is w
illful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinio
n of the good and respectable members of the community. (Aguirre)
Instances of Dishonesty and Deceit which Resulted to Discipline by the Supreme C
ourt: 1. Misappropriation of clients funds 2. Act of fraudulently concealing duti
able importation or smuggling 3. Giving false statements under oath in an Inform
ation Sheet submitted in connection with the lawyers application for the position
of Chief of Police 4. Wanton falsehood made in an ex parte petition in court wh
erein the lawyer attached affidavit of his grandfather and which affidavit he no
tarized knowing that the supposed affiant is already dead 5. Maneuvering re-conv
eyance of property in the name of a lawyer instead of the client in a case invol
ving sale with pacto de retro 6. Submission or presentation of mutilated copies
of certain documents to court for the purpose of deceiving and misleading it 7.
Falsification of grades in the Bar Examinations 8. Collecting several thousand p
esos on the pretense that counsel would allegedly appeal the complaints case to t
he Supreme Court of the United States, and that it was necessary to him to go to
Washington, D.C. which he did, knowing that the decision could no longer be app
ealed because it is already final 9. Introducing someone to buy a piece of land
knowing that it is not for sale 10. Delayed failure to account money collected f
or the client 11. Stealing evidence attached to the court records
Cases of Gross Immorality and the Resulting Consequences 1. Abandonment of wife
and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED (Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., Adm. Case N
o. 1392, April 2, 1984) 2. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with a woman throug
h a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill. DISBARRED (In re: Disbarment o
f Armando Puno, A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1967) 3. Seduction of a woman who is
the niece of a married woman with whom respondent lawyer had an adulterous relat
ion. DISBARRED (Royong v. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963) 4. Lawyer arrang
ing marriage of his son to a woman with whom the lawyer had illicit relations. D
ISBARRED DISBARRED (Mortel v. Aspiras,A.M. No. 145, December 28, 1956) 5. Lawyer
inveigling a woman into believing that they have been married civilly to satisf
y his carnal desires. DISBARRED (Terre v. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992) 6.
Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine
and asked a lady student to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge
of her under threat that if she refused, she would flunk in all her subjects. DI
SBARRED (Delos ( Reyes v. Aznar, A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989) 7. Bigamy perp
etrated by the lawyer. DISQUALIFIED FROM ADMISSION TO THE BAR (Royong vs. Oblena
, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 25 8. Concubinag

e coupled with failure to support illegitimate children. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
(Laguitan v. Tinio, A.M. No. 3049, December 4, 1989) 9. Maintaining adulterous r
elationship with a married woman. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY (Cordova v. Cordova, A.
M. No. 3249, November 29, 1989) 10. A retired judge who penned a decision 7 mont
hs after he retired, antedating the decision and forcing his former court staff
to include it in the expediente of the case. DISBARRED (Radjaie v. Alovera, A.C.
No. 4748, August 4, 2000) 11. Forging a Special Power of Attorney. SUSPENDED FO
R 3 YEARS (Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, A.C. No. 3637, January 24, 2001)
12. Attempting to engage in an opium deal SUSPENDED FOR 1 YEAR ( Piatt v. Abordo
, 58 Phil. 350, September 1, 1933) 13. Facilitating the travel of a person to th
e U.S. using spurious travel documents. DISBARRED (Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No.
5118, September 9, 1999)
NUNEZ V. ATTY. RICAFORT
(A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002)
FACTS: Soledad Nunez authorized Atty. Romulo Ricafort to sell her parcels of lan
d. After having sold the lots, Nunez demanded from Atty. Ricafort the proceeds o
f the sale but the latter failed to deliver the money. Atty. Ricafort paid only
a partial amount and issued post-dated checks to cover the balance. Said checks
however, were dishonoured because the account against which they were drawn was
closed. Consequently, Nunez filed a motion to cite Atty. Ricafort for contempt f
or his acts of misconduct and for his acts unbecoming of a lawyer. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort has committed acts of misconduct in his dealings
with Nunez. HELD: YES. Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsi
bility provides that A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct. In the case at bar, Atty. Ricafort gravely abused the conf
idence that his client has given in him and committed dishonesty when he did not
turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. He even closed the account
against which the checks for the payment of unpaid balance were drawn, which dep
icts that he never had the intention of paying his obligation. CORDON V. V. ATTY
. BALICANTA
(A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002)
FACTS: Atty. Bacalinta helped settle the estate of Rosaura Cordons husband and en
tice Rosaura to organize a corporation known as Rosaura Enterprise which develop
s real properties into a high scale commercial complex. Thereafter, the Atty. Ba
calinta single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation. Using spurious resol
ution, Atty. Bacalinta contracted a loan from the LBP and because of its failure
to pay, the bank foreclosed the property and sold the corporations right to rede
em the property mortgaged to a third person through a fake board resolution. ISS
UE: Whether or not Atty. Bacalinta may be disbarred. HELD: YES. Atty. Bacalintas
actions clearly violated Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code. The Code of Profession
al Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, the obligation to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is fo
rbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Lawyers
are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain ones good standi
ng in that exclusive and honoured fraternity .

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 26

MECARAL V. VELASQUEZ
(A.C. No. 8392, June 29, 2010)
FACTS: Atty. Danilo Velasquez was charged before IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct by Mecaral. Mecaral was his sec
retary and she became his lover and common-law wife. Atty. Velasquez then brough
t her to the mountainous area of San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran. She was left
there with a religious group, of which Atty. Velasquez was the leader. At first,
he visited her daily, but later the visits became scarce. This prompts Mecaral
to return home to Naval, Biliran. Angered, Atty. Velasquez brought her back to S
an Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and in
jected her with drugs. When she tried to escape, the members of the group tied h
er spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale
food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members. Her mother sought th
e help of the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched
two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her,
however, without the instruction of Atty. Velasquez. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty.
Velasquez guilty of gross immoral conduct and violated Canon 1 of the Code of P
rofessional Responsibility? HELD: Yes. Atty. Velasquez act of converting his secr
etary into a mistress is grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world
can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gro
ss misconduct that only a beast may be able to do. Therefore, the Atty. Velasque
z had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FIGUEROA V. BARRANCO JR.
(S.B.C. 519, July 31, 1997)
FACTS: Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were town-mates and teen sweetheart
s. Their intimacy yielded to a child Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first promised
he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship con
tinued and Simeon allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage
. Patricia learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successf
ully passed the 1970 bar examinations. But before he could take his oath, Patric
ia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyers Oath on the ground o
f gross immoral conduct. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Simeon in engag
ing in premarital relations with Patricia and making promises to marry her const
itute gross immoral conduct? HELD: The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute
gross immoral conduct warranting a permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and pr
omises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same doe
s not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify sus
pension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossl
y immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to const
itute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to
a high degree. It is wilful, flagrant, or shameless act, which shows a moral in
difference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 27 BARRIOS V. MA

RTINEZ
(A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004) (442 SCRA 324, 2004)
FACTS: Atty. Martinez was convicted of the crime for violation of BP 22. He was
also involved in another estafa case pertaining to his legal services rendered o
n the victim of Dona Paz tragedy when Atty. Martinez keep for himself the sum of
money that the victim get from Sulpicio as compensation for himself. Consequent
ly, Atty. Martinez is subject to disbarment. ISSUE: Is the act of Atty. Martinez
considered to be a ground for disbarment? HELD: YES. Atty. Martinez is guilty o
f violation of BP 22 which imports deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and
his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers t
o refrain from engaging into any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful cond
uct. RE: A.C. NO. 44 OF THE RTC BRANCH 4 TAGBILARAN TAGBILARAN CITY AGAINST ATTY
. OCCENA
(A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002)
FACTS: Under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William Ogan,
the residue of his estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Nec
itas Ogan-Occea, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she r
etained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occea, as her lawyer. The settlement of the
estate have been pending for thirteen (13) years when it was transferred under t
he sala of Judge Ruiz who found out that the principal cause of delay was the fa
ilure of Atty. Occea to obey lawful court orders such as the submission of the la
test inventory of all securities of the estate, take possession of all certifica
tes of stocks or the replacements belonging to the estate and as well as its inv
entory, and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers
. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Occeas acts constitute a gross violation of his oath
as a lawyer? HELD: Not only did Atty. Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly
immoral conduct and wilful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transg
ressions, he violated the lawyers oath by his acts of disobeying lawful court ord
ers and willfully prolonging the litigation through his maneuvers. FOODSPHERE IN
C. V. V. MAURICIO JR
(A.C. 7199, July 22, 2009)
FACTS: Foodsphere Inc. was found liable for damages to its customer when its liv
er spread sold turned out to contain worms. Foodsphere refused to pay, instead o
ffered to return actual medical and incidental expenses supported by receipts. A
tty. Mauricio, a writer/ columnists, proposed to Foodsphere to settle the matter
for a certain sum part of which would go to his Batas Foundation, and directed
them to place paid advertisements in his tabloids and radio and television progr
ams. Otherwise, he threatened them to proceed with the publication of articles m
aligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to Foodsphere and its prod
ucts. Foodsphere filed a complaint for disbarment and criminal complaints agains
t Mauricio for libel and threatening to publish libel ISSUE: Can Atty. Mauricio
be disbarred in the instant case? HELD: YES. The acts of Atty. Mauricio are a vi
olation of Rule 1.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawye
rs to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
. He engaged in deceitful conduct by taking advantage of the complaint against F
oodsphere Inc. to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation
and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television pro
gram.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 28

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA V. ATTY. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA
(A.M. 3249, November 29, 1989) (179 Phil 680)
FACTS: Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with imm
orality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. Later, in a telegraphic message
, Salvacion informed the Commission that she and her husband had already reconcil
ed. The Commission required the parties to appear before it for confirmation and
explanation but neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party
since then. Thus, the IBP reprimand Atty. Cordova for his acts, admonish him tha
t any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely,
and order him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against the respondent for immorality and ac
ts unbecoming a member of the Bar will be continued despite the fact that the co
mplainant and the respondent have already reconciled? HELD: The complaint agains
t the Respondent for immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar will con
tinue because the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily advers
ely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itsel
f. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that
he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and d
ispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that req
uirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good st
anding.
ADVINCULA V. ATTY. MACABATA
(A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007)
FACTS: Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the g
rounds of Gross Immorality. Cynthia sought for legal advice from Atty. Macabata
regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. In a couple meetings
they have, Atty. Macabata gave Cynthia a ride home. As the she gets off the car
, Atty. Macabata allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and embraced her tight
ly and in some other time he forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held
her breast. Cynthia hires another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of mess
ages thru sms where the Atty. Macabata apologized. Atty. Macabata admitted kissi
ng Cynthia on the lips however countered that there was no harassment, intimidat
ion or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous. ISSUE: Whether or not the re
spondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute serious moral d
epravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of law HE
LD: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendsh
ip and camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of Atty. M
acabata, though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing
her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive
and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral. The complainant miserabl
y failed to establish the burden of proof required of her. However, her efforts
are lauded to stand up for her honor. The complaint for disbarment against the r
espondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality is dismissed. However,
he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his clients.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 29 UI V. BONIFAC

IO
(A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000) (333 SCRA 28, 2000)
FACTS: A case for disbarment was filed against Atty. Bonifacio on grounds of imm
oral conduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husban
d of Leslie Ui. Atty. Bonifacio contended (1) that when she met Carlos Ui, she h
ad known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese woman wh
o is already in Amoy, China; (2) that they got married in USA therefore legalizi
ng their relationship; (3) that when she knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, s
he stopped their relationship; and (4) that she and Carlos Ui never lived togeth
er as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept the s
ituation. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bonifacio be disbarred. HELD: The p
ractice of law is a privilege. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to
the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of
legal ethics. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by rea
son of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. In the case at
bar, Atty. Bonifacio was not proven to have conducted herself in a grossly immo
ral manner. Thus, she may not be disbarred in this case. IN RE GUTIERREZ, 1962 1
962
(G.R. L-363, July 31, 1962)
FACTS: Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in
1956. After serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardo
n by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit an
y crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutie
rrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. IS
SUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was
granted pardon. HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but c
onditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itsel
f. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without r
egard to the pardon. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justif
y his being purged from the profession.
Canon 1 Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defia
nce of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. IN RE: TERRELL
(G.R. No. 1203, May 15, 1903) (2 Phil 266)
FACTS: Howard D. Terrell was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instanc
e, in the city of Manila, why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar.
Allegedly, he assisted in the organization of the Centro Bellas Artes Club, after
he had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of eva
ding the law then in force in said city and for acting as attorney for said Centr
o Bellas Artes during the time of and after its organization, which organization
was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 30 HELD: YES. He
violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that p
rohibits lawyer to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. He should not allow his services to b
e engaged by an organization whose members are violating the law, to defend them
when they get caught. ESTRADA V. SB
(G.R. No. 159486-88, November 25, 2003) (416 SCRA 465)
FACTS: Atty. Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent
justices have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rall
y and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to
the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Unable to get a favourable
action, Atty. Paguia made his criticisms and comments using the media. The Cour
t warned Atty. Paguia to refrain from doing such malicious acts and conduct hims
elf in the manner accorded to a professional lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty.
Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: Y
ES. The Supreme Court will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Cou
rt for, if well founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the
Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our p
eoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged
by it to practise law in the Philippines.
RENERIO SAMBAJON, et at. V. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING
(A.C. No. 7062, September 26, 2006)
FACTS: Renerio Sambajon filed a complaint before the NLRC for ULP and illegal di
smissal against the client of respondent Atty. Jose A. Suing. The NLRC ordered t
he respondents client to pay Sambajon however, on the basis of the Waiver and Qui
tclaims purportedly signed a sworn to by the seven complainants in the ULP and I
llegal Dismissal case before the Labor Arbiter in the present of respondent, the
Labor Arbiter dismissed the said case insofar as the seven complainants were co
ncerned. Herein complainants four of the seven who purportedly executed the Rele
ase Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Ar
biter the said documents or having received the considerations. In related move,
petitioner also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent
lawyer together with its client-employer of herein complainants. In his Report
and Recommendation, the IBP Commissioner, who conducted an investigation of the
administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for negl
igence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning. ISSUE: whether or not r
espondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged RELEASE
WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same
as bogus and falsified. HELD: As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called up
on to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance it
s cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the adm
inistration of justice constitutes misconduct. Besides, by respondent s own info
rmation, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of th
ose who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That should have alerted him
to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients intere
st. But he was not and he did not. While the disbarment of respondent is, under
the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is re
primand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondent s suspension
from the practice of law for six months is in order.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 31 Canon 1 Rule
1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any sui
t or proceeding or delay any mans cause. Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court D
uties of attorneys.it is the duty of an attorney: (g) Not to encourage either the
commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man s
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest
Among the unprofessional acts which come within the prohibition include the lawy
ers: (Agpalo) a. Volunteering advice to bring lawsuit, except in rare cases where
ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so; b. Hunting up d
efects in titles or other causes of action and informing thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking ou
t those claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action
in order to secure them as clients; c. Employing agents or runners for like pur
poses; d. Paying reward, directly or indirectly, to those who bring or influence
the bringing of such cases to his office; e. Remunerating policemen, court or p
rison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal,
the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek professional services;
f. Searching for unknown heirs and soliciting their employment of him; g. Initi
ating a meeting of the members of club and inducing them to organize and contest
legislation under his guidance; h. Purchasing notes to collect them by litigati
on at a profit; i. Furnishing credit reports in expectation of possible employme
nt; and j. Agreeing with a purchase of future interests to invest therein in con
sideration of his services
Purpose of the Prohibition To prevent ambulance chasing, chasing, this refers to
solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by laymen employed by an atto
rney for the purpose or by the attorney himself.
ONG V. ATTY. UNTO
(A.C. No. 2417, February 6, 2002)
FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto
, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident from
the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-de
mand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complai
nant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of cri
minal and administrative cases against the complainant. They, however, did not h
ave any bearing or connection to the cause of his client. The records show that
the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any info
rmation against the complainant just so he would have leverage in his actions ag
ainst the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Untos act constitute act unbecoming
of a lawyer. HELD: YES. His action is malicious as the cases he instituted agai
nst the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his c
lient, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, Atty. Unto violated the proscription in Rule 1.02
which requires that lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encou
rage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause. His behavior is inexcusable.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 32 Canon 1 Rule
1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controvers
y if it will admit of a fair settlement. CASTANEDA V. AGO
(G.R. No. L-28546, July 30, 1975) (65 SCRA 506)
FACTS: Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against the Agos to recover ce
rtain machineries. Judgment was made in their favor. Levy was made on Agos house
and lots. Ago moved to stop the auction but the same was dismissed. Ago thrice a
ttempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enfor
cing the writ of execution but his motions were denied. Ago filed a complaint up
on the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his pers
onal obligation and that his wife share in their conjugal house could not legall
y be reached by the levy made. The same was dismissed. Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession;
SC dismissed it. Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed
the petition. Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition. Agos filed anot
her petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to
the petition and granted preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Agos
lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy HELD: No. Despite the pendenc
y in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, jus
tice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in th
e replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty
. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to th
wart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petition
ers. Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted pos
ition as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for c
oncord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the condu
ct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral ju
stice. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients c
ause must be encouraged and is to be commended. What the SC does not and cannot
countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients pos
ition. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack o
f his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to
advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontroverti
ble.
b) Efficient and convenient legal services CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEG
AL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Canon 2 Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cau
se of the defenseless or the oppressed. Rule 138 Sec. 31 of the Rules of Court A
court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any p
arty in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and
unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to
secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he i
s excused there from by the court for sufficient cause shown.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 33 Legal aid is
not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalance th
at may and often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public responsib
ility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should, therefore, underlie all l
egal aid offices. The same should be administered to indigent and deserving memb
ers of the community on all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may
be necessary to forestall an injustice. (IBP Handbook, Guidelines Governing the
Establishment and
Operation of the Legal Aid Office, Art. 1, Sec. 1)
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
(G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974) (57 SCRA 473)
FACTS: FACTS: Atty. Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a
case pending in the sala of Judge Climaco. Atty. Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discha
rging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de
parte. Judge Climaco denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for
the two defendants. Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as c
ounsel de oficio, because the COMELEC requires full time service which could pre
vent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Atty.
Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not a m
ember of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Electio
n Registrar HELD: HELD: NO. There was no incompatibility between duty of Atty. L
edesma to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. Atty. Ledes
ma s withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty require
d of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is
burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of serv
ice, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de offi
cio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that su
ch services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer s zeal. The
Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by hims
elf and counsel. "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offens
e shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the indis
pensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. The right to
be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough for the Court to ap
prise the accused of his right to an attorney, but is essential that the court a
ssign on de officio for him if he desires/ is poor. Thus, Ledesma should exert h
imself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness
to remain a member of the profession in good standing.
Canon 2 Rule 2.02 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a cas
e, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to
the extent necessary to safeguard the latters rights. Canon 14 Rule 14.03 - A la
wyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless: a) he
is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently; b) he labor
s under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between
a present client and the prospective client;
A valid reason to refuse is when the lawyer is not in a position to carry out th
e work effectively and competently. However he shall still render legal advice (
such as those pertaining to preliminary steps a person can take). But he shall r
efrain from giving legal advice if the reason for not accepting the case is

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 34 that there in
volves a conflict of interest (between him and a prospective client or between a
present client and a prospective client). In the case mentioned above, renderin
g legal advice to the prospective client will establish an attorney-client relat
ionship between them and this will constitute a violation of the rule prohibitin
g a lawyer from representing conflicting interests. (Agpalo)
Canon 2 Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Reason for Prohibition: (Agpalo) The general rule is that a lawyer cannot advert
ise his talent as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. A lawyer is a member of an
honourable profession whose primary purpose is to render public service and help
secure justice and in which remuneration is a mere incident. Such professional
consideration makes a lawyer radically different from a shopkeeper, a trader, a
manufacturer or a money lender whose primordial aim is private gain and whose pr
incipal tool, to sell his product or service, is advertising. To allow a lawyer
to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the render der practice of
law, lower the profession in public confidence and lessen its ability to ren eff
iciently that high character of service to which every member of the bar is call
ed. called Advertising inescapably involves self-praise or puffing Advertising m
ay lead to assertion of fraudulent claims, corruption of public officials, and a
ttacks on marital stability It may encourage lawyers to engage in overreaching,
overcharging, under representation and misrepresentation It will increase lawsui
ts and result in needless litigations and inciting to strife otherwise peaceful
citizens

Exceptions to this Rule: (Agpalo) - publication in reputable law list with brief
biographical and other informative data which may include name, associates, add
ress, phone numbers, branches of law practiced, birthday, day admitted to the ba
r, schools and dates attended, degrees and distinctions, authorships, teaching p
ositions, associations, legal fraternities and societies, references and regular
ly represented clients must be published for that purpose; - an ordinary, simple
professional card; - publication of simple announcement of opening of law firm,
change of firm; - telephone directory (but not under designation of special bra
nch of law); - if acting as an associate (specializing in a branch of law), may
publish a brief and dignified announcement to lawyers (law list, law journal); working in a public office (which can be filled only by a lawyer); - full time
position as corporate counsel; - if in media, those acts incidental to his pract
ice (i.e., not his own initiative); - write articles for publication giving info
rmation upon the law (and not individual rights or advising through column/ TV b
roadcast, lest such be considered indirect advertising); - If entering into othe
r businesses (which are not inconsistent with lawyers duties) then it is advisabl
e that they be entirely separate and apart such that a layman could distinguish
between the two functions.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 35 Canon 2 Rule
2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed u
nless the circumstances so warrant. What the rule prohibits is the competition i
n the matter of charging professional fees for the purposed of attracting client
s in favor of the lawyer who offers lower rates. The rule does not prohibit a la
wyer from charging a reduced fee or none at all to an indigent or to a person wh
o would have difficulty paying the fee usually charged for such services. (Agpal
o)
c) True, honest fair, dignified and objective information on legal services CANO
N 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, F
AIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Section 27 of Rule 138 of Rules of Court - The practice of soliciting cases at l
aw for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. IN RE LUIS B. TAGORDA
(53 Phil 37, March 23, 1929)
FACTS: Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial boa
rd of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of
a card written in Spanish and Ilocano that states what he can do for the people
as a lawyer and as a notary public. Also, he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of
his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that he will sti
ll exercise his profession as a lawyer and notary public despite his election as
a Board member, even adding that he will only charge three pesos for registrati
on of their land titles. ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice
for soliciting employment. HELD: Tagorda is guilty of malpractice, for solicitin
g employment when he used card that states his capabilities as a lawyer and a no
tary public and writing a letter informing the people that he still exercises hi
s profession despite election as a board member. This violates Canon 3 of the Co
de of Professional Responsibility which states: "A lawyer in making known his le
gal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective informat
ion or statements of facts." and Section 27 of Rule 138 which states: "The pract
ice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thr
ough paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Tagorda stands convicted
of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
DIRECTOR OF LEGAL LEGAL AFFAIRS V. BAYOT
(A.C. No. L-1117, March 20, 1944) (74 Phil 579)
FACTS: Atty. Bayot is charged with malpractice for having published an advertise
ment in Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows: Marriage license
promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity av
oided if desired and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential Legal assistance service 12 Esc
olta, Manila Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 36 ISSUE: Whethe
r or not the act of Atty. Bayot constitute act unbecoming of a lawyer. HELD: YES
. The advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by Atty. Bayot of the e
thics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the pub
lic. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practi
ce of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thro
ugh paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for a
n attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
who stoops to and adopts the practice of mercantilism by advertising his servic
es or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple
of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the t
emple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professiona
l capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) ULEP V. V. LEGAL CLINIC
(A.C. No. L-553, June 17, 1993) (223 SCRA 378)
FACTS: The Legal Clinic was organized by Nogales. It is composed mainly of paral
egals. It makes ads which pertain to the practice of the law profession such as:
SECRET MARRIAGE? P560 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT
. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am-6pm 7F
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave, Mla Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The L
egal Clinic because (1) it is engaged in the practice of law but its people are
not lawyers and (2) its advertisements are unethical. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not t
he Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law 2. Whether or not their servic
es can be advertised. HELD: 1. Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice
of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainl
y of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein
a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litiga
tion and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond t
he domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged
in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services bein
g offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed b
y paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in g
ood and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
2. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making know
n his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of h
is profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merch
ant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to p
romote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of
law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible. The Suprem
e Court also noted which forms of advertisement are
allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the ou
tcome of character and conduct.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 37 Canon 3 Rule
3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, mislea
ding, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regard
ing his qualifications or legal services. Canon 2 Rule 2.02 of Code of Judicial
ConductConduct A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory. KHAN V.
SIMBILIO, SIMBILIO, (409 SCRA 229, 2003) FACTS: Atty. Simbillo advertised his s
ervices in a Philippine Daily Inquirer ad which read Annulment of Marriage Specia
list 532-433/521-2667. Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrativ
e complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in
violation of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. The Court held that the solicitation of
legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be pr
oper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office, and the resi
dence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisements in legal periodi
cals bearing the same brief data and the use of calling cards are permissible. T
he publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowed.
Canon 3 Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assume
d name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is per
missible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said pa
rtner is deceased. DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE
(A.M. 2131, May 10, 1985) (136 SCRA 349)
Filipino lawyers cannot practice law under the name of a foreign law firm, as th
e latter cannot practice law in the Philippines and the use of the foreign law f
irm is unethical.
FACTS: Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and nine other lawyers from practicing law
under Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to re
lease 87 shares of Cathay Products Intl., Inc. to Gabriel (a client). Dacanay den
ied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being represented by Baker
& McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming
from Clurman thus this administrative case. ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers s
hould be enjoined from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie. HELD: Yes, they sh
ould be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot practice law
in the country. Using the name constitutes representation that being associated
with the firm they could render legal services of the highest quality to multina
tional business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investments.
This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice in the
Philippines.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 38

FIRM RM IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FI NA
ME OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, ETC. AND PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF F
IRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, ETC. (1979) FACTS: Two separate Petitions we
re filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and that of Atty. He
rminio Ozaeta who died, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the n
ames of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. They contended t
hat the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissib
le by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use. They further contended that no loca
l custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner s name in a professio
nal firm s name. HELD: Surviving partners cannot continue to use the names of th
e deceased partners. Continued use will run counter to Art. 1815 CC which tacitl
y provides that names in a firm name of a partnership must be those of living pa
rtners and, in case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subject
to liability. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can cre
ate undue advantage and disadvantage in the practice of the profession. Note: Th
is ruling has been abandoned by a new ruling in the latest jurisprudence decided
by the Supreme Court. It is said that the continued use of the name of a deceas
ed partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communicat
ions that said partner is deceased. The reason for allowing the continued use of
the name of the deceased partner is that all of the partners by their joint eff
orts over a period of years contributed to the goodwill attached to the firm nam
e, and this goodwill is disturbed by a change in firm name every time a partner
dies. The name of a law firm may not necessarily identify the individual members
of the firm, and consequently, the continued use of the firm name after the dea
th of one or more partners is not a deception.
Canon 3 Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw fro
m the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allow
s him to practice law concurrently. Rule 138 Sec. 35 of the Rules of Court - No
judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of t
he Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients. No Senator or member of the House of Repre
sentative may personally appear before any court of justice or before the Electo
ral Tribunal, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies xxx (1987 Philip
pine Constitution Article VI, Sec 14) The President, Vice-President, the members
of the cabinet and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Cons
titution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall no
t, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession xxx (1987
Philippine Constitution Article VII, Sec 13) No member of a Constitutional Commi
ssion shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither sha
ll he engage in the practice of any profession xxx (1987 Philippine Constitution
Article IX, Sec 2)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 39 SAMONTE V. GA

TDULA
(A.M. No. P-99-1292, February 26, 1999) (303 SCRA 756)
FACTS: Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando R. Gatdula with grave misconduct
consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in c
onflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. Samonte represents
her sister as plaintiff in a civil case for ejectment. Contrary to their expect
ation that execution will proceed, they instead received a temporary restraining
order. Samonte contends that the order was hasty and irregular as she was never
notified of the application for preliminary injunction. Gatdula blamed Samontes
lawyer for writing the address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that
if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain
his law office, at the same time giving his calling card with the name Baligod, G
atdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not Gatdula is gu
ilty of infraction HELD: HELD: Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the p
rofessional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7, su
bpar. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Offici
als and Employees) which declares it unlawful for a public official or employees
to, among others: (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conf
lict with official functions. Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the priva
te practice of law. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in
the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
Canon 3 Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to represen
tatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to att
ract legal business.
Media publicity, publicity as a normal by-product of efficient legal service, is
not improper. What is improper is for a lawyer to resort to adroit propaganda t
o secure media publicity for the purpose of attracting legal business. The purpo
se of the rule is to prevent some lawyers from gaining an unfair advantage over
others through the use of gimmickry, press agentry, or other artificial means. (
Agpalo) (Agpalo)
CRUZ V. SALVA
(G.R. No. L12871, July 25, 1959) (105 Phil 1151)
FACTS: Fiscal Salva conducted the investigation of the case concerning the killi
ng of Monroy, in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City to accomm
odate the public and members of the press. Also, he told the press that if you wa
nt to ask question, I am allowing you to do so and the questions will be reprodu
ced as my own. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the fiscal in sensationalizing th
e case unethical? HELD: Yes. Fiscal Salva should be publicly reprehended and cen
sured for the uncalled and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given t
o and allowed in connection with his investigation, whatever be his motive, whic
h is considered and found to be contempt of court. Canon 3 Rule 3.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall not pay or give any
thing of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in re
turn for, publicity to attract legal business.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 40 Notarial Law
ANGELES V. IBAEZ
(A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009)
FACTS: A complaint was filed against Atty. Amado O. Ibaez for disbarment for nota
rizing the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in the absence of the affian
ts, relying merely on the representation of his confidential secretary Rosalina
Angeles that the signatures appearing on the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolut
e Sale subject of the present complaint are those of her co-heirs. ISSUE: Whether
or not Atty. Ibanez violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he notarized the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in
the absence of the affiants. HELD: YES. Respondent cannot exculpate himself fro
m the consequences of his recklessness and his failure to comply with the requir
ements of the law by relying on his confidential secretary. Section 2(b) of Rule
IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 reads: A person shall not perform
a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; a
nd (2) Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by t
he notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rule
s. The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain tha
t the document is the parties free act and deed.
SPOUSES SANTUYO V. HIDALGO
(A.C. No. 5838, January 17, 2005) (448 SCRA 282)
FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Hidalgo for being negligent
in his notarial duty when he allowed his secretaries by themselves affix the dry
seals of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the fi
rm. It turned out that in one instant, Spouses Santuyo was able to notarize thei
r Deed of Sale making it appear that it was signed by Atty. Hidalgo and carrying
with it the firms dry seal. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was negligent in hi
s notarial duty HELD: The SC found a notary public negligent in his duty for all
owing office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, i.e., safekeeping of
his notarial dry seal and notarial register. The Court held that considering tha
t the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive, respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and
should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he sh
ould not have been commissioned as notary public.
SICAT V. ARIOLA
(A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005) (456 SCRA 93)
FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Gregorio Ariola for violating Rul
e 1.01 of Canon1 by notarizing an SPA purportedly executed by a certain Benitez
at a time when Benitez was already dead. ISSUE: Is Atty. Ariola guilty of violat
ing the Code of Professional Responsibility?

