One approach would be to try to impose a legal duty on people to exhibit
these virtues. We might pass a law requiring everyone to vote, for example, or attend monthly neighbourhood meetings to discuss political affairs. There are a few countries which have such laws: Australia has a mandatory voting law; South Korea has a mandatory neighbourhood meeting law. But these are rather heavy-handed attempts to overcome 'civic privatism', and would do nothing by themselves to ensure that people participate actively or responsibly. Indeed, forcing citizens to engage in political activities they dislike may simply increase their resentment at the political process. In any event, it is difficult to see how the more diffuse virtues of civility or public reasonableness could be legally codified. One might hope that the very act of political participation itself will teach people responsibility and toleration. Even if initially entered into involuntarily or grudgingly, political participation will expose people to new ideas and develop new sympathies and identities. This is a familiar theme in democratic theory, going back at least to Rousseau and J. S. Mill, who believed that political participation 'enlarges the minds of individuals, familiarizes them with interests which lie beyond the immediacy of personal circumstance and environment, and encourages them to acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention' (Oldfield 1990a: 184). Unfortunately, this faith in the educative function of participation seems overly optimistic. Emphasizing participation does not yet explain how to ensure that citizens participate responsibly-i.e. in a public-spirited, rather than self-interested or prejudiced, way (Mulgan 1991: 40-1). Empowered citizens may use their power irresponsibly by pushing for benefits and entitlements society cannot ultimately afford; or by voting themselves tax breaks and slashing assistance to the needy; or by 'seeking scapegoats in the indolence of the poor, the strangeness of ethnic minorities, or the insolence and irresponsibility of modern women' (Fierlbeck 1991: 592). It is true that successful political participation requires the ability to create coalitions, which encourages a partial development of the virtues of justice and public reasonableness. No one can succeed in political life if they make no effort to listen to or accommodate the needs and views of others. But in many cases, a winning coalition can be built while ignoring the claims of marginalized groups. Indeed, if a significant portion of the population is prejudiced, then ignoring or attacking such groups may be the best route to political success. So merely compelling political participation is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of civic virtues. Instead, most scholars working on this topic have assumed that civic virtue must be promoted indirectly. Rather than have a state-imposed duty of participation or civic virtue, the approach has been to try to locate and strengthen the 'seedbeds of civic virtue'. The goal