Jacinto vs People

Petitioner had been convicted of qualified theft and is now seeking for a reversal of
the decision.
Facts:
Jacinto along with Valencia and Capitle was charged with qualified theft for having
stolen and deposited a check with an amount of 10,000 Php. Such check was issued
by Baby Aquino for payment of her purchases from Mega Foam, but the check
bounced. Dyhengco found out about the theft and filed a complaint with the NBI. An
entrapment operation was conducted with the use of marked bills. The entrapment
was a success and the petitioner along with her co-accused was arrested.
Issue:
Whether this can constitute as an impossible crime and not as qualified theft
Held:
This constitutes as an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property (all
acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft was consummated crime
against property)
2. That the act was done with evil intent (mere act of unlawful taking showed
intent to gain)
3. That its accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual or the extraneous circumstance that
constituted it as a factual impossibility (the fact that the check bounced)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime.(Impossibility of killing a dead person)
Factual impossibility when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent consummation of the intended crime. (Like the example
in the case of Intod: a man puts his hand on the coat pocket of another with intent
to steal but gets nothing since the pocket is empty)
From the time the petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. Replacement for the check was no
longer necessary for the consummation of the crime since the crime of theft is not a
continuing offense, petitioners act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. The fact that the petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof
of her intent to gain.

Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found guilty of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and

penalized in Article 4, paragraphs 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and
to pay the costs.

Intod vs CA
GR 103119
FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of
a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house
and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under
Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory
penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he
and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime

o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime this
case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible
or accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of
accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime

Title: People v. Genosa,

GR No. 135981
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his
husband which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not
provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her husband who
began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband
at least five times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile.
The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her
that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The
appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering
from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted
the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
Issues:
(1)

Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2)

Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements
of self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final

acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c)
At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable not necessarily
immediate and actual grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance
because the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned
the victim of the assailants aggression.