Information Security on Smart Grids

Gkhan Satlm
Mu Alparslan niversitesi
Mu, Trkiye
g.satilmis@alparslan.edu.tr

Asm Kaygusuz
nn niversitesi
Malatya, Trkiye
asim.kaygusuz@inonu.edu.tr

AbstractSmart Grids are explained in terms of risk

management, security. Risk assessment is characterized and
examples
are
presented.
Furthermore,
international
organizational standards including: IEEE Smart Grid, National
Standard of P.R.C., National Institute of Technology and
International Electro Technical Community mentioned how they
contribute for a better Smart Grids. Example of malicious
software is given and finally a security strategy is given for
organizations as a guideline.
Index TermsSmart
Vulnerabilities

Grids,

Security,

Risk,

Threats,

topmost icon) connects all of the domains in a two-way flow of

information that is both dynamic and real-time. In sum, there
are numerous advantages to migrating to Smart Grids including
increased reliability via distribution grid management, load
adjustment and load balancing using Advance Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) and Demand Response (DR), increased
sustainability through DERS, greater flexibility in network
topology with wide area situational awareness and an overall
increase in efficiency. Hence, SG uses communication and
information technology to create a power grid that is more
efficient, reliable, safe, and durable while minimizing
expensive investments in new production capacity. [1]

I. INTRODUCTION
Electrical grids have been around since the 19th century.
Todays conventional grids transport energy from where it is
produced - coal plants, hydroelectric dams, nuclear power
plants to our homes and industrial areas where it is consumed
instantaneously. The traditional grid is designed for the
requirements of the 1950s when we didnt use that much
energy from power outlets. Today our energy requirements
have increased dramatically due to sophisticated technology
such as smart phones, smart TVs, air conditioners and electric
cars.
Earlier technology required an enormous, centralized power
plant that fed power over an electro-mechanical grid. This t
power flowed only one direction; from the power plant to
where it was consumed. However, in the last three decades, we
have witnessed a tremendous evolution in telecommunication
networks with communication technologies including cellular,
GPS, cable, satellite TV and the Internet reaching maturity.
Yet, the traditional grid remains both analog and electromechanical in spite of the remarkable changes in information
and communication technology. The pace of technological
innovation shows no signs of abating and the demands for
reliable electricity continue to place ever increasing demands
on an electrical supply infrastructure that is not keeping up
with technological advances. This mismatch between supply
and demand has led to the idea of the Smart Grid.
Figure 1 is an illustration of a Smart Grid. The flow of
electricity starts at the point of generation, then flows to a
distribution substation next to transmission cables and finally
to the point of consumption. With conventional grids this flow
is one-way. However with smart grids the flow is two-way
between transmission and the consumer thus reflecting the
incorporation of Distributed Energy Sources (DERS). Another
difference with traditional grids is the importance of the flow
of communication. Operations management (signified by the

Figure 1 Interactivity Domains of Smart Grids

SGs have many domains, but security remains the most
critical element of SG systems. Therefore, the following
security objectives must be added to SG systems in order to
make the grids more secure [2]. The primary security
objectives are:
Providing uninterrupted power supply to users.
Satisfying information integrity.
Protecting users private data.
These three objectives correspond to three fundamental
dimensions; availability, integrity and confidentiality known as
a CIA triad. Moreover, these dimensions are a useful way to
characterize security requirements, classify information, and
risk management.
Integrity refers to the ability by which we can
maintain and assure accuracy and completeness
of data. In other words, it is goal to prevent data
from being modified through illegal channels.

For example the manipulation of power readings

from smart meters. If the data is changed, has
this been done by an authorized entity?
Availability insures that the information is
available at a precise time for an operative
system. This means that each systems
computing system, security controls, and
communication channels must operate properly.
High availability systems promise to prevent
service disruptions due to power outages, hard
failures, and system upgrades. Available systems
must be able to prevent situations such as denialservice-attacks.
Confidentiality is the last security dimension
and it aims to protect data from being accessed
by unauthorized users. It has the least importance
if we consider SG automation as a whole.
Generally, confidentiality is another way of
saying privacy concerns. Therefore, it mainly
refers to the privacy of consumers and the energy
market.

A. Vulnerabilities
Every information system has vulnerabilities on different
levels and SG networks are no different. Unlike conventional
grid networks, SGs have many components which are
vulnerable to attacks. For instance, hackers might remotely
attack the network causing power outages. As proposed in [2],
critical vulnerabilities are outlined below.

