G.R. No.

138896

June 20, 2000

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU,

petitioner,vs. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR
Condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14
the forerunners of the regional trial courts.
The said case was decided during the
effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948
which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs,
provided that courts of first instance had
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation." 15 The
1997 amendments to the Rules of Court
were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.
In support of its appeal, petitioner cites
Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides
that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It argues that
the present action involves the exercise of
the right to eminent domain, and that such
right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
This law provides that MTCs shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions that involve title to or possession of
real property, the assessed value of which
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty
thousand pesos exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
EMERITA
MUNOZ
VS.
ATTY.
VICTORIANO
R.
YABUT,
JR.
AND
SAMUEL GO CHAN, G.R. NO. 142676,
JUNE 6, 2011
The settled rule is that the aim and object
of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter,
is determined by its nature and purpose,
and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of
ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court.

The purpose of a proceeding in

personam is to impose, through the
judgment
of
a
court,
some
responsibility or liability directly upon
the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant
to specifically perform some act or actions
to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment
against the person, as distinguished
from a judgment against the propriety
to determine its state. It has been
held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights
or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is wellsettled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the
appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and
in which personal judgments are rendered
adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real
property are in personam.
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY
MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING
YAO,
ARANETA
INSTITUTE
OF
AGRICULTURE and JOSE N. QUEDDING,
respondents.
THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT IN THE
INSTANT
CASE
AROSE
FROM
THE
COMPLAINT OF PETITIONERS AGAINST
RESPONDENTS GO. THE COMPLAINT FILED
WAS FOR ACCION PUBLICIANA, I.E., THE
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF REAL
PROPERTY WHICH IS A REAL ACTION. THE
RULE IN THIS JURISDICTION IS THAT WHEN
AN ACTION IS FILED IN COURT, THE
COMPLAINT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY
THE PAYMENT OF THE REQUISITE DOCKET
AND FILING FEES.[11] IN REAL ACTIONS,
THE DOCKET AND FILING FEES ARE BASED
ON THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AND THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED, IF ANY.
[12] IF THE COMPLAINT IS FILED BUT THE
FEES ARE NOT PAID AT THE TIME OF FILING,
THE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION UPON
FULL PAYMENT OF THE FEES WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME AS THE COURT MAY

GRANT,
BARRING
PRESCRIPTION.[13]
WHERE THE FEES PRESCRIBED FOR THE
REAL ACTION HAVE BEEN PAID BUT THE
FEES OF CERTAIN RELATED DAMAGES ARE
NOT, THE COURT, ALTHOUGH HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THE REAL ACTION, MAY
NOT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE ACCOMPANYING CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
[14] ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT MAY
EXPUNGE THOSE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES,
OR ALLOW, ON MOTION, A REASONABLE
TIME FOR AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT
SO AS TO ALLEGE THE PRECISE AMOUNT
OF DAMAGES AND ACCEPT PAYMENT OF
THE REQUISITE LEGAL FEES.[15] IF THERE
ARE
UNSPECIFIED
CLAIMS,
THE
DETERMINATION OF WHICH MAY ARISE
AFTER THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT OR
SIMILAR PLEADING, THE ADDITIONAL FILING
FEE THEREON SHALL CONSTITUTE A LIEN
ON THE JUDGMENT AWARD.[16] THE SAME
RULE ALSO APPLIES TO THIRD-PARTY
CLAIMS AND OTHER SIMILAR PLEADINGS

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE

RUBEN REINOSO, SR., VS
COURT OF APPEALS
The rule is that payment in full of the
docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.[8] In Manchester v. Court of
Appeals,[9] it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. The strict application of this rule was,
however, relaxed two (2) years after in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,[10] wherein the Court decreed
that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable period of time, but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period. This ruling was
made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket
fees required.[11] Thus, in the more recent
case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros,[12]
the Court explained that where the party
does not deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and
manifests its willingness to abide by the
rules by paying additional docket fees when
required by the court, the liberal doctrine

enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,

and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply. It has been on
record that the Court, in several instances,
allowed the relaxation of the rule on nonpayment of docket fees in order to afford
the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate
their cases on the merits. In the case of La
Salette College v. Pilotin,[13] the Court
stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of
the requirement of payment of appellate
docket fees, we also recognize that its strict
application is qualified by the following:
first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary
period
allows
only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal;
second, such power should be used by the
court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, as well as
with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration
of
all
attendant
circumstances.
While there is a crying need to unclog court
dockets on the one hand, there is, on the
other, a greater demand for resolving
genuine disputes fairly and equitably,[15]
for it is far better to dispose of a case on
the merit which is a primordial end, rather
than on a technicality that may result in
injustice.

FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
VS FEDERICO AGCAOILI, Respondent.
The filing of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest
a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim.
In an action where the reliefs sought are
purely for sums of money and damages,
the docket fees are assessed on the basis
of the aggregate amount being claimed.
Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar
pleading must specify the sums of money
to be recovered and the damages being
sought in order that the clerk of court may
be put in a position to compute the correct
amount of docket fees.
If the amount of docket fees paid is
insufficient in relation to the amounts being

sought, the clerk of court or his duly

authorized deputy has the responsibility of
making a deficiency assessment, and the
plaintiff will be required to pay the
deficiency. The non-specification of the
amounts of damages does not immediately
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over
the case, provided there is no bad faith or
intent to defraud the Government on the
part of the plaintiff.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct
amount of docket fees are not paid at the
time of filing, the trial court still acquires
jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees
within a reasonable time as the court may
grant,
barring
prescription.
The
"prescriptive period" that bars the payment
of the docket fees refers to the period in
which a specific action must be filed, so
that in every case the docket fees must be
paid before the lapse of the prescriptive
period, as provided in the applicable laws,
particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of
the Civil Code, the principal law on
prescription of actions.
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,Petitioner- versus-HON.
PABLO C. FORMARAN III, G.R. No.
175914
It is also important to note that, with the
amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-204-SC, which became effective on 16
August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining
specifically to the basis for computation of
docket fees for real actions was deleted.
Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as
amended, provides that in cases involving
real property, the FAIR MARKET value of the
REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT
ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS HIGHER, OR
IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x shall be
the basis for the computation of the docket
fees. Would such an amendment have an
impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano?
The Court rules in the negative.
A real action indisputably involves real
property. The docket fees for a real action

would still be determined in accordance

with the value of the real property involved
therein; the only difference is in what
constitutes the acceptable value. In
computing the docket fees for cases
involving real properties, the courts,
instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the
fair market value of the real properties (as
stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal
Valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the
absence thereof, the stated value of the
same.
PROTON
PILIPINAS
CORPORATION,
AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE
CORPORATION and AUTOCORP, versus
BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS
G. R. No. 151242
whereas in the latter the plaintiff
demonstrated his willingness to abide by
paying the additional fees as required.
The principle in Manchester could very well
be applied in the present case. The pattern
and the intent to defraud the government
of the docket fee due it is obvious not only
in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended
complaint.
the clerk of court has the responsibility of
reassessing what respondent must pay
within the prescriptive period, failing which
the complaint merits dismissal.
With respect to the interest accruing after
the filing of the complaint, the same can
only be determined after a final judgment
has been handed down. Respondent cannot
thus be made to pay the corresponding
docket fee therefor. Pursuant, however, to
Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by
Administrative
Circular
No.
11-94,
respondent should be made to pay
additional fees which shall constitute a lien
in the event the trial court adjudges that it
is entitled to interest accruing after the
filing of the complaint.

Sec. 2. Fees as lien. Where the court in its

final judgment awards a claim not alleged,

or a relief different or more than that

claimed in the pleading, the party
concerned shall pay the additional fees
which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The
clerk of court shall assess and collect the
corresponding fees.

granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal

aid offices of the various IBP chapters will
really further the right of access to justice
by the poor. This will guarantee that the
exemption will neither be abused nor
trivialized.

In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,[43] in

interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun
Insurance regarding awards of claims not
specified in the pleading, this Court held
that the same refers only to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading as to which the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.

