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- versus
[20]
Lad-ing narrated:
Q. This year?
A. Yes, your honor.
COURT:
Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the
Trading Post. What kind of work do you have there?
A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan?
A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident
wherein we were conducting our line of business when
they came and joined us and we became partners,
Your Honor.
Q: You said, they, how many of you?
A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your
Honor.
Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later
on she became your partner in that business?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And so what happened when she became a partner
of your business?
A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then
went at their residence at Gabriela Silang, Baguio City,
Your Honor.
Q: What happened?
A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told
us that if we wanted to earn some more, she told us
that she has in her possession marijuana which could
be sold, Your Honor.
Q: And so, what happened?
A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: How big?
A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.
Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of
this cellophane?
A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving
room, Your Honor.
Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply
immediately for search warrant?
A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to
it that there are really some buyers or people who
would go and leave the place, Your Honor.
COURT:
2.
3.
200
grams
or
more
methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4.
of
shabu
or
5.
750 grams or more of Indian hemp or
marijuana;
6.
50 grams or more of marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil;
7.
40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrocholoride; or
8.
In the case of other dangerous drugs, the
quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the
Dangerous
Drugs
Board,
after
public
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, illegal possession of 750 grams or
more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in
her possession a total of 19,050 grams of marijuana,
for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed
upon accused-appellant by the RTC, affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still
within the range of fines imposable on any person who
possessed prohibited drugs without any authority,
under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
---RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by
Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of
petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs.[11]
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to
issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1
Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for
it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal
sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted
prior to the application of the same search warrant.
The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside
from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the
search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce
clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon
was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or
representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the
nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house
is no longer within the permissible area that may be
searched by the police officers due to the distance and
that the search warrant did not include the same nipa
hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on
the other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities and
not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod
who found the folded paper containing packs of shabu
inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that
the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
because he could not be presumed to be in possession
of the same just because they were found inside the
nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the
argument of the petitioner, stating that, when
prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or
other building belonging to and occupied by a
particular person, the presumption arises that such
person is in possession of such drugs in violation of
law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to
convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of
petitioner.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa
hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
your
team
xxxx
- versus -
1.
2.
Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person
subject of the search warrant in this case who is a
resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao,
Kalibo, Aklan;
3.
Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita
Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not
live therein;
4.
Both accused were not duly licensed firearm
holders;
5.
The search warrant was served in the house of
accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28,
2002; and
6.
The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not
arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military
personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw
them in possession of a firearm in the evening of
August 27, 2002.[5]
As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC
and the CA,[6] these are the chain of events that led to
the filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the
Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group
(PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police
Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza)
to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens
residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park
Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo,
Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence
of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 10, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the
February 10, 2009 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29,
2006 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of
violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as
amended.
The facts:
There
are,
however,
several
well-recognized
exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence
obtained through a warrantless search and seizure
may be admissible under any of the following
circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
[18]
xxxx
threw
Valerio
with
illegal
(1)
possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2)
lacks the authority or license to possess the
firearm.[24]
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor
constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw
Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were
thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding
the receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the
receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the
one in actual physical possession, was seen at the
rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence
pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or
consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable
for illegal possession of the receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of
part of a firearm can only proceed from the
assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches
the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts
earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed
to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute
for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same
whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which
are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. [25]The
quantum of proof required by law was not adequately
met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband
was not identified with sufficient particularity; as such,
it is impossible to match the same with any of the
seized receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically
stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he
and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house.
It is not unlikely then that the receivers later on
discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen
with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the
information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in
committing illegal possession of part of a firearm.
There is no evidence indubitably proving that
petitioner participated in the decision to commit the
criminal act committed by Valerio.
Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence in her favor was not
adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
[11]
citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on
the basis of a police officer's suspicion. [Footnote 5]
On the other side, the argument is made that the
authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed
by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to
date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth
Amendment. [Footnote 6] It is contended with some
force that there is not -- and cannot be -- a variety of
police activity which does not depend solely upon the
voluntary cooperation of the citizen, and yet which
stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to
make such an arrest. The heart of the Fourth
Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe
requirement of specific justification for any intrusion
upon protected personal security, coupled with a
highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce
upon the agents of the State the commands of the
Constitution. Acquiescence by the courts in the
compulsion inherent
[12]
in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is
urged, would constitute an abdication of judicial
control over, and indeed an encouragement of,
substantial interference with liberty and personal
security by police officers whose judgment is
necessarily colored by their primary involvement in
"the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14
(1948). This, it is argued, can only serve to exacerbate
police-community tensions in the crowded centers of
our Nation's cities. [Footnote 7]
In this context, we approach the issues in this case
mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in
controlling the myriad daily situations in which
policemen and citizens confront each other on the
street. The State has characterized the issue here as
"the right of a police officer . . . to make an on-thestreet stop, interrogate and pat down for weapons
(known in street vernacular as 'stop and frisk').
[Footnote 8]" But this is only partly accurate. For the
issue is not the abstract propriety of the police
conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the
evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. Ever
since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been
recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless
police conduct. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383, 391-393 (1914). Thus, its major thrust is a
deterrent one, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618,
629-635 (1965), and experience has taught that it is
the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the
criminal context, and that, without it, the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
would be a mere "form of words." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
S. 643, 655 (1961). The rule also serves another vital
function -- "the imperative of judicial integrity." Elkins
[13]
v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). Courts
which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional
rights
of
citizens
by
permitting
unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus,
in our system, evidentiary rulings provide the context
in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion
approves some conduct as comporting with
constitutional guarantees and disapproves other
actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in
a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect
[38]
for arrest. And that principle has survived to this
day. . . ."
". . . It is important, we think, that this requirement [of
probable cause] be strictly enforced, for the standard
set by the Constitution protects both the officer and
the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is
protected even though it turns out that the citizen is
innocent. . . . And while a search without a warrant is,
within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if
an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental
search, it must be made with probable cause. . . . This
immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without
jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen."
The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure"
of a person can only be "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment if we require the police to possess
"probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line
draws a meaningful distinction between an officer's
mere inkling and the presence of facts within the
officer's personal knowledge which would convince a
reasonable man that the person seized has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime.
"In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175.
To give the police greater power than a magistrate is
to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps
such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of
lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the
deliberate choice of the people through a
constitutional amendment.
[39]
Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied
with the Fifth, [Footnote 4] is rewritten, the person and
the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all
government agencies until there are reasonable
grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal
venture has been launched or is about to be launched.
There have been powerful hydraulic pressures
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court
to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has
probably never been greater than it is today.
Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the
police can pick him up whenever they do not like the
cut of his jib, if they can "seize" and "search" him in
their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision
to enter it should be made only after a full debate by
the people of this country.
---[G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of
ammunitions in two separate Informations which read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507[1]
That on or about the 21 st day of September 1996, in
the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Promulgated:
June 16, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718,
which affirmed the decision [2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union,
in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen
Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an
Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the
Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit
or authority from the proper government agency or
office.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accusedappellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the
following were stipulated upon:
- versus -
BELEN MARIACOS,
Appellant.
G.R. No. 188611
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
5. Customs search;
SO ORDERED.
------G.R. No. 203984
June 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MEDARIO
CALANTIAO
y
DIMALANTA,
AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision 1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069,
affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
127, finding accused-appellant Medario Calantiao y
Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before
the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 in an Information, 3 the pertinent portion
of which reads: That on or about the 11th day of
November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops
with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same
to be a dangerous drug.
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by
the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the
afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3
EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN
LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police
assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of
the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck
and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City,
he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab
prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached
along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan
City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of
them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their
guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but
continued his driving until he reached a police station
nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON
MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano
testified that they immediately responded to said
complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th
Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi.
While approaching said vehicle, two armed men
alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them
(police officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3
Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1
Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag