Personnel Safety with Pressurized Gas Systems

Lee C. Cadwallader, and Haihua Zhao

Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415; lee.cadwallader@inl.gov (for correspondence)
Published online 00 Month 2016 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.11850

In this article, selected aspects of safety with compressed

gas systems are discussed. Several accident case histories are
described that illustrate the potential modes of injury from
gas jets, pressure-driven missiles, and asphyxiants. Using
high-pressure helium and nitrogen, estimates of safe exclusion distances to prevent skin injuries from gas leaks are calculated for differing pressures, temperatures, and breach
C 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf
sizes. V
Prog 000: 000000, 2016

Keywords: Hazards evaluation; Industrial hygiene/occupational health

INTRODUCTION

There are a number of personnel hazards associated with

pressurized gas systems; the consequences of misusing these
systems include infection, incision, amputation, and death.
Leaks can create gas jets that may extend into habited areas
of a facility. The stored pressure energy in a gas system can
create pressure-driven missiles if system parts fail and are
expelled. Leaking gas can also create combustible or toxic
atmospheres, or displace air that can lead to asphyxiation.
The gases used in facilities range from cryogenic gases such
as nitrogen or helium, to fuel gases, gases needed for chemical additives, gases used in plant operation (e.g., compressed
air for pneumatic systems), and gases used for coolants such
as helium, nitrogen, air, or argon. Some gases pose chemical
hazards of toxicity or chemical asphyxiation, others pose
oxygen displacement hazards, and still others have flammability hazards.
Gas systems include gas delivery systems to meet process
needs of facilities and also industrial or research cooling systems using gas as the working fluid. Depending on the system functions, gauge pressures in gas systems can be low or
high (0.210 MPa [301500 psi] or more). Gas temperatures
can vary from cryogenic to room temperature to hundreds of
degrees C. Some hazards are commensurately increasing
with gas pressure and temperature.
GAS JETS

A gas jet occurs when pressurized gas leaks from a small

opening in a gas system. Personnel injuries from gas jets
include injection, incision, and thermal burn. A gas leak can
expel failed parts under the pressure force, such as gauge
faces or seal pieces. Gas escaping from a failed pipe can
entrain metal shavings, weld beads, scale, or other debris left
in the pipe from construction. Gas escaping from an
This work supported by the U. S. Department of Energy Office of
Science, under the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DE-AC0705ID14517).
C 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
V

Process Safety Progress (Vol.00, No.00)

instrument line or small pipeline can create reaction forces

that allow small lines to move or whip. High-temperature
steam creates burn hazards. Personnel injury hazards are
addressed here.
INJECTION

In a high-pressure injection injury, jets of gas issuing from

a nozzle or leaking from small breaches in a system penetrate a persons clothing and skin because of the close proximity of the person to the aperture (typically about 3 cm
from the gas jet [1]). The minimum gas pressure to penetrate
the skin at these close distances is 0.7 MPa (100 psi) [1]. Tissue damage occurs because the gas jet retains its high pressure for the distance of several diameters of the breach
opening. Many of the high-pressure devices used in industry
employ nozzles on the order of 0.11 mm diameter and
larger.
Most of the reported skin penetration and injection injuries have occurred on fingers and hands of persons using
high-pressure equipment such as compressed air hoses, paint
sprayers, pressure washers, and other industrial equipment.
Verhoeven states that gas injection injuries tend to be rare
on the order of 1 in 600 hand traumas [2]and the wounds
are typically small (17 mm diameter based on case histories
[3]). Immediate medical treatment is important. In more
severe events when a person waits many hours or days
before seeking treatment, amputation of the affected body
part may be required. Roughly 3048% of those patients that
did not quickly receive adequate treatment required amputation for traumatized fingers. Injured persons often misjudge
the severity of the injury, however, because of the small
puncture site and lack of pain immediately after the injury.
Patients often remark of a stinging sensation at the time of
the injury but the pain typically increases and tissue swelling
begins a few hours after the injury.
Treatment is needed for several reasons. The impact of
the gas and the trapped gas pressure can stop blood circulation, leading to tissue necrosis. The gas may also entrain
small foreign objects (such as pipe debris, scale, small metal
filings, paint chips, pieces of desiccant, insulation, and hose
fragments) into the body as well as any dirt, oil, or foreign
material on the objects and skin before the event. When
injected through the skin, these substances can cause infection. Another concern for infection is impurities in the gas
(such as water vapor or compressor oil) being entrained and
driven into the body. When liquids such as lubricating oil,
paint, hydraulic fluid, or paint thinner are injected, body tissues are damaged by chemical toxicity. Often surgical
debridement is required to remove the foreign materials and
allow gas escape [2,4]. After such surgery, the person often
requires several months, or even up to a year, of physical
therapy to regain proper range of motion in the finger or
Month 2016

