Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 98395-102449 June 19, 1995

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
DR.
MANUEL
BARADERO, respondents.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
MATILDE
S.
BELO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
In our decision dated October 28, 1994 we held that government
service rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in computing
the length of service for retirement purposes. Thus, we reversed
the questioned resolutions and orders of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) requiring the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) to consider creditable the services of private
respondents on a per diem basis.
However, private respondent Matilde S. Belo in G.R. No 102449
filed a motion for reconsideration dated 17 November 1994, of this
Court 's decision of October 28, 1994. She insists that the services
rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz, between December 31,
1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as creditable for purposes
of retirement. The Government Service Insurance System likewise
filed a motion for reconsideration on November 22, 1984 in behalf

of both private respondents Belo and Dr. Manuel Baradero on

essentially the same grounds. We shall deal with both motions
together.
Central to the averments on the aforestated motions for
reconsideration is the question of whether or not regular service in
government on a per diem basis, without any other form of
compensation or emolument, is compensation within the
contemplation of the term "service with compensation" under the
Government Service Insurance Act of 1987.
After a careful consideration of the arguments in both motions, we
are compelled to reconsider our decision.
While what respondents Belo and Baradero received were
denominated as "per diem," the amounts received were actually in
the nature of a compensation or pay. What should therefore be
considered as controlling in both cases would be the nature of
remuneration, not the label attached to it.
Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz
continuously between January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988.
From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office
by virtue of an election and was paid a fixed salary. 1 From
December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the position
of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity, broken down into
two periods: 2
1. A period in which she was paid on a per
diem basis from December 31, 1976 to December
31, 1979; and
2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary
from January 1, 1980 to February 1,1988.
In its June 7, 1989 Resolution 3 on the matter, CSC held that the
services rendered for the first holdover period between January 31,
1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of retirement.
CSC noted that during the entire holdover period, respondent Belo

actually served on a full time basis as Vice Governor and was on

call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing with the CSC's insistence that the
period in which respondent Belo was paid on a per diembasis
should be credited in computing the number of years of creditable
service to the government, GSIS subsequently filed a petition
for certiorari before this court, questioning the orders of the CSC.
Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within the
meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which amended Section 1(c)
of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), we granted
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 98395 and 102449, 4 and reversed the
CSC Orders and Resolutions in question.
A review of the circumstances surrounding payment to respondent
Belo of the per diems in question convinces us that her motion is
meritorious. We are convinced that the "per diem" she received
was actually paid for in the performance of her duties as ViceGovernor of Capiz in a holdover capacity not as the per
diem referred to by section 1(c) of R.A. No 1573 which amended
Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Insurance Service Act). A
closer look at the aforecited provision, moreover, reveals a
legislative intent to make a clear distinction between salary, pay or
compensation, on one hand, and other incidental allowances,
including per diems on the other. Section 1(c) provides:
(c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed
as to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances
and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation
given to the base pay of the position or rank as
fixed by law or regulations. 5
Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to
the discharge of an office is not a salary of office, 6 it follows that if
the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of
his duties does not constitute a mere "allowance for expenses" but
appears to be his actual base pay, then no amount of categorizing
the salary as base pay, a "per diem" would take the allowances
received by petitioner from the term service with compensation for
the purpose of computing the number of years of service in
government. Furthermore, it would grossly violate the law's intent
to reward the public servant's years of dedicated service to

government for us to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the

payment of the said remunerations to the petitioner in taking a
purely mechanical approach to the problem by accepting an
attached label at face value.
In G.R. No. 98395, the period disputed was served by respondent
Baradero as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental between January
1, 1976 to October 10, 1978 where he was likewise paid on a per
diem basis. It is not disputed that during this period, respondent
Baradero rendered full services to the government as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. In fact, on the basis of its earlier
resolution on the case of respondent Belo, the Civil Service
Commission recognized the period in which respondent Baradero
served as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan as creditable for
retirement purposes instead of allowing his petition for extension
of service in order to complete the 15 year period of service
required for the purpose of qualifying for retirement benefits. 7
In the sense in which the phrase "per diem" is used under the
Government Service Insurance Law, a per diemis a daily allowance
given for each day an officer or employee of government is away
from his home base. 8This is its traditional meaning: its usual
signification is as a reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by
the public official in the performance of his duties. 9 Under this
definition the per diem intended to cover the cost of lodging and
subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty
outside of their permanent station. 10
On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be considered a
compensation or remuneration attached to an office. 11 Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case of respondent Belo the per
diems received by her during the period that she acted in holdover
capacity obviously were in the nature of compensation or
remuneration for her services as Vice Governor of the Province of
Capiz, rather than as a reimbursement for incidental expenses
incurred while away from her home base. In connection with this, it
is important to lay stress to the following facts:

1. Petitioner rendered service to the government

continuously from January 25, 1972 to February 1,
1988 as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz.
During a portion of the holdover-period, i.e., from
December 31, 1976 to January 11 1979, payment
for her services to the government was throughper
diems for every regular or special session of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan attended. 12
2. The CSC noted that: "[F]ormer Vice Governor
Belo was on a full time basis when she served . . .
on a hold-over capacity. . . As such provincial
official she is (sic) legally and factually on call by
the provincial people and the province more than
eight hours a day, or at any time of the day beyond
the prescribed working hours.
3. She received no other forms of remuneration
during the disputed period. 13
The same could be said of the services rendered by respondent
Baradero, who, before and after the period in question had an
unblemished record of service to the government as a member of
the army and as a medical officer of the Philippine Medicare
Commission. The disputed period was served on a full-time basis
regardless of the denomination given to the compensation
received by him.
What ought to be controlling in the cases at bench therefore,
should be the nature of the remuneration rather than the label
attached to it. While there is no dispute that the law excepting per
diems from the definition of compensation is clear and requires no
interpretation, however, since the term per diem may be construed
either as compensation or as allowance, it would be necessary for
us to inquire whether the term per diem in the GSIS Law refers to
one or the other signification. As explained above, it is plainly
obvious that per diem as compensation, is not what the law
contemplates. The clear intent of the Government Insurance Law
was to exclude those extra incidental expenses or incurred on a
daily basis covered by the traditional definition of the term per

diem. An important fact missed from our earlier decision was that,
while respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis during her first
holdover period as Vice Governor she was subsequently paid a
fixed salary, which apparently rectified an otherwise anomalous
situation. The services rendered by respondent Belo having been
continuous, the disputed period should be credited for purposes of
retirement.
On the other hand, respondent Baradero was willing to serve two
additional years of service to government in order to complete the
15 year period required by our retirement laws. The Civil Service
Commission felt this was unnecessary and denied the same on the
ground that the period served on a per diem basis, was, like the
disputed period in the Belo case, creditable. 14
The distinctions between salary and per diem made hereinabove
were in fact adverted to in our original decision dated October 28,
1994. In explaining the allowance of service rendered on a per
diem basis in the case of Inocencio vs. Ferrer of the Social Security
System, we noted with approval the Government Service Insurance
System's explanation that the per diem service which was credited
for purposes of retirement was Commissioner Ferrer's full time
service as Hearing Officer not his per diem service for attendance
at Board Meetings. Even then, we indirectly noted the difference
between per diem paid as compensation for services rendered on a
full time basis and per diem as allowance for incidental expenses.
Respondent Belo asserts, with reason, that the per diems paid to
her, while reckoned on the basis of attendance in Board Meetings,
were for her full time services as Vice Governor of the Province of
Capiz. In fact, the same service, albeit still on a holdover basis, was
eventually paid with a fixed salary.
Retirement benefits given to government employees in effect
reward them for giving the best years of their lives to the service of
their country. This is especially true with those in government
service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring
management skills because the years they devote to government
service could be spent more profitably in lucrative appointments in
the private sector. In exchange for their selfless dedication to
government service, they enjoy security of tenure and are ensured

of a reasonable amount of support after they leave the

government. The basis for the provision of retirement benefits is,
therefore, service to government. While a government insurance
system rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep
this system of retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on
contributions made by the thousands of members of the system,
the fact that these contributions are minimal when compared to
the amount of retirement benefits actually received shows that
such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely
determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as
recipients of the retirement benefit system.
It cannot be convincingly asserted that petitioners could not avail
themselves of the benefits of the policy because no deductions
were made from their salaries during the disputed periods when
they were paid on aper diem basis. In respondent Belo's
case, before and after that short interregnum, she was paid a fixed
salary. She was not duly informed that short period was not to be
credited in computing the length of her service for retirement
purposes. She assumed in all good faith that she continued to be
covered by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that in fact and
in practice the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all
government employees on an essentially involuntary basis.
Similarly, had respondent Baradero been informed of the need to
pay the required deductions for the purpose of qualifying for
retirement benefits, he would have willingly paid the required
sums. In a sense, the contract made between the GSIS and the
government employee is done on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, that is,
it is a virtual contract of adhesion which gives the employee no
choice but to involuntarily accede to the deductions made from
their oftentimes meager salaries. If the GSIS did not deduct, it was
by
its
own
choice:
contributions
were
exacted
from
petitioner before and after the disputed period. To assert that
petitioners would have been entitled to benefits had they opted for
optional deductions at that point misses the principal fact in issue
here, which is the question as to whether or not the disputed
periods should be credited as service with compensation for the
purposes of retirement.

Moreover, the source of GSIS benefits is not in essence merely

contractual; rather, it is a social legislation as clearly indicated in
the "whereas" of Presidential Decree No. 1146, to wit:
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have
prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government
employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his
benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the
payment of benefits, must now yield to his
paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance
benefits of government employees must be
continuously re-examined and improved to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance programs that will provide benefits
responsive to their needs and those of their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability,
death, retirement, and other contingencies; and to
serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public
service;
WHEREAS, in the light existing economic conditions
affecting the welfare of government employees
there is a need to expand and improve the social
security and insurance programs administered by
the Government Service Insurance Systems,
specifically, among others, by increasing pension
benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing
survivorship benefits, introducing sickness income
benefits, and eventually extending the compulsory
coverage of these programs to all government
employees regardless of employment status.
The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are
concerned could be rectified by deducting a reasonable amount
corresponding to the contributions which should have been
deducted during the period from the amount of retirement benefits
accruing to them. It would be grossly inequitable as it would
violate the spirit of the government retirement and insurance laws

 to permanently penalize both respondents Belo and Baradero by

ignoring the fact of actual period of service to government with
compensation, and deny them the retirement privileges that they,
for their unselfish service to the government justly deserve. Under
the peculiar circumstances of the case at bench, the demand for
equity prompts us to regard spirit not letter, and intent, not form,
in according substantial justice to both respondents, where the law,
through its inflexible rules might prove inadequate.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, our decision
dated October 28, 1994 RECONSIDERED and the questioned
resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring GSIS to consider
creditable the services of private respondents on a per diem basis
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza
and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., concurs in the result.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 98395 October 28, 1994

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
DR.
MANUEL
BARADERO, respondents.

G.R. No. 102449

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
MATILDE
S.
BELO, respondents.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for Matilde S. Belo.

QUIASON, J.:
Before us are two petitions docketed as G.R. No. 98395 and G.R.
No. 102449. The petitions were consolidated since they principally
involved the same issue and parties.
We grant both petitions.
I
G.R. No. 98395
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, to reverse and set aside four orders of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), namely: (1) the Resolution No. 90-642 dated
July 16, 1990, which resolved as creditable for retirement purposes
the
service
of
private
respondent Manuel Baradero, who served as Sangguniang Bayan
member on a per diem basis from January 1, 1976 to October 20,
1978; (2) the Order dated September 20, 1990 directing the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 90-642; (3) the Order dated
December 7, 1990 directing the President and General Manager of
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the
implementation of Resolution No. 90-642; and (4) the Resolution
No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991, which dismissed petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 20, 1990.

Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied

the position of Medical Officer IV in the Philippine Medical Care
Commission, until he reached the mandatory age of retirement of
65 years old.
He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from November
17, 1942 until June 30, 1945. He resumed his government career
on January 1, 1976, when he was elected a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros
Occidental. As such, he received per diem for every session
attended. He resigned from the Sangguniang Bayan on October 10,
1976. On October 20, 1978, he was appointed Medical Officer I at
the Philippine Medical Care Commission, where he served until he
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old (Rollo, p.
28).
Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for compulsory
retirement with petitioner, which credited in his favor 13 years of
government service, excluding his term as a Sangguniang Bayan
member. He requested an extension of service from the CSC to
enable him to complete 15 years of government service. This was
necessary so that he may avail of retirement benefits.
The request was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-642
dated July 16, 1990. Instead, it ruled that Dr. Baradero's two-year
stint as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan be considered as
creditable service, hence completing the mandatory 15-year
service and making him eligible for retirement benefits (Rollo, p.
28).
The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:
(1) Per diem was expressly excluded in the
definition of compensation in RA 1573 on June 16,
1956. Prior to this, services paid on per diem basis
were considered creditable.
(2) Per diems were excluded from the definition of
compensation because " per diems, by themselves
are usually of minimal amounts which cannot

actually support an insurance coverage" (Office of

the General Counsel Opinion 08-85, June 3, 1985).
It had been maintained that "salary is essential to
insurance in the System, as it serves as the basis
for the determination of the monthly premiums or
contributions" (Government Corporate Counsel
Opinion No. 198, s. 1957).
(3) In the case of the late Commissioner Inocencio
V. Ferrer of the Social Security System,
Commissioner Ferrer received per diems not only
for attending meetings of the Commission but also
for hearing cases as hearing officer. With the
almost daily hearings of Commissioner Ferrer, he
was said to have been performing full-time service
and received substantial amount of per diemssuch
that
"the
so-called per
diems that
he received were not really per diems but
compensation" (OGC Opinion 08-85). Hence, his
services as hearing Commissioner were considered
creditable, but his per diem for attending the board
meetings were excluded in the computation of his
retirement benefits (Rollo, p. 32).
The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero
until he completes the required 15 years so that he may avail of
retirement benefits.
On September 20, 1990, the CSC issued an order directing the
GSIS to implement Resolution No. 90-642 (Rollo, p. 35).
The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order (Rollo, p.
37), which was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 91-526
dated April 23, 1991. The resolution further directed the GSIS to
comply with the CSC resolution and order under pain of contempt
(Rollo, p. 49).
Hence, this petition where the GSIS charges the CSC with grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that: (1) services rendered on a per
diem basis is creditable for purposes of retirement; and (2) it has

exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of services which are

creditable.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion
in Lieu of Comment," which submitted its position that the law
expressly excludes services rendered on per diem basis in
determining creditable government service for retirement
purposes.
The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions
and order crediting such services were in violation of the law, and
encroached on the power of the GSIS to administer and implement
retirement laws. He therefore recommended that the instant
petition be given due course (Rollo, p. 100).
G.R. No. 102449
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, to reverse and set aside three orders of the CSC, namely: (1)
the Resolution dated June 7, 1989, which resolved as creditable for
retirement purposes the services rendered by respondent Matilde
S. Belo, who served as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a hold-over
capacity from December 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979; (2) the Order
dated July 18, 1991 directing the President and General Manager of
petitioner to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
for the delay in the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368;
and (3) the Order dated October 3, 1991, finding the President and
General Manager of petitioner guilty of indirect contempt with
penalty of a fine of P1,000.00 per day of defiance until the
implementation
of
CSC
Resolution
No. 89-368.
Matilde Belo retired from the government service on February 2,
1988. At the time of her retirement, Belo was the Vice-Governor of
Capiz
in
a
hold-over capacity. She served as Governor of Capiz from January
25, 1972 until February 1, 1988.
As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of
P13,000.00 per annum from January 25, 1976 until December 31,

1976. Thereafter, she held the same position in a hold-over

capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1) from December 31,
1976 until January 1, 1979, she received per diem for every session
attended of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and (2) from December
31, 1979 until February 1, 1988, she received a fixed salary
ranging from P23,000.00 to P45,000.00 per annum (Rollo, p. 25).
Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the services
she rendered from December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, in
which period she was paid on a per diem basis, is creditable for
retirement purposes.
In response to the query, the CSC issued Resolution No. 89-368
dated June 7, 1987, which affirmed that her services for said period
was creditable (Rollo, pp. 25-26).
Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS
Committee on Claims, which adopted a position contrary to that of
the CSC.
On August 6, 1991, the GSIS received the Order dated July 18,
1991, which directed its President and General Manager to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368 (Rollo, pp. 28).

The GSIS filed the instant petition, charging the CSC with
committing the same errors in G.R. No. 98395.
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting
its "Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment" filed in G.R. No.
98395, holding the view that the law excluded services rendered
on a per diembasis, in crediting the length of service for retirement
purposes (Rollo, p. 62).
In her comment, Belo insisted that CSC was correct in finding that
her services rendered on a per diem basis are creditable for
retirement purposes. She claimed that the case of Commissioner
Ferrer of the Social Security Commission applied to her case by
analogy.
She likewise contended that Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) vests in the CSC jurisdiction over
matters
regarding
the accreditation of government services. She particularly cites
Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V thereof which enumerates the
powers and functions of the CSC, among which is to:
xxx xxx xxx
17. Administer the retirement program for
government employees and accredit government
services and evaluate qualifications for retirement
(Emphasis supplied);

The GSIS filed its "Manifestation/Explanation," alleging that it

cannot implement the resolution considering that it has a pending
petition for certiorari before this Court in the case of Dr. Baradero
(G.R. No. 98395), where the same issue was raised (Rollo, p. 30).

xxx xxx xxx

On October 3, 1991, the CSC issued an order finding the President
and General Manager of GSIS guilty of indirect contempt. Both
were meted a penalty of P1,000.00 fine for each day of defiance
until the implementation of Resolution No. 89-368. The CSC noted
that the mere pendency of the case of Dr. Baradero cannot prevent
the implementation of its resolution unless this Court issues a
temporary restraining order, and that said case had nothing to do
with the case of Belo (Rollo, p. 34).

II
The issues to be resolved are: (1) Is government service rendered
on a per diem basis creditable for computing the length of service
for retirement purposes; and (2) Is petitioner the proper
government agency in determining what service is creditable for
retirement purposes?

Section 35 of P.D. No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of

1987) vests in petitioner the power to implement the provisions of
said law, which includes the guaranty of retirement benefits.
Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides for the
computation of service, and reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Computation of Service.
For the purpose of this section, the term service
shall
include full
time
service
with
compensation:Provided, That part-time and other
services with compensation may be included under
such rules and regulations prescribed by the
System (Emphasis supplied).
It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that the
employee should have rendered service with compensation.
"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573, which
amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service
Insurance Act), thus:
(c) "Salary, pay, or compensation" shall be
construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems,
allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or
compensation given in addition to the base pay of
the position or rank as fixed by law or regulations
(Emphasis supplied).

The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the
definition of "compensation." Originally, per diemwas not among
those excluded in the definition of compensation (See Section 1(c)
of C.A. No. 186), not until the passage of the amending laws which
redefined it to exclude per diem.
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also
distinguishes it from other forms of remunerations. Such distinction
is significant not only for purposes of computing the contribution of
the employers and employees to the GSIS but also for computing
the employees' service record and benefits.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 196, s. 1976, opined:
. . . That such receipt of salary is an indispensable
requirement for membership, especially in the
Retirement Insurance Fund, is logically inferred
from these provisions of the GSIS Act: Section 5
which requires that to receive the benefits provided
for and described in the GSIS Act, each official or
employee who is a member of the System and his
employer shall pay the prescribed monthly rates of
contributions or premiums based on a percentage
of the "monthly salary" of the employee or official;
Sections 11 and 12, providing that the amount of
retirement annuity or gratuity, or death or
disability benefits granted thereunder, shall be
based on the monthly "salary"; and Section 13,
providing that the term "service" for purposes of
computing the aggregate period of service which
forms the basis for retirement, shall include only
service with "compensation" (Emphasis supplied;
G.R. No. 98395, Rollo, p. 67).

A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:

(i) Compensation the basic pay or salary
received by an employee, pursuant to his
employment/appointments, excluding per diems,
bonuses, overtime pay, and allowances (Emphasis
supplied).

In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an

obligation on the part of the employee to contribute to the
insurance fund of petitioner. Such obligation only arises where the
employee is receiving "salary, pay or compensation" and not per
diem, which is not capable of paying off the premium contributions
to petitioner.

Also enlightening is the "Joint Civil Service Commission,

Department of Budget and Management and Government Service
Insurance System Circular No. 1-89" dated July 13, 1989. It
prescribes the guidelines on the filing and processing of retirement
applications, and we quote:
IV. Certification of Services Rendered.
xxx xxx xxx
C. In certifying to services rendered, Heads and
Personnel
Officers/Administrative
Officers
of
agencies shall be guided by the existing laws, rules
and
regulations
followed
by
GSIS
in
determining creditable services for retirement
purposes which are as follows:
1. All previous services rendered by an
official/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment, including those of Presidential
appointees, to a position in the Civil Service with
compensation or salary or pay whether on
permanent, provisional, temporary, emergency,
substitute, or casual status, and whether paid
monthly, daily, or hourly, subject to these
conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Services of government employees paid on per
diem basis up to June 15, 1956 only.
D.
All
cases
not
covered
by
the
procedures/guidelines above shall be referred to
GSIS for final determination (G.R. No. 98395, Rollo,
pp. 75 and 77; Emphasis supplied).
The circular is clear that services rendered on a per diem bases are
not creditable for retirement purposes. It likewise confirms that it is

the GSIS, and not the CSC which is the proper agency in
determining services which are creditable for retirement purposes.
In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), we ruled that the GSIS
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a
member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit
under P.D. No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years
of government service. By analogy, we reiterate our ruling in the
cases at bench.
The case of Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security
System is unapplicable. While it is true that Commissioner Ferrer
was granted retirement benefits notwithstanding being paid on
a per diem basis, we find merit in the GSIS explanation that the
grant was consistent with its policy, since the service which was
creditable in Commissioner Ferrer's favor was his full time service
as Hearing Officer, and not his attendance at board meetings,
which was not credited.
Anent the CSC's power to "administer the retirement program . . .
and accredit government services . . . for retirement"
(Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Chapter 3, Section 12), we
rule that CSC role is ministerial. "Accredit" merely means
acknowledge. It must not be confused with the power to determine
what service is creditable for retirement purposes. It has been
established that such power belongs to the GSIS (cf. Profeta v.
Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).
The aforementioned provision relied upon by public respondent is
derived from the Administrative Code of 1987, which is a general
law. It cannot prevail over the Revised Government Insurance Act
of 1977, which is a special law (cf. Cena v. Civil Service
Commission, 211 SCRA 179 [1992]).
With the passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, members of
the Sangguniang Bayan are no longer paidper diem, but are now
receiving compensation. Thus, services rendered after the
effectivity of the law may therefore be considered creditable for
retirement purposes.

Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be

liberally interpreted in favor of the retirees. However, the doctrine
of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions,
where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for
interpretation or construction. Moreover, to accommodate private
respondents' plea will contravene the purpose for which the law
was enacted, and will defeat the ends which it sought to attain (cf.
Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216 SCRA 720 [1992])
WHEREFORE, the petitions are both GRANTED. The CSC resolutions
and orders in question are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO
T.
CENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A.
STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9
months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue
in
the
service
to
complete
the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
benefits
of
an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised
before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of
the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on

November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of
Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer
on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the
First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3)
months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.
On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of
Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time
he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January
22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government
service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th
birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to
complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire
with full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of
P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil
Service Commission whether or not to allow the extension of
service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service
Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated
August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed that if petitioner's
service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days
(should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to
15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68
years.
On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner
Cena's request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No.
90-681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired
from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach
the
compulsory
retirement
age
of
sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought
by the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, s. 1990.
Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17,
1990, the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No.

90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his

service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990, the pertinent of
which reads:
1. Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
and shall be granted for a period not exceeding
one (1) year.
On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion
reconsideration was denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.

for

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the
Civil Service Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the extension of petitioner's service as Registrar of
Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990,
instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to complete the 15year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits as
provided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No.
1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977.
Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of
Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a
compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both
erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent
intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par.
(b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the
maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the
15 years of service.
The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that
the questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par.
(b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has no

authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the

privilege under said section to government employees who lack
just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.
The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public
respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the
government, it is vested with the power and authority, among
others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement
age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent
CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if he has less than
fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause:
"Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities," which
means that the extension of service must be first authorized by the
Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11,
par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a compulsory retiree (one
who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of
service) can be extended.
We grant the petition.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be
interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to
only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 without having
completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation
to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be
carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments

and other personnel matters in the Civil Service
including extension of service beyond retirement
age;
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot authorize the modification of an express provision of a
special law (Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977).
Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement
and pension of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.
Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 expressly provides, thus:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Oldage pension shall be paid to a member who:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate
authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee of sixty-five years of age with at least
fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has
less than fifteen years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or
establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited
thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and wellbeing of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs.
Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176,
that a pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the

retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and

women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to
retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who
have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes
creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving
officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service
requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule
otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive
Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but
opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.
In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I.
Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988,
the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana,
who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986
lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for retirement
under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910
because his accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go on
leave until beyond the age requirement for retirement.
The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for
Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No.
6484 Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of
R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the
application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under
said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without
the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement
under
Section
1
(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his
disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re:
Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin,
applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had
received was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1

of the five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his

monthly pensions for the next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm.
Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion
cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming
exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there
are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The
crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required
age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on
case to case basis.
There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary
employees in the Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to
continue in the service to complete the 15-year service
requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of
P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1) year
would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions
of P.D. 1146.
In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory
retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service,
there must be present an essential factor before an application
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the
employer or government office concerned. In the case of officials of
the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for
lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the career of
the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to
the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the
instant case.
It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the fifteen years" found in
Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the
original text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance
Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the
original text as well as in the revised version which would serve as
the basis for providing the allowable extension period to only one
(1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of

P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory

retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less
than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months short
of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an
old-age pension.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the
Civil Service Commission the authority "to take appropriate action
on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the
said provision cannot be extended to embrace matters not covered
by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto.
Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12 C.J.
845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying
into effect what the special law, Revised Government Insurance Act
of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked provides. It
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being
in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by
the principle that administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs.
Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon
v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970,
33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs.
Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4,
1991, squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case
of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from
employment,
reinstatement,
or
re-employment in the government service provided under Section
22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and
Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is entirely
a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the
law itself which it was meant to implement and it cannot be related

to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is

meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice
Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission
was to implement the law or put it into effect, not
to add to it; to carry the law into effect or
execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.
"By its administrative regulations, of course, the
law itself can not be extended; said regulations
cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine
Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970],
citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see
also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office,
174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing
Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to
the conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule
III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section,
relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of
supererogation on the part of the Civil Service
Commission since the rule has no relation to or
connection with any provision of the law supposed
to be carried into effect. The section was an
addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146
otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension
of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service
under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot
likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or
connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried
into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service

Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D.

1146.
As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees
in the Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the
government service to complete the 15-year service requirement
to be entitled to the benefits under P.D. 1146.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC,
We allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65
years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government
service, to continue her services until October 10, 1992. Thus, she
was
given
a period
of
5 years,
to complete the
15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement
benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed
that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without any adverse
complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work
per report of the Medical Clinic.
The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3003-SC.-Re: Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T.
Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget
Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme
Court to continue her services until February 10, 1995. She was
granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days because she
has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days of
government service at the time she reached the age of 65 years on
March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement
benefits under P.D. No. 1146.
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11
years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par.
(b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered
at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the
time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty,
receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service."

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which
allows him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to
complete the 15-year of service consistent with the beneficial
intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion
of the government office concerned.
Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein
Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.
1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement under
Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a privilege given to an
employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted
to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the oldage pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to
retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the
benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash
equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every
year of service.
The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees
similarly situated, so it does not offend the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or
inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year
service beyond the retirement age. If he would be better off than
the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the
service at the age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he
would have worked for the whole period of 15 years as required by
law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service
should merit a greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the oldage pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the
service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be
entitled to the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash
equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every
year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11,
par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by
Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary

Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65

allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for "extremely
meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but
who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service
requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to
employees or officials who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age
pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they
are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to complete
the 15-year service requirement.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration
Authority (LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to
allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months
and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service
so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado,

Davide, Jr., Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995
DIONISIO
M.
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

RABOR, petitioner,

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the
Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility
worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.

Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the

Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to
apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the
age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen
(13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor
responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership" 2 issued by the Government Service Insurance
System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this
"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the
following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service
reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the
following date "2/28/91."
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan,
wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission,
Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the
foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be
taken on this matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSROXI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
Please be informed that the extension of services
of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office
of the President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder quoted:
Officials and employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years shall not be
retained the service, except for
extremely meritorious reasons in
which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the
services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility
Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble. 3

Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of

the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him
"to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991." 4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a
letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in
the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15)
years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could
also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees
of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about
two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very
able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility
Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception
to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the
President." 5 This request was denied by Director Cawad on 15
August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29
January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director
Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's
letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March
1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service
Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the
action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July
1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed
to continue rendering services as Utility Worker in
order to complete the fifteen (15) year service
requirement under P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum
provides, in part:

Circular

No.

27,

s.

1990

1. Any request for extension of

service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen years service
requirement for retirement shall be

allowed
only
to
permanent
appointees in the career service
who are regular members of the
Government
Service
Insurance
System (GSIS) and shall be granted
for a period of not exceeding one
(1) year.
Considering that as early as October 18, 1988,
Rabor was already due for retirement, his request
for further extension of service cannot be given
due course. 6 (Emphasis in the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of
Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service Commission this time
invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission. 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back
salaries and benefits, having been separated from the government
service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the
Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be
allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City
Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was
once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated
19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that,
underCena grant of the extension of service was discretionary on
the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the
extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the City Legal Office
and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated
July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both the City Legal
Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission
are
one
in
these
opinion
that extending you an appointment in order that

you may be able to complete the fifteen-year

service requirement is discretionary [on the part
of] the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment
but circumstances are that we can no longer do
so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday
may no longer be able to perform the duties
attached to your position. Moreover, the position
you had vacated was already filled up.
We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot
act favorably on your request. 8 (Emphases
supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a
Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service
Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May
1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal
requirements for instituting a special civil action ofcertiorari to
review the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In
turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner's
Letter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of
13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the mentioned
formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise
petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal
assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10
The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then
resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties
to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter
through PAO counsel) did so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls
squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission. 11

Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this

case from Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor General,
stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer
agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of
Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension
requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not
to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In
contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City Government did
exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the
extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court
considers that it must reexamine the doctrine ofCena and the
theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12

four (24) days to complete the fifteen-year service requirement for

retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a
government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet
completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension
Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service
for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply
with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held
that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one
vested in the head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court
concluded:

We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.

Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds
of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January
1991. By the latter date, his government service would have
reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6)
days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the
Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his
service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable
him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he
would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15
April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service
Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be granted
considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum
No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission
allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22
January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular
No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without
success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was entitled
to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-

Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land

Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of
Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months
and 6 days of government to complete the fifteenyear service so that he may retire with full benefits
under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D.
1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of
the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) OldAge Pension shall be paid to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of
service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of
age; and
(3) is separated from the service.

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate

authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at
least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if
he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he
shall he allowed to continue in the service to
completed the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases
supplied)
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction
which has often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute granting a
pension or establishing [a] retirement plan should
be liberally construed and administered in favor of
persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees
may be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms,
there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which
prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be
granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its
entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND
AGENCIES
OF
THE
NATIONAL/LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED
AND/OR
CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS
WITH
ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory
Retiree to Complete the Fifteen Years Service
Requirement for Retirement Purposes.

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May

21, 1990, the Civil Service Commission hereby
adopts and promulgates the following policies and
guidelines in the extension of services of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years
service requirement for retirement purposes:
1. Any request for the extension of
service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career service
who are regular members of the
Government
Service
Insurance
System
(GSIS),
and shall
be
granted for a period not exceeding
one (1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of
service of compulsory retiree to
complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement for retirement
who entered the government
service at 57 years of age or over
upon prior grant of authority to
appoint him or her, shall no longer
be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of
service to complete the fifteen (15)
years
service
requirement
of
retirement shall be filled not later
than three (3) years prior to the
date of compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of
service of a compulsory retiree who
meets the minimum number of
years of service for retirement

purposes may be granted for six

(6) months only with no further
extension.
This Memorandum Circular shall
immediately. (Emphases supplied)

take

effect

All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and

instrumentalities of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations, are
hereby enjoined to require their respective offices
to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.

The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No.

65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 provides:

By
authority
President

xxx xxx xxx

(Sgd.)
WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests
for reinstatement and/or retention in the service
of employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict
conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular
No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a
policy to adhere more strictly to the law providing
for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in
extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service
beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months only.
WHEREFORE,
the
pertinent
provision
of
Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the retention
in the service of officials or employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Officials or employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement
age
of
65
yearsshall not be
retained in the service, except for
extremely meritorious reasons in
which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.

CATALINO MAC
Executive Secre
June 14, 1988. 1
supplied)
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)
administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil
Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the
Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65
as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum
Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed by the
principle that administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General

Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42

SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to
one the year the extension of service of an
employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less
than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990,
cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has
no relationship or connection with any provision of
P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The
rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil
Service Commission has no power to supply
perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission
Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of
what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is
permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted
with this Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while
the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless,
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority
and promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
with it, but conform to standards that the law
prescribes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a

MECS Order which established passing a uniform admission test
called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite
for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines,
said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando
in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])
The standards may be either
expressed or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The Standard though
does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector
Law,
clearly the
legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be
attained in Calalang v. William is
"safe transit upon the roads."
We believe and so hold that the necessary
standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of
medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of
the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and
that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the nondelegation
principle. 20 (Citations
omitted;
emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract
and very general nature of the standards which our Court has in
prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance with

the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rulemaking:

Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987
Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

This
Court
has
considered
as
sufficient
standards, "public
welfare," (Municipality
of
Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547
[1917]); "necessary in the interest of law and
order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660
[1919]); "public interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68
Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case," (International
Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 17 Phil.
602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service]

Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher

degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against
prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be
very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative
regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative
bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in
respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes
subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so
important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded
is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes
projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that
is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be
examined is the present Civil Service law found in Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not
alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of
service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age
is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by
Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination
of many provisions of the present civil service law.

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines
for the Civil Service and adopt plans and
programs to
promote economical,
efficient and effective personnel administration in
the government;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs
relative to the development and retention of
aqualified and competent work force in the public
service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments
and other personnel matters in the Civil
Serviceincluding extension of service beyond
retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Administer the retirement program for
government officials and employees, and accredit
government services and evaluate qualifications
for retirement;

xxx xxx xxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a
central personnel agency and such other functions
as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the
Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the
government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and
guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel
administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its
function of "administering the retirement program for government
officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for
retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987
Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in
the development and retention of qualified and efficient work
force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the
"enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions,
relative to retirementand the regulation for the effective
implementation of the retirement of government officials and
employees" (Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible
extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65)
years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to
the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The
physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing
in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of
the service that may be expected from individual persons. The
policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in
limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for
compulsory retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the
Civil Service Commission that extending the

service of compulsory retirees for longer than one

(1) year would: (1) give a premium to latecomers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at
a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the
latter and of next-in-rank employees; and
(3)prejudice the chances for employment of
qualified young civil service applicants who have
already
passed
the
various
government
examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated
by "extendees" who have long passed the
mandatory retirement age but are enjoying
extension of their government service to complete
15 years so they may qualify for old-age
pension. 24(Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be
retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same
time, however, we are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and
of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing
from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and
inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in her
dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3)
years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his
service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age
of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general
principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close
to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational
personnel administration and management in the Civil Service, are
aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo involved the
provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the
appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in
government service without prior approval of the Civil Service
Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of
1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be

appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the

government service so required and provided that the appointee
possesses special qualifications not possessed by other officers or
employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be
filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil
Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education
and Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he
was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such
appointment had been obtained either from the President of the
Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission found that the other conditions laid down in Section
22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck
down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view
of permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on. 26
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena,
very strange results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a
person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later may demand extension
of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at
age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general
statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is
heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That
general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that
there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government
service and that opportunities for government service should be
distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people,
considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30)
years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life
expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than the
life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe,
North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby
modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is
hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146
must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No.
27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the
government agency concerned is vested with discretionary
authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official

or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without

completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion
is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President dated
14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 1112) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that
matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of
the President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to
apply only to officers or employees who have reached the age of
sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (l5) years of
government service. We noted earlier thatCena interpreted
Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and
employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement age
of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of
government service. Cenaso interpreted this Memorandum Circular
precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that
employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who
have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be
allowed such extension of service as may be needed to complete
fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cenaread
Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort
with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that
Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today
reached in the instant case, this last ruling ofCena is properly
regarded as merely orbiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office
of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must
be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the
instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution
No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner
Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26
July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 104139 December 22, 1992
LYDIA
M.
PROFETA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary,
Office
of
the
President
of
the
Philippines, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the
decision of the Office of the President, dated 23 October 1991,
declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the
Rizal Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October
1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the
appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion to
President of the same college on 1 May 1979.

After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed

her courtesy resignation as President of the Rizal Technological
Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March 1986. A day
before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner
applied for sick leave.
On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of
Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology
(hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter appointed its
President on 29 March 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989,
petitioner inquired from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extend her services
with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of
sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension
retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query, petitioner was
advised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall have
fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant of
Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension
retirement plan. The GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet
eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered the
sufficient number of years of service on the date of her supposed
retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service was
only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she
could only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average
monthly compensation for every year of creditable service or to a
refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS. 1
On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of
Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as
President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required
fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65)
years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for
an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve
(12) days. 2

In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an

administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and
corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the
Office of the President furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint
with a directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary,
who was duly authorized to conduct a formal investigation of the
charges against petitioner. Pending investigation of the complaint,
petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of
ninety (90) days. 3 After serving the period of suspension,
petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President of
EARIST.
In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary
recommended the compulsory retirement of petitioner. 4

Cario

For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against

petitioner, 5 an Ad-Hoc Committee was created by President Aquino
on 12 February 1991. The parties filed their respective pleadings
and hearings in the case were conducted by the committee.
Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her,
petitioner was detailed with the DECS Central Office pursuant to a
memorandum dated 13 February 1991 signed by Deputy Executive
Secretary
Sarmiento
III.
Petitioner
filed
a
petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her reinstatement as EARIST
President. After trial, said petition was dismissed. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on 2 April 1991. 6
Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central
Office, before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 30 July 1991,
the CSC denied petitioner's complaint. She moved for
reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied on 3
December 1991, which prompted petitioner to file a petition
for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271. On 3
March 1992, this Court dismissed said petition.
After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc
Committee, in a decision 7 dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the

President dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner

for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office of
the President also declared petitioner as compulsory retired from
government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:
... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days
(approximately 3 months) were to be added to the
respondent's creditable service, together with the
period of two (2) weeks which the respondent's
counsel admits in his Memorandum the respondent
had served as Professorial Lecturer, the respondent
should be considered as compulsorily retired as of
Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required 15
years in the service on or about the said date after
reaching the age of 65.
Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr.
Lydia M. Profeta for her alleged "irregular
appointment and graft and corrupt practices" are
hereby dismissed. However, Dr. Profeta is hereby
considered as now compulsorily retired from the
service as of October 15, 1991, in accordance with
the provisions of Section 11 (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1146, having completed fifteen (15)
years in the government service on or about he
said date after reaching the age of sixty-five (65)
on June 16, 1989. 8
In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to
determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5 November 1991,
petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of her
retirement falls on 14 August 1992. 9
A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the
Office of the President, assailing the portion of its decision
declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service as of 15
October 1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over
the issue of her compulsory retirement from the government
service.

In a resolution 10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for

reconsideration was denied by the Office of the President. In the
same resolution, the Office of the President clarified that there was
an over extension of petitioner's period of service with the
government by failure to reckon with the sixty-two (62) working
days during which petitioner went on sick leave (from 20 March to
17 June 1986) and the period of two (2) weeks during which
petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering petitioner
as compulsory retired as of 15 October 1991, the Office of the
President held that it merely resolved motu proprio to shorten by
three-and-a-half (3-1/2) months the extension granted to petitioner
to complete the required fifteen (15) years of service for purposes
of retirement. It further declared that it is for the President to
determine whether or not petitioner could still continue as EARIST
President despite her exoneration from the administrative charges
filed against her.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977), one of the benefits provided for qualified
members of the GSIS is the old-age pension benefit. A member
who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at
least sixty (60) years old when separated from the service, is
entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less than five
(5) years. On the other hand, a member who has rendered less
than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least three (3) years of
service and is sixty (60) years of age when separated from the
service is entitled to a cash payment equivalent to one hundred
percent (100%) of the average monthly compensation for every
year of service.
However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached
the age of sixty-five (65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of
service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15)
years, 11 to avail of the old-age pension benefit.
To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of
deferred compensation for services performed and his right to it
commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and
becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment of all

conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement

benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or
employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective
in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and
remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient
service while so employed. 12 Retirement laws are liberally
interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no
longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. 13 The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the
law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees maybe enhanced. 14
In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, she had rendered less than
the required fifteen (15) years of service under Section 11 of P.D.
1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension benefit,
she was allowed to continue in the service and her term as
President of EARIST was extended until she shall have completed
the fifteen (15) years service requirement, or for an additional two
(2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days, as determined
by the Office of the President.
This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended
by the Office of the President. In resolving the administrative
complaint against petitioner, the Office of the President, ruled not
only on the issues of alleged irregular appointment of petitioner
and of graft and corrupt practices, but went further by, in effect,
reducing the period of extension of service granted to petitioner on
the ground that the latter had already completed the fifteen (15)
years service requirement under P.D. 1146, and declared petitioner
as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991.
In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until
January 1992. However, the Office of the President made a new
computation of petitioner's period of service with the government,
the Office of the President included as part of her service the sixtytwo (62) days sick leave applied for by petitioner covering the
period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her service as a

lecturer of approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-ahalf (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new computation,
petitioner's extension of service which was supposed to end in
January 1992 was reduced by the Office of the President by threeand-a-half (3 1/2) months or until 15 October 1991.
On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the
exact date of retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August
1992. 15 Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner by the
Office of the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and
twelve (12) days which brought her services only up to January
1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow
the Office of the President to shorten the extension of service of
petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of
petitioner's sick leave and service as lecturer, would further reduce
petitioner's service with the government. Such reduction from
petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing
of the old-age pension plan, based on the computation of the GSIS.
We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to
avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of service with the
government. 16 The computation of a member's service includes
not only full time but also part time and other services with
compensation as may be included under the rules and regulations
prescribed by the System. 17
The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20
March to 17 June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer f
approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be
considered as part of her service with the government and it is
only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said
period of service.
We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of
petitioner's date of retirement failed to take into account the threeand-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not

reflected in her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded threeand-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner from 14 August
1992,petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992.
The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as
compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991defeats the purpose for
allowing petitioner to remain in the service until she has completed
the fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period of
16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner should have been
allowed to continue in the service to be able to complete the
fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was prepared to render
services for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should,
therefore, the entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other
emoluments during said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992).
However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her former
position to enable her to complete the fifteen (15) year service
requirement for retirement purposes is no longer possible,
considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service
requirement as of 30 April 1992.
WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the
President dated 23 October 1991 declaring petitioner as
compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner
is hereby declared to have been in the service as President of
EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April 1992 and therefore
entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments of said office
from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she is declared
as entitled to her old-age pension benefits for having reached age
65 years while in the service with 15 years of service to her credit,
subject to her compliance with all applicable regulations and
requirements of the GSIS.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G OV E R N M E N T S E R V I C E
INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Pe t i t i o n e r ,