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 41 HELD: YES. Th
e Court held that a notary public should not authenticate documents unless the p
ersons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personall
y appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated th
erein. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts
a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence wi
thout the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution
SANTIAGO V. RAFANAN
(A.C. No. 6252, October 05, 2004)
FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edison Rafanan filed by Jonar San
tiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management & Penology (BJMP). It charge
d Atty. Rafanan with violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice, among others.
Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documen
ts on different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make the proper notation rega
rding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the deta
ils of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute
the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had not
arized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrativ
e Code. Respondent claimed that he believed that the non-notation of their Resid
ence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed. He o
pined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents ackn
owledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to case
s pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the
latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did
not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. ISSUE: Did Atty
. Rafanan violate the Notarial Law? HELD: HELD Yes, the Court held that Atty. Ra
fanan violated the Notarial Law. The Court in its Decision stated: The Notarial L
aw is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are requir
ed to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has pres
ented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); an
d to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. Th
ey are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein
all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their]
register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which
the same is recorded. Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocat
ion of their commission as notaries public. These formalities are mandatory and
cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary
weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their com
missions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements. In Vda. De Ro
sales v. Ramos, the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as fol
lows: The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized
. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorize
d may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a pu
blic document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further p
roof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith a
nd credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and ap
pended to a private instrument.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 42 d) Participat

ion in the improvement and reforms in legal system CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PART
ICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFOR
TS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
While the lawyers task in contributing to the improvement of the legal system is
not a matter of strict duty, it is a duty nevertheless that flows from the lawye
rs sense of public responsibility. The improvement of the legal system cannot, ho
wever, be done by dreaming in a vacuum. The lawyer must recognize that the law i
s a part of vast social network and whether he likes it or not, he has to intera
ct with the rest of society. There is thus the need on the part of the lawyer to
transcend the narrow limits of technical law. Intricately woven is the law with
the social fabric that the legal profession cannot afford to confine itself to
narrowly technical legal questions. A lawyer must broaden out and continue to gr
ow in knowledge and competence in order to be able to make the law socially resp
onsive. (Agpalo)
e) Participation in legal education program CANON 5 - A LAWYER LAWYER SHALL KEEP
ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS; PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRA
MS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE P
RACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARD
ING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. OGKAOGKA-BENITO V. JUDGE BALINDONG
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103, February 23, 2009)
FACTS: Dr. Benito obtained a favourable judgment from the Ombudsman in an admini
strative complaint she filed against the municipal treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao
Del Sur for grave misconduct. To implement said judgment, the Regional Director
of the DILG-ARMM issued Department Order. Meanwhile, respondents in the adminis
trative case above-mentioned filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
the RTC of Malabang, Lanao Del Sur. The petition was raffled to the sala of Judg
e Balindong. The latter rendered an order/decision annulling the Department Order
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Dr. Benito charged Judge Balindong
with gross ignorance of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be held admini
stratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. HELD: YES. A patent disregard
of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the la
w. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws
and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith
. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For a
judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privi
lege vested in him. Judge Balindongs gross ignorance of the law constituted inexc
usable incompetence which was anathema to the effective dispensation of justice.
Since the Department Order was issued merely to implement the decision of the O
mbudsman, respondents in administrative case were actually questioning this deci
sion and seeking to enjoin its implementation by filing a petition for certiorar
i and prohibition in the RTC. This is not allowed under the law, rules and juris
prudence. Judge Balindongs act of taking cognizance of a case which was plainly n
ot within his courts jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of judicial c
onduct.

FSUU College
D OBLIGATION
is knowledge
ive interest
e owes it to
.

of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 43 THREEHREE-FOL

OF A LAWYER 1. First, he owes it to himself to continue improving h
of the laws; 2. Second, he owes it to his profession to take an act
in the maintenance of high standards of high education. 3. Third, h
the law public to make the law a part of their social consciousness

BAR MATTER 850: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE) (Adopting the Rules
on the Continuing Legal Education for Members of the Integrated Bar of the Phili
ppines) August 8, 2000 Purpose: To ensure that throughout their career, they kee
p abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Requirements of Completion Completion of MCLE Members of the IBP, unless exempte
d under Rule 7, shall complete every three (3) years at least 36 hours of contin
uing legal education activities. The 36 hours shall be divided as follows: a. 6
hours legal Ethics b. 4 hours trial and pretrial skills c. 5 hours alternative d
ispute resolution d. 9 hours updates on substantive and procedural laws and juri
sprudence e. 4 hours writing and oral advocacy f. 2 hours international law and
international conventions g. 6 hours such other subjects as may be prescribed by
the Committee on MCLE
Parties Exempted from the MCLE 1. The President, Vice-President, and the Secreta
ries and Undersecretaries of executive departments; 2. Senators and Members of t
he House of Representatives; 3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
SC, incumbent and retired justices of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Ju
dicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Jud
icial Academy Program of continuing legal education; 4. The Chief State Counsel,
Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
5. The Solicitor-General and the Assistant Solicitor-General; 6. The Government
Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel; 7. The Cha
irman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions; 8. The Ombudsman, the Overa
ll Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Offi
ce of the Ombudsman; 9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial f
unctions; 10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teac
hing experience for at least 10 years in accredited law schools; 11. The Chancel
lor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional Lecturers of the P
hilippine Judicial Academy; and 12. Governors and Mayors
Other Exempted Parties 1. Those who are not in law practice, private or public 2
. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 44 f) Lawyers in

Government Service CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS. MACOCO V. DIAZ
(A.C. No. 853, June 22, 1940) (70 Phil 97)
FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Fiscal Diaz. In order to redeem a prope
rty belonging to his wife s father, which had been levied upon sold at public au
ction; Marcelino Macoco deposited with the provincial sheriff the sum of P380. A
s no redemption could be done, the money was returned by the sheriff to one Albe
rto Suguitan, then counsel for Marcelino Macoco. Suguitan used the money accordi
ng to himself and failed to turn it over to Macoco; whereupon, the latter entrus
ted its collection to Fiscal Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz succeeded in
collecting P300 from Suguitan, but he also misappropriated this amount. ISSUE: I
SSUE: Whether or not Fiscal Diaz be disbarred HELD: YES. Whatever might have bee
n the agreement and with whomsoever Fiscal Diaz might have entered it into, the
undeniable fact remains that he misappropriated the money in breach of trust. Th
is makes him unfit for the office of an attorney-at-law. And his being a deputy
fiscal and not law practitioner at the time of the misappropriation, far from mi
tigating his guilt, aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more severel
y condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. COLLANTES V. ATTY
. RENOMERON
(A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991) (200 SCRA 584)
FACTS: This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which
complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Home
s Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomer
on, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter s irregular actuations wi
th regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The respondent was fo
und guilty in the investigation conducted in its agency hence, the petitioner fi
led for disbarment against respondent. ISSUE: Whether the respondent register of
deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by for his malfeasances as a public
official. HELD: Yes. The lawyer s oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; P
eople vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay n
o man for money or malice. The lawyer s oath is a source of his obligations and
its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary a
ction. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. Just as the Code of Conduct an
d Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees
to process documents and papers expeditiously and prohibits them from directly
or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiri
ng the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affect
ed by the functions of their office.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 45 DIANA RAMOS V
. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
(A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007)
FACTS: FACTS Diana Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing
civil and criminal actions against the spouses Jovellanos. Ramos tried to atten
d the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanos. Oddly, respondent
never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He
would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in
court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the co
mplainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cas
es in the trial courts. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any
case against the Jovellanos and that he was in fact employed in the Public Atto
rney s Office (PAO). ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent violated the p
rovisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility sufficient to warrant disba
rment. HELD: HELD YES. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty a
nd integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to b
e more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fi
delity to public service. Government employees are expected to devote themselves
completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of professi
on is prohibited. Section 7(b) (2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public O
fficials and Employees provides: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescri
bed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited a
cts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful: (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public o
fficials and employees during their incumbency shall not: (1) Engage in the priv
ate practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provide
d that such practice will not conflict with their official function.
Canon 6 Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution i
s not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or th
e concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. PEOPLE V. PINEDA
(20 SCRA 748)
FACTS: Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza and their 3 children we
re killed by respondents. The respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify
all the five criminal cases, and to file single information and drop the other
four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge
denied the motion to reconsider. ISSUE: May a City Fiscal be compelled to file
a single information in this case. HELD: NO. The benefit of the doubt belongs to
the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney is under no compulsion to fi
le a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evide
nce to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a d
ifferent conclusion.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 46

SUAREZ V. PLATON
(G.R. No. 46371, February 7, 1940) (69 Phil 556)
FACTS: Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas.
Apparently he was very vocal and he was despising the abuses made by government
officers. Incidentally, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais was aboard the train. Orais a
rrested Suarez and charged him with sedition. Orais however later moved for the
dismissal of the case upon the instruction of his superior. Thereafter, Suarez f
iled a case against Orais for arbitrary detention. The Fiscal handling the case
dismissed it on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prosecute the
case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano Platon. Suarez want
s the case reinstated. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated. HELD
: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case
if they find the evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the re
presentative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty who
se obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence shall suffer.
Canon 6 Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to in
terfere with his public duties. ALI V. BUBONG
(A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005)
FACTS: It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the adminis
trative case earlier filed by complainant Omar P. Ali against respondent Atty. M
usib Bubong. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registra
tion Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indi
scriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title and manipulating the crimin
al complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are r
elatives of respondent. ISSUE: Did atty. Bubong violate Canon 6 of the Code of P
rofessional Responsibility? HELD: YES. In the case at bar, respondents grave misc
onduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed
by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of
his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge o
f the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respon
dent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of
a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 require
s that a lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to p
romote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties. Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidenc
e in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the
legal profession. The illconceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of th
e law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice la
w.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 47 MISAMIN V. SA

N JUAN
(A.M. 1418, August 31, 1976) (72 SCRA 491)
FACTS: Atty. Miguel San Juan is a Captain of the Metro Manila Police and a membe
r of the Bar. He was charged for coercing an employee Jose Misamin to agree to d
rop the charges file by him against his employer for violation of the minimum wa
ge law whom Atty. San Juan is allegedly representing. The said matter was referr
ed to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The so
licitor-general dismissed the charges against Atty. San Juan for lack of evidenc
e. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was proper. HELD: The conclusion arrived
at by the solicitor-general was in accordance with the Tionko Doctrine which sta
tes that The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only
where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The pre
sumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has perfo
rmed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath. Wherefore t
he administrative case against the respondent is dismissed for not having been d
uly proved.
Canon 6 Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had interven
ed while in said service. PNB V. ATTY. CEDO
(A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995) (243 SCRA 1)
FACTS: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.03 that
states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving Government Service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter which he had intervened within said
service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group
of PNB. During Cedos stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sa
le of steel sheets to Ms. Ong; and 2.) Intervened in the handling of a loan of s
pouses Almeda. When a civil action arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the
bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a
civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo
& Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner. Cedo claims that he did not pa
rticipate in the litigation of Ms. Ongs case. He also claims that even if it was
his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty. Ferre
r. ISSUE: Whether or not violated Rule 6.03. HELD: YES. In the complexity of wha
t is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client, inquiry of
the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of
other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever
may be said as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client information g
iven to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their previous relati
onship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side. I
t is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consen
t of all the parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represent
s conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 48 OLAZO V. TING
A
(A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010)
FACTS: The complainant Jovito Olazo filed a sales application covering a parcel
of land in Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that wa
s segregated and declared open for disposition. The Charge: Violation of Rule 6.
03 The second charge involves a parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belon
ging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the
respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the
land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant alleged that the
respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of righ
ts over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the r
espondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the
Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffr
ey Rodriguez. ISSUE: Whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the s
tandard ethical conduct when he was no longer a public official, but a private l
awyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected wit
h. HELD: R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private pra
ctice after their separation from the service. As a rule, government lawyers are
not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice
of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private prac
tice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice w
ill not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. The las
t paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawy
ers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b)
(2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practic
e law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with. Rule 6
.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohi
bits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or empl
oyment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the sai
d service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility i
s the term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person
who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall withi
n the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respond
ent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of
his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings. As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respo
ndent previously interfered with the sales application covering Manuels land when
the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too,
failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practic
e of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limite
d only in the preparation of a single document.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 49 PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005)
FACTS: In herein case, PCGG questions the ethical propriety of a former Solicito
r General, in the person of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who now stands as the pri
vate lawyer of the Lucio Tan group who was benefitted in the liquidation proceed
ing of GENBANK which was declared insolvent. PCGG filed motions to disqualify At
ty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of t
he Sandiganbayan in Civil and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et a
l. and became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former gov
ernment lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any ma
tter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUE: Whether or not Mend
oza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: The Cou
rt ruled in the negative reasoning that the advice given by respondent Mendoza o
n the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 o
f the Code of Professional Responsibility. It grounded its determination on ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 which clearly stresses that the drafting, enforcing or int
erpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abst
ract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term mat
ter in Rule 6.03 and therefore cannot be a ground for disqualification. Moreover,
it explained that the term intervention in Rule 6.03 cannot be insubstantial an
d insignificant. Given that the 1969 Code restricted the latitude of the term in
tervention, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in
which the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial responsibility
. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) prov
ides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matt
er in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public off
icer or employee.
2. To the legal profession a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (i) Membership a
nd dues CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY O
F THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. IN RE 1
989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR FACTS: The oath-taking of the newly elected
officers of the 1989 election of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) was
suspended by the Supreme Court due to the widespread reports about the intensiv
e electioneering and overspending by the candidates. Among the allegations were
the use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public o
fficials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP
By-Laws. There was also the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels
where they were reportedly wined and dined continuously, womanized, and subjected
to endless haggling over the price of their votes for the national positions in
the Integrated Bar. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not the elected officers conducted
their campaign preparatory to the elections in violation of the IBP By-laws and
made a travesty of the idea of a strictly nonpolitical

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 50 HELD: The can
didates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the ByLa
ws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all l
awyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution a
nd the laws, duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, abstain from a
ctivities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the legal syste
m. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS EXAMINATIONS
(B.M. 1222, February 4, 2004) (421 SCRA 703)
FACTS: The Supreme Court, after inquiry and investigation, found out that there
had been a leakage of the questions in the 2003 Mercantile Law Bar Examination.
The Court, therefore, nullified the results in the examination on the said subje
ct. The investigation revealed that a certain Atty. Danilo de Guzman, one of the
assistant attorneys at the Balgos and Perez Law Firm, was responsible for the l
eakage. Atty. Marcial Balgos, a senior partner in the firm, happened to have bee
n commissioned by Justice Jose Vitug to prepare questions in mercantile law. Att
y. de Guzman admitted to downloading the questions from Atty. Balgos computer a
nd distributing the same to two of his fraternity brothers. From that point, the
leaked questions spread and an unknown number of examinees were able to obtain
copies thereof. Atty. de Guzman was thus disbarred, while Atty. Balgos was repri
manded for his negligence and lack of due care in safeguarding the proposed ques
tions in mercantile law. ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment of Atty. de Guzman
was proper. HELD: The disbarment was proper. Atty. de Guzman, by transmitting a
nd distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the his fraternity,
possibly for pecuniary profit and to give them undue advantage over the other e
xaminees in mercantile law, abetted cheating and dishonesty by his fraternity br
others in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 as well as
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. de Guzman was guilty
of misconduct unbecoming a member of the bar. He violated the law instead of pro
moting respect for it and degraded the noble profession instead of upholding its
dignity and integrity. LETTER OF OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING EX
EMPTION EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES
(B.M. 1370, May 9, 2005) (458 SCRA 209)
FACTS: In his letter, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues alleg
edly unpaid for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service, then mi
grated to, and worked in, the USA until his retirement in the year 2003. He main
tained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice
of one s profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed
for the years when he was working in the USA. Issue: Whether or not petitioner i
s entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was ina
ctive in the practice of law Held: NO. The integration of the Philippine Bar mea
ns the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membe
rship and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the p
ractice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Sup
reme Court. It must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege b
urdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure
to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity there
of warrants such drastic move.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 51 b) Upholding

the dignity and integrity of the profession Canon 7 Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall b
e answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fa
ct in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
LEDA V. TABANG
(A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)
FACTS: Evangeline Leda challenges Atty. Trebonian Tabangs good moral character. I
t appears that the two contracted marriage under as one of the exceptional chara
cter under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The parties agreed to keep their marria
ge a secret until Tabang had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar exam
inations. After Tabangs law studies and bar examinations, Leda blocked his oath-t
aking claiming that Tabang had acted fraudulently when he filled out his applica
tion declaring he was single and is thus unworthy to take the lawyers Oath for la
ck of good moral character. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Trebonian Tabang violate
d Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. Th
e Court held that Atty. Tabangs declaration in his application for Admission to t
he 1981Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a
material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. R
ule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explici
tly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false stateme
nt or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admi
ssion to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqua
lified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits
lack of good moral character.
Canon 7 Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to
the bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, ed
ucation, or other relevant attribute.
A lawyer should not readily execute an affidavit of good moral character in favo
r of an applicant who has not live up to the standard set by law. He should volu
nteer information or cooperate in any investigation concerning alleged anomaly i
n the bar examination. This is to help guard the profession from candidates who
are unfit or unqualified. He should expose without fear or favor before the SC c
orrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession and should not hesitate to accept
professional employment against a lawyer who has wronged his client. (Agpalo)
Canon 7 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Gross immorality reflective of unfitness to practice A grossly immoral act is on
e that is as corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprinciple
d or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 52

TAN V. SABANDAL
(B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992) (206 SCRA 493)
FACTS: Sabandal passed the 1987 Bar Examination. He was not allowed to take his
oath by the Supreme Court, in view of the finding by the latter of that he is gu
ilty of unauthorized practice of law. In his application for admission, Sabandal
claimed that there is no pending case against him. It was later found out that
he has a pending civil case in his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings
when the same was still working as Investigator in the Bureau of Lands, wherein
he was able to secure a free patent and later a Certificate of Title over a swam
pland, which was later mortgaged to a bank and was foreclosed, although, the cas
e was amicably settled. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent can still be admitted t
o the Practice of Law? HELD: No. Time and again, it has been held that the pract
ice of law is not a matter of right but is a privilege bestowed upon those who a
re not only leaned in the law but also those who possess good moral character. T
he acts of the respondent when he was still working with the Bureau of Land is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service which cannot be e
rased by the dismissal of the case. His failure to reveal the pendency of the sa
id case in his petitions reveals his lack of candor and truthfulness. The term go
od moral character admits broad definitions, including even common dishonesty.
SABURNIDO SABURNIDO V. MADRONO
(A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001) (366 SCRA 1)
FACTS: Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an administrative complain
t for disbarment against Atty. Florante Madrono. Saburnido allege that Atty. Mad
rono has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them in addit
ion to committing acts of dishonest. Previous to this case, Saburnido also filed
3 separate administrative cases against Atty. Madrono, which led to the latters
dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement benefits. ISSUE: W
hether or not Atty. Madronos act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross
misconduct that will warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions. HELD: Y
ES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all tim
es uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Clearly, Atty. Madr
onos act of filing multiple complaints against the Saburnido reflects on his fitn
ess to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a de
cidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as Saburnid
o were instrumental in Atty. Madronos dismissal from the judiciary. There is in A
tty. Madronos tenacity in pursuing several cases against the Saburnido not the pe
rsistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is
trying to exact revenge.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 53 ZAGUIRRE V. C

ASTILLO
(A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003) (398 SCRA 659)
FACTS: Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he ha
d an affair with Carmelita Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, w
hile Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results. Z
aguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo as the father. The latter, who
was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promisin
g for her support which did not materialize after the birth of the child. ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and sh
ould be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. HELD: The Court mete
d respondent the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The
attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and under
taking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness
on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble professi
on, tantamount to self-stultification. His repeated sexual congress with a woman
not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previousl
y recognized and promised to support is a clear violation of the standards of mo
rality required of the legal profession. The rule is settled that a lawyer may b
e suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, p
robity or good demeanor.
c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards
YER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND
EL. JAVIER V. CORNEJO
(A.C. No. 778, August 14, 1936) (63 Phil

professional colleagues CANON 8 - A LAW

FAIRNESS AND AVOID OID HARASSING CANDOR
SHALL AV TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNS
293)

FACTS: Atty. Javier was the lawyer of Severina Teodoro in a civil case where Sev
erina won. The monetary award was delivered by the opposing party to Javier as S
everinas lawyer. Javier however failed to deliver said amount to her. Subsequentl
y, Severina hired the services of another lawyer, Atty. Cornejo who sent a deman
d letter to Javier. Javeir failed to pay yet again so Atty. Cornejo assisted Sev
erina in filing an administrative complaint against Javier. The administrative c
omplaint against Javier was eventually dismissed. After said dismissal, Javier f
iled an administrative case against Cornejo accusing the latter of threatening h
im and instigating Severina to file an administrative case against him. ISSUE: W
hether or not the administrative complaint of Atty. Javier has merit. HELD: No.
The language used in the demand letter is not threatening. It was an honest effo
rt on the part of Cornejo to serve the interest of his client. The lawyer owes e
ntire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and de
fense of his rights and exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end t
hat nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. Cornejo could not have instigated Severina to file the administrative c
omplaint. Severina already knew of what remedy to seek against Javier if he fail
s to deliver whats due her even before she hired Cornejo. The Supreme Court also
stated: mutual bickering and unjustifiable recrimination, between brother attorney
s detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any symp
athy from this court.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 54 Canon 8 Rule
8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is a
busive, offensive or otherwise improper. The fact that one of the lawyers conduc
ts him/herself improperly does not relieve the other from professional obligatio
n in his relation with him/her. (Agpalo)
FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO, SUPRA HELD: To be sure, the adversarial nature of our le
gal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of t
heir duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is
entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not ju
stify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogat
ory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded m
embers of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fa
ct prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless require
d by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dign
ity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dig
nified. CRUZ V. ATTY. CABRERA
(AC No. 5737, October 25, 2004)
FACTS: An administrative complaint filed by Ferdinand A. Cruz charges respondent
Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the code of Professional
Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in court in
his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbour who is represented
by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the respondent engulfed with ang
er in a raising voice to the complainant saying appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka mu
nsa, wherein the manner, substance and the tone of voice and how the words were u
ttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridi
cule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public. The respondent ut
tered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performa
nce of his duties as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP commissione
r who recommended suspension of respondent in the practice of law which was annu
lled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending dismissal of the case for lac
k of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the manner of respondent may constitute miscon
duct? HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals has opted to resolve the case in the intere
st of justice and speedy disposition of cases. The Court held that respondents ou
tburst of Appear ka ng appear, pumas aka muna does not amount to violation of Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The court ruled that although
the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to such a magnitude as
to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby
dismissed the case due to lack of merit.
Canon 8 Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon th
e professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any law
yer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seekin
g relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. A lawyer should not steal the
other lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by promise of better se
rvice, good result or reduced fees for his services. Neither should he disparage
another, make comparisons or publicize his talent as a means to further his law
practice. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 55 He may accept
employment to handle a matter previously handled by another lawyer, provided th
at the other lawyer has been given notice of termination of service. Without suc
h notice, he shall only appear once he has obtained conformity or has, at the ve
ry least, given sufficient notice of contemplated substitution. A lawyers appeara
nce in the case without notice to the first lawyer amounts to an improper encroa
chment upon the professional employment of the original counsel. A lawyer should
not, in the absence of the adverse partys counsel, interview the adverse party a
nd question him as to the facts of the case even if the adverse party was willin
g to do so. Neither should he sanction the attempt of his client to settle a lit
igated matter with the adverse party without the consent nor is knowledge of the
latter counsel. (cf. Canon 9) (Agpalo) A clients proffer of assistance of additi
onal counsel should not be regarded as evidence of want of confidence but the ma
tter should be left to the determination of the client. The 2nd lawyer should co
mmunicate with the 1st before making an appearance. Should the 1st lawyer object
, he should decline association but if the 1st lawyer is relieved, he may come i
nto the case. (Agpalo) When there is conflict of opinions between two lawyers jo
intly associated in a case, the client should decide. The decision should be acc
epted unless the nature of the difference makes it impracticable for the lawyer
whose judgment has been overruled to cooperate effectively. In this event, it is
his/her duty to ask client to relieve him/her. (Agpalo) REYES V. CHIONG
(A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003)
FACTS: Atty. Ramon Reyes is the counsel for Xu. Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr. is
the counsel for Pan. Xu went into a business venture with Pan. Pan was supposed
to set up a Cebu-based fish ball, tempura and seafood products factory. He did n
ot establish it, and so Xu asked that his money be returned. Xu then filed a cas
e of estafa against Pan. Prosecutor Salanga then issued a subpoena against Pan.
Atty. Chiong then filed a motion to quash, but he also filed a civil complaint f
or the collection of a sum of money and damages against Xu and Atty. Reyes. Atty
. Reyes was allegedly impleaded because he allegedly connived with Xu in filing
the estafa case which was baseless. IBP recommended that Chiong be suspended for
2 years. ISSUE: Whether or not Chiong should be suspended. Held: YES. Canon 8 o
f the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct h
imself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, a
nd shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. If Chiong believed th
at the two had conspired to act illegally, he could have instituted disbarment p
roceedings. As a lawyer, Chiong should have advised his client of the availabili
ty of these remedies. Thus the filing of the cases had no justification. Lawyers
should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity a
nd civility. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels
in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA V. ATTY.
MARIANO PEFIANCO
(A.C. No. 5938, December 3, 2002)
FACTS: While Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman appro
ached them. Atty. Alcantara saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the gro
up and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taki
ng place in another room. At this point, Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting
nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, Nga-a gina
-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala. (Why
do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his
mistake.)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 56 ISSUE: did at
ty. Pefianco violate canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? HELD: H
ELD: YES. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers
to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow law
yers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They
must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct
themselves without reproach at all times. In this case, respondents meddling in
a matter in which he had no right to do so cause the untoward incident. He had n
o right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman ha
d not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain t
he matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
ATTY. DELA ROSA ROSA V. CA
(A.M. No. CA 03-35, July 24, 2003)
FACTS: In a criminal case, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO directing the trial
court and the City Prosecutor to refrain from conducting any further proceeding
s until further orders. The Court of Appeals further directed complainant to fil
e his comment to the petition for review. Instead of filing the required comment
, complainant filed a motion to quash the TRO. The three accused through their r
espective counsels filed written oppositions to the motion. Complainant then fil
ed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Justices for ignoranc
e of the law and inexcusable negligence when they issued the TRO without basis.
Complainant in his pleadings to the three respondent lawyers described them as br
illiant lawyers, legal supermen or sages, which amounted to sarcasm. This statement t
he Court did not countenance and consider it to be an act unbecoming of a lawyer
. ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa is guilty of act unbecoming of a lawyer
. HELD: YES. It is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairne
ss and candor toward his professional colleagues. As officers of the court, lawy
ers are mandated to conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward eac
h other. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. Obv
iously, complainants use of sarcasm in calling the three respondent lawyers brilli
ant lawyers, legal supermen and sages fell short of this mandate. It served no useful
purpose. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession i
s a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, D
IRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Canon 9 Rule
9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good stand
ing.
Purpose of the Rule To protect the public, the court, the client and the bar fro
m the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not sub
ject to the disciplinary control of the court.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 57 PAFLU V. BINA
LBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR
(G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971) (42 SCRA 302)
FACTS: In one labor case involving the above-mentioned parties, Cipriano Cid and
Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of a
ttorneys lien equivalent to 30% of the total back wages. Atty. Atancio Pacis also
filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Quintin Muning also filed a Peti
tion for the Award of Services Rendered equivalent to 20% of the back wages. Muni
ngs petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid and Associates the ground that he is not
a lawyer. The records show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid and Associ
ates through Atty. Pacis. All the appearances made in behalf of the complainants
were at first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning. ISS
UE: Whether or not a non-lawyer like Quintin Muning can recover attorneys fees fo
r legal services rendered. HELD: No, awarding of attorneys fees to a non-lawyer i
s condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified.
There should be an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery o
f attorneys fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the clients representati
ve in court is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish
an attorney-client relationship; therefore, he cannot recover attorneys fees. Th
e reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; th
at acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person
to reap the fruits or benefit of an act done in violation of law; and that if w
ere to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusio
n as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in chaotic c
ondition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amendable to disciplinary
measures.
IN RE FELIPE DEL ROSARIO
(52 Phil 399, 1928)
FACTS: Felipe Del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed twic
e. Subsequently, he was authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of hi
s papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades.
The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe Del Ro
sario to the bar. Thereafter, it was found out that he has pending criminal case
. He however was acquitted. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del
Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be fore
ver prohibited from taking the bar examination. ISSUE: Whether or not Felipe Del
Rosario shall surrender his certificate of attorney. HELD: YES. The acquittal o
f Felipe Del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings.
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that
Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating
in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
To admit Felipe Del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to
a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. T
he practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who deman
ds it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct w
hich merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be
a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as a
n officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, a
nd then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar
.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 58 OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. LADAGA
(A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001) (350 SCRA 326)
FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for
a relative in a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Ju
stice of the Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An administra
tive complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permiss
ion from the Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his
appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that he
was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such counsel. More
over, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his appearan
ces as such counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ladagas appearances as a pro bon
o counsel for a relative constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Admini
strative Code. HELD: Atty. Ladagas appearance as a pro bono counsel for a relativ
e constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code. Practice
of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be customarily or h
abitually holding ones self to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for s
uch services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in this case.
Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department (CJ) as required by law, respondent was reprimanded.
Canon 9 Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for l
egal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except: a) Where there
is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latters de
ath, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to pe
rsons specified in the agreement; or b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete un
finished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or c) Where a lawyer or law firm i
ncludes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profitable sharing arrangement. FIVE J TAXI V. NLRC
(G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994) (235 SCRA 556)
FACTS: In a labor case for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions, private res
pondents obtained favorable judgment and awarded of their back wages and the amo
unt deducted from them. They were represented by one Guillermo Pulia, a non-lawy
er. The latter claimed for attorneys fee for the legal services he rendered. ISSU
E: Whether or not Guillermo Pulia as authorized representative of private respon
dents be allowed attorney s fees or service fees. HELD: NO. Article 222 of the L
abor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691 states that,
non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only: (1) if they re
present themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members t
hereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized represen
tative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of
the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitle
d to attorney s fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his s
ervices necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as
a condition for the recovery of attorney s fees, and such relationship cannot ex
ist unless the client s representative is a lawyer.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 59 PACANA V. LOP
EZ
(A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009)
FACTS: Pacana, being the trustee of the Multitels fund, sought the legal advice o
f Atty. Lopez at the time Multitel had a problem due to failure of investment sc
hemes. Pacana said a lawyerclient relationship was established between them alth
ough no formal document was signed. When Pacana requested for an audited financi
al report of all the properties turned over to her, Lopez explained that all the
properties had been returned to her clients who had money claims against Multit
el, in exchange for quitclaim documents clearing Pacana from any liability. Paca
na then filed a complaint against Lopez. The latter insisted that she represente
d the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the settlem
ent of the claims her clients had against the Pacana, thus no attorney-client re
lationship that exist between her and petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not there ex
ist an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Maricel Lopez and Rolando Paca
na. HELD: There exist an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Maricel Lope
z and herein petitioner Rolando Pacana. To establish the relation, it is suffici
ent that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. The most upright and ethical thing which Att
y. Lopez should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the service
s of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or
to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as couns
el for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount
to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
IN RE CUNANAN
(94 Phil 534, March 18, 1954)
FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1
953. By virtue of the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it t
o 75 percent. Many of the unsuccessful post war candidates filed petitions for a
dmission to the bar invoking the provision of the said law. To avoid injustice t
o individual petitioners and to clear the doubts have been expressed as to its v
alidity for being contrary to public interest, the court resolved to review the
validity of the said Act in question. ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 972 is contra
ry to public interest. HELD: RA No. 972 is contrary to public interest. The publ
ic interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency espe
cially because the legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of l
aw that should be maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the pr
otection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicat
e mission is to create a serious social danger. By its declared objective, the l
aw in question is contrary to public interest because it qualifies law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession.
3. To the courts a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 60 CANON 10 - A

LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. A lawyer is, first and
foremost, an officer of the court. court His duties to the court are more signi
ficant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his clie
nt but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is whol
ly insubordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously obser
vant of the law and ethics of the profession. COBBCOBB-PEREZ V. LANTIN
(G.R. No. 22320, July 29, 1968) (24 SCRA 291)
FACTS: The court ordered an execution sale of the properties in question of Merc
edes Ruth Cobb-Perez and her spouse. They and their counsel assailed the executi
on in a piecemeal fashion unduly delaying the projected execution sale many time
s. The court assessed treble costs against the petitioners to be paid by their c
ounsels. Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioner
s, seek reconsideration of the decision contending that if there was delay it wa
s because they happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not
to be condemned. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas
used tactics to delay the execution of the judgment. HELD: YES. It is the duty
of a counsel to advise his client to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. When he finds his clients cause to be de
fenseless, then it is his duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rat
her than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer s oath to uphold the cause of j
ustice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. In th
e case at hand, despite their knowledge that their prayer would only be denied,
counsel for petitioners still pursue their claim before the court who has no jur
isdiction over the case; a clear tactic to unduly delay the execution of judgmen
t. ATTY. VAFLORVAFLOR-FABROA V. ATTY. PAGUINTO
(A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010)
FACTS: Complainant, Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa, who was Chairperson of the
General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), was removed as a m
ember of the Board of Directors (the Board) and thereafter, respondent, Oscar Pa
guinto and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pump hou
ses, water facilities, and operations. Complainant thus filed a complaint for an
nulment of the proceedings of her removal as well as other members of the Board
and a complaint against respondent for disbarment alleging that respondent had v
iolated the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly, among others, Can
on 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court, when having or
dered to submit position papers and despite grant, on his motion, of extension o
f time, did not file any position paper and further ignored the Courts subsequent
show cause order. Moreover, respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal c
omplaints against complainant. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents acts constitute
a violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, partic
ularly, Canon 10. HELD: Yes, lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and pr
ocesses and respondents deference is underscored by the fact that wilful disregar
d thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to dis
ciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a la
wyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to
their processes. The Court further noted that respondent had previously been su
spended from the practice of law for violation of the Code of Professional Respo
nsibility; however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. Hence, a more sev
ere penalty is thus called for; respondent was subjected to suspension for two y
ears.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 61 ISDRA TINGTIN
G-DUMALI V. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES
(A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004)
FACTS: The complainant was among the heirs of Julita and Vicente Ting. The respo
ndent was the brother-in-law of the complainant .The case stemmed from the execu
tion of the deed of extra judicial settlement and gross misrepresentation in cou
rt for the purpose of profiting from such forgery. The wife of the respondent as
well as another sister executed an affidavit stating that they are the only hei
rs of the Ting spouses and falsify the signature of the complainant. The defense
of the respondent was anchored on a clear oversight of non-inclusion the name o
f the complainant as heirs. ISSUE: Whether the act of the respondent violative o
f his oath of profession as well as the canons of professional ethics. RULING: T
he court resolved the issue as violations of the lawyer s oath and the code of p
rofessional responsibility. Respondent s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaw
s and doubtless bring the intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. The Cour
t found the respondent guilty of the provision of the lawyer s oath and code of
professional responsibility thereby rendering the latter unworthy to remain memb
er of the legal profession. He is thus ordered barred from the practice of law a
nd his name is ordered stricken off the roll of attorneys.
Canon 10 Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the do
ing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an
y artifice. CUARESMA V. DAQUIS
(G.R. No. 35113, March 25, 1975) (63 SCRA 257)
FACTS: Marcelo Daquis entered into a conditional contract of sale of lot. Eugeni
o Cuaresma is one of the occupants in the said lot in question. Later, Marcelo D
aquis instituted a Civil Case for writ of possession. Judge Pacifico de Castro i
ssued an order of demolition of the house of Eugenio Cuaresma. Atty. Macario Dir
ecto, on behalf of Eugenio Cuaresma filed a petition for certiorari alleging tha
t Cuaresma has no knowledge of the existence of the Civil Case. On the other han
d, Daquis maintained that Cuaresma was fully aware of the existence of said civi
l case having filed a motion for intervention thereof. When asked by the Court t
o show cause why no serious disciplinary action should be taken against him for
deliberately making false allegations in such petition, Atty. Directo contends t
hat all he wanted to convey was that the petitioners knowledge of the aforesaid c
ivil case came only after the decision was issued. ISSUE: Whether or not a serio
us disciplinary action should be taken against Atty. Marcelo Directo. HELD: YES.
The Canon of Professional Responsibility commands every lawyer not to do falseh
ood nor mislead or allow court to be misled in making their pleadings. Any viola
tion of this canon is a ground for disciplinary action. In the instant case, in
as much as the assumption goes with good faith, Atty. Directo is deemed to have
acted with such. However, a reprimand would suffice that Atty. Directo should be
much more careful in the preparation of his pleadings so as not to cast doubt t
o his honesty. Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealing
s with the Court is of the very essence of honourable membership in the professi
on.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 62

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. ADORABLE
(A.C. No. 8197, October 2, 1946) (77 Phil 468)
FACTS: With the belief that the case pending decision in the Court of Appeals re
mained unacted upon by the said Court, Miguel Penaranda filed a motion for recon
stitution. Instead of taking advantage of Penarandas lack of knowledge of what re
ally happened in the Court of Appeals, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, counsel for co
mplainant and appellees acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility as member of the bar, informed the Supreme Court that the cas
e had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appea
ls. Thereafter, claimant-appellant s attorneys filed a petition with the commiss
ioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court that the records be decl
ared reconstituted. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zamora has acted under the highe
st standards required of a member of the bar. HELD: YES. Attorney Manuel F. Zamo
ra, instead of taking advantage of Penerandas lack of knowledge of what really ha
ppened in the Court of Appeals informed the Supreme Court that the case had been
decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals. This n
ot only to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of t
his case, it also save the tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already
decided. Acting with truthfulness, fair play and nobility, these make Atty. Zam
ora an example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar.
YOUNG V. BATUEGAS FACTS: Atty. Walter Young is the private prosecutor in Crimina
l Case for Murder sought the suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Batueg
as and Atty. Llantino. Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Ma
nifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily surre
ndered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention. Upon persona
l verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Ara
na allegedly surrendered, Atty. Young learned that he surrendered only on Decemb
er 14, 2000. Batuegas and Llantino claimed that on December 13, 2000, upon learn
ing that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Man
ifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetc
hed the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. H
owever, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day;
hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on D
ecember 14, 2000. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino be sus
pended. HELD: YES. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admis
sion to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in c
ourt and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowled
ge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients
. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it
in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other ha
nd, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and plea
ding before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights
and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 63 HELD: Evident
ly, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected fr
om them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be d
enied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of th
e accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had volunt
arily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, s
uch artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute t
o injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is
a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when t
hey resorted to deception.
SOME CASES CASES OF FALSEHOODS WHICH MERITED DISCIPLINE 1. Lawyers falsely stati
ng in a deed of sale that property is free from all liens and encumbrances when
it is not so (Sevilla vs. Zoleta, 96 Phil. 979); 2. Lawyers making it appear tha
t a person, long dead, executed a deed of sale in his favor (Monterey vs. Arayat
a, 61 Phil. 820); 3. Lawyer, encashing a check payable to a deceased cousin by s
igning the latters name on the check (In re: Samaniego, 90 Phil. 382); 4. Lawyer
falsifying a power of attorney and used it in collecting the money due to the pr
incipal and appropriating the money for his own benefit (In re: Rusina, 105 Phil
. 1328); 5. Lawyer alleging in one pleading that his clients were merely lessees
of the property involved, and alleged in a later pleading that the same clients
were the owners of the same property (Chavez vs. Viola, G.R. 2152, 19 April 199
1) where there are false allegations in pleadings. 6. Lawyer uttering falsehood
in a Motion to Dismiss (Martin vs. Moreno, 129 SCRA 315). 7. Lawyer denying havi
ng received the notice to file brief which is belied by the return card (Ragacej
o vs. IAC, 153 SCRA 462). 8. Lawyer presenting falsified documents in court whic
h he knows to be false (Bautista vs. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151) or introducing fals
e evidence (Berrenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 673). 9. Lawyer filing false charge
s or groundless suits (Retuya vs. Gorduiz, 96 SCRA 526).
REQUIREMENTS OF CANDOR 1. A lawyer shall not suppress material and vital facts w
hich bear on the merit or lack of merit of complaint or petition. 2. A lawyer sh
all volunteer to the court any development of the case which has rendered the is
sue raised moot and academic. 3. Disclosure to the court of any decision adverse
to his position of which opposing counsel is apparently ignorant and which cour
t should consider in deciding a case. 4. He shall not represent himself as a law
yer for a client, appear in court and present pleadings in the latters behalf onl
y to claim later that he was not authorized to do so. .

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 64 Canon 10 Rule
10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of p
aper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decisio
n or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperativ
e by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rationale: If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of th
e court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other cou
rts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. A mere typographical erro
r in the citation of an authority is not contemptuous.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURAN
CE CO
(G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971) (37 SCRA 244)
FACTS: In a labor case involving the parties above-mentioned, petitioner Unions c
omplaint was dismissed by Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Indus
trial Relations for lack of merit. Petitioners sought to cite for contempt the r
espondent Judge on the ground that the formers citation of law to support his dec
ision is different from the original text. On the other hand, respondent Judge m
aintained that although there has been a clerical error in citation, still the i
mport of the underscored sentences of the quotation is substantially the same as
, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling of the Court s decision. ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Arsenio Martinez shall be held in contempt. HEL
D: NO. In citing Supreme Court s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty o
f courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and pun
ctuation mark-forpunctuation mark. Lawyers and courts take their bearings from t
he Higher Courts decisions and rulings. This is in accord with article 8 of the C
ivil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." If n
ot faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lo
se their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers a
nd the public who may thereby be misled. In the instant case, although the respo
ndent Judge and the respondents counsels committed mistake in the citation used
in their decision, there was however no substantial change in the thrust of thi
s Court s particular ruling which they cited. For this reason, the punishment of
contempt of court would be too much; hence, it does not apply.
In citing the SC decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges
and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation-mark-fo
r-punctuation-mark (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 65 ADEZ REALTY V
. CA
(G.R. No. 100643, December 12, 1995) (215 SCRA 301)
FACTS: Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law for havi
ng found guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of A
ppeals thereby misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Dur
ing the three years of his disbarment, Atty. Dacanay admitted his guilt for the
offense committed and repeatedly pleas for compassion from the court with a pray
er that he be reinstated, asserting his readiness to meet the standards of the l
egal profession. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dacanay shall be reinstated for the
practice of law. HELD: Dacanay shall be reinstated for the practice of law. The
practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Obedience to the stand
ards of mental fitness and morality and faithful compliance with the rules of th
e legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good st
anding of the bar. The disbarment of Atty. Dacanay for three (3) years has given
him to reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and proves once more
that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of th
e legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and
reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards th
e legal profession demands from its practitioners. Hence, the Court ruled that t
he disbarment of Atty. Dacanay be lifted. RIVERA V. ATTY. CORAL
(A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002)
FACTS: A NOTICE OF APPEAL from a decision of the court in an ejectment suit receiv
ed by him was filed in court by Atty. Napoleon Corral. The next day, Atty. Napol
eon Corral came to the Office of the Clerk of Court, and changed the date from F
ebruary 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is no 29th in
February 1990, he claimed that he received the Decision on the 28th of February
1990. Jose A. Rivera alleged that Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper ethi
cs as a lawyer by tampering and manually changing entries in the courts record wi
thout the Courts prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a member o
f the Philippine Bar. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Napoleon Corral shall be suspe
nded from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippi
ne Bar. HELD: YES. Atty. Napoleon Corral shall be suspended from the practice of
law for having tampered and changed entries in the courts record without the Cou
rts prior knowledge. Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provid
es that A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a p
aper xxx or the text of a decision or authority xxx. By altering the material dat
es to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, respondent comm
itted an act of dishonesty.
Canon 10 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall no
t misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of j
ustice. They should not be used to derail such ends. They should not misuse them
, as by filing multiple petitions regarding the same cause of action of by delib
erately misreading the law to seek a reopening of a case long decided. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 66 QUE V. REVILL
A REVILLA
(A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009)
FACTS: In an unlawful detainer case, a decision was rendered by the RTC against
respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla Jr.s clients. Thereafter, Atty. Revilla filed
series of petition all containing a prayer for injunctive relief. Conrado Que, a
ccused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. before the IBP of committing abuse of court
remedies and processes, a violation of Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of Profes
sional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rul
es of procedure and. . . Not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." IS
SUE: Whether or not Atty. Anastacio Revilla has violated Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for committing abuse of court remedies a
nd processes. HELD: YES. Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Respons
ibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedur
e and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." The successive f
ilings of petitions all containing a prayer for injunctive relief, reveal the re
spondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decis
ions of the lower courts against his client. The respondent violated Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
b) Respect for courts and judicial officers CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AN
D MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INS
IST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Canon Canon 11 Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall app
ear in court properly attired. IN RE VICENTE SOTTO, SOTTO, 82 Phil 595 (1949) FA
CTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement in connection with the decis
ion of the Supreme Court in In re Angel Parazo which statement was published in th
e newspapers. Atty. Sotto said that the Court has not only erroneously interpret
ed the law, but that it is once more shows the incompetency of narrow mindedness
of the majority of its members. He threatened to pass a bill reorganizing the S
upreme so as to change the members who decided the Parazo case. The court requir
ed Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court
. Atty. Sotto contends in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by th
e Constitution, he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith an
d with no intention of offending any of the members of the Court and that he has
not attacked the honesty or integrity of any one. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. V
icente Sotto shall be held liable for contempt of Court. HELD: YES. Mere critici
sm or comment on the correctness or wrongness, of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be allowed because if well founded it may c
ontribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is done in bad f
aith, it should not given any merit. Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or co
mment on the decision of the Parazo case; he also intends to intimidate the memb
ers of this Court by threatening to pass a bill reorganizing the Supreme so as t
o change the members who decided the Parazo case. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, is in duty bound to uphold the dignit
y and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity, and not to promote dis
trust in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court i
s under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to
the courts.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 67 GUERRERO V. V

ILLAMOR
(A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, September 25, 1998) (179 SCRA 589)
FACTS: Consequent to the dismissal for Qualified Theft against one Gloria Naval
by respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, the offended party, George D. Carlos, t
hru his lawyer Antonio T. Guerrero filed an action for damages, against responde
nt judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Respondent Judge issued an
Order of Direct Contempt of Court against Guerrero for degrading the respect and
dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language be
fore the court. Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been commi
tted against respondent judge in the complaint for damages because whatever was
mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in
recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judi
cial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were merely wo
rds descriptive of plaintiff s cause of action based on his reaction and remorse
and the wilful infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privil
eged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are
relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. ISSUE: Whether or no
t respondent judge can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner by reason o
f the alleged contemptuous language in the complaint for damages against respond
ent. HELD: Negative. The alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint d
id not constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect c
ontempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said, petitioners in the prope
r proceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was n
ot submitted to respondent judge nor in the criminal cases from which the contem
pt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another judge and
involving a separate action, the civil case for damages against respondent judg
e. However, lawyers should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintai
n the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and to insist o
n similar conduct by others. Observance of the respect due to the courts and jud
icial officers is best demonstrated by the lawyers use of respectful language. Co
urts have ordered a male attorney to wear a necktie and have prohibited a female
attorney from wearing a hat. However, the prohibition of a dress whose hemline
was five inches above the knee was held to be acceptable as such had become an ac
cepted mode of dress even in places of worship. (Aguirre) Respect begins with the
lawyers outward physical appearance in court. Sloppy or informal attire adversel
y reflects on the lawyer and demeans the dignity and solemnity of court proceedi
ngs. (Agpalo) SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION RESERVATION BOARD V. HON. CLORIBEL
(G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970) (31 SCRA 1)
FACTS: The Supreme Court decided against Mac Arthur International Minerals Co.,
client of counsels involved in this case. Counsels Santiago, Uy, Regala & Sotto
purportedly set forth a memoranda personally signed by Santiago on his behalf an
d purportedly for Uy, Regala & Associate, and Sotto claimed that the SC overlook
ed the applicable law due to the misrepresentation & obfuscation of petitioners c
ounsel and that never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such gimm
ick can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the pub
lic. They enumerated certain incidents which according to them were proof of unj
udicial prejudice, with unjudicial favouritism in favor of petitioners. They cla
imed that he needed to make those statements lest his client be deprived of due
process. Consequently, the counsels were charged with contempt of court.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 68 ISSUE: Whethe
r or not counsels for Mac Arthur Intl Minerals Co. shall be held guilty of contem
pt of court. HELD: YES. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court mandates e
very lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judici
al office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. The Court finds in
the language of counsels the style that undermines and degrades the administrat
ion of justice. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the lega
l profession.
TIONGCO V. AGUILAR
(G.R. No. 115932, January 25, 1995) (240 SCRA 589)
FACTS: A decision was rendered against herein petitioners spouses Atty. Jose Tio
ngco and Leticia Tiongco in their case for recovery of possession and damages. A
tty. Jose Tiongco as counsel for the petitioners contested alleging that the Cou
rt did not at all read the petition in their case before it concluded that the p
etition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a gr
ave abuse of discretion. Moreover, he described the respondent judge as a "liar,
" "thief" perfidious," and "blasphemer". He also called the respondent judge a "
robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eye
d." Atty. Jose Tiongco was held in contempt of court for violation of Canon 11 o
f the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall obs
erve and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and sho
uld insist on similar conduct by others. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jose Tiongc
o has violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: HELD:
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others. Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds
of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation against
the Court and his scurrilous characterizations is, indeed, all too obvious. Such
could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted.
When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he eve
n pointed out other intemperate words in his petition is a gross violation of Ca
non 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility. NG V. ALAR
A.M. No. 7252, November 22, 2006
FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the complainants in a labor case f
iled with the Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint. On appeal, NLRCs First
Division upheld the dismissal. In his Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used improper and abusive language full of diatribes
castigating the Labor Arbiter and the ponente of the NLRC decision. Johnny Ng,
one of the respondents, filed a disbarment case against Alar before the IBP Comm
ission on Bar Discipline for such misbehavior. Alar contended that the Rules of
Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing a
t the NLRC, the latter not being a court and that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are
not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply
to them, not being part of the judiciary. ISSUE: Is a lawyers misbehavior before
the NLRC susceptible of the provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct?

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 69 HELD: The MRM
I contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropri
ety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in hi
s pleadings that does not admit any justification. The assertion that the NLRC n
ot being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore
not part of the judiciary and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct do
es not apply to them, is unavailing. The Court held that respondent became unmin
dful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member o
f the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his clie
nt but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must b
e scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Canon 11 Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. DE GRA
CIA V. WARDEN OF MAKATI
(G.R. No. L-42032, January 9, 1976) (69 SCRA 4)
A writ of habeas corpus was filed for the production of the body of Manuel De Gr
acia. The hearing for the issuance of the writ has been delayed due to a series
of postponement. De Gracia was released from custody even before the proper hear
ing making the petition for the writ moot and academic. The Supreme Court howeve
r take note that there was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N.
Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day
his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, b
y his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It
suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future
actuations as a member of the bar.
Canon 11 Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menac
ing language or behavior before the Courts. Canon 8 Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall n
ot, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or ot
herwise improper. FERNANDEZ V. HON. BELLO
(G.R. No. 14277, April 30, 1960) (107 Phil 1140)
FACTS: Timotea Perreyras, the guardian over the persons and properties of her br
others, with the help of herein petitioner Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her coun
sel, asked the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common by the wa
rds to pay for the debts owed to Maximiano Umagay. The request was granted and a
valid sale was made in favor of the latter. The interest in the land of Maximian
o Umagay was in turn sold to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Part of the purchase pric
e was given to Atty. Fernandez in payment for the services rendered by him as co
unsel of the deceased father of the wards in a civil case. The record does not s
how that these payments were authorized by the court. An investigation was condu
cted, thereafter, herein respondent Judge Bello found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez
guilty of contempt for having taken a certain amount from the proceeds of the sa
le without court approval, finding this conduct of counsel to be anomalous and u
nbecoming for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to
enable him to collect unpaid attorney s fees due him from the father of the war
ds. Atty. Fernandez sought to annul said order alleging that that he acted in go
od faith believing that he is entitled to receive the fees due him.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 70 ISSUE: Whethe
r or not Atty. Miguel Fernandez is guilty for contempt for having taken a certai
n amount from the proceeds of sale of the wards property as payment for the legal
services rendered by him. HELD: Atty. Miguel Fernandez is not guilty for contem
pt for having taken a certain amount from the proceeds of sale of the wards prope
rty as payment for the legal services rendered by him. The duty of courts is not
just to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their du
ty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Atty. Fernandez was
entitled to receive payment for services rendered by him, which services are adm
itted to have been due from the father of the wards. Meanwhile, respondent Judge
wanted to strike out portions of petitioner s motion for reconsideration for em
ploying strong language. The language used by the judge in characterizing the ac
t of the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of
obtaining his fee "through manoeuvres of documents from the guardian-petitioner"
must have provoked petitioner to use strong language and the judge has nothing
to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start usin
g temperate language himself.
SANGALANG V. IAC
(G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988) (177 SCRA 87)
FACTS: Atty. J Cezar Sangco, counsel for Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, wa
s charged for contempt for using intemperate and accusatory language, when the f
ormer assailed the decision of the Court against his client. Atty. Sangco allege
d that said ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court s competence and i
ntegrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality and the extraordinary efforts e
xerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted concl
usions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of the Court ... On his p
art, Atty. Sangco assert that he was merely defending the interests of his clien
ts. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. J. Cezar Sangco shall be held guilt in contempt
of court for using intemperate and accusatory language. HELD: YES. A lawyer s "f
irst duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end
, his client s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." Rule 11.03 of the Code of P
rofessional Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Sangco has tr
anscended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves the Court s rebuke.
MONTECILLO V. GICA
(G.R. No. L-36800, October 21, 1974) (60 SCRA 234)
FACTS: In a criminal case for slander, Atty. Quirico Del Mar was able to obtain
favorable judgment for his client Jorge Montecillo. On appeal of the case, the C
ourt of Appeals reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsi
deration where he made a veiled threat against the CA judges intimating that he
thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been
rendered through negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived. The CA
denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the co
urt. He is charged for suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE: Whether or no
t Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 71

HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties
to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to he
lp build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the co
urt so essential to the proper administration of justice. It is manifest that De
l Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flims
y ground of alleged error in deciding a case; he proceeded to challenge the inte
grity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. I
n short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with g
ross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
POBRE V. SENATOR SANTIAGO
(A.C. NO. 7399, August 25, 2009)
FACTS: An administrative case and disbarment proceeding was filed against Senato
r Meriam Defensor Santigo for uttering in her privilege speech delivered in the
Senate floor where she was quoted as saying that she wanted to spit on the face o
f Chief Justice and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supr
eme Court of idiots. She alleged that it was considered as part of her Parliament
ary immunity as such was done during the session. ISSUE: Whether or not the cont
ention of Senator Santiago is correct? HELD: Yes, because her statements, being
part of her privilege speech as a member of Congress, were covered by the consti
tutional provision on parliamentary immunity. Indeed, her privilege speech is no
t actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court
. However, as a member of the Bar, the Court wishes to express its deep concern
about the language Senator Santiago used in her speech and its effect on the adm
inistration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed t
he limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that
her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. Se
nator Santiago should have taken to heart in the first place the ensuing passage
in In Re: Vicente Sotto that if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefro
m, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and p
erhaps chaos would be the result. No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the ju
diciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 11 Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge, motives not suppo
rted by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The rule allows such criticism so long as it is supported by the record or it is
material to the case. A lawyers right to criticize the acts of courts and judges
in a proper and respectful way and through legitimate channels is well recogniz
ed. The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the wall of decency and propriety. (Agpalo) The cardina
l condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not s
pill over the wall of decency and propriety. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 72 IN RE FELICIA

NO GOMEZ
(43 Phil 376, May 16, 1922)
FACTS: Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candidates at the election in
1919, for the position of provincial governor of Laguna. Gomez was proclaimed e
lected. Cailles contested the election successfully. At a public meeting held to
celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Gomez is charged wi
th having said, in effect, that the Supreme Court had decided the election prote
st in favor of Cailles, because Governor-General Wood, out of friendship for Cai
lles, had invited the members of the court to Malacaang previous to formulating t
he decision, and there, following a secret conference, had offered them a banque
t. These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion, a newspaper of the City o
f Manila and are substantiated by four affidavits. ISSUE: Whether or not Felicia
no Gomez is guilty of contempt of court. HELD: HELD: NO. The Supreme Court felt
at that time that declaring Gomez in contempt will only seem to vindicate his ac
cusations against the high court. The Supreme Court said litigants and lawyers sh
ould not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the mome
nt, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language. The rule in the more progressive jurisdictio
ns is that courts, when a case is finished, are subject to the same criticism as
other people. Judges may not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. Alth
ough the honor and integrity of the court may be assailed, judges, like other pe
rsons, are relegated to the courts for redress.
Canon 11 Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the pr
oper authorities only.
1987 Philippine Constitution Article VIII, Sec. Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall
have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
WHO ARE CONSIDERED AS PROPER AUTHORITIES 1. If administrative in nature - To be
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court 2. If crim
inal and not purely administrative in nature - It shall be filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman 3. If it involves a justice of the Supreme Court based on impe
achable offenses - It must be coursed through the House of Representatives and t
he Senate in accordance with the Rules on Impeachment
*** An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial reco
urse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a p
etition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fr
aud, malice, or dishonesty. (Santiago III v. Justice Enriquez, Jr. A.M. No. CA09
-47-J, February 13, 2009)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 73 CABANSAG V. F