hand. In one case, an industrial painter injected oil-based

paint into his index finger with a paint gun [2]. After surgery,
he immediately started passive physiotherapy and then
switched to intensive physiotherapeutic training for 612
months. One year after surgery, the finger and hand showed
a complete range of motion but exhibited hypersensibility
and dysfunction when exposed to cold. By 3 years after surgery, the patient had switched professions because of the
cold hypersensibility. Both the grip strength and pinch
strength in his hand had diminished slightly.
It should be noted that wearing leather gloves does not
protect the hands from high-pressure units. At 20 MPa (3,000
psi) pressure and higher [1], the gas jet penetrates gloves and
clothing easily. In general, the best industrial safety approach
is considered to be training to recognize this hazard, which
is very short range from the gas system piping. Always performing zero energy checks to verify that gas systems are
depressurized before maintenance is important.
The eyes are a special safety concern because they are at
least as susceptible to injury as the skin. The use of safety
glasses, preferably wrap-around or side shield glasses, is necessary for adequate eye protection. Scott noted that industrial
safety glasses with impact-resistant lenses will stop most high
pressure gas jets, giving adequate protection to the eyes [1].
INCISION

High-pressure gas jets can easily make incisions in skin or

other tissue. Gas escaping from pressurized lines at 4.450
MPa (6507,000 psi) has been noted to incise flesh [5]. The
higher the pressure, the deeper the incision. In one event, a
worker was starting a maintenance task on a 40 MPa (6,000
psi) nitrogen gas supply system. He loosened flange bolts on
a system piping flange without verifying that the system was
depressurized. The flange separated just slightly and a thin
plane jet of room-temperature nitrogen was expelled at high
pressure, cutting through his clothing and incising deep into
his leg [6]. The worker was estimated to be less than 30 cm
(12 in.) away from the flange in this event.
A study of injuries arising from the gases created by firearm blank cartridges suggests that at close range, the injuries to tissue from high-speed gases are the same as those
from projectiles striking tissue [7]. Experimental measurement
of a gunpowder blank cartridge firing its nitrocellulose
charge through a 4-mm-diameter opening gave a gas energy
density of 0.624 J/mm2 at 0.3 cm (0.1 in.) from the aperture;
at 2.5 cm (0.98 in.), the energy density was 0.127 J/mm2 [8].
The injury criterion for skin penetration is an energy density
of 0.1 J/mm2 [8,9]. Kneubuehl states that only a matter of
milliseconds of exposure time may be needed to create energy densities in excess of the 0.1 J/mm2 [9]; human reaction
time to pain stimulus tends to be 400 ms to 1 s, however
[10,11]. Assuming the human reaction time of 1 second is the
maximum exposure time for injury before the person moves
away from the source of pain gives a power density of 0.1
W/mm2 based on the critical energy density of 0.1 J/mm2.
THERMAL BURN