There are two other security dimensions, authentication and

non-repudiation. Authentication is the process of making sure
someone or something really is who or what they claim to be.
On the other hand, non-repudiation is figuring out who is
responsible for authenticating.
II. RISK MANAGEMENT IN SG
Developing secure SGs requires a comprehensive way of
managing risk. For example, the US Department of Energy
provides the following definition of an efficient risk
management, systematically documenting and prioritizing
known and suspected control system vulnerabilities [threats]
and their potential consequences, so that energy sector asset
owners and operators will be better prepared to anticipate and
respond to existing and future threats. [2] There are four
different terms that need to be explained in detail. These are
risk, vulnerability, threat and consequences. First, risk is the
probability of an unwanted event which causes harm to
informational assets. A vulnerability is a weakness or hazard
that leads to damage to informational assets. A threat could be
anything that has a capability of causing danger. Lastly,
consequences may be the impact if the threat if no action is
taken. In the generic model of risk depicted below, risk is equal
to the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequences.

Customer Security: Smart meters measure the

amount of energy that is consumed in our homes.
The data shows not only how much our bill is
going to be, but also gives clues about our private
life such as times when we arent at home.
Increasing number of intelligent devices: SGs
have many intelligent devices connected to them,
which are responsible for electrical supply and
demand and anyone of these devices may be used
as entry points by hackers. Furthermore, due to
the complexity of SG networks monitoring these
potential entry points is extremely difficult.
Physical Security: Traditional power systems
have enormous power plants that are protected by
fences, 7/24 online security cameras and on-site
guards. However, most of a SGs components are
outside of a utility companys property. As a
result, these locations are unprotected and
vulnerable to unauthorized physical access.
Lifespan of Systems: Power and IT systems have
different lifespans, but they must be compatible
with SGs. Power systems have longer lifespans
than IT systems and this mismatch may be a weak
security point.
Using Internet Protocol (IP) in SG: IP
standards are compatible with various electronic
components. However, IP based systems are
naturally weak to attacks like IP spoofing, Tear
Drop, Denial of Service, and other internet based
attacks.
Stakeholders: Stakeholders can be a weak point
for a possible of insider attacks.

B. Threats
Threat is a multiplication factor for calculating risk and also
has many consequences such as, destruction of power systems,
disclosure of private information, manipulation of the energy
market, interruption of operations, and denial of services.
Threats are divided in two classes: accidental and deliberate
ones [3].

THREAT X VULNERABILITY X CONSEQUENCES = RISK

Accidental Threat: These include natural

disasters, careless equipment failure and human
carelessness are examples of accidental threats.
These threats may be more hazardous than
deliberate ones.
Deliberate Threats: If these types of threats are
successful, their consequences can inflict

tremendous damage at different levels including

legal, social and financial.
The following table lists different possible threats and their
types and additional threats can be found European Network
and Information Agency SG Security Report.
I.
Types of Threats[3]

Technical

Corporate Image
and Information
management

Legal, social
aspects and
human ethics

Organizational

International
Relations/Politics

Marketing/
Economical
/Financial

Environment

Threat Classifications
Malware
Unauthorized firmware replacement
Physical manipulation of devices' subcomponents
Traffic injection
Sensible information theft
Low quality information for decision making
Lack of comprehensive insurance coverage
Unfavorable contractual agreements
Rumour
Weak knowledge of regulations
Strike
Sabotage
Employee unreliability
Retention
Error
Weak relations between management staff
Weak internal controls
Badly controlled outsourcing
Labour accidents
Illness
War
Terrorism
Regional conflict
Organized crime
Government corruption
Product/service boycott
Non adapted product
Bad strategic decisions
High competition
Negative Return on Investment (ROI)
Radio-electric incident
Pollution
Nuclear catastrophe
Chemical disaster
Biological disaster

We witnessed many cyber-attacks to SGs. For instance,

considering power generation, Edwin I nuclear power plant
was forced to shut down emergently due to software update.
Public didnt receive any danger, but the power company
lost millions of dollars. Concerning, distribution and
transmission, US electric grid was under attack in 2009. IT
administrations recognized that hackers from China and
Russia had hacked and hidden a software that is capable of
cutting power supply at any time. In terms of AMI, Mike
Davis, a security consultant, demonstrated a simulated
cyber-attack to whole metering infrastructure and managed
to take control of smart meters, which are about 15,000 out
of 22,000 houses in a 24 hours time. [3]
A software called Stuxnet was detected in June 2010. This
malware is similar to a worm due to two reasons: Firstly,
taking advantage of vulnerabilities for disturbing systems
and secondly for being an Industrial Control Security
rootkit, it can modify accidentally Programmable Logic

