Purisima v Salanga

-returns: erasures and superimposistions;

recount valid
- A candidate affected can file a petition for
recount alone, without the concurrence of the
provincial board of canvassers. From the fact,
therefore, that the provincial board of
canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it
cannot be inferred that they were notconvinced,
a discrepancy existed.The Commission on
Elections' copies of election returns are
authentic copies within the meaning of Section
163 of the Revised Election CodeWhere, as in
the case at bar, there were patent erasures and
superimpositions in words and figures on the
face of the election returns submitted to the
board of canvassers, itwas imperative for said
board to stop the canvass so as to allow time
for verificationof authentic copies and recourse
to the courts.
Cauton v. COMELEC
-Irregularity in canvassing of votes:
COMELEC issued resolution to open
ballots; valid?
- the Commission on Elections, in the exercise
of its power, may order the opening of the ballot
boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside
each ballot box is also tampered like the three
copies outside the ballot box, corresponding to
each precinct. The Commission on Elections
may do this on its own initiative, or upon
petition by the proper party. Once it is found
that the copy of the election return inside the
ballot box is untampered, the Commission on
Elections would then have accomplished two
things, namely: (1) secured a basis for the
prosecution for the violation of the laws relative
to elections, and (2) afforded the party
aggrieved by the alteration of the election
returns outside the ballot box a basis for a
judicial recount of the votes as provided for in
Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.

The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to

protect the integrity of elections and to
suppress all evils that may violate its purity and
defeat the will of the voters.
Arroyo v. DOJ
-DOJ & Comelec creating a a Joint
Committee and Fact Finding Team; WON
panel undermines
- grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec
and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision
in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding
probable cause for election offenses shall still
be approved by the Comelec in accordance
with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. With
more reason, therefore, that we the the court
cannot consider the creation of the Joint
Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs
independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The creation of a Joint Committee
is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law
The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the
situation where one files a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which
was immediately acted upon by said office and
the re- filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the
DOJ). The subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction by the second office over the cases
filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled
rule that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Ongsiako v. Comelec

-WON C. has jurisdiction over Ptr who is

proclaimed as winner; taken oath
- Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because
the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after
the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, as stated in Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one
to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Thus
the petitioner cannot be considered a member
of the HR yet as she has not assumed office
nd
yet. Also, the 2
requirement was not validly
complied with as a valid oath must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session.
Here, although she made the oath before
Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it
was made during plenary or in open session
and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied.
Macalintal v COMELEC
-Oversees Absentee Voting Act of 2003:
Filipino immigrant affidavit: intent to
return to Phil. Is void: WON correct
- No.There can be no absentee voting if the
absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period
required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one
is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election
laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus,
an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter
(absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant
does not execute the affidavit then he is not

qualified as an absentee voter. 2nd The said

provision should be harmonized. It could not be
the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC
to include the proclamation of the winners in
the vice-presidential and presidential race. To
interpret it that way would mean that Congress
allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The
canvassing
and
proclamation
of
the
presidential and vice presidential elections is
still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.
People v. Corral
-State has the right to deprive a persons
right to suffrage
- Yes. The right of the State to deprive persons
to the right of suffrage by reason of their having
been convicted of crime, is beyond question.
"The manifest purpose of such restrictions
upon this right is to preserve the purity of
elections. The presumption is that one
rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or
other base offense indicative of moral turpitude,
is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to
hold office. The exclusion must for this reason
be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed
for protection and not for punishment, the
withholding of a privilege and not the denial of
a personal right.
Appellants
contention:
end
of
punishment
ends
also
his
disqualifications for election
- No. Neither is there any merit in the
contention advanced by counsel for the
appellant that the disqualification imposed on
the latter must be considered as having been
removed at the expiration of his sentence. This
claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the
nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a
punishment when, as already indicated, the
correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection
and not for punishment,. the withholding of a

privilege and not the denial of a personal right."

Judicial interpretation and long established
administrative practice are against such a view.
Yra v. Akbayan
- is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold
a municipal office for the reason that he was
not a qualified voter in his municipality,
connoting that he was not a qualified elector
therein, sufficient to nullify his election? - No.
One of the qualifications required by law of a
person who announces his candidacy is that he
must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive
Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when
applied to a voter does not necessarily mean
that a person must be a registered voter. To
become a qualified candidate a person does
not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient
that he possesses all the qualifications
prescribed in section 431 and none of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The
fact that a candidate failed to register as an
elector in the municipality does not deprive him
of the right to become a candidate to be voted
for. Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides
that "No person shall be eligible to any office
who is not at time of his election a qualified
voter of the city and who has not resided
therein three years preceding his election." It
was said that "The act of registering is only one
step towards voting, and it is not one of the
elements that makes the citizen a qualified
voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote. Registering does
not confer the right; it is but a condition
precedent to the exercise of the right." The
distinction is between a qualified elector and
the respondent is such, and a registered
qualified elector and the respondent is such
although not in his home municipality.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right
of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right.It should not be forgotten that the people

of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to

be their local chief executive is the respondent.
The will of the electorate should be respected.
Maquiling v. COMELEC
-Use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects
ones qualification to run for public office
- We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that
such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which
he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position. The citizenship
requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just
at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which
violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack. by using his US
passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code applies to his
situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.
FrivaldovCOMELEC
No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship.
As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not
a Filipino. He lost his citizenship when he
declared allegiance to the United States. Even

if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not

restore his being a Filipino because he did not
undergo
naturalization
or
repatriation
proceedings. Neither did his participation in the
1988
elections
restore
his
Philippine
citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person.
He cannot serve as governor when he owes
allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he
was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone.
MercadovManzano
DualCitizenisdisqualifiedtoholdpublicoffice
The court ruled that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand,
refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec.
5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and The court ruled that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand,

refers to a situation in which a person

simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec.
5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
Lonzanidav.COMELEC
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and
served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the
May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner.
He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation was contested and
resulted to declaring his opponent winning the
election and ordered Lonzanida to vacate the
office.
The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be
considered a full term of office for two reasons,
he cannot be considered elected as the
proclamation was void and he also did not
voluntary renounce office, but was involuntary
severance from office.
Abundov.COMELEC
The instances wherein such consecutive
terms are not considered as having been
involuntarily interrupted or broken are as
follows:
(1)Assumption of Office by Operation of Law;
(2)Recall Election; (3) Conversion of a
Municipality into a City; (4)Period of Preventive
Suspension; and (5) Election Protest
MarquezvCOMELEC
fugitivefromjustice:No. Although it is provided

in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations

implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 that for a person to be considered a
fugitive from justice, he or she has to be
convicted by final judgment, but such definition
is an ordinate and under circumscription of the
law. For the term fugitive from justice includes
Atty.RisosVidalvCOMELEC
May former President Joseph Estrada run for
public office despite having been convicted of
the crime of plunder which carried an
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
to hold public office?
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised
Arateav.COMELEC
the alleged "second placer," should be
proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas
certificate of candidacy wasvoid ab initio. In
short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all.
All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus,
Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code are specifically enumerated.A petition for
disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers
to "the commission of prohibited acts and
possession of a permanent resident status in a
foreign country." All the offenses mentioned

not only those who after conviction to avoid

punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition
truly
finds
support
from
jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as
expressing
the
general
and
ordinary
connotation of the term.
in Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to
violations of other penal laws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Section
68 that would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or
offenses covered under Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when
there is false material representation of the
contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of
candidacy. The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office x
x xThe conviction of Lonzanida by final
judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor,
disqualifies him perpetually from holding
any public office, or from being elected to
any
public
office.
This
perpetual
disqualification took effect upon the finality
of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically
carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification
and
perpetual
special

disqualification. Under Article 30 of the

Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected
to such office. The duration of temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of
the principal penalty of prisin mayor.On the
other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised
Penal
Code,
perpetual
special
disqualification means that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public
office
during
the
period
of
his
disqualification, which is perpetually. Both
temporary
absolute
disqualification
and
perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold
elective public office.A person suffering from
these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for
elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
so run.Effect of a Void Certificate of
CandidacyA cancelled certificate of candidacy
void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.As the

Comelec stated in their February 2011

Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San
Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him
should
be
considered
stray
votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who
remains as the sole qualified candidate for the
mayoralty post and obtained the highest
number of votes, should now be proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy
was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was
never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo,
who therefore received the highest number of
votes.Petition dismissed.