If the gas is at high temperature, the gas poses a thermal

burn hazard. This type of injury is most commonly associated with high temperature, high pressure steam or water,
where small leaks of steam are not easily visible and may or
may not be audible over the combination of hearing protection and background noise in a stationary power plant
(some power plant areas can be 8891 dB [12]) or in the
engine room of a marine propulsion plant. One case history
discussed that a high-pressure, high-temperature steam leak
through valve packing cut through a steel bolt on the valve
bonnet [13]. Steam or hot gas leaks can scald or burn at distances greater than the incision distance. As a free jet of gas
2

Month 2016

Published on behalf of the AIChE

escapes its system, the initial momentum jet becomes turbulent as the gas travels from the point of discharge. Turbulence allows the hot gas to cool in air.
Steam-electric power plant personnel have long been
aware of the industrial hazards of steam leaks. There has
been discussion in the industry about using a broom to find
a steam leak rather than hands. Brennan states that while
superheated steam jets can sever limbs, using a broomstick
to check for high pressure steam leaks is not practiced in the
utility industry [14]. Brennan asserts that any superheated
steam leak makes a significant high decibel sound when the
steam is escaping. CoVan states that depending on gas pressure and escape opening shape, the sound level of escaping
gas can easily exceed 140 dB [15]. Therefore, this sound of
escaping gas should be audible over the normal noise level
in a power plant. Such high noise levels pose a threat of
hearing damage.
PRESSURE DRIVEN MISSILES

When a part fails on a pressurized gas system, the system

pressure may drive the failed part at high velocity or create
pipe whip. One accident case describes a pipefitter on a ladder who was removing a flanged end cap on a system that
contained nitrogen at 0.55 MPa (80 psi) [16]. The worker had
not performed a zero energy check and the system was at
pressure. When he loosened the end cap, the cap blew off
the end of the pipe, striking the man in the neck and upper
chest. The injury was twofold: the end cap impact and the
fall from the ladder to the ground. The pipe was 20.3 cm (8
in.) diameter (area of 324 cm2 [50 in2] or 0.03 m2). The differential pressure force on the end cap was F 5 PA or (0.55
MPa)(0.03 m2) 5 17.8 kN. The force required to break
healthy bones is on the order of 12 kN. While this projectile
was very close to the worker and did not accelerate very
much in the short distance before impact, the projectile
delivered a large force to the worker. The resulting injuries
and falling from the ladder proved to be fatal.
Kletz has commented on the lack of awareness by plant
personnel that small gauge pressures such as 0.24 MPa (20
psig) could produce pressure-driven missiles that result in
major injury or fatality; he reports that operators find it hard
to believe that only 20 pounds pressure could be so damaging [17]. This is a hazard awareness issue that safety engineers must address at their facilities.
In 2005, Cadwallader reported several events of compressed gas cylinders moving under the thrust of gas release
from inadvertently opened valves or valves that were
sheared off [18]. There have been more events since that
publication. In one event, a maintenance mechanic planned
to empty halon gas from an unsecured fire suppression gas
cylinder by applying a current to its squib valve. The squib
valve ignited, releasing the halon gas. The cylinder was propelled toward the mechanic. The cylinder struck his head
and he perished from his injuries [19]. In another event,
workers were moving a halon gas cylinder to weigh it. They
dropped the cylinder and the cylinder valve struck the concrete floor. The valve separated from the cylinder and the
cylinder was propelled by the 600 psi (4.1 MPa) gas escaping
from the valve bore. The cylinder flew across a tank farm
and two roads, landing 0.4 km (0.25 mi) away [20].
In 2008, in the worst event noted to date, a construction
project in Welwyn Garden City, UK, was installing an argonite (50% argon, 50% nitrogen) fire suppression system for a
business type building [21]. Argonite is a pressure-liquefied
gas held at 30 MPa (4,350 psi) [22]. Eighty of these 142-kg
(313-lb) gas cylinders were staged for installation of the fire
suppression system. The metal caps that protect the cylinder
valves were removed from all of the cylinders and the cylinders were positioned by, but were not secured to, their
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racks. One (or more) cylinder apparently de-stabilized and

toppled, shearing its valve. The moving cylinder collided
with others, which fell and damaged their valves. In a domino effect, multiple gas cylinders were moving in the building
in what was described as a barrage. The workers sought
shelter from the moving cylinders. This event continued until
66 of the 80 cylinders were discharged. One worker, a
plumber, was struck and killed by a propelled cylinder; he
died at the scene due to multiple trauma injuries. The cylinders were moving at speeds estimated to be up to 270 km/hr
(170 mph). Some cylinders penetrated walls and ceiling
voids, traveling into more remote parts of the building. Six
other workers, electricians and plumbers, were seriously
injured and the building was severely damaged as well.
ASPHYXIANTS

