VENUE/JURISDICTION

the Informations would be improper,

considering that the defects of the Informations
were not of form but of substance.

Case 1
Agustin v. Pamintuan

The OSG maintained that the failure of the

Informations to allege that the private
respondent is a resident of Baguio City is not a
jurisdictional defect. It asserted that the
averment in the Informations that the crimes
charged were committed within the jurisdiction
of the trial court in Baguio City, taken in
conjunction with the other allegations therein
are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the
subject cases in the RTC of Baguio City.

Facts:
Petitioner Victor Agustin was charged with 4
separate Informations of libel by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio. He was
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to all the
charges. On September 10, 2001, he then filed
a Motion to Quash the Informations on the sole
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over
the offenses charged. He pointed out that the
said Informations did not contain any allegation
that the offended party was actually residing in
Baguio City or that the alleged libelous articles
were printed and first published in a newspaper
of general circulation in Baguio City. Private
complainant opposed the motion alleging that
he was a bona fide resident and acting general
manager of Baguio Country Club.

Issue:
Whether the RTC of Baguio City has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the
four Informations.

Ruling:

The RTC issued an order denying the

MTQ and the motion for reconsideration of the
Order. Petitioner then brought the case to the
CA. The CA rendered a decision dismissing the
petition and the motion for reconsideration of
the decision for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner
filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition
before the Supreme Court.

The SC granted the petition, holding

that the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction.
The SC held that venue in criminal
cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or Information, and the offense must
have been committed or any of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Article 360 of the RPC
provides that the criminal and civil action for
damages in cases of written defamations, shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city

The petitioner contented that in the absence of

any allegations in the Informations that the
private respondent was actually residing in
Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles
were printed and first published in Baguio as
mandated by Article 360 of the RPC, the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the offenses
charged. He asserted that the amendments of
1

where the libelous article is printed and first

published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense.

affidavit executed by complainant and the

information filed before the court state that
complainants residence is in Marikina, thus the
dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is
that jurisdiction is determined solely by the
allegations contained in the complaint or
information. The trial court rendered an Order
dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction
and it held that the editorial box of Abante is in
Manila and that the address of complainant is
in Marikina as provided in the information.

In the case at bar, the Informations

did not allege that the offended party was
actually residing in Baguio City at the time of
the commission of the offenses, or that the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published in Baguio City. It cannot even be
inferred from the allegation 'the offended party
was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club and of good standing and
reputation in the community that the private
complainant was actually residing in Baguio
City.

The complainant then filed a motion for

reconsideration insisting that at the time the
alleged libelous article was published, he was
actually residing in QC. According to him, he
mistakenly stated that he was a resident of
Marikina at the time of publication but he
rectified the error by his supplemental affidavit
which indicated QC as his actual residence at
the time of publication of the defamatory
article.
However,
the
motion
for
reconsideration was denied.

Case 2
Macasaet v. People
Facts:

Respondents file a notice of appeal to the Court

of appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the
ruling of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the CA,
hence this petition before the Supreme Court.

Petitioners were charged with the crime of libel

before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the
ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
According to petitioners, as the information
discloses that the residence of private
respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of
Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to Article 360 of the RPC. The
public prosecutor argued that the RTC of QC
had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained
that during the time material to this case, the
complainant was a resident of both QC and
Marikina as shown in his Reply-Affidavit filed
during his preliminary investigation of the case.
The petitioners contended that the complaint-

Issue:
Whether the RTC of QC had jurisdiction.

Ruling:
The RTC of QC had no jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court held that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
2

should have been committed or any one of its

essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.

renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for

private respondent, the information filed before
the trial court falls way short of this
requirement. The assistant city prosecutors
failure to properly lay the basis for invoking the
jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City,
effectively denied said court of the power to
take cognizance of this case.

In libel cases, the criminal

action and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense.

Case 3
Campamano vs Datuin

In the case at bar, private respondent

was a private citizen at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article,
hence, he could only file his libel suit in the
City of Manila where Abante was first
published or in the province or city where he
actually resided at the time the purported
libelous article was printed.

Facts:
Seishin
International
Corporation,
represented by its president-herein petitioner
David B. Campanano, Jr. filed against
respondent. An Information for violation ofB.P.
Blg. 22. respondent was convicted of Estafa by
the Regional Trial Court, of Pasig City by
Decision of May 3, 1999. Meanwhile,
sometime in July 15, 2003when he vacated his
office, found the cash voucher evidencing his
cash payment of the two (2) road rollers, Sakai
brand, which he purchased from Mr. Yasonobu
Hirota, representing Seishin International
Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash
voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and it was
signed by respondent and Mr. Hirota.

A perusal, however, of the information

involved in this case easily reveals that the
allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of
Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating
Quezon City at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who
prepared the information did not bother to
indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC
Quezon
City
was
invoked
either
because Abante was printed in that place or
private respondent was a resident of said city at
the time the claimed libelous article came out.
As these matters deal with the fundamental
issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates
that either one of these statements must be
alleged in the information itself and the absence
of both from the very face of the information

Claiming that the complaint of Seishin

International Corporation against him was
false, unfounded and malicious respondent
filed a complaint for Incriminating Against
Innocent Persons, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon city against petitioner
and a certain Yasunobu Hirota.

In filing the complaint for Estafa - fully

knowing that it was baseless and without
factual or legal basis, according to
respondent Mr. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota
should be criminally liable for the crime of
Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

affidavit is that it is where respondent

resides. Respondent's complaint-affidavit was
thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals' conclusion-basis of its
reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since
petitioner's November 20, 2003 CounterAffidavit to respondent's complaint for
incriminating innocent person was executed in
Quezon City, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation of the case is
thus erroneous.

By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City dismissed respondent's complaint for
incriminating innocent person It appearing that
the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City , and
the testimony given by respondent David
Campano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City , this
office has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled
complainant.

In any event, the allegations in the complaintaffidavit do not make out a clear probable cause
of incriminating innocent person under Article
363 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:

the petition is Granted. The Court of Appeals

Decision of December 9, 2005 is Reversed and
set aside. The complaint of respondent for
Incriminating Innocent Person filed against
petitioner David Campamano, Jr. is Dismissed

whether the City prosecutor of Quezon City

has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the
respondent

Complaint/Information

Held:

Case 4
LUIS MARCOS P. LAURELvs. HON.
ZEUS C. ABROGAR,
Facts:
Petitioner is one of the accused in
Criminal action filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 150. The
Amended Information charged the accused
with theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
with Motion to Defer Arraignment, on the
ground that the factual allegations in the
Amended Information do not constitute the
felony of theft. The trial court denied the
Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as

It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an

essential element of jurisdiction; and that the
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information.
The complaint-affidavit for incriminating
innocent person filed by respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the
crime charged or any of its essential ingredients
was committed in Quezon City . The only
reference to Quezon City in the complaint4

well petitioners subsequent Motion for

Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the
Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the ruling of the RTC. The CA then, directed
the RTC to issue an order grating the motion of
the petitioner to quash the Amended
Information, holding that Amended Information
does not contain material allegations charging
petitioner with theft of personal property since
international long distance calls and the
business of providing telecommunication or
telephone services are not personal properties
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Refer the Case
to the Supreme Court En Banc. It maintains
that the Amended Information charging
petitioner with theft is valid and sufficient; that
it states the names of all the accused who were
specifically charged with the crime of theft of
PLDTs international calls and business of
providing telecommunication or telephone
service in Makati City by conducting ISR or
International Simple Resale; that it identifies
the international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service of
PLDT as the personal properties which were
unlawfully taken by the accused; and that it
satisfies the test of sufficiency as it enabled a
person of common understanding to know the
charge against him and the court to render
judgment properly.
According to the OSG, prosecution
under Republic Act (RA) No. 8484 or
the Access Device Regulations Act of 1998and
RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 does not preclude prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code for the crime of theft. The
latter embraces unauthorized appropriation or
use of PLDTs international calls, service and
business, for personal profit or gain, to the
prejudice of PLDT as owner thereof. On the
other hand, the special laws punish the
surreptitious and advanced technical means
employed to illegally obtain the subject service
and business. Even assuming that the correct
indictment should have been under RA 8484,

the quashal of the information would still not

be proper. The charge of theft as alleged in the
Information should be taken in relation to RA
8484 because it is the elements, and not the
designation of the crime, that control.
Issue:
whether the information should be quashed for
being insufficient.
Ruling
The SC resolved to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration but remanded the case to the
trial court for proper clarification of the
Amended Information.
Petitioners acts constitute theft of
respondent PLDTs business and service,
committed by means of the unlawful use of the
latters facilities. In this regard, the Amended
Information inaccurately describes the offense
by making it appear that what petitioner took
were the international long distance telephone
calls, rather than respondent PLDTs
business. Therefore, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone service
are personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in
ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under
said
article. However,
the
Amended
Information describes the thing taken as,
international long distance calls, and only later
mentions stealing the business from PLDT as
the manner by which the gain was derived by
the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy
of description, this case must be remanded to
the trial court and the prosecution is directed to
amend the Amended Information, to clearly
state that the property subject of the theft are
the services and business of respondent
PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
necessitated by a mistake in charging the
proper offense, which would have called for the
dismissal of the information under Rule 110,
Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be
sure, the crime is properly designated as one of
theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply
to ensure that the accused is fully and
5

sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause of

the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of
his rights under the Constitution.

why it was withheld was the complainant's

failure to submit a counter-affidavit.

case 5
NOTAN LUMBOS, complainant, vs.JUDGE
MARIE
ELLENGRID
S.L.BALIGUAT,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1,
General Santos City, respondent.

Issue
Whether or not the acts committed by the
respondent judge constitute gross ignorance of
the law, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty,
and oppression warranting dismissal from
judicial service and disbarment.

Facts
Administrative complaint was filed against
Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. Baliguat , MTCC,
Branch 1, General Santos City.

Ruling:

Complainant alleges that:

instead of
dismissing the case for patent lack of
jurisdiction, respondent judge conducted the
Preliminary Investigation without prior
application for the issuance of warrant of arrest;
with the object of issuing a warrant of arrest
against all accused, respondent propounded a
series of suggestive rather than searching
questions and merely tried to confirm her
preconceived presumption of guilt of all
accused via suggestive questions; respondent
issued an Order for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against complainant and his co-accused
without giving them a fair chance to file their
respective counter-affidavits.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or

proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.9 And prior to the
issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC10 which took
effect on October 3, 2005, among the officers
authorized by Sec. 2, Rule 11211 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to
conduct preliminary investigation are the city
prosecutors and judges of the MTC and MCTC.
The Charter of General Santos City,
specifically Sec. 84,12 authorizes the city court
to conduct preliminary investigations for any
offense without regard to the limits of
punishment and may release or commit and
bind over any person charged with such offense
to secure his appearance before the proper
court.

Respondent claims that: the conduct of the

Preliminary Investigation and the subsequent
issuance of the warrant of arrest are well within
the authority given in the Sections 84 and 86,
R. A. No. 5412 (City Charter of General Santos
City); there was no usurpation of authority of
an RTC Judge when she issued the assailed
warrant of arrest as she has authority to do so
under the City Charter; there was no grave
abuse of discretion when she held in abeyance
the resolution of the prayer for the lifting of the
warrant of arrest because the primary reason

Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules on

Criminal Procedure, without waiting for the
conclusion of the investigation, the judge may
issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
6

examination in writing and under oath of the

complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

Resolution finding the existence of a probable

cause for syndicated Estafa against private
respondents and Tafalla with no bail
recommended. The Resolution was approved
by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
An Information was filed on the same day by
Prosecutor Jurado against private respondents
and Tafalla before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and raffled off to the sala of
Honorable Judge Lucas Bersamin.

Wherefore, Administrative case against Judge

Baliguat is DISMISSED. In line with A.M. No.
05-8-26-SC, withdrawing the power to conduct
preliminary investigation from judges of the
first level courts, she is ADVISED to refer
criminal cases for preliminary investigation to
the Office of City Prosecutor for appropriate
action.

That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000

or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another in a syndicated
manner consisting of five (5) or more persons
through corporations registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and/or unregistered foreign entities with
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with
intent to gain and by means of fraud and deceit,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and
several other persons in the following manner,
to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or
representing, in a transaction or series of
transactions, which they made with the
Complainant and the public in general to the
effect that they were in a legitimate business of
foreign exchange trading successively or
simultaneously operating under the following
name and style of Asia Profits Philippines,
Incorporation,
Winggold
Management
Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management
Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited
or other unregistered foreign entities induced
and succeeded in inducing complainant and
several other persons to give and deliver and in

SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
Case 6
Catiis vs. CA anent to SUFFICIENCY OF
COMPLAINT
G.R. NO. 153979
February 6, 2006
Facts: Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated
May 28, 2001 against private respondents
Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez,
Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain
Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, for violation of Art.
315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689
(syndicated estafa) and other related offenses.
Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed
their joint counter-affidavits denying the
charges against them.
On October 10, 2001, Assistant City
Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a
7

fact, the latter and said persons gave and

delivered to said accused the amount of at least
US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine
Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, the accused knowing fully well
that the above-named corporations registered
with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign
entities are not licensed nor authorized to
engage
in
foreign
exchange
trading
corporations and that such manifestations and
representations to transact in foreign exchange
were false and fraudulent that resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant and
other persons and that the defraudation pertains
to funds solicited from the public in general by
such corporations/associations.

Private Prosecutor with the conformity of

Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O.
Malabaguio.
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued
an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of
November 7, 2001 by declaring that the offense
charged is bailable. In finding that the accused
are entitled to bail.

Issue:
Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding
that the crime charged is bailable despite that
the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua?

On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P.

Bersamin issued an Order finding probable
cause against all the accused and approved the
recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the
charge be non-bailable. The corresponding
warrants of arrest were issued.

Held:
The Court held that since the crime charged
was not committed by a syndicate as defined
under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment
to death cannot be imposed on private
respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when
he ruled that private respondents could only be
punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua in case of conviction since the amount
of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00.

A return on the warrant of arrest was made by

PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, with the information that
except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at
large, all other accused were already detained at
the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing
was issued by Judge Bersamin setting the case
for arraignment on November 20, 2001. Private
respondents on the same day filed an urgent
motion to fix bail.

The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of

Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The
complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and

On November 20, 2001, private respondents,

when arraigned, entered pleas of not guilty. The
Prosecution was required to file their
comment/opposition on private respondents
motion to fix bail which they did through the
8

aggravating circumstances. If there is no

designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.

President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior

Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing
tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, at the base of the pit ran a drainage
tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out
of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the
Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons
of tailings into the rivers.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts

or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

On August 1996, the Department of

Justice separately charged petitioners in the
Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs
5 and 6 of the Water Code of the Philippines
(P.D. 1067), Section 8 of the National Pollution
Control Decree of 1976 (P.D. 984), Section
108 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A.
7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Damage to Property.

Clearly, it is now a requirement that the

aggravating as well as the qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically
alleged in the complaint or information.
Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the
trial court in their judgment, even, if they are
subsequently proved during trial. A reading of
the Information shows that there was no
allegation of any aggravating circumstance,
thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found
that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal,
is imposable in case of conviction.

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations

on the ground that the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the Department of Justice
charged more than one offense for a single act.

Case 7
JOHN ERIC LONEY VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152644

Issue:

February 10, 2006

Whether or not there is duplicity of

charges made against petitioner?

Facts:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven
Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the

Ruling:
9

There is no duplicity of charges in the

present case. Duplicity of charges simply
means a single complaint or information
charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In short, there is duplicity of
charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense. Petitioners contention
that they should be charged with one offense
only for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property because all the charges
filed against them "proceed from and are based
on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" has no merit because this Court had
ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the
same offense. Here, double jeopardy is not at
issue because not all of its elements are present.

Facts: Complainant Armed Forces and Police

Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI)
is a non-stock and non-profit association
authorized to engage in savings and loan
transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya
was elected as president and general manager
of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to
increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost
its lending capacity to its members.
Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the Board of
Trustees of AFPSLAI passed and approved
Resolution No. RS-88-006-048 setting up a
Finders Fee Program whereby any officer,
member or employee, except investment
counselors, of AFPSLAI who could solicit an
investment of not less than P100,000.00 would
be entitled to a finders fee equivalent to one
percent of the amount solicited.
In a letter dated September 1991, the Central
Bank wrote Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, then
Chairman of the Board of Trustees, regarding
the precarious financial position of AFPSLAI
due to its alleged flawed management. As a
result, Gen. Abadia requested the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
investigation on alleged irregularities in the
operations of AFPSLAI which led to the filing
of several criminal cases against petitioner, one
of which is the instant case based on the alleged
fraudulent implementation of the Finders Fee
Program.

On petitioners claim that the charge for

violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984,
and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se
felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be

acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the petitioner by granting the petition and
acquit the petitioner based on reasonable doubt.
The facts alleged in the information are
sufficient to constitute the crime of falsification
of private document. Specifically, the

Case 8
Title: Andaya vs. People of the Philippines
10

allegations in the information can be broken

down into the three aforestated essential
elements of this offense as follows: (1)
petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was
entitled to a finders fee from AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact
no finders fee was due to him; (2) the
falsification was committed on Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the falsification
caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of
P21,000.00.

designated the offense as estafa through

falsification of commercial document in the
preamble of the information. However, as
correctly ruled by the trial court, the subject
voucher is a private document only; it is not a
commercial document because it is not a
document used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions
nor is it defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law.
While the first and second elements of the
offense charged in the information were
satisfactorily established by the prosecution, it
is the third element which is decisive in the
instant case. In the information, it was alleged
that petitioner caused damage in the amount of
P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he caused it
to appear in the disbursement voucher that
Diosdado Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00
finders fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI
owed no such sum to him. However, contrary
to these allegations in the information,
petitioner was able to prove that AFPSLAI
owed a finders fee in the amount of
P21,000.00 although not to Guilas but to
Ernesto Hernandez.

The first element of the offense charged in the

information was proven by the prosecution.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue,
as well as the presentation of Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 established that petitioner
caused the preparation of the voucher in the
name of Guilas despite knowledge that Guilas
was not entitled to the finders fee.
Significantly,
petitioner
admitted
his
participation in falsifying the voucher when he
testified that he authorized the release of the
voucher in the name of Guilas upon the request
of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not
personally prepare the voucher, he could be
considered a principal by induction, had his
conviction been proper, since he was the
president and general manager of AFPSLAI at
the time so that his employees merely followed
his instructions in preparing the falsified
voucher.

It was positively shown that Hernandez was

able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 worth of
investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario
Mercader which entitled him to a finders fee
equivalent to one percent of the amount
solicited (i.e., P21,000.00) under the Finders
Fee Program. The documentary evidence
consisting of the Certificate of Capital
Contribution Monthly No. 52178 which was
presented by the prosecution categorically
stated that Rosario Mercader deposited
P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in
AFPSLAI. In fact, Rosario Mercader was no
longer presented as a defense witness in view

The second element of the offense charged in

the information, i.e., the falsification was
committed in Disbursement Voucher No.
58380, a private document, is likewise present.
It appears that the public prosecutor
erroneously characterized the disbursement
voucher as a commercial document so that he
11

of the stipulation by the prosecution on the fact

that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and
that Hernandez was the one who convinced her
to make such deposit. Moreover, the defense
showed that the disbursement voucher was
merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the
request of Hernandez so that he would have a
lower tax base. Thus, after Guilas received the
P21,000.00 from AFPSLAI, he gave the money
to petitioner who in turn surrendered the
amount to Hernandez.

On January 9, 2001, an information was filed

before the RTC of Manila, charging the
accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with
multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the
Court of Appeals finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson
with multiple homicide. The accused-appellant
asserts that the prosecutions evidence was
insufficient to prove her guilt, that she is
charged with crime not defined and penalized
by law.

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of

proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has
the duty to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for the said crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein.
However, in the case at bar, the prosecution
failed to prove the third essential element of the
crime charged in the information. Thus,
petitioner should be acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appelant is liable of
the crime of arson with multiple homicide and
whether or not the crime charged is not defined
and penalized by law.

Held:
What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. As stated in the body of information,
accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the house. Consequently, if
proved at the trial, she may be convicted, and
sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case not withstanding the
error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective
insofar as it states the facts constituting the
crime alleged therein.

Case 9
People vs. Malngan
Facts:
On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a
housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was accused
of setting fire the house of his employer
resulted in the destruction of his employers
house and the death of six persons including his
employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven
adjoining residential houses,were also razed by
fire.

12

distinct offense of child abuse committed

through the use of threatening words and child
abuse through the infliction of physical injuries.

Case 10
Jumaquio vs. Villarosa

Petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted

of grave threats and child abuse in the first case
and slight physical injuries and child abuse in
the second. In the first information, petitioner
charged with child abuse uttering debasing,
demeaning and degrading words to the minor.
In the second, he is charged with child abuse by
inflicting physical injuries. What controls is not
the title of the information or the designation of
the offense but the actual facts recited therein.
Moreover, an information is not duplicitous if it
charges several related acts, all of which
constitute a single offense, although the acts
may in themselves be distinct offenses.

Facts:
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses Resty
Jumaquio, with the crime of grave threats in
relation to RA 7610 and also accuses with the
crime of physical injuries. That on or about
August 2, 2003, the said accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten the minor, a 13 year old boy, and that
on the same date the said accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, box and hit the minors, 13 years old and
17 years old, thereby causing physical injuries
to the latter, which required medical treatment
for a period of three to five days, to their
damage and prejudice.

Amendment

That the above acts of the accused debases,

degrades and demeans the dignity of the
complaint and impairs their normal growth and
development.

Case 11
Rafael Gonzales vs. Hon. Tranquil P. Salvador,
Glen Dale, Et al.
G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006

Issue:
Facts:
Whether or not the several crimes charged with
the accused-appellant should be dismissed on
the grounds of could not be considered a crime
and could not even be complexed.

Rafael Gonzales filed a complaint of libel

against Glen Dale a.k.a. Rene Martel arising
from the latters column Bizz N Fizz in
Today newspaper. Finding that there is
probable cause, the Prosecutor filed
information before the said court. Petition for
Review the prosecutors resolution was raised
before the DOJ but was denied. Thus, Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition were raised
before the CA but was denied. Hence,

Held:
As correctly argued by the City Prosecutor, the
questioned information separately charged two
13

respondent was arraigned and pleaded not

guilty to the libel charges.

the prosecution to amend the information. Once

the court has granted the motion to quash the
information and such order became final and
executory, then, there is nothing more to
amend. The trial court has the discretion to
order the filing of another information and if
warranted, must be contained in the same order
granting the motion to quash.

Respondent filed a Motion to Quash on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged because there is no allegation in the
information that petitioner resides in Makati or
that the libelous article was first published in
Makati, hence, the court has no jurisdiction to
try the case.

In this case, the petitioner failed to assert the

propriety of amending the information within
the reglementary period, thus, the order
quashing the information became final and
executory. Furthermore, the petition of
Gonzales is denied.

The Motion to Quash was granted. Upon

petitioners motion, the trial court granted and
directed the public prosecutor with 10 days
within which to file amended information. It
was opposed by respondent on the ground that
defective information may only be amended
before a motion to quash is granted, and that
once quashed, the information can no longer be
amended. Respondent was favored by the trial
court. On appeal with the CA, the same was
denied. Hence, this recourse was filed before
the highest court.

Case 12
Eduardo G. Ricarze vs. CA, Caltex Phils. Inc.,
PCIBank
G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007

Issue:

Facts:

Whether or not amendment to information can

be allowed subsequent to a grant of a Motion to
Quash.

Eduardo Ricarze (employed as a collectormessenger of City Service Corporation) is

assigned to collect checks payable to Caltex.
He opened a bank account in the name of Dante
Gutierrez, a regular customer of Caltex, forged
the signatures on the dorsal portions of the
stolen check and deposited it in that same bank
account. He was charged by the officers of
Caltex with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. In the original
information filed by the prosecutor, Caltex
appeared to be the offended party because the
prosecutor was not informed that PCIBank
credited certain amount to Caltex. After

Holding:
Not all defects in an information can be cured
by amendment. In this case, the amendment of
the information to vest jurisdiction upon a court
is not permissible. Sec. 4 of Rule 117 applies if
the trial court finds that there is a defect in the
information and the defect can be cured by
amendment, in which case the court shall order
14

arraignment and plea, PCIBank appeared as the

complainant. Ricarze averred that the
information can no longer be amended because
he had already been arraigned under the
original information, and that doing so would
place him in double jeopardy. On one hand,
PCIBank contended that PCIBank had recredited the amount to Caltex to the extent of
the indemnity, hence, the PCIBank had been
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex
as private complainant.

amendment is allowed because it is settled that

the same does not prejudice the rights of
Ricarze. In addition, it was held that in case of
offenses against property, the designation of the
name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act
charged in the complaint or information can be
properly identified.

Case 13
PACOY VS. CAJIGAL

Issue:

G.R. NO. 157472

Whether or not an information can be amended

even after the accused had been arraigned and
entered his plea.

September 28, 2007

FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for

Homicide was filed in the RTC against
Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment,
petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide.
However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued
another Order directing the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information to Murder in
view of the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank alleged in the Information
which public respondent registered as having
qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon
such Order, the prosecutor entered his
amendment by crossing out the word
Homicide and instead wrote the word
Murder in the caption and in the opening
paragraph of the Information. The accusatory
portion remained exactly the same as that of the
original Information for Homicide.

Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the amendment in
the name of the complainant is of form. The
test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by
the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information
in one form as in the other. In this case, the
amendment made which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be one
of form and not of substance. As provided by
the Rules of Court, after the entry of the plea,
only a formal amendment may be made but
with leave of court and if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. In the case at bar, the
15

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with

attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his
Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the
respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in
mandating the amendment of the charge from
Homicide to Murder in disregard of the
provisions of the law and existing
jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the
Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Under Section 14, Rule 110 - Amendment or

substitution. A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused.

While the amended Information was for

Murder, a reading of the Information shows
that the only change made was in the caption of
the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing
out of word Homicide and its replacement by
the word Murder. There was no change in the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged
or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the
court. Thus, we find that the amendment made
in the caption and preamble from Homicide
to Murder as purely formal.

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration,

respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows
that disregard of rank is merely a generic
mitigating circumstance which should not
elevate the classification of the crime of
homicide to murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion and exceeds his
jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the
information from homicide to murder.

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in

allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary
that the amendments do not prejudice the rights
of the accused. The test of whether the rights of
an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of
a complaint or information is whether a defense
under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information.
Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion
of the amended Information are identical with
those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the

HELD:
The petition is not meritorious. The change of
the offense charged from Homicide to Murder
is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution.

16

prosecution's theory of the case; neither would

there be any possible prejudice to the rights or
defense of petitioner.

Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was

conducted. It was found that Marissa was
engaged in illegal activities. Some of the
borrowers whose loan applications she
recommended for approval were fictitious and
their signatures on the checks were spurious,
the cash amounts received were turned over to
Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in
their personal accounts. To facilitate
encashment, Marissa would sign the check to
signify to the bank that she personally knew the
alternative payee. The total amount embezzled
reached P7 million.

While the respondent judge erroneously

thought that disrespect on account of rank
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was
only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do
not find that he committed any grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the amendment of the
Information after petitioner had already pleaded
not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the
amendment made was only formal and did not
adversely affect any substantial right of
petitioner.

Respondents
filed
complaints
against
petitioners with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Forthwith, the City
Prosecutor
filed
an
Information
for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita
Chua.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED,

there being no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge.

Prosecution of Offenses
Case 14
Believing that a more serious offense should
have been charged against petitioners,
respondents interposed an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice
found that the participation of Wilson Chua in
the commission of the crime was not clearly
established by the evidence. As to Renita Chua,
the Secretary of Justice found no proof of
conspiracy between her and Marissa.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied with finality by the Secretary
of Justice.

CHUA VS. PADILLO

G.R. 163797
April 24. 2007

FACTS: Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo,

respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending
Investor engaged in the money lending
business. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua,
served as the firms manager. Marissa is
married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita
Chua, herein petitioners.
17

Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari

with the Court of Appeals. They alleged that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion. They prayed that the Court of
Appeals order the Prosecutor to withdraw the
Information and instead, file several
Informations against petitioners. The Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition, holding that there was no conspiracy
among the petitioners.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of

Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly
provides that "All criminal actions either
commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor." The rationale
for this rule is that since a criminal offense is an
outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it
necessarily follows that a representative of the
State shall direct and control the prosecution
thereof.. However, that the public prosecutors
exercise of his discretionary powers is not
absolute. One of the exceptions is that the
Court of Appeals may review the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice on a petition for
certiorari on the ground that he committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.

Respondents seasonably filed a motion for

reconsideration and then the Court of Appeals
reverses itself. The Court of Appeals found that
it overlooked certain facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would establish probable
cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of
Appeals identified these facts to be: (1)
Marissas consistent practice of depositing
checks with altered names of payees to the
respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita
Chua; (2) considering that Wilson and Marissa
are husband and wife, it can be inferred that
one knows the transactions of the other; and (3)
Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful
activities of Marissa. . This is supported by the
affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara.

As found by the Court of Appeals, the

Secretary of Justice either overlooked or
patently ignored the following circumstances:
(1) Marissas practice of depositing checks,
with altered names of payees, in the respective
accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the
fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and
wife makes it difficult to believe that one has
no idea of the transactions entered into by the
other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara
confirming that Wilson had knowledge of
Marissas illegal activities. WHEREFORE, the
petition is denied and the Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred

in compelling the Secretary of Justice to
include in the Information Wilson and Renita.

HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err in

directing the City Prosecutor to include Wilson
and Renita Chua in the Information for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.

Prosecution of Civil Action Arising from

crimes
Case 15
Quinto Vs. Andres
18

453 SCRA 511

Facts:
The son of the petitioner died by
drowning as the former assented to the
invitation of the respondents to go fishing
inside a concrete culvert.
The NBI filed information for homicide
and prosecution had presented its witnesses.
The trail court had acquitted the
respondents on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence and held the respondents not liable for
damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence. The CA affirmed.

The trial court acquitted the petitioners

for the crime of estafa based on reasonable
doubt. However, it found petitioners civilly
liable under the trust receipt. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal of the
petitioners operates to extinguished their civil
liability.
Held:
The rule is that where the civil action is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal- where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is requires in civil cases; where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature
xxx and where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.

Issue:
Whether or not the extinction of
respondents criminal liability carries with it
the extinction of their civil liability.
Held:
The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the civil action
that the act or omission from where the civil
liability may arise does not exist.
In the present case, we rule that, as held
by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution
failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove the facts on which the civil liability of
the respondents rest, i.e. that the petitioner has
a cause of action against the respondents for
damages.

Case 17
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner, vs. CLARITA
NICDAO
and
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS, Respondents
I. Facts of the Case
Clarita Nicdao was accused
of BP22 by Samson Ching. Eleven (11)
Informations were filed with the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan,
which, except as to the amounts and check
numbers. At about the same time, fourteen (14)
other criminal complaints, also for violation of
BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by
Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law
spouse of petitioner Ching. Another witness
presented by the prosecution was Imelda
Yandoc, an employee of HSLB. On directexamination,15 she testified that she worked as
a checking account bookkeeper/teller of the
bank. stated anew that respondent Nicdaos
checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being
"DAIF" and her account was closed the
following day, on October 8, 1997.

Case 16
Tupaz IV Vs. Court of Appeals
475 SCRA
Facts:
Petitioners signed trust receipts in favor
of respondent BPI for the letters of credit
issued by the latter to the former. When
petitioners did not comply with their
undertaking under the trust receipts after the
respondents several demands, the latter charged
the former with estafa under trust Receipt Law.
19

The defense proffered the

testimonies of respondent Nicdao, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On directexamination,17 respondent Nicdao stated that
she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently
denied the allegation that she had borrowed
money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid
in the total amount of P22,950,000.00.
On December 8, 1998, the
MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal Cases
Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao
of eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22. The
MCTC gave credence to petitioner Chings
testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed
money from him in the total amount of
P20,950,000.00.
On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5,
in separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999,
affirmed in toto the decisions of the MCTC
convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11)
and fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22
in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 94589471, respectively.
On November 22, 1999, the
CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting
respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11) counts of
violation of BP 22 filed against her by
petitioner Ching.The Decision of the CA
became final and executor.

Under the pertinent provision of the Revised

Rules of Court, the civil action is generally
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At
the time of petitioner Chings filing of the
Informations against respondent Nicdao,
Section 1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
A painstaking review of the case leads to the
conclusion that respondent Nicdaos acquittal
likewise carried with it the extinction of the
action to enforce her civil liability. There is
simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao
civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao
is not merely based on reasonable doubt.
Rather, it is based on the finding that she did
not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In
particular, the
CA found
that
the
P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check
which was never issued nor delivered by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As
such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching
"did not acquire any right or interest over
Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause
of action founded on said check,"41 and that
respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make
good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the
CA established that the loans secured by these
checks had already been extinguished after full
payment had been made by respondent Nicdao.
In this connection, the second element for the
crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made
or drawn and issued to apply on account or for
value," is not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the
CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to
petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly
stated that she had already fully paid her

III-Issue
Repondent Nicdaos acquittal by the
CA,does the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction
and authority to resolve and rule on her civil
liability, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which, prior to its
amendment
III-Held by SC
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal,
petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the civil
aspect of the case within the reglementary
period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."34
20

obligations. The CA computed the payments

made by respondent Nicdao vis--vis her loan
obligations in this manner:
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the
back of the cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid
in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00
and the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received
by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that
petitioner [respondent herein] had already made
payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00
for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00
(P950,000.00 in the case at bar and
P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).43
On the other hand, its finding relative to the
P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check
necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any
civil liability thereon as well.
Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show
that respondent Nicdaos liability did not arise
from or was not based upon the criminal act of
which she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from
her loan obligations to him (ex contractu),
however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to
prove by preponderant evidence the existence
of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly,
it can be inferred from the following findings
of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent
Nicdao that the act or omission from which her
civil liability may arise did not exist. On the
P20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as
follows:
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and
undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the
possession of complainant Ching who, in
cahoots with his paramour Emma Nuguid,
filled up the blank check with his name as
payee and in the fantastic amount of
P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and
presented it to the bank on October 7, 1997,
along with the other checks, for payment.
Therefore, the inference that the check was
stolen is anchored on competent circumstantial
evidence. The fact already established is that
Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store,
had access to said store. Moreover, the
possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a
credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that the person in possession of

the stolen article is presumed to be guilty of

taking the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237
SCRA 664).
Therefore. CA decision is affirmed and
petitioners appeal is deny for lack of merit.
Case 18
CRUZ v. MINA
G.R. No. 154207, 27 April 2007
Case Summary:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz,

filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court a
formal entry of Appearance as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for
Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz
is the complaining witness.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the

RTC, a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no
civil aspect. On June 5, 2002 however, the RTC
issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of Grave Threats
carries with it civil liability
21

Preliminary Investigation
Decision of the case:

Case 19
CELSA P. ACUA, Petitioner, versus
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON,
PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA,
(Angeles City National Trade School),
Respondents.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides

that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable except in instances when
no actual damage results from the offense, such
as espionage, violation o neutrality, flight t an
enemy country, and crimes against popular
representation. The basic rule applies in the
instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waves the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.

2005 Jan 31
G.R. No. 144692
CARPIO

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari of the Resolution

dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19
June 2000 of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The 4 April 2000 Resolution dismissed
for lack of probable cause the complaint for
perjury of petitioner Celsa P. Acua against
respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie Turla.
The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for
reconsideration.

The petitioner is correct in stating that there

being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case
No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from grave Threats is deemed instituted
with the criminal action, and hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.

FACTS:
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed resolution and order of the RTC,
branch 116, Pasay City are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Celsa P. Acua (petitioner) is a

former teacher of the Angeles City National
Trade School (ACNTS) in Angeles City,
Pampanga.
Respondent Pedro Pascua
(respondent Pascua) was ACNTS Officer-In-

SO ORDERED.
22

Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla

(respondent Turla) was a member of its
faculty.

Private respondents denied the charge against

them and sought the dismissal of the
complaint. Public respondent found no
evidence to indict respondents for perjury,
hence, dismissed the complaint. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but public respondent
denied her motion in the 19 June 2000 Order.

On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut

(Yabut), another ACNTS teacher, together
with other school personnel, requested a
dialogue with respondent Pascua on some
unspecified matter. Respondent Pascua agreed
to the request and the meeting took place on 16
July 1998. Respondent Turla attended the
meeting upon respondent Pascuas directive.
Petitioner, whom Yabut apparently invited, also
attended the meeting.

Hence, petitioner filed the petition before the

Supreme Court contending that public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing her complaint for lack of
probable cause.

As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July

1998 meeting, petitioner charged respondent
Pascua with misconduct (OMB-ADM-1-990387) and with violation of Article 131
(perjury) of the Revised Penal Code (OMB 199-903) before the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman).

ISSUE:

Whether public respondent committed grave

abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause.

Contending that private respondents perjured

themselves in their sworn statements in OMBADM-1-99-0387, petitioner charged private
respondents with perjury (OMB 1-99-2467)
before the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon (public respondent). Petitioner alleged
that private respondents were liable for perjury
because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed
against respondent Pascua before the Civil
Service Commission, later endorsed to the
DECS, was not the same as her complaint in
OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut
and not respondent Pascua who called the 16
July 1998 meeting.

HELD:

The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse

His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467
for lack of probable cause

It is the Courts policy of non-interference with

the
Ombudsmans
exercise
of
his
constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.
The rule is based not only upon respect for the
23

investigatory and prosecutory powers granted

by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant. The Court, in the
present case, found no reason to deviate from
this long-standing policy.

CARPIO

The Case

This petition for review assails the 29 October

1999 Decision[2] and 25 April 2000 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
44778. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Jimmy
Ang and affirmed the Resolutions issued by
former Secretary of Justice Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.

FACTS:
Probable cause, as used in preliminary
investigations, is defined as the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.

The record shows that complainant [Lucero],

an American citizen, is a businesswoman and a
native of Pangasinan. On August 8, 1989, she
entered into a memorandum of agreement with
E. Ganzon, Inc. for the purchase of
Condominium Unit 1512, Makati Cinema
Square Tower located along Pasong Tamo,
Makati for P2,417,655.00. As she is a resident
of Guam, she appointed by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney,[3] Graciano P. Catenza, Jr.
as her attorney-in-fact on November 20, 1990
to manage and administer all her businesses
and properties in the Philippines, including the
condominium unit.
Catenza, however,
delegated his authority to the respondent.

Case 20

JIMMY ANG, Petitioner, versus ELEANOR

R.
LUCERO,
THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and THE CITY
PROSECUTOR
OF
MAKATI
CITY,
Respondents.

Respondent/complainant
filed
against
petitioner a criminal complaint for estafa
through failsification of public documents for
falsifying a letter of authorization dated 6 July
1992 and to make it appear that she authorized
petitioner to register the condominium unit in

2005 Jan 21
G.R. No. 143169
24

his name and the Deed of Assignment dated

June 22, 1992 to make it appear that she
transferred the ownership of the condominium
unit.

and (2) for estafa through falsification of public

document. Ang moved for a reinvestigation.
Prosecutor Wilfredo Ong of the CPO Makati
reconsidered Prosecutor Bautistas resolution of
17 April 1995 and dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. Lucero appealed the
dismissal of the complaint to the Department of
Justice and the resolution was reversed.
Petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
TRO was filed. The Court of Appeals rendered
a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
and affirming the resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice. Hence, petitioner before the
Supreme Court.

Through the use of the aforementioned

fictitious documents, her title was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, condominium Certificate of
Title No. 23578 was issued in the name of
respondent by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City which title he used as a collateral to secure
a loan in the amount of P2,000,000.00 from the
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC). When she learned of the fraudulent
transfer, she executed an affidavit of adverse
claim and annotated it on the title on March 21,
1994. The day after the thirty-day effectivity
period of the adverse claim lapsed, respondent,
to add insult to injury, immediately secured an
additional loan in the amount of P700,000.00
with the same bank (RCBC) using the same
property as collateral even after the transport
business he was managing for the complainant
had ceased operation already. Respondent
failed to act on complainants demands for
accounting and for the reconveyance to her of
Condominium Unit No. 1512.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of the Secretary of
Justice of probable cause for estafa valid?

HELD:
Angs contentions are untenable.

The NBI found the signature on the Deed of

Assignment and Luceros sample signatures to
have been written by one and the same
person. However, the NBI found the signature
on the Authorization Letter a traced forgery.

In a preliminary investigation, the public

prosecutor merely determines whether there is
probable cause or sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It
does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, probable
cause is concerned with probability, not
absolute or moral certainty. The complainant

A preliminary investigation was conducted

finding probable cause against Ang. Prosecutor
Bautista recommended the filing of two (2)
informations, (1) for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (c) of the Revised Penal Code[7]
25

need not present at this stage proof beyond

reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation
does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties evidence.

Case 21.
TORRES VS AGUINALDO
Facts:
Torres, the petitioner, was charged for the
falsification of public documents by forging the
Deed of Absolute Sale of property of the
Spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo. They
alleged that the title to their properties covered
by TCT No. T-93596,T-87764-65 were
transferred without their knowledge and
consent in the name of Torres.
Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause and recommended the filing of an
information against Torres. Torres moved for
reconsideration but was denied. On appeal DOJ
reversed the findings and ordered withdrawal
of the information. Information was withdrawn
and petitioner has not been arraigned.
Aguinaldo filed petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeal which was granted.

In this case, Ang calls on this Court to assume

the function of a public prosecutor. Angs
arguments are essentially evidentiary matters
that must be presented and heard during the
trial. Whether Lucero granted Ang the authority
to sell and mortgage the Property is a question
which requires an examination of the parties
evidence.

In this case, Ang admitted typing the Deed of

Assignment over Luceros signature in blank.
Thereafter, Ang used the Deed of Assignment
to transfer the ownership of the Property from
Lucero to him. Lucero claims that she was
prejudiced by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment. However, whether Ang took
advantage of Luceros signature is a question
that should be presented and resolved during
the trial.

Issue:
Whether or not evidence of a respondent in a
criminal case should be considered during the
preliminary investigation in determining if
probable cause exists to indict him for the
crime charged.
Held:
Preliminary investigation

There is also probable cause that Ang

committed estafa by falsification of public
document. The Deed of Assignment is a public
document since it is notarized. Lucero claims
that the Deed of Assignment was falsified
because she was out of the country when it was
executed. Moreover, though the signature in
the Deed of Assignment appears to be her
signature, it was not Luceros intention to
transfer the Property to Ang.

is

executive

in

character. It does not contemplate a judicial

function. It is essentially an inquisitorial
proceeding, and often, the only means of
ascertaining who may be reasonably charged
with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits and
has no purpose except to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is

26

guilty thereof. 'It does not place the person

the warrant of arrest. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan
denied on April 24, 1992In a Decision dated
May 16, 1995, this Court declared invalid the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
PCGG for lack of jurisdiction. However, it
held that the invalidity or absence of a
preliminary investigation did not affect the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the
validity of the informations.

against whom it is taken in jeopardy.

Generally, preliminary investigation falls under
the authority of the prosecutor. It is well to note
that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure not only requires the
submission of the complaint and the affidavits

Issue:

of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as

Whether or not the Ombudsman acted

with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the preliminary
investigation?

other supporting documents, but also directs the

respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and
that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense. Section

Ruling:

4 thereof also mandates the investigating

No. The Supreme Court ruled, that the
Ombudsman is the proper authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the alleged
offenses committed by petitioner. Pursuant
thereto, there is no need for a new complaint to
be filed by PCGG because the Ombudsman, on
its own, may conduct a preliminary
investigation of offenses committed by public
officers. Moreover, the denial of his motion to
dismiss was concomitant with Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman disallowing a motion to dismiss
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

prosecutor to certify under oath in the

information that the accused was informed of
the complaint and the evidence against him,
and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.

Case 22
Romualdez vs Marcelo
470 SCRA 763

Case 23
Matalam vs Sandiganbayan
455 SCRA 737
Facts :

Facts :
A warrant of arrest was issued on
February 28, 1989, but this was not served
because of petitioners exile from the country.
On October 21, 1991, he filed through counsel
a Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest, alleging
that the preliminary investigation conducted by
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG)
was
invalid
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.Due to his non-compliance with
these terms, the Sandiganbayan denied on
January 24, 1992 petitioners motion to recall

An information 15 November 2004 was

filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A.
Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and
Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their
alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay
the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul
E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle
27

Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura

and Faizal I. Hadil. After the reinvestigation,
the public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Admit Amended Information
Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except
Datu Guimid Matalam to which petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the
Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended
Information Against the Accused Guimid P.
Matalam Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed
his Reply to which petitioner filed a
Rejoinder.In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
alleged that the amended information charges
an entirely new cause of action. The corpus
delicti of the amended information is no longer
his alleged refusal to pay the backwages
ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but
the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal
dismissal from the service of the complaining
witnesses. He insists that the amended
information charging a separate and entirely
different offense cannot be admitted because
there would be a serious violation of due
process of law. He claims he is entitled to a
preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the
alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses
and that he was not given the opportunity to
explain.Petitioner argues that the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and
03 November 2004 admitting the Amended
Information charging a new offense without
conducting a preliminary investigation were
issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

The
amendment
was
indeed
substantial. The recital of facts constituting the
offense charged was definitely altered. In the
original information, the prohibited act
allegedly committed by petitioner was the
illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the
monetary claims of the private complainants,
while in the amended information, it is the
illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants. However, it cannot be denied
that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal
to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose
from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants.Thus,
before or after a plea, a substantial amendment
in an information entitles an accused to another
preliminary investigation.However, if the
amended information contains a charge related
to or is included in the original information, a
new preliminary investigation is not required.

Issue :

This is a petition for review

on certiorari assailing the 13 December 2002
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 67511 dated December 13, 2002
which affirmed in toto the 12 January 2001
Resolution of the Office of the OmbudsmanVisayas in, as well as the order dated 17 July
2001 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, suspending the petitioner from
her position as principal of Dr. Cecilio Putong

Case 24
DR. BENITA F. OSORIO, petitioner,
Versus
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, G.R. No.
156652
Promulgated October 13, 2005

Facts:

whether or not petitioner was deprived

of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Information without
conducting another or new preliminary
investigation?
Ruling :

28

National High School (formerly Bohol National

High School).

7.
Falsification of travel document to claim
bigger representation allowances; and

The petition originated from a letter

complaint from Beatriz L. Tenorio to the
Ombudsman alleging that the petitioner
committed the following acts:

8.

1.
Failure to account for the rentals of the
school facilities;

Other improper acts.

Acting on the complaint, the Office of

the Ombudsman-Manila, on 29 January 1998,
requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an investigation to verify the
alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong
National High School. In the course of that
investigation, the NBI found:

2.
Non-remittance to the school trust funds
of money from the sale of old newspapers to
the school and appropriation of the said amount
to herself;

a) that petitioner Osorio authorized the sale of

newspapers, but did not remit the proceeds
thereof to the school; and

3.
Ready-made bidding with supplier of
school-needed materials;

b) that she issued a memorandum through

which students were charged more than the
allowable fees for their membership with Boy
and Girl Scouts of the Philippines.

4.
Double mandatory collection supposedly
for the Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines,
from all students of Bohol National High
School and non-remittance of all the
contributions to BSP and GSP;

On 17 February 1998, the Office of the

Ombudsman-Manila requested audit specialists
from the COA to conduct a thorough
investigation on the alleged anomalies at the
Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School.

5.
Treatment of money from the school
canteen as her personal money;

6.
Conspiracy with treasure hunters in
digging under the main ground of the school
building for Yamashita treasures;

After evaluating the report of the COA

auditors, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
was convinced that allegations no. 1 to no. 4
were duly substantiated while the rest of the
allegations were not. It found prima facie case
29

of five (5) counts of Malversation of Public

Funds against petitioner on the proceeds of the
sale of the schools old newspapers on five
occasions.

1. Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in

ruling that the Honorable Office of the
Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion when it opted not to conduct a
clarificatory hearing in the case of the
petitioner.

On 17 December 1998, the investigating

auditors submitted a sworn affidavit. In an
order dated 27 January 1999, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas issued an order placing
petitioner and Mr. Nestor Robles under
preventive suspension. On 05 February 1999,
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas ordered
petitioner and Mr. Nestor Robles to file their
respective counter-affidavits to the complaint.
Later, on 15 March 1999, petitioner and corespondent Robles submitted their respective
counter-affidavits, denying participation in the
alleged irregularities.

2.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the other issues raised by the
petitioner on certiorari are purely questions of
evidence and not of law.

Decision:
On the first issue raised by petitioner,
she bewails respondent courts ruling decreeing
that a clarificatory hearing in the instant
criminal case is optional on the part of the
investigating prosecutor. Petitioner believes
that without a clarificatory hearing, it is
impossible for the investigating prosecutor to
resolve numerous irreconcilable issues and
arrive at a lawful indictment.

In a resolution dated 12 January 2001,

the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found
probable cause against petitioner for five (5)
counts of Malversation of Public Funds and
five (5) counts of violations of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides:
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry
or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas

denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
in its order dated 17 July 2001.

Issues:

The foregoing provision sets forth the

purpose of preliminary investigation which is
to determine whether there is a sufficient
30

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a

crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof.

to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon

practicality as well.

Subsection (e) of Section 3 and of the same

rule provides:

The instant petition is DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67511 dated 13
December 2002 affirming in toto the resolution
dated 12 January 2001 and the order dated 17
July 2001 issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas is AFFIRMED.

(e) The investigating officer may set a

hearing if there are facts and issues to be
clarified from a party or a witness. The parties
can be present at the hearing but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. They may,
however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or
witness concerned.

Case 25
G.R. No. 147932

It is the call of the investigating prosecutor, in

the exercise of his sound discretion, whether to
conduct a clarificatory hearing or not. If he
believes that the evidence before him is
sufficient to support a finding of probable
cause, he may not hold a clarificatory hearing.

January 25, 2006

LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
MAGDALENA
B.
DACARRA,
and
ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, Respondents.
The Facts

As held in Webb v. De Leon:

The present case arose from a sworn statement

of respondent Magdalena B. Dacarra
("Magdalena") executed before the Womens
Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan
Hills, Quezon City on 10 December 1999
stating that on 4 December 1999, her nine-yearold son Ronald complained of dizziness upon
arriving home at about six in the evening and
then vomited. When asked what happened,
Ronald replied that petitioner, who was
Ronalds teacher, banged his head against that
of his classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo").
Magdalena inspected Ronalds head and saw a
woundless contusion. Due to Ronalds
continued vomiting, Magdalena brought him to
a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December
1999. The following morning, Magdalena

. . . The decision to call witnesses for

clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand
already yields a probable cause, the investigator
need not hold a clarificatory hearing.

The consistent and general policy of the

Court is not to interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and
prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
31

brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical

Center where he underwent an x-ray. The
attending physician informed Magdalena that
Ronalds head had a fracture. Blood oozed out
of Ronalds nose before he died on 9 December
1999.

head injury due to a vehicular accident in

November 1997.
Petitioner also alleged that the witnesses
have immature perception.
Petitioner further asserted that the
causes of death stated in Ronalds Death
Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the
preliminary investigation.

Lorendo also executed a sworn statement

narrating how petitioner banged his head
against Ronalds.

The investigating prosecutor issued a

Resolution finding probable cause against
petitioner for the offenses charged. Petitioner
filed a petition for review with the DOJ.

The Inquest Proceedings which will be the

primary defence citation of the petitioner stated
that:
Evidence warrants the release of the
respondent for further investigation of the
charges against her. The case is not proper for
inquest as the incident complained of. Further,
the evidence insufficient to support the charge
for homicide against the respondent. There is
no concrete evidence to show proof that the
alleged banging of the heads of the two minor
victims could be the actual and proximate cause
of the death of the minor. There is no certainty,
therefore, that respondents alleged wrongdoing
contributed or caused the death of said victim.

The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for

review. The DOJ Secretary held that there was
no bias in complainants favor when the
investigating prosecutor did not conduct a
clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procured
the autopsy report as nothing precluded her
from doing so.
The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioners claim
that she is innocent as held by the inquest
prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not
dismiss the case. She merely recommended
petitioners release for further investigation
since the case was not proper for inquest and
the evidence was then insufficient.

Subsequently, the case was referred for

preliminary investigation. During the said
preliminary investigation, Lorendos mom
alleged that she was bribed by the petitioner
and presented said bribe money. Also 2 other
witnesses swore they saw petitioner banging
the heads of the minors as well as physically
abusing them.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process
during the preliminary investigation; and

Her counter argument contained:

-

2. Whether there is probable cause against

petitioner for homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section

The findings of the inquest proceedings

Petitioner assailed the omission in

Magdalenas sworn statement about Ronalds
32

10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation

of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.

investigation. Due process is merely an

opportunity to be heard.
Preliminary
investigation
is
merely
inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether
a crime has been committed and whether the
respondent isprobably guilty of the crime. It is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties evidence.

Ruling:
Absence of a clarificatory hearing
The Court rejects petitioners contention that
she was denied due process when the
investigating prosecutor did not conduct a
clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is
not
indispensable
during
preliminary
investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of
the investigating officer as evidenced by the
use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule
112:

There is probable cause for the offenses

charged against petitioner. Probable cause is the
existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind
that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty of the crime. In
effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the
head-banging incident but denies committing it.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that

there are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses, during which the
parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. xxx15 (emphasis supplied)

Petition is denied and the Resolutions affirmed.

In this case, the investigating prosecutor no

longer conducted hearings after petitioner
submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply
means that at that point the investigating
prosecutor believed that there were no more
matters for clarification. It is only in
petitioners mind that some "crucial points" still
exist and need clarification. In any event,
petitioner can raise these "important" matters
during the trial proper.

As alleged in the complaint, accused appellant

German Luna was apprehended on August 24,
1999 in Poblacion, Tanauan, Batangas for
violation of PD 1866 and RA 6425.
Concomitantly, the police team headed by
Major Ablang secured an entrapment operation
against the accused appellant through a buybust. A civilian informant, under the name of
Rodolfo Alonzo was able to purchase 206.32
grams of shabu which was positively identified
by a chemist from the PNP crime laboratory in
camp Vicente Lim.
In light of the foregoing decision of the RTC,
the accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the charge of RA 6425,
however, he was acquitted for the charge of

Arrest
Case 26
People of the Philippines Vs German Agojo

Petitioner was not deprived of due process

since both parties were accorded equal rights in
arguing their case and presenting their
respective evidence during the preliminary
33

violation of PD 1866 for lack of sufficient

evidence.

Q.C. Branch 104 and were sentenced to the

penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
Eusebio Gardon.

Issues:
1.

Whether or not appellants guilt was

proven beyond reasonable doubt
2.
Whether or not appellant was framed up
by the buy first team violation of

In due course, a decision was rendered and the

three were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of P100, 000 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs of the suit. Although said
defendants filed appealed the judgement but the
decision of the court was affirmed with
modification.

Held
In the case at bench, violation of RA
6425 was evidently proven by the prosecution
through the testimony of Alonzo on the sale of
illegal drugs and the identification of appellant
as
the
seller
is
clear
and
straightforward.
More so, the
buy bust team witnessed the sale of shabu and
it was duly accorded the immediacy between
the time of commission of the offense and the
time of the arrest.
Further review of the record reveals
that the second instance of lawful warrantless
arrest covered by paragraph (B) were met in
this case in which the offense has just been
committed and the person marking the arrest
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
As regards to the issue of framed up,
the buy bust team has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused appellant
accepted payment for the contraband. It was
also proven that the VHS tape containing drugs
were examined in PNP crime laboratory and
positively tested for shabu. Thus, there was no
evidence that such an attempt to frame him up
was made in this case.

Prescinding to prove the fact and cause of death

of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented
in evidence the testimony medico legal office
P/ Maj Florante Baltazar wherein the testimony
shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab
wound possibly caused by a single bladed
weapon.
Collorarily the daughter of the victim,
Milagroso Gardon and another witness Melinda
Delfin testified against the accused and it is
noteworthy that they knew accused appellant
and the other assailants and that in fact some of
them are related to witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the presence of reasonable
doubt the court a quo has committed an error in
convicting the accused appellant of the crime
charged.

Case 27
People of the Phil. Vs Cesar Givera

Held:
The court finds the petition devoid of

On May 2, 1993 Cesar Givera together with

Epifanio Geralde and Arturo Geralde were
charged with the same offense at the RTC of

merit
First and foremost:
34

It is clearly apparent that the

prosecution presented evidence and testimonies
of witnesses were quoted as spontaneous,
detailed and arid consistent. Markworthy to
note that the accused appellant are even
related by affinity to the deceased and residing
within the vicinity where the crime was
committed , and therefore, no reason to doubt
their identification by the prosecution witness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. DANILO DE GUZMAN y

PEREZ, accused-appellant.
Facts:
Appellant in this case was under surveillance
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs by the
police. The policemen however did not arrest
him immediately but waited for him to be
caught in flagrante delicto for selling shabu and
possessing unlicensed gun and a magazine. The
offenders were brought to the police station for
questioning and detention. The police officers
were without warrants of arrest or search
warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of
evidence. As the operation was conducted
largely during night-time, the police officers
were unable to secure the necessary warrants
for fear of leaving the place of surveillance.

