1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR
ORDER
S.B.CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NO.606/2015
Salman Khan
Vs.
State of Rajasthan
Date of Order

::

10th April, 2015

HONBLE MS.JUSTICE NIRMALJIT KAUR

Mr.Mahesh Bora, Senior Counsel assisted by
Mr.H.M.Saraswat & Mr.Nishant Bora, counsel for the petitioner.
Mr.Vikram Rajpurohit, counsel for the State.
Reportable
The Criminal Misc. Petition has been filed under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. against two orders of the even date i.e.
03.03.2015 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
District Jodhpur in Regular Criminal Case No.533/2014 (Old Case
No.68/2011) registered for offence under Section 3/25 & 27 of the
Arms Act, vide which, both the applications filed by the
prosecution under Sections 91, 173(8) read with Section 242 of
the Cr.P.C. and under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. were allowed.
The brief facts of the case are that on 15.10.1998, one Lalit
Bora filed a complaint at Police Station Luni, Jodhpur against the
petitioner stating that in the intervening night of 01.10.1998 and
02.10.1998, the petitioner hunted two black bucks at village
Kankani by using two revolver i.e. (i) Revolver S. & W. .32 Bore,

Number 87011 made in U.S.A. and (ii) .22 Bore Rifle No.2118, for
which, he did not have a valid arms license on the date of the
alleged incident. On the basis of the said complaint, an FIR was
registered against the petitioner for allegedly committing offence
under Section 3 read with Section 25 and Section 27 of the Arms
Act, 1959. Charge-sheet was filed on 10.10.2000 and the charges
were framed on 27.01.2001. The petitioner is also arraigned as an
accused in Criminal Case No.66/2011 (Old Case No.352/2000),
which was registered as a complaint case by the Forest
Department on 17.06.2000 for the offences under Sections 2(16),
9/51, 9/52 of the Wild Life Protection Act. In the said case, the
learned court below took cognizance against the petitioner and
five other co-accused for offences under Section 51 of the Wild
Life Protection Act, under Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code
and under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The charges were also
framed against the petitioner for the said offences in that case.
However, the petitioner already stands discharged for the offence
under Section 27 of the Arms Act and the trial of the case for
remaining offences is still pending and is at the stage of evidence.
An application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. was moved
by the prosecution on 14.08.2006 and another application under
Section 91, 173(8) read with Section 242 of the Cr.P.C. was filed
on 30.08.2006. Reply to these applications were filed by the
petitioner on 05.09.2006 and 18.09.2006 respectively. Before the
said applications could be decided, the record of the trial court
was called by the High Court in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition

No.858/2006. Thereafter, the record was received back on

25.05.2013. On receipt of the said record, the evidence of the
prosecution commenced once again. After recording the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, the evidence of the prosecution was
closed by an order dated 15.01.2014. Thereafter, the defence
evidence was closed on 08.12.2014 and the matter was fixed for
arguments. The final arguments were heard on 09.02.2015, which
continued up till 10.02.2015. The learned Magistrate fixed
25.02.2015 for pronouncement of the judgment in the matter.
Meanwhile, before the judgment could be pronounced, an
application for hearing the above mentioned two applications
dated 14.08.2006 & 30.08.2006 was moved on 20.02.2015 by the
prosecution and on the date fixed for pronouncement of the
judgment, the learned Magistrate is stated to have informed the
petitioners

counsel

that

four

applications

moved by

the

prosecution in the year 2006 are still pending and the same have
to be decided before the judgment could be pronounced in the
matter. Reply to all the applications were filed in the year 2006
itself and thereafter, the prosecution never brought up the
applications. After 9 years, on 03.03.2015, the trial court allowed
two out of the four applications: (i) under Sections 91 & 173(8)
read with Section 242 of the Cr.P.C. and (ii) under Section 311 of
the

Cr.P.C.,

thereby granting

another opportunity to

the

prosecution to submit acknowledgment receipts and documents

pertaining to sending/despatching FSL reports in the matter and
has also allowed the prosecution to produce four witnesses who

are relevant in connection with the said reports.