There are two types of asphyxiants: simple and chemical.

A simple asphyxiant is a gas that will displace oxygen from
breathing air. Gases displacing air in a room leads to oxygen
deficiency or an asphyxiation hazard to any persons in the
room even though they are outside the gas jet injury zone. A
case history describes an employee at a gas cylinder filling
company who was the first person to arrive for his shift. He
noted that the nitrogen fill hose had been left on the previous day and much nitrogen had flowed out of the bulk storage tank. He attempted to shut off the nitrogen valve but
was asphyxiated [23]. In another event, an electronics technician entered an analyzer building at a chemical plant. Nitrogen gas was leaking from a line into the building and he
was asphyxiated [24].
In the U.S., oxygen deficiency is defined as oxygen concentrations less than 19.5% by volume [25]. This level was
selected because it is believed this is the oxygen level where
humans just begin to experience adverse health effects. The
Compressed Gas Association describes the effects of reduced
oxygen volume percentages. At 19.5% to 10% oxygen, individuals experience increased breathing rates, accelerated
heartbeat, impaired attention, impaired thinking and reduced
coordination [26]. Lower oxygen concentrations begin to
affect the physical and mental ability to evacuate to fresh air
[27]. A simple calculation for oxygen percentage in a room
where a compressed gas cylinder has leaked is remaining
O2% 5 (21% O2) 3 (room volume gas release volume) 4
(room volume). If the room is under active ventilation, the
oxygen deficiency hazard is reduced by dilution with fresh
air. However, when determining need for personnel evacuation in a gas release event, the room ventilation is generally
not considered; the gas release may be very fast (driving
down the oxygen concentration quickly) or ventilation could
be off-line.
A chemical asphyxiant is a gas that will bind to the hemoglobin in the blood and reduce a persons ability to deliver
oxygen where needed in the body [28]. CO is an example of
a chemical asphyxiant. The calculation for concentration is
the same as for simple asphyxiants but the danger levels are
lower. Generally, these gases will have sensors to warn personnel of increasing gas concentrations.
Gas release events must be evaluated for their hazards
and a determination must be made if oxygen monitors are
needed in the room to warn personnel that a gas leak is displacing the room air. Many gases used in research and industry are colorless and odorless, so the sound of a leak may be
the only indicator of leakage unless instrumentation is used
to protect personnel.
SAFE DISTANCES TO PREVENT SKIN PENETRATION FROM GAS LEAKS

In order to calculate the safe distance from the gas leak

location, we follow similar methods described by Xiao et al.
[29] and Bulent Yuceil [30] with some modification and
Process Safety Progress (Vol.00, No.00)

Figure 1. Schematic of the high pressure gas leakage flow

stages for a small breach. [Color figure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

simplification. Figure 1 shows how the jet flow can be characterized with four distinct stages: (1) adiabatic expansion to
sonic condition at the leak exit from the source, (2) adiabatic
free expansion to supersonic condition and to depressurize
to the ambient pressure (virtual nozzle), (3) zone of flow
establishment, and (4) free jet. We use different models to
analyze each stage.
For the adiabatic expansion process from the source to
the leak exit, an isentropic process is assumed and the choking is assumed to happen at the exit point. When ideal gas
law is assumed, the choking velocity (sound speed), pressure, and temperature can be calculated according to the
source conditions [31].
For the non-isentropic adiabatic free expansion process
from the leak exit to the room air ambient pressure, the gas
jet pressure, temperature, velocity, and density vary rapidly
while the gas jet diameter expands significantly over a short
distance from the leak exit [30]. As shown in Figure 1, this
process is called virtual nozzle in the literature. The mass
entrained by the jet during this expansion process is insignificant compared to the jet mass flow rate from the leak exit.
Therefore, it is assumed that there is no mass flux through
the jet boundary at this stage. According to mass, momentum, energy balance, and the ideal gas law, four equations
can be formulated to calculate jet velocity, temperature, density, and diameter at the end of this stage. This method has
been used by Xiao et al. [29] and Bulent Yuceil [30]. To estimate the length of this stage, the distance for the Mach disk,
where shock happens and the gas pressure abruptly
becomes the ambient value, is assumed to approximate this
expansion length. The model developed by Velikorodny and
Kudriakov [32] is used in this article to calculate the distance
for the Mach disk.
The zone of flow establishment describes the process
where unsheared jet profiles undergo changes into profiles
with similarity. The transition is complex and the transition
length has large uncertainty. For the low speed flow, the distance extends up to 510 times the orifice diameter [33]. For
sonic or supersonic flow, the length is even larger. According
to the experimental results presented by Bulent Yuceil, the
temperature profiles become self-preserving at about 18
times the jet diameter at the end of the virtual nozzle [30]. To
be conservative, we have used 20 times the virtual nozzle
end diameter.
The free jet was simulated with the BMIX11 code (UC
Berkeley mechanistic MIXing code in C11) [34]. The
BMIX11 code has been developed to accurately and efficiently predict the fluid mixture distribution and heat transfer
in large stratified enclosures for accident analyses and design

Published on behalf of the AIChE

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Month 2016

Table 1. Choking conditions, virtual nozzle conditions and safe distance for high pressure helium at 258C to leak into
environment.
Source pressure at 15.27 MPa
Breach size in diameter (cm)
Pressure at the leak exit (MPa)
Temperature at the leak exit (8C)
Velocity at the leak exit (m/s)
Pressure at the virtual nozzle (MPa)
Temperature at the virtual nozzle (8C)
Velocity at the virtual nozzle (m/s)
Jet diameter at the virtual nozzle (cm)
Distance from the leak exit to the
virtual nozzle (cm)
Total safe distance (cm)

0.01

0.1

Source pressure at 41.47 MPa

1

0.01

7.45

0.1

7.77
12.9
341

20.2
249
879
0.1013

4.75 E 202
7.83 E 202

2164
1400
4.75 E 201
7.83 E 201

4.75
7.83

7.77 E 202
1.29 E 201

2165
1410
7.77 E 201
1.29

2.03

20.7

208

3.48

34.0

Table 2. Choking conditions, virtual nozzle conditions and safe distance for high pressure and high temperature helium at
3008C to leak into environment.
Source pressure at 1.83 MPa
Breach size in diameter (cm)
Pressure at the leak exit (MPa)
Temperature at the leak exit (8C)
Velocity at the leak exit (m/s)
Pressure at the virtual nozzle (MPa)
Temperature at the virtual nozzle (8C)
Velocity at the virtual nozzle (m/s)
Jet diameter at the virtual nozzle (cm)
Distance from the leak exit to the
virtual nozzle (cm)
Total safe distance (cm)

0.01

0.1
0.893

Source pressure at 3.55 MPa

1

0.01

0.1

2.37
3.77
117

1.73
158
1219
0.1013

1.78 E 202
2.71 E 202

236
1870
1.78 E 201
2.71 E 201

1.78
2.71

2.37 E 202
3.77 E 202

250
1910
2.37 E 201
3.77 E 201

0.78

8.63

0.86

1.11

11.7

Table 3. Choking conditions, virtual nozzle conditions and safe distance for high pressure and high temperature helium at
5008C to leak into environment.
Source pressure at 1.83 MPa
Breach size in diameter (cm)
Pressure at the leak exit (MPa)
Temperature at the leak exit (8C)
Velocity at the leak exit (m/s)
Pressure at the virtual nozzle (MPa)
Temperature at the virtual nozzle (8C)
Velocity at the virtual nozzle (m/s)
Jet diameter at the virtual nozzle (cm)
Distance from the leak exit to the
virtual nozzle (cm)
Total safe distance (cm)