ERNANDEZ
(G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957) (102 Phil 152)
FACTS: Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. s
eeking to eject them from a portion of land covered by a Torrens title. For almo
st five years, a decision has not yet been reached due to the fact that the tran
script of the records has not yet been transcribed and the Judge could not proce
ed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The stenographer
s who took the notes are now assigned in other courts. Thereafter, Cabansag sent
a letter to the Chief Executive requesting the latter through its Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), to act upon the case which had long bee
n pending thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer. Atty. Manuel Fernand
ez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion praying that Apolonio Cabansag be dec
lared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his lette
r to the PCAC. On the other hand, Cabansag and his counsels maintained that the
letter is not contemptuous. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petition
er Cabansag is guilty of contempt of court. HELD: NO. Any act which tends to bel
ittle or degrade or embarrass the court in its administration of justice constit
utes contempt of court. In the instant case, the criticism of Cabansag is direct
ed, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres has alle
gedly caused the undue delay of the case. While it would have been proper for Ca
bansag to have his letter addressed to the Secretary of Justice or to the Suprem
e Court rather than to the President, such act alone would not be contemptuous.
His conduct is justified considering that, being a layman; he is unaware of the
technical rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective ma
ntle of our constitution. But the same does not apply with regard to his counsel
s. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted wi
th more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarras
sment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its pro
ceedings. Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court
and defend it against unjust criticism and clamour. However, there is no proof
that they acted in bad faith, hence a warning that a commission of a similar mis
step in the future would render them amenable to a more severe disciplinary acti
on would suffice.
MAGLASANG MAGLASANG V. PEOPLE
(G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990) (190 SCRA 306)
FACTS: Upon conviction of Khalyxto Maglasang, his counsel, Atty. Castellano, fil
ed for a petition for certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-compliance
with the requirements, the court dismissed the petition and a motion for reconsi
deration. Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the President
where he accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with biases and ignoranc
e of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments. He accused the court of sa
botaging the Aquino administration for being Marcos appointees, and robbing the
Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also said that the SC is doing
this to protect the judge who was impleaded in the petition and for money reaso
ns. He alleges further that the court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary
men. The court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. He was t
hen charged for violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsi
bility. ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Castellanos acts constitute a violation o
f the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 74 HELD: YES. In
filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court s Second Division with
the Office of the President, even the most basic tenet of our government system
-the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislat
ive branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. The Supreme Court is supreme-the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial po
wer to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No
other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them unjust.
Atty. Castellano s complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of t
he Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capa
city to render justice according to law. MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
(G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993)
FACTS: Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsm
an against RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Abiera alleged that Maceda has falsi
fied his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determi
ned and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, Maceda
knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that h
ave been submitted for decision. Abiera alleged that Maceda falsified his certif
icates of service for 17 months. ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by
the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of su
pervision over all inferior courts. HELD: In the absence of any administrative a
ction taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts po
wer of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violatio
n of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and cour
t personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal t
rial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee th
e judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and takes the proper admin
istrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other bra
nch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doct
rine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or othe
r court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must def
er action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination wheth
er said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrati
ve duties.
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice CANON 12 - A
LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEED
Y AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 138 SEC. 20 (g) of Rules of Court It is the duty of an attorney: (g) Not to
encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding
, or delay any man s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 75 ALONTO V. HON
. MEMORACION (Forum shopping)
(G.R. No. 83614, May 7, 1990) (185 SCRA 73)
FACTS: Eldigario D. Gonzales is suspended from office as Vice-President of the M
indanao State University, Tawi-Tawi College of Technology and Oceanography (MSUTCTO). He then filed a petition compelling Ahmad Alonto, Jr. and the MSU Board o
f Regents (BOR) to allow him to reassume his position. Accordingly, the lower co
urt issued a restraining order in his favor. However, Alonto did not comply with
the said order; instead they issued a Resolution placing Gonzales under prevent
ive suspension. The lower court found Alonto guilty of contempt of court. After
having denied their motions for reconsideration of the order, Alonto made an app
eal. Despite the action taken on their notice of appeal, Alonto filed the instan
t petition alleging that their appeal was not prosecuted. ISSUE: Whether or not
Ahmad Alonto Jr., et al is guilty of contempt of court. HELD: YES. Forum-shoppin
g, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the c
ourts and abusing their processes, is a ground for holding a lawyer in contempt
of court. Petitioners have not been candid with the Court. In their manifest, th
ey maintained that the appeal was not prosecuted which is an outright falsehood,
a tactic to conceal from the Court the practice of forum-shopping in seeking re
lief from the assailed orders of the trial court. These acts of petitioners cons
titute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice a
nd this violation constitutes contempt of court.
PENTICOSTES vs. HIDALGO
(A.M. No. RTJ-89-331, September 28, 1990) (190 SCRA 165)
FACTS: Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges aga
inst Judge Rafael B. Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tarlac, Tarlac
which were unsubstantiated charges and done in pursuit of a desire to unjustifia
bly bring respondent to public disdain and ridicule" as determined by the Office
of the court Administrator. Despite the stern warning of the OCA, Penticostes p
ersisted. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Penticostes action is consistent with the C
ode of Professional Conduct. HELD: The Court ruled that considering the nature,
frequency and indiscriminate filing of groundless charges and despite the admoni
tion previously given by resolution of the Court, which Penticostes wilfully ign
ored and disobeyed by manifesting the intent to file more of the same, he impose
d upon the time, resources and forbearance of the Court and diverted the energie
s of the respondent judge who has been called upon to comment and defend his eve
ry action. This is not to say that a judge may not be answerable for violation o
f the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, but not every order or ruling advers
e to a party can be made the basis for an administrative charge. As a member of
the bar, Penticostes has responsibilities to the judiciary. The Code of Professi
onal Responsibility and the rules there under impose obligations on the lawyer i
n relation to the court: Canon 12 mandates that a lawyer shall exert very effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration o
f justice. Through his imprudent filing of administrative cases against responde
nt judge, Penticostes has transgressed the provisions of the Code of Professiona
l Responsibility and miserably failed to observe conduct expected of a member of
the bar under the Code and in accordance with his lawyer s oath.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 76 GABIONZA V. C

A
(G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994) (234 SCRA 192)
FACTS: Dennis T. Gabionza was a defendant in a civil case but the case was dismi
ssed by the lower court. An appeal before the Court of Appeals was then institut
ed. The appellate Court dismissed the petition for being violative of the provis
ion of Circular No. 28-91 for having failed
to indicate in the caption thereof the docket number of the case in the trial co
urt whose orders are sought to be reviewed. Gabionza admits that the docket numb
er had not been set forth in the caption of his Petition for Certiorari and Proh
ibition with the Court of Appeals, however, he
maintains that his Petition should nevertheless have been deemed in substantial
compliance with Circular No. 28-91, for the reason that the docket number of the
case pending before the trial court was in fact set out in the body of his Peti
tion. ISSUE: Whether or not Dennis T. Gabionza is in substantial compliance with
Circular No. 28-91 in so far as the requisite for caption of petition or compla
int is concerned. HELD: YES. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to promote and faci
litate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to undermine its own ultimate and legitimate object
ive which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. In the
instant case, Gabionza has substantially complied with the original requirement
s of Circular No. 28-91 Caption of petition or complaint and that the objectives
of that Circular were not being subverted by Gabionza s Petition in as much as
the docket number of the case pending before the trial court was in fact set out
in the body of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. TAKE NOTE: (Agpalo)
Agpalo) The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but the administration
of justice. As an officer of the Court, it is the duty of the lawyer to advance
the Courts objective of having a speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexp
ensive adjudication of case and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. The
duty to assist in the administration of justice may be performed by doing no act
that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice and by faith
fully complying with all his duties to the court and to his client. Examples of
the former would include the duty to inform the court of any change of his addre
ss or of the death of his client. Acts that amount to obstruction of the adminis
tration of justice may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a
complaining witness in a criminal case not to appear at the scheduled hearing so
that the case against his client, the accused, would be dismissed
Canon 12 Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequate
ly prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will a
dduce and the order of its preferences. He should also be ready with the origina
l documents for comparison with the copies. A lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. (Rule 18.02) Without adequate preparation,
the lawyer may not be able to effectively assist the court in the efficient admi
nistration of justice. Non-observance of this rule might result in: 1) The postp
onement of the pre-trial or hearing, which would thus entail delay in the early
disposition of the case; 2) The judge may consider the client nonsuited or in de
fault or 3) The judge may consider the case deemed submitted for decision withou
t clients evidence, to his prejudice. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 77 Canon 12 Rule
12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. M
ASINSIN V. THE HON. ED VINCENT VINCENT ALBANO
(G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994) (232 SCRA 192)
FACTS: In an ejectment suit against the spouses Masinsin, the lower court ruled
against them. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final a
nd executory. Later, the Masinsins through different counsels tried to nullify t
he same MTC decision before different branches of the court. They file pleadings
, one after another. The Court took notice of the filing of series of unsubstant
iated petitions by the Masinsins through their counsels which is a delaying tact
ic. The Court finds the counsels guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer; hence
they are censured and warned. ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels of the Masinsi
ns are guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. HELD: YES. The utter lack of me
rit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of the
Masinsins to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has l
ong become final and executory. In no uncertain terms that any act on the part o
f a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, i
mpede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both
an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt p
ower. Petition is dismissed. Petitioners counsel of record is strongly CENSURED a
nd WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyers oath in the future will be dea
lt with most severely.
Canon 12 Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. MARIVELES V. MALLARI
(A.C. No. 3294, February 17, 1993) (219 SCRA 44)
FACTS: Mario S. Mariveles filed an administrative complaint for disbarment again
st his former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had e
ngaged to handle his defense in Criminal Case where he was charged with violatio
n of B.P. Blg. 22. After an adverse decision was rendered, Mariveles instructed
Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court s decision to the Court of Appeals, w
hich the respondent did. However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous exte
nsions of time, which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to fil
e the appellant s brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not Atty. Mallari be disbarred. HELD: YES. What was committed by Atty. Mall
ari is a blatant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 12.0
3 a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memo
randa or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 18.03 a lawyer shall not neglect a l
egal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall re
nder him liable. Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing hi
s profession if in the course of that practice, he will eventually wreck and des
troy the future and reputation of his client and thus disgrace the law professio
n. Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instil an
d maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 78

Canon 12 Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the executi
on of a judgement or misuse Court processes. PLUS BUILDERS INC. VS REVILLA
(A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009)
FACTS: The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor
of Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et.a
l, who were the clients of Atty. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that the farmers w
ere mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The cas
e reached the Supreme Court which sustained Plus Builders Inc.s rights over the l
and. Atty. Revilla, Jr. was found to have committed intentional falsehood and mi
sused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision
through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining order
s, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. maintains that the courses of action he took were not meant t
o unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty.
Revilla, Jr. is guilty of gross misconduct. HELD: YES. In support of the cause o
f their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within
the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at t
he expense of truth and justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of ju
stice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a ju
dgment or by misusing court processes.
AGUINALDO V. AGUINALDO
(36 SCRA 137)
FACTS: A writ of execution is issued in favor of Victoria Aguinaldo and Simeona
Aguinaldo for the reconveyance of a part of the property in litigation. An appea
l was made by Segundo Aguinaldo but the same was denied. Cecilio Aguinaldo conte
sted the writ alleging that his father Segundo Aguinaldo died during the pendenc
y of such appeal. Thereafter, the petitioners, in order not to render nugatory a
decision, final and executory in character, ask the court to have the heirs of
the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo substituted as defendants. The lower court grante
d them favor and substituted respondents in place of the deceased Segundo Aguina
ldo citing the provision of Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that whenever a party to a pending case dies, xxx it shall be the duty of his at
torney to inform the court promptly of such death, xxx and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative
. Respondents contested saying its too late to apply said provision of the Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting favor to petitioners. H
ELD: NO. Defendants reliance that it is too late to apply the provision of Sec 16
, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is untenable. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for s
uch neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. The judgmen
t had become final and the stage of execution reached. The Court said litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effecti
ve and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become fina
l, the winning party be not, through a mere artifice, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 79 MALONZO V. PR

INSIPE
(A.C. No. 6289, December 16, 2004) (447 SCRA 1)
FACTS: In expropriation proceedings by the NAPOCOR against several lot owners in
Bulacan, the president of an organization of the lot owners entered into a cont
ract for legal services with Atty. Pete Principe. Complainant Julian Malonso, a
member of the same organization, appointed on the other hand a certain Danilo El
fa as his attorney-in-fact on the matter of negotiation with NPC. Thereafter, th
ere was an amicable settlement between NAPOCOR and the lot owners. More than two
years after the expropriation cases were instituted; Atty. Principe filed his m
otion to separate legal fees and filed his Notice of Entry of Appearance claiming
that he is the legal counsel of the lot owners. The other lot owners including M
alonso wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorize
d Sandamas President to hire the services of Atty. Principes law firm to represent
them. Atty. Principe filed several motions to ensure his claim to the 40% of th
e selling price of the properties being expropriated. An investigation conducted
by the IBP recommended Atty. Principes suspension from the practice of law ISSUE
: Whether or not Atty. Prinsipe be suspended from the practice of law. HELD: YES
. Atty. Principe had violated among others Rule 12.04 which says that a lawyer sh
all not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes. In its Resolution, the IBP Board ordained his suspension from the prac
tice of law. The SC however found that formal requisites of the investigation an
d resolution had not been complied with and dismissed the case requiring the IBP
to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving disb
arment and discipline of attorneys.
Canon 12 Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during
a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination. Th
e purpose of this rule is to avoid any suspicion that he is coaching the witness
what to say during the resumption of the examination. (Agpalo)
Canon 12 Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepres
ent himself or to impersonate another. A lawyer may interview witnesses in advan
ce of trial or attend to their needs if they are poor but he should avoid any su
ch action as may be misinterpreted as an attempt to influence the witness what t
o say in court. Court will not give weight on a testimony of a witness who admit
s having been instructed. A lawyer who presents a witness whom he knows will giv
e a false testimony or is an impersonator may be subjected to disciplinary actio
n. (Agpalo)
Canon 12 Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor
needlessly inconvenience him.

The lawyer has a duty to always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairnes
s and due consideration (Agpalo) The client cannot be made the keeper of the law
yers conscience in professional matters. He has no right to demand that his couns
el abuse the opposite party and the latters witnesses or indulge

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 80 in offensive

personalities. Improper speech is not excusable on the ground that it is what th
e client would say if speaking in his own behalf If it is the judge who subjects
the witness to harsh treatment, the lawyer has the right to protest in a respec
tful and dignified manner the action of the judge and to make the incident of re
cord without being held liable administratively or for contempt of court

Canon 12 Rule 12.08 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his cli
ent, except: a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custod
y of an instrument, and the like, or b) on substantial matters, in cases where h
is testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during
his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel. The underlying
reason for the impropriety of a lawyer acting in such dual capacity lies in the
difference between the function of a witness and that of an advocate. The funct
ion of a witness is to tell the facts as he recalls then in answer to questions.
The function of an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to distingui
sh between the zeal of an advocate and the fairness and impartiality of a disint
erested witness (Agpalo) PNB V. UY TENG PIAO
(G.R. No. L-35252, October 21, 1932) (57 Phil 337)
FACTS: The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National B
ank (PNB) and against Uy Teng Piao in one civil case. Upon failure by Uy Teng Pi
ao to pay, its mortgaged land was sold at public auction to the PNB. Later, the
PNB secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property in qu
estion and sold the same to a third person. In his answer Uy Teng Piao alleged t
hat he waived his right to redeem the land upon an agreement that the bank would
not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that th
e trial court released PNB from the complaint. One of the attorneys for the PNB
testified that Uy Teng Piao renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land, be
cause a friend of the respondent was interested in buying it. The testimony of t
he attorney was questioned from the fact of his being a witness and an attorney
at the same time in a cause. ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel for the responden
t PNB could be a witness and at the same time an attorney in the instant case. H
ELD: The counsel for the respondent PNB, could not be a witness and at the same
time an attorney in the instant case. Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics provi
des that when a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal m
atters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he sho
uld leave the trial of the case to other counsel, except when essential to the e
nds of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his clien
t. With respect to the testimony of the bank s attorney, it is observe that alth
ough the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a wit
ness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active manag
ement of the case.
d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends
to influence or gives the appearance of influence upon the courts CANON 13 - A L
AWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROP
RIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 81 NESTLE V. SAN
CHEZ
(G.R. No. 75209, September 30, 1987) (154 SCRA 542)
FACTS: Two unions with pending cases before the Supreme Court had intermittent p
ickets in front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC building, obstructing access t
o and egress from the Courts premises. They also constructed provisional shelters
, set up a kitchen, littered the area causing it to be unhygienic and un-sanitiz
ed, waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and harangued the court
with the use of loud speakers. Two justices called the leaders of the unions an
d their counsel to inform them that the pickets constitute direct contempt of co
urt, and that their petitions could not be heard until the pickets stop. Atty. E
spinas, the counsel for the unions, apologized and assured that the acts would n
ot be repeated. ISSUE: Is Atty. Espinas guilty of contempt of court. HELD: YES.
Grievances must be ventilated through proper channels (appropriate petitions, mo
tions or other pleadings) in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impar
tial administrators of justice entitled to proceed to the disposition of its bus
iness in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its fu
nctions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice; for though the r
ights of free speech and of assembly are constitutionally protected, an attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice is no longer within the ambit of cons
titutional protection. However, Atty. Espinas, the counsel for the unions, apolo
gized and assured that the acts
Canon 13 Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospi
tality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges. LANTORI
A V. BUNYI
(A.M. No. 1769, June 8, 1992) (209 SCRA 528)
FACTS: In an ejectment case handled by Atty. Irineo Bunyi pending before the Mun
icipal Court, it is contended by Cesar L. Lantoria that Atty. Bunyi was the one
who prepared the decisions and the judge simply signed them. This is predicated
on the letters sent by Atty. Bunyi to Lantoria. Thereafter, the latter filed a c
omplaint against Atty. Bunyi for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The
case was referred to the Solicitor General who found that respondent is guilty o
f highly unethical and unprofessional conduct required of a member of the Bar an
d consequently recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
. Atty. Bunyi manifested that he did not offer the Judge any gift or considerati
on to influence the latter in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. He al
so offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have res
ulted from his preparation of the draft decisions. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. I
rineo Bunyi shall be suspended from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming o
f a member of the Bar. HELD: YES. CANON 13 of the Code of Professional Responsib
ility provides that a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influ
encing the court. Rule 13.01 further provides that a lawyer shall not extend ext
raordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating fa
miliarity with judges. In the case at hand, Atty. Bunyi is guilty of unethical p
ractice in attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case by
preparing the draft decision. These acts of respondent amounted to conduct unbec
oming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 82 Canon 13 Rule
13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pend
ing case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. CRUZ V. SALVA
See Canon 3, Rule 3.04
MARTELINO V. ALEJANDRO
(G.R. No. L-30894, March 25, 1970) (32 SCRA 106)
FACTS: Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97t
h Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some
Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
Later, Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general cou
rt-martial, following the latter s admission that he read newspaper stories of t
he Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an a
mount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being explo
ited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on Nove
mber 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the m
ilitary court denied the challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publicit
y which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing that the cour
t-martial s president s fairness and impartiality have been impaired. ISSUE: Whe
ther or not the publicity given to the case prejudice Martelinos right to fair tr
ial. HELD: NO. Televising a court trial would amount to a violation of due proce
ss. A carnival atmosphere would be created. Jurisprudence also states that there
is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in th
e courtroom. But there is a reasonable likelihood that the prejudicial news prio
r to trial will prevent a fair trial. If publicity during the proceeding threate
ns the fairness of the trial, a new trial shall be ordered. However, the case at
bar is different. The publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the government for what was clai
med to be a massacre of Muslim trainees. If there was a trial by newspaper it was no
t of the petitioner but of the government. There is no showing that the courts m
artial failed to protect the accused from massive publicity. Protection would in
clude: controlling the release of information; change the venue or postpone tria
l until the deluge of prejudicial publicity has subsided. Even granting hat ther
e is massive and prejudicial publicity, the petitioners do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be. IN RE ALM
ACEN
(G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970) (31 SCRA 562)
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender the Lawyers Certif
icate of Title to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what h
e call a tribunal peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice. He
also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like justice is not only blin
d, but also deaf and dumb. The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the a
bsence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismis
sed in the Court of Appeals. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court,
it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he th
ought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his t
itle is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he rega
ined confidence in the justice system. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen shoul
d be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 83 RULING: YES.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of publ
ic officers. The Court also treats with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who v
igorously assails their actuations, provided it is done in respectful terms and
through legitimate channels; for courageous and fearless advocates are the stran
ds that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. The reason is that an att
orney does not surrender his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of th
e court in fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the Bar, as well
as the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. Criticism has been a
n important part of the traditional work of a lawyer. As a citizen and as office
r of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise his right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. But the cardinal condition of all
such criticism is that is shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety.
Canon 13 Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another
branch or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings
.
4. To the clients
NATURE OF ATTORNEYATTORNEY-CLIENT CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 1. Strictly personal 2. Hi
ghly confidential 3. Fiduciary
ATTORNEYATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, HOW FORMED 1. Oral when the counsel is emp
loyed without a written agreement, but the conditions and amount of attorneys fee
s are agreed upon. 2. Express when the terms and conditions including the amount
of fees are explicitly stated in a written document, which may be a private or
public document. Written contract of attorneys fees is the law between the lawyer
and the client. 3. Implied When there is no agreement, whether oral or written,
but the client allowed the lawyer to render legal services not intended to be g
ratuitous without objection and client is benefited by reason thereof. *** While
a written agreement for professional services is the best evidence to show the
relation, formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney
. The absence of a written contract will not preclude a finding that there is a
professional relationship.
ADVANTAGES OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN THE LAWYER LAWYER AND THE CLIENT 1. It
is conclusive as to the amount of compensation. 2. In case of unjustified dismis
sal of an attorney, he shall be entitled to recover from the client full compens
ation stipulated in the contract

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 84 RULES PROTECT
ING ATTORNEYATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP RELATIONSHIP 1. Best efforts must be ex
erted by the attorney to protect his clients interest; 2. The attorney must promp
tly account for any fund or property entrusted by or received for his client; 3.
An attorney cannot purchase his clients property or interest in litigation; 4. T
he privacy of communications shall at all times upheld; 5. An attorney cannot re
present a party whose interest is adverse to that of his client even after the t
ermination of the relation.
LICENSED ICENSED ATTORNEY THREE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY THAT A
L ATTORNEY AT LAW GENERALLY ENGAGES IN THE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION 1. Legal a
dvice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations
; 2. Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and auth
ority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in or
der to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law; and 3. Preparatio
n for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)
a) Availability of service without discrimination
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
(i)
Services regardless of persons status
Canon 14 Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latters race, sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own
opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h(h-i) of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorneys.It is the du
ty of an attorney: (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himsel
f, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed. (i) In the defense of a person acc
used of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opini
on as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits
, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due proce
ss of law
Canon 14 Rule 14.01 makes it his duty not to decline to represent the accused re
gardless of his opinion as to his guilt. Note that in criminal cases, cases it i
s easy to take accused because of presumption of innocence and proof beyond reas
onable doubt. It is the lawyers duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proce
edings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes t
o be honestly debatable under law. He is not to encourage the commencement or th
e continuance of an action or delay any mans cause, for any corrupt motive or int
erest. He must decline to conduct a civil case or to make a defense when convinc
ed that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work
oppression or wrong. If he were to take a bad civil case for a plaintiff, it wil
l only be to advise him not to file the action or to settle it with the claimant
. If he were to accept the defense of a bad civil case against a defendant, it w
ill either be to exert his best effort toward a compromise or, to tell his clien
t to confess judgment. In criminal cases: easy to take accused because of presum
ption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 85 (ii) Services
as counsel de officio
Canon 14 Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and suffici
ent cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a reques
t from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for renditio
n of free legal aid.
Rule 138, sec. 31 of the Rules of Court Attorneys for destitute litigants.A court
may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in
a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable
to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure
the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the dut
y of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excus
ed therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. Rule 138, Sec. 36 of the R
ules of Court Amicus curiae. Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by
the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submit
ted to it.
Who is an Amicus curiae? curiae A friend of the court; a bystander (usually a coun
selor) who interposes or volunteers information upon some matter of law in regar
d to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken. (Agpalo)
(iii)
Valid grounds for refusal
Canon 14 Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an ind
igent client unless: a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively o
r competently; b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the pro
spective client or between a present client and the prospective client.
(iv)
Same standard of conduct for paying and non-paying clients
Canon 14 Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay h
is professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his re
lations with paying clients.
b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CAN
DOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
(i)
Confidentiality rule
Canon 15 Rule Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, sh
all ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict
with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 86 HORNILLA V. S

ALUNAT
(A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003)
FACTS: Hornilla filed a complaint against Atty. Salunat with the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline for unethical practice regarding conflict of interests. Atty.
Salunat is a member of the ASSA Law Office and acted as the legal counsel for th
e Philippine Public School Teachers Association. In a quarrel between the PPSTA
and some of its board members pending SEC resolution for unlawful spending and u
ndervalued sale of real properties, Atty. Salunat appeared as counsel for said b
oard members. Atty. Salunat avers that he only appeared in behalf of ASSA since
he was a partner. Moreover, he only filed a Manifestation for extreme urgency. I
SSUE: Whether or not Salunat is guilty of unethical behavior as a member of the
IBP. HELD: YES. A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent m
embers of the same corporations board of directors in a derivative suit brought a
gainst them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests
which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. There is conflic
t of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interest of two or more oppo
sing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawy
ers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. Also, if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attor
ney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matt
er in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their c
onnection. Another test is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyal
ty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof. DEE V. CA
(G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989) (176 SCRA 652)
FACTS: Donald Dee and his father engaged the services of Atty. Mutuc regarding t
he problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey to Caesars Pal
ace. Atty. Mutuc went to the casino to negotiate with its president to let Dewey
off the hook, and go after the real debtor Ramon Sy. The president of the casin
o then told Mutuc that if he can make Ramon Sy acknowledge the debt, then Dewey
would be exculpated. Thereafter Mutuc was able to convince Ramon Sy to acknowled
ge the debt and brought a letter to the casino asking for a discount, which resu
lted to the clearing of Deweys name in the casino. Having resolved the problem, M
utuc proceeded to collect from Dee the remaining balance of their agreed profess
ional fee. However despite several letter of demand respondent Mutuc never recei
ved his fees. This prompted Mutuc to file an action for collection of the fees.
Dee alleged that Mutuc at the time when he was rendering the alleged services fo
r the petitioner was actually working for the interest and to the advantage of t
he casino, and that Mutuc is not justified to claim professional fees considerin
g that there was conflict of interest involved. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mutu
c is guilty of representing conflicting interests. HELD: No. Generally, an attor
ney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions. However,
at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may
represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A common repres
entation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with h
onest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties disparate positions,
may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their diffe
rences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and
confidence of said parties. Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that p
rivate respondent was during the period in question an agent of Caesar s Palace,
petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot n
ow decry the dual representation that he postulates.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 87 (ii) Privileg
ed communications Canon 15 Rule 15.02 - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on p
rivilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective c
lient. REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996) (262 SCRA 122)
FACTS: This case emerges from the institution of the Complaint before the Sandig
anbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the princ
ipal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth which includes sh
ares of stocks in the named corporations in a PCGG Case. The partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm) p
erformed legal services for its clients. One of the firms clients is Mr. Cojuanco
. The members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantia
te the client s equity holdings. In the course of their dealings with their clie
nts, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of c
lients as well as their personal and business circumstances. It is in this regar
d that the PCGG required the firm to disclose the identity of its client and the
documents and information related to its clients case. The law firm contest clai
ming that they cannot be compelled to disclose their clients information by virtu
e of the lawyer-client privilege communication. ISSUE: Whether or not the ACCRA
lawyers be compelled to disclose the identity of their clients and the informati
on related to their clients case. HELD: NO. The general rule is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his clie
nt. The reasons for this are that: - The Court has a right to know that the clie
nt whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has be
en established. The privilege does not attach until there is a client. - The pri
vilege pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. - Due process conside
rations require that the opposing party should know his adversary. The general r
ule is however qualified by some exceptions. Client identity is privileged: - Wh
ere a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate t
he client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice. - Where di
sclosure would open the client to civil liability. - Where the governments lawyer
s have no case against an attorneys client unless by revealing the clients name, t
he said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime. Information relating to the ident
ity of the client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clients nam
e itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal
client confidences.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 88

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION One that refers to information transmitted by voluntary
act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which,
so far as the client is aware discloses the information to no third person othe
r than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the a
ccomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
PURPOSE OF MAKING THE COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGED 1. To encourage a client to make
a full disclosure of the facts of the case to his counsel without fear 2. To all
ow the lawyer freedom to obtain full information from his client.
TEST IN DETERMINING WHETHER A COMMUNICATION TO AN ATTORNEY IS COVERED BY THE RUL
E ON PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION Whether the communications are made to an attorney
with view of obtaining from him personal assistance or advice regardless of whet
her there is a pending or merely impending litigation or any litigation.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT ESSENTIAL FACTORS TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY PRI
VILEGE COMMUNICATION COMMUNICATION Where the legal advice of any kind is sought
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications re
lating to that purpose made in confidence by the client are at his instance perm
anently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except if t
he protection be waived. (Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007)
REQUISITES OF PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION 1. There is attorney-client relationship o
r a kind of consultancy requirement with a prospective client; 2. The communicat
ion was made by the client to the lawyer in the course of the lawyers professiona
l employment; 3. The communication must be intended to be confidential. *** The
privilege continues to exist even after the termination of the attorney-client r
elationship. It outlasts the lawyers engagement. The privileged character of the
communication ceases only when waived by the client himself or after his death,
by the heir or legal representative. (Baldwin v. CIR, 94 F. 2d 355, 20 AFTR 940)
*** The party who avers that the communication is privileged has
roof to establish the existence of the privilege unless from the
ument itself, it clearly appears that it is privileged. The mere
the matter is privileged is not sufficient. (People v. Sleeper,
mber 3, 1924)

the burden of p
face of the doc
allegation that
No. 22783, Dece

(iii) Conflict of interest Canon 15 Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent co
nflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a ful
l disclosure of the facts.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 89

PORMENTO V. ATTY. PONTEVEDRA
(A.C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005) (454 SCRA 167)
FACTS: Atty. Alias Pontevedra is the familys legal counsel of Pormento. In one ci
vil case involving the latter, Pormento averred that the same was dismissed beca
use Atty. Pontevedra deliberately failed to inform him of the dismissal of his c
ounterclaim, as a result of which, Pormento was deprived of his right to appeal
said order. Pormento also claims that in order to further protect his rights and
interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a criminal ca
se for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new owner of the sai
d land. Atty. Pontevedra is the counsel of the accused in said case. Pormento cl
aims that as part of his defense in said criminal case, Atty. Pontevedra utilize
d pieces of confidential information he obtained from him while he is still his
client. In a separate incident, Pormento claims that he bought a parcel of land.
Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, Pormento a
lleges that he heeded respondents advice to build a small house on the property a
nd to allow his (complainants) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order
for complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently,
complainants nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file
an ejectment case. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainants nephew. Compla
inant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by repres
enting clients with conflicting interests and should be disbarred by reason ther
eof. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pontevedra violates the Code of Professional Re
sponsibility for representing conflicting claims for his clients. HELD: NO. Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that A lawye
r shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all con
cerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. There is a representation of c
onflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the atto
rney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new r
elation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their co
nnection. Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney f
rom the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clie
nt or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance th
ereof. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a for
mer client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, direct
ly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he a
ppeared for the former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in the re
lation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highe
st degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clien
ts case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the s
trong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No o
pportunity must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A lawyer m
ust have the fullest confidence of his client; for if the confidence is abused,
the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. In the present case, the Court f
inds no conflict of interests when Atty. Pontevedra represented herein complaina
nts nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case and in the crimi
nal complaint filed by herein complainant against them. The only established par
ticipation respondent had with respect to the parcel of land purchased by compla
inant, is that he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said land. O
n that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent obtained any
information from herein complainant that can be used to the detriment of the lat
ter in the ejectment case he filed.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 90 RUTHIE LIMLIM
-SANTIAGO V. ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO
(A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006)
FACTS: Respondent, Atty. Sagucio was a former Personnel Manager and Counsel of T
aggat Industries Inc. Thereafter in 1992, he was appointed as Asst. Provincial p
rosecutor of Tuguegarao Cagayan. Employees of Taggat Industries, through their c
ounsel Atty. Sagucio filed criminal charges against it for withholding the payme
nt of their wages and salaries without a valid cause. Taggat Industries through
complainant Ruthie-Lim charges respondent with engaging in private practice of l
aw while working as a government prosecutor and for violation of Rule 15.03 of C
PR. ISSUES: Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat posits conflict of in
terests with his work as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. HELD: NO. The issue of the
matter of the criminal complaint was pertaining to the withholding of the wages
and salaries of the Taggat employees which occurred from April 1, 1996 to July
15, 1997. Evidently, the respondent was no longer connected with the Taggat Indu
stries during such period since he is working as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
since 1992. Should there be apparent conflict of interest, it must be supported
by sufficient evidence that Atty. Sagucio used any confidential information fro
m his preceding employment with Complainant in resolving the filed criminal comp
laint. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be aske
d to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his for
mer client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doi
ng anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previous
ly represented him. GONZALES V. CABUCANA
(AC No. 6836, January 23, 2006)
FACTS: Leticia Gonzales was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damag
es where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND C
ABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respo
ndent as an associate/partner. A decision was rendered in the civil case orderin
g the losing party to pay Gonzales. Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully impl
ement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompte
d Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff. Notwithstanding the pen
dency of Civil Case where respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, h
erein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales. Compl
ainant contended that the respondents acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos vi
olates the lawyer-client relationship between complainants and respondents law fi
rm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law fo
r representing conflicting interest. HELD: Affirmative. It is well-settled that
a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written con
sent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibiti
on is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the
lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. L
awyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also t
o avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigan
ts be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramoun
t importance in the administration of justice. Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not rep
resent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given aft
er a full disclosure of the facts.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 91

TESTS TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 1. Conflicting Duties
- When, on behalf of one client, it is the attorneys duty to contest for that whi
ch his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when possibility of such
situation will develop. 2. Invitation of Suspicion - Whether the acceptance of
the new relation will prevent a lawyer from the full discharge of his duty of un
divided fidelity and loyalty to his client or will invite suspicion of unfaithfu
lness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. 3. Use of Prior Knowledge Ob
tained - Whether a lawyer will be called upon in his new relation to use against
the first client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment.
INSTANCES WHEN A LAWYER MAY NOT REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS DESPITE CONSENT
OF BOTH PARTIES CONCERNED Where the conflict is: 1. Between the attorneys interes
t and that of a client; or 2. Between a private clients interests and that of the
government or any of its instrumentalities.
EFFECTS OF REPRESENTING ADVERSE INTERESTS 1. Disqualification as counsel of new
client on petition of former client. 2. Where such is unknown to, becomes prejud
icial interests of the new client, a judgment against such may, on that ground b
e set aside. 3. A lawyer can be held administratively liable through disciplinar
y action and may be held criminally liable for betrayal of trust. 4. The attorne
ys right to fees may be defeated if found to be related to such conflict and such
was objected to by the former client, or if there was a concealment and prejudi
ce by reason of the attorneys previous professional relationship with the opposit
e party.
(iv) Mediator, Conciliator, Arbitrator of settling disputes Canon 15 Rule 15.04
- A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conc
iliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
(v) Candid and honest advice to clients Canon 15 Rule 15.05 - A lawyer when advi
sing his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probab
le results of the clients case, neither overstating nor understating the prospect
s of the case.
Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 (1996) His client is entitled to and he is boun
d to give a candid and honest opinion on the merit or lack of merit of his clien
ts case, neither overstating nor understating the prospect of the case. It is lik
ewise incumbent upon him to give his client an honest opinion on the probable re
sults of the case, with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and the
legal processes.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 92 Periquet vs.
NLRC, 186 SCRA (1990) As officers of the court, counsels are under obligation to
advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims. Lawyers
are not merely hired employees who must unquestionably do the bidding of the cli
ent, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciati
on of the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
GILLEGO V. DIAZ
(G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971) (39 SCRA 88)
The case at bar recalls to mind the Court admonition, in a similarly unmeritorio
us case that "The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove tha
t appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves severe condemnation, wasting as it does, t
he time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases." In Lopez vs. Aq
uino, the Court exhorted counsel that "the cooperation of litigants and their at
torneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritori
ous cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, secti
on 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that the signature of an attorney con
stitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; a
nd that it is interposed for delay and expressly admonishes that for a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action ."
(vi) Non-influential to public official, tribunal, or legislative body Canon 15
Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body.
CJC Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships t
o influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or pe
rmit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to infl
uence the judge. This rule protects against influence peddling. Some prospective
clients secure the services of a particular lawyer or law firm precisely becaus
e he can exert a lot of influence on a judge and some lawyers exact big fees for
such influence (Agpalo)
(vii) Compliance with laws Canon 15 Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Art. 19 of NCC. Eve
ry person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duti
es, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
TAKE NOTE: (Agpalo) A lawyer is required to represent his client within the boun
ds of the law. The CPR enjoins him to employ only fair and honest means to attai
n the lawful objectives of his client and warns him not

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 93 to allow his
client to dictate procedure in handling the case. He may use arguable constructi
on of the law or rules which are favorable to his client. But he is not allowed
to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law.
A lawyer should comply with the clients lawful requests. But he should resist and
should never follow any unlawful instructions. In matters of law, it is the cli
ent who should yield to the lawyer and not the other way around. A lawyer must a
lso observe and advice his client to observe the statute law, thought until a st
atute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent jurisdiction, he is
free and is entitled to advice as to its validity and as to what he conscientio
usly believes to be its just meaning and extent

(viii)Concurrent practice of another profession Canon 15 Rule 15.08 - A lawyer w

ho is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice
of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in an
other capacity. CJC RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule
, a judge may hold and manage investments but should not serve as officer, direc
tor, manager or advisor, or employee of any business except as director of a fam
ily business of the judge.
NAKPIL V. VALDES
(A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998) (286 SCRA 758)
FACTS: Atty. Carlos Valdes was the lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils. Jose Na
kpil wanted to buy a summer residence in Baguio City but because of lack of fund
s, he agreed that Atty. Valdes would keep the property in trust until the Nakpil
s could buy it back. Atty. Valdes took out two loans to purchase the property. L
ater, Jose Nakpil died. The ownership of the Baguio property became an issue in
the intestate proceedings as Valdes excluded it from the inventory of Joses estat
e. Valdes then transferred his title to the property to his company. The adminis
tratrix filed an administrative case to disbar Valdes for (1) maliciously approp
riating the property in trust to his family corporation (2) including in the cla
ims against the estate the amounts of the two loans which he claimed were Joses l
oans and (3) for conflict of interest, since his auditing firm prepared the list
of claims of creditors who were also represented by his law firm. ISSUE: May At
ty. Valdes be disbarred in this case. HELD: The Court suspended Atty. Valdes. Bu
siness transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discou
raged by policy of law because by virtue of a lawyers office, he is an easy posit
ion to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, there
is no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing in favor of lawyer
s. MOREOVER, the proscription against representation of conflicting interests fi
nds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same g
eneral matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It
applies although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in
good faith. Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the pa
rties give an informed consent to the representation after full disclosure of fa
cts. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflic
t and the possible adverse effects must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
The test to determine whether there is conflict of interest in the representati
on is the probability, not the certainty of conflict.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 94 c) Clients mon
eys and properties CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPER
TIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Art. 1491 of the NCC. The
following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial aucti
on, either in person or through the mediation of another: (5) Justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officer
s and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and r
ights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose ju
risdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibiti
on includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Effects of Prohibited Pu
rchase - A prohibited purchase is null and void ab initio; public interest and p
ublic policy dictate that its nullity is definite and permanent and cannot be cu
red by ratification. The lawyer will be deemed to hold the property in trust for
the client. The client is therefore entitled to recover property and interest f
rom his attorney with the fruits. The client should, however, return the purchas
e price and the legal interests. ORDONIO V. EDUARTE
(A.M. No. 3216, March 16, 1992) (207 SCRA 229)
FACTS: In one civil case, Antonia Ulibari through her counsel Atty. Josephine Ed
uarte, obtained a favourable decision from the RTC. While the case was pending a
ppeal, Antonia Ulibari conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty. Eduarte as her Atto
rney s fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of
the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the na
me of Antonia Ulibari. Later, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed a complaint for disb
arment against Atty. Eduarte on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother
Antonia Ulibari stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land
to Atty. Eduarte as her attorney s fees. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP, to which the case was referred for investigation, found Atty. Eduarte guil
ty of violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of Office
. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Eduarte has violated the law in this case. HELD: Y
ES. Even if Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject prope
rty in favor of Atty. Eduarte, the latter, in causing the execution of the Deed
of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said p
roperty, has violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers fro
m "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be the object of any li
tigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession." In the case
at bar, the property was already in actual litigation first in the lower court
and then in the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at
the instance of the client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers is o
f no moment. In either case, an attorney occupies a vantage position to press up
on or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply pro
tective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between atto
rney and client and of the rights of both. The act constitutes malpractice, even
if the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation. For having improperly a
cquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, Atty. Eduarte h
as violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any i
nterest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting."

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 95

DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR. V. ATTY. MINERVO T.LANGIT T.LANGIT
(A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006)
FACTS: David L. Almendarez, Jr. filed a complaint before the IBP seeking the dis
barment of Atty. Minervo T. Langit for acts unbecoming a lawyer. Complainant was
the plaintiff in an ejectment case. Respondent served as complainant s counsel.
While the case was pending, defendant in ejectment case Roger Bumanlag deposite
d monthly rentals for the property in dispute to the Branch Clerk of Court. The
trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case based on a compromise agre
ement executed by complainant and Bumanlag. The court granted the Motion for Exe
cution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as complainant s
counsel. Complainant learned that respondent was able to withdraw the rentals de
posited by Bumanlag but respondent did not inform complainant. Complainant, thro
ugh his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent a final demand letter for the a
ccounting and return of the amount. Respondent failed to reply. The IBP found th
at respondent failed to account for money he held in trust for complainant. ISSU
E: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for acts unbecoming o
f a lawyer and betraying the confidence of his client. HELD: YES. Respondent com
mitted a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money repres
enting the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and r
eturning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his ca
pacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust
for complainant. The Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states: CANON
16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MA
Y COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or pro
perty collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deli
ver the funds and property to his client when due or upon demand. However, he sh
all have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments an
d executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court
. Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court s a
pproval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the fun
ds to him, respondent could have collected any lien which he had over them in co
nnection with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant.
A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client s money for him
self by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney s fees. In this case, re
spondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other righ
t that he had to retain the money. Respondent s failure to turn over the money t
o complainant despite the latter s demands gives rise to the presumption that he
had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. This is a gross viola
tion of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public con
fidence in the legal profession. More specifically, it renders respondent liable
not only for violating the Code but also for contempt, as stated in Section 25,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client s funds; contempt When an attorney unjustl
y retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his offic
ial transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a cri
minal prosecution.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 96 LOURDES R. BU

SIOS V. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT
(A.C. No. 4349, December 22, 1997)
FACTS: Complainant Lourdes R. Busios filed a case of estafa against Respondent At
ty. Francisco Ricafort for misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00, of which P30,
000.00 was entrusted to respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainan
ts husband while P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent demanded from compla
inant supposedly for a bond in Civil Case but it was subsequently dropped upon p
ayment of the respondent of the amount allegedly owed to the complainant. Howeve
r, the administrative case was pursued by the complainant claiming gross miscond
uct on the part of the respondent as to the delayed payment of his despite sever
al demands from her and her lawyer, in addition to the asking of P2,000.00 above
mentioned, for which stated purpose such was not even required. ISSUE: Whether o
r not Atty. Francisco Ricafort is guilty of gross misconduct for his delayed pay
ment of his debt (the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained) despit
e several demands. HELD: Atty. Francisco Ricafort is guilty of gross misconduct
for his delayed payment of debt. His belated payment of the amount he illegally
used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any liability if only to
impress upon him that the relation between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential charac
ter, requiring high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special r
elationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property receive
d by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes profession
al misconduct. Moreover, the Respondent, by converting the money of his clients
to his own personal use without their consent, and by deceiving the complainant
into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a bond which w
as not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross miscon
duct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not
only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the f
air name of an honorable profession. Plainly, respondent breached Rules 16.01, 1
6.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(i)
Fiduciary relationship
Canon 16 Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client. PARIAS V. PAGUINTO
(AC No. 6297, July 13, 2004)
FACTS: Dolores Parias engaged the services of Atty. Oscar Paguinto to annul her m
arriage to Danilo Soriano. Parias paid Atty. Paguinto P10, 000.00 in cash as part
ial payment of the acceptance fee. An acknowledgment receipt evidenced this paym
ent. Before the end of December 2001, Parias gave Atty. Paguinto P2, 500.00 for t
he filing fee. Atty. Paguinto led Parias to believe that he had filed the annulme
nt case. Atty. Paguinto informed Parias that the case was filed with the RTC-Mani
la before Judge Ricaforte. However, Parias later found out that Atty. Paguinto ne
ver filed the annulment case in court. Parinas demanded the return of the filing
fee given but Paguinto did not return the same. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pag
uinto violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes, Atty. Paguint
o violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 97 HELD: Yes, At
ty. Paguinto violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility whic
h provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected for o
r from the client. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-cli
ent relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Mon
ey entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not
used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on
demand. Atty. Paguinto returned the money only after Parias filed the administra
tive case for disbarment.
LEMOINE V. BALON
(A.C. No. 5829, October 28, 2003) (414 SCRA 511)
FACTS: Daniel Lemoine filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insuranc
e Company (Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. A
s he encountered problems in pursuing his claim, his friend, a certain Jesus Gar
cia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of Atty. Amadeo Balons services. Balon
was charging 25% of the amount actually recovered payable upon the successful re
covery, among others. The said attorneys fee was not agreed to by Lemoine. Lemoin
e left for France but before he left he signed an undated special power of attor
ney allowing Lemoine to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the
satisfaction of the complaint as well as to negotiate, sign and compromise, enca
sh and receives payment. Metro Insurance issued a check worth 525k as full settl
ement. Garcia told Lemoine that Balon had told him that the claim was still pend
ing and that it was subject to negotiation and that it had offered 350k or 50% o
f the policy. When Lemoine returned to the Philippines and paid a visit to the M
etro Insurance he was informed that the claim had been settled a year prior. He
then proceeded to the office of Balon to demand an explanation, however Balon wa
s not there. They had a phone conversation where he demanded the return of the p
roceeds of the claim. Balon claimed that he had in his possession the proceeds b
ut that there was a lien for his fees on pending payment of his attorneys fees a
t 50% of the amount collected. In a letter, there were threats at deportation an
d investigation by the NBI, DOLE and BIR where Balon is supposedly well connecte
d. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Balon violated the CPR? HELD: Canon 16 Rule 16.01
of the CPR states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collect
ed or received for or from the client. This commandment entails certain specific
acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or pro
perty received for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or proper
ty to the client when due or upon demand. Atty. Balon breached this Canon when a
fter he received the proceeds of complainants insurance claim, he did not report
it to Lemoine. By Atty. Balons failure to promptly account for the funds he recei
ved and held for the benefit of his client, he committed professional misconduct
. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously don
e on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant wh
o was kept in the dark about the release of the check, until he himself discover
ed the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof. A
lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not onl
y violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but al
so degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession. Tha
t Atty. Balon had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not reli
eve him of his duty to account for it. The lawyers continuing exercise of his ret
aining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees
to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount f
or being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the fund
s in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file, if he still deems i
t desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix
the amount of such fees.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 98 LEONILA J. LI

CUANAN V. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO
(A.M. No. 2361, February 9, 1989) (170 SCRA 100)
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court
Administrator against Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics,
alleging that the latter who was her counsel in an ejectment case, failed to rem
it to her the rentals collected by him on different dates over a twelve-month pe
riod, much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only af
ter approximately a year from actual receipt that Atty. Licuanan turned over his
collections to her after demand. Atty. Licuanan admitted having received the pa
yment of rentals from complainant s tenant but explained that he kept this matte
r from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in col
lecting the rentals. ISSUE: Whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of
Atty. Licuanan in accounting for the funds collected by him for his former clien
t for which unprofessional conduct respondent should be disciplined. HELD: Yes.
The conduct of Atty. Licuanan is a breach of the Lawyer s Oath to which he swore
and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the Ca
non, money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property com
ing into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promp
tly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used
by him. Indeed, by his professional misconduct, Atty. Licuanan has breached the
trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confiden
ce and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the p
ractice of law. DUMADAG V. LUMAYA LUMAYA
(A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000) (197 SCRA 303)
FACTS: In one civil case involving a sale of a parcel of land filed by Maximo Du
madag through his counsel Atty. Ernesto Lumaya, a compromise agreement has been
reached whereupon the Avellanosas are to pay Dumadag the amount of Php 4,644.00.
The Avellanosas paid the said amount to Dumadag through the latters counsel. How
ever, Atty. Lumaya failed to deliver to Dumadag the said money despite the latte
rs demand. Thus, the administrative charge for unethical practice was filed by Du
madag against Atty. Lumaya. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lumaya is guilty of unet
hical practice. HELD: YES. Canon 16 Rule 16.01 of the Canons of Professional Res
ponsibility requires a lawyer to account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. This rule Atty. Lumaya has violated making him
guilty of unethical practice of law.
(ii) Co-mingling of funds Canon 16 Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of
each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
(iii) Delivery of funds Canon 16 Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds a
nd property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgements and executions h
e has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 99 Rule 138 SEC.
37 of the Rules of Court an attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents
and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the s
ame extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client
, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, o
r issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be del
ivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right
and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce
his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
QUILBAN V. ROBINOL
(A.M. No. 2144, April 10, 1989) (171 SCRA 768)
FACTS: Congressman Luis R. Taruc broached the idea of donating or selling a parc
el of land somewhere in Quezon City to the squatters. Following such advice, the
squatters formed the Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala, with Bernabe Martin a
s President. However, Martin sold the said land to Maximo Rivera, a realtor, to
the exclusion of the other Samahan members. The members of the Samahan filed a c
ivil case against Rivera but were dismissed. On appeal, they hired Atty. Santiag
o R. Robinol. The latter was able to obtain a reversal of the said decision. The
Court of Appeals ordered that Rivera be reimbursed the amount of P41,961.65 for
the expenses he incurred for the land. The officers of the Samahan raised a tot
al amount of P75,000.00 and gave it Atty. Robinol. However, he made no payment t
o Rivera. As a consequence, complainants filed an administrative case against hi
m for unethical practice. On the other hand, Atty. Robinol claims lien over the
subject money in lieu of the services rendered by him invoking the principle of
quantum meruit. ISSUES: Whether or not respondent can be held guilty of ethical
infractions and grave misconduct HELD: YES. His violation was that he retained i
n his possession his clients funds intended for a specific purpose. His act, unde
r the circumstances, was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were
mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. Atty. Robinol he is beref
t of any legal right to retain his clients funds intended for a specific purpos
e the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to the
ir rightful owners. The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is emplo
yed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entit
led to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In thi
s case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensa
tion. The implied assumption quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
If client agrees with lawyer as to the amount of attorneys fees and as to the app
lication of the clients fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursement, a lawyer ma
y deduct what is due him and remit the balance to his client. If no such agreeme
nt or consent or if there is dispute or disagreement as to the fees, he should r
eturn everything to client without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his
unsatisfied fees. (Agpalo)
This rule grants the lawyer a lien over the clients funds in his possession as we
ll as on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client, to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 100 (iv) Borrowi
ng or lending Canon 16 Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his cli
ent unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, wh
en in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal m
atter he is handling for the client.
Art. 1491 of the NCC. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of anoth
er: (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of j
ustice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and sha
ll apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the ob
ject of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession
. RUBIAS V. BATILLER
(G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973) (51 SCRA 120)
FACTS: Francisco Militante claimed that he owned a parcel of land located in Ilo
ilo. He filed with the CFI of Iloilo an application for the registration of titl
e of the land but the same was denied. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pend
ing that appeal, he sold to Rubias (his son-inlaw and a lawyer) the land. The CA
rendered a decision, dismissing the application for registration. Rubias filed
a Forcible Entry and Detainer case against Batiller. In that case, the court hel
d that Rubias has no cause of action because the property in dispute which Rubia
s allegedly bought from Militante was the subject matter of a land case, in whic
h case Rubias was the counsel on record of Militante himself. It thus falls unde
r Article1491 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rubias may purchase
the land subject of the case he handles. Held: NO. Article 1491 says that The fo
llowing persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public or judicial auctio
n, either in person or through the mediation of another. (5) Justices, judges, pr
osecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rig
hts in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose juri
sdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with re
spect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in wh
ich they may take part by virtue of their profession. The present case clearly fa
lls under this, especially since the case was still pending appeal when the sale
was made. IN RE RUSTE, RUSTE, 70 Phil 243 (1973) FACTS: Atty. Melchor Ruste app
eared as counsel for the San Juan spouses in a cadastral proceeding. An 11/12 sh
are of the estate was adjudged in her favor. Atty. Ruste demanded for his fees.
The couple did not have enough money to pay him, so he asked them to execute in
his favor a contract of sale of their share of Lot No. 3764, intending to apply
a portion of the would-be proceeds as payment for his fees. The spouses complied
. The land was sold but the proceeds was kept by Ruste and never reached the han
ds of the San Juan couple. ISSUES: Whether or not Ruste committed malpractice.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 101 HELD: YES. W
hether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses
driven by financial necessity (as contended by Ruste) or at their behest (as con
tended by the couple) is immaterial. In either case, the lawyer occupies a vanta
ge position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client in breach of
the "rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessa
rily exist between attorney and client and of the rights of both."
What is a Champerty? Champerty? A bargain by a stranger (the lawyer) with a part
y to a suit (the client) by which such third person undertakes to carry on the l
itigation at his own expense and risk, in consideration of receiving, if success
ful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. What is a Champer
tous Contract? Contract? Where the lawyer assumes all expenses of litigation and
reimbursement is contingent on outcome of case is prohibited. Champertous contr
acts are like wagersthe lawyer gets paid and reimbursed if he wins the case and l
oses even what he had spent on the case if he loses.
d) Fidelity to clients cause CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HI
S CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CAN
TILLER V. POTENCIANO
(A.M. No. 3195, December 18,1989) (180 SCRA 246)
FACTS: Humberto V. Potenciano is a lawyer. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and
misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbe
coming of an officer of the court. In an action for ejectment filed against Pere
grina Cantiller, the latter lost and was ordered to vacate. Cantiller then asked
Atty. Potenciano to handle their case. She was made to sign by Atty. Potenciano
of what she described as a "hastily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly
composed petition for annulment of judgment. It was filed with the RTC however t
he judge of the said court asked Atty. Potenciano to withdraw as counsel by reas
on of their friendship. Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded b
y the latter which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will iss
ue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating t
he judge. Contrary to Potencianos promise that he would secure a restraining orde
r, he withdrew his appearance as counsel for Cantiller. The latter was not able
to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was eventually
enforced and executed. ISSUE: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as c
ounsel of Cantiller. HELD: YES. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby
covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conc
lusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client s c
ause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him
. A lawyer has a duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his clie
nt and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. More so w
here by reason of his gross negligence his client thereby suffered by losing all
her cases. Lawyers should be fair, honest, and respectable, above suspicion and
beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous
with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 102 ROLLON V. AT
TY. NARAVAL
(A.C. No. 6424, March 4, 2005) (452 SCRA 675)
FACTS: Consorcia Rollon, together with her son, went to the office of Atty. Cami
lo Naraval to seek his assistance in a case filed against her for Collection of
Sum of Money. After going through the documents, Atty. Naraval agreed to be Roll
ons lawyer and required her to pay P8,000 as filing and partial service fee. As p
er instruction of Atty. Naraval, Rollons son returned to his office to follow up
however the former told the son that he was not able to act on the case because
he was busy. After several follow-ups and still no action, Rollon decided to wit
hdraw the amount paid to Atty. Naraval for failure of the latter to comply with
their mutual agreement. Atty. Naraval said that he could not return the document
s because the same were in his house and the P8,000 paid by Rollon because he ha
s no money. Rollon thus files an administrative charge against Atty. Naraval for
unethical practice of law. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Naraval is guilty of une
thical practice of law. HELD: YES. Canon 17 requires that a lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they
can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawye
rs agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and ca
re. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath. The circumstances of
this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing a
nd partial service fee, Atty. Naraval failed to render any legal service in rela
tion to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow
-ups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward hi
s clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Atty. Naraval cle
arly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inabi
lity to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just
to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general publ
ic. SUAREZ V. CA
(G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993) (220 SCRA 274)
FACTS: In criminal cases for violation of BP 22 of the Bouncing Check Law agains
t Romina Suarez, she had for her counsel Atty. Vicente San Luis. At the trial of
the case, when it is the defense turn to offer evidence, Atty. San Luis did not
appear. He left for good to USA without formally withdrawing himself from the c
ase neither did he inform Suarez that he would be leaving. Trial ensued and judg
ment was rendered against Suarez. Thereafter, Suarez filed an admin case against
Atty. San Luis for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for having abandoned her in c
ourt which results to her being prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting
her defense. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. San Luis is guilty of conduct unbecomin
g of a lawyer. HELD: The legal difficulty Suarez finds herself in is imputable t
o the negligence of her de parte counsel, Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning
the conduct of the case without formally withdrawing or at least informing petit
ioner that he would be permanently staying in the U.S.A. so that petitioner coul
d appoint another counsel. A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his c
lient. He owes his client full devotion to his genuine interests, warm zeal in t
he maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learnin
g and ability. A lawyer is required to exercise ordinary diligence or that reaso
nable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business
he undertakes to do. Among his duties to his client is attending to the hearing
s of the case.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 103 SOLATAN V. I
NOCENTES
(A.C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005) (466 SCRA 1)
FACTS: The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office were retained by spouses Ge
nito, owners of an apartment complex. They represented the spouses in ejectment
cases against nonpaying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. Complainants sis
ter was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. A complaint for ejectment for non-pay
ment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a judgment
by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Complainant informed Atty. Inoce
ntes of his desire to arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of
which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him
to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of t
he Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement w
as made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his siste
r, including awarded attorneys fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check
in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorneys fees. Complainant
failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano
enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject a
partment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied
properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty. Ca
manos advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who
released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complain
ant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he w
as temporarily staying. Complainant filed the instant administrative case for di
sbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes. HELD: The fidelity lawyers ow
e their clients is traditionally characterized as undivided. This means that lawye
rs must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or im
pairment from any conflicting interest. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal
advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resultin
g in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be i
t that every utterance of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some
relief adverse to the formers client may be labeled as a culpable act of disloya
lty. While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment d
ebtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the properties. C
onsequently, the latter had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering th
e circumstances, the questioned statement is in consonance with complainants fore
most duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. C
amano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice i
n conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have
no interest over the incorrectly levied properties. We, thus, note that the act
of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him up
on showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest
of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double d
ealing and betrayal of the latters confidence so as to deserve outright categoriz
ation as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients cause. IN RE SUSPENSION FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW, LAW, 435 SCRA 417 FACTS: Atty. Leon G. Maquera was admitted to
the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On 1974, he was admitted to the practi
ce of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in
Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client s property as payment for his le
gal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fe
e for handling his client s case. The District Court of Guam would want the IBP
to look into this case for appropriate action (suspension or disbarment). On the
basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that alt
hough the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence
to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 104 ISSUE: May a
member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice o
f law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney b
e meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infract
ion committed in the foreign jurisdiction? HELD: Maquera s acts in Guam which re
sulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdict
ion are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Ph
ilippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer s sworn duty to act with fidelity
toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Respons
ibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to t
he cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in
him."
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e) of the Rules of Court Court: To maintain inviolate the con
fidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, a
nd to accept no compensation in connection with his client s business except fro
m him or with his knowledge and approval. Rule 138, Sec. 20 (f) of the Rules of
Court: Court To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact pr
ejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by
the justice of the cause with which he is charged. NGAYAN V. TUGADE
(G.R. No. 1991) (193 SCRA 779)
FACTS: Ngayan asked Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a com
plaint against Soriano and Leonido as a consequence of the latters entry into com
plainants dwelling. Ngayan signed the affidavit without thoroughly reading it but
she noticed one paragraph which did not mention that Leonido was with Soriano w
hen they both barged into complainants residence. Upon being informed of this omi
ssion, Tugade crossed out the said paragraph. Ngayan asked Tugade to make anothe
r affidavit and the latter promised to do so. For some reason, Ngayan discharged
Tugade as their counsel. He also found out that Tugade did not include the name
of Leonido in the criminal case filed. When the omission was remedied by their
new counsel, the adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation through thei
r counsel, Atty. Gaminda, who was a former classmate of Tugade. Tugade was also
the lawyer of the brother of Leonido in an insurance company. In the hearing for
the motion for reinvestigation, the adverse parties in affidavit which Tugade p
repared for Ngayan, with one paragraph crossed out, Tugade himself presented an
affidavit controverting the discarded affidavit which he prepared for Ngayan. Th
us Ngayan charged Tugade for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f), Sec.20, Rule 1
38 Rules of Court (e) to maintain inviolate the confidenceand to preserve the sec
rets of his client (f) to abstain from all offensive personality..against a party
or witness ISSUE: Whether or not Tugade must be disciplined for violation of the
said Rule. HELD: YES. When Tugade furnished the adverse parties with a copy of
the discarded affidavit, thus enabling the adverse parties to use it as evidence
against complainants, he betrayed the trust and confidence of his clients in vi
olation of paragraph (e) Sec.20 Rule 138. Tugades actuations from the beginning s
how that he was partial to the adverse parties. This could be explained by the f
act that he was a former classmate of Atty. Gaminda, the adverse parties counsel,
and also by the fact that he was the lawyer of Leonidos brother in an insurance
company. Tugade submitted an affidavit containing facts prejudicial to his forme
r client such as the fact that the crime charged by Ngayan had already prescribe
d, and that Ngayan asked him to make the offense graver to prevent the offense f
rom prescribing. This constitutes an act of offensive personality against compla
inants, violative of par. (f) Sec.20 Rule 138.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 105

BUN SIONG YAO V. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO
(A.C. No. 7023, March 30, 2006)
FACTS: The complainant, Bun Siong Yao, is a majority stockholder of Solar Farms
& Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. He alleged tha
t since 1987, he retained the services of another stockholder, Atty. Leonardo Au
relio, as his personal lawyer, who also happened to be the brother-in-law of his
wife. In 1999, they had a disagreement. Atty. Aurelio then filed cases against
Yao and his wife. Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his
wife is a form of harassment and constitute an abuse of the confidential inform
ation which Atty. Aurelio obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. The C
omplainant further argued that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests when he filed several suits not only against the complainant and the o
ther officers of the corporation, but also against the two corporations which he
is both a stockholder and retained counsel. Atty. Aurelio, on the other hand, c
laimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Sol
ar Textile Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential informatio
n in pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only used those information which
he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder of Solar Textile Finishing Corp
oration. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aurelio violated Canon 17 of the Code of Pr
ofessional Responsibility. HELD: Atty. Aurelio has violated Canon 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He took advantage of his being a lawyer in orde
r to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized inform
ation he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainants compani
es for his own end. It is essential to note that the relationship between an att
orney and his client is a fiduciary one as Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides, a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confid
ence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitt
ed to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consent
s. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at
the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perp
etual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affec
ted by the party s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by a
ny other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the clie
nt. Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their cli
ents and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond repr
oach. Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of e
xacting vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any personmost e
specially against a client or former client. As the Court stated in Marcelo v. J
avier, Sr.: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requir
e in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, h
is profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standar
d of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speakin
g, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his du
ties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, noth
ing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to les
sen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and inte
grity of the profession.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 106 e) Competenc
e and diligence CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND D
ILIGENCE.
Competence It is that sufficiency of lawyers qualifications to deal with the matt
er in question and includes knowledge and skill and the ability to use them effe
ctively in the interest of the client
Diligence It is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation
and is the opposite of negligence. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that th
e price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client. Lawyer impli
edly represents that: he possesses requisite degree of learning, skill, ability
which is necessary to the practice of his profession and which other similarly s
ituated possess; he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense o
f the litigation entrusted to him; he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care
and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge t
o his clients cause; He will take such steps as will adequately safeguard his cli
ents interest. A client may reasonably expect that counsel will make good his rep
resentations. (Agpalo)
(i)
Collaborating counsel
Canon 18 Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he know
s or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating coun
sel a lawyer who is competent on the matter. However well meaning he may be, a l
awyer cannot ask another lawyer to collaborate with him in a particular case wit
hout the consent of the client. The fiduciary nature of attorney-client relation
ship prohibits this. (Aguirre) Some cases involve specialized fields of law and
require special training. A lawyer should not accept an undertaking in specific
area of law which he knows or should know he is not qualified to enter. (Agpalo)
(ii) Adequate protection Canon 18 Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any leg
al matter without adequate preparation. Lawyer should safeguard his clients right
s and interests by thorough study and preparation; mastering applicable law and
facts involved in a case, regardless of the nature of the assignment; and keepin
g constantly abreast of the latest jurisprudence and developments in all branche
s of the law (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 107 SAN MIGUEL C
ORPORATION V. LAGUESMA
(G.R. No. 100485, September 21, 1994)
FACTS: The North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union filed with the DOLE a petition
for certification election among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Da
iry Products in the North Luzon Sales Area. San Miguel Corporation (SMC) opposed
the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought t
o be represented by respondent union. The petition was heard with petitioner bei
ng represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion Reyna law office. Atty.
Batalla withdrew petitioner s opposition to a certification election and agreed
to consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At t
he preelection conference, the parties agreed inter alia, on the date, time and
place of the consent election. Respondent union won the election. Thus, responde
nt union became the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sale
s personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luz
on Sales Area. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor claiming that Atty.
Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for Atty. Ona and was allegedly unfamili
ar with the collective bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner claim
s it should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer. ISSU
E: Whether or not SMC should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substi
tute lawyer in this case. HELD: The collective bargaining history of a company i
s not decisive of what should comprise the collective bargaining unit. Insofar a
s the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that this
mistake was the direct result of the negligence of petitioner s lawyers. It wil
l be noted that Atty. Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers. Th
ere is nothing in the records to show that these two (2) counsels were likewise
unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the hearing, petitioner s counsel
s chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such case, the
lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC s labor case should have adequately a
nd sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters involv
ed in the case and the specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately, this was
not done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner.
(iii) Negligence Canon 18 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him
liable. DINOY V. ROSAL
(Admin Case No. 3721, August 17, 1994)
FACTS: Mr. Julian C. Dinoy sent the Secretary of Justice an unverified letter ch
arging Atty. Jesus Rosal with having notarized a Special Power of Attorney in fa
vor of one Estela Gentacutan, at a time when some of the principals mentioned in
the document were already dead. The matter was referred to the IBP which finds
the charge duly substantiated and recommends the suspension of Atty. Rosal from
the practice of law. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jesus Rosal be suspended from t
he practice of law. HELD: Notarization of a private document converts such docum
ent into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof o
f its authenticity. Consequently, it is the duty of the notarial officer to dema
nd that a document be signed in his presence by the real parties thereto; the no
tarial officer must observe "utmost care" to comply with the elementary formalit
ies in the performance of his duties. This, the respondent fails to observe, thu
s, his suspension.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 108 LEGARDA V. C
A
(G.R. No. 94457, June 10, 1992) (209 SCRA 722)
FACTS: Atty. Antonio Coronel is the counsel of one Victoria Legarda in a civil c
ase for specific performance filed against the latter by the New Cathay House In
c. When asked by Court to file their answer, Legarda through Atty. Coronel ask f
or an extension of time which was granted. Thereafter, Atty. Coronel did not lif
t a finger to file an answer. Neither did he file a motion for reconsideration a
fter judgment by the trial court; nor did he initiate moves towards an appeal of
the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his client. Consequently, Att
y. Coronel was required by the Court to show cause why he should not be liable a
dministratively for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to
his client. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Coronel be liable administratively for h
is acts and omissions in this case. HELD: YES. The facts of the case clearly sho
w that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibilit
y which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and dilig
ence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requi
res that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his ne
gligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Undoubtedly, Atty. Co
ronel s failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the int
erest of his client caused the latter material prejudice. It should be remembere
d that the moment a lawyer takes a client s cause; he covenants that he will exe
rt all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails
to exercise due diligence or abandons his client s cause makes him unworthy of
the trust reposed on him by the latter. Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only
to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel f
ailed to obey this Court s order even on a matter that personally affects him, s
uch that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on professional se
lf-destruction. ATTY. ATTY. SOLIDON V. ATTY. MACALALAD
(A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010)
FACTS: Macalalad is the Chief of the DENR Legal Division and that while he is in
public service he was allowed by the DENR Secretary to practice law. While in S
amar, he was introduced to Atty. Solidon who asked him to handle the titling of
a land located there, the entire task was to be completed within 8 months. Initi
al payment has been made. To date, Macalalad has not filed any petition for regi
stration over the property. Solidon allegedly followed up with Macalalad through
text and calls. Macalalad on the other hand, claims that the failure was due to
Solidons lack of communication with him in addition to the lack of documentary e
vidence. IBP found that Macalalad failed to present any reasonable excuse for th
e filing of the application; that this was a violation of 18.03, thus, his suspe
nsion. ISSUE: Was the suspension of Atty. Macalalad proper? HELD: Yes. A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and negligence in connection t
herewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Profession
al Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03 A la
wyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewi
th shall render him liable. The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligat
ions due to the client is
considered per se a violation. A certain Cabo-BOrata in an affidavit said that s
he was able to contact Macaladlad easily and that when asked about progress of t
he case he was vague. Saying it was in process. Macaladlad never contested this
claim. Because of the time period fixed by the parties, he should have taken pro
mpt action to communicate with his clients. He should have initiated contact wit
h them. He had already been paid and thus he should have at least taken some ste
ps toward the fulfilment of his task.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 109 BARBUCO V. A
TTY. BELTRAN
(A.C. No. 5092, August 11, 2004)
FACTS: Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltr
an for malpractice of law, negligence and dishonesty. It appears that complainan
t, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the pur
pose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Complainants appeal was dis
missed by the Court of Appeals for failure to file Appellants Brief, pursuant to
Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Complainant found ou
t that her appeal had been dismissed only when her son went to the Court of Appe
als to verify the status of the case. Respondent Beltran averred that the docket
fees were paid on time and that he filed the Appellants Brief with the Court of
Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed. Respondent then alleged that he file
d a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that he received the notice to fil
e brief on June 25, 1998; however, on June 26, 1998, he met a vehicular accident
which physically incapacitated him for several days; and that as a result of th
e accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose track of deadline
s for the filing of pleadings. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Beltran be suspended
for failing to file appellants brief resulting to the dismissal of his clients cas
e? HELD: Yes. Lawyer suspended for failing to file appellants brief resulting to
the dismissal of his clients case. Rule 18.03 provides that: a lawyer shall not ne
glect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewit
h shall render him liable. An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to
the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within
the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so i
f the delay of forty-three (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. Th
at Respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injurie
s as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on ti
me considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawye
r. Respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the
Appellants Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to
file the said pleading. Failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusa
ble negligence on Respondents part. RIZALINO FERNANDEZ V. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO,
JR
(A.C. No. 5394, December 2, 2002)
FACTS: Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty. Reyna
ldo Novero, Jr. for alleged patent and gross neglect in the handling of their ci
vil case against the Bacolod City Water District. The complainants imputed that
the respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing nor seek a postponement, for
which reason the trial court considered respondent to have waived further prese
ntation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits. However
, respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits, prompting the trial court to
order the dismissal of the case. The respondent filed a motion for reconsiderat
ion of the order of dismissal however he did not file his motion within the regl
ementary period. He even tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming tha
t the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last witness
. The truth was that complainants sister had already testified. The respondent co
ntended that complainant engaged his legal services after the first counsel had
withdrawn and he had no knowledge of what had happened in the case before he han
dled it because complainant did not furnish him with the records and stenographi
c notes of the previous proceedings despite his repeated requests. He alleged th
at he failed to formally offer the exhibits because complainant tried to take ov
er the handling of the case by insisting on presenting more witnesses who failed
to appear during trial. The Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report find
ing respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility an
d recommending his suspension.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 110

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling of t
he civil case? HELD: The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep
in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance would be
binding on his client. A lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost pruden
ce and capability in that representation. The respondents attempt to evade respo
nsibility by shifting the blame on complainant due to the latters failure to turn
over to him records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his inco
mpetence and inadequacy in handling the complainants case. The respondent Atty.
Novero is found guilty of neglect of his clients case.
(iv) Duty to apprise client Canon 18 Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time t
o clients request for information.
BLANZA V. ARCANGEL
(A.C. No. 492, September 5, 1967) (21 SCRA1)
FACTS: Atty. Agustin Arcangel volunteered to be the counsel of Olegaria Blanza a
nd Maria Pasion in a labor case for pension claims. Later, the two ask the Court
to take disciplinary action against Atty. Arcangel for professional non-feasanc
e on the following grounds: (1) his failure to attend to complainants pension cla
ims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite r
epeated demands upon him; and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, a
llegedly all of her documents. Atty. Arcangel contended that the complainants fa
iled to cooperate and pay for the Photostat services and that there were no agre
ements as to his compensation as counsel. These the complainants did not controv
ert. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arcangel is liable as charge. HELD: No. The Cou
rt ruled in this case that the evidence presented by the complainants is insuffi
cient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against Atty. Arcangel. The C
ourt is constrained to dismiss the charges against Atty. Arcangel for being lega
lly insufficient, yet, the court must counsel against his acts as a member of th
e bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merel
y complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law her
is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. Atty.
Arcangel here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to ha
ve complainants wait and hope for 6 long years. Upon their refusal to cooperate,
Atty. Arcangel should have terminated the professional relationship, instead of
keeping them hanging.
The standard of diligence required of a lawyer is that of a good father of a fam
ily. He is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence. There is want of requi
red diligence when a lawyer fails without sufficient justification to bring an a
ction immediately, to answer a complaint within the reglementary period, to noti
fy his client of the date of the date of hearing, to attend the scheduled pre-tr
ial conference, to inform the client of an adverse judgment within the reglement
ary period to appeal, to take steps to have the adverse decision reconsidered or
appealed, to ascertain the correct date of receipt of decision, to acquaint him
self with what has happened to the litigation, to pay docket fee on appeal, to c
laim judicial notice sent to him by mail or to file the appellants brief.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 111 OFELIA R. SO
MOSOT V. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA
(A.C. No. 7024, January 30, 2009)
FACTS: In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that
she retained the services of the respondent as her counsel in a collection case
filed by Golden Collection Marketing Corporation against her and other co-defend
ants. Her defense was that it was the corporation who actually owed her. The res
pondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his appearance as counsel aft
er securing his acceptance fee. However, that after filing the Answer to the Com
plaint, the respondent lawyer fails to informed her of the developments in the c
ase. She only heard about the case when there was already a decision against her
and her co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sough
t his discharge as counsel without her knowledge and consent. Contrary to the re
spondent s claim that he could no longer locate her, she claimed that the respon
dent knew all along where she lived and could have easily contacted her had he b
een in good faith. Respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence re
quired of him as counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lara is deemed incompetent
in his services to Mrs. Ofelia Somosot. DECISION: YES. He violated the basic ru
le under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that "a lawyer shal
l serve his client with competence and diligence." While it may be said that the
respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handling of the complainant
s defense left much to be desired. The complainant was never informed the devel
opment of the case and the omission eventually led to the grant of the plaintiff
s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to the decision again
st the defendants. The respondent failed to provide details on the developments
that led to the adverse rulings on the interrogatories/admissions and the judgme
nt on the pleadings.
f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRES
ENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. (i) Use of fair and hones
t means
Canon 19 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in prese
nting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper ad
vantage in any case or proceeding.
Rule 138 SEC. 20 (d) of the Rules of Court It is the duty of an attorney: (d) To
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means o
nly as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge
or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law
The rule is that in espousing his clients cause, a lawyer should not state his pe
rsonal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case. The reasons: the lawye
rs personal belief has no real bearing on the case; if expression of belief were
permitted, it would give improper advantage to the older and better known lawyer
whose opinion would carry more weight; If such were permitted, omission to make
such assertion might be taken as an admission of the lack or belief in the soun
dness of his clients cause. (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 112 PENA V. ATTY
. APARICIO
(A.C. No. 7298 Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565)
FACTS: FACTS: In herein case, respondent lawyer, in the exercise of his zeal to
defend the interest of his client sent a letter to the company who was his clien
ts employer. Unfortunately, the said demand letter included threats amounting to bl
ackmail, specifically the words were: BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 20
05, 2005 we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral
damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the abovementioned words violated Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative ratiocina
ting that Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawye
r shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding le
gal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administrat
ion of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his c
onduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest m
eans to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, partic
ipate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should
not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases a
gainst the adversaries of his client designed to secure leverage to compel the a
dversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers client. In th
e case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Thro
ugh his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the
amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts incl
uding moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsificat
ion of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violati
ons of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they
also amount to blackmail.
(ii)
Clients fraud
Canon 19 Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribu
nal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which
he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rule
s of Court.
(iii) Procedure in handling the case Canon 19 Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not al
low his client to dictate the procedure on handling the case.
A lawyer should seek instruction from his client on any substantial matter conce
rning the litigation, which requires decision on the part of the client. In proc
edural matters, the client must yield to the lawyer. (Agpalo) The rule is that i
n matters of law, it is the client who should yield to the lawyer and not the ot
her way around. The reason for this is that lawyers duty to the court is foremost
. The dignity of the legal profession may be compromised.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 113 g) Attorneys
fees Right to Attorneys Fees (Agpalo) The practice of law is a profession and not
a money-making trade. It does not operate to deny a lawyer the right to attorne
ys fees for his professional services. He has the right to have and recover from
his client a fair and reasonable compensation for his services, except in cases
where he has agreed to render service gratuitously or has been appointed counsel
de oficio. Lawyers should avoid controversies concerning compensation so far as
shall be compatible with self-respect and with right to receive a reasonable re
compense for services. Resort to law suits with clients should only be done to p
revent injustice, imposition or fraud. The impression is that those instituting
suits are mercenaries. As a general rule, a right of lawyer to reasonable compen
sation for services requires the following: 1. that attorney-client relationship
exists; and 2. that he rendered services to the client. A written agreement is
not necessary to establish a clients obligation to pay attorneys fees. As long as
the lawyer is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the inter
est of his client, an absence of express undertaking does not defeat recovery of
fees. Clients obligation to pay attorneys fees arises from the inanimate contract
of facis ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the principle that no one
shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Generally, a person wh
o had no knowledge of, or objected to, the lawyers representation may not be held
liable for attorneys fees even though such representation redounded to his benef
it. The objection should be raised before and not after beneficial services shal
l have been rendered by the lawyer; otherwise, the party who benefited may be re
quired to pay counsel fees. For it is neither just that client who retained lawy
er should alone pay nor is it fair that those who, investing nothing and assumin
g no risk, received benefits should not contribute their proportionate share to
counsel fees (based on equity). Non-lawyer cannot recover attorneys fees even if
there is a law authorizing him to represent a litigant in court because basis of
reasonable compensation is the existence of attorney-client relationship and th
e rendition of services. Lawyer who is absolutely disqualified from engaging in
private practice of law by reason of his government position may neither practic
e law nor, should he do so illegally, charge attorneys fees for such services. Ex
ception: fees for services already performed before lawyer qualified for public
office even though payment is made thereafter. Lawyer designated by court to ren
der professional services, in the absence of law allowing compensation, cannot c
harge government nor the indigent litigant for his professional services. Appoin
tment neither violates constitutional restriction against taking of property wit
hout just compensation or the due process of law nor imposes upon the government
the obligation to pay him his fees because one of the obligations of an attorne
y willingly assumed when he took his oath as lawyer is to render free legal serv
ices whenever required by the court to do so. Although a client has right to dis
charge lawyer anytime, dismiss or settle action or even waive the whole of his i
nterest in favor of adverse party, he cannot, in the absence of lawyers fault, co
nsent or waiver, deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 114 What is Quan
tum Meruit? Meruit? It is when no price is stipulated for lawyers service, courts
will fix amount on quantum meruit basis, or such amount which his service merit
s. The requisite for the principle is that there is an acceptance of the benefit
s by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as r
easonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task is expecting to be p
aid compensation. It is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equita
ble postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying fo
r it. The doctrine is also applicable where amount stipulated in written agreeme
nt is found to be unconscionable or where client dismissed counsel before termin
ation of case or where the lawyer withdrew there-from for valid reasons.
Concepts of attorneys fees (Compania Maritima v. CA, 318 SCRA 169) (a) Ordinary c
oncept This refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
for the legal services he has rendered the latter. (b) Extraordinary concept It
is the amount of damages which the court may award to be paid by the losing par
ty to the prevailing party.
Meruit t Instances when Court will fix Amount of Attorneys Fees based on Quantum
Merui 1. agreement is invalid for some reason other than illegality of object of
performance 2. amount stipulated is unconscionable 3. no agreement as to fees e
xisted between parties 4. client rejects amount fixed in contract as unconsciona
ble and is found to be so 5. lawyer, without fault, was unable to conclude litig
ation
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 138 SEC. 24 of the Rules of Court Compensation of attorneys; agreement as t
o fees.An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance o
f the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, an
d the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opin
ion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disr
egard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unl
ess found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. RA 5185 Section 6.
Prohibition Against Practice. A member of the Provincial Board or City or Munici
pal Council shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case where
in the province, city or municipality, as the case may be, is the adverse partyxx
x nor shall he collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative proceedin
gs before provincial, city or municipal agencies of the province, city or munici
pality, as the case case may be, of which he is an elected official.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 115 EMILIANO COU
RT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA
(A.C. No. 5162, March 20, 2003) (399 SCRA 296)
FACTS: ETCHA and Atty. Michael Dioneda entered into a Retainer s Agreement where
in respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of ETCHA against LVF Realty, Mr.
Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a complaint - in - intervent
ion. ETCHA alleged that after respondent received the amount of Php 20,000.00, h
e did nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint in - i
ntervention. ETCHA then demanded the return of the amount received by respondent
since he did nothing to protect the interest of the complainant. Respondent pro
mised to return the amount but after deducting therefrom a reasonable fee for th
e efforts exerted by him. He averred that the agreement also included an earlier
case with the HLURB where he was able to obtain a favorable judgment for the co
mplainant. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dioneda is entitled to compensation based
on the Retainer s Agreement? If not, is he entitled to compensation based on qu
antum meruit? HELD: He is not entitled to compensation neither based on the Reta
iner s Agreement nor on quantum meruit. Generally, a valid written agreement fix
ing attorney s fees is conclusive as between the parties. And when both parties
are deemed to have impliedly repudiated the contract and placed themselves in th
e position as though there was no express stipulation as to the attorney s fees,
the lawyer s compensation shall be determined on the basis of quantum meruit. H
ere, the Supreme Court considered the demand of ETCHA for the refund of the enti
re amount received as attorney s fees and the counter - proposal of respondent t
o deduct reasonable fees for the efforts exerted by him as implied repudiation o
f the contract by both parties. However, to deserve compensation based on quantu
m meruit the lawyer must prove by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a
reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing his client s case with the court taki
ng into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees. It is notewort
hy to point out respondent s failure to attend any hearing of his disbarment cas
e before the IBP without presenting any reason. Respondent s lamentable attitude
towards his client s case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in h
is own case for disbarment. Therefore, for having missed the opportunities to pr
esent evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation as to his non-a
ppearance, he should be denied compensation based on quantum meruit due to the l
ack of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainant s cou
nsel. ANGEL ALBANO vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA
(A.C. No. 528, October 11, 1967) (21 SCRA 411)
FACTS: This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano agai
nst respondent Atty. Perpetua Coloma. In a letter addressed to the Court, compla
inant alleged that during the Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, an
d he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them in one Civil Case.
After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts
had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination
of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another law
yer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case
to collect her attorney s fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing the
y were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that th
ey promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-/3% of whatever could be recovered
whether in land or damages. ISSUE: May Atty. Coloma be removed for her failure t
o comply with her obligations as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently,
continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity?

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 116 HELD: No. If
there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case it is complainant who, after
benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to reneg
e on their agreement for the payment of the latter s contingent attorney s fees
by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them said case
in the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Any counsel, who is worthy of his h
ire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital cons
isting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the p
rotection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client t
o escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the bes
t that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would
not get his due. QUIRANTE V. IAC
(G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989) (169 SCRA 769)
FACTS: Atty. John Quirante represented Dr. Casasola in a case filed against Guer
ero for failure of the latter to comply with his obligations as building contrac
tor. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Casasola who was already dead
when the courts decision came. Pending petition for review filed by the adverse
party, Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of
his attorneys fees pending adverse partys filing of a petition for review on certi
orari. He claims that he and Dr. Casasola had an agreement that in case the cour
t award damages to Casasola in excess of the 120,000 pesos bond of the building
contractor, such amount shall be divided equally between the Casasola and Quiran
te. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled to the attorneys fees pendin
g petition for review filed by the adverse party of the case filed by Casasola.
HELD: Atty. Quirante is not entitled to his attorneys fees as of that time becaus
e a petition for review on certiorari was still pending in court involving the s
ame case in which Casasola was granted award of damages. Since the main case fro
m which Atty. Quirantes claims for attorneys fees is based has not yet become fina
l, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should
be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the ru
le that the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an incident of the main actio
n may be availed of only when something is due to the client. TANHUECO vs. DE DU
MO
(A.M. No. 1437, April 25, 1989) (172 SCRA 774)
FACTS: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano
de Dumo for his refusal to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal t
o return documents entrusted to him as a counsel in certain collection cases. Ta
nhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may be able to collect from debt
ors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of what he may be
able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not turn over th
e P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his attorneys fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Dumos contingent fee is grossly excessive. HELD: De Dum
os contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of the total
amount due from Tanhuecos debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent becau
se he took advantage of his client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of t
he CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Attorne
ys fee which is found out to be unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to cour
ts modification. A lawyer as an officer of the court has the duty to assist in th
e impartial administration of justice between parties, and hence, the fees shoul
d be subject to judicial control.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 117

RAMOS V. ATTY. NGASEO
(A.C. No. 6210, December 9, 2004)
FACTS: This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of th
e Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the de
livery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for his
appearance fees. Atty. Ngaseo agreed to handle the case of complainant Ramos, in
volving recovery of a piece of land, for an acceptance fee of 20,000 pesos, appe
arance fee of 1,000 pesos per hearing, and in case of a favorable decision, to g
ive 1,000 sq. m. of the land to Atty. Ngaseo. The Court of Appeals rendered a fa
vorable decision ordering the return of the 2-hectare land to Ramos, and said de
cision became final and executory. Atty. Ngaseo, thereafter, sent a letter to hi
s client, Ramos, for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. meter portion of the land whi
ch Ramos promised to him as payment for his appearance fees. Ramos filed a compl
aint with the IBP charging his former counsel, Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m.
parcel of land which was the subject of litigation, and Art. 1491 of the Civil C
ode prohibiting lawyers from acquiring property or rights which are object of th
eir litigation. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ngaseo should be suspended for viola
ting the Code of Professional Responsibility and Art. 1491 of the Civil Code. HE
LD: The prohibition under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code applies only if the sale o
r assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation i
nvolving the clients property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after
the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the C
ivil Code attaches. In the instant case, there was already a final and executory
order made by the CA, hence, Art. 1491 no longer applies. Also, there was no ac
tual acquisition of the property in litigation since Atty. Ngaseo only made a wr
itten demand. Nevertheless, Atty. Ngaseo violated Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation. He is, therefore, reprimanded for his act.
Canon 20 Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in deter
mining his fees: a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or re
quired; b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; c) The importan
ce of the subject matter; d) The skill demanded; e) The probability of losing ot
her employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; f) The customary
charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to whi
ch he belongs; g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits result
ing to the client form the service; h) The contingency or certainty of compensat
ion; i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
A valid written contract is conclusive as to amount of compensation. Unless both
parties set aside contract and submit question of reasonableness of amount of f
ees for court to resolve on quantum meruit basis, neither client nor lawyer may
disregard amount fixed (Agpalo)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 118 METROPOLITAN
BANK & TRUST CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 86100-03, January 23, 1990) (181 SCRA 367)
FACTS: Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari when the CA affirms t
he decision of the trial court expressing its view that it should pay the chargi
ng lien on the civil case filed against them which result into a dismissal. Base
d upon subsequent dismissal of the said case, private respondents filed a motion
to fix its attorneys fees based on quantum meruit, resulting to an exchange betw
een the parties. Petitioners aver that they have paid services of its lawyers in
full but the latter contends that partial amounts forwarded to them did not con
sist of payment. To avoid adverse confrontation, Metrobank offered to pay P600,0
00 in which case respondents refused. Both trial court and appellate court comma
nded petitioner to pay the amount of P936,000 based on the charging liens of the
dismissed civil case against them. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not private respondent
is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney
s fee. 2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement
of such lien. 3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (
25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a qu
antum meruit basis. HELD: The Court holds that respondent cannot charge a lien d
ue to the dismissal of the civil case. Such enforceability is only applicable to
money claims and only to dismissed judgments if there is an applicable law or p
re-existing agreement between the parties. In addition, the fixing of attorneys f
ees is determined in a separate civil action. Accordingly, in fixing compensatio
n based on quantum meruit, three conditions are to be considered: (1) the import
ance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services render
ed, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. Likewise, the Court reitera
tes the legal professions manifest mandate for public service instead of capital
gain. Its aim is to uphold public interest and not profiteering. Appropriate pro
ceedings may be commenced by respondent to establish attorneys fees.
Canon 20 Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the consent of
the client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to work performed an
d responsibility assumed. URBAN BANK, INC. V. ATTY. MAGDALENO PEA
(A.C. No. 4863, September 7, 2001)
FACTS: Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, In
c. (UBI) for P240 million. million As the land was occupied by unauthorized subtenants, ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea had to negotiate with them for them to
relocate but the said occupants, knowing that the land was already transferred t
o UBI, refused to recognize Pea. Pea then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Bo
rlongan, president of UBI, where Pea explained to him the situation. In said conv
ersation, Pea asked authorization from Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. P
ea also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or (P24 P24 million) mill
ion for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Pea sh
ould be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Pea a
lso asked that said authorization be put into writing. The authorization was put
into writing but no mention was made as regards the 10% fee. Pea was able to set
tle and relocate the tenants. Pea began sending demands to UBI for the latter to
pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon but UBI refused to make payment hence Pea
filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 119 ISSUE: Wheth
er or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28 million. HELD: No. T
he Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Pea is entitled to pay
ment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the b
asis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In the first pla
ce, other than the selfserving testimony of Pea, there was no other evidence pres
ented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the ph
one. The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted hi
m to negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence
of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea should be pai
d. The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a profes
sion in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Canon 20 Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent
of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or f
orwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client. Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of
Court Duties of attorneys.It is the duty of an attorney: (e) To maintain inviolat
e the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client s business e
xcept from him or with his knowledge and approval
This rule is intended to ensure protection of lawyers in collection of fees. Mor
eover, it is designed to secure the lawyers wholehearted fidelity to the clients c
ause and to prevent that situation in which the receipt by him of a rebate or co
mmission from another in connection with the clients cause may interfere with the
full discharge of his duty to the client. The amount received by lawyer from op
posite party or third persons in the service of his client belongs to the client
except when the latter has full knowledge and approval of lawyers taking (Agpalo
)
Canon 20 Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning
his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition
, injustice of fraud. Rule 138 SEC. 24 of the Rules of Court Compensation of att
orneys; agreement as to fees.An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover fr
om his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a vi
ew to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shal
l be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper comp
ensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own pr
ofessional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount t
o be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonabl
e. Rule 138 138 SEC. 32 of the Rules of Court Compensation for attorneys de ofic
io.Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by law the court may, in i
ts discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensated
in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Wh
enever such compensation is allowed, it shall not be less than thirty pesos (P30
) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in lig
ht felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundre
d pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five hundred p
esos (P500) in capital offenses.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 120 CORPUS V. CO
URT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 40424, June 30, 1980) (98 SCRA 424)
FACTS: Atty. David rendered legal services to Mr. Corpus for his reinstatement i
n the Central Bank. They have no agreement as to amount for the attorneys fees. W
hen they won the case, Atty. David demanded for 50% of the amount awarded to Cor
pus. The demand of Atty. David was largely objected by Mr. Corpus. Marino Corpus
contends that David is not entitled to attorney s fees because there was no con
tract to that effect. On the other hand, David contends that the absence of a fo
rmal contract for the payment of the attorney s fees will not negate the payment
thereof because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an implie
d understanding between the petitioner and private respondent that the former wi
ll pay the latter attorney s fees when a final decision shall have been rendered
in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to -his former position in the Centr
al Bank and paying his back salaries. The lower court as affirmed by the Court o
f appeals awarded 30,000 to Atty. David, in which the latter did not accept. ISS
UE: Whether or not Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorneys fees to 50% of th
e amount of the award recovered by Mr Marino Corpus? HELD: No. While there was e
xpress agreement between Corpus and David as regards attorney s fees, the facts
of the case support the position of David that there was at least an implied agr
eement for the payment of attorney s fees. Moreover, the payment of attorney s f
ees to David may also be justified by virtue of the innominate contract of facio
ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that "no one shall un
justly enrich himself at the expense of another." And such being the case, David
is entitled to a reasonable compensation. In determining a reasonable fee to be
paid to David as compensation for his services, on a quantum meruit basis, it i
s proper to consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case. The
Court ruled that the reasonable compensation of David in this case should be P20
,000.00.
h) Preservation of clients confidences CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CON
FIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEYATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIO
N IS TERMINATED
Rule 138, 20 (e) of the Rules of Court. Court. Duties of attorneys.It is the duty
of an attorney: (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation i
n connection with his client s business except from him or with his knowledge an
d approval Rule 130, sec. 21 (b) of the Rules of court. court Privileged communic
ation. An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to a
ny communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the c
ourse of professional employment; nor can an attorney s secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, conce
rning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. What i
s confidential communication? communication? A confidential communication refers
to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which so far as the client is aware, discloses
the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which i
t was given. Covers all actions, signs, means of communication.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 121

GENATO V. SILAPAN
(A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003) (406 SCRA 75)
FACTS: Atty. Essex Silapan borrowed money from William Genato for a purchase of
new car. His car and house and lot were being mortgaged by Atty. Silapan as secu
rity for the loan. The latter issued post-dated checks in return. When Genato en
cashed the checks, the same were dishonoured for the account has been closed alr
eady. Despite repeated demands, Atty. Silapan failed to make payments; thus, Gen
ato filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against Atty. Silapan and a civ
il case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Atty. Silapan made an
allegation that Genato engages into illegal practices and even discloses Genatos
alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending cas
e. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence b
y imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged i
ntention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case. HELD:
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose commu
nications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latt
er consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client
arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the clie
nt is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor i
s it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of
the client. It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure
of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a
lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetr
ation of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the compla
inants alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, t
he communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult
the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise
a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thu
s, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional em
ployment in the strict sense. Be that as it may, Atty. Silapans explanation that
it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satis
fy the Court. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as th
ey were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for him to use it
against Genato in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of liti
gation therein and Atty. Silapans professional competence and legal advice were n
ot being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach.
His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith and fairness.
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(262 SCRA 112, 1996)
See Canon 15 on privileged communication

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 122 Canon 21 Rul
e 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client exc
ept: a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences
of the disclosure; b) When required by law; c) When necessary to collect his fee
s or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
Exceptions to the General Rule (Agpalo): (Agpalo) In cases of contemplated crime
s or perpetuation of fraud because a lawyer-client relationship should only be f
or lawful purposes in case client files complaint against his lawyer or unreason
ably refuses to pay his fees, the lawyer may disclose so much of clients confiden
ces as may be necessary to protect himself or to collect fees
Canon 21 Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to
his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowled
ge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Canon 21 Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his cli
ent, give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such informati
on for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any s
imilar purpose.
Canon 21 Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm
to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Canon 21 Rule 21.05 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be require
d to prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using
confidences or secrets of the client.
Canon 21 Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a clien
ts affairs even with members of his family.
Canon 21 Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about
a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 123 i) Withdrawa
l of services
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOT
ICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRTUMSTANCES. Canon 22 Rule 22.01 -A lawyer may withdraw
his services in any of the following cases: a) When the client pursues an illeg
al or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; b)
When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canon
s and rules; c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the
best interest of the client; d) When the mental or physical condition of the law
yer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; e) Whe
n the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to com
ply with the retainer agreement; f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to p
ublic office; and g) Other similar cases.
CENIZA V. RUBIA RUBIA
(A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009)
FACTS: FACTS Ma. Earl Beverly Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian Rubia with grave misco
nduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents. Ceniza
engaged the services of Atty. Rubia with regard to the share of her mother-in-la
w in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. Allegedly, Atty. Rubia misrepresen
ted to her that the complaint was already filed in court when in fact, upon veri
fication, it was not. But upon the IBP investigation, the allegations filed by C
eniza have no factual basis. However, IBP found that Rubia committed some acts f
or which she should be sanctioned, she leave Ceniza with no representation and f
ailed to maintain open communication regarding the status of the said complaint
due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Comp
anies. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rubias withdrawal of service is reasonable. HE
LD: Rubias withdrawal of service is unreasonable because when she accepted to han
dle the case of Ceniza she is expected to do her duties with utmost attention, s
kill and competence, despite other workloads to do with other client. This is a
violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that states: A lawyer shall withdraw his servic
es only for god cause and upon notice appropriate to the circumstances. Being an
officer of the court, who is task to assist in the administration of justice, a
lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if it will cause injustice to
client. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdraw
al of services.
Causes of Termination of AttorneyAttorney-Client Relation (Agpalo) Withdrawal of
the lawyer under Rule 22.01 Death of the lawyer Death of client Discharge or di
smissal of the lawyer by the client Appointment or election of a lawyer to a gov
ernment position which prohibits private practice of law Full termination of the
case Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer from the practice of law Intervenin
g incapacity or incompetence of the client during pendency of case Declaration o
f presumptive death of lawyer Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of lawyer

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 124 Note: Except
for items 2 and 6, the lawyer has duty to notify the court in case of terminati
on of attorney-client relationship.
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORP V. DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO
(G.R. No. 147010, July 18, 2003) (406 SCRA 639)
FACTS: FACTS De Dios Transportation Co.(DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transportatio
n Corp. (DMTC) executed a Deed of Conditional sale covering 58 buses and its fra
nchise in favor of Coyukiat and Goldfinger and later on failed to follow the con
tract which both parties agreed upon. Coyukiat and Goldfinger through its counse
l Padilla Reyes and De la Torre Law office filed a complaint against DDTC and DM
TC for rescission of contract and posted Bond issued by Pioneer Insurance and Su
rety Corp. the Trial Court ruled in favour of DDTC and DMTC. Aggrieved, Coyukiat
and Goldfinger filed their brief through counsel Atty. Ronaldo Reyes with the C
ourt of Appeals but before the adverse party can file their brief, Padilla Reyes
and De la Torre Law office filed its withdrawal of appearance as counsel and on
the same day Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Associates filed its appearance as counse
l for Coyukiat and Goldfinger. It filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal but did
not bear the conformity of their client and the adverse party were served copie
s via registered mail thru their counsel. DDTC and DMTC contend that the filing
of withdrawal of appeal of Coyukiat and Goldfinger through new counsel without t
he clients conformity to the substitution and to such withdrawal of appeal was no
t self-executory. ISSUE: Whether or not Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Associates as c
ounsel failed to submit the proper substitution requirements. HELD: Yes. A prope
r substitution of counsel requires: written application for substitution, writte
n conformity of client and written consent of attorney to be substituted. In suc
h case the written consent cannot be secured, there must be filed with the appli
cation proof of service of notice of the application upon the attorney to be sub
stituted. A substitution which does not comply with the required formalities is
ineffective to effect a change of counsel or to terminate his authority
Who may Terminate AttorneyAttorney-Client Relation 1. Client Client has absolute
right to discharge his attorney with or without just cause or even against lawy
ers consent. Existence or nonexistence of a just cause is important only in deter
mining right of an attorney to compensation for services rendered. Discharge of
an attorney or his substitution by another without justifiable cause will not op
erate to extinguish the lawyers right to full payment of compensation as agreed u
pon in writing. 2. Attorney 3. Court 4. Circumstances beyond control of parties
Canon 22 Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to
a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the clie
nt is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer o
f the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the
matter.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 125 Kinds of Lie
ns
1. Retaining Lien (general lien)
The right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and disburse
ments have been paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. Reason
and essence of lien: Inconvenience or disadvantage caused to the client because
of exercise of such lien may induce client to pay the lawyer his fees and disbu
rsements. It is a general lien for the balance of the account due to the attorne
y from client for services rendered in all matters he may have handled for the c
lient, regardless of outcome. It is dependent upon and takes effect from time of
lawful possession and does not require notice thereof upon client and the adver
se party to be effective. Passive right and cannot be actively enforced; amounts
to a mere right to retain funds, documents and papers as against the client unt
il the attorney is fully paid his fees. However, lawyer may apply so much of cli
ents funds in his possession to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. Requisites Requisites for validity (o
f retaining lien) 1. attorney-client relationship 2. lawful possession by lawyer
of the clients funds, documents and papers in his professional capacity 3. unsat
isfied claim for attorneys fees or disbursements
2. Charging Lien (special lien)
A charging lien is a right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the pay
ment of money and executions issued in pursuance thereof, secured in favor of hi
s client. Covers only services rendered by attorney in the action in which the j
udgment was obtained and takes effect only after a statement of claim has been e
ntered upon record of the particular action with written notice to his client an
d adverse party. Requisites for validity of charging lien 1. attorney-client rel
ationship 2. attorney has rendered services 3. money judgment favorable to the c
lient has been secured in the action 4. attorney has a claim for attorneys fees o
r advances 5. statement of his claim has been duly recorded in the case with not
ice thereof served upon the client and adverse party

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 126

DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS
PURPOSE OF DISCIPLINING DISCIPLINING LAWYERS To ascertain that a lawyer still po
ssesses those qualifications which are conditions precedent for the continuous p
ractice of law and; to deter others from similar misconduct, to protect the cour
t and the public from the misbehavior of its officers.
NATURE NATURE OF THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE The power to discipline a lawyer is jud
icial in nature and can be exercised only by the courts. It cannot be defeated b
y the legislative or executive departments.
POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO DISCIPLINE LAWYERS 1. Warning 2. Admonition 3. Re
primand 4. Censure 5. Disbarment 6. Suspension[Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules
of Court (RRC)] 7. Interim suspension 8. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
POWERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO DISCIPLINE LAWYER
S 1. Warning 2. Admonition 3. Reprimand 4. Suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in Sec 27, Rule 138 until further action of the Supreme
Court in the case; (Sec. 16, Rule 139-B) and 5. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
OTHER SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES 1. Restitution 2. Assessment of costs 3. Limitation
upon practice 4. Appointment of a receiver 5. Requirement that a lawyer take th
e bar examination or professional responsibility examination; 6. Requirement tha
t a lawyer attend continuing education courses 7. Other requirements that the hi
ghest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the purposes of the sanc
tions
FORMS OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES 1. Warning an act of putting one on his guard aga
inst an impending danger, evil, consequence or penalty; 2. Admonition a gentle o
r friendly reproof, mild rebuke, warning, reminder, or counseling on a fault, er
ror or oversight; an expression of authoritative advice;

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 127 3. Reprimand
eprimand a public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a perso
n at fault by his superior officer or the body to which he belongs; 4. Censure o
fficial reprimand; 5. Suspension temporary withholding of a lawyers right to prac
tice his profession as a lawyer for a certain period or for an indefinite period
of time: a. Definite; b. Indefinite qualified disbarment; lawyer determines for
himself how long or how short his suspension shall last by proving to court tha
t he is once again fit to resume practice of law. 6. Disbarment it is the act of
the Supreme Court of withdrawing from an attorney the right to practice law. Th
e name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys; 7. Interim Susp
ension it is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pendi
ng imposition of final discipline; Includes: a. Suspension upon conviction of a s
erious crime; b. Suspension when the lawyers continuing conduct is or is likely to
cause immediate and serious injury to a client or public 8. Probation it is a s
anction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS (SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT) 1. Neither a civil action nor
a criminal proceeding; 2. SUI GENERIS, it is a class of its own since it is neit
her civil nor criminal 3. Confidential in nature 4. Defense of double jeopardy i
s not available 5. Can be initiated by the SC, motu proprio, or by the IBP. It c
an be initiated without a complaint. 6. Can proceed regardless of interest of th
e complainants 7. Imprescriptible 8. It is itself due process of law 9. Whatever
has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be e
nforced in another action; 10. In pari delicto rule not applicable; 11. No preju
dicial question in disbarment proceedings; 12. Penalty in a disbarment case cann
ot be in the alternative; and 13. Monetary claims cannot be granted except resti
tution and return of monies and properties of the client given in the course of
the lawyer-client relationship.
OBJECTIVES OF SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT: 1. To compel the attorney to deal fairl
y and honestly with his clients; 2. To remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibil
ities belonging to the office of an attorney; 3. To punish the lawyer; 4. To set
an example or warning for the other members of the bar; 5. To safeguard the adm
inistration of justice from dishonest and incompetent lawyers; 6. To protect the
public; OFFICES OFFICES AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE DISBARMENT CASES 1. Supreme C
ourt 2. IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigators
3. Office of the Solicitor General

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 128

GROUNDS
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT 1. Deceit A fraudulent and deceptive misrep
resentation, artifice or device used by one or more persons to deceive and trick
another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the p
arty upon which it was imposed. There must be false representation as a matter o
f fact. 2. Malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office any malfeasance or de
reliction of duty committed committed by a lawyer Malpractice refers to any malf
easance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Legal malpractice consists
of failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as a lawyer
of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance
of tasks which they undertake, and when such failure proximately causes damage,
it gives rise to an action in tort. (Tan Tek Beng v. David, A.C. No. 1261, Dec.
29, 1983) 3. Grossly immoral conduct Grossly immoral conduct is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgrace
ful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Vitug v. Rongcal, A.C. No. 6313, S
ept. 7, 2006) Gross Misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful
conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice wh
ich is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of
a cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or
intentional purpose. (Yumol Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 6585, April 21, 2005)
4. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude Moral turpitude has been defi
ned as everything that is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good mor
als, an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a ma
n owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and cus
tomary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to just
ice, honesty modesty, or good morals. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, Jan. 25
, 2006) (e.g. estafa, bribery, murder, bigamy, seduction, abduction, concubinage
, smuggling, falsification of public document, violation of BP 22) 5. Violation
of oath of office The specific grounds that would constitute violation of the la
wyers oath are: a. Commission of falsehood b. Instituting baseless or unfounded c
omplaints c. Engaging in dilatory actions for an ulterior motive d. Malpractice
or reprehensible conduct in dealing with the court of his client. (Lapena, Jr.,
2009) 6. Willful Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court 7.
Corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without an
authority to do so. (see Sanctions to Practice of Law without authority)
*** Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of discip
linary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases wh
ere the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Vitug v. Rongca
l, A.C. No. 6313, Sept. 7, 2006)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 129

THE GROUNDS FOR FOR DISBARMENT ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE
A lawyer may be removed from office or suspended from the practice of law on gro
unds other than those specifically provided in the law. The statutory enumeratio
n is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of SC to suspend or di
sbar a lawyer. (In Re: Puno, A.C. No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967) QUINGWA V. PUNO, A.C.
No. 398, February 28, 1967 The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarme
nt or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of cour
ts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its offic
ers cannot be restricted. STA. MARIA V. TUAZON, A.C. No. No. 396, JULY 31, 1964
The Supreme Court has disbarred or suspended lawyers for reasons not found in th
e statute as when their acts are contrary to honesty and good morals or do not a
pproximate the highest degree of morality and integrity expected of the members
of the bar. AQUINO V. MANGAOANG, 425 SCRA 572 In disbarment proceedings, the bur
den of proof is upon the complainant and this court will exercise its disciplina
ry power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and s
atisfactory evidence. DANIEL S. AQUINO V. ATTY. MARIA MARIA LOURDES VILLAMARVILL
AMAR-MANGAOANG
(A.C. No. 4934, March 17, 2004)
FACTS: Complainant avers that prior to his present assignment, he was a Special
Investigator of the Legal and Investigation Staff of the Bureau of Customs, Cust
oms Police Division, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command,
Pasay City, headed by respondent. Complainant claims that prior to or during th
e preliminary investigation of the case, NAIA Customs Police Officer Apolonio Bu
stos and respondent ordered the transfer of the gun parts inside Gomezs balikbaya
n box to another box. She then ordered Office Messenger Joseph Maniquis to deliv
er to the State Prosecutor the balikbayan box without the gun parts. According t
o complainant, respondent did this because Gomez was a close friend. The switchi
ng of the balikbayan boxes and the substitution of the evidence resulted in the
dismissal of the criminal charges against Gomez. Complainant argues that respond
ent exercised dishonesty, committed acts of legal impropriety, and compromised h
er duties and responsibilities as a lawyer, an officer of the court and a public
official, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the government. In her Answer
respondent avers that she could not have switched the contents of the balikbaya
n box of Gomez because she was not in charge of the physical disposition of the
evidence. She pointed out that if complainants allegations were true, he should h
ave filed a complaint against her after the case against Gomez was dismissed. Ho
wever, he waited more than two years before bringing these unfounded and false a
ccusations against her. ISSUE: ISSUE Whether or not respondent be disbarred for
allegedly introducing false evidence in a case and or breaching her duties to th
e legal profession. HELD: Respondent should not be disbarred for allegedly intro
ducing false evidence in a case and for breaching her duties to the legal profes
sion. The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to th
e administration of discipline to those found culpable of misconduct but also to
the protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously charged In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Co
urt will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. In the case at bar, compla
inant failed to meet the required evidentiary standard. In the absence of convin
cing or clearly preponderant evidence, as in this case, the complaint for disbar
ment against respondent should be dismissed.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 130 AMAYA V. TEC
SON, 450 SCRA 510 Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less sev
ere such as reprimand, suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired. MARI
O S. AMAYA V. ATTY. DELANO A. TECSON
(A.C. No. 5996, February 07, 2005)
FACTS: Mario S. Amaya sought the disbarment of Atty. Delano A. Tecson for highly
irregular actuations and/or grave negligence in handling an appeal with the Cour
t of Appeals. The complainant alleged that he retained the services of the respon
dent to handle the said appeal when his former counsel suffered a stroke due to
acute hypertension. The respondent demanded P20,000.00 for the filing of the not
ice of appeal, which the complainant immediately paid but was dismissed because
of untimely filing of the Tecson of the Notice of Appeal. The latter then reques
ted another amount for the filing of motion for reconsideration which was also e
ventually dismissed because of non-filing of Tecson of the prescribed docket fee
. Tecson then returned the money for litigation expenses to Amaya after such den
ial. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tecson be disbarred. HELD: Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
similar duty of fidelity to the clients cause. The Court rules that in failing to
zealously attend to a legal matter entrusted to him, the respondent failed to l
ive up to the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal profession. I
t must be stressed however that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplina
ry sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with gre
at caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the c
ourt and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed wher
e any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would acco
mplish the end desired. Considering that the respondent in this case returned th
e money for litigation expenses to the complainant after the denial of the motio
n for reconsideration, the Court sees fit to reprimand the respondent for his ac
tuations.
DEFENSES
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT 1. Good faith in the acquisition of a pro
perty of the client subject of litigation (In Re: Ruste, A.M. No. 632, June 27,
1940); 2. 2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept
. 28, 1973); 3. Age (Santos v. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, Apr. 19, 1991); 4. Apology (M
unoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973); 5. Lack of Intention to sligh
t or offend the Court (Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-2297
9, Jan. 27, 1967); 6. Absence of prior disciplinary record; 7. Absence of dishon
est or selfish motive; 8. Personal or emotional problems; 9. Timely good faith e
ffort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; 10. Full and
free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the procee
dings; 11. Character or reputation; 12. Physical or mental disability or impairm
ent; 13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings; 14. Interim rehabilitation; 15. Impo
sition of other penalties or sanctions; 16. Remorse; and 17. Remoteness of prior
offenses. (IBP Guidelines 9.32)

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 131 AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT DISBARMENT 1. Prior disciplinary offenses; 2. Dishon
est or selfish motives; 3. A pattern of misconduct; 4. Multiple offenses; 5. Bad
faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to co
mply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 6. Submission of false evi
dence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary pr
ocess; 7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 8. Vulnerability of
victim; 9. Substantial experience in the practice of law; and 10. Indifference
to making restitution. (IBP Guidelines 9.22)
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE NEITHER MITIGATING NOR AGRAVATING 1. Forced or compelled
restitution; 2. Agreeing to the clients demand for certain improper behavior or r
esult; 3. Withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 4. Resignation prior to co
mpletion of disciplinary proceedings; 5. Complainants recommendation as to sanct
ions; or 6. Failure of injured client to complain. (IBP Guideline 9.4)
READMISSION TO THE BAR
Reinstatement, Defined It is the restoration in disbarment proceedings to a disb
arred lawyer the privilege to practice law. The power of the Supreme Court to re
instate is based on its constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules on the ad
mission of applicants to the practice of law. (Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Consti
tution)
Conditions for Reinstatement The applicant must, like a candidate for admission
to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character a fit
and proper person to practice law.
Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a
lawyer from the practice of law 1. Upon the expiration of the period of suspensi
on, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office o
f the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practi
ce of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her susp
ension; 2. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter
of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pendin
g cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel; a
nd 3. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance
with the order of suspension

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 132 ADMISSION TO
THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED ENRIQUE ZALDIVAR V. RAUL GONZALEZ
(G.R. No. 80578, February 1, 1989) (166 SCRA 316)
FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganb
ayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was th
e then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the S
upreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the a
uthority of the Tanodbayan to investigate. The Supreme Court, acting on the peti
tion issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporari
ly restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzale
s however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations ag
ainst Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims
that he scored one on the Supreme Court. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contem
pt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side
. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was o
nly exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulin
gs of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into erro
r. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Su
preme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embar
rass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. HE
LD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt
and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Hi
s statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed t
heir oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect
for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supre
me Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice
in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe
ech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expressio
n needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice.
Guidelines to to be observed in Case of Lifting an Order Suspending a Lawyer fro
m the Practice of Law The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court,
the same to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a l
awyer from the practice of law: 1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must b
e suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing
the penalty; 2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immedia
tely executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file
a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render th
e decision final and executory; 3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspensi
on, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office o
f the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practi
ce of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her susp
ension; 4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter
of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pendin
g cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 133 5. The Sworn
Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order
of suspension; 6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the l
awyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishmen
t, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
READMISSION TO THE BAR BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED Considerations for
Reinstatement 1. The applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment;
2. The nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred; 3. His con
duct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the dis
barment and the application for reinstatement; (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grec
ia, A.C. No. 2756, Dec. 18, 1990) 4. His efficient government service; (In re: A
driatico, G.R. No. L-2532, Nov. 17, 1910) 5. Applicants appreciation of the signi
ficance of his dereliction and his assurance that he now possesses the requisite
probity and integrity; and 6. Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas of his
loved ones. (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 144, Feb. 24, 1989)
Effects of Reins Reinstatement nstatement 1. Reinstatement to the roll of attorn
eys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a previous disbar
ment (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964); 2. Recognition of moral reha
bilitation and mental fitness to practice law; 3. Lawyer shall be subject to sam
e law, rules and regulations as those applicable to any other lawyer; and 4. Law
yer must comply with the conditions imposed on his readmission.
Effect of Executive Pardon pending Disbarment Proceeding If during the pendency
of disbarment preceding the respondent was granted executive pardon, the dismiss
al of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether the executive pardon is
absolute or conditional. 1. Absolute or unconditional pardon - the disbarment c
ase will be dismissed. 2. Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will not be d
ismissed on the basis thereof. An absolute pardon by the President is one that o
perates to wipe out the conviction as well as the offense itself. The grant ther
eof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him, if such pro
ceeding is based solely on the fact of such conviction. (In re: Parcasio, A.C. N
o. 100, Feb. 18, 1976) But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the prof
essional misconduct involved in the transaction which culminated in his convicti
on, the effect of the pardon is only to relieve him of the penal consequences of
his act and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as
the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not
possess good moral character. (In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, Apr. 7, 1922)
READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPARTRIATED Effects of Loss and
ReRe-acquisition of Filipino Citizenship General Rule: The loss of Philippine c
itizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines
.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 134 Exception: T
he Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Fi
lipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof termi
nates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engag
e in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice o
f law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citize
nship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but su
bsequently reacquired pursuant to R.A. 9225. This is because all Philippine citiz
ens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost thei
r Philippine citizenship under the conditions of R.A. 9225. Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost hi
s Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with R.A. 9225. Altho
ugh he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine
bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Before a lawyer who reac
quires Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 can resume his law practice, h
e must first secure from the SC the authority to do so, conditioned on: 1. The u
pdating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; 2. The pay
ment of professional tax; 3. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of manda
tory continuing legal education, this is especially significant to refresh the a
pplicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal develop
ments; and 4. The retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
(Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay, B.M. No. 167
8, Dec. 17, 2007)
LIABILITIES OF A LAWYER
CIVIL LIABILITY 1) Client is prejudiced by lawyers negligence and misconduct 2) B
reach of fiduciary obligation 3) Civil liability to third persons 4) Libelous wo
rds in pleadings; violation of communication privilege 5) Liability for costs of
suit (treble costs) when lawyer is made liable for insisting on clients patently
unmeritorious case or interposing appeal merely to delay litigation
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1) Prejudicing client through malicious breach of professiona
l duty 2) Revealing client secrets 3) Representing adverse interests 4) Introduc
ing false evidence 5) Misappropriating clients funds (Estafa)
REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OF LAWYERS 1. Declaratory relief;
2. Petition for Injuction; 3. Contempt of court; 4. Criminal complaint for Estaf
a against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney to the dama
ge of a party; 5. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment; or 6. Administ
rative complaint against the erring lawyer or government official.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 135

CONTEMPT OF COURT
A. Nature It is exercised on preservative and not on vindictive principles and o
n corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment. It is criminal in n
ature. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is essenti
al in the observance of order in judicial proceedings and to enforcement of judg
ment, orders and writs.
B. Kinds of Contempt 1) Direct Contempt It consists of misbehavior in the presen
ce of or near a court or judge as to interrupt or obstruct the proceedings befor
e the court or the administration of justice. 2) Indirect or Constructive Contem
pt One committed away from the court involving disobedience of or resistance to
a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court, tending to beli
ttle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the court. a) Civil contempt fai
lure to do something ordered by the court which is for the benefit of the party.
b) Criminal contempt consists of any conduct directed against the authority or
dignity of the court.
C. Acts of a Lawyer Constituting Contempt 1. Misbehavior as officer of court 2.
Disobedience or resistance to court order 3. Abuse or interference with judicial
proceedings 4. Obstruction in administration of justice 5. Misleading courts 6.
Making false allegations, criticisms, insults, veiled threats against the court
s 7. Aiding in unauthorized practice of law (suspended or disbarred) 8. Unlawful
retention of clients funds 9. Advise client to commit contemptuous acts
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL LEGAL EDUCATION
B.M. No. 850 August 22, 2000
PURPOSE Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abrea
st with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance
the standards of the practice of law.
REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLETION OF MCLE Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rul
e 7, shall complete every 3 years at least 36 hours of continuing legal educatio
n activities. The 36 hours shall be divided as follows: 1. 6 hours legal ethics

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 136 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 4 hours trial and pretrial skills 5 hours alternative dispute resolution 9
hours updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence 4 hours lega
l writing and oral advocacy 2 hours international law and international conventi
ons Remaining 6 hours such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee
on MCLE.
Classes of Credits 1. Participatory credit Attending approved education activiti
es like seminars, conventions, symposia, and the like; speaking or lecturing, or
assigned as panelist, reactor, or commentator, etc. in approved education activ
ities; teaching in law school or lecturing in bar review classes. 2. Non-partici
patory Preparing, as author or co-author, written materials (article, book or bo
ok review) which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which w
ere not prepared in the ordinary course of his practice or employment; editing a
law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
COMPLIANCE What constitute non-compliance? 1. Failure to complete education requ
irement within the compliance period; 2. Failure to provide attestation of compl
iance or exemption; 3. Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (i
ncluding evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period; 4. Failure to
satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within
60 days from receipt of non-compliance notice; 5. Failure to pay non-compliance
fee within the prescribed period; or 6. Any other act or omission analogous to
any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
EXEMPTIONS 1. The President, Vice-President and the Secretaries and Undersecreta
ries of Executive Departments; 2. Senators and Members of the House of Represent
atives; 3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumb
ent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of Judicial Bar Coun
cil, incumbent members of the MCLE Committee, incumbent court lawyers who have a
vailed of the Philippine Judicial Academy programs of continuing judicial educat
ion (Amendment to Bar Matter 850, Resolution of the Court En Banc, July 13, 2004
); 4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries
of the Dept. of Justice; 5. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor Ge
neral; 6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corp
orate Counsel; 7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions; 8.
The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Speci
al Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman; 9. Heads of government agencies ex
ercising quasi-judicial functions; 10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and profes
sors of law who have teaching experience for at least 10 years in accredited law
schools; 11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Profes
sional and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and 12. Go
vernors and Mayors.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 137 CONSEQUENCES
OF NONNON-COMPLIANCE A member who fails to comply with the requirements after t
he 60-day period shall be listed as delinquent member by the IBP Board of Govern
ors upon recommendation of the Committee on MCLE.
SOME JURISPRUDENCE ON DISCIPLINE OF LAWYER
IN RE MARCIAL EDILLON
(A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978) (84 SCRA 554)
FACTS: FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing at
torney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court t
he removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwi
thstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP
dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he i
s being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in g
ood standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and t
hat as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organizatio
n to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, th
e respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By
-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Edi
llon may be removed from the Rolls of Attorney for nonpayment of IBP dues suffer
s constitutional infirmity. DECISION: YES. The payment of IBP dues does not suff
er constitutional infirmity. All legislation directing the integration of the Ba
r has been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right b
ut a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawy
er owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in t
he profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the mo
st important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer
of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the socie
ty at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authori
ties for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his lib
erties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his conce
rns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the la
wyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings o
f his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he ch
ooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual due
s. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in eleva
ting the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of im
proving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiari
es of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exe
rcise of the police power of the State.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 138

YUSECO V. BERNAD
(A.M. No. 94-1-061-SC March 29, 1995) (243 SCRA 19)
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Atty. Joaquin Yuseco and Benjamin
Grecia against Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, charging him with
suppressing facts and making false statements in his report to the Court in the
disbarment case against complainant Grecia for the purpose of causing injury to
him (Grecia). The complaint for disbarment against Benjamin Grecia was filed by
Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St.
Luke s Medical Center who charged him with dishonesty and grave misconduct in co
nnection with the theft of some pages of a medical chart used in evidence in a d
amage suit filed by Grecia s clients against the doctors and the hospital. The d
isbarment case was assigned to respondent Deputy Court Administrator Bernad for
investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent submitted report in which B
ernad found therein respondent Benjamin Grecia guilty of the charges. Bernad ref
rained from recommending the penalty but instead left the matter to the Court to
determine, observing that whether the penalty should be disbarment or suspensio
n, the two are "severe forms of disciplinary action [which] should be resorted t
o only in cases where a lawyer demonstrates an attribute or course of conduct wh
olly inconsistent with approved professional standard." ISSUES: ISSUES: Can resp
ondent be disbarred on the following grounds: (1) submitting a report and recomm
endation to the Supreme Court in the disbarment case without furnishing complain
ant Grecia with a copy thereof; (2) falsifying his written report by narrating f
acts which are absolutely false; (3) deliberately not revealing his relationship
with former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan, whose brother-in-law, Atty. Pompeyo N
olasco of the Quasha law firm, is the counsel for complainant-doctors in the dis
barment case as well as in Civil Case No. 3548-V-91 which Grecia had filed again
st the doctors and the hospital. HELD: HELD: First. Respondent had no duty to co
mplainant to furnish him a copy of his report in the disbarment case. That repor
t was solely for Courts use. What was important was that he was given a copy of t
he Court s decision ordering his disbarment.
Second. The fourteen (14) cases or instances in which respondent allegedly made
false
statements in his report to the Court are the same ones cited in complainant Gre
cia s motion for new investigation and reconsideration which this Court denied w
ay back on August 12, 1993.
Third. The Court agreed with the findings of respondent, his findings became tho
se of the Court
and complainants have no basis for charging suppression of material facts. Indee
d, "the Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts.
Fourth. Atty. Nolasco is a brother-in-law of former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fer
nan. However
respondent points out that the disbarment case was assigned to him three months
after Chief Justice Fernan had retired from the Court. Indeed, aside from this a
llegation, there is no evidence in the record to support the charge of complaina
nts.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 139

TAN V. BALAJADIA
(G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2006)
FACTS: Rogelio, Normal all surnamed Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan (petitioners) in
their petition alleged that Bendicto Balajadia (respondent) filed a criminal ca
se against them for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of cit
y tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitio
ners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asse
rted that he is a "practicing lawyer."However, certifications issued by the Offi
ce of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that re
spondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim
that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as
a lawyer. In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of
the complaintaffidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He
claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complain
t-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. It appea
rs that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaintaffidavit against petitione
rs involving the same subject matter. Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, exe
cuted an affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaintaffi
davit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because h
e assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with
respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no i
ntention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer. In their Reply, peti
tioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt fo
r having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he canno
t shift the blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is
liable for indirect contempt. HELD: SC ruled in the negative. Section 3(e), Rul
e 71 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished
after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an oppo
rtunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxxx (e) Assuming
to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority
; In several cases, SC have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assum
ing to be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect
contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for
the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Cou
rt is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they
are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the order
ly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, we
ll-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be pun
ished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. In the c
ase at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never inte
nded to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence o
n the part of the secretary of Atty. Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay atte
sting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the
complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken togeth
er, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents co
mplaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence. Respondent has satisf
actorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result
of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable f
or indirect contempt. In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that
respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequent
ly, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of inten
t to illegally practice law.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 140

JUDICIAL ETHICS
PRELIMINARIES
TERMS
De Facto Judge An officer who is not fully vested with all the powers and duties
conceded to judges but, one who exercises the office of judge under some color
of right. He has the reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some
defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. (Lun
a v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13744, Nov. 29, 1918) De Jure Judge One who exercises
the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully vested with all the powers an
d functions conceded to him under the law. (Luna v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13744,
Nov. 29, 1918) Independent judiciary one free from inappropriate outside influe
nce Inhibition An act when a judge personally prevents himself from taking cogni
zance of the case. This is made through a written petition to inhibit which shal
l state the grounds for the same. The explanation of the judge whether or not to
take cognizance of the case must also be in writing Judicial Ethics It is the b
ranch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be observ
ed by all judges in trying and deciding controversies brought before them for ad
judication which conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality, integrity, compe
tence, independence and freedom from improprieties. This freedom from impropriet
ies must be observed in both the public and private life of a judge being the vi
sible representation of the law.
Qualifications of Justices in the Supreme Court of Court of Appeals One must be:
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 40 years of age; 3. A
person who has been, for 15 years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged
in the practice of law; and 4. A person of proven competence, integrity, probity
and independence. (Sec. 7(2), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Qualifications of Judges in the RTC One must be: 1. A natural-born citizen of th
e Philippines; 2. At least 35 years of age; and 3. For at least 10 years engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines or held a public office in the Philip
pines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
Qualifications of Judges in the MTC One must be: 1. A natural-born citizen of th
e Philippines; 2. At least 30 years of age; and 3. For at least 5 years, engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines or held a public office in the Philip
pines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 141

THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUC NDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
CANO ANON 1 INDE NDEPENDE NDENCE Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the
Rule of Law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall, therefo
re, uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and instit
utional aspects.
SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basi
s of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious unders
tanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, thre
at or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. PEOP
LE V. VENERACION
249 SCRA 244 (1995)
In one criminal case for the crime of rape and homicide, the judge found defenda
nts guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Under the law, particularly RA 7659, the pun
ishment for the crime of rape with homicide is death. However, in the subject ca
se, the judge imposed upon the accused the punishment of reclusion perpetua. A c
ourt of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of
the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penal
ty in specific and well-defined instances.
SECTION 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judic
ial colleagues in respect of decisions decisions which the judge is obliged to m
ake independently. TAHIL V. EISMA
64 SCRA 378 (1975)
The discretion of the Court to grant bail must be based on the Courts determinati
on as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may be
exercised only after the evidence has been submitted at the summary hearing cond
ucted pursuant to Sec. 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules. Respondents admission that he
granted bail to an accused upon the request of a Congressman, despite his belief
that the evidence of guilt against said is strong, is indeed reprehensible.
SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of li
tigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. SABIT
SANA, JR. V. VILLAMOR
RTJ NO. 90- 474, October 4, 1991
FACTS: Judge Villamor is the executive judge of RTC. Acting on such capacity, he
designated Judge Pitao as the acting MCTC judge of a municipality. Judge Villam
or, by sending a note to Judge Pitao, assured the wife of a certain accused in a
criminal case, which had long been pending before the MCTC that Judge Pitao sho
uld acquit the accused. However, Judge Pitao decided otherwise. This prompted Ju
dge Villamor to direct Judge Pitao to forward the record of the case to his sala
. Judge Villamor then acquitted the accused.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 142 ISSUE: Wheth
er or not Judge Villamor commit an act of misconduct? HELD: Yes. A judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge s
hall not influence in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending be
fore another court. This is so because such interference does not only subvert t
he independence of judiciary but also undermines the peoples faith in its integri
ty and impartiality. In the instant case, Judge Villamors act of sending a note t
o Judge Pitao for the latter to decide a case in favor of the accused constitute
s undue interference
SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influ
ence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit ot
hers to convey the impression impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge. Judges Family includes: 1. Judges spouse 2. Son 3. Daughter 4
. Son-in-law 5. Daughter-in-law 6. Other relative by consanguinity or affinity w
ithin the sixth civil degree, or 7. Person who is a companion or employee of the
judge and who lives in the judges household (NCJC of the Philippine Judiciary-An
notated, February 2007)
PADILLA V. ZANTUA
237 SCRA 670 (1994)
Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the po
int that favors in the future may be asked from respondent judge which he may fi
nd hard to resist. The actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking in p
ublic places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well arouse sus
picion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in t
he impartiality of the judge.
SECTION 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, an
d influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must a
lso appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer. ALFONSO V. ALONZOALONZ
O-LEGASTO
A.M. No. MTJ 94-995, September 5, 2002
An executive judge has no authority to cause the transfer of court employees as
the jurisdiction to do so is lodge solely upon the SC through the Office of the
Court Administrator. This is so because of the need to maintain judicial indepen
dence. Moreover, a judge shall be free from inappropriate connections with and i
nfluence from the executive and legislative branch. Here, the judge did not act
independently of the LGU when she asked the Mayor of QC to re- employ the displa
ced employees instead of informing the SC through the OCA of the need to streaml
ine her court of its personal needs.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 143 SECTION 6. J
udges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to
the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate. SECTION 7
. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial dut
ies in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independe
nce of the Judiciary. SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards
of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, w
hich is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Good Judges, Defined In the case of Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. 16808, January
3, 1921, good judges are those who: 1. Have the mastery of the principles of la
w, 2. Discharge their duties in accordance with law, 3. Are permitted to perform
the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and 4. Are independen
t and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate with
the other two departments of the government
CANO CANON 2 INTEG TEGRITY Integrity is essential not only to the proper dischar
ge of the judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above repr
oach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. AT
TY. ATTY. ARTURO ROMERO V. JUDGE GABRIEL VALLE JR.
147 SCRA 197, January 9, 1987
FACTS: Atty. Romero charged Judge Valle with grave misconduct and oppression. Th
e case arose from a dispute between Romero and Valle as to the proper marking of
Iglesia Filipinas inventory book in one civil case where Judge Valle is the pres
iding judge of the RTC where the case was lodged. Atty. Romero insisted that it
should be marked as Exh F while judge claimed that it should be Exh G since ther
e was already an Exh F marked during the previous trial when counsel was absent.
Counsel, however, continued insisting in a loud voice, which irritated the judg
e. Valle admonished counsel not to bring his passion to the court and to respect
the court. He allegedly uttered embarrassing remarks against Atty. Romero and e
ven challenged the latter for a fight. Valle then banged his gavel, left the ros
trum, and went to his chamber. Outside, he allegedly held a gun with his right h
and in an angry and menacing manner. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Valle has viola
ted the Code of Judicial Conduct. HELD: Yes. Judge Valle, in losing his temper,
failed to preserve order in his court. Judges have contempt powers to endeavor c
ounsel to appreciate his duties to the court. He should have cited counsel in co
ntempt instead of walking out of the courtroom. His act of carrying his licensed
gun, though permitted, was not an innocent gesture but with intent to intimidat
e counsel. He violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that a judges
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his per
sonal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial dutie
s, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 144 SECTION 2. T
he behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people s faith in the integr
ity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done, but must also be seen to
be done. IN MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM AGAINST AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTIC
E MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted fr
om a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review arti
cle, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a partys bri
ef are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sou
rces they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of re
prisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for
two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, th
e purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicati
ng cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
SECTION 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures agai
nst lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of of which the judge
may have become aware.
CANO CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of t
he judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the p
rocess by which the decision is made. SECTION 1. Judges Judges shall perform the
ir judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice. DIMO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT,
INC. V. DIMACULANGAN
G.R. No. 130991, March 11, 2004
For a judge to be inhibited, allegations of partiality and pre-judgment must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Here, mere allegation that the judge ar
bitrarily issued the TRO without presenting evidence showing bias on his part is
not sufficient. While Judge Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction when h
e issued the TRO for such should only be enforceable within his territorial juri
sdiction, such error may not necessarily warrant inhibition at most it is correc
tible by certiorari
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court
, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the Judiciary. TALEN
STALENS-DABON V. ARCEO
259 SCRA 354 (1996)
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to a
dminister justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community t
hat the people who run the system have done justice. Hence, in order to create s
uch confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justic
es, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects o
f the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probit
y, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives.
Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this countr
y run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 145 SECTION 3. J
udges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the o
ccasions deciding ng cases. on which it will be necessary for them to be disqual
ified from hearing or decidi Rule of Necessity, Defined In the case of Parayno v
. Meneses, G.R. No. 112684, Apr. 26, 1994, it is stated that a judge is not disq
ualified to sit in a case where there is no other judge available to hear and de
cide the case. Furthermore, when all judges will be disqualified as a result, it
will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with the power in the premis
es. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic judge is better than no
judge at all. It is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide the ca
se regardless of objections or disagreements.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could com
e before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor s
hall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair t
rial of any person or issue.
SECTION 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedi
ngs proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in
which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the
matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances w
here: (a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings; (b) The judg
e previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in contr
oversy; (c) The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest
in the outcome of the matter in controversy; (d) The judge served as executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy,
or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association,
or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; (e) The judge s ruling in
a lower court is the subject of review; (f) The judge is related by consanguini
ty or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel w
ithin the fourth civil degree; or (g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or
child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherw
ise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or an
y other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proc
eedings.
SECTION 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from
the proceeding, parties es and disclose on the records the basis of disqualific
ation. If, based on such disclosure, the parti lawyers, independently of the jud
ge s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immat
erial or unun-substantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated incorporate
d in the record of the proceedings.
Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court 1
. Mandatory of Compulsory Disqualification Grounds: Specific and Exclusive Role
of the Judicial Officer: no discretion to sit or try the case 2. Voluntary Inhib
ition Grounds: no specific grounds but there is a broad basis for such Role of t
he Judicial Officer: the matter is left to the sound discretion of the judge

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 146

QUERY OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAIOLOS, B
ULACAN, ON TIHE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES MASADAO and ELI
ZAGA RE: RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 49544954-M
FACTS: Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., rendered a decision in a criminal case finding
the accused guilty of the crime of estafa. Counsel for the accused, Atty. Efren
C. Moncupa, filed a motion for reconsideration. Retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes
entered his appearance for the accused, wherefore, Judge Masadao issued an order
inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case on the ground that retired
Justice J. B. L. Reyes had been among those who had recommended him to the Bench
. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Luciano G. Elizaga. Judge Elizaga re
turned the records of the case with an accompanying letter stating a refusal to
act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and assailing the re-raffling of
the case as impractical and uncalled for. ISSUE: Who shall resolve a motion for
reconsideration filed against the decision of Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., after
he had voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in Criminal Case No. 4
954-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, Malolos entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Jaime Tadeo"? HELD: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Ru
les of Court embodies the rule on disqualification and inhibition of judges. No
judge or judicial off icer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or chi
ld, is pecuniarily interested as heir. legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in whi
ch he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or aff
inity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules o
f civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or de
cision is the subject of review, without written consent of an the parties in in
terest, signed by them and entered upon the record. On the other hand, where no
grounds for disqualification as above enumerated exist, as in the case at bar, t
he rule on inhibition provides: A judge may, in the exercise of his discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or fri
endship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a sui
t is no ground for disqualification. The court held that the fact "that one of t
he counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground f
or the disqualification of said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden ot
her trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion wo
uld result, for under a different rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in
a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared."
Likewise, the rule applies when the lawyer of the defendant was a former associ
ate of the judge, when he was practising law. Inhibition is not allowed at every
instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge app
ears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", pe
r se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should rec
ognition of such value in Philippine society prevent the performance of one s du
ties as judge. However, where, as in this case, the judge admits that he may be
suspected of surrendering to the persuasions of utang na loob or he may even suc
cumb to it considering that he "and the members of his family, no less, shall ev
er remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice Reyes", the negative answer to
the question of judge Elizaga yields to exceptions in extraordinary cases.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 147 CANO ANON 4
PROPRIETY ETY Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the per
formance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in a
ll of their activities. Prohibitions: Actual impropriety Appearance of improprie
ty
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and sho
uld do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges judges shall conduct thems
elves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of
the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations sit
uations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favor
itism or partiality.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which
any member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner
manner with the case.
SECTION 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the
legal profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the leg
al profession.
to o freedom of expression, belief, association SECTION 6. Judges, like any othe
r citizen, are entitled t and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shal
l always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the j
udicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. RE: ANONY
MOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE ACUA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005
FACTS: Judge Acua was charged with improper conduct for allegedly making humiliat
ing statements such as putris, and putang-ina. In his answer, Judge Acua claimed that
those words are only his favorite expressions and they are not directed to any
particular person. He further maintained that his behavior is justified by the f
act that he is still mourning the sudden demise of his eldest son. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not Judge Acuna is guilty of improper conduct. HELD: Yes. Judges are demand
ed to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in the conduct and languag
e. Indeed, judges should so behave at all times because having accepted the este
emed position of a judge he ought to have known that more is expected of him tha
n ordinary citizen. Here, the judges use of humiliating and insensitive expressio
ns like putris and putang- ina is improper as such intemperate language detracts fro
m how he should conduct himself. Moreover, it does not matter whether such expre
ssions were directed to a particular person or not, as they give the impression
of a persons ill manners.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 148 SECTION 7. J
udges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial inter
ests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial intere
sts of members of their family. SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or or lend the p
restige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a
member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit influ
ence nce them in others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special pos
ition improperly to influe the performance of judicial duties. SECTION 9. Confid
ential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be us
ed or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties. UMALE V.
VILLALUZ
G.R. No. L-33508 May 25, 1973
FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order of respond
ent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the
robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused. Petitioner Leon Umale is the compl
ainant in the said robbery case. However, without any party moving for his disqu
alification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibite
d himself from trying the case on the ground that before the criminal case was f
iled in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same; and directed t
he immediate forwarding of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition. ISSUE: Whether
respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz can voluntarily inhibit himself without any
motion therefor by the parties on the ground of his personal knowledge of the c
ase even before the same was filed. HELD: Yes. A judge may voluntarily inhibit h
imself by reason of his being related to a counsel within the fourth civil degre
e (no expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because Rule 126 (t
he old rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntar
y inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned." Herei
n respondent Judge has personal knowledge of the case. Such personal knowledge o
n his part might generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the complai
ning witness or any of the accused or in a manner unconsciously color his judgme
nt one way or the other without the parties having the opportunity to cross-exam
ine him as a witness. A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability tha
t a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judg
e had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. It is possible t
hat the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the ca
se when he tries and decides the same on the merits, which would certainly const
itute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or
decision. It is best that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his o
wn initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by herein
petitioner and thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the part
ies and therefore maybe subject to cross-examination.
SECTION 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may: (a
) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the le
gal system, the administration of justice or related matters; (b) Appear at a pu
blic hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law,
the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters; (c) Engage
in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the ju
dicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 149 SECTION 11.
Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office. SECTION 12.
Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizat
ions representing the interests of judges. judges. SECTION 13. Judges and member
s of their families shall neither ask for nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan, o
r favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him
or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties. duties. ATTY. DAVI
D G. OMPOC vs. JUDGE NORITO E. TORRES FACTS: A civil case for ejectment was file
d and it was assigned to Judge Norito Torres. While the case was being tried, at
one time he invited Atty. Ompoc to see him at his residence and he instructed t
he former to bring his client along with him. At the meeting, Judge Torres gave
them a guide what evidence and argument they have to present. Also in that meeti
ng, Judge Torres requested the client, who is engage in the business of Car Deco
r to install a brand new air conditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace and said air condi
tioner was installed without Judge Torres paying for it. As the ejectment case p
rogressed, Judge Torres had been pestering Atty. Ompocs client with request for l
oans which Judge Torres never acknowledged by means of a receipt and he was give
n by Atty. Ompocs client sums of money in various amounts and on different dates.
These loans have never been paid up to now and are certainly will not be paid,
to the end of time because Judge Norito Torres is smart enough not to sign anyth
ing. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Torres committed gross misconduct. HELD: Yes. R
eceiving money from a party litigant is the kind of gross and flaunting miscondu
ct on the part of the judge, who is charged with the responsibility of administe
ring the law and rendering justice. Members of the judiciary should display not
only the highest integrity but must, at all times, conduct themselves in such ma
nner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion.
SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to t
heir influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest
, loan or favor in relation to anything done, to be done or omitted omitted to b
e done in connection with their duties or functions. SECTION 15. Subject to law
and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a that ha
t such token gift, award, or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it
is made, provided t gift, award or benefit might not be reasonably perceived as
intended to influence the judge in the performance of official duties or otherwi
se give rise to an appearance of partiality.
CANO CANON 5 EQUAL UALITY Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the court
s is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of and understand diversity in society and diff
erences arising from various sources, including, but not limited to, race, color
, sex, religion, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital stat
us, sexual orientation, social and economic status, and other like causes.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 150 SECTION 2. J
udges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, man
ifest bias or prejudice towards towards any person or group on irrelevant ground
s.
SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judic
ial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to
the proper performance of such duties.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to hi
s or her influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons concer
ned, in a matter matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
SECTION 5. Judges shall
in from manifesting, by
grounds, except such as
and may be the subject

require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refra

words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant
are legally relevant relevant to an issue in proceedings
of legitimate advocacy.

CANO ANON 6 COMPETEN ETENCE AND DILIGENCE Competence and diligence are pre-requi
sites to the due performance of judicial office.
SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence precedence over all ot
her activities.
SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, w
hich include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities
in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks tasks relevant to th
e judicial office or the court s operations.
SECTION 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their know
ledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of jud
icial duties, taking advantage advantage for this purpose the training and other
facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
ABAD V. BLEZA, 1986 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, disho
nesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subjec
t to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Even on the assum
ption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he c
annot be held administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action. A judi
cial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him
in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. T
o hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decisi
on he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position unbearable.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 151 DAGUDAG V JU
DGE PADERANGA FACTS: Illegal forest products possessed by NMC Container Lines, I
nc were seized by the DENR. The items were found to be lacking the required lega
l documents and were consequently abandoned by the unknown owner. Later a certai
n Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated pro
ducts. Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative
case was already pending before the DENR. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paderanga
is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge. HEL
D: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for thr
ee reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. I
n the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative reme
dy. Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cogni
zance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Thi
rd, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the sub
ject of replevin. Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit
and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. Cano
n 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section
3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enh
ance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Ju
dges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintanc
e with laws. The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pe
nding before administrative agencies is basic.
SECTION 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of
international international law, including international conventions and other i
nstruments establishing human rights norms. SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fair
ly and with reasonable promptness. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. JUDGE D
OYON
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2108 November 25, 2008
FACTS: After the conducted judicial audit, respondent Judge Orlando P. Doyon was
found to have neglected his duties. The audit team reported that there were six
civil cases and nine criminal cases where no action was made for a considerable
length of time and other cases which were already beyond the period to resolve
and beyond the reglementary period to decide. At the time the findings were made
, respondent judge has already retired which he also used as a defense in order
to exculpate himself. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Doyon is guilty of neglect and
undue delay of rendering justice. HELD: The Court held that the Constitution re
quires trial judges to dispose of all cases or matters within three months. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct also provides in Canon 6, Section 5 thereof that ju
dges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decis
ions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. The reason for this ru
le is that justice delayed is justice denied. Undue delay in the disposition of
cases results in a denial of justice which, in turn, brings the courts into disr
epute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the judici
ary. Thus, the failure of judges to render judgments within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative san
ction.

FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes P a g e | 152 SECTION 6. J
udges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and b
e patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. capacity. Judges s
hall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others su
bject to their influence, direction or control.
SECTION 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent dis
charge of judicial duties.
//FSUU College of Law Consejo de Legis S.Y. 2012-2013/