The request of the Misamis Oriental

Chapter for the exemption from the
payment of filing, docket and other fees of
the clients of the legal aid offices of the
various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule
on the Exemption From the Payment of
Legal Fees of the Clients of the National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the
Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
(which shall be assigned the docket number
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this
resolution is hereby APPROVED

The amount of any claim for damages,

therefore, arising on or before the filing of
the complaint or any pleading should be
specified. While it is true that the
determination of certain damages as
exemplary or corrective damages is left to
the sound discretion of the court, it is the
duty of the parties claiming such damages
to specify the amount sought on the basis
of which the court may make a proper
determination,
and
for
the
proper
assessment of the appropriate docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims
not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the
court is limited only to any damages that
may arise after the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.[44]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citation omitted)
RE: REQUEST OF A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
NATIONAL
COMMITTEE
ON
LEGAL
AID[1] TO EXEMPT Present: LEGAL AID
CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET
PUNO,
C.J.,
AND
OTHER
FEES.
QUISUMBING,
August 28, 2009
The means and merit tests appear to be
reasonable determinants of eligibility for
coverage under the legal aid program of
the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be
improved to ensure that any exemption
from the payment of legal fees that may be

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC

RULES
OF
PROCEDURE
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

FOR

RULE
8
WRIT
OF
CONTINUING
MANDAMUS
Section 3. No docket fees. - The petitioner
shall be exempt from the payment of
docket fees.
PART III SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
RULE 7 WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Section 4. No docket fees. - The petitioner
shall be exempt from the payment of
docket fees.
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,- versusHON.
PABLO
C.
FORMARAN
III,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court
Branch 21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge
for Regional Trial Court Branch 22,
Formerly Presided By HON. NOVELITA
VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May
2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L.
OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES G.R. No. 175914
It is also important to note that, with the
amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-204-SC, which became effective on 16
August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining

specifically to the basis for computation of

docket fees for real actions was deleted.
Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as
amended, provides that in cases involving
real property, the FAIR MARKET value of the
REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT
ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS HIGHER, OR
IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x shall be
the basis for the computation of the docket
fees. Would such an amendment have an
impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano?
The Court rules in the negative.

judgment of the Court of Appeals is allowed

to stand and not rectified, it would result in
grave injustice and irreparable injury to
petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount
assessed against it. It is a sweeping
assertion which lacks evidentiary support.
Undeniably, before the Court can conclude
that the amount of docket fees is indeed
prohibitive for a party, it would have to look
into the financial capacity of said party. It
baffles this Court that herein petitioner,
having the capacity to enter into multimillion transactions, now stalls at paying
P720,392.60 additional docket fees so it
could champion before the courts its rights
over
the
disputed
real
properties.
Moreover, even though the Court exempts
individuals, as indigent or pauper litigants,
from paying docket fees, it has never
extended such an exemption to a corporate
entity.

A real action indisputably involves real

property. The docket fees for a real action
would still be determined in accordance
with the value of the real property involved
therein; the only difference is in what
constitutes the acceptable value. In
computing the docket fees for cases
involving real properties, the courts,
instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the
fair market value of the real properties (as
stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal
Valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the
absence thereof, the stated value of the
same.

UCPB vs BELUSO

In sum, the Court finds that the true nature

of the action instituted by petitioner against
respondents is the recovery of title to and
possession of real property. It is a real
action necessarily involving real property,
the docket fees for which must be
computed in accordance with Section 7(1),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not
commit any error in affirming the RTC
Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional
docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case
No. 2006-0030.
The Court does not give much credence to
the allegation of petitioner that if the

UCPBs contention that this action to

recover the penalty for the violation of the
Truth in Lending Act has already prescribed
is likewise without merit. The penalty for
the violation of the act is P100 or an
amount equal to twice the finance charge
required by such creditor in connection with
such transaction, whichever is greater,
except that such liability shall not exceed
P2,000.00 on any credit transaction.[39] As
this penalty depends on the finance charge
required of the borrower, the borrowers
cause of action would only accrue when
such finance charge is required. In the case
at bar, the date of the demand for payment
of the finance charge is 2 September 1998,
while the foreclosure was made on 28
December 1998. The filing of the case on 9
February 1999 is therefore within the oneyear prescriptive period.
As can be gleaned from Section 6(a) and (c)
of the Truth in Lending Act, the violation of
the said Act gives rise to both criminal and
civil liabilities. Section 6(c) considers a
criminal offense the willful violation of the
Act, imposing the penalty therefor of fine,
imprisonment or both. Section 6(a), on the
other hand, clearly provides for a civil
cause of action for failure to disclose any
information of the required information to