0.01

0.1
0.893

Month 2016

0.01

0.1

2.37
3.77
126

1.73
308
1416
0.1013

1.78 E 202
2.71 E 202

47
2172
1.78 E 201
2.71 E 201

1.78
2.71

2.37 E 202
3.77 E 202

27
2219
2.37 E 201
3.77 E 201

0.78

9.23

92.3

1.11

12.5

optimizations. The BMIX11 code contains multiple options

for free and wall jet models. Schatzmanns model for circular
free curved buoyant jets was used. This jet model is a generic free jet model and is capable of simulating any noncondensable gas with or without buoyancy. The Schatzmanns jet model and the BMIX11 code have been validated with hot air jet experiments [34] and hydrogen jet
experiments [35].
The energy density only includes kinetic
energy flux 12 qu3 and ignores the enthalpy flux (qhu).
Using the injury criteria for skin penetration at a power
density of 0.1 W/mm2, the safe distance from the gas jet can
4

Source pressure at 3.55 MPa

1

Published on behalf of the AIChE

be calculated. After sufficient distance from the virtual source

(i.e., 50 times the virtual jet origin diameter), the jet is significantly diluted by the ambient air and the temperature is
quite close to the ambient temperature. Jets from both high
temperature and low temperature reservoirs exhibit similar
behavior. To be conservative, values at the jet centerline,
where maximal velocity values are located, are used to calculate the kinetic energy flux.
In our calculations, high pressure helium and nitrogen
gas are used to represent typical light and normal gases,
respectively.
Different
combinations
of
pressures,
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Table 4. Choking conditions, virtual nozzle conditions and safe distance for high pressure nitrogen gas at 258C to leak into
environment.
Source pressure at 15.27 MPa
Breach size in diameter (cm)
Pressure at the leak exit (MPa)
Temperature at the leak exit (8C)
Velocity at the leak exit (m/s)
Pressure at the virtual nozzle (MPa)
Temperature at the virtual nozzle (8C)
Velocity at the virtual nozzle (m/s)
Jet diameter at the virtual nozzle (cm)
Distance from the leak exit to the
virtual nozzle (cm)
Total safe distance (cm)

0.01

Source pressure at 41.47 MPa

0.1

0.01

8.07

0.1

8.81
13.6
341

21.9
225
321
0.1013

5.37 E 202
8.26 E 203

2119
548
5.37 E 201
8.26 E 201

5.37
8.26

8.81 E 202
1.36 E 202

2120
550
8.81 E 201
1.36 E 201

2.16

20.8

207

3.50

34.2

Table 5. Choking conditions, virtual nozzle conditions and safe distance for high pressure and high temperature nitrogen gas
at 3008C to leak into environment.
Source pressure at 1.83 MPa
Breach size in diameter (cm)
Pressure at the leak exit (MPa)
Temperature at the leak exit (8C)
Velocity at the leak exit (m/s)
Pressure at the virtual nozzle (MPa)
Temperature at the virtual nozzle [8C]
Velocity at the virtual nozzle (m/s)
Jet diameter at the virtual nozzle (cm)
Distance from the leak exit to the
virtual nozzle (cm)
Total safe distance (cm)