While impugning the above two orders, the learned counsel
for the petitioner contended that the same are de hors the
provisions of law including the Code of Criminal Procedure and
are against all the established principles of fair trial jurisprudence
and that the prosecution was trying to fill up all the loopholes in the
present matter, which was pointed by the defence during the final
arguments. The prosecution was well aware of these pending
applications. However, they chose not to bring up the said
applications till the entire defence had been disclosed and the final
arguments were completed. The same shall cause severe
prejudice, great hardship and irreparable damage & injury to the
petitioner. Further, the same Magistrate had rejected the
application field by the petitioner under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C.
to summon relevant witness, the Arms Licensing Authority, on the
ground that application had been filed at a belated stage with
intention to delay the proceedings but has allowed the application
of the prosecution in complete disregard of the same principle.
Last but not the least, it was argued that the documents are not a
part of the challan and the witnesses sought to be produced were
never investigated by the police and their statements were never
recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. It is further contended
that subsequent witnesses and documents could be allowed to be
produced only, in case, subsequent charge-sheet was filed in
pursuance to further investigation conducted under Section 173(8)
of the Cr.P.C. In the present case, neither was there any further

investigation and nor a subsequent charge-sheet. Hence, the

prosecution cannot be allowed to examine such witnesses.
Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the
learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of
State by Inspector of Police Vs. S.Sankaran & Anr., reported in
2005 Crl.L.J. 1474 to contend that no permission can be granted
to examine new witness who had not given the statement under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. at the time of investigation as well as
the order dated 10.05.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge
of this High Court in the case of Deepak Gopalia Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B.Criminal Misc. Petition No.2536/2012), vide
which, the order dismissing the application under Section 311 was
upheld on the ground that once the defence has disclosed its
stand in the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., an
opportunity to examine new witness will not only amount to filling
up the lacuna but shall also destroy the gains made by the
defence.
Reply has been filed.
Besides the reply, learned counsel for the State raised the
preliminary objection that petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
is not maintainable and the impugned order being revisable, the
petitioner should have filed revision. In their reply to petition under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., it is stated that the State had filed a
revision petition before the High Court bearing S.B. Criminal
Revision Petition No.858/2006. The record of the case was
summoned by the High Court. Thereafter, reminder was sent to

the Deputy Registrar (Judl.), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur for

sending the record on 23.03.2013, which was received only on
25.05.2013. The proceedings of the trial court were pending
during all these long years. Meanwhile, counsels for the
prosecution changed from time to time and so also the Presiding
Officers and the case was also transferred to different courts
resulting in oversight and overlooking the applications filed by the
prosecution in the year 2006 but as soon as the prosecution
realized about the pendency of the present applications, an
application was moved before the trial court on 20.02.2015 for
deciding

the

pending

applications

dated

14.08.2006

and

30.08.2006.
It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the State
that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner with
respect to the similar application moved by the petitioner under
Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. having been rejected by the Magistrate
was no more relevant as the said order of the Magistrate stood
merged with the order of the High Court dated 28.01.2015 partly
allowing S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.131/2015, vide which, the
petitioner was allowed to exhibit the document.
The parties were heard at length.
The preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability
of petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has been raised by the
learned counsel for the respondent although not taken in the reply.
However, the question of maintainability of the petition under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on account of the order being revisable

was dealt by the Apex Court in the case of Sethuraman Vs.

Rajamanickam, reported in 2009 Cri.L.J 2247. The Apex Court
held in no uncertain terms that the said orders were interlocutory
in nature and revision was clearly not maintainable, as under:4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order
passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the
documents and rejecting the application under Section
311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the
revision against those orders was clearly barred under
Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common
order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was
admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the
only defence that was raised, was that his signed
cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant
had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also
recorded a finding that the documents were not
necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide
anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on
the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production
of documents and other on the application under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the
orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under
Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable.
Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could
not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The
impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and
would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside.
The appeals are allowed.
Moreover, in the case of State by Dharimal Tobacco
Products Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Maharasthra & Anr., reported in
2009(2)

SCC

370,

too,

the

Apex

Court

observed

that

maintainability of revision cannot be a bar for entertaining an

application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In any case, the State
has not been able to show as to how the impugned orders were
revisable and in the circumstances, this court is of the view that
the only alternative remedy available to the petitioner was to
challenge the impugned orders under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
The next question is as to whether documents which are not

part of the charge-sheet or the witnesses whose statements have

not been recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. can be
allowed to be summoned under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. for
recording their evidence?
Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his
arguments has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the
learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in the case of State by
Inspector of Police Vs. S.Sankaran & Anr. (supra). However, in the
said case, the said permission to examine the witnesses as
additional evidence was declined not because the witnesses cited
had not given their statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. at
the time when the investigation was going on but because the
material witnesses who were cited as witness in the charge-sheet,
were still available and instead of proving the case by recording
the statement of such witnesses, the prosecution was attempting
to examine some other witnesses against whom they could wield
undue influence.
In order to adjudicate whether in the facts of the present
case, such documents which are not part of the challan can be
allowed to be produced, it would be necessary to refer to Section
91 of the Criminal Procedure Code:91. Summons to produce document or other
thing.- (1) Whenever any Court or any officer in
charge of a police station considers that the production
of any document or other thing is necessary or
desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry,
trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before
such Court or officer, such Court may issue a
summons, or such officer a written order, to the person
in whose possession or power such document or thing
is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce

it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the

summons or order.
(2) Any person required under this section merely to
produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to
have complied with the requisition if he causes such
document or thing to be produced instead of attending
personally to produce the same.
Similarly, while dealing with the objection that witnesses
whose statements have not been recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. cannot be called upon to give their evidence,
reference to Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. would be necessary, which
reads as under:311. Power to summon material witness, or examine
person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code,
summon any person as a witness, or examine any
person in attendance, though not summoned as a
witness, or recall and re-examine any person already
examined; and the Court shall summon and examine
or recall and re-examine any such person if his
evidence appears to it to be essential to the just
decision of the case.
A perusal of the above makes it clear that additional witness
can be summoned even though he or she was not earlier
summoned as a witness, if his/her evidence is essential for the
just decision of the case. Similarly, Section 91 of the Cr.P.C.
allows the Court as well as any officer incharge of a police station
to summon a person who had the possession of such a document.
There is no distinction in the provision with respect to documents
which are a part of the charge-sheet or which are not a part of the
charge-sheet. In fact, it specifically states any document and
any witness as long as they are necessary for the proper

10

adjudication of the case and relevant for arriving at the truth.

Moreover, in the present case, from the two applications
under Section 91 and under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. moved by
the prosecution, the replies filed by the defence and the order of
the trial court, some of the following facts have emerged:(a)

By an order dated 26.06.2006, the following documents

were already taken on record: (i) F.S.L. Report No.228/98
dated 22.02.1998 which is regarding Revolver .32 No.87011
and .22 Rifle No.2118 and their memo of seizure is ExhibitP/2A, and (ii) Besides this, F.S.L. Report No.17/1999 dated
19.02.1999 regarding sample of the black buck No.1 dated
11.10.1998 taken from the spot is already on the record.

(b)

However, the documents relating to malkhana register for

sending the items of FSL were not filed nor the documents
to prove the FSL report No.228/1998 and nor the documents
to prove FSL report No.17/1999, which are otherwise
essential for link evidence, were placed on record.

(c)

These documents are otherwise present in their original

form in Criminal Case No.352/2000, which have already
been supplied to counsel for the accused in Criminal Case
No.352/2000. Both the cases are related to the same
incident. The petitioner already stands discharged for the
offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act in the said case.

Thus, from the above, it appears that the documents sought

to be produced are in any case part of the Criminal Case
No.352/2000 which was registered as a complaint case by the

11

Forest Department.
Although, there is some merit in the argument of learned
counsel for the petitioner that even though the applications were
moved in the year 2006, the witnesses are being sought to be
produced only now after the closure of the defence evidence
leading to the disclosure of the defence of the accused and thus,
granting opportunity to the prosecution to fill up the lacuna as held
by this Court in the case of Deepak Gopalia Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. (supra), it would not entirely correct to state that
the applications have been filed at a belated stage after the
arguments

were

heard

and

the

matter

was

kept

for

pronouncement of the judgment. It is evident from the facts that

the applications were moved way back on 14.08.2006 &
30.08.2006 and the reply to the said applications already stood
filed on 05.09.2006 and 18.09.2006 respectively but before the
said applications could be decided, the record of the trial court
was sent to the High Court in S.B.Criminal Revision Petition
No.858/2006. Subsequently, the record was received only on
25.05.2013. It is also not in dispute that number of counsels for
the prosecution and Presiding Officers changed meanwhile
leading to oversight and overlooking of the applications filed way
back in the year 2006. It was clearly an error. In these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the applications were an
afterthought or filed after the defence evidence was closed.
The Apex Court in the case of Hanuman Ram Vs. The State
of Rajasthan and others 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 823 has, in fact,

