1.

Denver Automated baggage handling system 1994

In 1989 the Denver in the United States of America started construction a massive new
international airport. The airport was also designed to incorporate a new state of the art
integrated automated baggage handling system, [14]. The automated baggage handling system
was designed to distribute all baggage including transfers automatically between check-in, the
aircraft and pick-up on arrival. The system was thus meant to replace reliance of baggage
systems on manual labour with a fully-automated system, [14]. It was thus hoped that it would
reduce aircraft turnaround time for faster service to travellers. The automated baggage system
was initially estimated to cost $ 193 million to construct, [14]. However, massive problems
plagued this automated baggage system consequently, the New Denver Airport did not open in
October 1993 as scheduled. After missing later opening dates in April and May 1994, and only
opened in March 1995, with a delay of around 16 months, [14]. The problematic baggage
system ended up costing the city an extra $560 million, while the system only performed a
fraction of its original automation goals. To avoid further delays the project teams only option
was to revert to building an alternative system based on conventional conveyor belt technology
with the distribution of bag to concourses by tugs and carts, [14]. The alternative system was
operated for almost ten years before it was finally scraped due to high maintenance costs, [14].
The automated baggage system was not part of the original scope and was added in 1992 to add
further gloss to new state of the airport project, [14]. This choice to go ahead with the automated
baggage system went against the expert advice of Breier Neidle a feasibility consultant from Patrone
Associates. According to Neidle the complexity of the system made it unfeasible (Calleam
Consulting Ltd, 2008), [14]. 16 bidders were invited to bid yet only three bids were received, and
none of the bidders reported that they could achieve the October 1993 deadline of when the airport
was scheduled to open. The city of Denver rejected all three bids and decided instead to approach.
BAE Automation Systems to expand the existing united airlines baggage handling system into an

integrated system capable of handling baggage at all three of the airports concourses, for all airlines
departing and arriving, [14]. BAE was the obvious choice for the installation as they had a reputation
of being among the best and, and had been responsible for most of the major baggage systems
installed in the United States up to that point. .The foremost goal of the automated baggage system
was to cut aircraft turnaround time to as low as 30 minutes in so doing improving operations and
eradicating the time wasting manual conveyor and tug baggage handling and sorting system, [14].
BAE initially expressed misgivings about the complexity of the project and having a two year
deadline. A similar system built for Munichs took a full two years to complete, followed by six months
of round the clock testing before the actual launch, [14]. However these concerns were ignored and
the project went ahead with the two year dead line.

The automated baggage system planned was Unique in its complexity, its innovative
technology, and its projected capacity. It was designed to deliver each bag, including
transfers, individually from check-in to the baggage reclaim, [14]. The distribution
apparatus consisted of approximately 9 km of conveyors and over 27 km of track on
which 4000 individual radio controlled carts or destination coded vehicles (DCV) would
circulate. The capacity of each track was supposed to be 60 DCVs per minute, [14].
The layout of the automated baggage system at Denver required that the conveyor belts feed
the central network of DCVs, [14]. The bags were not meant flow continuously from the
conveyor belts, however each bag had to be independently placed on its exclusive cart, [14].
This meant that the delivery of the bags from the conveyor belts had to t be carefully controlled.
Additionally, the conveyor belt could only advance when there was an empty cart onto which the
leading bag on the conveyor belt could be placed. The speed with which the conveyor belts
could advance was dependent on the rate of delivery of empty carts to each conveyor belt, [14].
This is a fundamental point, at the heart of the problems with the original design. The
destination of each bag and its individual cart was meant to be defined by bar-coded labels, and
transmitted by via radio frequency identification to tags on the constantly moving vehicles, [14].
The operation of the vehicles was meant to be controlled by a network of about 150 computers.

Speed was considered as critical to the commercial success of the New Denver Airport, [15]. The
owners of the airport was marketed to the airlines as a highly efficient center for operations due to its
numerous parallel runways and future ability to rapidly turn around aircraft flights. The leading airline
at Denver, United airlines insisted on a swift baggage handling system being installed before signing
its lease with Denver, [15] .In spite of the vital significance of the automated baggage system, its
design was basically an afterthought. The Denver system was conceptualized approximately two
years before the airport was scheduled to open long after construction of airport had commenced,
[15]. Due to tardiness of the design project was subject to two major constraints. The first constraint
was the geometry, the automated system needed to fit within the limitations of the airport passenger
buildings and the underground tunnel connecting the concourses and the terminal, [15]. In several
cases it was crammed in and presented considerable inconvenience. Secondly, the deadlines were
tight, the system was meant to be implemented within 21 months. The schedule excluded wideranging simulations and physical testing of the full design, [15].

Another startling omission in the design of the fully automated baggage system at
Denver was that it did not include a viable backup system, [16]. The planners didnt set
aside set of tugs and carts that could cope with the level of baggage expected nor did
the set aside access paths between check in facilities and the aircraft, [16].
2.1.1.1.1

Failure Modes of the Project

In essence the systems down fall according to (Schlohs, (1996); Neufville, (1994); and
Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008) was down to, [16]:
1. Miscalculations such as underestimating overall system complexity , underestimation of
tasks, a multitude of unplanned changes requested by the airline and Denver airports
management and critical mechanical, electrical and software failures.
2. The baggage system was of very complex nature, predisposed to errors. The lack of proper
planning in terms of the tight deadline which based on expert advice was unachievable. The
constricted schedule also meant that the system could not to be sufficiently tested.

3. Poor procurement management led to the bids of experts who point to the
impossibility of completing the baggage system within the remaining project duration
(2 years), being ignored.
4. Inefficient communication management or in some instances no communication controls
, lead to a project team member cancelling purchase orders for the electrical fitters
without any knowledge that the filters were part of the project. The filters were rehired
much later than they should of. The baggage handling system had to be force fitted into
the configuration of the already constructed airport

5. The lack of succession planning, came to haunt to the project team, in that Walter
Slinger, the systems de facto sponsor died in October 1992 leaving the project
without critical leadership. His successor lacked the technical know-how essential to
manage such a project.
6. The city of Denver initiated the project without including major stakeholders such as
Continental and United airlines both major airlines. When the airlines were finally got
involved in the project it lead to the persistent changes to the project strategy.