0.01

Source pressure at 3.55 MPa

0.1
0.967

0.01

0.1

2.66
3.98
105

1.88
205
446
0.1013

1.96 E 202
2.86 E 202

43
731
1.96 E 201
2.86 E 201

1.96
2.86

2.66 E 202
3.98 E 202

32
747
2.66 E 201
3.98 E 201

0.82

7.61

76.3

1.17

10.5

Table 6. Choking conditions, virtual nozzle conditions and safe distance for high pressure and high temperature nitrogen gas
at 5008C to leak into environment.
Source pressure at 1.83 MPa
Breach size in diameter (cm)
Pressure at the leak exit (MPa)
Temperature at the leak exit (8C)
Velocity at the leak exit (m/s)
Pressure at the virtual nozzle (MPa)
Temperature at the virtual nozzle (8C)
Velocity at the virtual nozzle (m/s)
Jet diameter at the virtual nozzle (cm)
Distance from the leak exit to the
virtual nozzle (cm)
Total safe distance (cm)

0.01

0.01

0.1

2.66
3.98
107

1.88
371
518
0.1013

1.96 E 202
2.86 E 202

154
849
1.96 E 201
2.86 E 201

1.96
2.86

2.66 E 202
3.98 E 202

138
867
2.66 E 201
3.98 E 201

0.82

7.81

77.7

1.17

10.7

temperatures, and breach sizes are assumed to calculate conservative safe distances from the break location. Tables (16)
show the major parameters and safe distance results. From
the results, breach size and pressure are the two most important parameters affecting safe distance (as explained, the
temperature is quite close to the ambient temperature and
therefore has a very weak effect; gas type has a limited effect
for the same reason). For a 0.1 mm (0.004 in.) break size,
3.5 cm (1.4 in.) seems to be enough safe distance even for a
41.47 MPa (6,015 psi) high-pressure source. For 1 mm (0.04
in.) break size, a safe distance of 34 cm (14 in.) is required
Process Safety Progress (Vol.00, No.00)

Source pressure at 3.55 MPa

0.1
0.967

for the same high pressure. For 1 cm (0.4 in.) break size, a
safe distance of 3.4 m (11 ft) is required. Higher source pressure requires a longer safe distance but the relationship
between the safe distance and the source pressure is not linR
ear. The methods used in this work are based on ExcelV
spreadsheet calculations and a fast running gas dynamics
code. For other conditions and gas types, similar calculations
can be quickly performed to derive safe distance.
A good safety practice is marking exclusion areas to protect plant workers from high pressure incision injuries and
gas jet burn injuries in the plant. This practice is used in

Published on behalf of the AIChE

DOI 10.1002/prs

Month 2016

steam power plants when there are steam leaks [36,37].

Keeping a safety factor of 1.5 or more on the distances given
in Tables (16) is a good safety precaution. These tables
show that the safe distances vary from less than a centimeter
and up to 341 centimeters, even for heated gases. These calculated distances tend to be shorter than are generally
assumed in industry. It is possible to revisit the safety distances for skin penetration being used in industrial facilities.

11.
12.

CONCLUSIONS

Recognition of the hazards posed by compressed gas systems will allow facility personnel to adopt protective measures to avoid exposure to high gas pressure and
temperature. Exclusion distances to protect workers from
skin penetration injuries from gas jets can be calculated
according to the simple and fast running models presented
in this article. The computer code models are suitable for
any kind of non-condensable gases or their mixtures with or
without buoyancy effects. The example distances calculated
in this article show that safe distances tend to be shorter
than are generally assumed in industry. It is possible to revisit the safety distances for skin penetration being used in
industrial facilities. If a skin exposure accident does occur,
recognition of a gas injection event and prompt action can
prevent need of amputation of the affected body part.
Another recognized hazard of gas releases is oxygen displacement, which must be addressed on a case-by-case
basis.

1. A.R. Scott, Occupational high-pressure injection injuries:

Pathogenesis and prevention, J Soc Occup Med 33
(1983), 5659. doi:10.1093/occmed/33.2.56.
2. N. Verhoeven and R. Hierner, High-pressure injection
injury of the hand: An often underestimated trauma: Case
report with study of the literature, Strategies Trauma
Limb Reconstr 3 (2008), 2733. doi:10.1007/s11751-0080029-9.
3. M. Valentino, V. Rapisarda, and C. Fenga, Hand injuries
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DOI 10.1002/prs

Month 2016