People v Acbangin PARDO, J.

:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite,[1] finding accused-appellant, Jocelyn Daria Radam Acbangin
(hereinafter referred to as "Jocelyn") guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua. In the
same decision, the court acquitted accused Juanita Niu (hereinafter referred to as "Niu").[2]
We state the facts.
On April 23, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Danilo Acbangin was worried when his daughter, four-year old Sweet Grace Acbangin (hereinafter referred
to as "Sweet") did not come home.[3]
Sweet's father, Danilo, testified that he last saw Sweet on the same day, at six o'clock in the evening, playing in Jocelyn's house.[4] Jocelyn was the common -law
wife of his second cousin, Remy Acbangin.[5]
Danilo went to Jocelyn's house and looked for Sweet. There was no one there. [6]
At around seven fifteen in the evening, Danilo reported to the Barangay and the Bacoor Police Station that Sweet was missing.[7]
On the same day at eleven o'clock in the evening, Jocelyn arrived at Danilo's house without Sweet. When asked where the child was, Jocelyn denied knowing of the
child's whereabouts.
On April 24, 1991, Danilo made a second report to the Bacoor Police Station, stating that Jocelyn returned without the child.[8]
On April 24, 1991, Jocelyn informed Danilo's mother-in-law that Sweet was in Niu's house in Tondo, Manila.[9]9
On April 25, 1991, the case was reported to the Manila police.[10]
Jocelyn accompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police officers to Niu's house.[11] Jocelyn personally knew Niu and was first to enter the house.[12] Jocelyn
went up to the second floor of the house. She went down with Niu and Sweet.[13] Sweet was well-dressed and smiling.[14]14 She ran to her father and embraced
him. Niu then voluntarily turned Sweet over to her father and the policemen.[15]
Pat. Manuel Lao testified that when he asked Niu how she came to have possession of the child, she answered that a certain "Helen" brought the child to her. This
"Helen" could not be found.[16]
However, on the witness stand, Niu told a different story. Niu narrated that it was Jocelyn who brought Sweet to her house on April 23, 1991. Jocelyn told Niu that she
was going to leave the child and was going to return to get her.[17]
On April 26, 1991, a complaint for kidnapping a minor[18] was filed against accused-appellant Jocelyn Acbangin, accused Niu, Helen Doe and Juana Doe with the
Municipal Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite, to wit:[19]
That on the 23rd day of April 1991 (Tuesday) at about 7:00 P. M. at Brgy. San Nicolas, in the municipality of Bacoor, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx being a private person (sic), kidnapped and deprived one SWEET JOCELYN ACBANGIN, a xxxx
four years old child (sic) without any justifiable cause which is prohibited by law to the damages (sic) and prejudice of said SWEET JOCELYN ACBANGIN and her
relatives.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
On September 2, 1991, an information for kidnapping a minor was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite[20] against Niu, Jocelyn and two Mary Does, to
wit:[21]
"That on or about the 23rd day of April 1991 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay San Nicolas, Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, the abovenamed accused Jocelyn Acbangin, being then the auntie of Sweet Grace Acbangin, and being then private individuals, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take, kidnap and deprive said Sweet Grace Acbangin of her liberty and failed to return her to the custody of her parents, thereby causing her damage and
prejudice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
On May 26, 1992, accused Niu and accused-appellant Jocelyn were arraigned. Both pleaded "not guilty."[22]
At the trial, Jocelyn testified that: For six years, she was employed as Niu's housemaid. While working for Niu, she took care of several children of different ages. The
number of children in Niu's household would vary from seven to fourteen. According to Jocelyn, Niu was in the business of selling children. On April 23, 1993, Sweet
was brought to Niu's house by a certain Celia and Helen. Jocelyn recognized Sweet as her niece. Upon seeing Sweet, she decided to go to Sweet's parents in
Bacoor, Cavite. She then accompanied Sweet's father, along with some policemen to Niu's house.[23]
On June 22, 1994, the trial court rendered the appealed decision. We quote its fallo:[24]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, only accused Jocelyn Acbangin is hereby found Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code with the imposable penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to Death. Thus, she should suffer the
prison term of Reclusion Perpetua.