- versus -

B E N J A M I N NO N OY O.
F O N TA N A R E S ,

G.R. No. 149571

Pre s e n t :
Y N A R E S - S A N T I AG O , J . ,
Chairperson,
A U S TR I A- M A RT I N E Z ,
C A L L E J O , S R. ,
CHICO -NAZARIO, and
N AC H U RA , J J .
Pro m u l g a t e d :

Re s p o n d e n t .
Fe b r u a r y 2 1 , 2 0 0 7
T h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e , a s a p t l y s um m a r i z e d b y
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
t h e E C C , a re a s f o l l ow s :
x x x [ Re s p o n d e n t ]
fi r s t
joined
g o v e rn m e n t s e r v i c e a s S t o re ke e p e r I a t
D E C I S I O N
the
A rc h i v e s
Division
of
Re c o rd s
Management
and
A rc h i v e s
O ffi c e ,
D e p a r t m e n t o f E d u c a t i o n , C u l t u re a n d
AU S T R I A - M A RT I N E Z , J . :
S p o r t s i n M a n i l a o n M a rc h 1 6 , 1 9 8 7 . I n
M a rc h 1 9 8 9 , h e w a s p ro m o t e d t o t h e
p o s i t i o n o f A rc h i v i s t I . O n D e c e m b e r 1,
1 9 9 4 , h e t r a n s f e rre d t o t h e M a r i t i m e
B e f o re t h e C o u r t i s a Pe t i t i o n f o r Re v i e w
Industry Authority as Maritime Industry
o n C e r t i o r a r i u n d e r Ru l e 4 5 of t h e Ru l e s o f C o u r t
Development Specialist II.
a s s a i l i n g t h e D e c i s i o n [ 1 ] d a t e d Fe b r u a r y 6, 2 0 0 1 o f t h e
C o u r t of A p p e a l s ( C A ) i n C A- G . R. S P N o. 5 4 9 9 5 , w h i c h
re v e r s e d a n d s e t a s i d e t h e D e c i s i o n d a t e d A u g u s t 1 9 ,
1999 of

the

Employees

Compensation

C om m i s s i o n

( E C C ) i n E C C C a s e N o. M G - 1 0 4 8 9 - 4 9 9 a ffi rm i n g t h e
j u d g m e n t o f t h e G o v e rn m e n t S e r v i c e I n s u r a n c e S y s t e m
( p e t i t i o n e r ) ; a n d t h e C A Re s o l u t i o n [ 2 ] d a t e d A u g u s t 2 1 ,
2001 which

denied

re s p o n d e n t s

Motion

for

Re c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

This

case

compensation,
fi l e d

by

the

originated

income,

and

re s p o n d e n t

f ro m

claim

hospitalization
b e f o re

the

for

b e n e fi t s
petitioner

onSeptember 15, 1998 due to Rheumatic Heart Disease

a n d Pu l m o n a r y Tu b e rc u l o s i s M i n i m a l .

A s A rc h i v i s t I , h i s d u t i e s w e re a s f o l l o w s :
1 . Pro c e s s e s
notarial
documents
by
p re p a r i n g
i n d ex
guides,
accession
n u m b e r s a n d l a b e l s b y b u n d l e s a c c o rd i n g
to the names of notary public.
2 . Re t r i e v e s n o t a r i a l d o c u m e n t s re q u e s t e d
f o r o n a fi r s t c o m e fi r s t s e r v e b a s i s .
3 . Pre p a re s
re p l i e s ,
c o m m u n i c a t i o n f rom t h e p u b l i c .

written

4 . A s s i s t s i n s o r t i n g o u t i n c o m i n g a rc h i v a l
re c o rd s
and
p e r f o rm s
such
other
f u n c t i o n / d u t i e s a s m a y b e a s s i g n e d f ro m
time to time by his supervisors.
As
Maritime
Industry
Development
S p e c i a l i s t I I , h i s d u t i e s a re a s f o l l o w s :
1.

Pre p a re s
technical
p ro g r a m a n d b u d g e t .

re p o r t ,

2. Inspects ships in the overseas and

domestic trade.
T h e re c o rd s o f t h e c a s e f u r t h e r re v e a l t h a t
[ re s p o n d e n t ] w a s c o n fi n e d a t t h e C h i n e s e
G e n e r a l H o s p i t a l f ro m J a n u a r y 8 t o 1 0 ,

1 9 9 8 d u e t o R h e u m a t i c Va l v u l a r D i s e a s e
w i t h A S, M R , C a rd i o m y o p a t h y a n d P T B
M i n i m a l . H i s c h e s t x - r a y s t a ke n o n J u l y 1 1 ,
1 9 9 8 a n d O c t o b e r 2, 1 9 9 8 s h o w e d fi n d i n g s
consistent
with
PTB,
minimal
and
C a rd i o m e g a l y.
O n a c c o u n t o f h i s a i l m e n t , [ re s p o n d e n t ]
fi l e d w i t h t h e [ p e t i t i o n e r ] a c l a i m f o r
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e fi t s u n d e r P D 6 2 6 , a s
a m e n d e d . Fi n d i n g
his
ailment
c o m p e n s a b l e , h e w a s a w a rd e d Te m p o r a r y
To t a l
Disability
( TT D )
b e n e fi t s
f ro m J a n u a r y 8 t o 1 0 , 1 9 9 8 . H ow e v e r ,
[ re s p o n d e n t s ]
claim
for
compensation
b e n e fi t s o n a c c o u n t o f h i s R h e u m a t i c
H e a r t D i s e a s e w a s d e n i e d o n t h e g ro u n d
that the said ailment is not workc o n n e c t e d . D i s s a t i s fi e d w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n ,
[ re s p o n d e n t ] re q u e s t e d f o r t h e e l e v a t i o n
o f h i s c a s e t o [ t h e E C C ] f o r re v i e w
p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 5, Ru l e X V I I I o f t h e
Ru l e s of P D N o. 6 2 6 , a s a m e n d e d . [ 3 ]

Re s p o n d e n t a p p e a l e d t o t h e C A u n d e r Ru l e 4 3 of t h e
Ru l e s o f C o u r t . O n Fe b r u a r y 6 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e C A re n d e re d
i t s D e c i s i o n , t h e d i s p o s i t i v e p o r t i o n of w h i c h re a d s :
W H E R E F O R E , j u d g m e n t is h e re b y re n d e re d
giving due course to the petition. The
assailed
decision
of
the
Employees
Compensation Commission dated August
1 9 , 1 9 9 9 i s h e re b y S E T A SI D E a n d a n o t h e r
one
e n t e re d
declaring
the
illness
Rheumatic Heart Disease compensable
a n d d i re c t i n g t h e p a y m e n t o f t h e c l a i m
t h e re f o re [ s i c ] .
SO ORDERED.[4]

T h e C A h e l d t h a t t h e w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s ex p o s e d t h e
re s p o n d e n t ,
chemical

O n A u g u s t 1 9 , 1 9 9 9 , t h e E C C re n d e re d h e re i n a s s a i l e d
Decision

a ffi rm i n g i n

t h e p e t i t i o n e r. T h e

ECC

Disease

is

not

toto the
held

that

ruling

of

Rheumatic

Heart

a i lm e n t

under

compensable

Pre s i d e n t i a l D e c re e ( P. D . ) N o. 6 2 6 , a s a m e n d e d ; t h a t
t h e re s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p ro v e b y s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e
that the risk of contracting the said ailment had been
i n c re a s e d

by

his

working

conditions;

and,

that

re s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o s h o w a n y c a u s a l re l a t i o n b e t w e e n
his ailment and his working conditions.

then

S t o re ke e p e r

h a z a rd ,

as

c e r t i fi e d

and
by

A rc h i v i s t

the

II,

to

S e c re t a r y

of

H e a l t h , w h i c h l ow e re d h i s b o d y re s i s t a n c e ; t h a t w h e n
h e t r a n s f e rre d t o t h e M a r i t i m e I n d u s t r y A u t h o r i t y a n d
assumed

the

position

of

Maritime

Safety

I n s p e c t o r / S u r v e y o r , h e w a s l i ke w i s e ex p o s e d t o t ox i c
f u m e s a n d g a s c o m i n g f ro m t h e re s i d u e o f c a rg o e s a n d
w a s o ft e n t i m e s m a d e t o w o r k i n 2 4 h o u r s h i ft s ; t h a t , i n
v i e w of t h e s e , t h e i l l n e s s o f re s p o n d e n t s u p e r v e n e d
d u r i n g h i s e m p l o y m e n t a n d , t h e re f o re , t h e p re s u m p t i o n
arises

that

employment;

he

a c q u i re d

that

the

such

Maritime

ailments
Industry

f ro m

his

Authority

f a i l e d t o c o n t e s t o r c o n t ro v e r t re s p o n d e n t s c l a i m w i t h i n

t h e p ro p e r p e r i o d a n d , h e n c e , i t i n e ff e c t a d m i t t e d t h e

with Rheumatic Heart Disease; and, that the employees

compensability of the illness.

c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w is s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n a n d , h e n c e , i t
s h o u l d b e i n t e r p re t e d l i b e r a l l y i n f a v o r of t h e w o r ke r ;

H e n c e , t h e i n s t a n t Pe t i t i o n r a i s i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g
issues:

and to substantiate these allegations, he submitted the

C e r t i fi c a t i o n s is s u e d b y t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f H e a l t h , t o
t h e e ff e c t t h a t t h e Re c o rd s M a n a g e m e n t a n d A rc h i v e s

I.

O ffi c e ,

W H E T H E R T H E C O U RT O F A P P E A L S E R R E D
IN DECLARING RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO
C O M P E N S AT I O N B E N E F I T S E V E N TH O U G H
THERE
WA S
NO
SHOWING
TH AT
HIS
WORKING CONDITIONS HAD INCREASED
THE
RISK
OF
HIS
C O N T RAC T I N G
R H E U M AT I C H E A RT D I S E A S E .

including

its

actual

duties

Services)

Divisions, is

and

re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ; [ 6 ] t h a t

all

O ffi c e

at

T. M . Ka l a w S t . ,

W H E T H E R T H E I L L N E S S R H E U M AT I C H E A RT
DISEASE IS COMPENSABLE WHEN SUCH
D I S E A S E I S C L E A R LY N O T I N C LU D E D I N T H E
LIST OF COMPENSABLE DISEASES UNDER
PD 626, AS AMENDED. [5]

d i re c t / i n d i re c t

re s p i r a t o r y
ex p o s u re

Manila
illnesses

to

dust,

a re
due

at

risk
to

biological

emanating

their
h a z a rd s

f ro m

ancient

fi l e s / v e n d s

which

a re

p re s e r v e d ; t h a t t h e y a re ex p o s e d t o c h e m i c a l s u s u a l l y
u s e d a s p re s e r v a t i v e s ; [ 7 ] a n d , t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e s o f

T h e p r i n c i p a l q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e re s p o n d e n t
i s e n t i t l e d t o c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e fi t s u n d e r ex i s t i n g l a w
due to the condition of Rheumatic Heart Disease.

that

the

t ox i c

fumes,

t h e Re c o rd s M a n a g e m e n t a n d A rc h i v e s O ffi c e , Re g i o n
X I , D a v a o C i t y a re a t r i s k / d a n g e r t o t h e i r h e a l t h a n d
s a f e t y d u e t o t h e f o l l ow i n g fi n d i n g s / o b s e r v a t i o n s :
1. Risk
f ro m
ex p o s u re
to
d a n g e ro u s ,
n ox i o u s o d o r s / t ox i c c h e m i c a l s / g a s i n t h e
c o n d u c t of p ro c e s s i n g , p re s s u r i n g a n d
f u m i g a t i o n o f o l d fi l e s a n d re c o rd s ; a n d ,

o v e rc ro w d e d p a s s e n g e r s , a n d a n i m a l c a rg o e s i n t h e
he

of

( s u c h a s f u n g i , y e a s t , e t c . ) p ro d u c i n g n ox i o u s o d o r

The petition has merit.

vessels

the

e m p l o y e e s o f t h e Re c o rd s M a n a g e m e n t a n d A rc h i v e s

developing

avers

(Medical

f o u n d t o b e ex p o s e d t o c h e m i c a l h a z a rd , i n p e r f o rm i n g

II.

Re s p o n d e n t

all

inspected,

to streptococciinfection which,

ex p o s e d

h im

i n t u rn , a ffl i c t e d

h im

2. Risk
f ro m
ex p o s u re
to
biological
h a z a rd s a n d o t h e r s u b s t a n c e s l i ke d u s t ,
m o l d s , t i c k s , s i l v e r fi s h a n d o t h e r i n s e c t

a n d v e c t o r s l o c a t e d i n t h e i l l -v e n t i l a t e d
and cramped workplace. [8]

A re v i e w of t h e fi n d i n g s o f f a c t s o f t h e C A a n d t h e
agencies a

quo fails

to

s h ow

that

the

re s p o n d e n t

d i s c h a rg e d h i s b u rd e n o f p ro o f , u n d e r t h e m e a s u re o f
substantial
i n c re a s e d

evidence,
the

risk

that

of

Disease. In particular,
i n f o rm a t i o n

his

working

conditions

contracting Rheumatic
the

establishing

re c o rd s

the

show

etiology

of

Heart

no medical
Rheumatic

Heart Disease that would enable this Court to evaluate

whether

t h e re

is

causal

re l a t i o n

between

the

re s p o n d e n t s e m p l o y m e n t a n d h i s i l l n e s s .

In Government
Court

of

Appeals,

Service
[9]

this

I ns u r a n c e
Court

System

v.

c o m p re h e n s i v e l y

d i s c u s s e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d p o l i c i e s o f t h e ex i s t i n g
c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w , P. D . N o. 6 2 6 , a s a m e n d e d , v i z :
At
the
outset,
certain
basic
postulates
g o v e rn i n g
employees
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e fi t s u n d e r P. D . N o. 6 2 6
n e e d b e re v i e w e d . F i r s t , s a i d D e c r e e
abandoned
the
presumption
of
compensability and
the theory
of
aggravation
under
the
Wo r k m e n s
C o m p e n s a t i o n Ac t . S e c o n d , f o r t h e
s i c k n e s s a n d r e s u l t i n g d i s a b i l i ty o r
death
to
be
compensable,
the
c l a i m a n t m u s t p r o v e e i t h e r o f t w o (2 )
things: (a) that the sickness was the
result of an occupational disease

l i s t e d u n d e r A n n e x A o f t h e Ru l es o n
Employees Compensation; or (b) if the
sickness is not so listed, that the risk
of
contracting
the
disease
was
increased by the claimants working
conditions. Third, the claimant must
prove this causal relation between
the ailment and working conditions by
substantial
evidence,since
the
p ro c e e d i n g i s t a ke n b e f o re t h e E C C , a n
administrative
or
quasi-judicial
b o d y. Wi t h i n t h e fi e l d o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
l a w , w h i l e s t r i c t r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e a re n o t
a p p l i c a b l e t o q u a s i - j u d i c i a l p ro c e e d i n g s ,
nevertheless,
in
adducing
evidence
constitutive of substantial evidence, the
b a s i c r u l e t h a t m e re a l l e g a t i o n i s n o t
e v i d e n c e c a n n o t b e d i s re g a rd e d . Fi n a l l y ,
in case of doubt in construction and
i n t e r p re t a t i o n
of
social
legislation
s t a t u t e s , t h e l i b e r a l i t y of t h e l a w i n f a v o r
o f t h e w o r k i n g m a n a n d w o m a n p re v a i l s i n
light of the Constitutions social justice
p o l i c y.
On the other side of the coin,
however,
t h e re
is a
competing,
yet
e q u a l l y v i t a l i n t e re s t t o h e e d i n p a s s i n g
upon
undeserving
claims
for
c o m p e n s a t i o n . I t i s w e l l t o re m e m b e r t h a t
if diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated
a re
inadvertently
or
re c k l e s s l y i n c l u d e d , t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e
State
Insurance
Fu n d
is
e n d a n g e re d . C om p a s s i o n f o r t h e v i c t i m s o f
d i s e a s e s n o t c o v e re d b y t h e l aw i g n o re s
t h e n e e d t o s h o w a g re a t e r c o n c e rn f o r
the trust fund to which the tens of
m i l l i o n s of w o r ke r s a n d t h e i r f a m i l i e s l o o k
t o f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n w h e n e v e r c o v e re d
accidents,
diseases
and
deaths
o c c u r. T h i s
stems
from
the
d e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e l a w t h a t no l o n g e r
i s t h e p o o r e m p l o y e e s t i l l a r r ay e d

against the might and power of his

r i c h c o r p o r a t e em p l o y e r, h e n c e t h e
n e c e s s i ty o f a ff o r d i n g a l l k i n d s o f
favorable
p r e s u m p t i o ns
to
the
employee. This reasoning is no longer
g o o d p o l i c y. I t i s n o w t h e t r u s t f u n d a n d
n o t t h e e m p l o y e r w h i c h s u ff e r s if b e n e fi t s
a re p a i d t o c l a i m a n t s w h o a re n o t e n t i t l e d
u n d e r t h e l a w. T h e e m p l o y e r j o i n s t h e
employee in trying to have their claims
a p p ro v e d . T h e e m p l o y e r i s s p a r e d t h e
problem
of
proving
a
negative
p r o p o s i ti o n t h a t t h e d i s ea s e w a s n o t
c a u s e d b y e m p l o y m e n t . M o r e o v e r, t h e
n e w s y s t em i ns t i t u t e d b y t h e n e w l a w
has discarded, among others, the
concept
of
presumption
of
compensability and aggravation and
substituted
one
based
on
social
security principles. The new system is
a d m i n i s t e re d b y s o c i a l i n s u r a n c e a g e n c i e s
the GSIS and the SSS under the ECC. The
p u r p o s e o f t h i s i n n o v a t i o n w a s t o re s t o re
a
sensible
equilibrium
between
the
employers obligation to pay workmens
compensation and the employees right to
re c e i v e re p a r a t i o n f o r w o r k - c o n n e c t e d
d e a t h o r d i s a b i l i t y. [ 1 0 ] ( E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d )

The

petitioner

c o rre c t l y

points

out

that

the

re s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o d i s c h a rg e h i s b u rd e n o f p ro o f. T h e
C e r t i fi c a t i o n s

of

the

Department

of

Health

bear

no

re l e v a n c e t o t h e c l a i m s o f t h e re s p o n d e n t f o r a n um b e r
of

re a s o n s . F i r s t , t h e

C e r t i fi c a t i o n s c l e a r l y

state

the

purpose and period for which it may used, i.e., for the
p u r p o s e o f c l a i m s f o r h a z a rd p a y a n d f o r t h e y e a r s
1995 and 1996 only, thus indicating that the conditions
m a y n o t n e c e s s a r i l y ex i s t b e f o re o r a ft e r 1 9 9 5 o r 1 9 9 6 ;
a n d , s e c o n d , t h e C e r t i fi c a t i o n s s h ow t h a t h e h a d b e e n
ex p o s e d t o t ox i c c h e m i c a l s a n d b i o l o g i c a l h a z a rd s b u t
do not go any furtherthey do not indicate the causal
re l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e ex p o s u re a n d R h e u m a t i c H e a r t
Disease.

In its Decision, the ECC, quoting medico-legal

T h e re

is

no

dispute

that

Rheumatic

Heart

D i s e a s e i s n o t i n c l u d e d u n d e r t h e P. D . N o. 6 2 6 , a s
amended,

as

P. D .

626,

N o.

an

occupational
as

amended,

disease. Hence,
the

employee

under
must

d e m o n s t r a t e t h ro u g h s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ( 1 ) t h a t t h e
r i s k o f c o n t r a c t i n g t h e d i s e a s e w a s i n c re a s e d b y t h e
claimants

working

conditions,

and

(2)

the

causal

re l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e a i l m e n t a n d w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s .

a u t h o r i t i e s , ex p l a i n e d t h e n a t u re o f R h e u m a t i c H e a r t
Disease, thus:
x x x either resulted from or ascribed
t o p r e v i o us r h e u m a t i c f e v e r. Wi t h t h e
d e c l i n i n g i n c i d e n c e o f a c u t e rh e u m a t i c
f e v e r , o t h e r e t i o l o g i e s a re i n c re a s i n g l y
re c o g n i z e d ; c o n g e n i t a l d e f e c t s t h a t m a y
b e c o m e a p p a re n t u n t i l l a t e c h i l d h o o d o r
adult
y e a r s , m y xo m a t o u s , s c l e ro r i s a n d
c a l c i fi c a t i o n s . W h a t e v e r
the
etiology,
v a l v e o b s t r u c t i o n o r re g u rg i t a t i o n c a u s e s
characteristic
physical
and
laboratory
fi n d i n g s . S e c o n d a r y

i n f e c t i v e e n d o c a rd i t i s i s
a
continuing
h a z a rd
for
these
p a t i e n t s . A n t i s t re p t o c o c c a l p ro p h y l a x i s
is
a d v i s a b l e . ( Re f e re n c e : M e rc k s M a n u a l ,
14th Edition,
page
526). [11] (Emphasis
supplied)

[ re s p o n d e n t s ]
application
for
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e fi t s u n d e r P D N o. 6 2 6 ,
as amended.[12]

The

Court

a ffi rm s

the

fi n d i n g s

of

the

agencies a

q u o . T h e C A e rre d i n d i s re g a rd i n g t h e fi n d i n g s o f t h e
T h e re s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p ro v e t h a t h i s w o r k
conditions

had

p re d i s p o s i n g

factors

that

caused

E C C o n t h e t e c h n i c a l m a t t e r c o n c e rn i n g t h e n a t u re of
re s p o n d e n t s i l l n e s s .

R h e u m a t i c Fe v e r w h i c h , i n t u rn , l e d t o R h e u m a t i c H e a r t
Disease,

the

subject

ailment.

E x p o s u re

to

t ox i c

This is one instance when, pursuant to prudence

c h e m i c a l s a n d b i o l o g i c a l h a z a rd s d o e s n o t b y i t s e l f

a n d j u d i c i a l re s t r a i n t , a t r i b u n a l s z e a l i n b e s t o w i n g

c o n s t i t u t e t h e c a u s e o f re s p o n d e n t s a i l m e n t . M o re o v e r ,

c o m p a s s i o n m u s t y i e l d t o t h e p re c e p t i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

re s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p re s e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t h e e v e r

l a w t h a t i n [ t h e ] a b s e n c e of g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c re t i o n ,

c o n t r a c t e d R h e u m a t i c Fe v e r w h i c h c o u l d h a v e l e d t o

c o u r t s a re l o a t h e t o i n t e r f e re w i t h a n d s h o u l d re s p e c t

Rheumatic Heart Disease.

t h e fi n d i n g s o f q u a s i - j u d i c i a l a g e n c i e s i n fi e l d s w h e re
t h e y a re d e e m e d a n d h e l d t o b e ex p e r t s d u e t o t h e i r

T h e E C C c o rre c t l y h e l d :
It is well-settled under the Employees
C o m p e n s a t i o n L aw t h a t w h e n t h e c l a i m e d
c o n t i n g e n c y i s n o t t h e d i re c t re s u l t o f t h e
c o v e re d e m p l o y e e s e m p l o y m e n t , a s i n t h e
instant case, and the claimant failed to
s h o w p ro o f t h a t t h e r i s k o f c o n t r a c t i n g t h e
d i s e a s e w a s i n c re a s e d b y t h e c o v e re d
employees
employment
and
working
conditions, the claim for compensation
b e n e fi t s c a n n o t p ro s p e r.
S i n c e t h e re i s n o c a u s a l re l a t i o n b e t w e e n
[ re s p o n d e n t s ]
ailment,
Va l v u l a r
Heart
Disease, and his employment and working
c o n d i t i o n s ; n o r a re t h e re i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t
t h e n a t u re o f h i s w o r k h a d i n c re a s e d t h e
risk of contracting the said disease, [the
petitioner]
is
c o rre c t
in
denying

special technical knowledge and training. [13]

T h e C A l i ke w i s e e rre d w h e n i t r u l e d t h a t w h e re
the

illness

supervened

p re s u m p t i o n

is

that

during

such

illness

employment,

the

a ro s e

the

out

of

e m p l o y m e n t . B e f o re P. D . N o. 6 2 6 , a s a m e n d e d , t h e
e m p l o y e e n e e d n o t p re s e n t a n y p ro o f o f c a u s a t i o n . I t
w a s t h e e m p l o y e r w h o s h o u l d p ro v e t h a t t h e i l l n e s s o r
injury

did

not

employment.
changed

the

[14]

arise

out

of

or

in

the

course

of

H ow e v e r , P. D . N o. 6 2 6 , a s a m e n d e d ,

system

of

compensation.

As

discussed

in Government

Service

ex p l i c i t l y

that

held

Insurance

the

concept

System, this
of

Court

p re s u m p t i o n

of

c o m p e n s a b i l i t y a n d a g g r a v a t i o n h a s b e e n d i s c a rd e d b y
t h e n e w s y s t e m . T h e p u r p o s e of t h i s i n n o v a t i o n w a s t o
re s t o re a s e n s i b l e e q u i l i b r i u m b e t w e e n t h e e m p l o y e r s
obligation

to

employees

pay

right

w o r km e n s
to

re c e i v e

compensation
re p a r a t i o n

and

for

the

work-

c o n n e c t e d d e a t h o r d i s a b i l i t y. T h i s p r i n c i p l e h a s b e e n

Decision

and

the

Re s o l u t i o n

a re R E V E R S E D a n d S E T

petition
of

SERVICE

INSURANCE

Petitioner,

a ffi rm e d i n a l i n e o f c a s e s . [ 1 5 ]

WHEREFORE,

GOVERNMENT
SYSTEM (GSIS),

the

ASIDE.

is GRANTED.
Court
The

of

The

Appeals

Decision

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

of

CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,

t h e E m p l o y e e s C o m p e n s a t i o n C om m i s s i o n d a t e d A u g u s t
19, 1999 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 171378

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and

MARIA TERESA S.A. CORDERO,

BRION, JJ.

Respondent.
N o p ro n o u n c e m e n t a s t o c o s t s .

S O O RD E R E D .

x------------------------x

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 171388

In her post, Cordero examines insured government properties

MARIA TERESA S.A. CORDERO,

Promulgated:

to verify the existence of overinsurance or underinsurance, the degree

of risks, correctness of rate charged and paying capacity of the

Respondent.
March 17, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

insurer; gathers situations and conditions of insurance risks exposure

and rates, previous losses and other pertinent data and information
relative to non-life insurance; inspects damaged properties and
reports the value of a claim payable to the insured, in accordance with
established policies in force; and interviews or corresponds with
claimants and witnesses to determine the extent of GSIS liability for

DECISION

insurance claims.[5]
QUISUMBING, J.:
From April 12 to 17, 2000, Cordero was confined at
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assail
the Decision[1] dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74399, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[2] dated September

6,

2002 of

the

Employees

Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-12987-202

and granted respondent Maria Teresa S.A. Corderos claim for
compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D. No.

the Quezon City Medical Center and was diagnosed with Chronic
Glomerulonephritis with Hypertension. Then, fromJune 25 to 28,
2001 and from October 10 to 14, 2001, she was confined at St.
Lukes Medical Center in Quezon
Chronic

From October 1987, Cordero occupied several contractual and

casual positions in the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
until she was extended a permanent appointment on May 7, 1990.
On December 10, 1996, she was promoted as Senior General
Insurance Specialist,[4] her position to date.

Failure

final

secondary

diagnosis
to

was

Chronic

Glomerulonephritis. Also, based on her medical records, she had

hypertension since 1995.[6]

626),[3] as amended.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

Renal

City. The

Accordingly, Cordero filed with the GSIS a claim for

compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. She stated
that in her pre-employment physical and medical examinations,
she was in perfect health when she entered GSIS in 1987. But later,
she was diagnosed with hypertension, and then hospitalized in
April 2000, June 2001 and October 2001 because of Chronic Renal
Failure secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis.
To prove that her illness is work-connected, she presented a medical
certificate[7] dated December 6, 2001 issued by Dr. Florencio J. Pine,
M.D.,

F.P.C.P.,

F.P.S.N.,

Internal

Medicine,

Kidney

Diseases

and

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal is
dismissed for lack of merit.

Hypertension of the UERM Memorial Hospital and National Kidney

Institute. Dr. Pine certified that based on the history and available
diagnostic examinations, the predominant evidence indicates that

SO ORDERED.[10]

Corderos end stage renal disease is secondary to the combined

damage inflicted by the urinary tract infection and hypertension since
1995. He likewise certified that both conditions are work-related.

Pursuant to Rule 43[11] of the Rules of Court, Cordero filed a petition

for review with the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated February

Cordero also presented a Certification[8] issued by Mr. Arnulfo Q.

3, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC ruling and held that

Canivel,

Cordero

Division

Chief

III,

GSIS

Claims

Department,

stating

contracted

Chronic

Glomerulonephritis

during

her

that [t]he nature of her work and working conditions outside

employment in the GSIS and that the risk of contracting the same

the office increased the risk and is probably a big factor in

was increased by her working conditions. It pointed out that in her

the development of her hypertension which led to her End

pre-employment physical and medical examination with the GSIS in

Stage

Chronic

1987, Cordero was in perfect health condition. But sometime in

week

1995, she was diagnosed with hypertension, which eventually led to

Renal

Disease

Gl[o]merulonephritis

secondary

requiring

three

to
times

the development of her End Stage Renal Disease secondary to

hemodialysis.

Chronic Glomerulonephritis. The Court of Appeals agreed with her

On January 16, 2002, the GSIS denied her claim on the ground
that her illness is not work-connected and her duties did not increase
the risk of contracting the same.[9] Cordero sought reconsideration,
but to no avail. Aggrieved, Cordero appealed to the ECC.

On September 6, 2002, the ECC affirmed the Decision of

the GSIS and held that:
xxxx
As Sr. General Insurance Specialist, there
was no proof that she was significantly exposed to
occupational hazards that would result to kidney
injury. Her job does not involve exposure to
chemicals
implicated
in
Chronic
Glomerulonephritis. Thus, the ailment cannot be
considered work-related.

physician that both conditions are work-related. The fallo of the

decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition
for
Review
is GRANTED
DUE
COURSE. The
Decision
of
the
Employees
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. GM12987-202 approved on 06 September 2002 under
Board
Resolution
No.
02-09-646,
is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and
the
Government
Service
Insurance
System
is
hereby DIRECTED to pay petitioner Maria Teresa
S.A. Cordero her claim for compensation benefits
pursuant to P.D. 626, as amended. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Hence these petitions. Petitioner GSIS raises the following

II.

THAT THE COMPENSABILITY OF THE CLAIM

IS CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.

III.

THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 626, AS

AMENDED, IS A SOCIAL LEGISLATION THAT
MUST BE INTERPRETED AND CONSTRUED IN
FAVOR OF ITS INTENDED BENEFICIARIES.[16]

issues:
I.
WHETHER
THE
RESPONDENTS
AILMENT
DENOMINATED AS CHRONIC GLOMERULONEPHRITIS
MAY
BE
CONSIDERED
WORK-CONNECTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 1 (B), RULE III OF THE
AMENDED RULES OF P.D. NO. 626, AS AMENDED.

Simply stated, the issue posed for our resolution is: Is

II.

respondents End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT

IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENTS CLAIM FOR
COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER P.D. 626, AS
AMENDED, MAINLY DUE TO A HUMANITARIAN
IMPULSE.[13]

Glomerulonephritis compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended?

GSIS contends that Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not an
occupational disease; accordingly, Cordero should adduce proof
that the risk of contracting her disease was increased by her

Petitioner ECC, for its part, raises a single issue:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONSIDERING CHRONIC GLOMERULONEPHRITIS AS
A WORK-RELATED DISEASE AND COMPENSABLE
UNDER THE THEORY OF INCREASED RISK.[14]

working conditions. But Cordero failed to do so; hence, her illness

is not compensable under the law.
Cordero counters that her illness is compensable even if
Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease because
her working conditions increased the risk of contracting the
illness. She contends that she started with the GSIS in perfect health

In her Memorandum[15] dated February 22, 2007, covering

but years later, because of the strenuous nature of her work, she

both G.R. No. 171378 and G.R. No. 171388, respondent Cordero

suffered from hypertension, which eventually led to the damage of

presents the following statement of issues:

her kidney resulting to End Stage Renal Disease.

I.

THAT RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO

DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT
THE RISK OF CONTRACTING HER AILMENT,
CHRONIC
GLOMERULONEPHRITIS,
WAS
INCREASED BY HER WORKING CONDITIONS,
HENCE, COMPENSABLE UNDER THE LAW.

After a careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, we

are unanimous in finding that Cordero has substantially proved her
claim to compensability.

Under Section 1(b),[17] Rule III implementing P.D. No. 626,

the ECC Rules,[23] it is scientifically linked to hypertension, a

sickness or death is compensable if the cause is included in the list

compensable illness.[24] Hence, we cannot close our eyes to the

of occupational diseases annexed to the Rules. If not so listed,

reasonable connection of her work vis--vis her ailment.

compensation may still be recovered if the illness is caused or

precipitated by factors inherent in the employees work and

Years after Cordero contracted hypertension, her health

working conditions.[18] Here, strict rules of evidence are not

condition worsened when she was hospitalized in April 2000, June

applicable since the quantum of evidence required under P.D. No.

2001 and October 2001 and she was diagnosed as having End Stage

626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant

Renal

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

attending physician certified that based on medical examinations,

support a conclusion.[19]

her hypertension has led to the development of her End Stage Renal

Disease

secondary

to

Chronic

Glomerulonephritis. Her

Disease. In our jurisprudence, a doctors certification as to the nature

What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and

of the claimants disability normally deserves full credence because

not a direct causal relation. [20] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on

in the normal course of things, no medical practitioner will issue

which the workmens claim is based is probable since probability,

certifications indiscriminately, considering the serious and far-

not certainty, is the touchstone.

reaching effects of false certifications and its implications upon his

[21]

own interests as a professional.[25]

Inasmuch as Corderos disease was not listed as an
occupational disease, it is incumbent upon her to adduce

Premised on the aforementioned considerations, this Court

substantial proof that would show that the nature of her

affirms the findings and conclusions reached by the Court of

employment or working conditions increased the risk of End Stage

Appeals upholding Corderos claim to compensability.

Renal

Disease

or Chronic

Glomerulonephritis. The

evidence

presented by Cordero shows that her Chronic Glomerulonephritis

that led to End Stage Renal Disease was caused by hypertension.
[22]

WHEREFORE,

the

instant

petitions

are DENIED. The

Decision dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 74399 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Government Service
Insurance System is hereby ORDERED to pay respondent Maria

At the onset, Cordero was given a clean bill of health and

declared fit-to-work when she was employed by GSIS in 1987. But

Teresa S.A. Cordero the compensation benefits due her under

Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

in 1995, she contracted hypertension. While End Stage Renal

Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not among
those enumerated as an Occupational Disease under Annex A of

SO ORDERED.

51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN
NICDAO
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

CARIO, petitioner,

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of
the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the
controversy
between
the
two
Susans
whom
he
married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to

diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pagibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant
case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan
Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which
she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner
and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of
it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her

action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that

the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears
no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9,
1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license
of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who
are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we
cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage
License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee
Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent,
Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in
the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago
S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and
costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed
in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition,
contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS
TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this
case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the
marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of
Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put
her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that

since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void
ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of
the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him

or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the

home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during
the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article
148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI,
are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer.
Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to
the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not
being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in

equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the
disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to
the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession,
to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other
half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that

marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil
Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in
the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio
as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity,
[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the
other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is
premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said
case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance
with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing
Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate
declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule
applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the
parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or
invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do
is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would
prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the

issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40
of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 84846 August 5, 1991

JESUS
D.
vs.
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
AL., respondents.

AGUJA,
INSURANCE

petitioner,
SYSTEM,

ET

Ariel F. Aguirre, Roberto Y. Mabulay and Cesar R. Vidal for GSIS.

On the basis of the accident in 1979, the petitioner claimed for

compensation benefit with the GSIS. He was awarded temporary
total disability benefits from September 5 to 29, 1979 and was
thereafter granted permanent partial disability benefit for a period
of twenty five (25) months.
After receipt of the corresponding monetary benefits from the
System, the petitioner asked for additional benefits on the ground
of permanent total disability under PD 626, claiming that he was
also gradually losing vision of his left eye. This was denied by the
GSIS on the ground that he had already previously received the
maximum which could be awarded to him under the law.
Furthermore, the condition of his left eye which allegedly had
normal vision did not satisfy the criteria for a grant of permanent
total disability benefits.
The petitioner then elevated his case to the ECC which later
affirmed the decision of the GSIS on November 10, 1988. (The
petitioner was however notified of such decision only on January 8.
1989).

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioner, as a pauper litigant, seeks the review of the
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) decision dated
November 10, 1987 denying his claim for additional benefits under
P.D. 626, as amended on account of his eye injury.
Jesus D. Aguja worked as a janitor in the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer in Libmanan, Camarines Sur. While he was cleaning the
office toilet sometime in April, 1979, the bottle of muriatic acid he
was using suddenly fell to the floor, causing the contents to splash
all over. Some of the acid hit the petitioner's right eye which
caused gradual loss of vision, finally culminating in blindness. The
petitioner's left eye was not blinded, but it contracted pterygium
nasal side with visions of 20/40", per certification of Dr. Delfin M.
Rosales, an eye, ear, nose and throat (EENT) specialist in Naga City
causing a disturbance of vision. Notwithstanding his blindness on
the right eye, the petitioner continued to work but retired finally
from service on February 26, 1982.

Unaware of the denial of his claim, the petitioner sought the help of
this Court praying for the additional benefits.
Consequently, in a resolution dated February 10, 1988, the Court
denied the petition for being premature but at the same time
directed the ECC to act speedily on the claim pending with it.
Later, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Court's
resolution attaching to it the decision of the ECC.
Thus, on June 15, 1988, the Court resolved to reconsider its
February 10, 1988 resolution and revived the case. The
respondents, ECC and GSIS were required to file their comments.
On September 15, 1990, the Court issued another resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

Considering the foregoing, the Court Resolved to

require petitioner Aguja to submit satisfactory
medical proof on the condition of his left eye and
whether the same is still capable of treatment and
to what extent. Since he is a pauper litigant who
cannot even afford the services of a lawyer, he
may go to the nearest government hospital which
has a competent eye doctor, present a copy of this
Court's resolution, and request for the necessary
medical certificate. (Rollo, p. 95)

3) The System has been duly notified of the injury

or sickness which caused his disability. (Sec. l(a)
Rule
XI,
Amended
Rules
on
Employees'
Compensation)
The public respondents denied the petitioner's claim on the basis
of the 1985 finding that only the right eye was blind at the time
while the left eye was not. The respondents ruled that the
petitioner is not qualified for permanent total disability benefits but
only permanent partial disability which the petitioner has already
received.

In a later resolution dated November 26, 1990, the Court directed

the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to assist the petitioner in this
case specifically in obtaining the required medical certificate with
respect to the condition of the petitioner's left eye necessary for
the resolution of the claim.

It must be stressed that the petitioner is claiming for additional

benefits because of the gradual loss of vision of his left eye which
the public respondents never considered anymore in evaluating his
claim.

The issue now before the Court is whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to the additional compensation prayed for.

From the records of the case, there is sufficient basis for granting
the petition.

Petitioner Aguja is claiming for additional benefits because "his left

eye with PTERYGIUM is slowly and gradually losing sight. As of now,
he can not recognize people beyond one (1) meter. It is possible he
may also totally lose his vision."

The medical certificate submitted to this Court with respect to the

condition of the petitioner's left eye reveals the following results:

To be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability,

the following conditions must be satisfied:
Section 1. Condition of entitlement. (a) An
employee shall be entitled to an income benefit for
permanent total disability if all of the following
conditions are satisfied:

- CATARACT IMMATURE O.S.

- OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE O.D. WITH IRIDODIALYSIS
O.D. SECONDARY CHEMICAL BURNS
- PTERYGIUM (Rollo, p. 115)
Medical authorities disclose that:

1) He has been duly reported to the System;

2) He sustains the permanent total disability as a
result of the injury or sickness; and

CATARACT IMMATURE - is an opacity of the

crystalline eye lens or of its capsule.
(DORLAND, Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th
Edition, 1965)

- any cataract in the beginning stages, or one

which affects only a part of the lens or its covering.
(MALOY, Medical
edition, 1951).

Dictionary

for

Lawyers,

was also caused by the accident in 1979. The causal connection

between the resulting disability and the petitioner's work is beyond
civil. In Belarmino v. ECC, 185 SCRA 304 [1990], we stated that:

2nd

OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE - is the closure of the opening

in the iris of the eye by formation of an opaque
membrane.
IRIDODIALYSIS - is the separation or loosening of
the iris from its attachment.
PTERYGIUM - a triangular fleshy mass of thickened
conjunctiva occurring usually at the inner side of
the eyeball, covering part of the cornea and
causing a disturbance of vision. (Dorland,
Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th edition, 1965)
Clearly, from the above findings, the petitioner's left eye is indeed
gradually losing vision. The left eye was found to be burned which
only goes to show that the present condition can be traced back to
the accident which occurred in April, 1979 and no other. There is no
showing that there was any supervening event which may have
caused the blindness of the left eye. Undeniably, the injury was
caused by the splashing of muriatic acid while the janitor was
cleaning the government building's toilet. This accident not only
blinded the right eye but also "compromised" the left eye.
According to the medical certificate issued in 1985, a pterygium
was already growing on the nasal side of the left eye. In such a
case, the injury caused on the left eye is considered as workconnected; hence, compensable.
The fact that the aggravation occurred after the petitioner's
retirement does not militate against his claim for additional
benefits. There is no question that the proximate cause of the
apparent but gradual loss of vision of the left eye was the
accidental fall of the bottle of muriatic acid. The presence of
secondary chemical burns on the left eye as stated in the medical
certificate buttresses the assumption that the injury of the left eye

... Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen

in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the result
of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimant's own negligence or misconduct (I Larson
Workmen's Compensation Law 3279 [1972]. Simply
stated, all the medical consequences and sequels
that flow from the primary injury are compensable.
(Ibid.)
A person's disability might not emerge at one precise moment in
time but rather over a period of time (See Jimenez v. ECC, G.R. No.
79193, November 28, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). It is
possible that an injury which at first was considered to be
temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a
partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from
the same cause as in the case at bar. Unfortunately, the
petitioner's permanent disability has further deteriorated affecting
also the vision of his left eye. The aggravation of petitioner's
condition arose from the same injury or disability. The petitioner
was compelled to retire from work on account of the blindness of
his right eye. With the gradual loss of vision of his left eye, it would
even be more difficult, if not impossible for the petitioner to be
gainfully employed now. As stated in numerous cases, "total
disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but
disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attachments could do. (Abaya v. ECC, 176 SCRA 507
[1989]; Orlino v. ECC, G.R. No. 85015, March 29,1990 En Banc
Minute Resolution, Marcelino v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 47 SCRA 343
[1972]; Landicho v. WCC and Canlubang Sugar Estate, 89 SCRA
147 [1979]) To deny the petitioner, the benefits prayed for would
certainly be contrary to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the
law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code (Lazo v. ECC,
186 SCRA 569 [1990].

We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to a conversion of

his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total.
The compensation benefits shall be determined in accordance with
Section 5, of Rule XI of the Amended Rules on Employment's
Compensation providing as follows:
For contingencies which occurred before May 1,
1979, the limitation of P12,000 or 5 years,
whichever comes first, shall be enforced.

Since the petitioner has already received income benefits under

permanent partial disability the public respondent shall pay only
the difference between the two.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Employees'
Compensation Commission decision dated November 10, 1988 is
SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The respondents are ordered to pay
compensation benefits as stated above.
SO ORDERED,