any person in violation of the Act. The

penalty therefor is an amount of P100 or in
an amount equal to twice the finance
charge required by the creditor in
connection
with
such
transaction,
whichever is greater, except that the
liability shall not exceed P2,000.00 on any
credit transaction. The action to recover
such penalty may be instituted by the
aggrieved private person separately and
independently from the criminal case for
the same offense.
Even if we assume for the sake of
argument, however, that only one cause of
action is involved in the two civil actions,
namely, the violation of the right of the
spouses Beluso not to have their property
foreclosed for an amount they do not owe,
the Rules of Court nevertheless allows the
filing of the second action. Civil Case No. V7227 was dismissed by the RTC of Roxas
City before the filing of Case No. 99-314
with the RTC of Makati City, since the venue
of litigation as provided for in the Credit
Agreement is in Makati City.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
(FEBTC)
and/or
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES ROMULO PLAZA and WILMA
PLAZA, respondents.
Contrary
to
petitioners
contention,
respondents do not question the validity of
the real estate mortgage they entered into.
In fact they uphold its validity since they
are willing to pay their obligation under the
contract after which the contract should
then be declared without legal effect. Also,
there is as yet no transfer of title from
respondents to petitioners. Respondents
maintain that the title remains in their name and

they are still in actual physical possession of the

property. There is no foreclosure yet of the
mortgage. Hence, there is no title to the land to be
affected by the action.
There is also the issue of whether the real estate
mortgage secured only the loan of P2,158,000.00
or it also secured the other loans subsequently
obtained by And from petitioners. Petitioners
argue that the mortgage is a continuing security
for the loans obtained by Ang subsequent to the

principal amount of P2,158,000.00. Respondents

counter that they limited themselves to repay
petitioners to the extent only of P2,158,000.00 and
no more. Respondents admit in their Comment
that this question could be properly ventilated in
the trial court where the civil suit is pending, but
since this is raised in connection with the petition
at bar, they are willing to have the matter resolved
now.
Considering that the civil suit is still before the
trial court and conformably with its Order of 17
March 2003 where the issue is raised therein, it
would not be proper to resolve it here. Any ruling
thereon would be premature. Moreover, there may
be evidence aside from the contract/mortgage
deed that may be presented by the parties in the
trial court to support their respective contentions.
Belle Corp vs. Erlinda de Leon, Et. Al
A cause of action is a formal statement of
the operative facts that give rise to a
remedial right. The question of whether
the complaint states a cause of action is
determined by its averments regarding the
acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it
must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action. Failure to make a
sufficient allegation of a cause of action
in the complaint warrants its dismissal.
The essential elements of a cause of
action are (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief. In determining whether a complaint
states a cause of action, the RTC can
consider all the pleadings filed, including
annexes, motions, and the evidence on
record. The focus is on the sufficiency, not
the veracity, of the material allegations.
Moreover, the complaint does not have to
establish facts proving the existence of a

cause of action at the outset; this will have

to
Be done at the trial on the merits of the
case. Thus,
the
first
paragraph
of
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court
provides that [e]very pleading shall
contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting
the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE,- versus CANOGA
PARK
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,G.R. No. 167246

Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a

single cause of action. If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in
any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action, such
as whether the same evidence would support and
sustain both the first and second causes of action
(also known as the same evidence test), or
whether the defenses in one case may be used to
substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test of determining whether the
cause of action in the second case existed at the
time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially
applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the
cause of action in the second case existed at the
time of the filing of the first complaint and to
which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly
show that the filing of the first ejectment case was
grounded on the petitioners violation of
stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing
of the second case was based on the expiration of
the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed
the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000,
the lease contract between the parties was still in
effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2)
years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence
of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease
remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was
only at the expiration of the lease contract that the
cause of action in the second ejectment complaint

accrued and made available to the respondent as a

ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause
of action in the second case was not yet in
existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment
case.
In response to the petitioners contention that the
similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests
on the reiteration in the second case of the cause
of action in the first case, we rule that the
restatement does not result in substantial identity
between the two cases. Even if the respondent
alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground
for ejectment in the second complaint, the main
basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case
was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for
this subsequent development, the respondent
could no longer file a second complaint for
unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint
may only be filed within one year after the accrual
of the cause of action, which, in the second case,
was the expiration of the lease contract.
ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L.
ESCOBIDO
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all coowners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring
an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of
co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the
co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is
an indispensable party thereto. The other coowners are not indispensable parties. They are not
even necessary parties, for a complete relief can
be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. 25
[Emphasis supplied.]

Section 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife

shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
law.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to
dismiss action
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable
party to the action, we have held in a number of
cases26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a
ground for dismissal of action. As we stated in
Macababbad v. Masirag
In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the
proper remedy when a party is left out is to
implead the indispensable party at any stage of the
action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the
motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the
indispensable party or give the plaintiff
opportunity to amend his complaint in order to
include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to
whom the order to include the indispensable party
is directed refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to
obey the order to include or to amend is the action
dismissed.
ARCADIO
and
MARIA
LUISA
CARANDANG,- versus -HEIRS OF
QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely:
MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE
GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN,
CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO
DE GUZMAN, JR., G.R. No. 160347
A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.1[15] On the other
hand, an indispensable party is a party in
interest
without
whom
no
final
2
determination can be had of an action, [16]
in contrast to a necessary party, which is
one who is not indispensable but who ought
to be joined as a party if complete relief is

to be accorded as to those already parties,

or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the
action.3[17]
The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the
court void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.[24] On the other hand, the
non-joinder of necessary parties do not
result in the dismissal of the case. Instead,
Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides for the consequences of such nonjoinder:

Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to

be pleaded. Whenever in any pleading in
which a claim is asserted a necessary party
is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his
name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the court find the reason
for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his
person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his

inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be
deemed a waiver of the claim against such
party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party

does not prevent the court from proceeding
in the action, and the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party.

Non-compliance with the order for the

inclusion of a necessary party would not
warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This
is an exception to Section 3, Rule 17 which
allows the dismissal of the complaint for

failure to comply with an order of the court,

as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically provides for
the effect of such non-inclusion: it shall not
prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein
shall be without prejudice to the rights of
such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3
likewise provides that the non-joinder of
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
the action.

Other
than
the
indispensable
and
necessary parties, there is a third set of
parties: the pro-forma parties, which are
those who are required to be joined as coparties in suits by or against another party
as may be provided by the applicable
substantive law or procedural rule.[25] An
example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court:

Conversely, in the instances that the proforma parties are also indispensable or
necessary parties, the rules concerning
indispensable or necessary parties, as the
case may be, should be applied. Thus,
dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma
party not joined in the complaint is an
indispensable party.

Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be

a co-owner of the credits allegedly
extended to the spouses Carandang, seems
to be either an indispensable or a
necessary party. If she is an indispensable
party, dismissal would be proper. If she is
merely a necessary party, dismissal is not
warranted, whether or not there was an
order for her inclusion in the complaint
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.

Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and

wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:

Pro-forma
parties
can
either
be
indispensable,
necessary
or
neither
indispensable nor necessary. The third case
occurs if, for example, a husband files an
action to recover a property which he
claims to be part of his exclusive property.
The wife may have no legal interest in such
property, but the rules nevertheless require
that she be joined as a party.

In cases of pro-forma parties who are

neither indispensable nor necessary, the
general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must
be followed: such non-joinder is not a
ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case
concerning an action to recover a sum of
money, we held that the failure to join the
spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional
defect.[26] The non-joinder of a spouse
does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a
formal requirement which may be cured by
amendment.[27]

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be

governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in this
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.

This provision is practically the same as the

Civil Code provision it superceded:

Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be

governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in this
Chapter.

G.R. No. L-770

April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O.
FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Under the regime of the Civil Code and
before the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person
were considered in contemplation of law as
the continuation of his personality by virtue
of the provision of article 661 of the first
Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights
and obligations of the decedent by the
mere fact of his death. It was so held by
this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44,
46. However, after the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the
Civil Code was abrogated, as held in
Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13,
22. In that case, as well as in many others
decided by this Court after the innovations
introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in
the matter of estates of deceased persons,
it has been the constant doctrine that it is
the estate or the mass of property, rights
and assets left by the decedent, instead of

the heirs directly, that becomes vested and

charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise.