"This Court finds the above penalty to be too harsh to be imposed against 23-year old and third year high school student-accused Jocelyn Acbangin. The evidence
on record had not clearly indicated that Danilo Acbangin and minor-victim Sweet Grace Acbangin during the latter's two-day stay in the house of Juanita Niu has
been emotionally or physically injured. The degree of malicious intent of accused Jocelyn does not warrant the excessive penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
"In connection with Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court recommends to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, thru the Secretary of Justice, that
executive clemency be extended to accused Jocelyn Acbangin as a means of mitigating the undue harshness of the penalty herein imposed.
"Also send a copy of this Decision to the Provincial Warden of Trece Martires City for his information and guidance.
"SO ORDERED."[25]
On August 8, 1994, accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.[26]
Accused-appellant contends that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[27]
We deny the appeal.
Jocelyn knew for two days where Sweet was. In fact, it was she who brought Sweet to Niu's house. The fact that she later on felt remorse for taking Sweet to Tondo,
Manila and showed Sweet's father where the child was, cannot absolve her. At that point, the crime was consummated. Jocelyn's repentance and desistance came
too late.
The elements of serious illegal detention are: [28]
"(1) that the offender is a private individual;
"(2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
"(3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
"(4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances are present:
"(a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days;
"(b) that it is committed simulating public authority;
"(c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
"(d) that the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer. (underscoring ours)"
In the case at bar, all the aforementioned requisites were present and were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there was actual deprivation of the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of
the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child.[29]
Sweet was deprived of her liberty. True, she was treated well. However, there is still kidnapping. For there to be kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be
placed in an enclosure. It is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Given Sweet's tender age, when Jocelyn left her in Niu's house, at a distant place
in Tondo, Manila, unknown to her, she deprived Sweet of the freedom to leave the house at will. It is not necessary that the detention be prolonged.[30]
The intention to deprive Sweet's parents of her custody is indicated by Jocelyn's hesitation for two days to disclose Sweet's whereabouts and more so by her actual
taking of the child. Jocelyn's motive at this point is not relevant. It is not an element of the crime.
Sweet's testimony, stating that it was Jocelyn who brought her to Niu's house, should not be disregarded. Section 20, Rule 134 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that, "All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others may be witnesses." A witness' young age will not deter him
or her from being a competent and credible witness. To be a competent child witness, the following criteria must be met: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of
recollection and (c) capacity of communication.[31] All these were met by Sweet. Besides, the trial court's assessment of Sweet's credibility should be upheld and
respected since its assessment was not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of any material fact.[32]
Burdensome and harsh as it may be, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. True, Sweet was not maltreated. True also, that at the time of
the crime, Jocelyn was only 21 years old. However, the crime as defined by law was committed. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh, but it is the law.
We agree with the trial court that a strict application of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code would be too harsh, taking into consideration the minimal injury caused by
the offense. We agree that the accused be recommended to the Chief Executive for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, dated June 22, 1994, finding accused-appellant JOCELYN
RADAM ACBANGIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,[33] we recommend to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice, the grant to
accused-appellant JOCELYN RADAM ACBANGIN of either a commutation of sentence to an indeterminate penalty of prision correctional to prision mayor or
executive clemency, considering that she has been in preventive detention since April 29, 1991.[34] Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice.

Luz Farms (petitioner) vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (respondent) G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply
to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. On June 10,1988, the President of the Philippines
approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657. Luz Farms, petitioner in this
case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2,1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9,1989.
Issue: Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is constitutional.
Held: If legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void? This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
[1987]).
reason why it was held as the court did
) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and
void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent. SO ORDERED.
EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLAR, petitioners, vs.VICTORIANO T. CUENCO, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Sought to be reviewed herein is the judgment dated August 18, 1970, of the Court of Appeals, 1 rendered in CA-G.R. No. 41318-R, entitled "Victoriano T. Cuenco,
Plaintiff-appellant, vs. Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia and Pacita W. Vallar, Defendants- appellees, " declaring Victoriano T. Cuenco (now the respondent) as the
absolute owner of the coconut land in question.
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis
Oriental (now Camiguin province), with an area of 29,150 square meters, more or less. 2
The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, one of
the petitioners herein. They are Filipino citizens.
On September 5, 1936, Epifania Sarsosa then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po, for the sum of P1,050.00 (Exhibit "B"). Ong King Po
took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof.
On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigated property to Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), a naturalized Filipino, for the sum of P5,000.00 (Exhibit "A").
Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits therefrom.
On March 6, 1962, Epifania "usurped" the controverted property, and on July 26, 1962, Epifania (through her only daughter and child, Emeteria Barsobia), sold a
one-half (1/2) portion of the land in question to Pacita W. Vallar, the other petitioner herein (Exhibit "2"). Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the land to
Ong King Po and that she signed the document of sale merely to evidence her indebtedness to the latter in the amount of P1,050.00. Epifania has been in
possession ever since except for the portion sold to the other petitioner Pacita.
On September 19, 1962, respondent filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court of Sagay, Camiguin. The case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction since, as the laws then stood, the question of possession could not be properly determined without first settling that of ownership.
On December 27, 1966, respondent instituted before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of the
litigated land, against Epifania and Pacita Vallar (hereinafter referred to simply as petitioners).
In their Answer below, petitioners insisted that they were the owners and possessors of the litigated land; that its sale to Ong King Po, a Chinese, was inexistent
and/or void ab initio; and that the deed of sale between them was only an evidence of Epifania's indebtedness to Ong King Po.
The trial Court rendered judgment:
1.

Dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff (respondent herein).

2.

Declaring the two Deeds of Sale, Exhibits A and B, respectively, inexistent and void from the beginning; and

3.

Declaring defendant Pacita W. Vallar as the lawful owner and possessor of the portion of land she bought from Emeteria Barsobia (pp. 57, 67, Record.) 3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned Decision and decreed instead that respondent was the owner of the litigated property, thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of all the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. In lieu thereof, we render judgment:
(a)

Declaring the plaintiff-appellant Victoriano T. Cuenco the absolute owner of the land in question, with the right of possession thereof;

(b)

Ordering the defendants-appellees to restore the possession of said land to the plaintiff;

(c)

Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim;

(d)

Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of

P10,000.00 representing the latter's share from the sale of copra which he failed to receive since March, 1962 when he was deprived of his possession over the land,
and which defendants illegally appropriated it to their own use and benefit, plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; plus P2,000.00
representing expenses and attorney's fees;
(e)

Sentencing the defendants to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 4
Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on certiorari with this Court on January 21, 1971. Petitioners
claim that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
... when it reversed the judgment of the trial court declaring petitioner Pacita W. Vallar as the lawful possessor and owner of the portion of land she
purchased from Emeteria Barsobia, not a party to this case, there being no evidence against her.
II
... when it included petitioner Pacita W. Vallar to pay P10,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, representing respondent's share in the
harvest and to pay the costs, there being no evidence against her.
III.

... when it condemned petitioners to pay P2,000.00 representing expenses and attorney's fees, there being no factual, legal and equitable justification.

IV.
... in not applying the rule on pari delicto to the facts of the case or the doctrine enunciated ... in the case of Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, L17587, September 12, 1967, to ... Petitioner Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia.
V.

... in denying, for lack of sufficient merits, petitioners' motion for rehearing or reconsideration of its decision. 5

As the facts stand, a parcel of coconut land was sold by its Filipino owner, petitioner Epifania, to a Chinese, Ong King Po, and by the latter to a naturalized Filipino,
respondent herein. In the meantime, the Filipino owner had unilaterally repudiated the sale she had made to the Chinese and had resold the property to another
Filipino. The basic issue is: Who is the rightful owner of the property?
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7], Civil
Code) 6 because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for
the Filipinos. Said provision reads:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. 7
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the ruling in
Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 8 reading:
... For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari delicto that when the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby
enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered. ...
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent,
as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons: 9
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept
on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property
(Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35). (cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154
[1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.
The award of actual damages in respondent's favor of P10,000.00, as well as of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation of P2,000.00, is justified. Respondent was
deprived of the possession of his land and the enjoyment of its fruits from March, 1962. The Court of Appeals fixed respondent's share of the sale of copra at
P10,000.00 for eight years at four (4) harvests a year. The accuracy of this finding has not been disputed.
However, we find merit in the assigned error that petitioner, Pacita Vallar, should not be held also liable for actual damages to respondent. In the absence of contrary
proof, she, too, must be considered as a vendee in good faith of petitioner Epifania.
The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P2,000.00 in respondent's favor is in order considering that both petitioners compelled respondent
to litigate for the protection of his interests. Moreover, the amount is reasonable. 10
WHEREFORE, except for that portion holding petitioner, Pacita W. Vallar, also liable for damages of P10,000.00, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.