Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC
June 29, 1948
GR No. L-1779 JOSE A. ARCHES, appellant-appellant, vs. ANACLETO I.
BELLASILLO and PROVINCIAL FISCAL CAPIZ, appealed-appellees.

Jose A. Arches in representation of the appellant-appellant.

's First Assistant Attorney General and Mr. Roberto A. Gianzon Attorney Luis R. Fair
in representation of the respondents-appellees.
BRIONES, J. :
Against the appellant and appellant, Jose A. Arches, the Capiz provincial prosecutor
presented the January 10, 1947 before the justice of the peace of the municipality
of Capiz, capital of the province, the complaint which is transcribed below:
That on or about the year 1939 up to this date, in the municipality of Capiz,
Province of Capiz, Philippines, and Within the jurisdiction of this court, said Accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously block the course of the
Talaga Lacturan River and Creek - Both waterways are navigable and of public
domain-by constructing dikes Therein three in the former and another three dikes
in the Latter without authority from the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, Causing thereby prejudice to the inhabitants of neighborhoods
and Tanza Banica of said municipality by obstructing Their only shortest river
passage from said districts to the capital city of Capiz. Contrary to law.
The defendant presented motion for dismissal (motion to quash) two grounds: ( a )
because at first glance, reading the complaint, it alleged crime and his sentence
were already presciritos, ( b ) because the justice of the peace of the municipality
of Capiz lacked jurisdiction over the cause, having committed the infraction subject
of complaint on territorial understanding of the adjoining town of Panay. The Court
dismissed the motion by unmerited.

Almost immediately you depues the defendant proceeded to initiate an action

forcertiorari prohibition, under the same grounds, before the Court of First
Instance, with equally adverse outcome. The judgment dismissed the appeal has
been filed the appeal now we have to decide.
Clearly the appeal is entirely without merit. Which is said in the complaint "in or
about the year 1939 to date ... the defendant deliberately and maliciously crashes
and obstrueye the course of the river and creek Talaga Lacturan 3 by constructing
dams in the first and 3 dikes in the second, without AUTHORIZATION the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, to the serious detriment of the inhabitants of
the barrios and Banica Tanza ... "does not mean that the 4-year period for
prescription of speaking the appellant must made from the year 1939 when,
apparently, first raised the dikes, with breach of Commonwealth Act No. 383 which
prohibits and punishes such acts of obstruction. Attorney General is right in saying
that this is a continuing violation.While the levees now are there, obstrueyendo the
river course and reachuelo concerned, there is no solution of continuity, the
offense continues , therefore evil can corner the prescription period, which would
take place only since the crime was committed and just. in other terms, the period
of limitation equivalent vacuum that is created enters the date and consummation
of the commission of the offense and the date of its continuation. The case would
be different if the complaint is said that the levees existed until that date to
obstruct the course of rivers, and from that date until the complaint is prsento the
prescriptive period had elapsed.
The second ground of the motion for dismissal is less meritorious yet. The
complaint specifically and categorically said that the violation was committed within
the jurisdiction of the municipality of Capiz, and is elementary that what determines
the jurisdiction and competence of our courts is alleged in the complaint
(EU againstMallari, 24 Jur Fil, 378,. Pueblo against Co Hiok, RG No. 43154, Nov. 7,
1935 [[ 1 ]] , and Pueblo against Velez, GR No. 41234, August 31, 1934). There is
talk of affidavits in which, apparently, insinuates that the rivers are mentioned
compredidos in the town of Panay, but not only these affidavits are not part of the
complaint, but in any case this constitutye evidentiary point and not be raising it a
special appeal as the present one.The impropriety of this action is obvious if one
considers the considerable delay that results in clearing the main cause. If he had

followed the view in the Magistrates' Court, considering there as the scuestiones
defense raised in the certiorari and prohibition does not occupy (anyway would
have fitted the accused the right to appeal), perhaps the main reason would be
completed currently, not as now there to start over.
For these reasons, the judgment appealed from, with costs borne by the appellantappellant confirmed. So is ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, MM., Are conformity.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
[[ 1 ]] 62 Phil., 501 .