12

while interpreting the powers under Section 311 of Cr.P.C, held

that Section 311 Cr.P.C makes it mandatory for the Court to
summon a witness, in case, the said witness was necessary for
the just and proper decision to the facts of the present case and
cannot be refused on account of error of the party. The Court
further laid down the object underlying Section 311 of the Code,
which reads:7. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is
that there may not be failure of justice on account of
mistake of either party in bringing the valuable
evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the
statements of the witnesses examined from either side.
The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the
just decision of the case. The section is not limited only
for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an
improper exercise of the powers of the Court to
summon a witness under the Section merely because
the evidence supports the case for the prosecution and
not that of the accused. The section is a general
section which applies to all proceedings, enquires and
trials under the Code and empowers Magistrate to
issue summons to any witness at any stage of such
proceedings,trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the
significant expression that occurs is "at any stage of
inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code". It
is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the
section confers a very wide CRM No. M 11970 of 2011
5 power on the Court on summoning witnesses, the
discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as
the wide the power the greater is the necessity for
application of judicial mind.
Similarly, while dealing with such error and oversight, the
Apex Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Vs. Narcotic Cell
through its Officer Incharge, Delhi, reported in 1999 Cr.L.J. 3529,
held:It is a common experience in criminal courts that
defence counsel would raise objections whenever
courts exercise powers under Section 311 of the Code
or under Section 165 of the Evidence Act by saying
that the Court could not fill the lacuna in the

13

prosecution case'. A lacuna in prosecution is not to be

equated with the fallout of an oversight committed by a
public prosecutor during trial, either in producing
relevant materials or in eliciting relevant answers from
witnesses. The adage `to err is human' is the
recognition-of the possibility of making mistakes to
which humans are proved. A corollary of any such
latches or mistakes during the conducting Of a case
cannot be understood as the lacuna which a court
cannot fill up.
Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the
inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of
the prosecution case. The advantage of it should
normally go to the accused in the trail of the case, but
an over sight in the management of the prosecution
cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a
trial can before-closed from correcting errors. If proper
evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was
not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the
court should be magnanimous in permitting such
mistakes to be rectified. After all, function of the
criminal Court is administration of criminal justice and
not to count errors committed by the parties or to find
out and declare who among the parties performed
better.
The Apex Court further went on to say:
We cannot therefore accept the contention of the
appellant as a legal proposition that the Court cannot
exercise power of re-summoning any witness if once
that power was exercised, nor can the power be
whittled down merely on the ground that prosecution
discovered latches only when the defence highlighted
them during final arguments, The power of the court is
plenary to summon or even recall any witness at any
stage of the case if the court considers it necessary for
a just decision.
Moreover, the provision of Section 311 of the Cr.P.C.
permits the calling of a witness and producing document at any
stage as long as the same is before the pronouncement subject to
the condition that the said document should be relevant and
essential for the just decision of the case. Wide power has been
conferred to meet the ends of justice. If the Court comes to the

14

conclusion that the same is essential, the Statute makes it

mandatory on the Court to summon such a witness. The Apex
Court in the case Mohanlal Shamji Soni Vs. Union of India,
reported in AIR 1991 SC 1346, while dealing with the jurisdiction
of the Court under section 311 of the Code has laid down that :"It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best
available evidence should be brought before the Court
to prove a fact or the points in issue. But it is left either
for the prosecution or for the defence to establish its
respective case by adducing the best available
evidence and the Court is not empowered under the
provisions of the Code to compel either the
prosecution or the defence to examine any particular
witness or witnesses on their sides. It is the duty of the
Court not only to do justice but also to ensure that
justice is being done. In order to enable a Court to find
out the truth and render a just decision, the salutary
provisions of section 540 of the Code (section 311 of
the new Code) are enacted whereunder any Court by
exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of
inquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any
person as a witness or examine any person in
attendance though not summoned as a witness or
recall or re-examine any person in attendance though
not summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine
any person already examined who are expected to be
able to throw light upon the matter in dispute; because
if judgments happen to be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts, the
ends of justice would be defeated. The very usage of
the words such as 'any Court' 'at any stage', or 'any
enquiry, trial or other proceedings', 'any person' and
'any such person' clearly spells out that this section is
expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit
the discretion of the Court in any way. However, the
very width requires a corresponding caution that the
discretionary power should be invoked as the
exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially
with circumspection and consistently with the
provisions of the Code. The second part of the section

