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doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogw002
Research Article
Krickovic, Andrej. (2016) Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma. Journal of Global Security Studies, doi:10.1093/jogss/ogw002
C The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
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Realists are accustomed to thinking about security competition between states in terms of the security
dilemma: each states efforts to improve its security can be taken as a threat by others, sparking competition that destabilizes the system and increases the likelihood of conflict. By focusing almost exclusively on
external threat dynamics, however, common thinking about the security dilemma misses how domestic
vulnerabilities can also be a catalyst for security competition. This is particularly the case in weak states
that lack internal legitimacy. Weak developing states see intervention (whether perceived or real) targeted
at their domestic vulnerabilities as an existential threat to political survival. When the targeted state
responds to minimize or negate the threat, its response may be perceived as a threat, warranting a counter
response. Particularly, when a targeted state possesses significant national poweras in the cases of China
and Russiaa security competition is born. This article develops the logic behind this modified version of
the security dilemma focused on internal vulnerabilities. Managing these internal fears will be of critical
importance if we are to avoid the reemergence of security competition between great powers in the future.
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ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
Ayoobs work allows us to develop a better understanding of the domestic context under which leaders operate, as
well as the larger structural forces that shape internal vulnerabilities. Under the circumstances described above, concerns about internal security may encompass more than
just the imperative for political survival, but also reflect
concerns about domestic stability and continued political
and economic development. However, the increased complexity that is gained by considering these factors comes at
the price of analytical ambiguity. The fate of the regime is
equated with the interests of the state and nation, making it
difficult to determine whether leaders are motivated by personal concerns of political survival or by genuine commitments to state and nation building. This task is largely left
up to the analyst on a case-by-case basis, and Ayoob provides few clues about how to make this distinction.
Taken together, this body of literature allows us to better understand the critical role that domestic insecurity
plays in shaping foreign and security policies. For the most
part, these studies focus on developing or weak states that
have a limited ability to project their power externally.
Like the states that are the focus of these theories, China
and Russia exhibit profound internal vulnerabilities. But,
unlike many third-world states, China and Russia have
unique characteristics not captured in the existing literature. They are both significant powers in their own right,
and as such have a variety of political and economic interests that extend internationally and go well beyond the
mere survival of their domestic political regime. They
have the capability to exert their national power on the
world stage and can react to what they see as Western
meddling in their internal affairs in ways that threaten the
security of the developed states of the West.
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Table 1. Foreign policies that target states may adopt to push back against perceived intervention
Response
Internal
by the targeted state are not necessarily offensive in nature, they may be perceived as such by the intervening
state. In response, the intervening state may adopt policies
designed to counter the perceived threats from the targeted state.
As a result, both states find themselves embroiled in a
classic security dilemma. However, the roots of this dilemma lie in the internal weaknesses of one state, rather
than either states efforts to address external security
concerns. Thus, the internal dimension of the security
dilemma can generate conflict even in circumstances
where states do not pose an immediate external military
threat to one another.
In many situationsas is the case with the United
States relationship with China and Russiaonly one
side exhibits significant internal vulnerabilities. This may
make it more difficult for the two sides to extricate themselves from the vicious cycle of the security dilemma. It
may be logical to assume that the intervening state will
forego its efforts to promote democracy and human
rights when confronted by the defensive reactions of the
target state. But, this may not necessarily be the case. An
intervening democratic state may not recognize the need
to adjust or modify these policies to make them less
threatening. As it does not have the same internal vulnerabilities, the intervening state will not fully appreciate a
target states sensitivities to internal security concerns.
Nor will an intervening state be able to recognize that a
target states reaction is defensive in nature. An intervening state may instead view the target states aggressive
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Instituting a policy of reassurance that avoids the security dilemma is difficult enough in the real world of international politics. The internal dimension of the security dilemma not only complicates the relationship, but also
creates a unique problem even more difficult to solve. Fears
of internal meddling are generated, not only by the policies of other states, but also by the internal vulnerabilities
of a targeted state. In reviewing the model in Figure 2, it is
thus unclear as to exactly what kind of policies will reassure
state A that B will not take advantage of its internal vulnerabilities. State A will always harbor the fear of being taken
advantage of as long as internal vulnerabilities exist. Even
if state B stops its policy of promoting democracy and human rights, this may not be enough to assuage state As fears
of internal destabilization. In a world where the most prominent potential challengers to US hegemony (i.e., China and
Russia) are developing states that exhibit these internal
vulnerabilities, avoiding a security dilemma in the form
outlined above is a particularly challenging problem for
policymakers. I will return to this issue in the conclusion
with some policy prescriptions, but there are no easy solutions to this conundrum.
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
Liberal democracy is not the only ideology that can confer legitimacy to a regime. The examples of communism,
fascism, and (in the present day) Islamic fundamentalism have all played a similar legitimizing role for
regimes. Nevertheless, neither Russia nor China have
thus far been able to develop a coherent ideological
alternative to liberal democracy that would command
peoples loyalty (Laqueur 2014; Shamabaugh 2013).
scholars exploring the nexus between internal and external security concerns are still relevant (i.e., that the security concerns of nations undergoing nation and state
building differ profoundly from those of developed
Western states). However, as demonstrated earlier via
the theoretical models, advanced developing countries,
with both internal vulnerabilities and an ability to project national power, pose a unique problema problem
not yet fully analyzed by scholars. Despite the progress
Russia and China have made in recent decades, they still
lag behind developed Western states in terms of legitimacy and institutional state capacity. These deficiencies
are vulnerabilities that fundamentally shape how Russia
and China define their security.
Although Russia and China are not vulnerable to the
same type of uprisings and insurgencies described in Ayoobs
work on the least developed countries, they do remain vulnerable over concerns of leader and institutional legitimacy.
In authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, where
elections are absent or manipulated, leader legitimacy is fragile and tied directly to the ruling governments performance
in delivering collective goods valued by citizens, such as economic growth or international status.4 Openly contested
elections confer a certain degree of legitimacy to elected authorities that even domestic opponents must recognize (Baldwin 1989). Elected officials are often given the benefit of the
doubt by the electorate, and their right to rule (at least for
the period of their mandate) is unchallenged unless they
egregiously violate the law. When performance does not
meet citizens expectations, they are liable to take to the
streets or engage in other kinds of anti-systemic protests, including acts of violence. This creates problems of internal security for both the state and its leaders.
The constitution of the political community (which
groups belong and which do not) is also contested as ethnic and religious fissures continue to divide these states.
In most cases, the situation is not as dire as it is in many
third-world states, as the titular ethnic groups (be they
Han Chinese or ethnic Russians) are dominant in terms
of their numbers. Yet, these countries still have large ethnic and religious minorities, many of which do not accept
the legitimacy of existing state structures (Chechens in
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Community
Territoriality
Economic
and social
system
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
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both these powers may very well become a source of conflict that catalyzes security dilemmas between them and
other great powers, including the United States.
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Conclusion
Rather than focusing solely on the external security
threats that states face from one another, a more compre-
to the Ukraine crisis, it is not clear that Putin faced the kind
of domestic opposition that would make a diversionary foreign policy necessary. His popularity had recovered from
the 2011 street protests in Moscow (at least among Russias
conservative silent majority) to the point where he felt
comfortable making substantial concessions to the domestic
opposition, such as the liberalization of electoral laws and
the freeing of political prisoners (Tsygankov 2015).
A more convincing explanation is put forward by
Andrei Tysgankov (2015), who argues that Russias policies
visavis the Color Revolution are reactive and reflect Moscows fears of Western encroachment in its sphere of influence. Tysgankov argues that Russias motivations also
include a desire to protect its identity and traditional cultural values from the onslaught of Western postmodernism.
A complete understanding of Russias reactive policies,
however, must also acknowledge the critical role that Russias internal insecurities have played in the calculations of
its leaders. Because of Russias domestic vulnerabilities,
Color Revolutions in neighboring states, or the toppling of
a friendly regime in Ukraine, can have spillover effects that
directly threaten Russian domestic political stability and
regime survival. Russias meddling in former Soviet states is
thus a defensive reaction against what Russian leaders see
as a direct existential threat to the regime.
Nevertheless, the West has seen these actions as evidence of Russias imperial ambitions or the Kremlins
need to divert attention from domestic problems. Many
Western leaders now see Putins Russia as a revisionist
power, determined to reverse the outcome of the Cold
War and reestablish Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet
space (Pifer and Talbott 2015). Conversely, Russian leaders are convinced that economic sanctions and other policies instituted by the West to isolate and punish Russia are
ultimately aimed at regime change (Suslov 2014). In retaliating against what it perceives to be US meddling in its
internal affairs, Russia has aggravated security concerns in
the West. Of course, the Color Revolutions and the Russian reaction to them are not the only reasons behind the
deterioration of Russias relations with the West. NATO
enlargement, the expansion of the US missile defense program, and Russias growing authoritarianism have also
contributed to worsening relations. Yet, Russias internal
insecurities have been an important catalyst to the current
conflict and have given rise to security concerns on both
sides, which are in turn propelling US and Russia toward a
new Cold War (Trenin 2014).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Steven Walt, Deborah Avant, Erica
Chenoweth, Felix Berenskoetter, and all of the participants
in the Journal of Global Security Studys Special Issue
Workshop, held April 2930, 2015, at the University of
Denver for their invaluable comments, criticisms, and editorial suggestions to earlier drafts of this article.
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