Controllers behavior, specifically Siemens S7 PLC

microcontrollers. This sophisticated tool can only be
developed by governments due to its capabilities. Security
experts consider that Iranian Natanz nuclear facility is the
target. Duqu is also another a worm. Duqu and Stuxnet have
in common their source code, so the authors of both
software may be the same people. Unlike Stuxnet, Duqus
main mission is to collect information for future attacks.
I. ORGANIZATIONS FOR SG STANDARDS
There are international organizations that deal with
securing Smart Grids by publishing standards. These
organizations include: International Electro technical
Community (IEC), IEEE Smart Grid, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and National Standard of
Peoples Republic China (P.R.C.).
A. International Electro Technical Community (IEC)
IEC established Strategic Group (SG3) on SG in 2008. The
IEC intended to achieve standards on security, High Voltage
Direct Current (HVDC), blackout prevention, DERS, AMI,
DR, and load management.
IEC 62357, IEC 61970, IEC 61968 and IEC 62351 are an
example of standards. Moreover, IEC61850 deals with
substation automation and it features data modelling, reporting
schemes, commands and data storage. [4]
B. National Institute of Technology (NIST)
NIST publishes Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity in
three volumes: Volume 1; Smart Grid Cybersecurity Strategy,
Architecture, and High-Level Requirements, Volume 2;
Privacy and the Smart Grid, Volume; and Supportive Analyses
and References on September 2014.
Organizations should use these reports for identifying and
applying appropriate security requirements.
C. IEEE Smart Grid
The IEEE Smart Grid is established by IEEE and its goal is
to develop standards, conferences, publications and education.
IEEE works closely with NIST on standards. IEEE has
published more than 100 standards for addressing many
technologies such as broadband over power lines, cyber
security, DERs, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), and
Green gas emission credits. For example, IEEE 1686-2007 is a
standard for substation Intelligent Electronic Devices Cyber
Security Capabilities and IEEE 2030-2011 is another standard
for Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy
Technology and Information Technology Operation with the
Electric Power System, End-use Applications, and Loads.
D. National Standard of P.R.C.
There are three codes for standards and these are GB, GB/T
and GB/Z. GB is used for mandatory national standards, GB/T
means voluntary national standards and GB/Z refers to national
standardization guiding technical documents. State Grid
Corporation of China uses the GB18336 for Smart Grid
Security Assessment.

II. CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY

III. CONCLUSION

Cyber security strategies aim to address prevention, detection,

response, and recovery. Figure 2 illustrates these tasks in the
SGs .The set of use case analysis is helpful for defining risk
assessment, developing reference models, and setting the
security requirements in Task 1. Performance of risk
assessment is calculated by taking into account top-down
analysis, bottom-up analysis, and vulnerability classes in Task
2. The output of task 2 is the basis for determining security
requirements. Moreover, privacy assessments should also be
considered when an organization implements security
standards. The following source documents are used for highlevel security requirements in Task 3.

SGs are a system of systems and have a complex

architecture so there are inevitable vulnerabilities, threats, and
risks that could disrupt millions of lives. Securing such a
critical infrastructure is vital and governments and utility
companies must give importance to it.

NIST SP 800-53, Revision 3, Recommended Security

Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations, August 2009;
NERC CIP 002, 003-009, version 3;
Catalog
of
Control
Systems
Security:
Recommendations for Standards Developers,
Department of Homeland Security, March 2010.

The goal of task 4a is to develop a reference model and the

goal of task 4b is to assess SG standards. Conformity
assessment, also known as compliance assessment is a process
whether a service meets technical standards and satisfy relevant
requirements. Finally, a conformity assessment is done.
1.Start with case
analysis

Top-down
analysis

2.Risk Assessment
Vulnerability
Threat
Consequences

Bottom-down
analysis

3.High-level
security
requirements

Privacy
Assesment

4b.Smart Grid
Standards
Assessment

4a.Security
Architecture

Existing
Standards (CIP,
IEEE,
IEC, etc.

5.Conformity
Assessment

Figure 2 Tasks in SG Security Strategy [5]

REFERENCES
[1] Satlm, G. (2015). Designing A PLC Modem for Smart Grid
Applications (Master Dissertation)
[2] Fadi Aloula, A. R. Al-Alia , Rami Al-Dalkya, Mamoun AlMardinia, Wassim El-Hajjb, Smart Grid Security: Threats,
Vulnerabilities and Solutions, 2012 International Journal of
Smart Grid and Clean Energy
[3] European Network and Information Agency, Smart Grid
Security, Annex II. Security aspects of the smart grid
[4] Wang, Y., et al. (2011). Analysis of Smart Grid security
standards. Computer Science and Automation Engineering
(CSAE), 2011 IEEE International Conference on.
[5] Introduction to NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber
Security, September 2010