15

does not allow for any discretion but it binds and

compels the Court to take any of the aforementioned
two steps in the fresh evidence to be obtained is
essential to the just decision of the case."
Still further, the Apex Court in the case of Raja Ram Prasad
Yadav Vs. State of Bihar & Anr., reported in 2013(2) Apex Court
Judgments 604 (S.C.) has laid down the following principles to be
borne in mind by the courts while exercising powers under Section
311 of the Cr.P.C.:23. From a conspectus consideration of the above
decisions, while dealing with an application under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. read along with Section 138 of the
Evidence Act, we feel the following principles will have
to be borne in mind by the Courts:
a) Whether the Court is right in thinking that the new
evidence is needed by it? Whether the evidence
sought to be led in under Section 311 is noted by the
Court for a just decision of a case?
b) The exercise of the widest discretionary power under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. should ensure that the judgment
should not be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive
speculative presentation of facts, as thereby the ends
of justice would be defeated.
c) If evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be
essential to the just decision of the case, it is the power
of the Court to summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person.
d) The exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
should be resorted to only with the object of finding out
the truth or obtaining proper proof for such facts, which
will lead to a just and correct decision of the case.
e) The exercise of the said power cannot be dubbed as
filling in a lacuna in a prosecution case, unless the
facts and circumstances of the case make it apparent
that the exercise of power by the Court would result in
causing serious prejudice to the accused, resulting in
miscarriage of justice.
f) The wide discretionary power should be exercised
judiciously and not arbitrarily.

16

g) The Court must satisfy itself that it was in every

respect essential to examine such a witness or to recall
him for further examination in order to arrive at a just
decision of the case.
h) The object of Section 311 Cr.P.C. simultaneously
imposes a duty on the Court to determine the truth and
to render a just decision.
i) The Court arrives at the conclusion that additional
evidence is necessary, not because it would be
impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but
because there would be a failure of justice without such
evidence being considered.
j) Exigency of the situation, fair play and good sense
should be the safe guard, while exercising the
discretion. The Court should bear in mind that no party
in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and
that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant
material was not brought on record due to any
inadvertence, the Court should be magnanimous in
permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
k) The Court should be conscious of the position that
after all the trial is basically for the prisoners and the
Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest
manner possible. In that parity of reasoning, it would be
safe to err in favour of the accused getting an
opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution
against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused.
The Court should bear in mind that improper or
capricious exercise of such a discretionary power, may
lead to undesirable results.
l) The additional evidence must not be received as a
disguise or to change the nature of the case against
any of the party.
m) The power must be exercised keeping in mind that
the evidence that is likely to be tendered, would be
germane to the issue involved and also ensure that an
opportunity of rebuttal is given to the other party.
n) The power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must
therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet
the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons and the
same must be exercised with care, caution and
circumspection. The Court should bear in mind that fair
trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and
the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper
opportunities to the persons concerned, must be

17

ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a

human right.
Thus, in view of the above discussion, the only limit to the
wide powers appears to be the underlying golden rule that witness
and the document sought to be produced should be necessary for
the just decision of the case with the object of finding out the truth
or obtaining proper proof for such fact. The objection that the
application has been moved only to fill a lacuna is normally raised
in each and every case. In case, an application under Section 311
of the Cr.P.C. is dismissed on this ground alone, the very purpose
of Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. would be defeated and the same
would become redundant. The same depends upon facts of each
case. Moreover, the right of the petitioner can always be
safeguarded by granting equal opportunity to cross-examine, lead
evidence, etc. in accordance with law.
Keeping the above principle in mind, we need to examine
now whether these documents are material to the just decision of
the case.
The F.S.L. report No.222/1998 dated 22.02.1998 and the
F.S.L. report No.17/1998 dated 19.02.1999 and the F.S.L. report
No.222/1998 dated 20.01.1999 are already present on records.
However, the documents related to them including Malkhana
register, letter for sending it to S.P. Office, letter of S.P. for
sending it to F.S.L. and receipt of F.S.L. relating to all these
reports although are stated to be present in their original form in
Criminal Case No.352/2000, have not been filed in the present

18

case. From para 18 of the impugned order dated 03.03.2015, vide

which, the application under Order 91, 173(8) read with Section
242 of the Cr.P.C. was allowed, it appears that the evidence
sought to be produced is the link evidence and hence, necessary
for the just decision of the case. Moreover, it is not the case of the
petitioner that they are not necessary documents and the
witnesses are not relevant and necessary for the just decision of
the case. Hence, the Court finds no ground to interfere in the
impugned orders dated 03.03.2015 passed by the trial court.
Dismissed accordingly.
(NIRMALJIT KAUR), J.

NK