G.R. No.

115147 January 4, 1995

GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
LAND
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the
resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of
respondent Civil Service Commission
("CSC") relative to an administrative
case, entitled "Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as
well as its resolution, dated 03 March
1994, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner George I. Rivera was the
Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I
of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits
of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez,
petitioner was charged, on 01
February 1988, by the LBP President
with having committed the following
offenses:
(1) Dishonesty;
(2)
Receiving
for
personal use of fee, gift
or other valuable thing,
in the course of official
duties or in connection
therewith when such
fee, gift, or
other
valuable thing is given
by any person in the
hope or expectation of
receiving a favor or
better treatment than
that accorded other
persons;
(3) Committing acts
punishable under the
Anti-Graft laws;
(4) Pursuit of private
business vocation or
profession without the
permission required by
Civil Service Rules and
regulations;

(5) Violation of Res. 87A,

R.A.
No.
337;
resulting to misconduct
and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of
the service. 1
Rivera allegedly told Perez, the
Marketing Manager of Wynner which
had a pending loan application with
LBP, that he could facilitate the
processing, approval and release of
the loan if he would be given a ten
percent (10%) commission. Rivera
was said to have subsequently
received a P200,000.00 commission
out of the P3,000,000.00 loan
proceeds from the LBP. From Lao,
who had substantial investments in
Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise
received
the
amount
of
approximately P20,000.00 pocket
money for his trip to the United
States, as well as additional funds for
his
plane
ticket,
hotel
accommodations and pocket money
for still another trip to Hongkong.
Rivera was further charged with,
among other things, having served
and acted, without prior authority
required by Civil Service Rules and
Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of
the Office of the President of the
Philippines,
as
the
personal
consultant of Lao and as consultant
in various companies where Lao had
investments. He drew and received
salaries
and
allowances
approximately P20,000.00 a month
evidenced by vouchers of Edge
Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing
Corporation, and JME Trading
Corporation.
Once the charges were filed, Rivera
was
placed
under
preventive
suspension (effective 19 February
1988). After a formal investigation,
the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service in
accepting employment from a client
of the bank and in thereby receiving
salaries and allowances in violation
of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the
Revised Civil Service Rules. He was
also found to have transgressed the
prohibition in Section 3, paragraph
(d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019,

as amended). The penalty of forced
resignation,
without
separation
benefits
and
gratuities,
was
thereupon imposed on Rivera.
On appeal, the decision was modified
by the Merit Systems Protection
Board ("MSPB") which held. 2
In view of the foregoing,
the decision appealed
from is hereby modified
that
respondentappellant George I.
Rivera is considered
guilty only of committing
acts prejudicial to the
best interest of the
service.
Considering
that this is his first
offense on record, the
penalty
of
Forced
Resignation
without
separation benefits and
gratuities to which he
may be otherwise be
entitled under the laws
is reduced to one (1)
year
suspension. 3
The LBP filed a motion for the
reconsideration of MSPB's decision.
In its resolution, 4 promulgated on 08
June 1992, the MSPB denied the
motion.
Rivera and the LBP both appealed to
the CSC. In its Resolution No. 931189, 5 the CSC resolved only the
appeal of Rivera (rejecting that of the
LBP pursuant to the rule laid down by
his Court in Magpale vs. Civil Service
Commission [215 SCRA 398]). The
resolution, in part, read:
The Commission is
inclined to sustain the
original decision of the
Land Bank of the
Philippines. Committing
an act punishable under
the
Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019) is considered
a Grave Misconduct. It
is a wanton and/or
blatant violation of law.
As an officer of the

Bank,
respondent
Rivera should know
better that it was illegal
and improper for him to
accept regular monthly
allowances
from
a
private firm which is a
client of his Bank. More
so, that such act is
prohibited
and
punishable under Sec.
3(d) of RA 3019.
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
premises
considered,
the
Commission resolves to
dismiss the appeal of
Respondent
George
Rivera. Moreover, the
Commission finds him
guilty
of
Grave
Misconduct for which he
is meted out the penalty
of dismissal from the
service. Accordingly, the
MSPB
decision
is
hereby set aside. 6
Rivera
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, which the CSC
denied in its Resolution No. 941276. 7
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner averred that the CSC
committed grave abuse or discretion
in imposing the capital penalty of
dismissal
on
the
basis
of
unsubstantiated
finding
and
conclusions.
On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved
to dismiss the petition for petitioner's
failure to sufficiently show that CSC
acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing its questioned resolution.
Rivera
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of the Court's
dismissal of the petition, now strongly
asserting that he was denied due
process when Hon. Thelma P.
Gaminde, who earlier participated in
her capacity as the Board Chairman
of the MSPB when the latter had
taken action on LBP's motion for
reconsideration, also took part, this
time as a CSC Commissioner, in the
resolution of petitioner's motion for

reconsideration with the CSC. The

Court, in its resolution of 05 July
1994, resolved to grant the motion, to
reinstate the petition and to require
respondents to comment thereon.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in
its comment, dated 15 September
1994, sided with petitioner and
suggested that the CSC be given an
opportunity to submit its own
comment. CSC did in due time.
This is not the first time that the Court
has been confronted with this kind of
prejudicial issue.
In Zambales
Chromite
Mining
Company vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the
decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
was set aside by this Court after it
had been established that the case
concerned an appeal from the
Secretary's own previous decision he
handed down while he was yet the
incumbent Director of Mines. Calling
the act of the Secretary a "mockery
of administrative justice," the Court
said:
In order that the review
of the decision of a
subordinate
officer
might not turn out to be
a farce, then reviewing
officer must perforce be
other than the officer
whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there
could be no different
view or there would be
no real review of the
case. The decision of
the reviewing officer
would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be
the same view since
being human, he would
not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view
of the case.
The Court similarly struck down a
decision of Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave over a
resolution of the Civil Service
Commission, in which he, then
concurrently its chairman, had earlier
"concurred." 9

Given the circumstances in the case

at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit
herself totally from any participation
in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if
we are to give full meaning and
consequence to a fundamental
aspect of due process. The argument
that Commissioner Gaminde did not
participate in MSPB's decision of 29
August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not
denied that she did participate,
indeed has concurred, in MSPB's
resolution of 03 March 1994, denying
the motion for reconsideration of
MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.
WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No.
94-1276 is SET ASIDE, and the case
is REMANDED to respondent Civil
Service
Commission
for
the
resolution, sans the participation of
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde,
of herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution
No. 93-1189. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132248. January 19,
2000]
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in
her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA
LUISA C. MORAL, respondent. Nexold
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SECRETARY
ERLINDA
C.
PEFIANCO of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) seeks to nullify through this
petition for review the Decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed by then
DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for
lack of merit, as well as its Resolution
dated 13 January 1998 denying
reconsideration thereof.

On 26 July 1994 former DECS

Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a
complaint against respondent Maria
Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian,
Catalog Division, of the National
Library
for
dishonesty,
grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
The complaint charged respondent
Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents from the vaults
of the Filipiniana and Asian Division
(FAD) of the National Library which
were under her control and
supervision as Division Chief and
keeping in her possession, without
legal authority and justification, some
forty-one (41) items of historical
documents which were missing from
the FAD vaults of the National
Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee
conducted several hearings on the
complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special
Prosecutor from the Department of
Justice, represented the DECS
Secretary in the administrative case
while respondent was represented by
her own private counsel. On 25
September 1996 Secretary Gloria
issued
a
resolution
finding
respondent
"guilty
of
the
administrative offenses of dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, for the commission of
pilferage of historical documents of
the national library, to the prejudice of
the national library in particular, and
the country in general." She was
ordered
dismissed
from
the
government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her
retirement
benefits
and
other
remunerations.
On 30 September 1996 respondent
received a copy of the resolution.
Thereafter, or on 1 October 1996,
she received another resolution
correcting the typographical errors
found on the first resolution.
Respondent did not appeal the
judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed
a Petition for the Production of the
DECS
Investigation
Committee
Report purportedly to "guide [her] on

whatever action would be most

appropriate to take under the
circumstances."[2] Her petition was,
however, denied. Man-ikx
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for
DECS Committee Report and DECS
Resolution dated September 25,
1996,
which
Secretary
Gloria
similarly denied in his Order of 23
October 1996. Respondent moved
for reconsideration but the motion
was merely "noted" in view of the
warning in the 23 October 1996
Order that the denial of the request
for the production of the Investigation
Committee Report was final.[3] As
earlier stated, respondent did not
appeal the Resolution dated 30
September 1996 dismissing her from
the service. Instead, she instituted an
action for mandamus and injunction
before the regular courts against
Secretary Gloria praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and
that the DECS Secretary be enjoined
from enforcing the order of dismissal
until she received a copy of the said
report.[4]
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss
the mandamus case principally for
lack of cause of action, but the trial
court denied his motion. Thus, he
elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court.
In its assailed Decision of 24
November 1997 the appellate court
sustained the trial court and
dismissed Secretary Glorias petition
for lack of merit holding that FIRST. Petitioner Gloria
acted prematurely, not
having filed any motion
for reconsideration of
the assailed order with
the respondent judge
before filing the instant
petition to this Court.
This
constitutes
a
procedural infirmity x x x
x SECOND. Even if the
aforesaid
procedural
defect were to be
disregarded, the petition
at hand, nevertheless,
must fail. The denial of

the motion to dismiss is

an option available to
the respondent judge.
Such
order
is
interlocutory and thus
not appealable. The
proper recourse of the
aggrieved party is to file
an
answer
and
interpose, as defenses,
the objection(s) raised
by him in said motion to
dismiss, then proceed
with the trial and, in
case
of
adverse
decision, to elevate the
entire case on appeal in
due course.
His motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the Court of Appeals
on 13 January 1998, Secretary Gloria
filed the instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was
replaced by Secretary Erlinda C.
Pefianco
who
was
thereafter
substituted in the case for Secretary
Gloria.
The issues before us are: whether
the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing
the
petition
for certiorari for failure of petitioner to
file a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the motion to
dismiss, and in holding that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to
dismiss.
Petitioner contends that there is no
need
to
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration as the trial courts
order denying the motion to dismiss
is a patent nullity, and a motion for
reconsideration would practically be
a useless ceremony as the trial court
virtually decided the case, and that
there is no law requiring the DECS to
furnish respondent with a copy of the
Report of the DECS Investigation
Committee so that the petition
for mandamus has no leg to stand on
hence should have been dismissed
for lack of cause of action. Manik-s
Excepting thereto respondent argues
that the denial of the motion to
dismiss is interlocutory in nature as it

did not dispose of the case on the

merits, and petitioner still has a
residual remedy, i.e., to file an
answer, thus her substantive rights
have not been violated as she
contends; that respondent is clearly
entitled
to
the
remedy
ofmandamus to protect her rights;
and, that petitioner has not shown
any law, DECS order or regulation
prohibiting the release of the
petitioned documents for reasons of
confidentiality or national security.
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule
16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure mandatorily requires that
the resolution on a motion to dismiss
should clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor After hearing, the court
may dismiss the action
or claim, deny the
motion or order the
amendment
of
the
pleading.
The court shall not defer
the resolution of the
motion for the reason
that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.
In
every
case, the
resolution shall state
clearly and distinctly the
reasons
therefor (underscoring
supplied).
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the
common practice of perfunctorily
denying motions to dismiss "for lack
of merit." Such cavalier disposition
often
creates
difficulty
and
misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse
therefrom and likewise on the higher
court called upon to resolve the
issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial
court dated 23 April 1997 falls short
of the requirements prescribed in
Rule 16. The Order merely discussed
the
general
concept
ofmandamus and the trial courts
jurisdiction over the rulings and
actions of administrative agencies

without stating the basis why

petitioners motion to dismiss was
being denied. We are reproducing
hereunder for reference the assailed
Order This treats of the Motion
to Dismiss filed by
respondent Gloria on 14
March 1997 to which
petitioner filed their (sic)
opposition on April 8,
1997.
Respondent premised
his motion on the
following grounds: (a)
Mandamus does not lie
to compel respondent
DECS
Secretary
to
release the Report of
the DECS Investigating
Committee because the
Petition does not state a
cause of action; (b) The
DECS
Resolution
dismissing petitioner is
legal and valid, and
therefore, the writ of
preliminary
injunction
cannot be granted to
enjoin its execution;
while petitioner alleged
among others that she
has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of
law.
Mandamus is employed
to
compel
the
performance,
when
refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its main
objective.
"Purely
ministerial" are acts to
be performed in a given
state of facts, in a
prescribed manner in
obedience
to
the
mandate
of
legal
authority without regard
to the exercise of his
own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety
of the act done. While
the discretion of a
Constitutional
Commission cannot be
controlled by mandamus

x x x x the court can

decide whether the duty
is
discretionary
or
ministerial x x x xManikan
Generally, courts have
no supervising power
over the proceedings
and actions of the
administrative
departments
of
the
government. This is
generally
true
with
respect to acts involving
the exercise of judgment
or discretion, and finding
of fact. Findings of fact
by an administrative
board
or
official,
following a hearing, are
binding upon the courts
and will not be disturbed
except where the board
or official has gone
beyond his statutory
authority,
exercised
unconstitutional powers
or
clearly
acted
arbitrarily and without
regard to his duty or
with grave abuse of
discretion or as when
there is capricious and
whimsical exercise of
judgment
as
is
equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction as where the
power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or
personal
hostility
amounting to an evasion
of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined, or to
act
at
all
in
contemplation of law x x
xx
WHEREFORE,
in
regard to the foregoing,
the motion to dismiss by
herein respondent is
hereby denied for lack
of merit and is hereby
ordered to file its (sic)
responsive
pleadings
within ten (10) days

from receipt of this

Order. Copy furnished
petitioner
who
is
likewise given ten (10)
days to submit his (sic)
comment or opposition.
Indeed, we cannot even discern the
bearing or relevance of the
discussion
therein
on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground
relied upon by petitioner in her
motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of cause
of action, and the dispositive portion
of the order. The order only confused
petitioner and left her unable to
determine the errors which would be
the proper subject of her motion for
reconsideration. Judges should take
pains in crafting their orders, stating
therein clearly and comprehensively
the reasons for their issuance, which
are
necessary
for
the
full
understanding of the action taken.
Where the court itself has not stated
any basis for its order, to be very
strict in requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before resort to
higher courts on certiorari may be
had, would be to expect too much.
Since the judge himself was not
precise and specific in his order, a
certain degree of liberality in exacting
from petitioner strict compliance with
the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless
the lower court, through a motion for
reconsideration, has been given an
opportunity to correct the imputed
errors on its act or order. However,
this rule is not absolute and is subject
to well-recognized exceptions. Thus,
when the act or order of the lower
court is a patent nullity for failure to
comply with a mandatory provision of
the Rules, as in this case, a motion
for
reconsideration
may
be
dispensed with and the aggrieved
party may assail the act or order of
the lower court directly on certiorari.
[5]
Ol-dmiso
On the second issue, the nature of
the remedy of mandamus has been
the subject of discussions in several
cases. It is settled that mandamus is
employed
to
compel
the
performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main

objective. It does not lie to require

anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that petitioner should
have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. It never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely
expressed,
it
must
nevertheless be clear. The writ will
not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do
or which is his duty not to do, or give
to the applicant anything to which he
is not entitled by law. The writ neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It
is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.[6]
In her petition for mandamus,
respondent miserably failed to
demonstrate that she has a clear
legal right to the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS
Secretary to furnish her with a copy
thereof. Consequently, she is not
entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal
to the Civil Service Commission the
DECS resolution dismissing her from
the service.[7] By her failure to do so,
nothing
prevented
the
DECS
resolution from becoming final and
executory. Obviously, it will serve no
useful purpose now to compel
petitioner to furnish her with a copy of
the investigation report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule
which imposes a legal duty on
petitioner to furnish respondent with
a copy of the investigation report. On
the contrary, we unequivocally held
in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent
in an administrative case is not
entitled to be informed of the findings
and
recommendations
of
any
investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against
him. He is entitled only to the
administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record,
and a reasonable opportunity to meet
the charges and the evidence
presented against her during the

hearings
of
the
investigation
committee. Respondent no doubt
had been accorded these rights.
Respondents assertion that the
investigation report would be used
"to guide [her] on what action would
be appropriate to take under the
circumstances,"[9] hardly
merits
consideration. It must be stressed
that the disputed investigation report
is
an
internal
communication
between the DECS Secretary and
the Investigation Committee, and it is
not generally intended for the perusal
of respondent or any other person for
that matter, except the DECS
Secretary. As correctly ruled by
Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2
October 1996 Respondents
(Moral)
counsel is reminded that
the Report of the DECS
Investigating Committee
is not an integral part of
the Decision itself x x x
x [t]he report is an
internal communication
between
the
Investigating Committee
and
the
DECS
Secretary,
and,
therefore,
confidential
until the latter had
already read and used
the same in making his
own determination of
the facts and applicable
law of the case, to be
expressed
in
the
Decision
he
may
make. Nc-m
The Report remains an
internal and confidential
matter to be used as
part - - although not
controlling - - of the
basis for the decision.
Only when the party
adversely affected by
the decision has filed
and perfected an appeal
to the Civil Service
Commission may all the
records of the case,
including the aforesaid
Report be forwarded to
the CSC. In the latter

appellate tribunal, the

respondents
counsel
may be allowed to read
and/or be given a copy
of the Report to enable
the appellant to file an
intelligent
and
exhaustive
appellants
Brief Memorandum.
More
importantly,
the
DECS
resolution is complete in itself for
purposes of appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, that is, it
contains sufficient findings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which
respondents removal from office was
grounded. This resolution, and not
the investigation report, should be
the basis of any further remedies
respondent might wish to pursue,
and we cannot see how she would
be prejudiced by denying her access
to the investigation report.
In fine, the trial courts Order of 23
April 1997 denying petitioners motion
to dismiss is not a mere error of
judgment as the Court of Appeals
held, but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the
Order is a patent nullity for failure to
comply with the provisions of the
rules requiring that a resolution on a
motion to dismiss should clearly and
distinctly state the reasons therefor;
and, respondent is clearly not entitled
to the writ ofmandamus as she did
not appeal the DECS resolution
dismissing her from service, and
there is no law or rule which imposes
a ministerial duty on petitioner to
furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report, hence her
petition clearly lacked a cause of
action. In such instance, while the
trial
courts
order
is
merely
interlocutory
and
nonappealable, certiorari is the proper
remedy to annul the same since it is
rendered with grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals of 24 November
1997 sustaining the trial courts denial
of petitioners motion to dismiss, as
well as its Resolution dated 13

January
1998
denying
reconsideration, is REVERSED and
SET
ASIDE.
The
petition
for mandamus filed by respondent
before the court a quo to compel
petitioner to furnish her a copy of the
DECS
Investigation
Committee
Report is DISMISSED for want of
cause of action.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465
2000

January 18,

SECRETARY
OF
JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON.
RALPH
C.
LANTION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25, and
MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck
of particle or molecule vis--vis the
vast and overwhelming powers of
government. His only guarantee
against oppression and tyranny are
his fundamental liberties under the
Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now
called to decide whether to uphold a
citizen's basic due process rights, or
the government's ironclad duties
under a treaty. The bugle sounds and
this Court must once again act as the
faithful guardian of the fundamental
writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast
against
the
following
factual
backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President
Ferdinand
E.
Marcos
issued
Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on:
the doctrine of incorporation under
the Constitution; the mutual concern
for the suppression of crime both in
the state where it was committed and

the state where the criminal may

have escaped; the extradition treaty
with the Republic of Indonesia and
the intention of the Philippines to
enter into similar treaties with other
interested countries; and the need for
rules to guide the executive
department and the courts in the
proper implementation of said
treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States
of America" (hereinafter referred to
as the RP-US Extradition Treaty).
The Senate, by way of Resolution
No. 11, expressed its concurrence in
the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic
Notes
correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on
the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request
upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the
Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department
of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale
No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were
the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of
Florida,
and
other
supporting
documents for said extradition.
Based on the papers submitted,
private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of
the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to
commit offense or to defraud
the United States; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to
evade or defeat tax; four [4]

counts; Maximum Penalty 5

years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by
wire, radio, or television; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries; six [6]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election
contributions in name of
another; thirty-three [33] counts;
Maximum Penalty less than
one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued
Department
Order
No.
249
designating and authorizing a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case pursuant to Section
5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069.
Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical
evaluation
and
assessment" of the extradition
request and the documents in
support thereof. The panel found that
the "official English translation of
some documents in Spanish were
not attached to the request and that
there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p.
15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition
documents,
private
respondent, through counsel, wrote a
letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed
to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the
U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted
therewith; and that he be given
ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested
that the proceedings on the matter be
held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested
that preliminary, he be given at least
a copy of, or access to, the request
of the United States Government,
and after receiving a copy of the

Diplomatic Note, a period of time to

amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's
July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a
reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but
received by private respondent only
on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following
reasons:
1. We find it premature to
furnish you with copies of the
extradition
request
and
supporting documents from the
United States Government,
pending evaluation by this
Department of the sufficiency of
the
extradition
documents
submitted in accordance with
the provisions of the extradition
treaty and our extradition law.
Article 7 of the Extradition
Treaty between the Philippines
and
the
United
States
enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes
the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be
received and admitted as
evidence.
Evidentiary
requirements
under
our
domestic law are also set forth
in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department
of
the
aforementioned
documents is not a preliminary
investigation
nor
akin
to
preliminary investigation of
criminal cases. We merely
determine
whether
the
procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and
treaty have been complied with
by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the accused in all
criminal
prosecutions
are
therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the
petition for extradition when the
person sought to be extradited
will be furnished by the court
with copies of the petition,
request
and
extradition
documents and this Department
will not pose any objection to a

request for ample time

evaluate said documents.

to

2. The formal request for

extradition of the United States
contains grand jury information
and
documents
obtained
through grand jury process
covered by strict secrecy rules
under United States law. The
United States had to secure
orders from the concerned
District Courts authorizing the
United States to disclose
certain grand jury information to
Philippine government and law
enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez. Any further disclosure
of the said information is not
authorized by the United States
District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United
States Government requested
the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure
of the subject information. This
Department's denial of your
request is consistent with Article
7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the
United
States
in
any
proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition. The
Department of Justice under
P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of
the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a
position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with
an extradition request. Article
26 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, to which
we are a party provides that
"[E]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them
in good faith". Extradition is a
tool of criminal law enforcement
and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons
must
be
processed
expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when,

on August
6,
1999,
private
respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation,
for mandamus (to compel herein
petitioner
to
furnish
private
respondent
the
extradition
documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request
impartially,
fairly
and
objectively);certiorari (to set aside
herein petitioner's letter dated July
13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to
enjoin the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the NBI
from performing any act directed to
the extradition of private respondent
to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684
and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of
said regional trial court stationed in
Manila which is presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the
case was heard on August 9, 1999.
Petitioner, who appeared in his own
behalf, moved that he be given
ample time to file a memorandum,
but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent
judge issued an order dated the
previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE,
this
Court
hereby Orders the respondents,
namely: the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director
of the National Bureau of
Investigation,
their
agents
and/or
representatives
to
maintain
the status
quo by

refraining from committing the

acts complained of; from
conducting further proceedings
in connection with the request
of
the
United
States
Government for the extradition
of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a
Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to
the extradition of the petitioner
to the United States, for a
period of twenty (20) days from
service on respondents of this
Order, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
The hearing as to whether or
not this Court shall issue the
preliminary
injunction,
as
agreed upon by the counsels
for the parties herein, is set on
August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock
in
the
morning.
The
respondents
are,
likewise,
ordered to file their written
comment and/or opposition to
the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said
date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the
instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK
OR
EXCESS
OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER
BECAUSE:
I.
BY
ORDERING
HEREIN
PETITIONER TO REFRAIN
FROM COMMITTING THE
ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E.,
TO DESIST FROM REFUSING
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND

DOCUMENTS AND FROM

DENYING
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A
COMMENT
ON,
OR
OPPOSITION
TO,
THE
REQUEST,
THE
MAIN
PRAYER
FOR
A
WRIT
OF MANDAMUSIN
THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION
WAS,
IN
EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO
CONSTITUTE
AN
ADJUDICATION
ON
THE
MERITS
OF
THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER
WAS
UNQUALIFIEDLY
PREVENTED
FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES
UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY
AND
THE
PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION
LAW;
III.
THE
PETITION
FOR (MANDAMUS),
CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS
FACE,
FORMALLY
AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT;
AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS
NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT
NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL
NOT
SUFFER
ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court
required private respondent to file his
comment. Also issued, as prayed for,
was a temporary restraining order
(TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective
immediately and continuing
until further orders from this
Court, You, Respondent Judge

Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,

representatives or any person
or persons acting in your place
or stead are hereby ORDERED
to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing the assailed order
dated August 9, 1999 issued by
public respondent in Civil Case
No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, this 17th day of
August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral
argument on August 31, 1999, after
which the parties, as directed, filed
their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing
parties,
both
procedural
and
substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as
well as the extensive arguments of
both parties, compel us to delineate
the focal point raised by the
pleadings: During the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings,
is private respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of
notice and hearing? An affirmative
answer would necessarily render the
proceedings at the trial court, moot
and academic (the issues of which
are substantially the same as those
before us now), while a negative
resolution would call for the
immediate lifting of the TRO issued
by this Court dated August 24, 1999,
thus allowing petitioner to fast-track
the process leading to the filing of the
extradition petition with the proper
regional trial court. Corollarily, in the
event that private respondent is
adjudged entitled to basic due
process rights at the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceedings, would
this entitlement constitute a breach of
the
legal
commitments
and
obligations
of
the
Philippine
Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming
that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between
private respondent's basic due

process rights and the provisions of

the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental
importance, the Court has elected to
go directly into the substantive merits
of the case, brushing aside
peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition
therein, and of the issuance of the
TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial
court.
To be sure, the issues call for a
review of the extradition procedure.
The RP-US Extradition Treaty which
was executed only on November 13,
1994, ushered into force the
implementing
provisions
of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also
called as the Philippine Extradition
Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines
extradition as "the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal
of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or
government." The portions of the
Decree relevant to the instant case
which involves a charged and not
convicted individual, are abstracted
as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign
Diplomat of the Requesting State,
addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be
accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic
copy of the criminal charge and
the warrant of arrest issued by
the authority of the Requesting
State having jurisdiction over
the matter, or some other
instruments having equivalent
legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which
extradition is requested, with
the fullest particulars as to the

name and identity of the

accused, his whereabouts in
the Philippines, if known, the
acts or omissions complained
of, and the time and place of
the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law
or a statement of the contents
of said law, and the designation
or description of the offense by
the law, sufficient for evaluation
of the request; and
4. Such other documents or
information in support of the
request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential
Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree,
which sets forth the duty of the
Secretary
of
Foreign
Affairs,
pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs that
the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the
relevant treaty or convention,
he shall forward the request
together with the related
documents to the Secretary of
Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take
charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too
clearly that the executive authority
given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the
supporting
documents
is
the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What
then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and
3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, the executive authority must
ascertain whether or not the request
is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or
other types of information which
describe the identity and
probable location of the person
sought;

2. A statement of the facts of

the offense and the procedural
history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions
of the law describing the
essential elements of the
offense for which extradition is
requested;
4. A statement of the provisions
of
law
describing
the
punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions
of the law describing any time
limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the
offense;
6. Documents, statements, or
other types of information
specified in paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4 of said Article, as
applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7,
Presidential Decree No.
1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according
to the law of the Requested
State, would provide probable
cause for his arrest and
committal for trial if the offense
had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or
order of arrest issued by a
judge or other competent
authority; and
9. A copy of the charging
document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of
Foreign Affairs) must also see to it
that the accompanying documents
received in support of the request
had been certified by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the
Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No.
052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy
Note
No.
951309
from
the
Department of Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of

the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition
shall not be granted if the executive
authority of the Requested State
determines that the request is
politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military offense which is
not punishable under non-military
penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the
extradition request and its supporting
documents
are
sufficient
and
complete in form and substance, he
shall deliver the same to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize
an attorney in his office to take
charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a
written petition with the proper
regional trial court of the province or
city, with a prayer that the court take
the
extradition
request
under
consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional
trial court, upon receipt of the petition
for extradition, shall, as soon as
practicable,
issue
an
order
summoning
the
prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer
the petition on the day and hour fixed
in the order. The judge may issue a
warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice (Paragraph
[1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to
prevent the flight of the prospective
extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not
specifically indicate whether the
extradition proceeding is criminal,
civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section
9 thereof provides that in the hearing
of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court,
insofar as practicable and not
inconsistent with the summary nature
of the proceedings, shall apply.
During the hearing, Section 8 of the

Decree provides that the attorney

having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the
proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the
court shall render a decision granting
the extradition and giving the reasons
therefor upon a showing of the
existence of a prima facie case, or
dismiss
the
petition
(Section
10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable
to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision
shall
be
final
and
immediately
executory
(Section
12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules
of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall
apply in the aforementioned appeal,
except for the required 15-day period
to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or
not the offense mentioned in the
petition is extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule
and other conditions mentioned in
Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
The
trial
court
also
determines whether or not the
offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one
(Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the
extradition proceedings as backdrop,
the following query presents itself:
What is the nature of the role of the
Department of Justice at the
evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition
Law indicates that the only duty of
the Secretary of Justice is to file the
extradition petition after the request
and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official
who is authorized to evaluate the
extradition papers, to assure their
sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine
whether or not the request is
politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military offense which is
not punishable under non-military
penal legislation. Ipso facto, as

expressly provided in Paragraph

Section 5 of the Extradition Law,
Secretary of Justice has
ministerial duty of filing
extradition papers.

[1],
the
the
the

However, looking at the factual milieu

of the case before us, it would
appear that there was failure to abide
by the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1069. For while it is true
that the extradition request was
delivered to the Department of
Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the
following day or less than 24 hours
later, the Department of Justice
received the request, apparently
without the Department of Foreign
Affairs discharging its duty of
thoroughly evaluating the same and
its accompanying documents. The
statement of an assistant secretary at
the Department of Foreign Affairs
that his Department, in this regard, is
merely acting as a post office, for
which reason he simply forwarded
the request to the Department of
Justice, indicates the magnitude of
the error of the Department of
Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities.
Thereafter,
the
Department of Justice took it upon
itself to determine the completeness
of the documents and to evaluate the
same to find out whether they comply
with the requirements laid down in
the Extradition Law and the RP-US
Extradition
Treaty.
Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that
although the Department of Justice
had no obligation to evaluate the
extradition
documents,
the
Department also had to go over them
so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also
at
this
stage
where
private
respondent insisted on the following;
(1) the right to be furnished the
request and the supporting papers;
(2) the right to be heard which
consists in having a reasonable
period of time to oppose the request,
and to present evidence in support of
the opposition; and (3) that the
evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private
respondent's opposition to the
request.

The two Departments seem to have

misread the scope of their duties and
authority, one abdicating its powers
and
the
other
enlarging
its
commission. The Department of
Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the
instant petition as its own, indirectly
conveying the message that if it were
to evaluate the extradition request, it
would not allow private respondent to
participate in the process of
evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot
support the presumption of regularity
that the Department of Foreign
Affairs thoroughly reviewed the
extradition request and supporting
documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the
request and its annexed documents
satisfy the requirements of law. The
Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is
in the field of law, could not privately
review the papers all by himself. He
had to officially constitute a panel of
attorneys. How then could the DFA
Secretary or his undersecretary, in
less than one day, make the more
authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the
extradition
proceedings
proper,
belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal
investigation, but it is also erroneous
to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage,
the executive authority has the
power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers;
(b) to outrightly deny the request if on
its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c)
to make a determination whether or
not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation
(tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29;
Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article
3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence,
said process may be characterized
as an investigative or inquisitorial
process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an

administrative body's quasi-judicial

power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial
proceeding involves: (a) taking and
evaluation
of
evidence;
(b)
determining facts based upon the
evidence
presented;
and
(c)
rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved (De
Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing
Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S.
1). Inquisitorial power, which is also
known as examining or investigatory
power, is one or the determinative
powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its
quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
This power allows the administrative
body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the
activities, of persons or entities
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p.
27), or to require disclosure of
information by means or accounts,
records,
reports,
testimony of
witnesses, production of documents,
or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).
The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing, and analyzing
evidence, which is a useful aid or tool
in
an
administrative
agency's
performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions. Notably,
investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098
[1957], unreported), the Court had
occasion to rule on the functions of
an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation. It does not
exercise judicial functions and its
power is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test
of
determining
whether
an
administrative body is exercising
judicial
functions
or
merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication
signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the
rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose
for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based

on the facts and circumstances

presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties,
then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.
The
above
description
in Ruperto applies
to
an
administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The
body has no power to adjudicate in
regard to the rights and obligations of
both the Requesting State and the
prospective extraditee. Its only power
is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the
law and the treaty and, therefore,
sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is
thus merely initial and not final. The
body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should
be effected. That is the role of the
court. The body's power is limited to
an initial finding of whether or not the
extradition petition can be filed in
court.
It is to be noted, however, that in
contrast to ordinary investigations,
the
evaluation
procedure
is
characterized by certain peculiarities.
Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the
deprivation
of
liberty of
the
prospective
extraditee.
This
deprivation can be effected at two
stages: First, the provisional arrest of
the prospective extraditee pending
the submission of the request. This is
so because the Treaty provides that
in case of urgency, a contracting
party may request the provisional
arrest of the person sought pending
presentation
of
the
request
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), but he shall be
automatically discharged after 60
days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree
No. 1069 provides for a shorter
period of 20 days after which the
arrested person could be discharged
(Section 20[d]). Logically, although
the Extradition Law is silent on this
respect, the provisions only mean
that once a request is forwarded to
the Requested State, the prospective

extraditee may be continuously

detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9,
RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will
only be discharged if no request is
submitted. Practically, the purpose of
this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest
of the prospective extraditee during
the pendency of the extradition
petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat
to a prospective extraditee's liberty
as early as during the evaluation
stage. It is not only an imagined
threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.
Because
of
these
possible
consequences, we conclude that the
evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an
investigative
proceeding,
the
consequences
of
which
are
essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of
a
prospective
extraditee.
As
described by petitioner himself, this is
a "tool" for criminal law enforcement
(p. 78,Rollo). In essence, therefore,
the evaluation process partakes of
the nature of a criminal investigation.
In a number of cases, we had
occasion to make available to a
respondent in an administrative case
or investigation certain constitutional
rights that are ordinarily available
only in criminal prosecutions. Further,
as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Mendoza during the oral arguments,
there are rights formerly available
only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the
proceedings, such as the right to
counsel and the right against selfincrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999,
p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical
Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we
held that the right against selfincrimination under Section 17,

Article III of the 1987 Constitution

which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect,
such
as
an
administrative
investigation of a licensed physician
who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the
privilege to practice medicine if found
guilty. The Court, citing the earlier
case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA
1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of one's license as a
medical practitioner, is an even
greater deprivation than forfeiture of
property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved
an
administrative
charge
of
unexplained
wealth
against
a
respondent which was filed under
Republic Act No. 1379, or the AntiGraft Law. Again, we therein ruled
that since the investigation may
result in forfeiture of property, the
administrative
proceedings
are
deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a
penalty. There is also the earlier case
of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA
970 [1962]), where the Court, citing
American jurisprudence, laid down
the test to determine whether a
proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such
that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the
criminal case, such proceeding is
criminal in nature, although it may be
civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the
action is meant to be criminal in its
nature, it cannot be considered as
civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged,
the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to
an impending threat of deprivation of
one's property or property right. No
less is this true, but even more so in
the case before us, involving as it
does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, is
placed second only to life itself and
enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be

returned or replaced, the time spent

in incarceration is irretrievable and
beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in
an extradition request exposes a
person to eventual extradition to a
foreign
country, thus
saliently
exhibiting the criminal or penal
aspect of the process. In this sense,
the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both
procedures may have the same
result the arrest and imprisonment
of the respondent or the person
charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may
result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly
lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's
reliance
on Wright
vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241
[1992])
(p.
8,
petitioner's
Memorandum) that the extradition
treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute is not well-taken.Wright is not
authority for petitioner's conclusion
that his preliminary processing is not
akin to a preliminary investigation.
The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against
an ex post facto law. It had nothing to
do with the denial of the right to
notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that "any legal
proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age
or custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the general public
good, which regards and preserved
these principles of liberty and justice,
must be held to be due process of
law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S.
516). Compliance with due process
requirements cannot be deemed
non-compliance
with
treaty
commitments.
The
United
States
and
the
Philippines share a mutual concern
about
the
suppression
and
punishment of crime in their

respective jurisdictions. At the same

time, both States accord common
due process protection to their
respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the
American
and
Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in
exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly,
they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as
the spirit with which the provisions
are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their
dynamic and resilient character
which make them capable of meeting
every modern problem, and their
having been designed from earliest
time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and
expanding future. The requirements
of due process are interpreted in both
the United States and the Philippines
as not denying to the law the
capacity
for
progress
and
improvement. Toward this effect and
in order to avoid the confines of a
legal straitjacket, the courts instead
prefer to have the meaning of the
due process clause "gradually
ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course
of the decisions of cases as they
arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Owner's Association vs. City
Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849
[1967]). It relates to certain
immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two
components substantive due
process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural
due process which consists of the
two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and
competent
tribunal
(Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp.
102-106).

True to the mandate of the due

process clause, the basic rights of
notice and hearing pervade not only
in criminal and civil proceedings, but
in administrative proceedings as well.
Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate
the
proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified
of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, they may
claim the right to appear therein and
present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties
(Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996
ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is
an
administrative
investigatory
proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondent's basic due process
rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit
counter-affidavits
and
other
supporting documents within ten
days from receipt thereof. Moreover,
the respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted
by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be
considered dispensable in certain
instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is
an urgent need for immediate
action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per
se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a
public
servant
facing
administrative charges (Section
63, Local Government Code,
B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like
establishments
which
are
immediate threats to public
health and decency, and the
cancellation of a passport of a
person sought for criminal
prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness
of administrative action, that is,
where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a

later time without prejudice to

the person affected, such as
the summary distraint and levy
of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement
of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have
previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not
been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the
case at bar, the query may be asked:
Does the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings fall under any
of the described situations mentioned
above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature
of American extradition proceedings
which
are
quite
noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty
involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes
between interstate rendition or
extradition which is based on the
Extradition Clause in the U.S.
Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings.
In interstate rendition or extradition,
the governor of the asylum state has
the duty to deliver the fugitive to the
demanding state. The Extradition
Clause and the implementing statute
are given a liberal construction to
carry out their manifest purpose,
which is to effect the return as swiftly
as possible of persons for trial to the
state in which they have been
charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d
754-755). In order to achieve
extradition of an alleged fugitive, the
requisition papers or the demand
must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts
essential to the extradition must
appear on the face of the papers,
such as the allegation that the person
demanded was in the demanding
state at the time the offense charged
was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the
commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the
demanding state before some court
or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407).
The extradition documents are then
filed with the governor of the asylum

state, and must contain such papers

and documents prescribed by
statute, which essentially include a
copy of the instrument charging the
person demanded with a crime, such
as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory
requirements with respect to said
charging instrument or papers are
mandatory since said papers are
necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction on the government of the
asylum state to effect extradition (35
C.J.S.
408-410). A
statutory
provision requiring duplicate copies
of
the
indictment, information, affidavit, or
judgment of conviction or sentence
and other instruments accompanying
the demand or requisitions be
furnished and delivered to the
fugitive
or
his
attorney
is
directory. However, the right being
such a basic one has been held to
be
a
right
mandatory
on
demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex
parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158
Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr.,
324, S.W.2d 853).
In
international
proceedings,
extradition treaties generally provide
for the presentation to the executive
authority of the Requested State of a
requisition or demand for the return
of the alleged offender, and the
designation of the particular officer
having authority to act in behalf of the
demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d
815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on
September 15, 1999, he attached
thereto a letter dated September 13,
1999 from the Criminal Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice,
summarizing the U.S. extradition
procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination
of treaties (with special reference to
the RP-US Extradition Treaty),
federal
statutes,
and
judicial
decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition
are transmitted through the
diplomatic channel. In urgent
cases,
requests
for
the
provincial arrest of an individual
may be made directly by the

Philippine
Department
of
Justice to the U.S. Department
of Justice, and vice-versa. In
the event of a provisional
arrest, a formal request for
extradition
is
transmitted
subsequently
through
the
diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State
forwards
the
incoming
Philippine extradition request to
the Department of Justice.
Before
doing
so,
the
Department of State prepares a
declaration confirming that a
formal request has been made,
that the treaty is in full force and
effect, that under Article 17
thereof the parties provide
reciprocal legal representation
in extradition proceedings, that
the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under
Article 2 thereof, and that the
documents
have
been
authenticated in accordance
with the federal statute that
ensures admissibility at any
subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge
is authorized to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the prospective
extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184).
Said judge or magistrate is
authorized to hold a hearing to
consider the evidence offered in
support of the extradition
request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must
determine whether the person
arrested is extraditable to the
foreign country. The court must
also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant
and jurisdiction to conduct the
hearing; (b) the defendant is
being sought for offenses for
which the applicable treaty
permits extradition; and (c)
there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant is the
person sought and that he
committed
the
offenses
charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate
judge is vested with jurisdiction

to certify extraditability after

having received a "complaint
made under oath, charging any
person
found
within
his
jurisdiction"
with
having
committed any of the crimes
provided for by the governing
treaty in the country requesting
extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard,
it is noted that a long line of
American decisions pronounce
that international extradition
proceedings partake of the
character of a preliminary
examination
before
a
committing magistrate, rather
than a trial of the guilt or
innocence of the alleged
fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the
elements
necessary
for
extradition are present, it
incorporates its determinations
in
factual
findings
and
conclusions of law and certifies
the person's extraditability. The
court
then
forwards
this
certification of extraditability to
the Department of State for
disposition by the Secretary of
State. The ultimate decision
whether to surrender an
individual
rests
with
the
Secretary of State (18 U.S.C.
3186).
7. The subject of an extradition
request
may
not
litigate
questions
concerning
the
motives of the requesting
government in seeking his
extradition. However, a person
facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems
relevant to the Secretary of
State, who makes the final
determination
whether
to
surrender an individual to the
foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be
observed that in the United States,
extradition begins and ends with one
entity the Department of State
which has the power to evaluate the
request
and
the
extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in
the person of the Secretary of State,
the power to act or not to act on the

court's
determination
of
extraditability. In the Philippine
setting, it is the Department of
Foreign Affairs which should make
the initial evaluation of the request,
and having satisfied itself on the
points earlier mentioned (see pp. 1012), then forwards the request to the
Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition
for extradition. Sadly, however, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, in the
instant case, perfunctorily turned
over the request to the Department of
Justice which has taken over the task
of evaluating the request as well as
thereafter, if so warranted, preparing,
filing, and prosecuting the petition for
extradition.
Private respondent asks what
prejudice will be caused to the U.S.
Government should the person
sought to be extradited be given due
process rights by the Philippines in
the evaluation stage. He emphasizes
that petitioner's primary concern is
the possible delay in the evaluation
process.
We agree with private respondent's
citation of an American Supreme
Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt
efficacious
procedures
to
achieve legitimate state ends is
a proper state interest worthy of
cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But
the
Constitution recognizes higher
values
than
speed
and
efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process
Clause, in particular, that they
were designed to protect the
fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy
government
officials no less, and perhaps
more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S.
645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares
the same interest as the Philippine

Government that no right that of

liberty secured not only by the
Bills of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution but of the United States
as well, is sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
(pp.
40-41,
Private
Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's
ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of
the democratic system is that
where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means.
It is not enough that there be a
valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution.
Mere expediency will not
excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not
even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a
person
invoking
a
right
guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of
one even as against the rest of
the nation who would deny him
that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over
petitioner's argument that extradition
is a tool of criminal law enforcement.
To be effective, requests for
extradition or the surrender of
accused or convicted persons must
be
processed
expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fasttracked proceedings and adherence
to fair procedures are, however, not
always incompatible. They do not
always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It
does not carry a disregard of the
basic principles inherent in "ordered
liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for

immediate action at the evaluation
stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of
the word. Extradition may or may not
occur. In interstate extradition, the
governor of the asylum state may
not, in the absence of mandatory
statute, be compelled to act favorably
(37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close
evaluation of the extradition papers,
he may hold that federal and
statutory requirements, which are
significantly jurisdictional, have not
been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).
Similarly, under an extradition treaty,
the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to
deny the behest from the requesting
state. Accordingly, if after a careful
examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs finds that the request fails to
meet the requirements of the law and
the treaty, he shall not forward the
request to the Department of Justice
for the filing of the extradition petition
since non-compliance with the
aforesaid requirements will not vest
our government with jurisdiction to
effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed
that the Department of Justice
exerted notable efforts in assuring
compliance with the requirements of
the law and the treaty since it even
informed the U.S. Government of
certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in
Spanish and without the official
English translation, and those that
are not properly authenticated). In
fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still
supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those
from the U.S. Justice Department.
With the meticulous nature of the
evaluation, which cannot just be
completed in an abbreviated period
of time due to its intricacies, how
then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates
immediate and prompt action where
notice and hearing can be dispensed
with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of
whether or not there is tentativeness

of administrative action. Is private

respondent precluded from enjoying
the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to him?
Here lies the peculiarity and deviant
characteristic of the evaluation
procedure. On one hand there is yet
no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative if
adverse to the person involved, may
cause his immediate incarceration.
The grant of the request shall lead to
the filing of the extradition petition in
court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c]
of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls
him), faces the threat of arrest, not
only after the extradition petition is
filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue
of the provisional arrest allowed
under
the
treaty
and
the
implementing law. The prejudice to
the "accused" is thus blatant and
manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing
requirements of administrative due
process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of
the Constitution, private respondent
likewise invokes Section 7 of Article
III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people
to information on matters of
public
concern
shall
be
recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government
research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The above provision guarantees
political rights which are available to
citizens of the Philippines, namely:
(1) the right to information on matters
of public concern, and (2) the
corollary right of access to official
records documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the
right to information on matters of
public concern. In its implementation,
the right of access to official records

is likewise conferred. These cognate

or related rights are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by
law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil.
Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997
ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise
that ultimately it is an informed and
critical public opinion which alone
can protect the values of democratic
government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters
covered by private respondent's
letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do
not fall under the guarantee of the
foregoing provision since the matters
contained
in
the
documents
requested are not of public concern.
On
the
other
hand,
private
respondent
argues
that
the
distinction between matters vested
with public interest and matters which
are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third
person, who is not directly affected
by the matters requested, invokes
the right to information. However, if
the person invoking the right is the
one directly affected thereby, his right
to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public
concerns escapes exact definition.
Strictly speaking, every act of a
public officer in the conduct of the
governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This
concept embraces a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen
(Legaspi
v.
Civil
Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]).
Hence, the real party in interest is the
people and any citizen has
"standing".
When the individual himself is
involved in official government action
because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either
cause him some kind of deprivation
or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not
exactly the right to information on

matters of public concern. As to an

accused in a criminal proceeding, he
invokes Section 14, particularly the
right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
The
right
to
information
is
implemented by the right of access to
information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in
official records, and in documents
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers
requested by private respondent
pertain to official government action
from the U.S. Government. No official
action from our country has yet been
taken. Moreover, the papers have
some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U.S. Government.
Consequently, if a third party invokes
this constitutional provision, stating
that the extradition papers are
matters of public concern since they
may result in the extradition of a
Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the
interests necessary for the proper
functioning of the government.
During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our
own government has as yet been
done; hence the invocation of the
right is premature. Later, and in
contrast, records of the extradition
hearing would already fall under
matters of public concern, because
our government by then shall have
already made an official decision to
grant the extradition request. The
extradition of a fellow Filipino would
be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue
pertinent to the subject matter of the
instant controversy: Would private
respondent's entitlement to notice
and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a
breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RPExtradition Treaty? Assuming the
answer is in the affirmative, is there
really a conflict between the treaty

and the due process clause in the

Constitution?
First
and
foremost,
let
us
categorically say that this is not the
proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the
same. We limit ourselves only to the
effect of the grant of the basic rights
of notice and hearing to private
respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one
of the oldest and most fundamental
maxims of international law, requires
the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The
observance of our country's legal
duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of
the Constitution which provides that
"[t]he Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with
nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international
law form part of the law of the and
land no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere
(Salonga & Yap, Public International
Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal tribunals
(or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions
of the constitution or statute of the
local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the
observance of the Incorporation
Clause
in
the
above-cited
constitutional
provision
(Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p.
55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a