G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]

PETRA
VDA.
DE
BORROMEO,
Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY,
Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu
City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES,
Respondents.
1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE
ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD; ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE CASE
AT BAR. Under Article 1147 of the Civil
Code, the period for filing actions for
forcible entry and detainer is one year, and
this period is counted from demand to
vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de
Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v.
Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197)
In the case at bar, the letter-demand was
dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint
for ejectment was filed in court on
September 16, 1982. Between these two
dates, less than a month had elapsed,
thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full
months of the prescriptive period provided
for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under
the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD
1508, the time needed for the conciliation
proceeding before the Barangay Chairman
and the Pangkat should take no more than
60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9)
months-ample time indeed- within which to
bring his case before the proper court
should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it
cannot be truthfully asserted, as private
respondent would want Us to believe, that
his case would be barred by the Statute of
Limitations if he had to course his action to
the
Barangay
Lupon.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D.
No. 1508; CONSTRUED. Under Section
4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the
Barangay Lupon is required only where the
parties thereto are "individuals." An
"individual" means "a single human being
as contrasted with a social group or

institution." Obviously, the law applies only

to cases involving natural persons, and not
where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership,
corporation sole, testate or intestate,
estate,
etc.
3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON,
NOT REQUIRED. In Civil Case No. R239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere
nominal party who is suing in behalf of the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is
true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court allows the administrator of an estate
to sue or be sued without joining the party
for whose benefit the action is presented or
defended, it is indisputable that the real
party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is
the intestate estate under administration.
Since the said estate is a juridical person
(Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil.
776) plaintiff administrator may file the
complaint directly in court, without the
same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon
for arbitration.
G.R. No. 63145. October 5, 1999]
SULPICIA VENTURA, petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, in His Capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial District, Branch XII, Cebu City; and
JOHN UY, respondents.
First. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court provided that only natural or judicial
persons, or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action. This was the rule
in 1982 at the time that private respondent
filed his complaint against petitioner. In
1997, the rules on civil procedure were
revised, but Sec. 1, Rule 3 remained largely
unaltered, except for the change of the
word, judicial to juridical.
Parties may be either plaintiffs or
defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the
party complaining, and a proper party
plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on
the court.i[17] In order to maintain an
action in a court of justice, the plaintiff
must have an actual legal existence, that
is, he, she or it must be a person in law and
possessed of a legal entity as either a
natural or an artificial person, and no suit

can be lawfully prosecuted save in the

name of such a person.ii[18]

defended inthe name of the real party in

interest. x x x.

The rule is no different as regards party

defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff,
when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to
name the proper party defendant to his
cause of action.iii[19] In a suit or proceeding
in personam of an adversary character, the
court can acquire no jurisdiction for the
purpose of trial or judgment until a party
defendant who actually or legally exists and
is legally capable of being sued, is brought
before it.iv[20] It has even been held that
the question of the legal personality of a
party defendant is a question of substance
going to the jurisdiction of the court and
not one of procedure.v[21]

A real party in interest is defined as "the

party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of a suit." The real
parties in interest, at the time the
complaint was filed, were no longer the
decedents Avelino and Pedro, but rather
their respective heirs who are entitled to
succeed to their rights (whether as
agricultural
lessees
or
as
farmersbeneficiaries) under our agrarian laws.
They are the ones who, as heirs of the
decedents and actualtillers, stand to be
removed from the landholding and made to
pay back rentals to respondents if the
complaint is sustained.

The original complaint of petitioner named

the estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by
surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura as
the defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the same on the ground that the defendant
as named in the complaint had no legal
personality. We agree.
Neither a dead person nor his estate may
be a party plaintiff in a court action. A
deceased person does not have such legal
entity as is necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to substitute cannot
lie and should be denied by the court. vi[22]
An action begun by a decedent's estate
cannot be said to have been begun by a
legal person, since an estate is not a legal
entity; such an action is a nullity and a
motion to amend the party plaintiff will not
likewise lie, there being nothing before the
court to amend.vii[23] Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the
capacity to sue, to the same extent, a
decedent does not have the capacity to be
sued and may not be named a party
defendant in a court action.

G.R. No. 188944

July 9, 2014

SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA

BEROT, Petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE C. SIAPNO, Respondent.
PARTIES, CAPTION
PLEADINGS

AND

SERVICE

OF

SECTION 1. Parties in Interest. Every

agrarian case must be initiated and

Since respondents failed to correcttheir

error (they did not amend the erroneous
caption of their complaint to include the
real parties-ininterest), they cannot be
insulated from the confusion which it
engendered in the proceedings below. But
at any rate, notwithstanding the erroneous
caption and the absence of a formal
substitution of parties, jurisdiction was
acquired over the heirs of Avelino and
Pedro who voluntarily participated in the
proceedings below. This Court has ruled
that formal substitution of parties is not
necessary when the heirs themselves
voluntarily appeared, participated, and
presented
evidence
during
the
proceedings.
As such, formal substitution of the parties
in this case is not necessary.

G.R. No. 207266

June 25, 2014

HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented

by REMEDIOS CHAN, Petitioners,
vs.
PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK,
Respondent.
The MTCC must be reminded that it is the
policy of the law that every litigant should
be afforded the opportunity to have his
case be tried on the merits as much as
possible. Hence, judgments by default are
frowned upon.30 It must be emphasized
that a case is best decided when all
contending parties are able to ventilate
their respective claims, present their

arguments and adduce evidence in support

of their positions. By giving the parties the
chance to be heard fully, the demands of
clue process are subserved. Moreover, it is
only amidst such an atmosphere that
accurate factual findings and correct legal
conclusions can be reached by the
courts.31
ANG VS ANG GR 186993 Aug 22, 2012
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest
A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. (Emphasis ours)
Interest
Within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved.
A real party in interest is the party
who, by the substantive law, has the
right sought to be enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest
in the case below as he does not stand
to be benefited or injured
by
any
judgment
therein. He
was
merely
appointed
by
the petitioners as their
attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of
filing and prosecuting
the
complaint
against
the
respondents.
Such
appointment, however, does not mean
that he is subrogated into the rights of
petitioners and ought to be considered as
a real party in interest. Being merely a
representative of the petitioners, Atty.
Aceron in his personal capacity does not
have the right to file the complaint below
against the respondents.
He may only
do so, as what he did, in behalf of the
petitioners the real parties in interest.
To stress, the right sought to be
enforced in the case below belongs to
the petitioners and not to Atty.
Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a
real party in interest.

The petitioners reliance on Section 3, Rule

3 of the Rules of Court to support their
conclusion that Atty. Aceron is likewise a
party in interest in the case below is
misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that: Sec. 3.
Representatives as parties. Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted and
defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary
capacity,
the
beneficiary shall be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be
the
real
property
in
interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an
expert trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by
law or these Rules. An agent acting in his
own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except
when
the
contract involves things
belonging to the principal. (Emphasis ours)
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated
or, at the very least implied, that the
representative is likewise deemed as the
real party in interest. The said rule simply
states that, in actions which are allowed to
be
prosecuted
or
defended
by
a
representative, the beneficiary shall be
deemed the real party in interest and,
hence, should be included in the title of
the
case. Indeed,
to
construe
the
express requirement of residence under
the rules on venue as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would
abrogate the meaning of a real party in
interest, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Court
vis--vis Section 3 of the same Rule.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC.,
and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, petitioners,
vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC.,
and
MARTINA
GICALE,
respondents.

Petitioners insist that the trial court has no

jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action
of each respondent did not arise from the same
transaction and that there are no common
questions of law and fact common to both parties.
Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
[5] provides:
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons
in whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except
as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as

plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one

complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent
any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed
or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the
right to relief arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions; (b) there is a question of
law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on
jurisdiction and venue.[6]
In this case, there is a single transaction common
to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side
of the jeepney. There is also a common question
of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent.
There being a single transaction common to both
respondents, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must
be ascertained whether the same evidence which
is necessary to sustain the second cause of action
would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery
in the first.[7] Here, had respondents filed separate
suits against petitioners, the same evidence would
have been presented to sustain the same cause of
action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the
complaint with the court below is in order. Such
joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and
ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
administration of justice.
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules
provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in
one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may
have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

The above provision presupposes that the different

causes of action which are joined accrue in favor
of the same plaintiff/s and against the same
defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is
involved.[8] The issue of whether respondents
claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This
paragraph embodies the totality rule as
exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129[9]
which states, among others, that where there are
several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions.
ISIDRO ABLAZA,-versus -REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii