MALDJI Souma

Pr Cizel
Thursday, 3 April 2014

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Obamas Rebalancing to the Pacific

and its Implications on US-China 1Relations

Manyin, Mark E. and Stephen Dagett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F.
Martin, Ronald ORourke, Bruce Vaughn. Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administrations Rebalancing Toward Asia. Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress. March 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf

Szczudlik-Tatar, Justyna. Chinas Response to the United States AsiaPacific

Strategy. PISM Policy Paper 41. October 2012. https://www.pism.pl/files/?
id_plik=12076

Swaine, Michael D.. Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot


China Leadership Monitor 38. August 2012. http://www.hoover.org/
publications/china-leadership-monitor/9426

China, for the purpose of this paper, must be understood as the Popular Republic of China
(PRC), as opposed to the Republic of China (Tawan).

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The Asia-Pacific region has been at the center of a power struggle between China and
the US for several decades. Americas diplomatic and military presence in the AsiaPacific region has been a major concern since the end of World War II, and has
materialized through both the presence of a large military corps (over 90,000 troops in
2012, naval bases) and substantial diplomatic US involvement in regional political
developments. Chinas desire to become a major player in South East Asia particularly
has been embodied in its 1970s so-called reform and openness policy. Since then, it
has strived to become (at least) a regional pole using both soft and hard power, which
was greatly facilitated while the US was distracted by the war on terror both at home
and in the Middle East.
However, that is not to say that the US was absent from the Asia-Pacific under
the Bush administration. In fact, many policies initiated under Bush have been taken
over by Obamas administration. Hence, many observers argue that the Administration
has overstated the depth and extent of its pivot.

From this point of view, the

importance of the pivot stems not from its novelty or even its increased depth, but rather
its increased publicity. Indeed, the stakes of the pivot are higher for the Obama
administration (and even administrations to come) because audience costs have been
raised significantly. In other words, the US cannot back down or fail without losing
credibility. This level of commitment however required Obamas rebalancing to bring
some novelty to the USs stance in the Pacific. Indeed, if emerging countries potentially
counting on the US to counterbalance Chinas power may have high expectations of the
pivot, Chinas suspicion of Americas intentions are at least equally high, and may
impede the latters progress.
As a federal, non-partisan, public policy research institution, the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) is credited for offering an unbiased, insightful and factual
resource to Congress. This report thus offers a comprehensive understanding of the
Pivot to the Pacific, as well as a breakdown of the costs, risks and benefits of this
undertaking. However, the nature of the report does not allow it to provide an in-depth
analysis of Chinas reaction to the pivot. For this reason, two more articles will be
2

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p2

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needed to comprehend and analyze the Chinese perspective, and to evaluate the
implications that the pivot has had on Sino-American relations. Michael Swaines
article on the Chinese Leadership and Elite Response provides valuable insights into the
reactions of Chinese officials and intellectuals, and accounts for comments both from
opponents and moderate commentators. Interestingly enough, his research underlines
that the Pivot was not commented upon by authoritative sources as frequently as they
were by quasi- and non- authoritative sources (not explicitly expressing the regimes
views). Finally, Szczudlik-Tatars includes a more detailed analysis of Chinese reactions
to the pivot.
This paper will first examine what the pivot is and how it was perceived by
Asia-Pacific allies, before explaining how each aspect (military, economic and
diplomatic) impacts Sino-US relations.

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Obamas Asia-Pacific policy does not exist in a vacuum. It is rather the
continuity of the work of previous administrations, especially George W. Bushs. This
shows in the diplomatic realm with continued efforts to consolidate partnerships with
emerging countries (India, Vietnam, Indonesia) and to maximize regional integration
notably through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Just
as well, the strategy of rotational deployment (instead of establishing permanent
military bases) carried out under Bush, still goes under Obama. American goals and
interests in the region also remain essentially the same: to maintain stability, ensure
freedom of navigation and trade, and promote democratic values. Obamas policy is
said to have a much deeper and much wider approach to the region than his
predecessors had, however, the CRS report highlights that many of the moves the
Administration has taken and said it will undertake are relatively small-scale. Yet,
cumulatively they are designed to have a large symbolic impact.3
Obamas Asia-Pacific policy has been referred to by his administration and by
current literature both as a pivot and a rebalancing. The choice of word is
3

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p2-3, p7

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particularly interesting because if the term pivot implies a simple shift of Americas
interests to the Pacific, rebalancing suggests a twofold approach. First, there is a
readjustment of US focus in the Asia-Pacific to counterbalance, in a way, its own
involvement in other regions. This could be called a rapprochement with Asia-Pacific
allies who prior to President Obama taking office, felt they had been neglected by the
United States4. This renewed commitment thus had for purpose to confirm Americas
interest and involvement with Asian allies, and to reassure them. This approach seems
to have been heard, since in February 2009, ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan
said about Hillary Clinton that her visit showed the seriousness of the United States to
end its diplomatic absenteeism in the region.5
Second, the term rebalancing suggests a US attempt to act as a counterweight
to regional poles, in particular China. The US has continuously tried to assuage Chinas
concerns and to deepen Chinas integration into the international community.6
However, its growing military, economic and diplomatic involvement in the region has
had Chinese officials suspicious of American intentions. Chinese hard-liners thus
consider that the Pivot has had for sole purpose to undermine Chinas influence in the
region because only Chinas rise can pose a potential challenge to [U.S.] hegemony.
According to Swaine, there is truth to this statement inasmuch as China had been, prior
to the pivot, significantly enhancing its military capabilities and increasing its presence
in South East Asia, and claiming disputed territories. Chinas growing assertiveness
had many Asian leaders weary, but more importantly threatened Washingtons ability
to project power in the region.7
Since 2011, the US has decided to increase its military footprint because of the
overall decrease in its defense budget. In other words, the US did not want its allies to
4

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p2

State Department, Beginning a New Era of Diplomacy in Asia, press release, February 18,
2009.
6
7

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p3

Michael D. Swaine. August 2012. p6 and Zhong Sheng, Goals of U.S. Return to Asia
Strategy Questioned, Peoples Daily, October 18, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
90780/7620216.html.

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think that budget cuts would turn its focus away from the region, on the contrary it had
to show renewed and ever so strong commitment to the Asia-Pacific partnership.
Therefore, in Australia, Singapore and the Philippines, American troops and naval bases
are expected to be deployed and military cooperation to be expanded. More interesting
is the Department of Defense (DoD)s Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)8, a
strategy to emphasize efforts to improve capabilities to defeat what planners describe
as Area Denial/Anti-Access strategies, which are known to be a focus for Chinas
military. Such strategies are employed (in this case by China) to destabilize or disable a
rival (the US) trying to project its influence in its backyard. At the same time, Defense
Secretary Panetta announced the USs intentions to focus the majority of its naval power
to the region. US military involvement will feature a broader distribution of forces,
increased flexibility, and enhancement the national defense and security capabilities of
key allies.9 This is aimed at strengthening ties with traditional partners in the region
while keeping the cost of military deployment relatively low.
As far as economic and diplomatic aspects of the rebalancing are concerned, the
US sought a greater involvement in the region for three reasons. First, it is at the center
of Obamas National Export Initiative aimed at promoting American Exports abroad.
Second, the region is going through a fast-paced integration process as shows the
dramatic increase in the number of multilateral free trade agreements from 3 to 61
between 2000 and 2010. Third, the US had to demonstrate its commitment to remain a
major regional player. American initiatives thus have taken several forms, from bilateral
agreements to participation in TPP FTA talks. The US notably focused on deepening
relations with

the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).10 It seems

interesting to note that although no ASEAN member in itself is a major power in the
region, the organization has become an indispensable partner, as its many partnerships
with Asia-Pacific countries show, especially as it seeks to create an Economic
8
9

Michael D. Swaine. August 2012. p4

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p4, p10

10

Formed in 1967, the association counts 10 members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand (founding members) as well as Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam.

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Community with a single market and production base. Obamas rebalance was quite
successful in terms of strengthening its trading partnership with ASEAN. From 2010 to
2011, exports rose by 8.6%, and imports by 9.2%11. From the point of view of its South
East Asian Partners, Americas engagement in Asia through regional organizations is a
reassuring factor, as US (attempted) leadership and influence can be counterbalanced by
the framework of the organization. In 2009, the US thus signed a Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN, and took part in dialogues on regional security and
development, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.
Even more significant are the ongoing TPP12 negotiations. If the agreement was
successful, it would increase U.S. access to the growing markets of Asia, help
stimulate the growth in U.S. exports, generate export-related jobs, and foster an
economic recovery, while enhancing the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights
and ensuring that U.S. companies are competing in a more fair and impartial regional
market13 This alliance would have beneficial spill-over effects for the US as it would
lower the risk of foul play in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, increasing the reliability
and safety of cargo floats. However, so far the negotiations have not been able to
overcome major disagreements on intellectual property rights and access to US
agricultural markets (which are highly subsidized and equally protected) to only
mention these two. The success of Obamas economic rebalancing to the pacific relies
deeply on the success of the TPP, as it would be the most integrated forum in the region.

As far as Sino-US relations are concerned, although US officials claimed that no

aspect of the rebalancing aimed at containing, encircling, or counterbalancing14 any
country, commentators both in China and the US highlight that Chinas growing
11

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p22 and Overview of ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations,
asean.org, June 2013. Accessed April 1, 2014 http://www.asean.org/news/item/overview-ofasean-us-dialogue-relations
12

Current countries involved in TPP negotiations are Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, but Japan, Canada and Mexico have
begun consultations to join the negotiations.
13
14

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p22

Michael D. Swaine. August 2012. p3

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military capabilities and its increasing assertiveness were certainly a motivator for US
military deployment in the region.15 Official Chinese statements on the rebalancing
have generally been sparse and mild, as they mostly express a hope to see increased
peace and stability in the region. However, according to Szczudlik-Tatar, Obamas
policies were perceived by Chinese observers as more confrontational than his
predecessors, as its diplomatic, military and economic involvement in the Asia-Pacific
are seen as attempts to constrain the PRCs position as a regional great power and a
future global superpower.16
Chinas self-description as a potential superpower (an idea that was comforted
by worldwide speculation on the evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar world, with
China as a counterweight to the US) partly explains the comparison of US strategy to its
past Cold War policies. Referring to the military alliance between the US and Australia,
a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense thus characterized the initiative as an
expression of a Cold War mentality, not [in accord with] the trend of peace,
development, and cooperation. Some Chinese observers have also stressed the
similarity of the current US Air-Sea Battle Concept to the Air-Land Battle concept
formerly used during the Cold War, implying that the US views China as the new Soviet
Union. However, Swaine underlines that this analysis greatly exaggerates the scope
and significance of the ASBC at this point in time, since the concept remains largely
undefined, unfunded, and unimplemented [] although the DoD has also explicitly
identified Iran and China. 17
There is among Chinese observers a shared opinion that the US is solely joining
Asia-Pacific institutions in order to counter the supposedly negative effects they have
on the US as they are effectively responsible for the US decline in the export sector.
Joining the TPP negotiations, was furthermore an attempt to alienate China from its
regional allies by creating divisions between them, undermining the process of regional
integration.
15

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p4, p10

16

Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar.. October 2012. p5

17

Michael D. Swaine. August 2012. p7-8 and Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar.. October 2012. p5

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Chinese observers are very pessimistic about the future of Sino-US relations, as
they believe the pivot could eventually generate a zero-sum competition with
Beijing, and thus undermine U.S. attempts to benefit from Asias dynamism or promote
a more stable regional security environment.18 However, the CRS report underlines
that these concerns might be grossly exaggerated as it is unlikely that Obamas
administration will successfully implement all the measures proposed. They indeed face
major obstacles, the biggest of which being obtaining congressional approval. Indeed
the administration simply cannot unilaterally ratify treaties or assign budget to any
project.19 The report further underlines that US efforts on all fronts (military,
diplomatic, and economic) so far have not been as significant and as forceful as Chinese
commentators fear them to be.

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18
19

Michael D. Swaine. August 2012. p4

Mark E. Manyin. et al. March 2012. p24