rule of international law and

municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld
by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA
230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA
984 [1961]) for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law
and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances
(Salonga
&
Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative
enactments.
Accordingly,
the
principle lex
posterior
derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the
land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties
may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a
conflict between international law and
municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of
the law of the land are not pined
against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two
should be upheld. Instead, we see a
void in the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, as implemented
by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as
regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the
evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings. From the procedures
earlier abstracted, after the filing of
the extradition petition and during the
judicial determination of the propriety
of extradition, the rights of notice and
hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However,
prior thereto, the law is silent as to
these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests
this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as

unavailability
of
these
rights.
Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex
parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request
and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of
law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. An application of the basic twin
due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty
or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly,
American
jurisprudence
and
procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained
above, the prospective extraditee
may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the
governor of the asylum state, and if
he does, his right to be supplied the
same becomes a demandable right
(35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United
States requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information.
Hence, the secrecy surrounding the
action of the Department of Justice
Panel
of
Attorneys.
The
confidentiality argument is, however,
overturned by petitioner's revelation
that everything it refuses to make
available at this stage would be
obtainable
during
trial.
The
Department of Justice states that the
U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain
grand jury information. If the
information is truly confidential, the
veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any
stage of the extradition proceedings.
Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called
for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, the Extradition
Law,
as
well
as
American
jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition, for any prohibition against

the conferment of the two basic due

process rights of notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings. We have to
consider
similar
situations
in
jurisprudence for an application by
analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are
similarities between the evaluation
process
and
a
preliminary
investigation since both procedures
may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process,
a provisional arrest is even allowed
by the Treaty and the Extradition Law
(Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty;
Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No.
1069). Following petitioner's theory,
because there is no provision of its
availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ
of habeas
corpus is
suspended,
despite Section 15, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "[t]he
privilege of the writ or habeas
corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety
requires it"? Petitioner's theory would
also infer that bail is not available
during the arrest of the prospective
extraditee when the extradition
petition has already been filed in
court since Presidential Decree No.
1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III
of the Constitution which provides
that "[a]ll persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of
the
writ
of habeas
corpus is
suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly
argue that since these contraventions
are by virtue of a treaty and hence
affecting foreign relations, the
aforestated guarantees in the Bill of
Rights could thus be subservient
thereto?
The basic principles of administrative
law instruct us that "the essence of
due
process
in
administrative

proceeding is an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the actions
or ruling complained of (Mirano vs.
NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla
vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997];
PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997];
Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA
315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997];
Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632
[1997]). In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA
31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate
the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a
law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that
the Requesting State may have valid
objections to the Requested State's
non-performance of its commitments
under the Extradition Treaty are
insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RPUS Extradition Treaty? Do we limit
ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the
rulings
in Government
Service
Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991])
and Go
vs. National
Police
Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997])
where we ruled that in summary
proceedings
under
Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the
Organization of the Civil Service
Commission in Accordance with
Provisions of the Constitution,
Prescribing its Powers and Functions
and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential
Decree
No.
971
(Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National
Police who may be charged for
Service-Connected Offenses and
Improving the Disciplinary System in
the Integrated National Police,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
other purposes), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1707,
although summary dismissals may
be effected without the necessity of a
formal investigation, the minimum
requirements of due process still

operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of

Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what
the opening sentence of
Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or
dismissed even without formal
investigation,
in
certain
instances. It is equally clear to
us that an employee must be
informed
of
the
charges
preferred against him, and that
the normal way by which the
employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of
the charges against him. This is
a basic procedural requirement
that a statute cannot dispense
with and still remain consistent
with the constitutional provision
on due process. The second
minimum requirement is that
the employee charged with
some
misfeasance
or
malfeasance must have a
reasonable
opportunity
to
present his side of the matter,
that is to say, his defenses
against the charges levelled
against him and to present
evidence in support of his
defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings
are also non-litigious in nature, yet
we upheld the due process rights of
the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent
does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself,
which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioner's
favorable action on the extradition
request and the deprivation of private
respondent's
liberty
is
easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that
this Court's equity jurisdiction, which
is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the
absence of, and never against,
statutory
law
or
judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co.,

Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA

530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar
does not even call for "justice outside
legality," since private respondent's
due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty,
are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to
the organic law of the land if we
choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of
liberty. That would not be in keeping
with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous
waters of conflicting and opposing
currents of liberty and government
authority, he must ever hold the oar
of freedom in the stronger arm, lest
an errant and wayward course be
laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file
his
comment
with
supporting
evidence. The incidents in Civil Case
No. 99-94684 having been rendered
moot and academic by this decision,
the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127066. March 11, 1997]
REYNALDO
O.
MALONZO, petitioner, vs.
THE
HONORABLE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS and THE LIGA
NG
MGA
BARANGAY
(Caloocan Chapter) and ALEX
L. DAVID, CONRADO G.
CRUZ, TRINIDAD REPUNO,
GLORIA M. CRUZ, MIRALI M.
DURR, FERMIN JIMENEZ,
AURELIO BILUAN, ROGELIO

SARAZA,
HELENE
VALBUENA,
and
HIGINO
RULLEPA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The Court is called upon to strike
down Resolution 96-026,[1] dated
November 18, 1996, of the
respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) calling for an Election
for the Recall of the Petitioner
Reynaldo O. Malonzo, the incumbent
Mayor of Caloocan City.
Petitioner was duly elected as
Mayor in the elections held on May 8,
1995, winning over former Mayor
Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year
into his term, petitioner's office as
Mayor was put to serious question
when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong
Barangays
and
Sangguniang
Barangay
members
and
Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen,
constituting a majority of the
members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly of the City of Caloocan,
met, and upon deliberation and
election, voted for the approval of
Preparatory
Recall
Assembly
Resolution No. 01-96, expressing
loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo,
and calling for the initiation of recall
proceedings against him.
Together
with
relevant
documents, PRA Resolution No. 0196 was filed with the COMELEC for
appropriate
action. In
response,
Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with
the respondent Commission alleging,
principally, that the recall process
was deficient in form and substance,
and therefore, illegally initiated. The
COMELEC found the petition devoid
of merit and declared the recall
proceedings to be in order. The
COMELEC's Resolution on the
petition states pertinently:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc hereby RESOLVES
to DISMISS the Petition. We approve and give DUE COURSE to PRA Resolution No.
01-96 entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE RECALL OF REYNALDO O. MALONZO AS
MAYOR OF KALOOCAN CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. Accordingly and
conformably with Section 71 R.A. 7160, the Commission SETS the date of the Election
on Recall on December 14, 1996. We shall, by separate resolution, issue a calendar of
activities involved in said exercise.

SO ORDERED."[2]
On November 28, 1996, Mayor
Malonzo came to us on a "Petition for
Certiorari With Prayer For Temporary
Restraining Order and Application for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
assailing the COMELEC's resolution
as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The Petition, in
the main, raises the issue of the
validity of the institution and
proceedings of the recall, putting to
fore the propriety of the service of
notices to the members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, and
the proceedings held, resulting in the
issuance
of
the
questioned
Resolution.
Due to the importance of the
matters in issue, and the proximity of
the Recall Election date declared by
the COMELEC, the Court, on
November 29, 1996, issued a
Resolution[3] ordering the respondent
COMELEC to cease and desist from
proceeding with the recall election
projected on December 14, 1996,
and directing the respondents to file
their respective Comments.
Private respondents Liga ng
mga Barangay (Caloocan Chapter),
Alex L. David, Conrado G. Cruz,
Trinidad Repuno, Gloria M. Cruz,
Mirali M. Durr, Fermin Jimenez,
Aurelio Biluan, Rogelio Saraza,
Helene Valbuena and Higino Rullepa,
filed their Comment[4] on December
6, 1996, alleging that all the
requirements for the holding of a
recall election were duly complied
with and that the petition is therefore
without basis. On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of Comment[5] on
February 7, 1997, with the surprising
submission that the COMELEC was
amiss in its duties as enforcer of
election laws.
According to the Solicitor
General, the veracity of notices sent
to 42 members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly were not directly
passed upon by the COMELEC
before it issued the questioned
Resolution. It thus submits that the
propriety of notices sent to said PRA

members must first be determined by

the COMELEC, after giving private
respondents the chance to prove the
same, otherwise, a discussion of the
other issues in the present petition
would be premature.
At this juncture, the Court finds
that there is no need to refer the
matter of the veracity of the
questioned notices sent to certain
members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly back to the COMELEC, for
the reason that the COMELEC has
already conducted an investigation
into the same, and has found the
proceedings instituting the recall to
be in accord with law.
The
Solicitor
General's
observation that the issue of veracity
of the notices was not directly passed
upon
by
the
COMELEC
is
incorrect. On the contrary, the matter
of validity of notices to the members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
was sufficiently considered by the
respondent Commission, as in
response to petitioner's request for a
technical examination of the recall
documents, the COMELEC directed
its Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) to resolve the
matter of notices sent to the
Preparatory
Recall
Assembly
members. The
ERSD
in
turn
performed its task and reported its
findings to the COMELEC. The
following excerpts from Resolution
UND 96-026 of the COMELEC reflect
the
results
of
the
ERSD's
investigation, and the resulting action
of the COMELEC:
"The ERSD Report
following information:

gave

the

Three (3) lists of elected Barangay officials were used as reference, namely:
COMELEC list; DILG list and Caloocan City list.
According to the COMELEC listing, of the 188 barangays in Kalookan City,
there should have been 1,692 members of the PRA. However, one barangay,
Barangay 94, did not elect an SK Chairman, thus, there are of record, 1,691
elected barangay officials of Kalookan City, broken down as follows:
Punong Barangay - 188
Barangay Kagawads - 1,316
SK Chairmen - 187

(One Barangay, Barangay 94 did not elect its SK Chairman)

The DILG registry is incomplete, showing only a listing of 1,390 barangay
officials. The Kalookan City Talaan ng mga Barangay tallies with the
COMELEC List. From the records, the following data is found: Of the 1,691
barangay officials, forty (40) had resigned. In the stead of twenty-eight (28)
resignees, replacements were appointed. Twelve (12) positions however,
remained vacant, there being no successors named therein.Twenty-two (22)
barangay officials are deceased. Twelve (12) vacancies caused by such death
were filled up by appointing replacements. Ten (10) vacant positions were
however not filled up. There being twenty-two (22) unfilled posts, the total
number of Barangay officials of Kalookan City at the time of the constitution of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly was initiated is 1,669.
ERSD reported that there were a total of 1,927 notices sent, some members
being served two or three notices. The Notices were sent in three modes;
Personal, registered mail and by courier and they were in the name of the PRA
member, and addressed at his residence or office of record.
In its initial report, the Department stated that six persons listed in the
COMELEC record as barangay officials were not duly notified. These were:
Jose de Chavez, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 6; Enrico
Marasigan, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 65; Pablo Musngi, listed
as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119; Rolando Ang, listed as Barangay
kagawad of Barangay 109; and Pilar Pilares, Barangay Kagawad of Barangay
162 and Teresita Calayo, listed as kagawad of Barangay 182. Respondents
explained the absence of notice to these persons thus:
'1. Jose de Chavez has been removed from office as Barangay
kagawad of Barangay 6 by virtue of Resolution No. 95-011 passed on
July 16, 1995, and has been replaced by Corazon Obusan by virtue of
Resolution No. 95-016 passed on August 1995, both promulgated by
the Barangay Council of said barangay. In view of the fact that it is
Corazon Obusan who is the recognized Barangay kagawad of the
aforementioned barangay, as it appears in the official roster of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) the notice of the
July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly served on her and not on Mr. de
Chavez.
2. Enrico Marasigan has resigned as Barangay kagawad of Barangay
65 as evidenced by his resignation letter dated March 24, 1995. He
was replaced by Ronio de la Cruz, by virtue of a Resolution passed by
the Barangay Council of Barangay 65 dated August 10,
1995.Accordingly, the notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly
served on Mr. de la Cruz and not on Mr. Marasigan.
3. Pablo Musngi ceased to be a Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119
by reason of his death on April 12, 1996. He has been replaced by
Sylvia Saberola on whom notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session has
been duly served.
4. Notices, both by personal delivery and by registered mail, were
served on Mr. Rolando Ang at his official address at Barangay 109
Zone 10 East Grace Park, Caloocan City. The returns of the said
service of notice, however, disclosed that he can no longer be located
in the said address. He has, however, not informed the DILG of any
change in his official address.
5. Pilar Pilares had been served notice by personal delivery but
refused to sign acknowledgment receipt. She has likewise been

served notice by registered mail as evidenced by the receipt in her

behalf by a certain Ricardo Pilares III.' (Respondents' Comment, dated
October 14, 1996.
As
to
Teresita
Calayo,
respondent defends lack of
notice to her, thus:
'Teresita Calayo is not a duly elected kagawad of Barangay 182, Zone
16.
Per certification issued by the Board of Election Tellers, Ms. Calayo did
not win in the May 1994 Barangay Election. Records would show that
it should be Kagawad Fermin Quintos who should be recognized as
legitimate barangay kagawad of the said barangay having placed no. 7
in the election and not Ms. Calayo who appears to be a loser/9th
place. There appears to be an apparent oversight in placing the name
of Calayo in the subject PRA Resolution for signature, wherein it
shows that both the names of Fermin Quintos and Teresita Calayo are
included.' (Respondents' Compliance dated November 13, 1996, p. 6)
In the ERSD's final and complete report, two (2) additional names were
reflected as not having been served notices and these were Lino Ramos and
Teodulfo Abenoja, listed as kagawads of Barangay 174.
Commenting on this report,
respondents stated:
'1. As regards Tomas Daep and Teodulfo Abenoja (not Agenoja);
Notice by registered mail was served on, and acknowledged by Tomas
Daep, who personally signed the return card.
There was actually an error committed by the ERSD when it
concluded that Tomas Daep has already resigned and was replaced
by Ernesto Taupa. Official records would show that Tomas Daep and
Ernesto Taupa are still both presently holding the position of Kagawad
of Barangay 174 Zone 15.
Ernesto Taupa was officially appointed to the position vacated by
Teodulfo Abenoja by virtue of the latter's resignation on 15 March
1996. Teodulfo Abenoja, on the other hand, was appointed to the
position vacated by Lino Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja - they, having
resigned and, the latter, having been already replaced by Ernesto
Taupa.
Ernesto Taupa on the other, as correctly determined by the ERSD, was
validly served with the notice of the PRA session two (2) days before
the scheduled PRA meeting.'
Respondents' submission, being substantiated by documents and uncontroverted by
Petitioner are hereby accepted as meritorious.
In addition to the aforenamed, three persons; Pablo de Castro, Ruben Ballega, and
Jesus Tan claiming to be the Barangay captains of Barangay 116, Barangay 148 and
Barangay 156, respectively, and therefore members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, came before the Commission and manifested that they were not duly
notified about the PRA session.

The records in custody of the Commission, however, revealed that there was no truth to
their allegations.
Pablo de Castro was served notice by registered mail on July 1, 1996, and this he
received on July 3, 1996, as shown in the return card duly signed in
acknowledgment. The same notice was served on him by courier (LBC) on July 5,
1996.
Ruben Ballega was notified by personal service on July 1, 1996, the receipt of which
was duly acknowledged and by registered mail on July 2, 1996.
Jesus Tan Sr. was served notice personally and by registered mail. The personal
service was completed on July 1, 1996, as shown by the receipt signed by his
daughter, one Analiza T. Asque. The same notice was sent him by registered mail,
received by the same daughter on July 2, 1996.
The Commission however regards the sending of notice one thing, and the completion
of service thereof another, for indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully
satisfied, if there was not only service, but also completion of service thereof. Thus, we
were obliged to inquire more closely into the records and we found:
Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the
addressee himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest
relative or a person of sufficient discretion in the member's residence or
office. Service by registered mail was evinced by the return card duly signed by
the addressee or by persons acting for him. There were instances when
notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the acknowledgment
receipt by the server and his witnesses. The circumstances being thus, we
hold that there was complete service of the notices as contemplated in Section
8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides:
'Section 8 - Completeness of Service - Personal service is complete
upon delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration
of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides;
Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within
five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service
shall take effect at the expiration of such time.'
That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who sent the notices is
of no moment. We had earlier determined that as member of the PRA, he can legally
exercise the prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, sending notices to the other members of its scheduled convening.
It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the
requirements of notice had been fully complied with."[6]
Needless to state, the issue of
propriety of the notices sent to the
PRA members is factual in nature,
and the determination of the same is
therefore
a
function
of
the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent
error, or serious inconsistencies in
the findings, the Court should not
disturb the same. The factual findings
of the COMELEC, based on its own
assessments and duly supported by
gathered evidence, are conclusive
upon the court, more so, in the

absence of a substantiated attack on

the validity of the same.
Moreover,
to
order
the
COMELEC to repeat the process of
determining the notices' propriety
would be sanctioning a recycling of
administrative functions, entailing
added cost and waste of effort.
Petitioner likewise attacks the
COMELEC's ruling on the validity of
the proceedings held by the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, in that
it allegedly ruled that the LIGA ng
mga Barangay is authorized to
initiate the recall and convene the
Preparatory
Recall
Assembly. Petitioner likewise averred
that the session held, and the
adoption of the recall resolution, by
the recall assembly were tainted with
irregularities, violence, graft and
corruption.
The pertinent provisions of law,
as regards the initiation of the recall
process, are Sections 69 and 70 of
R.A. 7160:
"SEC. 69. By whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.
SEC. 70. Initiation of the Recall
Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the
registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district,
and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
xxx
(2) City level. - All punong
barangay and sangguniang
barangay members in the city;
xxx
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in
session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective
official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or
municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a
majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned
during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may
also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in
which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the province,
city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC
through its office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or its duly
authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and
conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20)
days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and
the required percentage of voters.
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official
sought to be recalled."
Petitioner's insistence, that the
initiation of the recall proceedings
was infirm since it was convened by
the Liga ng mga Barangays, is
misplaced. Petitioner observes that
"respondent Liga is an organization
of all barangays. It is not an
organization of barangay captains
and kagawads. The barangays are
represented in the Liga by the
barangay captains as provided under
Section 492 of the Local Government
Code. It also provides that the
Kagawad
may
represent
the
barangay in the absence of the
barangay chairman."[7] The Liga ng
mga Barangay is undoubtedly an
entity distinct from the Preparatory
Recall Assembly. It just so happens
that the personalities representing
the barangays in the Liga are the
very members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly, the majority of
whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted
in favor of the resolution calling for
the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after
deliberation reported in the record, in
accordance with the existing law.
Thus, the Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members
convened and voted as members of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly of
the City of Caloocan, and not as
members of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The recall proceedings,
therefore, cannot be denied merit on
this ground.
Any doubt as to the propriety of
the proceedings held during the

recall assembly should be laid to

rest. As the respondent COMELEC
pertinently observes:
"The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a
session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory
Assembly, as we shall later on establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were
formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was that of
petitioner's recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on their
resolve about the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through
their votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No
proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing
thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the resolution. The law on
recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific
procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there should be a
session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of
all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the
resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA
members."[8]
The charges of graft and
corruption, violence and irregularities,
before and during the session of the
preparatory recall assembly are
largely uncorroborated, and cannot
override the substantiated findings of
the respondent COMELEC.
"In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."[9]
Substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
[10]
It means such evidence which
affords a substantial basis from
which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.[11] To overturn
the presumption of validity of
performance of official duty, more
than a mere scintilla of proof is
needed, otherwise, one disgruntled
fellow can destroy the foundations
laid by the overwhelming majority,
and this is not the scenario
envisioned by our democratic system
of government.
In sum, we are persuaded
strongly by the principle that the
findings of fact of administrative
bodies charged with their specific
field of expertise, are afforded great
weight by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that
such findings are made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and

in the interest of stability of the

governmental structure, should not
be disturbed.
ACCORDINGLY,
the
Court
hereby RESOLVED to DISMISS the
present petition, for lack of merit. The
decision
of
the
respondent
Commission on Elections to GIVE
DUE COURSE to PRA Resolution
No. 01-96 is hereby AFFIRMED. The
Commission on Elections is hereby
ORDERED to set the date of the
Election on Recall in the city of
Caloocan, which date shall not be
later than thirty days after receipt of
notice of this Resolution, which is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST

DIVISION

[G.R.

No.

L-33906.

December

21,

1983.]

VICTORIA ABLAZA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS

OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION (ADLO) and its members, ROSA LEONARDO,
VIRGINIA ESPADILLA, THELMA YABUT, MELITONA VARGAS, SEGUNDINA GAMBOA,
ALEGRIA SAPICO, PRISCILLA REYES, TERESITA ESCUETA, ANASTACIA CORPUZ,
ELENA MOLINA, ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, PATRICIO VILLASENOR, EDITHA ADIZAS,
DOLORES ESPADILLA, ESMERALDA FLORES, ROSALINA PINGOL, ZENAIDA MENDOZA,
VICENTE ADIZAS, FLORA DEL CASTILLO, GAUDENCIA RAEL, SEDES PINGOL,
ESTRELLITA ABULENCIA, PERLITA BAUTISTA, NORMA ABULENCIA, CONCEPCION
SUAREZ, NORMA VINOYA, EDNA FABIAN, ALICIA REYES, GLORIA GO, TERESITA GO,
ERLINDA SY, DELIA ESPANDOR, ESTRELLITA HUEVIA, LUCILA HUEVIA, BERNARDITA
ORACION, EMILIA VILLASENOR and GILBERT P. LORENZO in his capacity as special
sheriff, Respondents.
Montesa,
The

Manikan
Solicitor

&
General

Associates
for

respondent

for Petitioner.
CIR.

Eufemio Law Offices for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF A
DEFENDANT; ACQUISITION. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil case is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service
of
summons.
2. ID.; ID.; SUMMONS; MODE OF SERVICE UPON ASSOCIATES IN BUSINESS SUED
UNDER A COMMON NAME. The petitioners contentions have no merit. Section 9, Rule 14
of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when persons associated in business are sued
under a common name, service may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any
one of them or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in the
common name. Since petitioner Ablasa Uy and Chuan Uy were doing business under the
common name Cerisco Blackcat Trading, the service of summons made upon the person in
charge of the office or place of business maintained in the common name was adequate. This is
specially true in this case where the plaintiffs are poor laborers who are entitled under the
Constitution to State protection and who are only seeking the legitimate fruits of their
employment
from
an
employer.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. The purpose of summons is give notice to the defendant or
respondent that an action has been commenced against him. The defendant or respondent is
thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiffs or petitioners.
4. ID.; RULES OF COURT; LIBERALITY; CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES; SIMILAR SPIRIT OBSERVED WHEN
APPLIED TO LABOR CASES. The petitioner always transacted business as Cerisco
Blackcat Trading. All papers, documents, products, and receipts issued by the petitioners
business bore the name Cerisco Blackcat Trading. Since the laborers were working for a firm
known as Cerisco Blackcat Trading, it was natural and understandable why they should sue
their employer through the common name used by the owners in their business. The controlling
principle in the interpretation of procedural rules is one of liberality that they may promote their
object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding (Section 2, Rules of Court). When the rules are applied to labor cases.
the interpretation must proceed in accordance with the liberal spirit of the labor laws (See
Malate Taxicab and Garage, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., 99 Phil. 41). The Court
of Industrial Relations was created as an instrument to carry out the legislative policies
embodied in the Industrial Peace Act pursuant to the constitutional mandates in Section 5,
Article II on social justice and Section 6, Article XIV on protection to labor, both sections in the
then applicable 1935 Constitution. Without in any way depriving the employer of his legal rights,

the thrust of statutes and rules governing CIR cases has been to benefit laborers and workers
and avoid subjecting them to greater delays and hardships. (Permanent Concrete Products,
Inc.,
Et.
Al.
v.
Frivaldo,
109
Phil.
4O4).
5. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; PRAYER; SCOPE. The prayer asked for wage
differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime pay, reinstatement, and
backwages. The payment for services rendered on Sundays or on legal holidays necessarily
included in the prayer for overtime pay beyond the eights hours. Likewise, payment for
maternity leave may be deemed included in the abovecited prayer. In fact, there was no
amendment to speak of in the case at bar. All that private respondents did was to introduce
evidence tending to prove claims which were necessarily included in their prayer.
MELENCIO-

HERRERA, J.,

concurring:chanrob1es

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1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE SUMMONS; WHEN AMENDMENT ALLOWED;

SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON PERSON IN CHARGE OF PLACE OF BUSINESS IN THE
COMMON NAME, ADEQUATE. The summons directed to Cerisco Blackcat Trading was
detective in that it did not include petitioner as defendant in the Court below. The defect,
however, could have been cure by amending the name of the defendant in the title to read
"Victoria Ablaza, doing business under the name and trademark Cerisco Blackcat Trading,"
since the intention was to sue the owner of the business enterprise. Amendment is allowed in
cases where it appears that the plaintiff intended, in fact, to act against the individual doing
business rather than against the business entity which the individual was operating (ALR Fed
513. 516, 530). The ownership of Cerisco Blackcat Trading could have been verified from the
proper government agency. Nonetheless, under Section 9, Rule 14, service of summons upon
the person in charge of the place of business in the common name, as was done in this case,
was adequate.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to declare null and void the decision, the order, and the resolution
as well as any and all proceedings of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations CIR Case No.
2794-V entitled "Association of Democratic Labor Organizations, Bernardita Oracion, Et Al., v.
Cerisco Blackcat Trading." There are 36 workers or laborers as private respondents.
The Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as ADLO),
Bernardita Oracion, and others filed a complaint before the Court of Industrial Relations against
Cerisco Blackcat Trading for salary differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law,
overtime
pay,
and
reinstatement
with
backwages.
The records show that summons with a copy of the complaint attached thereto were served on
defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading. Subsequently, the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
caused the service of the required notice of hearing upon defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading.
Cerisco Blackcat Trading failed to file its answer or any responsive pleading within the
reglementary period provided by law. Hence, the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
declared Cerisco Blackcat Trading in default and private respondents ADLO, Et Al., were
allowed
to
present
their
evidence
ex-parte.
After trial, respondent Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of
which
reads:cralawnad
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Chief of the Examining Division of this Court is hereby
ordered to make a computation of the amount of salary differentials, overtime pay for work
rendered in excess of 8 hours, Sunday premiums for work performed on Sundays and legal
holidays as well as overtime compensation for work performed by petitioners for the period
August 25, 1966 up to the date of their respective dismissals due the petitioners in this case,

based at P6.00 a day in accordance with the award and disposition of the Court as above
stated, and upon termination to submit a report to the Court immediately for further
disposition."cralaw
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library
Acting

on

the

following

report

of

the

Chief

of

the

Examining

Division

"1. The total salary differentials, overtime and night time premiums still due the petitioners for
their services rendered from August 26, 1966 up to their respective date of dismissals amount to
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT AND 4/100 (P223,098.04)
PESOS distributed as follows:"
x

the respondent Court of Industrial Relations issued an order which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It appearing in the aforesaid Report of Examiner that the computation of the overtime
compensation, night time premiums and salary differentials was based on the amount actually
received by the petitioners and appearing in their testimonies incorporated in the decision and
there being no objection filed thereto by respondents, let said Report of Examiner be, as it is
hereby,
APPROVED."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The private respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations granted against defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading owned and
operated by petitioner Victoria Ablaza Uy and one Chuan Uy in the amount of P223,098.04
representing the money value of the private respondents wage differentials, overtime pay for
work rendered in excess of eight (8) hours, premiums for work performed on Sundays and legal
holidays as well as overtime compensation for work performed by private respondents for the
period August 25, 1966 up to the date of their respective dismissals in accordance with the
award
and
disposition
of
the
Court.
After Gilbert Lorenzo, authorized deputy sheriff of the Court of Industrial Relations levied upon
petitioner Victoria Ablazas personal properties, the latter filed an urgent petition for relief
alleging inter alia (1) that herein petitioner was completely and totally unaware of the
existence of any suit for a sum of money against her as she has not been lawfully summoned
and informed of any such case; (2) that Cerisco Trading is a mere trade name belonging to
herein petitioner, and this tradename is not a juridical person nor entity capable of suing or
being sued in any court pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(3) that the jurisdictional requirement of Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 14, Rules of Court were not
met as petitioner was not made a party-defendant in CIR Case No. 2794-V; (4) that petitioner
was unjustifiably included in the writ of execution since she was never made a party thereto nor
duly summoned as aforesaid; (5) that respondent Court of Industrial Relations never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading; (6) that petitioner was never
served with and thereby was never duly informed of, any orders of respondent Court of
Industrial Relations declaring her in default; and (7) that petitioner was never duly served with
any
copy
of
any
decision
against
her
in
this
case.
The Court of Industrial Relations denied the petition for relief. A motion for reconsideration was
also
denied.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioner Ablaza now raises the following issues in her brief:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS EVER
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF PETITIONER HEREIN VICTORIA
ABLAZA WHO WAS NEVER IMPLEADED AS A PARTY RESPONDENT IN CIR CASE NO.
2794-V.
II

WHETHER
BUSINESS
JURIDICAL
SUING OR
COURT.

OR NOT THE MERE COMBINATION OF A TRADEMARK BLACKCAT AND A

NAME CERISCO TRADING WITHOUT IMPLEADING ANY NATURAL OR
PERSON CAN CONSTITUTE THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST CAPABLE OF
BEING SUED IN A CIVIL ACTION AS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF

III
WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION OR COMPLAINT CAN BE AMENDED ORALLY TO INCLUDE
NEW CAUSES OF ACTION WITHOUT ANY FORMAL AMENDED PETITION OR COMPLAINT
BEING FILED AND NO NEW SUMMONS BEING ISSUED ON THE AMENDED PETITION OR
COMPLAINT.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT FRAUD AND FATAL IRREGULARITIES IN SERVICES OF SUMMONS,
COURT PROCESSES AND ORDERS WHICH DEPRIVE A PARTY OF DUE NOTICE AND
RIGHT TO BE HEARD CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW GUARANTY
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER VICTORIA
ABLAZA WHO WAS NOT IMPLEADED AS A PARTY RESPONDENT IN CIR CASE NO. 2794V.
The main issue raised is jurisdiction. The petitioner maintains that since the complaint filed with
the respondent court was against Cerisco Blackcat Trading as sole respondent and the body of
the complaint makes no mention whatsoever of Victoria Ablaza, the petitioner was not duly
served
with
summons.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Petitioner Ablaza relies on the case of Heath v. Steamer San Nicolas (7 Phil. 532) where we
held that it is absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of a contentious action in the courts
of justice to have as defendant some natural or juridical person. Petitioner argues that since the
name "CERISCO TRADING" is a mere business name while "BLACKCAT" is a mere trademark,
the combination CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING is neither a natural or a juridical person, and
as
such,
can
neither
sue
nor
be
sued.
The petitioners contentions have no merit. Section 9, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that when persons associated in business are sued under a common name, service
may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of them or upon the person in
charge of the office or place of business maintained in the common name. Since petitioner
Ablaza Uy and Chuan Uy were doing business under the common name Cerisco Blackcat
Trading, the service of summons made upon the person in charge of the office or place of
business maintained in the common name was adequate. This is specially true in this case
where the plaintiffs are poor laborers who are entitled under the Constitution to State protection
and who are only seeking the legitimate fruits of their employment from an employer.
The petitioner always transacted business as Cerisco Blackcat Trading. All papers, documents,
products, and receipts issued by the petitioners business bore the name Cerisco Blackcat
Trading. Since the laborers were working for a firm known as Cerisco Blackcat Trading, it was
natural and understandable why they should sue their employer through the common name

used by the owners in their business. The controlling principle in the interpretation of procedural
rules is one of liberality that they may promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. (Section 2, Rule 1,
Rules of Court.) When the rules are applied to labor cases, the interpretation must proceed in
accordance with the liberal spirit of the labor laws. (See Malate Taxicab and Garage, Inc. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., 99 Phil. 41). The Court of Industrial Relations was created
as an instrument to carry out the legislative policies embodied in the Industrial Peace Act
pursuant to the constitutional mandates in Section 5, Article II on social justice and Section 6,
Article XIV on protection to labor, both sections in the then applicable 1935 Constitution. Without
in any way depriving the employer of his legal rights, the thrust of statutes and rules governing
CIR cases has been to benefit laborers and workers and avoid subjecting them to greater
delays and hardships. (Permanent Concrete Products Inc., Et Al., v. Frivaldo, 109 Phil.
404).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The purpose of summons is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has
been commenced against him. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the
demands
of
the
plaintiffs
or
petitioners.
The records indicate beyond doubt that the respondent in the case before the CIR was
adequately given the necessary notice and that the owners of Cerisco Blackcat Trading
deliberately avoided acknowledgment of the service of summons. The officers return at the
back
of
the
summons
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On Sept. 8, 1969 a.m. the undersigned went to the given address to serve this Summon to the
President/Owner/and Gen. Manager of the Cerisco Blackcat Trading, I met a certain Mr. R. Cruz
(Mechanic of the respondent company) and I introduced myself as representative of the Court
(CIR) and I asked the whereabouts of the president/manager/owner of the respondent company.
He (R. Cruz) told me that Miss/Mrs. Ablaza is out. And also I asked him (Mr. R. Cruz) who is
taking over just in case the owner/president/gen. manager is out and he told me that he is the
one taking over, and I gave this Summons to him (Mr. R. Cruz) for and in behalf of the
president/owner/gen. manager of the Cerisco Blackcat Trading." (Rollo, p. 68)
The officers return annotated at the back of the Notice of Hearing reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On November 13, 1969 undersigned went at Cerisco Blackcat Trading at 2956 Jose Abad
Santos, Manila to serve this Notice of Hearing but nobody wants to receive. A certain Mr.
Rodolfo Cruz alleged that the President and/or Manager of the company is out of the town and
the incharge of said company is out of the office, he also refused to receive said notice.
Undersigned left Notice of Hearing at the table inside the company in the presence of Mr.
Rodolfo Cruz to be given to the President and/or Manager or the officer incharge but Mr.
Rodolfo
Cruz
threw
said
notice
outside
the
company."
(Rollo,
p.
69)
The officers return annotated at the back of the notice of the order of default
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. THE PRESIDENT/MANAGER, CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING served last November 29,
1969 undersigned have refused to enter premises people inside Establishment refused to
receive said order, for the reason that said Gen. Manager is in Bulacan province. Return for
further
disposition
of
the
Sala
Concerned."
(Rollo,
p.
119)
The officers return annotated at the back of the notice of the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. THE OWNER OR GENERAL MANAGER, CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING recd. by MR.
ERNESTO K. CALUB on July 11, 1970, Bldg., Caretaker at J. Abad Santos Ave., Tondo." (Rollo,
p.
129)
The officers return annotated at the back of the notice of the Examiners Report
reads:chanrobles
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library
:
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"BAILIFFS

RETURN

"DULY

SERVED

TO:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The Owner or Manager, Cerisco Blackcat Trading, copy given to the building caretaker who
refused to sign and give his name this 27th day of July, 1970.
x

"NOTE: NO LONGER STAYING AT ABAD SANTOS, TONDO, MANILA. SERVED AT ITS NEW
ADDRESS, 14 CHRISTIAN ST., GRACE VILLAGE, QUEZON CITY." (Rollo, p. 134)
The officers return annotated at the back of the order approving the examiners report
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"BAILIFFS
"Duly

RETURN
Served

to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The owner or General Manager, Cerisco Quezon City, copy of Order given to Mr. Reyes this
2nd
day
of
December
1970;
"2. The Owner or General Manager, Cerisco J. Abad Santos, copy of order given to Mr. Murillo
this
2nd
day
of
December
1970;"
(Rollo,
p.
141).
And the officers return annotated at the back of the notice of the order approving the issuance
of
a
writ
of
execution
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RETURN OF SERVICE
x

"Note: the copy for the Owner & Gen. Manager of the CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING, was
returned for further disposition of the sala, on the ground that the undersigned Bailiff of this court
did not allow by the Gen. Manager itself (Mrs. Ablaza), to enter inside the premises of the
company, & denying that she is the Manager of the firm, but according to one of the personnel
of the company she is Mrs. Ablaza, that after she read the foregoing order of the court which the
undersigned tender to her (infront of the gate of the compound), threw the court processes
outside the door gate of the compound and she verbally told to the undersigned they dont care
about this and the Gen. Manager of the firm is not Mrs. Ablaza; This court processes was
brought to them for proper service but they refused; This was served to them last December 24,
1970,
December
29,
1970;
&
January
4,
1971;"
(Rollo,
p.
145).
No less than seven returns of the Sheriff clearly show that there was service of the necessary
processes. It is evident from a perusal of the records of the case at bar that efforts were made
to serve summons personally to the President/General Manager and or Owner of defendant
Cerisco Blackcat Trading. In fact the notice of the order approving the issuance of the writ of
execution was served December 24, December 29 and January 4 or three times upon
defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading. At no time did petitioner Ablaza, owner of Cerisco,
condescend to honor or respect the summons. On the contrary, she had a contemptuous regard
for judicial process. At one instance, she verbally told the bailiff that "they dont care about this,"
after throwing the court process outside the gate of the compound. Since personal service of
summons was made impossible by the refusal of the owner/general manager of the defendant
company to accept the same, substituted service was availed of by the bailiff by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
In the execution of the lower courts judgment, it is natural that the persons doing business
under the common name should be the ones made to answer. Victoria Ablaza cannot claim that
since Cerisco Blackcat Trading is the respondent, she has no responsibility whatsoever to
answer for the judgment in favor of the laborers working for her. As owner and general manager
of
Cerisco,
Ablaza
was
properly
bound.chanrobles
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The refusal to accept service of processes was due to reasons other than an apparent desire to
make it difficult for the workers. As stated by the private respondents, Ablaza was the wife of
Chuan Uy. The two had several children. Neither Ablaza or Chuan Uy could appear openly in
business because of statutory enactments prohibiting aliens from engaging in the retail trade.
Cerisco
Blackcat
Trading
engaged
in
retail
trade.
The other issue raised refers to the alleged inclusion of new causes of action. The petitioners
arguments
in
this
respect
have
no
merit.
The

complaint

asked

Cerisco

Blackcat

Trading

to:chanrob1es

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a. Pay petitioners the difference of their wages pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law;
b.

Pay

overtime

work

performed

by

petitioners

beyond

the

eight

hours;

c. Reinstatement of petitioners to their former or equivalent positions with backwages from the
date of their dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatement without loss of seniority and
other
privileges;
and
d. Granting petitioners such other relief which this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable
under
the
premises.
The prayer asked for wage differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime
pay, reinstatement, and backwages. The payment for services rendered on Sundays or on legal
holidays is necessarily included in the prayer for overtime pay beyond the eight hours. Likewise,
payment for maternity leave may be deemed included in the abovecited prayer. In fact, there
was no amendment to speak of in the case at bar. All that private respondents did was to
introduce evidence tending to prove claims which were necessarily included in their prayer.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision
appealed
from
is
AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September

22, 1986
EVELIO
B.
JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna PatajoKapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The new Solicitor General has
moved to dismiss this petition on the
ground that as a result of
supervening events it has become
moot and academic. It is not as
simple as that. Several lives have
been lost in connection with this
case, including that of the petitioner
himself. The private respondent is
now in hiding. The purity of suffrage
has been defiled and the popular will
scorned through a confabulation of
those in authority. This Court cannot
keep silent in the face of these
terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private
respondent were candidates in
Antique for the Batasang Pambansa
in the May 1984 elections. The
former appeared to enjoy more
popular support but the latter had the
advantage of being the nominee of
the KBL with all its perquisites of
power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of
the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head
when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed,
allegedly by the latter's men. Seven
suspects,
including
respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for
these murders. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province
and sharpened the climate of fear
among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting
the Opposition candidate or into
supporting the candidate of the ruling
party.

It was in this atmosphere that the

voting was held, and the postelection developments were to run
true to form. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroad the
private respondent's proclamation,
the
petitioner
went
to
the
Commission on Elections to question
the canvass of the election returns.
His complaints were dismissed and
the
private
respondent
was
proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this
Court, arguing that the proclamation
was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commission
on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, the
private respondent took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered
by this Court when on February 11,
1986, the petitioner was gunned
down in cold blood and in broad
daylight.
The
nation,
already
indignant
over
the
obvious
manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was
revolted by the killing, which flaunted
a scornful disregard for the law by
the assailants who apparently
believed they were above the law.
This ruthless murder was possibly
one of the factors that strengthened
the cause of the Opposition in the
February revolution that toppled the
Marcos regime and installed the
present government under President
Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang
Pambansa and the disappearance of
the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondentboth of whom have gone their
separate ways-could be a convenient
justification for dismissing this case.
But there are larger issues involved
that must be resolved now, once and
for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more
important purpose is to manifest in
the clearest possible terms that this
Court will not disregard and in effect
condone wrong on the simplistic and
tolerant pretext that the case has
become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the

highest arbiter of legal questions but
also
the
conscience
of
the
government. The citizen comes to us
in quest of law but we must also give
him justice. The two are not always
the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the
issue has been settled and decision
is no longer possible according to the
law. But there are also times when
although
the
dispute
has
disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then,
not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint
upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many
people and even by the foreign press
that elections during the period of the
Marcos dictatorship were in the main
a desecration of the right of suffrage.
Vote-buying,
intimidation
and
violence, illegal listing of voters,
falsified returns, and other elections
anomalies
misrepresented
and
vitiated the popular will and led to the
induction in office of persons who did
not enjoy the confidence of the
sovereign
electorate.
Genuine
elections were a rarity. The price at
times was human lives. The rule was
chicanery and irregularity, and on all
levels of the polls, from the barangay
to the presidential. This included the
rigged plebiscites and referenda that
also elicited the derision and
provoked the resentments of the
people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line
and equaled if it did not surpass the
viciousness of elections in other
provinces dominated by the KBL.
Terrorism was a special feature, as
demonstrated
by
the
killings
previously
mentioned,
which
victimized no less than one of the
main protagonists and implicated his
rival as a principal perpetrator.
Opposition leaders were in constant
peril of their lives even as their
supporters were gripped with fear of
violence at the hands of the party in
power.

What made the situation especially

deplorable was the apparently
indifferent attitude of the Commission
on Elections toward the anomalies
being committed. It is a matter of
record that the petitioner complained
against the terroristic acts of his
opponents. All the electoral body did
was refer the matter to the Armed
Forces without taking a more active
step as befitted its constitutional role
as the guardian of free, orderly and
honest elections. A more assertive
stance could have averted the
Sibalom election eve massacre and
saved the lives of the nine victims of
the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission
on Elections was practically nil
because of its transparent bias in
favor of the administration. This
prejudice left many opposition
candidates without recourse except
only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the
conduct of the elections and the
canvass of the election returns, the
petitioner went to the Commission on
Elections to prevent the impending
proclamation of his rival, the private
respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the
petitioner charged that the elections
were marred by "massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of
election returns under duress, threat
and intimidation, snatching of ballot
boxes perpetrated by the armed men
of
respondent
Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was
made of the municipalities of Caluya,
Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an,
and also of San Remigio, where the
petitioner claimed the election returns
were not placed in the ballot boxes
but merely wrapped in cement bags
or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second
Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further
orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same
Second Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim

the winner without prejudice to the

outcome of the case before the
Commission. 4 On certiorari before
this Court, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day
period of appeal, which the petitioner
had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on
July 23, 1984, the Second Division
promulgated the decision now
subject of this petition which inter
alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador
the elected assemblyman of the
province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by
Chairman Victoriano Savellano and
Commissioners Jaime Opinion and
Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously
asked to inhibit himself on the ground
that he was a former law partner of
private
respondent
Pacificador,
Opinion had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this
Court, asking us to annul the said
decision.
The core question in this case is one
of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second
Division of the Commission on
Elections authorized to promulgate
its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent
the winner in the election?
The applicable provisions are found
in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of
the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission
on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang
Pambansa
and
elective
provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections
may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election cases
may be heard and decided by
divisions
except
contests
involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which

shall be heard and decided en

banc.
Unless
otherwise
provided by law, all election
cases shall be decided within
ninety days from the date of
their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above
provisions, the petitioner and the
respondents have arrived at opposite
conclusions.
The
records
are
voluminous and some of the
pleadings are exhaustive and in part
even erudite. And well they might be,
for the noble profession of the lawdespite all the canards that have
been flung against it-exerts all efforts
and considers all possible viewpoints
in its earnest search of the truth.
The petitioner complains that the
Proclamation made by the Second
Division is invalid because all
contests involving the members of
the Batasang Pambansa come under
the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections en banc. This is as it
should be, he says, to insure a more
careful decision, considering the
importance of the offices involved.
The respondents, for their part, argue
that only contests need to be heard
and decided en banc and all other
cases can be-in fact, should be-filed
with and decided only by any of the
three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes
much of this argument and lays a
plausible distinction between the
terms "contests" and "cases" to
prove his point. 8 Simply put, his
contention
is
that
the
preproclamation controversy between
the petitioner and the private
respondent was not yet a contest at
that time and therefore could be
validly heard by a mere division of
the Commission on Elections,
consonant with Section 3. The issue
was at this stage still administrative
and so was resoluble by the
Commission under its power to
administer all laws relative to the
conduct
of
elections, 9 not
its
authority as sole judge of the election
contest.
A contest, according to him, should
involve a contention between the

parties for the same office "in which

the contestant seeks not only to oust
the intruder but also to have himself
inducted into the office." 10 No
proclamation had as yet been made
when the petition was filed and later
decided. Hence, since neither the
petitioner nor the private respondent
had at that time assumed office,
there was no Member of the
Batasang Pambansa from Antique
whose
election,
returns
or
qualifications could be examined by
the Commission on Elections en
banc.
In providing that the Commission on
Elections could act in division when
deciding election cases, according to
this theory, the Constitution was
laying down the general rule. The
exception was the election contest
involving the members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which had to
be
heard
and
decided en
banc. 11 The en banc requirement
would apply only from the time a
candidate
for
the
Batasang
Pambansa was proclaimed as
winner, for it was only then that a
contest could be permitted under the
law. All matters arising before such
time were, necessarily, subject to
decision only by division of the
Commission as these would come
under the general heading of
"election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this
interpretation would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections into two, viz.: (1) over
matters
arising before the
proclamation, which should be heard
and decided by division in the
exercise of its administrative power;
and (2) over matters arising after the
proclamation, which could be heard
and decided only en banc in the
exercise of its judicial power. Stated
otherwise, the Commission as a
whole could not act as sole judge as
long as one of its divisions was
hearing a pre-proclamation matter
affecting the candidates for the
Batasang Pambansa because there
was as yet no contest; or to put it still
another way, the Commission en
banc could not do what one of its
divisions was competent to do, i.e.,

decide
a
pre-proclamation
controversy. Moreover, a mere
division of the Commission on
Elections could hear and decide,
save only those involving the
election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the Batasang
Pambansa, all cases involving
elective
provincial
and
city
officials from start to finish, including
pre-proclamation controversies and
up to the election protest. In doing
so,
it
would
exercise
first
administrative and then judicial
powers. But in the case of the
Commission en banc, its jurisdiction
would
begin only
after
the
proclamation was made and a
contest was filed and not at any time
and on any matter before that, and
always in the exercise only of judicial
power.
This interpretation would give to the
part more powers than were enjoyed
by the whole, granting to the division
while denying to the banc. We do not
think this was the intention of the
Constitution. The framers could not
have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the
Commission on Elections the sole
judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials, the Constitution
intended to give it full authority to
hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters
related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the
winners.
It is worth observing that the special
procedure for the settlement of what
are now called "pre-proclamation
controversies" is a relatively recent
innovation in our laws, having been
introduced only in 1978, through P.D.
No. 1296, otherwise known as the
1978 Election Code. Section 175
thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and
annulment of proclamation.-The
Commission shall be the sole
judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies and any of its

decisions, orders or rulings

shall be final and executory. It
may,motu
proprio or
upon
written petition, and after due
notice and hearing order the
suspension of the proclamation
of a candidate-elect or annul
any proclamation, if one has
been made, on any of the
grounds mentioned in Sections
172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings
affecting the election, returns and
qualifications of public officers came
under the complete jurisdiction of the
competent court or tribunal from
beginning to end and in the exercise
of judicial power only. It therefore
could not have been the intention of
the framers in 1935, when the
Commonwealth
Charter
was
adopted, and even in 1973, when the
past Constitution was imposed, to
divide the electoral process into the
pre-proclamation stage and the postproclamation stage and to provide for
a separate jurisdiction for each stage,
considering the first administrative
and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was
understood at the time Article XII-C.
Section 2(2) was incorporated in the
1973 Constitution did not follow the
strict definition of a contention
between the parties for the same
office. Under the Election Code of
1971, which presumably was taken
into consideration when the 1973
Constitution was being drafted,
election contests included the quo
warranto petition that could be filed
by any voter on the ground of
disloyalty or ineligibility of the
contestee although such voter was
himself not claiming the office
involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be
given a restrictive meaning; on the
contrary, it should receive the widest
possible scope conformably to the
rule that the words used in the
Constitution should be interpreted
liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be
understood as referring to any matter
involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after

proclamation of the winner, whether

or not the contestant is claiming the
office in dispute. Needless to stress,
the term should be given a consistent
meaning and understood in the same
sense under both Section 2(2) and
Section 3 of Article XII-C of the
Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and
qualifications" should be interpreted
in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting
the
validity
of
the
contestee's title. But if it is necessary
to specify, we can say that "election"
referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign,
and the casting and counting of the
votes; "returns" to the canvass of the
returns and the proclamation of the
winners,
including
questions
concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns
and "qualifications" to matters that
could
be
raised
in
a quo
warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections insofar as they applied to
the members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa and, under
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973
Constitution, could be heard and
decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic
term denoting the actions that might
be heard and decided by the
Commission on Elections, only by
division as a general rule except
where the case was a "contest"
involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard
and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the
petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in
requiring
that
cases
involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa
be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure
the most careful consideration of
such cases. Obviously, that objective

could not be achieved if the

Commission could act en banconly
after the proclamation had been
made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with
the grab-the-proclamation-and-delaythe-protest
strategy
of
many
unscrupulous candidates which has
resulted in the frustration of the
popular will and the virtual defeat of
the real winners in the election. The
respondent's theory would make this
gambit possible for the preproclamation proceedings, being
summary in nature, could be hastily
decided by only three members in
division, without the care and
deliberation
that
would
have
otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.
After
that,
the
delay.
The
Commission en banc might then no
longer be able to rectify in time the
proclamation summarily and not very
judiciously made by the division.
While in the end the protestant might
be sustained, he might find himself
with only a Phyrric victory because
the term of his office would have
already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring
the initial power to decide the preproclamation question upon the
division, the Constitution did not
intend to prevent the Commission en
banc from exercising the power
directly, on the theory that the greater
power embraces the lesser. It could if
it wanted to but then it could also
allow the division to act for it. That
argument would militate against the
purpose of the provision, which
precisely limited
all
questions
affecting the election contest, as
distinguished from election cases in
general, to the jurisdiction of the
Commission en bancas sole judge
thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not
only all other tribunals but also and
even the division of the Commission
A decision made on the contest by
less
than
the
Commission en
banc would not meet the exacting
standard of care and deliberation
ordained by the Constitution
Incidentally,
in
making
the
Commission the "sole judge" of pre-

proclamation controversies in Section

175, supra, the law was obviously
referring to the body sitting en
banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation
controversies involved inAratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, 13 where
the said provision was applied, were
heard and decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest
consideration of this Court but
accorded cavalier attention by the
respondent Commission on Elections
is due process of law, that ancient
guaranty of justice and fair play
which is the hallmark of the free
society.
Commissioner
Opinion
ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on
the ground that he was formerly a
law partner of the private respondent,
he
obstinately
insisted
on
participating in the case, denying he
was biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the
party in power at the time, and the
particular
relationship
between
Commissioner Opinion and MP
Pacificador, one could not be at least
apprehensive, if not certain, that the
decision of the body would be
adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it
was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal
to inhibit himself and his objection to
the transfer of the case to another
division cannot be justified by any
criterion of propriety. His conduct on
this matter belied his wounded
protestations of innocence and
proved the motives of the Second
Division when it rendered its
decision.
This Court has repeatedly and
consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as
the indispensable imperative of due
process. 15 To
bolster
that
requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. 16 The
litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when
their rights are violated they can go
to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at

all. They must believe in his sense of

fairness, otherwise they will not seek
his
judgment.
Without
such
confidence, there would be no point
in invoking his action for the justice
they expect.
Due process is intended to insure
that
confidence
by
requiring
compliance
with
what
Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play cans for equal justice.
There cannot be equal justice where
a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with
a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial
(and also extra-judicial) proceedings
are not orchestrated plays in which
the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There
is no writer to foreordain the ending.
The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all
the arguments are filed, on the basis
of the established facts and the
pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one
of the parties may color the facts and
distort the law to the prejudice of a
just decision. Where this is probable
or even only posssible, due process
demands that the judge inhibit
himself, if only out of a sense
of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife,
he must be above suspicion.
Commissioner Opinion, being a
lawyer, should have recognized his
duty and abided by this well-known
rule of judicial conduct. For refusing
to do so, he divested the Second
Division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision, assuming it
could act, and rendered the
proceeding null and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many
significant developments have taken
place, not the least significant of
which was the February revolution of
"people power" that dislodged the
past regime and ended well nigh
twenty years of travail for this captive
nation. The petitioner is gone, felled
by a hail of bullets sprayed with
deadly purpose by assassins whose

motive is yet to be disclosed. The

private respondent has disappeared
with the "pomp of power" he had
before enjoyed. Even the Batasang
Pambansa itself has been abolished,
"an iniquitous vestige of the previous
regime" discontinued by the Freedom
Constitution. It is so easy now, as
has been suggested not without
reason, to send the recrds of this
case to the archives and say the
case is finished and the book is
closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words
in tribute to a fallen hero who was
struck down in the vigor of his youth
because he dared to speak against
tyranny. Where many kept a meekly
silence for fear of retaliation, and still
others feigned and fawned in hopes
of safety and even reward, he chose
to fight. He was not afraid. Money did
not tempt him. Threats did not daunt
him. Power did not awe him. His was
a
singular
and
all-exacting
obsession: the return of freedom to
his country. And though he fought not
in the barricades of war amid the
sound and smoke of shot and shell,
he was a soldier nonetheless,
fighting valiantly for the liberties of his
people against the enemies of his
race, unfortunately of his race too,
who would impose upon the land a
perpetual night of dark enslavement.
He did not see the breaking of the
dawn, sad to say, but in a very real
sense Evelio B. Javier made that
dawn draw nearer because he was,
like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than
eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a
letter which began: "I am the sister of
the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am
the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the
grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV
and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of
Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of
them in the election eve ambush in
Antique last year." She pleaded, as
so did hundreds of others of her
provincemates in separate signed
petitions sent us, for the early
resolution of that horrible crime,
saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am
sick. May I convey to you my prayer

in church and my plea to you, 'Before

I die, I would like to see justice to my
son and grandsons.' May I also add
that the people of Antique have not
stopped praying that the true winner
of the last elections will be decided
upon by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then
a new government has taken over in
the wake of the February revolution.
The despot has escaped, and with
him, let us pray, all the oppressions
and repressions of the past have also
been banished forever. A new spirit is
now upon our land. A new vision
limns the horizon. Now we can look
forward with new hope that under the
Constitution of the future every
Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his
own country, able to express his will
through the pristine ballow with only
his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream.
Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It
can and will be won if we are able at
last, after our long ordeal, to say
never again to tyranny. If we can do
this with courage and conviction,
then and only then, and not until
then, can we truly say that the case
is finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the
records of this case that were it not
for the supervening events that have
legally rendered it moot and
academic, this petition would have
been granted and the decision of the
Commission on Elections dated July
23, 1984, set aside as violative of the
Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46732 May 5, 1979
MARIO
Z.
REYES, Petitioner,
vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
as Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs, Office of the President,

MARSMAN and Co., Inc., and e.g.

Vito, Respondents.
Calanog & Associates Law Office for
petitioner.chanrobles
virtual
law
library
Wilfredo Y. Guevarra for private
respondents.chanrobles virtual law
library
Office of the Solicitor General for the
Public respondent.
SANTOS, J.:
Special civil action filed on August
24, 1977 for (1) certiorari to annul
and set aside the decision dated
November 12, 1976 of the Office of
the President thru Deputy Executive
Secretary Roberto V. Reyes, which
granted respondent Marsman and
Co., leave to terminate petitioner's
employment, and reversed the
decision of the Secretary of Labor
dated August 22, 1974 ordering the
reinstatement of petitioner with back
wages, from the date of his
preventive suspension on January
17, 1974, and (2) mandamus to
compel the Office of the President to
limit its review of the decision of the
Secretary of Labor solely on the
basis of the evidence presented and
established during the hearing
conducted at the mediation-factfinding
stage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
On October 7, 1977, private
respondents Marsman and Co., Inc.
(henceforth Company) and e.g. Vito
filed their comment 1 to which
petitioner filed his reply on October
26, 1977. 2chanrobles virtual law
library
Respondent public official after
extension, filed his comment on
December 20, 1977. 3On February 1,
1978, We gave due course to the
petition, considered respondent's
comments as answers, and required
the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.4The Solicitor General,
in behalf of respondent public official,
manifested on February 16, 1978
that he is adopting the comment he

filed
as
his
memorandum. 5 Petitioner, in turn
thru counsel, filed his memorandum
on
March
21,
1978. 6 Private
respondents, Company and e.g. Vito,
also after extension, adopted their
comment filed on May 29, 1978 as
their memorandum. 7 Thereafter, the
case was submitted for decision on
June
9,
1978.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
The following are the factual and
procedural antecedents which gave
rise to this petition. Petitioner Mario
Z. Reyes is Credit and Collection
Manager and Operations Coordinator
of Marsman and Co., Inc. On
January 17, 1974, the Company thru
its Vice- President, e.g. Vito, herein
private respondent, suspended him
indefinitely for "misappropriation of
company funds." At that time,
petitioner has been with the
Company for seven years, six
months
and
twelve
days. 8 chanrobles virtual law library
It appears that in December, 1973,
the Company sponsored a sales
promotional contest to advertise
its pondocillin products. A certain
Evangeline R. Tagulao, a nurse
employed at Singer Industries Phil.,
Inc., won the first prize - a
Volkswagen Beetle 1200. However,
Miss Tagulao chose to receive the
cash value of the car which was
P24,000.00.
Accordingly,
the
Company issued PCIB Check No.
416234 dated December 19, 1973 for
P24,000.00 in favor of Miss Tagulao.
The check was delivered to Miss
Tagulao
by
petitioner
Reyes,
accompanied by his co-employee
Victor Santos. Together, the three of
them went to a bank 9 to cash the
check.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
On January 16, 1974, the Company
received two handwrite ten letters
from Miss Tagulao:
First letter
January 16, 1974

Marsman Co. Leo chanrobles virtual

law library
Pharmaceutical
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
This is to certify that I only received
P20,000 from Mr. Mario Reyes, and I
expect to receive the balance of
P4,000.
(Sgd) E.R Tagulao
Evangeline R. Tagulao
Second Letter
January 16, 1974 chanrobles virtual
law library
Marsman
Co.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Leo
Pharmaceutical
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
The following are the circumstances
the
of
the
P20,000
to
me.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
Sometime December 20, 1973 Mr.
Mario Reyes came to my clinic
bringing
the
P24,000
check
supposedly the equivalent of (1 200
Beetle VW) which I won in
the pondocillin
raffle .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
From the clinic we proceeded to
Rizal Commercial Bank (sic) at
Buendia to cash the check. I was
surprised when I received only
P20,000, but Mr. Reyes explained
that the remaining P4,000 will go to
the consolation prizes. I didn't
complain at that time thinking that
what Mr. Reyes told me was true and
I found out later that the whole
amount of P24,000 is due to me.
(Sgd) E.R. Tagulao
Evangeline R. Tagulao 10

On the following day, January 17,

1974, respondent Company wrote to
Miss Tagulao attaching RCBC Check
No. 1363018 for P4,000.00, and
indicating that the said check was in
lieu of the amount withheld by
petitioner Reyes. The Company
thereafter advised petitioner Reyes
that he was being placed on
suspension starting January 18,
1974. It also filed with National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on
January 21, 1974, an application for
clearance to terminate complainant's
services alleging that "(P)ending
further investigation and considering
that this constitutes misappropriation
of
company
funds,
and
in
accordance with existing policy as
well as the applicable rules and
regulations, Mr. Reyes has been
placed under preventive suspension
effective as of the close of office
hours on January 17, 1974 pursuant
to Section 2 of NLRC Implementing
Instructions No. 1 issued on
November 9, 1972 and Presidential
Decree No. 21 issued on October 14,
1972." It added further that "the
preventive suspension of Mr. Mario
Z. Reyes is necessary in order to
prevent further violation of the
provisions of the Revised Penal
Code and other statutes as well as
the established employment policies
and reasonable company rules and
regulations, said violation being
inimical to the interests of the
company." 11 chanrobles virtual law
library
Toward the latter part of January
1974, the Company received two
letters from Miss Tagulao this time
informing it that she was returning
the check for P4,000.00 because she
... actually received the full amount of
P24,000.00 ... 12 One of the letters
reads:
January 24, 1974
Mr. E.G. Vitochanrobles virtual law
library
Exec.
Vice
Pres.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library

Marsman
and
Co.
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Sir: chanrobles virtual law library
In all conscience now that I know the
truth and everything is clear to me,
I'm voluntarily returning the cheek in
the amount of P4,000.00. I would like
to retract an the previous statement I
have
given.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
I hope this statement of mine closes
the case and clear Mr. Mario Reyes
of
whatever
charges.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
hanrobles virtual law library
I don't expect to be bothered again
about this matter. I hope this closes
the case.
Yours truly, chanrobles virtual law
library
(Sgd.) E.R. TAGULAOchanrobles
virtual law library
EVANGELINE R. TAGULAO 13
On January 30, 1974, petitioner
Reyes filed with the NLRC an
"Opposition to Request for Clearance
to Dismiss" which was docketed and
considered as a complaint for illegal
dismissal. 14 He alleged that "in spite
of results of investigations tending to
exculpate him from the charges, he
has been placed under harassing
situations to the prejudice of himself
and his family ... and prayed that
respondent Company be ordered "to
immediately reinstate (him) to his
former position with full back-salaries
..." chanrobles virtual law library
The case was assigned to MediatorFact-finder Mirasol Corleto for
mediation and/or fact-finding. After
hearing, she submitted a "Mediation
Report" 15 dated February 25, 1974
to the NLRC wherein she found
petitioner innocent of the charge of
misappropriation and recommended
his reinstatement with backwages,
thus: chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS:
In order to shed light to this case,
Miss Tagulao personally testified
during the mediation stage and
stated that without her knowledge,
the amount of P4,000 was taken by
Mr. Victor Santos from the envelope
containing the cash prize. She was
at that time, personally indebted to
Mr. Victor Santos of the sum of
P4,000 for a diamond ring which she
purchased on installment basis on
November 15, 1973 as evidenced by
hereto attached promissory note.
She further testified that she did not
have any intention of filing a
complaint against Mr. Mario Reyes
were it not for the instigation and
prodding
of
Mr.
Romeo
Henson.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
hanrobles virtual law library
The other witness Mr. Victor Santos
also testified to the fact that he was
the one who took the P4,000 as
payment to him by Miss Tagulao for
a diamond ring. When Mr. Santos
explained the whole thing and after
he had issued a receipt to Miss
Tagulao for the P4,000, Miss Tagulao
withdrew
her
complaint
from
Marsman and returned the check to
respondent
Co.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
It is crystal clear from the evidences
and testimonies presented by
witnesses that complainant Mario
Reyes was innocent of what had
transpired to the sum of P4,000 and
he was just a victim of an honest
mistake.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
hanrobles virtual law library
Respondent company does not have
any right to suspend complainant
after Miss Tagulao had clarified the
whole
matter
to
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
Respondent does not have any
sound basis to lose their trust and
confidence in complainant who had
rendered service with the Company
for almost 8 years.

RECOMMENDATION
In view of the foregoing, it is
respectfully
recommended
that
complainant be reinstated with
backwages
and
request
for
clearance of respondent be denied.
The NLRC 16issued an Order 17 dated
February 14,1974 adopting the
"findings of Mediator-Fact-finder
Mirasol Corleto dated 25 February
1974 (sic)." Contrary to Corleto
recommendation however, the NLRC
ordered the Company to reinstate
petitionerwithout backwages.chanrob
lesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
From the NLRC's order, both parties
appealed to the Secretary, now
Minister, of Labor. Respondent
Company's,
"Motion
for
Reconsideration" 18 dated April 2,
1974, which was denied, was
considered as its appeal to the
Minister of Labor. The Company
based its appeal on the following
grounds:
1. Vital evidences were disregarded,
which if otherwise considered would
have substantially changed the
nature
of
the
Order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
2.
Assuming
arguendo
that
substantial evidence on the whole
had
been
considered,
the
circumstances of the case do not
warrant the relief granted.
Petitioner on the other hand, on April
8, 1974, appealed that portion of the
NLRC's order which denied him
backwages. 19 chanrobles virtual law
library
The
Minister
of
Labor's
"Decision" 20 dated August 22, 1974
ordered
the
reinstatement
of
petitioner with backwages. Pertinent
portion
of
the
decision
reads: chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the evidence, we hold
complainant completely blameless

from the imputation and charges

which
were
the
bases
for
respondent's
application
for
clearance to dismiss complainant.
Consequently, loss of trust may not
be imputed to complainant. Also, the
grounds in support of complainant's
preventive suspension, namely: 'to
prevent further violation of the
provisions of the Revised Penal
Code and other statutes as well as
the established employment policies
and reasonable company rules and
regulations' would be gratuitous
assertions
devoid
of
factual
foundation.
On
this
basis,
complainant's prayer to modify the
Commission's Order to one of
reinstatement
with
backwages
deserves utmost consideration.
The Minister of Labor decided in
favor of petitioner on the strength of
the "diamond ring story" mentioned
in
Mediator-Fact-finder
Corletos
Report (supra), and sustained by the
NLRC, thus:
At the mediation-fact-findings stage,
Miss Evangeline Tagulao declared
that she did not know that Mr. Victor
Santos deducted the amount of
P4,000 from the envelope containing
her rash prize. She further declared
that at that time she was indebted to
Mr. Santos of the sum of P4,000 for
a diamond ring she purchased from
him on installment basis on
November 15, 1973 as evidenced by
a promissory note she executed in
his favor. Further testimony reveals
that she filed the complaint against
Mr. Mario Reyes because of the
instigation and prodding of Mr.
Romeo
Henson,
Promotions
Coordinator at Marsman & Company,
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
These facts were confirmed by Mr.
Victor Santos who was presented as
witness for complainant and further
admitted that he took the amount of
P4,000 from the envelope containing
Miss Tagulao's cash prize as
payment of the balance of the
diamond ring he sold to her. It
appears
that
after
these
circumstances were explained to her,
on the basis of which she issued a

receipt for P4,000 as full payment of

the diamond ring by Mr. Victor
Santos, Miss Evangeline Tagulao
withdrew her complaint against
complainant Mario Reyes and
returned the check for P4,000 which
was earlier issued to her by
respondent
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryc
hanrobles virtual law library
Despite these clarifications by both
Miss Tagulao and Mr. Santos of an
apparent misunderstanding of which
complainant was the unsuspecting
victim, respondents continued with
their suspension of complainant.
Respondents Company and e.g. Vito
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration 21 dated September
2, 1974 alleging that 1. The decision treated the evidence
unfairly and with manifest subjectivity
in favor of complainant;
xxx xxx xxx
2.
The
consideration
of
complainants' appeal has denied
respondents their right to due
process; and
xxx xxx xxx
3. The reinstatement and backwages
ordered in the decision of August 22,
1974 is without legal basis.
The Minister of Labor, Hon. Blas F.
Ople,
found
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration "lacking of merit"
and denied the same in an
Order 22dated
December
23,1974.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
hanrobles virtual law library
A
Second
Motion
for
Reconsideration 23dated January 16,
1975 filed by respondents was again
denied "(F)or lack of merit" in an
Order 24 dated
March
22,
1975.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
Respondents then appealed to
Office of the President, praying
the reversal of the Order of
Minister of Labor dated March

the
for
the
22,

1975 denying their motion for

reconsideration, on the following
"extraordinary grounds" : 25
1. The Order is contrary to law and
jurisprudence
on
the
matter
and chanrobles virtual law library
2. The Order contains serious errors
in the findings of facts and would
cause grave or irreparable damage
and injury to the appellants.
Anent the first ground, respondents
allege that reinstatement with
payment of backwages cannot be
ordered "in the absence of a finding
of unfair labor practice (as in this
case)", and that mere loss of
confidence win suffice for the dismiss
of a supervisory or managerial
employee, such as petitioner in this
case. As to the second ground, the
main
thrust
of
respondent's
argument is that it was clear error for
the Minister of labor to hold petitioner
Reyes ... blameless from the
imputation and charges ..." by the
mere fact "that the complaint and
previous statement of the winner,
Evangeline Tagulao, had already
been with drawn or retracted by her.
They allege that in termination
cases, direct and positive evidence
of an employee's guilt of the
charges, as required in criminal
cases,
need
not
be
shown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
The Office of the President decided
the
appeal
by
a
1st
Indorsement 26 dated November 12,
1975. The decision was arrived at
after additional hearings were
conducted by it on July 15, July 25
and October 22, 1975. It reversed
the decision of the Minister of Labor
dated August 22, 1974 ordering the
reinstatement of petitioner with
backwages, having found Tagulao's
"diamond ring story" implausible,
thus:
At the fact-finding proceedings of
February 18, 1974, Miss Tagulao for
the first time stated the reason for
her retraction. According to her, she
owed Victor Santos (the promotions
supervisor with whom she and the

complainant proceeded to the bank

for the cashing of the prize money
check) the balance of P4,000 for a
diamond ring which she purchased
from the latter on installment basis
since November 15, 1973, as per a
promissory note she executed in his
favor. She testified that she filed the
complaint against Mario Reyes
because she was allegedly instigated
by Romeo Henson, production
coordinator of the respondent.
Received for all and whatever it is
worth, the promissory note allegedly
executed by Tagulao in Victor
Santos' favor sans the formalities
ordinarily
attendant
to
such
undertakings exists as a document
the truth of which can never really be
ascertained except on the verbal
testimony of the person supposedly
its author. The existence of this note,
however, was never revealed to the
respondent at the time Miss Tagulao
complained on January 16, 1974. If
as alleged by Miss Tagulao the
P4,000 deducted from the prize
money on the very day the check
was cashed represented payment of
the promissory note, then Victor
Santos, the supposed creditor, could
have simply asked for the P4,000
balance from her, the alleged debtor,
and just demanded a receipt for the
payment of such amount, nothing
more. Instead, in her letter-complaint
against Mario Reyes, Tagulao
charged that she was made by the
complainant herein to believe that
the P4,000 deducted from her prize
money was for consolation prizes.
This contradictory allegations of
Tagulao puts her credibility in serious
doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
Moreover, a week or so had passed
since the filing of her Complaint on
January 16, 1975, up to her
retraction on January 24, 1975, and
within this period, Miss Tagulao set
up entirely different and opposite
explanations. So also, during the
entire period of time that passed
from the encashment of the check in
December 1973 to the filing of the
complaint on January 16, 1974, the
P4,000 was not delivered to the
winner Miss Evangeline Tagulao.
This leads this of office to gravely
doubt the integrity of her retraction

and suspect that her letter of January

24, 1975 was, more than anything
else, made to exculpate the
complainant-appellee. Under the
circumstances, this Office is inclined
to hold that complainant's guilt as
complained
has
not
been
satisfactorily erased.
On the finding of the Minister of
Labor that the complaint against
petitioner was due to "instigation and
prodding of Mr. Romeo Henson,
Promotions Coordinator at Marsman
and Company, Inc. ", the Office of
the President made the following
observations:
For his part, Romeo Henson,
testifying on oath before this Office
on October 22, 1975, disclosed that
as promotions manager of the
respondent, he had to see to the
proper and orderly disposition of
awards in promotional contests,
including
that
in
which
the
complainant was allegedly irregularly
involved and in which Evangeline
Tagulao
emerged
winner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
Tipped off by one Romeo Real
promotions
supervisor
of
the
pharmaceuticals division of the
respondent, on alleged anomalies
attending the aforesaid contest,
Henson accordingly proceeded to
investigate the matter and visited
Tagulao at the latter's residence.
Whereupon he learned from the
winner that she received P20,000,
the complainant having allegedly told
her that the P4,000 was allocated for
consolation prizes. He therefore
informed her that she should have
received P24,000, and that the
company shall forthwith remit to her
the balance of P4,000, upon her
proper notice to the respondent,
Thereafter
Tagulao
drafted
a
handwritten letter to the company
which Henson picked up at the
winner's
office
the
following
day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
Henson, who admitted being a
"compadre" and a personal friend of
the complainant averred that both he

and Tagulao never discussed

anything beyond the winner's desire
to have the balance of her prize
money remitted to her by Marsman &
Company. He therefore expressed
surprise at Tagulao's subsequent
"retraction". Further, he vehemently
denied having prodded or instigated
Tagulao to file the complaint against
Mario Reyes, and that his only
purpose was to help Miss Tagulao
recover the balance of the prize due
her. ... A circumspect consideration
of the testimonies adduced in this
case leads this Office to believe the
version of Henson than Tagulao's.
For in the natural course of things no
amount of prodding by Henson could
have moved Tagulao to make the
complaint against anybody if she
were not short-changed in the
payment of the prize. And if there
really was a private transaction
between her and Victor Santos
and/or Mario Reyes which accounted
for the withholding or non-remittance
to her of the P4,000, it is beyond
comprehension why she would still
file, as she did file, the complaint in
question.
Finally, the Office of the President
concluded:
There is, therefore, basis for the
respondent to claim that it had lost
confidence on the complainant
employee, in the light of the fact that
the
complainant-appellee
deliberately withheld the sum of
P4,000 from Miss Tagulao, the latter
receiving only P20,000 from the
original prize money of P24,000. The
turnabout of events as manifested in
Tagulao's retraction fails to convince
this Office of the innocence of the
complainant-appellee
from
the
irregularity. Verily, tile complainant
has sufficiently given his employer,
the respondent, ground for loss of
confidence.
xxx xxx xxx
This Office (so) holds that the
foregoing
circumstances
are
sufficient
for
the
respondent
employer to terminate (the services
of) the complainant employee.It is
not wise to tolerate the latter to

remain in his position simply

because
of
the
questionable
retraction by the winner of the sales
promotional contest because the
breach of trust has already been
committed. The interest not only of
the respondent corporation, but of
the public itself it involved, since
promotional contests such as the
one involved herein are advertised to
the public at large. The respondent
was, therefore, justified in requesting
the termination of the services of its
managerial
employee,
the
complainant herein The decision of
the Secretary of Labor dated August
22, 1974, is therefore hereby
reversed, and the request for
clearance to terminate complainant's
employment is granted. (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 27 dated December
29, 1975 of the decision of the Office
of the President. It was however
denied for lack of merit by said Office
thru Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs, Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, in
a letter 28dated February 8, 1977.
Hence
this
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
Petitioner alleges that the Office of
the President acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned decision dated November
12, 1976 and the resolution dated
February 8, 1977 denying his Motion
for Reconsideration, on the grounds
that the Office of the President 1. Does not have any jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal; and chanrobles
virtual law library
2. Has no authority to conduct a new
hearing on appeal for the purpose of
fishing new or additional evidence.
With respect to the first ground,
petitioner argues that the appeal of
respondents does not fall under
Section 13, Rule XIII of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code, infra, since the grounds
alleged in the said appeal are not

those prescribed by the aforesaid

provision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the second ground, petitioner
insists that the Office of the
President "committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
when,
apart
from
reviewing the case on the basis of
the evidence on records, (it) went
further thereby conducting a new
hearing on appeal .. . ."chanrobles
virtual law library
Private respondents Marsman and
Co. and e.g. Vito on the other hand
contend that ... The allegation of being contrary to
law and jurisprudence is really one
such purely on questions of law
which is therefore in keeping with
par. (b) of Sec. 13, Rule XIII and, the
allegation that serious errors in the
findings of facts would definitely lead
one to conclude as the prima facie
evidence of abuse of discretion and
therefore substantially in keeping
with par. (a) of Sec. 13, Rule XIII.
On the allegation that the Office of
the President does not have
jurisdiction to conduct a new hearing
on appeal, they maintain that a new
hearing was necessary because of
patent inconsistencies" in the case
for the complainant which must be
clarified so that the Office of the
President may render a "judicious
decision."chanrobles
virtual
law
library
The Solicitor General 29postulates similarly with the private respondents
- that "serious errors in the findings
of facts" relied upon by respondents
may be considered as falling under
"abuse of discretion" (par. [a], Sec.
13, Rule XIII) whereas the averment
that "the order is contrary to law and
jurisprudence on the matter" may be
considered as a ground raising a
question of law (par. [b], sec. 13,
Rule XIII) chanrobles virtual law
library
On the propriety/legality of the new
hearings conducted by the Office of
the President, the Solicitor General

maintains that "(T)here is no law

which prohibits the Office of the
President from conducting additional
hearings in an appealed case.
Furthermore, it is by itself an
administrative body and as such is
possessed
with
fact-finding
prerogatives, especially so when the
purpose thereof is necessary, nay
indispensable,
to
the
proper
adjudication of the case. In the case
at bar, public respondent found the
evidence on record wanting in some
important factual aspects as to be
able to determine whether or not
petitioner's
suspension
and/or
dismissal was justified. Thus it could
not be said that public respondent
abused its discretion in conducting
additional hearings prompted as it
was by its desire to render a correct
and just decision." chanrobles virtual
law library
From
the
foregoing
discussions/arguments the following
issued emerge for Our resolution, i.e.
1. Whether or not the Office of the
President has jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal of private respondents,
under Rule XXI, Sec. 13 of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the
Labor
Code
of
the
Philippines: chanrobles virtual law
library
2. Whether or not the Office of the
President acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion in conducting
new
hearings
on
appeal;
and chanrobles virtual law library
3. Whether or not petitioner's
dismissal on the ground of loss of
confidence is justified.
Now to resolve
in seriatim

the

foregoing

1. We perceive no difficulty in
sustaining respondents' claim on the
first issue. They relied in their appeal
to the Office of the President on the
following.

a) The Order is contrary to law and

jurisprudence
on
the
matter;
and chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law
library
b) The Order contains serious errors
in the findings of facts and would
cause grave or irreparable damage
and injury to the appellants; "
whereas, the grounds provided
under Rule XIII, Section 13 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code, are:
a) If there is prima facie evidence of
abuse
of
discretion; chanrobles
virtual law library
b) If made purely on questions of law
and chanrobles virtual law library
c) If there is a showing that the
national security or social and
economic stability is threatened.
Petitioner's allegation that the
grounds relied upon are not those
provided for is more apparent than
real. For the truth is, as the Solicitor
General and the private respondents
point out, the allegation that "(T)he
order is contrary to law and
jurisprudence on the matter" raises a
question of law and hence can be
subsumed under paragraph (b),
aforequoted. Indeed when one
alleges that an order is contrary to
law and jurisprudence, plain common
sense dictates that the order is being
attacked
on question
of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
Again, the second ground - that "the
order contains serious errors in the
findings of facts and would cause
grave or irreparable damage and
injury to appellants - is in the final
analysis
tantamount
to
alleging "abuse of discretion", and
may be subsumed under paragraph
(a), supra. Serious errors in the
findings of facts may not per se be
equated with abuse of discretion.
Under Rule XIII, Section 7 30 of the
Rules and Regulations providing for
appeals from the decision of the

Labor
Arbiter
or
compulsory
arbitrator to the NLRC, "abuse of
discretion" and "serious errors in the
findings of facts" are two separate
and distinct grounds, i.e. (a) and (d)
thereof. In this case, however, a
careful
perusal
of
private
respondents' appeal wig show that
they are raising principally grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
Minister in rendering decision. As
previously stated, the main thrust of
respondents' argument is that under
the circumstances of the case, the
Minister made a palpably erroneous
conclusion in holding that petitioner
did not commit a breach of
respondents' trust and confidence.
This is tantamount to ascribing to
him
an
abuse
of
discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In any event, the first ground, which
raised a question of law, already
conferred jurisdiction in the Office of
the President to entertain the
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
2. Petitioner's bare allegation that the
Office of the President acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion in
conducting a new hearing on appeal
is devoid of merit. Firstly, if that were
his belief, he should not have taken
part in the hearing, and testified
therein. 31 He should have taken
proper legal steps to raise his
objection at the earliest opportunity.
With
his
participation
and
cooperation in said new hearing, he
is now estopped from complaining
that the Office of the President
conducted new hearings on appeal.
Secondly, petitioner can cite no law
or jurisprudence to support his
argument. For the truth is, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, "(T)here
is no law which prohibits the Office of
the President from conducting
additional hearings in an appealed
case" * and that the said Office "is by
itself an administrative body and as
such is possessed with fact-finding
prerogative, especially so when the
purpose thereof is necessary, nay
indispensable,
to
the
proper
adjudication of the case." Further, the

Solicitor General observed that the

new hearing was necessary because
"public
respondent
found
the
evidence on record wanting in some
important factual aspects as to be
able to determine whether or not
petitioner's
suspension
and/or
dismissal was justified." chanrobles
virtual law library
3. Is petitioner's dismissal on the
ground of loss of confidence
justified? chanrobles
virtual
law
library
Loss of confidence is a valid ground
for dismissing an employee, and
proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the
employee's
misconduct
apparently demanded by the Minister
of Labor - is not required to dismiss
him on this charge. 32 It is sufficient if
there is "some basis" for such loss of
confidence; 33 or if the employer has
reasonable grounds to believe, if not
to entertain the moral conviction that
the
employee
concerned
is
responsible for the misconduct and
that the nature of his participation
therein rendered him absolutely
unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded
by
his
position. 34chanrobles virtual law
library
In the case at bar, it is an admitted
fact that petitioner is a managerial
employee, one in whom respondent
Company has given its complete
trust and confidence. 35He was, at
the time of the anomaly, per his own
claim, "concurrent Acting Manager of
Leo Pharmaceutical (a division of
respondent Company) and Credit
and
Collection
Manager36 The
Company, therefore, was justified in
expecting that his actuations should
be above suspicion. Because of
petitioner's involvement in the raffle
anomaly, i.e., having withheld from
the winner Miss Tagulao, P4,000 of
the P24,000 prize money, which
withholding he was not able to
explain convincingly much less
disprove, 'it is not in the words of the
decision of the Office of the
President, "wise to tolerate the latter
(petitioner) to remain in his
position . . . because the breach of
trust
has
already
been

committed. 37 chanrobles virtual law

library
The petitioner would also pray that
the writ of mandamus issue against
the Office of the President, directing
said Office to confine its review of
the decision of the Minister of Labor
solely on the evidence presented
and established during the hearing
conducted at the mediation-factfinding stage. Petitioner would, in
effect, request this Court to prevent
said Office from considering the
evidence presented at the hearings
conducted by the said Office, in its
resolution
of
the
appeal
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
This petition also lacks merit. In the
first. place, the office of the writ of
mandamus is to direct "any
tribunal ... , board or person" to
perform " an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or
station ... . " 38 In the instant case,
there is no duty that the Office of the
President neglected to do which
would warrant the issuance of a writ
of mandamus. Secondly, as has
been observed earlier, the petitioner
did not take legal steps to prevent
said hearings. On the contrary, he
participated in the same. He is
therefore
now
estopped
from
questioning the said proceedings
through a request for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus which, obviously,
is
not
the
proper
remedy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, let this Petition be as
it is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the Office of the
President dated November 12, 1975
- granting respondent company's
application for clearance to terminate
petitioner's employment is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
This
decision
is
immediately
executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40245 April 30, 1975

CIVIL
AERONAUTICS
BOARD, appellee,
vs.
PHILIPPINE
AIR
LINES,
INC., appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix
Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor
Patricio M. Patajo for appellee.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo &
Ongsiako and Felipe L. Goson &
C.S. Cervantes, Jr. for appellant.

ESGUERRA, J.:+.wph!1
This appeal from Resolutions Nos.
109 (70) and 132 (70) of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), imposing a
fine of P2,500 upon appellant
Philippine Air Lines Inc. (PAL) for
making a flagstop at Baguio City on
May 12, 1970, in its Flight 213, was
originally taken to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 45738-R). It
was forwarded to this Court by
resolution dated February 11, 1975,
of the Court of Appeals (First
Division) on the ground that only a
question of law is involved, the facts
being undisputed. Appellant PAL in
its manifestation dated February 17,
1975, interposed no objection
thereto, stating that notwithstanding
that said appeal was properly taken
to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
Section 1 of Republic Act 5434 which
allows appeal from the Civil
Aeronautics Board on pure question
of law, "the question of whether or
not the Civil Aeronautics Board has
authority under the Civil Aeronautics
Act to impose penalties" ... "has not
yet been decided by the Supreme
Court."

The, undisputed facts are: .t.

hqw
The Philippine Airlines
Inc. is a grantee of a
legislative
franchise,
Public Act No. 4271, as
amended by Republic
Acts Nos. 2360 and
2667, where under the
said airline provides
both
domestic
and
international air service.
In its domestic service
PAL provides, among
others,
services
between
Tuguegarao
and Manila (designated
as Flight 213) and
between Baguio and
Manila (designated as
Flight 205).
On May 12, 1970, PAL
had an excess of twenty
(20) passengers from
Baguio to Manila who
cannot
be
accommodated in its
regular
flight.
To
accommodate
these
twenty passengers, PAL
required the aircraft
operating Flight 213
(Tuguegarao to Manila)
to pass Baguio City on
its way to Manila and
pick
up
these
passengers. Flight 213
at that time was carrying
only five (5) passengers.
The following are the
additional
facts
established before, and
not disputed by, the Civil
Aeronautics Board:
(a) At the time of the
above incident, no other
airline served Manila
and Baguio. No other
airline, therefore, was
affected
by
the
aforesaid flagstop.
(b)
The
expenses
incurred by the PAL in
operating the flagstop at
Baguio
City
far

exceeded the revenue

that it derived from the
twenty passengers that
it fetched at Baguio City.
The flagstop, therefore,
was motivated not by
profit but solely by PAL's
desire to meet a public
need
for
additional
service between Baguio
and Manila on that
date..
(c) No one, except
perhaps the Chairman
of the CAB, filed any
formal complaint with
the C.A.B.
Claiming
that
PAL
should
have
first
obtained the permission
of the CAB before
operating the flagstop
and that such failure is a
violation of Republic Act
No. 776, the CAB
imposed a fine of
P5,000.00 upon PAL in
a resolution, copy of
which is attached hereto
as Annex "A". Upon
motion
for
reconsideration filed by
PAL, the CAB reduced
the fine to P2,500.00
(See copy of resolution
attached
hereto
as
Annex "B").
The appellee adopted the statement
of facts appearing on pages 1 to 3 of
appellant's brief as substantially
correct and in addition stated "that
Public Act No. 4271, as amended,
requires the grantee, Philippine Air
Lines Inc. to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 776
and the regulations promulgated
thereunder from time to time".
The first questioned resolution (No.
109(70)) reads: t.hqw
Considering
that
operation of flag-stops
are not authorized and
must be operated only
with prior approval by
the
Board

and considering further

that Philippine Air Line,
Inc. has conducted such
flagstop for its Flight
212/213 on May 12,
1970 and on previous
occasions prior thereto,
the
board,
after
conducting
hearings
thereon and after due
deliberations on the
explanations of PAL's
counsel, resolves, as it
is hereby resolved to
impose
a
fine
of
P5,000.00 against PAL
to be paid within ten
(10) days from receipt
hereof, pursuant to the
provisions of Section
42(k) of Republic Act
776."
(Emphasis
supplied).
The
Board
further
resolves to warn PAL
that a repetition of the
same will be dealt with
more
severely.
Considering, however,
that flagstops may have
to be undertaken with as
short notice as possible,
the carriers may notify
the technical staff thru
the Executive Director of
the CAB of their desire
to
operate
such
flagstops
citing
the
reasons therefor and the
Executive Director may
give initial approval
thereto, but the same
has to be confirmed
immediately
by
the
Board at its next regular
meeting.
The appellant PAL in its motion for
reconsideration of the above CAB
Resolution No. 109(70), contended
that "there is simply nothing in
Republic Act No. 776 in general, nor
in Section 42(k) thereof in particular,
which expressly empowers this
Honorable Board (CAB) to impose a
fine and order its payment in the
manner pursued in this case and
under CAB Resolution No. 109(70)".
It is argued that "the power and

authority to impose fines and

penalties is a judicial function
exercised through the regular courts
of justice, and that such power and
authority cannot be delegated to the
Civil Aeronautics Board by mere
implication or interpretation".
In the regular meeting held on July 6,
1970, the CAB adopted resolution
No. 132(70), to wit: t.hqw
After considering the
motion of Philippine Air
Lines Inc. for the
reconsideration of CAB
Resolution No. 109(70)
the Board resolved to
reduce, as it hereby
reduces the amount of
fine imposed to P2,500
to be paid fifteen (15)
days
after
receipt
hereof. The imposition
of the fine is not so
much
on
exacting
penalty for the violation
committed as the need
to stress upon air
carriers to desist from
wanton disregard of
existing
rules,
regulations
or
requirements of the
government regulating
agency, if not the
additional risk forced
upon the passengers
who boarded the aircraft
without notice to them
of such flagstops or the
delays encountered as
a result thereof. The
same will serve also as
a warning to all air
carriers from operating
flagstops without prior
authority.(Emphasis
supplied)
To determine whether the appellee
CAB possesses the necessary legal
authority to impose a fine as it did in
Resolutions Nos. 109(70) and
132(70), the provisions of Republic
Act 776 have to be minutely
scrutinized. Said law created the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the
Civil Aeronautics Administration so
that in the exercise and performance

of their powers and duties, they shall

consider among other things, "as
being in the public interest, and in
accordance
with
the
public
convenience and necessity" certain
declared policies which include
t.hqw
(c) The regulation of air
transportation in
such
manner as to recognize
and
preserve
the
inherent advantage of,
assure
the
highest
degree of safety in, and
foster sound economic
condition
in, such
transportation and
to
improve the relation
between,
and
coordinate
transportation by, air
carriers; .... ; (Emphasis
supplied)
(f) To promote safety of
flight in air commerce in
the Philippines; ... "(Sec.
4, Republic Act 776).
The Civil Aeronautics Board "shall
have
the general
supervision and regulation
of,
and jurisdiction and control over, air
carriers as well as their property,
property rights, equipment, facilities,
and franchise, in so far as may be
necessary for the purpose of carrying
out the provisions of this Act." (Sec.
10 Republic Act 776). It has the
power "to issue, deny, amend,
revise, alter,
modify, cancel,
suspend or revoke, in whole or in
part, upon petition or complaint,
or upon its own initiative any
temporary
operating
permit or Certificate
of
Public
Convenience and Necessity" (Sec.
10(c) (1) Republic Act 776).
(Emphasis supplied)
The CAB has the power to
"investigate, upon complaint or upon
its own initiative, whether any
individual or air carrier, domestic or
foreign, is violating any provision of
this
act,
or
the rules
and
regulations issued thereunder, and
shall take such action, consistent
with the provisions of this Act, as

may be necessary to prevent further

violation of such provisions, or rules
and regulations so issued (Section
10(D) Republic Act 776). (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, the CAB has the power to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal any administrative
decision or order" of the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator on matters
pertaining to "imposition of civil
penalty or fine in connection with the
violation of any provision of this Act
or rules
and
regulations issued
thereunder." It has the power also
"either on its own initiative or upon
review on appeal from an order or
decision of the Civil Aeronautics
Administrator,
to
determine whether to
impose,
remit, mitigate,
increase,
or
compromise, such fine and civil
penalties, as the case may be." (Sec.
10(F) (G) Republic Act 776).
(Emphasis for emphasis). The power
to impose fines and/or civil penalties
and make compromise in respect
thereto is expressly given to the Civil
Aeronautics
Administrator
(Sec.
32(17) Republic Act 776).
There is no doubt that the fine
imposed on appellant PAL in CAB
resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is
that fine or civil penalty contemplated
and mentioned in the foregoing
provisions of Republic Act 776 and
not a fine in the nature of criminal
penalty as contemplated in the
Revised Penal Code, because the
"fine" in this case was imposed by
the C.A.B. because of appellant
PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on
flagstops without previous authority
on "May 12, 1970 and on previous
occasions", said C.A.B. explaining
clearly in its resolution No. 132(70)
that the "imposition of the fine is not
so much on exacting penalty for the
violation committed as the need to
stress upon the air carriers to desist
from wanton disregard of existing
rules, regulations or requirements of
the government regulating agency ...
" In other words, it is an
administrative
penalty
which
administrative
officers
are
empowered to impose without
criminal prosecution. Similar power

has
been
granted
to
the
Commissioners of Immigration and
Customs for violation of the
Immigration law and Tariff and
Customs Code, respectively. (Sec.
44 of Commonwealth Act 613,
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended
by R.A. 118, 135, 144, 503, 749, 827
and 1901; Sec. 2307 of R.A. 1937,
Tariff and Customs Code) The same
power has been given to the Public
Service Commission in its exercise of
an effective administrative regulatory
supervision and control over public
service enterprises. (Section 21,
Chapter IV, Commonwealth Act No.
146, as amended) .
We have no quarrel with appellant
PAL's contention that the C.A.B. has
no power to impose fines in the
nature of criminal penalty and that
only courts of justice can do so. It
could easily be discerned from a
scrutiny of the provision on Chapter
VII of Republic Act 776, on "Violation
and penalties" that whenever the law
provides a penalty for a violation
involving fine and/or imprisonment
(criminal in nature), the words "in the
discretion of the court" always
appear (Sec. 42 (E) (F) (G) (N)
Republic Act 776) for the very simple
reason that the C.A.B. is not
authorized to impose a criminal
penalty, but in those cases where the
violation is punishable by a fine or
civil penalty, the law does not include
the words "in the discretion of the
court".
There
exists
but
an
insignificant doubt in Our mind that
the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law
(Republic Act 776) to impose fines in
the nature of civil penalty for
violations of its rules and regulations.
To deprive the C.A.B. of that power
would amount to an absurd
interpretation of the pertinent legal
provision because the CAB is given
full power on its own initiative to
determine whether to "impose, remit,
mitigate, increase or compromise"
"fines and civil penalties", a power
which is expressly given to the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator whose
orders or decision may be reviewed,
revised, reversed, modified or
affirmed by the C.A.B.. Besides, to
deprive the C.A.B. of its power to
impose civil penalties would negate
its effective general supervision and

control over air carriers if they can

just disregard with impunity the rules
and regulations designed to insure
public safety and convenience in air
transportation. If everytime the
C.A.B. would like to impose a civil
penalty on an erring airline for
violation of its rules and regulations it
would have to resort to courts of
justice in protracted litigations then it
could not serve its purpose of
exercising a competent, efficient and
effective supervision and control over
air carriers in their vital role of
rendering public service by affording
safe and convenient air transit.
It is appellant's view that the fine
imposed by the CAB was not
commensurate with the nature and
extent of violation done, since
according to its argument the
Tuguegarao-Manila
flight
F213
actually served a public need when it
made a flagstop at Baguio on May
12, 1970 to pick up 20 passengers
who could not be accommodated in
the Baguio-Manila flight. Appellant's
argument overlooks the fact that
when it violated the rule on
unauthorized flagstop, it might have
done some public service to the 20
Baguio passengers but to the
prejudice and inconvenience of the
five Tuguegarao-Manila passengers.
The appellant was under obligation to
bring the five Tuguegarao-Manila
passengers directly to Manila and not
to make a flagstop in Baguio City to
pick up additional passengers, which
is not scheduled in that flight. There
is no question that for that plane to
descend and ascend at the airport in
Baguio City resulted in additional risk
to its five Tuguegarao- Manila
passengers and also to their
inconvenience. Besides, it is an
established fact that the C.A.B.
imposed the civil penalty not only for
appellant's violation of May 12, 1970,
but also for violation "on previous
occasions" and the "need to stress
upon the air carriers to desist from
wanton disregard of existing rules,
regulation or requirements of the
government regulating agency". To
Our Mind, the rules regulating flight
of air carriers must be strictly
complied with because they are
designed for the passenger's safety
and convenience and violations

thereof should not be slightly treated

since said violations might result in
irremediable disaster. The C.A.B. did
not commit any mistake in imposing
a civil penalty on appellant for its
violation of the rule prohibiting
unauthorized flagstop to serve "as a
warning to all air carriers from
operating flag-stops without prior
authority". It appears, however, that
the PAL committed the violation of
the
C.A.B.
regulation
against
flagstops without malice and with no
deliberate intent to flout the same.
For this reason, the penalty imposed
by the C.A.B. may be mitigated and
reduced to a nominal sum.
WHEREFORE,
the
resolution
appealed from is modified by
reducing the administrative fine
imposed on the appellant PAL to
ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00).
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-80160 June 26, 1989
GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN
LUIS,
THE
SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN,
PROVINCIAL
ENGINEER JUANITO C. RODIL
AND PROVINCIAL TREASURER
AMADEO C. ROMEY, ALL OF
LAGUNA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
AND
MARIANO
L.
BERROYA,
JR., respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for
petitioners.
Cecilio C. Villanueva for Gov. San
Luis.
Felicisimo T. San Luis for himself and
in behalf of his co- petitioners.
Renato B.
respondent.

Vasquez

for

private

CORTES, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus
and/or
appeal
by
certiorari assails the appellate court's
ruling that mandamus lies to compel
the reinstatement of a quarry
superintendent in the provincial
government of Laguna who was
initially detailed or transferred to
another office, then suspended, and
finally dismissed following his expose
of certain anomalies and irregularities
committed by government employees
in the province.
The background facts, as narrated by
the respondent Court of Appeals are:
Records show that at all pertinent
times, petitioner-appellant (private
respondent herein) had been the
quarry superintendent in the Province
of Laguna since his appointment as
such on May 31, 1959. In April and
May of 1973, petitioner-appellant
denounced
graft
and
corrupt
practices by employees of the
provincial government of Laguna.
Thereafter, the development of
events may be briefly encapsulated
as follows:
a. On July 20, l973, herein
respondent-appellee
provincial
governor (one of the petitioners
herein) issued Office Order No. 72
transferring Berroya to the office of
the Provincial Engineer. An amended
office order invoked LOI 14-B for said
transfer.
b. Berroya challenged said transfer,
and on October 25, 1973, the Civil
Service Commission ruled the same
violative of Section 32, RA 2260, and
ordered that Berroya be reverted to
his regular position of quarry
superintendent.
c. On December 12, 1973, instead of
complying with the CSC directive that
Berroya be reverted to his regular
position, herein respondent-appellee
provincial
governor
suspended
Berroya
for
alleged
gross
discourtesy,
inefficiency
and
insubordination. On that basis,
reconsideration of the CSC directive
that Berroya be reverted to the

position of quarry superintendent was

sought as academic (sic).
d. On February 26, 1974 the Civil
Service Commission reiterated its
October 25, 1973 directive for the
immediate reversion of Berroya to his
former position, and ruled the oneyear suspension illegal.
e. Respondent-appellee provincial
governor appealed to the Office of
the President from the CSC rulings
alluded to.
f. On May 29, 1974, there issued OP
Decision 954, Series of 1974
reversing the CSC rulings without
prejudice to the decision of the Local
Review Board [which had in fact
already sustained the one-year
suspension under date of May 6,
1974].
g. On petitioner-appellant's motion
for reconsideration, the Office of the
President rendered OP Decision
1834, Series of 1976, dated May 19,
1976, setting aside OP Decision 954,
declaring the one-year suspension
improper, and ordering payment of
back salaries to Berroya.
h. Respondent-appellant moved for
reconsideration of OP Decision 1834
on June 14, 1976. The said motion
for reconsideration was denied on
November 6, 1978.
i. In the interim, respondent-appellant
provincial governor issued an Order
of April 27, 1977 dismissing Berroya
for alleged neglect of duty, frequent
unauthorized absences, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of duty
and abandonment of office, which
order of dismissal was appealed by
Berroya to the Civil Service
Commission on May 12, 1977.
j. On January 23, 1979, the Civil
Service Commission resolved said
appeal by declaring the dismissal
unjustified, exonerating Berroya of
charges,
and
directing
his
reinstatement
as
quarry
superintendent.
k. On February l4, 1979, respondentappellee provincial governor sought

relief from the CSC decision of

January 23, 1979 declaring Berroya's
dismissal unjustified.
1. On October 15, 1979, the CSC
Merit System Board denied said
motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution No. 567.
m. Thereafter, respondent-appellee
provincial governor moved anew to
set aside O.P. Decision 1834, Series
of
1976-the
first
motion
for
reconsideration of which had been
denied on November 6, 1978. (ref.
#h, supra). The Office of the
President dismissed said motion on
March 27, 1981.
Petitioner-appellant's formal demand
for reinstatement to the position of
quarry superintendent having been
disdained
despite
the
factual
antecedents aforestated, he filed, [on
May 27, 1980] the antecedent Civil
Case No. SC-1834 for mandamus to
compel his reversion to the position
of quarry superintendent at the
Oogong Quarry, with back salaries
for the entire period of his
suspension and dismissal (exclusive
of leaves of absence with pay), and
prayed for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and
expenses of suit.
Respondents-appellees moved to
dismiss said petition for mandamus,
as amended, and opposed the
therein application for preliminary
injunctive relief
for
immediate
reinstatement.
In an Order of December 1, 1980, the
trial court denied the application for
preliminary injunctive relief "until after
the parties shall have adduced
evidence, pro and con the grant of
injunctive relief", and similarly
deferred its resolution on the motion
to dismiss "for lack of merit for the
present ... until after the trial."
On
December
15,
1980,
respondents-appellees answered the
petition for mandamus and prayed
that judgment be rendered1.
Dismissing
the
Complaint and denying

the
prayer
for
Preliminary Injunction;
2. Declaring petitioner to
have
been
legally
separated or dismissed
from the government
service;
3. Order petitioner to
pay each of them the
sum of P 200,000.00 by
way of moral damages;
P
100,000.00
as
exemplary
damages
and P 10,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus P
300.00 each per court
appearance;
other
litigation
expenses
which may be incurred
as may be proved in
due course; and to pay
the costs of suit [Rollo,
pp. 35-37].
During the pendency of the civil case
for mandamus, on April 9, 1981
petitioner provincial governor filed a
petition for relief from O.P. Decision
1834 with the Office of the President.
This was denied on November 27,
1984 on the ground that only one
motion for reconsideration of O.P.
Decision 1834 was allowed, the
petition for relief being the third such
motion filed by petitioner.
On May 17, 1985, after trial, the court
a quo rendered its decision finding
the transfer of petitioner- appellant
from
his
position
of
quarry
superintendent to the office of the
Provincial
Engineer
sufficiently
warranted. Furthermore, his one-year
suspension was found to be proper
under LOI 14-B and unassailable
upon affirmation by the Local Review
Board. His summary dismissal was
likewise found to be a justified
exercise of the authority granted
under LOI 14-B. The trial Court
further decided "that none of the
respondents
should
be
held
personally liable in their private
capacity to the petitioner because
their actuations are not at all tainted
with malice and bad faith" [Rollo, p.
38].

However, although the trial court

upheld the validity of Berroya's
dismissal, it nevertheless ordered his
reinstatement to an equivalent
position as a matter of equity. Hence,
the dispositive portion of its decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Ordering respondents
to reinstate petitioner to
any position equivalent
to that of a quarry
superintendent
which
has been abolished in
the present plantilla of
the
provincial
government of Laguna
as reorganized pursuant
to PD 1136 without
diminution in rank and
salary;
2. Ordering respondents
to pay the back salary of
petitioner from April 26,
1977 to September 1,
1977
only
and
appropriating
funds
therefor, as soon as this
decision becomes final;
3. Dismissing all claims
and counterclaims of
both parties for other
damages
including
attorney's fees [Rollo, p.
35].
On June 6, 1985, herein private
respondent Berroya appealed from
the decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated May 17, 1985. The
appeal was resolved by the
respondent Court of Appeals in his
favor in a decision which was
promulgated on April 30, 1987, the
decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is
accordingly resolved as follows:
(a) Petitioner-appellant is ordered to
be reinstated to the position of quarry
superintendent of the Oogong Quarry
in Laguna or to the position which
said office may now be called
pursuant to the reorganization of the

plantilla of the Provincial Government

of Laguna under PD 1136, without
diminution in rank and salary;
(b)
Respondents-appellees
are
ordered to pay the back salary of
petitioner-appellant corresponding to
the period of suspension and of
illegal dismissal from the service,
exclusive of that corresponding to
leaves of absences with pay;
(c) Respondents-appellants (sic) are
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioner-appellant the sum of P
50,000.00 as and for moral damages;
(d) Respondents-appellants (sic) are
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioner-appellant the further sum of
P 20,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees, plus costs and expenses of suit.
The decision of May 17, 1985, in Civil
Case No. SC-1748 is accordingly set
aside forthwith.
With costs
appellees.

against

respondents-

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 43.]

Petitioners moved to reconsider the
decision of the appellate court but
their motion was denied. Hence, the
instant petition docketed as G.R. No.
80160, which is "both or alternatively
an original action for certiorari and
mandamus and an appeal by
certiorari" [See Rollo, p. 1, et seq.]
Another petition for review of the
Court of Appeals' decision was filed
with this Court on October 8, 1987
docketed as G.R. No. 79985 by the
same petitioners. However, in a
resolution dated November 16, 1987,
the
Court
noted
the
manifestation/motion
filed
by
petitioners stating, among other
things, that the petition docketed as
G.R. No. 79985 be considered
withdrawn and the petition dated
October 16, 1987 which was filed on
October 19, 1987 and docketed as
G.R. No. 80160 be considered as the
main and real petition [Rollo, p. 50].
Accordingly,
the
parties
were
required to submit their respective
pleadings in G.R. No. 80160. The

petition in G.R. No. 80160 contains

the following assignment of errors:
First
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
AS
WELL
AS
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION
BY
MEANS OF A MERE MINUTE
RESOLUTION, STATING NO LEGAL
BASIS THEREFOR, IN GROSS
VIOLATION
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION'S
EXPRESS
MANDATE AND WHEN IT STATED
AND HELD IN SAID RESOLUTION
"THAT NO NEW REASON HAS
BEEN ADDUCED [IN SAID MOTION]
TO JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OR
MODIFICATION OF [ITS] FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS".
Second
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN
FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
MARIANO L. BERROYA, JR. DOES
NOT FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY
OF
"NOTORIOUSLY
UNDESIRABLE" AND THAT THE
"APPLICABILITY OF LOI 14-B TO
RESPONDENT BERROYA IS OPEN
TO QUESTION AS HE WAS NEVER
ASKED TO RESIGN AS BEING
NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE".
Third
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
BLATANTLY ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS
WELL
AS
EXCEEDED
ITS
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
THE "RECALL" OF THE DISMISSAL
ORDER IS ITSELF ATTENDED BY A
TOUCH
OF
MYSTERY,
MENTIONED
ONLY
IN
THE
TESTIMONY
OF
PETITIONER
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR,
UNFORTIFIED BY ANY WRITING
THEREOF, AND NOT ADVERTED
TO IN THE DECEMBER 15, 1980
ANSWER
FILED
IN
THE
ANTECEDENT mandamus ACTION,
AND IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT
BERROYA
COMMITTED ABANDONMENT OF
OFFICE.
Fourth
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN
FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF
THE LOCAL BOARD OF REVIEW
UNDER LOI 14-B MAY BE
REVIEWED
UNDER
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE
OF
THE
PRESIDENT
TO
SUPERVISE
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS, WHICH
INCLUDES THE AUTHORITY TO
REVIEW, MODIFY OR REVERSE
DECISION
INVOLVING
SUSPENSION
OF
LOCAL
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.
Fifth
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN
CONCLUDING
IN
RATHER
STRONG LANGUAGE THAT THE
"ABOLITION OF THE POSITION OF
QUARRY
SUPERINTENDENT
FROM THE PLANTILLA OF THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
LAGUNA MUST BE VIEWED WITH
(sic)
ABERRATION
AND
AN
ANOMALY, IN THE LIGHT OF
UNCONTROVERTED
SHOWING
THAT QUARRY OPERATIONS AT
THE SAME SITE CONTINUE TO
DATE, AS WOULD MILITATE
AGAINST ATTENDANCE OF GOOD
FAITH IN THE ABOLITION OF SAID
OFFICE."
Sixth
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BACK
SALARIES FOR THE PERIOD OF
HIS SUSPENSION AS WELL AS
DISMISSAL
UNTIL
REINSTATEMENT AS QUARRY
SUPERINTENDENT,
AND
IN

AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES IN

THE SUM OF P50,000.00 AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM
OF P20,000.00 IN FAVOR OF THE
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
BERROYA, AND IN HOLDING ALL
THE
PETITIONERS
HEREIN
SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF AFORESAID BACK
SALARIES AND DAMAGES [Rollo,
pp. 13-14].
The first error assigned in the instant
petition is not well taken. A thorough
perusal of the assailed resolution of
the
respondent
CA
denying
petitioners'
motion
for
reconsideration reveals clearly its
legal basis. Thus, its resolution
stating that
Considering that the motion for
reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 30, 1987 filed
by
respondent-appellee
merely
reiterates
the
grounds
and
arguments
already
discussed,
thoroughly analyzed and passed
upon by this Court; and that no new
reason has been adduced to justify a
reversal or modification of the
findings and conclusion of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit [Rollo, p. 45; Emphasis
supplied].
constitutes sufficient compliance with
the constitutional mandate that no
motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be denied
without stating the legal basis
therefor (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII,
Sec. 14, par. 2).
The resolution of the remaining
assigned errors hinges on a
determination of the effect of the
decisions rendered in favor of
Berroya by two administrative
agencies.
A. It is worth noting that the issue of
legality of the order of suspension by
petitioner Governor dated December
12, 1973 had already been passed
upon in a decision of the Office of the
President (O.P. Decision No. 1834)
dated May 19, 1976 reversing its

earlier ruling in O.P. Decision No. 954

dated May 29, 1974. The Office of
the President categorically ruled as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not disputed that the Governor, in
issuing his Order of Suspension, was
exercising an authority legally
endowed upon (sic) him by LOI 14-B,
but it must not be an unbridled
exercise of such authority....
A review of the records discloses that
the only act of the governor which
was sustained by the Local Review
Board was his imposing the
suspension on Berroya for alleged
discourtesy. This Office is prone to
adopt a contrary stand on the matter
taking
into
consideration
the
circumstances leading to the writing
of
the
so-called
"dishonest'
statements of the petitioner. It is
unfortunate that the Local Review
Board took it as an infraction of the
Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
It must be observed that the said
statements were made in the course
of a pending case before the Civil
Service Commission, and in defense
of the position of the petitioner.
Although the said statements, by
themselves, may be considered as
lacking in refinement, still this fact
alone does not justify the drastic
action taken against the petitioner in
this case. . . .
In view of the foregoing, this Office
rules that the suspension order was
unjustified.
Considering
that
respondent Berroya has already
served the suspension order and that
his suspension was not proper, it is
hereby ordered that he be entitled to
the payment of his back salaries
corresponding to the period of his
suspension [Folder of Exhibits, Vol.
1, pp. 102-103].
From this decision of the Office of the
President, petitioner Governor filed a
petition for reconsideration dated
June 14, 1976 which was denied for
lack of merit in a resolution of the
Office of the President dated
November 6, 1978 [Folder of
Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 170]. On July 3,

1979, petitioner governor filed a

second petition to reconsider O.P.
Decision No. 1834 on the main
ground that the disputed decision is
null and void ab initio allegedly
because Berroya filed his motion for
reconsideration of O.P. Decision No.
954 only on July 15, 1975 or after a
lapse of one year and forty seven
(47) days from the date when the
said decision was rendered. The
Office of the President denied such
petition in a resolution dated March
27, 1981 [Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1, p.
210] on the strength of Executive
Order No. 19, Series of 1966 which
empowers said office to act upon
petitions for reconsideration, even if
filed late, in exceptionally meritorious
cases. Said Office further pointed out
that upon review of the records of the
case, it was shown that Berroya's
motion for reconsideration was filed
on July 15, 1974 and not on July 15,
1975 as erroneously indicated in O.P.
Decision No. 1834 [Folder of
Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 213].
From the foregoing, it can be seen
that OP Decision No. 1834 had
already attained finality upon denial
of the first motion for reconsideration
in view of the clear provisions of the
applicable law at the time. Executive
Order No. 19, Series of 1966, which
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Petitions for reconsideration filed
after the lapse of the aforesaid period
(fifteen days from receipt of the
decision) shall not be entertained
unless the Office of the President, for
exceptionally meritorious causes,
decides to act thereon, provided that
only one petition for reconsideration
by any party shall be allowed
[Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, the filing of the second
petition for reconsideration could not
have stayed the finality of the
aforesaid decision.
In a last ditch attempt to assail the
validity of O.P. Decision No. 1834, a
petition for relief was filed by herein
petitioners on April 9, 1981, during
the pendency of the mandamus

case. This petition was finally denied

in a resolution of the office dated
November 27, 1984.
B. On the other hand, the validity of
Berroya's dismissal was already
passed upon by the Merit Systems
Board
of
the
Civil
Service
Commission in MSB Case No. 40. In
a decision promulgated on January
23, 1979, the Merit Systems Board
held as follows:
After carefully perusing the records of
this case, this board is convinced that
there is no strong evidence of guilt
against Berroya. In fact, there is not
even sufficient evidence to maintain
the charges against him. Hence, the
same does not fall within the scope
of Section 40, Presidential Decree
No. 807.
The record does not show that
Berroya is notoriously undesirable.
On the contrary, his performance
ratings from the period ending
December 31, 1969 to the period
ending June 30, 1973 are all very
satisfactory.
Such being the case, he is not
notoriously undesirable under the
standard laid down by the President,
to wit: "the test of being notoriously
undesirable is two-fold: whether it is
common knowledge or generally
known as universally believed to be
true or manifest to the world that
petitioner committed the acts imputed
against him, and whether he had
contracted the habit for any of the
enumerated misdemeanors". The
same are not present in the case of
Berroya. On the contrary he should
be given recognition for his efforts in
exposing the irregularities allegedly
committed by some authorities of the
Laguna Provincial Government which
led to the filing of criminal as well as
administrative cases against such
officials.
Foregoing premises considered, this
Board finds the order of dismissal
dated April 27, 1977, without
justifiable basis. Wherefore, the
Board hereby exonerates Engr.
Mariano Berroya, Jr. of the charges
against him. Consequently, it is

hereby directed that he be reinstated

to
his
position
as
Quarry
Superintendent
of
Laguna
immediately, [Folder of Exhibits, Vol.
1, pp. 175-176].
The motion for reconsideration from
this decision was denied in a
resolution of the Board dated
October 15, 1979. This decision was
therefore already final when Berroya
instituted suit in 1980 to compel
petitioner to reinstate him to his
former position and to pay his back
salaries.
Since the decisions of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office
of the President had long become
final and executory, the same can no
longer be reviewed by the courts. It is
well-established in our jurisprudence
that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial
authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of resjudicata [Brillantes v.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdjian
Merchadising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals,
G.R.
No.
L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.]
The rule of res judicata which forbids
the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of
courts having general judicial powers
[Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
Indeed,
the
principle
of
conclusiveness of prior adjudications
is not confined in its operation to the
judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but it extends to all
bodies upon whom judicial powers
had
been
conferred.
Hence,
whenever any board, tribunal or
person is by law vested with authority
to judicially determine a question, like
the Merit Systems Board of the Civil
Service Commission and the Office
of the President, for instance, such
determination, when it has become
final, is as conclusive between the
same parties litigating for the same

cause as though the adjudication had

been made by a court of general
jurisdiction [Ipekdjian Merchandising
Co.,
Inc.
v. Court
of
Tax
Appeals, supra at 76].
Furthermore, the trial court's act of
reviewing and setting aside the
findings of the two administrative
bodies was in gross disregard of the
basic legal precept that accords
finality to administrative findings of
facts.
The general rule, under the principles
of administrative law in force in this
jurisdiction, is that decisions of
administrative officers shall not be
disturbed by the courts, except when
the former have acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies
who
have
acquired
expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but at
times even finality if such findings are
supported
by
substantial]
evidence. . . . [Lianga Bay Logging
Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, G.R. No. L30637, July 16, 1987,152 SCRA 80].
Finally, the Court cannot ignore the
undisputed fact that the decisions
rendered by the Office of the
President and the Merit Systems
Board had attained finality without
petitioners having taken any timely
legal recourse to have the said
decisions reviewed by the courts. On
the other hand, Berroya, in order to
enforce his right to reinstatement and
to back salaries pursuant to these
final and executory administrative
rulings,
instituted
a
suit
for
mandamus to compel petitioners to
comply with the directives issued by
the two administrative agencies.
Since private respondent Berroya
had established his clear legal right
to reinstatement and back salaries
under the aforementioned final and
executory administrative decisions, it
became a clear ministerial duty on
the part of the authorities concerned
to comply with the orders contained
in said decisions [Tanala v. Legaspi,

G.R. No. L-22537, March

1965,13 SCRA 566 at 574-575].

31,

The established rule is that a writ of

mandamus lies to enforce a
ministerial duty or "the performance
of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust or station" [Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court; Lianto v. Mohamad Ali
Dimaporo, et al., G.R. No. L-21905,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 599]. In
this
case,
the
appropriate
administrative
agencies
having
determined with finality that Berroya's
suspension and dismissal were
without just cause, his reinstatement
becomes a plain ministerial duty of
the petitioner Provincial Governor, a
duty whose performance may be
controlled
and
enjoined
by
mandamus [Ynchausit and Co. v.
Wright, 47 Phil. 866 (1925); Tee and
Co. v. Wright, 53 Phil. 194 (1929);
Gementiza v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. L-41717-33, April 12, 1982,113
SCRA 477; Laganapan v. Asedillo,
G.R. No. L-28353, September 30,
1987, 154 SCRA 377].
Thus, this Tribunal upholds the
appellate court's judgment for the
reinstatement of respondent Berroya
and payment of his back salaries
corresponding to the period of
suspension and of illegal dismissal
from service, exclusive of that
corresponding to leaves of absences
with pay. However, as respondent
Berroya can no longer be reinstated
because he has already reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty
five years on December 7, 1986,** he
should be paid his back salaries
[Salcedo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-40846, January 31, 1978, 81
SCRA 408] and also all the
retirement and leave privileges that
are due him as a retiring employee in
accordance with law [Tanala v.
Legaspi, supra at 576].
According to settled jurisprudence,
Berroya, as an illegally terminated
civil service employee is entitled to
back salaries limited only to a
maximum period of five years
Laganapan v. Asedillo, supra;
Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II,

G.R. No. L-40490, October 28, 1977,

80 SCRA 123; Salcedo v. Court of
Appeals, supra, Gementiza v. Court
of Appeals, supra].
That petitioners Provincial Governor,
Provincial Treasurer and Provincial
Engineer
of
Laguna,
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
of
Laguna and the Province of Laguna,
formally impleaded herein,'** are
liable for back salaries in case of
illegal termination of a civil service
employee finds support in earlier
decisions of this Court [Balquidra v.
Court of First Instance of Capiz,
Branch II, supra; Gementiza v. Court
of Appeals, supra; Rama v. Court of
Appeals,
G.R.
Nos.
L-44484,
1,44842, L-44894, L-44591, March
16, 1987,148 SCRA 496; Laganapan
v. Asedillo, supra].
However, the petitioners Juanito
Rodil and Amado Romey must be
held liable only in their official
capacities as Provincial Engineer and
Provincial Treasurer, respectively
since they had been expressly sued
by Berroya as such [Petition for
mandamus
with
Preliminary
Injunction, Record, Vol. 1, p. 1, et
seq.; Gray v. De Vera, G.R. No. L23966, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 268].
The same does not hold true for
petitioner provincial governor who
was found by the appellate court to
have acted in bad faith as manifested
by his contumacious refusal to
comply with the decisions of the two
administrative
agencies,
thus
prompting respondent Berroya to
secure an indorsement from the
Minister of Local Government and
Community
Development
dated
November 15, 1979 for his
reinstatement [Annex "Y-9", Folder of
Exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 207]. The
Minister's directive having been
ignored, Berroya was compelled to
bring an action for mandamus.
Where, as in this case, the provincial
governor obstinately refused to
reinstate the petitioner, in defiance of
the orders of the Office of the
President and the Ministry of Local
Government
and
in
palpable
disregard of the opinion of the Civil

Service Commission, the appellate

court's finding of bad faith cannot be
faulted and accordingly, will not be
disturbed by this Tribunal Enciso v.
Remo, G.R. No. L-23670, September
30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580.] This is in
line with our previous ruling in Remo
v. Palacio [107 Phil. 803 (1960)] that
xxx xxx xxx
(i)t having been clearly
shown by evidence, that
respondent, Deogracias
Remo, in his capacity as
Mayor of Goa, refused
to
reinstate
the
petitioner to his former
position in the police
force of Goa, despite
the
orders
of
Malacanang to do so
(Exhs. G and I), and
inspite of the opinion of
the Secretary of Finance
(Exh. H), the respondent
Mayor of Goa, willfully
acted in bad faith, and
therefore, he, as Mayor
of Goa, should pay for
damages caused to the
petitioner, Angel Enciso.
[At pp. 807-808.]
It is well-settled that when a public
officer goes beyond the scope of his
duty,
particularly
when
acting
tortiously, he is not entitled to
protection on account of his office,
but is liable for his acts like any
private individual [Palma v. Graciano,
99 Phil. 72 (1956)].
Thus, in Mendoza v. De Leon [33
Phil. 508 (1916)], it was held:
Nor are officers or agents of the
Government charged with the
performance of governmental duties
which are in their nature legislative or
quasi-judicial
liable
for
the
consequences of their official acts,
unless it be shown that they act
wilfully and maliciously and with the
express purpose of inflicting injury
upon the plaintiff [at 513; Emphasis
supplied].
Accordingly, applying the principle
that a public officer, by virtue of his

office alone, is not immune from

damages in his personal capacity
arising from illegal acts done in bad
faith [Tabuena v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-16290, October 31, 1961,
3 SCRA 413; Correa v. Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, G. R. No. L46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312],
the Court holds that petitioner
Felicisimo T. San Luis, the Provincial
Governor of Laguna who has been
sued both in his official and private
capacities, must be held personally
liable
to
Berroya
for
the
consequences of his illegal and
wrongful acts.
In this regard, the Court sustains the
appellate
court's
finding
that
petitioner San Luis must be held
liable to Berroya for moral damages
since justice demands that the latter
be recompensed for the mental
suffering and hardship he went
through in order to vindicate his right,
apart from the back salaries legally
due him [Rama v. Court of
Appeals, supra at p. 5061]. The
appellate court was clearly warranted
in awarding moral damages in favor
of respondent Berroya because of
the obstinacy of petitioner Governor
who arbitrarily and without legal
justification
refused
Berroya's
reinstatement
in
defiance
of
directives of the administrative
agencies with final authority on the
matter. We agree with the appellate
court that the sum of P 50,000.00 for
moral damages is a reasonable
award considering the mental
anguish and serious anxiety suffered
by Berroya as a result of the wrongful
acts of petitioner Governor in
refusing to reinstate him.
Finally, as correctly adjudged by
respondent court, petitioner San Luis
must likewise answer to Berroya for
attorney's fees plus costs and
expenses of suit, which have been
fixed by said court at P 20,000.00, in
view of the wrongful refusal of
petitioner provincial governor to
afford Berroya his plainly valid and
just claim for reinstatement and back
salaries [Rollo, p. 42].
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision
of the appellate court is hereby

MODIFIED as follows: (1) the

petitioners, in their official capacities,
are
ordered
to
pay
private
respondent Berroya, his back
salaries for a maximum period of five
years; (2) since the reinstatement of
Berroya can no longer be ordered by
reason of his having reached the
retirement age, he should instead be
paid all the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law;
and (3) petitioner Felicisimo T. San
Luis, in his personal capacity, is
further ordered to pay Berroya the
sum of P 50,000.00 as and for moral
damages, the sum of P 20,000.00 as
and for attorney's fees plus costs and
other expenses of suit. This decision
shall
be
IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 54424 August 31, 1989
NASIPIT
LUMBER
COMPANY,
INC., petitioner
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR
ARBITER ILDEFONSO G. AGBUYA
and
JUANITO
COLLADO, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Nasipit Lumber Company,
Inc. (NALCO for brevity) is a
domestic corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It is engaged in the
business
of
logging,
lumber
manufacturing and wood processing
with field offices at Nasipit, Agusan
del Norte.
Private respondent Juanita Collado
was employed by petitioner as a
security guard on September 9,
1970. He was assigned as lst

Sergeant of the NALCO Security

Force at Nasipit. In the course of
Collado's employment or on August
20, 1976, four (4) crates of lawanit
boards containing 1,000 panels were
stolen from petitioner's premises,
particularly the crating section of the
Philippine Wallboard Corporation, a
NALCO affiliate.
Collado was implicated in the theft
and was thereafter placed under
preventive
suspension.
On
September 8, 1976, NALCO filed a
petition (application) for clearance to
dismiss Collado with the Regional
Office No. X of the Department of
Labor in Cagayan de Oro City. 1 On
September 15, 1976, Collado filed an
opposition to said application for
clearance to dismiss. The case was
set for hearing the following day,
September 16, but Collado, despite
notice, failed to appear. Hence,
NALCO was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte.
On October 12, 1976, the application
for clearance to dismiss was
approved in an order issued by
Regional Office No. X Officer-inCharge Roy V. Seneres. 2 The order
was based on the investigation report
of the head of the Agusan Provincial
Labor Office. Collado filed a motion
for the reconsideration of said order
on the ground that he was not given
an opportunity to rebut the false
findings or adduce evidence in his
favor. He further denied participation
in the theft. 3
On December 7, 1976, the said
Officer-in-Charge,
through
a
subordinate, certified the case to the
Executive
Labor
Arbiter
for
compulsory arbitration. 4 Notice and
summons were issued.NALCO and
Collado were then required to submit
their respective position papers
under
pain
of
a
default
judgment. 5 After a perusal of the
records, Executive Labor Arbiter
Ildefonso G. Agbuya returned the
case to the Regional Director of
Regional Office No. X in Cagayan de
Oro City for whatever appropriate
action he may deem fit. A portion of
the order dated February 25, 1977 of
said Executive Labor Arbiter reads:

From all indications, we

find that the Motion for
Reconsideration should
be treated as an appeal
to (sic) the Order of Roy
V. Seneres, dated 12
October 1976, and as
such it should be
elevated
to
the
Secretary
of
Labor.
Besides, we also fear
that
if
we
take
cognizance of this case,
perhaps,
we
might
reverse the order of the
Regional Director which,
to our thinking, would
only
create
a
disturbance
to
the
harmonious
relation
existing between our
two offices. . . . 6
Consequently, the case was elevated
to the Secretary of Labor. On June 7,
1978, Acting Secretary of Labor
Amado G. Inciong issued an order
affirming the order of Officer-inCharge Roy V. Seneres thereby
granting petitioner's application for
clearance to dismiss Collado. 7
Instead of resorting to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, 8 on October 9,
1978, Collado filed a complaint
before the Butuan District Labor
Office, Butuan City, for unjust dismiss
and reinstatement with backwages
and benefits. 9 Without going to
specifics, Collado averred therein
that his termination from employment
"was unfounded, unjust and illegal,
based as it was on uncorroborated
and malicious suspicion, insinuation
and hearsay, and characterized by
harassment."
NALCO flied a motion to dismiss the
complaint. It alleged that in view of
Acting Secretary Inciong's aforesaid
order, Collado did not have any
sufficient cause of action and
therefore his complaint was a
nuisance. 10 In its position paper,
NALCO added that because Acting
Secretary Inciong's order had
become final and executory, the
issue of illegal dismissal had also
become res judicata. 11

The case having been certified for

compulsory arbitration, on January
29, 1979, Executive Labor Arbiter
Ildefonso G. Agbuya rendered a
decision ordering NALCO to reinstate
Collado to his former position without
backwages and without loss of
seniority rights "provided he has the
necessary papers required of the
service as security guard. 12
In his decision, the said labor arbiter
stated that while NALCO complied
with the requirements of law when it
obtained a clearance to terminate, he
could not discount the possibility that
NALCO "knew or at least suspected
that there was something wrong with
the manner in which the investigation
was conducted" by the head of the
Butuan District Labor Office whose
report was the basis of the approval
of the clearance application. 13 He
conceded that NALCO acted in good
faith
in
terminating
Collado's
employment and that it was NALCOs
prerogative to terminate
such
employment to protect its business
interests.
However,
he
was
constrained to arrive at said
conclusion
ordering
the
reinstatement of Collado because of
the order of the Nasipit municipal
judge in Criminal Case No. 2236
finding that there was nothing in the
testimony of the prosecution witness
to establish the probable guilt of
Collado who should therefore be
dropped from the complain for
qualified theft. He also took into
consideration the certification of the
Agusan del Norte provincial fiscal
showing that Collado had also been
dropped from the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 1127.
Both parties appealed to the National
Labor
Relations
Commission
(NLRC).lwph1.t NALCO asked
for the reversal and revocation of the
decision of the Executive Labor
Arbiter, while Collado prayed for a
modification of the appealed decision
to include backwages and benefits in
addition to reinstatement.
On May 30, 1980, the NLRC First
Division 14 rendered
a
decision
modifying the Executive Labor
Arbiter's
decision
by
ordering

Collado's reinstatement to his former

position
with
two
(2)
years
backwages without qualification and
loss of seniority rights. 15 It agreed
with the findings and conclusions of
the Executive Labor Arbiter with
respect to the dropping of Collado
from the criminal cases but it ruled
that the rights of Collado to
backwages were not precluded by
the findings that his termination was
effected in good faith. On the issue
of res judicata, the NLRC said:
We cannot subscribe to
the arguments of the
respondent-appellant
that the order of the OIC
of Region X which was
subsequently approved
by then Acting Secretary
Amado G. Inciong has
become the law of the
case. Res
judicata cannot
be
validly invoked in this
case
because
the
granting
of
the
application for clearance
which
although
admittedly was secured
with all the formalities
required by law, did not
resolve the case on its
merits. Records show
that on September 16,
1976 the application to
terminate
was
scheduled
for
investigation before the
Provincial Labor Office.
Petitioner Collado who
was
then
the
respondent in this case
failed
to
appear
although
he
was
properly notified of the
scheduled investigation.
On
September
22,
1976, the Head of the
Agusan Provincial Office
submitted
its
investigation
report
recommending
the
approval
of
the
application to terminate
Juanito Collado without
affording him another
chance to be heard and
defend his side. It is
very clear that the

investigation conducted
by the Provincial Labor
Office was hastily done
and
vitiated
with
infirmities.
What
it
should have done is to
give the respondent
Collado another chance
to defend his case
considering the gravity
of the offense imputed
against him which if
proved would cause him
his only means of
livelihood. 16
NALCO filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or a
restraining order, seeking to annul
the NLRC decision and to prohibit its
execution. It imputed to the NLRC
lack or excess of jurisdiction and
grave and patent abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
overturning the final decision of the
Acting Secretary of Labor thereby
denigrating the time-honored doctrine
of bar by former judgment or res
judicata.
It
assailed
Collado's
reinstatement as improper inasmuch
as the employer-employee relations
of the parties had been legally
severed by the approval of the
clearance to dismiss.
This Court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. 17 Upon receipt of the
dismissal resolution, NALCO filed an
urgent motion for reconsideration
based on the following grounds: (a) it
has a valid and meritorious cause of
action due to the NLRC's violation of
the principle of res judicata; (b) the
occurrence of a supervening event
consisting of the remand of the
records of the approved clearance to
dismiss
for
execution
and/or
appropriate action, 49 days after the
promulgation
of
the
herein
questioned NLRC decision; (c) the
NLRC not only disregarded the final
and executory decision of the Acting
Secretary of Labor but also the
pronouncements of this Court on the
curative effects of appeals in labor
cases wherein the issue of denial of
procedural due process had been
raised; and (d) should the NLRC

decision become final, a confusing

situation of two diametrically opposed
decisions on the same issue of
dismissal, would arise.
Understandably, Collado opposed
the motion for reconsideration. On
the other hand, the Solicitor General,
appearing for public respondents,
filed a manifestation and motion
recommending that the urgent motion
for reconsideration be granted. He
stated therein that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion because: (a) all
the elements of res judicata are
present in this case: (b) the merits of
Collado's
dismissal
had
been
litigated in the first case and Collado
was
therefore
estopped
from
attacking the final decision of the
Acting Secretary of Labor either in
the original action or in a new and
subsequent action; (c) not only the
"formal aspect" in the application for
clearance to terminate was involved
in the first case as the merits thereof
were fully taken into consideration;
and (d) to allow a distinction between
the two cases would result in splitting
a cause of action which would
ultimately breed multiplicity of suits.
On the strength of the Solicitor
General's manifestation and motion,
the Court reconsidered the dismissal
resolution and gave due course to
the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition. 18
The two principal issues presented to
this Court for adjudication are the
applicability of the principle of res
judicataand the legality of Collado's
reinstatement with backwages and
without loss of seniority rights.
On the first issue, we hold that this is
one of the cases wherein the
pronouncement of this Court thru
Justice Vicente Abad Santos in
Razon vs. Inciong 19 applies. The
Court stated therein that the principle
of res judicata may not be invoked in
labor
relations
proceedings
considering that Section 5, Rule XIII,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code
provides that such proceedings are
"non-litigious and summary in nature
without regard to legal technicalities

obtaining in courts of law." Said

pronouncement is in consonance
with the jurisprudential dictum that
the doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise
of administrative powers.20
The requirement of a clearance to
terminate employment was a creation
of the Department of Labor to carry
out the Labor Code provisions on
security of tenure and termination of
employment.
The
proceeding
subsequent to the filing of an
application for clearance to terminate
employment was outlined in Book V,
Rule XIV of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. The fact that said rule allowed
a procedure for the approval of the
clearance with or without the
opposition
of
the
employee
concerned
(Secs.
7
&
8),
demonstrates the non-litigious and
summary nature of the proceeding.
The clearance requirement was
therefore necessary only as an
expeditious shield against arbitrary
dismissals without the knowledge
and supervision of the Department of
Labor. Hence, a duly approved
clearance implied that the dismissal
was legal or for cause (Sec. 2).
But even while said clearance was a
requirement, employees who faced
dismissal
still
contested
said
applications
not
only
through
oppositions thereto but by filing
separate complaints for illegal
dismissal. Usually, the investigation
on the application and the hearing on
the complaint for illegal dismissal
were
conducted
simultaneously.
What makes the present case
unusual is that the employee filed the
complaint for illegal dismissal only
after the Acting Secretary of Labor
had affirmed the approval of the
application
to
terminate
his
employment. Nonetheless, we are
unprepared to rule that such action of
the Acting Secretary of Labor barred
Collado from filing the complaint for
illegal dismissal. If ever, the most that
can be attributed against Collado is
laches for his failure to question
seasonably the Acting Secretary of
Labor's affirmance of the approval of

the clearance to terminate. However,

to count such laches against Collado
would be prejudicial to his rights as a
laborer.
Be that as it may, the possibility that
there would be two conflicting
decisions on the issue of Collado's
dismissal may now be considered
academic. The requirement of a
written
clearance
from
the
Department prior to termination was
abolished by the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981.
Dismissal proceedings are now
confined within the establishments.
The NLRC or the labor arbiter steps
in only if the said decision is
contested by the employee. 21
On the legality of Collado's dismissal,
we hold that the NLRC abused its
discretion
in
directing
his
reinstatement with two (2) years
backwages. The relation between
petitioner and Collado is now
strained by the latter's violation of the
trust and confidence reposed on him
as a member of the security force, a
position impressed with a high
degree of trust. 22 Proof beyond
reasonable doubt of an employee's
misconduct is not required when loss
of confidence is the ground for
dismissal. It is sufficient if the
employer has "some basis" to lose
confidence or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to
entertain the moral conviction that
the
employee
concerned
is
responsible for the misconduct and
that the nature of his participation
therein rendered him absolutely
unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. 23
In this case, petitioner supported its
application for clearance to terminate
Collado's employment with sworn
statements implicating him in the
theft. 24 Such sworn statements are
sufficient to warrant the dismissal. On
the other hand, the dropping of the
qualified theft charges against
Collado is not binding upon a labor
tribunal. 25 The sensitivity of Collado's
job as a security guard vis-a-vis the
cause of his dismissal cost him his
right to be rehired to the same
position. Reinstatement is not proper

where termination of employment

was due to breach of trust and
confidence. 26
We are aware of Collado's almost six
years of service to the petitioner as
well as the hardships resulting from
the loss of his job. Compassion
dictates us to grant him separation
pay as financial assistance but we
are bound by the ruling of the Court
en banc in Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. NLRC 27 that
henceforth separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for
causes
other
than
serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
NLRC is hereby reversed and set
aside. Juanita Collado's dismissal
from employment is hereby declared
valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29551 March 25, 1970

B. F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
EMILIO ACEBEDO, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondents.
Manuel O. Chan for petitioner.
Emilio Acebedo in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner B. F. Goodrich Philippines,
Inc. in this appeal by certiorari, seeks

the reversal of an award of

respondent
Workmen's
Compensation Commission in favor
of respondent Emilio Acebedo for
partial permanent disability. The plea
for the setting aside of the above
decision is sought to be justified by
the alleged refusal of respondent
Commission to be bound by an
opinion of its Evaluation Division to
the effect that inguinal hernia "after
repair by surgery" does not call for
the imposition of such a liability. It
would thus impute to respondent
Commission a grave abuse of
discretion. Implicit in such a
contention
is
the
view
that
respondent
Commission
must
perforce
yield
unquestioning
obedience to whatever medical
opinion may thus be arrived at, even
if not brought to the attention of the
claimant,
upon
pain
of
its
determination being stigmatized as
arbitrary and improvident. That is not
and has never been the law. That is
to disregard the standard consistently
and uninterruptedly followed by us as
to when a decision of respondent
Commission may justifiably be
assailed
as
subject
to
the
condemnation
that
the
broad
discretion conferred on it had been
gravely abused. Petitioner is not
entitled to the reversal of the award
sought. We sustain respondent
Commission.
The decision of August 2, 1968 of
respondent Commission, now sought
to be reversed, sets forth the facts
thus: "An examination of the records
of the case reveals that claimant
Emilio Acebedo, a calender operator
of the respondent B. F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc., with an average
weekly wage (including overtime pay)
of P115.90 filed with the Regional
Office No. 4, Manila (Sub-Regional
Office, Quezon City), a claim for
compensation against the latter on
May 9, 1967, for disability for labor
due to recurrent left inguinal hernia
sustained while actually in the
performance of his duty; that
because respondent in its Employer's
Report of Accident or Sickness
submitted to the sub-regional office
on May 29, 1967 has not only
indicated its intention not to
controvert the right of the claimant

under Section 14 of the Act but also

stated that it has already paid the
latter the sum of P715.26, although it
made known its intention of
contesting
any
award
of
compensation under Section 17 of
the same Act, the Chief of Section
issued on August 16, 1967 a lettercomputation
awarding
disability
benefits in the total amount of
P5,699.78 in favor of claimant Emilio
Acebedo; and that respondent in its
letter dated August 28, 1967 (which
in effect may be considered a petition
for review) vigorously assailed said
award on the ground that according
to the opinion of the Chief of
Evaluation Division of the Bureau of
Workmen's Compensation, inguinal
hernia 'after repair by surgery should
not be considered as partial
permanent disability under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.'"1
As to the precise and specific issue
of the partial permanent disability,
respondent Commission relied on its
previous ruling in Opalalic v. B. F.
Goodrich Philippines, Inc.,2 the facts
of which, according to the decision
now under review, are similar. Thus:
"'Without the least minimizing the
medical [significance] of the opinion
rendered by the Evaluation Division,
we say that such an opinion may not
be taken in consideration where, the
adverse party, the claimant in the
case, was not given the opportunity
to object to its admission. More so,
where on its admission depends
primarily a decision of reversal.
(Magalona vs. WCC and NASSCO,
L-21849, December 11, 1967.)'"3 The
appealed decision added further:
"'Moreover, it does not appear in the
case at bar that Opalalic's inguinal
hernia was ever repaired or corrected
by operation. Neither does it appear
that such operation had proved
successful to the point of having any
future recurrence thereof. For this
reason, we find the much invoked
medical opinion to have no
application at all'."4
It is easy to understand, therefore,
why the decision did go against
petitioner. Nor can the conclusion
reached by respondent Commission
be repudiated unless "on a clear

showing of failure to consider the

evidence on record, or failure to
consider fundamental and patent
logical relationships in the evidence,
amounting to a clear travesty of
justice
or
grave
abuse
of
5
discretion." What was said by us
in Basaysay
v.
Workmen's
Compensation Commission, through
the present Chief Justice, bears
repeating: "The task of ascertaining
the credibility and weight of
conflicting evidence, is, however,
beyond the province of our authority
in appeals by certiorari."6 Even if the
possibility that the Commission's
conclusions were erroneous could
not be ruled out, still, to borrow the
language
of
Justice
Dizon
in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Workmen's
Compensation
Commission, "such errors would
constitute mere errors of judgment
but do not involve any grave abuse of
discretion on its part."7
Deference to the above doctrinal
pronouncements
calls
for
the
affirmance
of
the
award
of
respondent Commission. Petitioner,
however, would stress that the cited
decision, Magalona v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission,8 to the
effect that the adverse party should
be given an opportunity to object to
an admissibility of the opinion of the
Evaluation Division of respondent
Commission has been overruled by
the later case of Vda. de Layag v.
Republic.9Petitioner is in error. The
doctrine announced in the Magalona
case, which is in accordance with the
fundamental requirement of due
process insofar as the right of a party
to a fair hearing is concerned, is not
rendered obsolete at all unless the
cardinal requirement of fairness in
administrative
proceedings
so
explicitly stressed in Ang Tibay v.
Court 10 and reiterated time and time
again, 11 is a thing of the past. This
Court, no court for that matter, cannot
sanction such a deviation from the
norm that justice dictates.
The opinion in the Vda. de Layag
decision is to be searched in vain for
any such implication which petitioner
was able to discern in it. It speaks for
itself. Thus: "The issue posed by the

parties is whether or not the cause of

death was service connected. In
returning a negative conclusion the
Commission found that aside from
his duties as chief-cook and the
usual chores incidental thereto, such
as marketing, preparing and setting
the table, and serving during meals,
the deceased performed no other
work, let alone scrubbing the floor,
cleaning and painting the boat, as
petitioner alleges; and that the record
of his illness does not reveal any
causal relation with his job." 12Then
it went on to state that insofar as the
particular ailment from which the
employee died was concerned, the
Commission took into account the
research and study made by its
senior medical officer. The objection
that such medical study was not
competent evidence because it was
not formally offered and received with
notice to the claimant was answered
in the opinion this way: "The cause of
death here is not disputed:
thrombocytopanic
purpose
with
cerebral hemorrhage and hypoplastic
anemia. All that the Commission did
was to go into the clinical causes of
the disease as revealed by the
studies made by its own medical
officer. This the Commission could do
to properly inform itself on the
technical
questions
involved,
pursuant to one of its Rules (Sec. 9),
which provides that 'in the hearing,
investigation and determination of
any question or controversy and in
the exercise of any duties or powers,
the Hearing Officer or Commissioner
shall act according to justice and
equity and the substantial merits of
the
case, without
regard
to
technicalities or legal forms, and
shall not be bound by any technical
rule of legal evidence but may inform
himself of their merit in such manner
as to attain the objectives of the
law.'" 13
What is immediately apparent is that
in
the
Layag
decision
the
Commission was sustained; it was
not overruled. Moreover, why in this
particular case the non-compliance
with the requirement of notice to the
claimant did not have the significance
it would otherwise possess was
solely due to the fact that what was
material in such medical study was

not the effect of the ailment which

could be the basis for compensation
but the "clinical causes" thereof,
about which there could be no
controversy thus obviating the need
for notice to the claimant, otherwise
essential. Viewed as it ought to be,
then, it is readily apparent why the
principle in the Magalona case was
not found controlling. That is not the
situation that this case presents.
Moreover, petitioner would ignore this
express finding of facts set forth
above. Thus: "'Moreover, it does not
appear in the case at bar that
[Acebedo's] inguinal hernia was ever
repaired or corrected by operation.
Neither does it appear that such
operation had proved successful to
the point of having any future
recurrence thereof. For this reason,
we find the much invoked medical
opinion to have no application at
all." 14 petitioner did not even aver
that respondent commission was not
justified in so concluding. such an
omission is fatal to its plea
independently of whether or not the
magalona
doctrine
has
been
overruled. 15
It would be a departure, therefore,
unjustified and unwarranted, for this
Court not to manifest the same
solicitude
and
concern
for
respondent Emilio Acebedo when
invariably it has accorded the
Workmen's Compensation Act a
liberal interpretation inescapable
under the constitutional mandates of
social justice and protection to
labor. 16Petitioner is not entitled to
the reversal of the award sought.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Workmen's
Compensation
Commission of August 2, 1968 as
well as its resolution of September 4,
1968 denying the motion for
reconsideration
of
the
above
decision, are affirmed. With costs
against petitioner B. F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc. .