Secondly, forthwith with the

allegations of conspiracy, the evidence
convincingly and unequivocally shows a
coordinated action by the group in the
execution of the crime. Nonetheless evident
premeditation and treachery cannot be
appreciated in this case for the very reason that
the victim is not totally oblivious of the
impending attack by all the group of the
accused appellant. Suffice to say that the victim
had very opportunity to escape from the attack
because he had been forewarned by his
daughter of the danger posed by the group of
the accused appellant.

Accused-appellant was arraigned on February

22, 1993 with the assistance of his counsel de
officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to both charges.
The RTC of Cavite convicted Danilo de
Guzman for violation of RA 6425, Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 and Unlawful possession of
firearms and ammunition.

Thirdly, his arrest by virtue of a

warrant of arrest was deemed waived because
he failed to move for the question of the
information before the trial court when he
entered a plea of not guilty and participated in
the trial. The law provides that a warrant of
arrest remains enforceable until it is executed,
recalled, or quashed.

Accused-appellant assails his conviction and

raised the issue that the trial court committed a
patent reversible error in not finding that the
evidence so far presented was obtained in an
illegal search before the Supreme Court.
Accused-appellant contended that his arrest and
the search conducted incidental to his arrest
were illegal as the surrounding circumstances
of the arrest were not within the purview of the
allowable warrantless arrests under Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Lastly the testimony of the medico

legal officer was inadmissible for failure of the
adverse party to cross examine the officer.

Case 28
G.R. No. 117952-53

February 14, 2001

35

Issue:

arrest upon his failure to move for quashal of

the information against him prior to his
arraignment
and
entry
of
plea. Any
irregularity .was therefore cured upon their
voluntary submission to the trial court's
jurisdiction.

Whether the arrest was illegal

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and found that the
contention of the accused untenable.

Case 29
People of the Philippines versus Molina

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the

police officers' manner of conducting the
accused-appellant's arrest was not tainted with
any constitutional infirmity. Despite word from
their fellow officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw
accused-appellant sniff "shabu", they resisted
the first impulse to storm the rented cottage
which could have caused them to seriously
disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the
police officers waited for the needed opening to
validly arrest the accused.

FACTS: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1

Paguidopon received an information regarding
the presence of an allegedmarijuana pusher in
Davao City. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as
the pusher. As toaccused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him
before the arrest.Moreover, the names and
addressesof the accused-appellants came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they
were arrested. In the morning of August
8,1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be
passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called
forassistance at the PNP proceed to the house
of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would
wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.At around
9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a
trisikad carrying the accused-appellants
passed by.At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the
pushers. The police officers then ordered the
trisikad to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced
himself as a police officer and asked accusedappellant Molina to open the bag. Molina
replied, Boss, if

Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court

provides that:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; x x x
In the case at bar, accused-appellant was caught
by the police officers in flagrante delicto while
carrying a firearm without the necessary permit
or license. Clearly, it was in violation of P.D.
No. 1866, Section 1, at the time of the arrest.
Furthermore, accused-appellant in this case is
estopped from questioning the legality of his
36

possible we will settle this. SPO1 Pamplona

insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter,
accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers. Accusedappellants contended that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having been obtained in violation
of
their
constitutional
right
against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD: The fundamental law of the land

mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion. The Constitution
provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects againstunreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oathor
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched andthe
persons or things to be seized. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible
in thefollowing instances: (1) search incident to
a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation ofcustoms laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonablesearches and seizures;ii[24] and
(6) stop and frisk situations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana is in

admissible evidence for having been seized in
violation of appellants constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures?

As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if

effected with a valid warrant of arrest.The
Rules of Court, however,recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests.Thus, a peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a)when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based onpersonal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or a place where he
is servingfinal judgment or is temporarily
37

confined while his case is pending, or has

escaped while being transferred from
oneconfinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners). In the case at bar, accusedappellants
manifested
no
outward
indicationthat would justify their arrest.In
holding a bag on board atrisikad, accusedappellants could not be said to be
committing,attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. The response of Molina
that Boss, if possible we will settle this is
anequivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an
inflagrante delicto arrest.Note thatwere it not
for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not
participate in the arrest but merely pointed
accused-appellants to thearresting officers),
accused-appellants could not be the subject of
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1
Paguidopon onlylearned Mulas name and
address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accusedappellant Mula.It is worthy to note that, before
the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person
only once, pinpointed to him by his informer
whilethey were on the side of the road.These
circumstances could not have afforded SPO1
Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant
Mula, considering that the latter was then
driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon
caught a glimpse of him.Withrespect to
accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon
admitted that he had never seen him before the
arrest.

The Court holds that the arrest of accusedappellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules.Hence, thesearch
conducted on their person was likewise
illegal.Consequently, the marijuana seized by
the peace officers could not beadmitted as
evidence.WHERE
FORE accused
are
ACQUITTED

Case 30
People of the philippines versus Galvez
FACTS: At around 11:30 in the evening of May
9, 1998 the accused Manuel Galvez together
with unidentified companions attack, assault,
and stab with a bladed weapon Romen Castro,
which injuries eventually caused the latters
death at a local fair inside the DM Compound
in Heroes del 98, Caloocan City. Several
witnesses identified Manuel Galvez as the
assailant, SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo then went to
Manuel Galvez invite him to the victims
house for clarification however the relatives
denied Manuel Galvez as the assailant therefore
the SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo release him,
Although allegedly released, he was later
forced by a barangay tanod Arturo Saligumba
to board a taxi and go to the police
headquarters in Sangandaan, Caloocan City
where SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, investigator of
the Station Investigation Division of the
Caloocan City police told him that he was a
suspect in the killing of Romen Castro and he
pleaded not guilty. He was not shown a warrant
when he was arrested nor was he interviewed
by the policemen at the headquarters. Later that
same day, SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo said he saw
Galvez in the police station and SPO1
Lizarondo asked why Galvez was there, but the
relatives of the victim and the other witnesses
38

told him that the reason they said nothing when

he asked them to identify Galvez was because
of fear.

Case 31
G.R. No. 121877 September 12, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

ISSUE: Whether or Not the arrest executed on

Manuel Galvez was illegal arrest

vs.
ERLINDA GONZALES Y EVANGELISTA,
accused-appellant.

HELD: Accused-appellants arrest was illegal.

Arturo Saligumba admitted that he arrested
Galvez on the basis solely of what Reynaldo
Castro had told him and not because he saw
accused-appellant commit the crime charged
against him. Indeed, the prosecution admitted
that there was no warrant of arrest issued
against accused-appellant when the latter was
taken into custody. Considering that accusedappellant was not committing a crime at the
time he was arrested nor did the arresting
officer have any personal knowledge of facts
indicating that accused-appellant committed a
crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be
justified. By entering a plea of not guilty and
participating actively in the trial, however,
accused-appellant Galvez waived his right to
raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is
now settled that objection to a warrant of arrest
or the procedure by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. The fact that the
arrest was illegal does not render the
subsequent proceedings void and deprive the
State of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts point to the culpability of the
accused. The decision of the RTC of Caloocan
City was affirmed with modification, finding
accused-appellant Manuel Galvez guilty of
murder and sentencing him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts of the Case:
Appellant Erlinda Gonzales y Evangelista was
convicted violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425) and
sentenced her to life imprisonment.

The prosecution presented two witnesses,

namely, PO1 Reggie Pedroso and Angela
Baldevieso, forensic chemist of the PNP. In
addition, the prosecution presented the
following object and documentary evidence:
(1) ten bundles of dried marijuana leaves or
fruiting tops, weighing 9.560 kilograms. (2)
Physical Sciences Report No. D-087-93 issued
by Angela Baldevieso, PNP forensic chemist
and (3) black traveling bag. On the other hand,
the defense presented appellant herself and
Isaac Lamera, the trisikad driver.

PO1 Reggie Pedroso narrated that the Chief of

Police of Dueas, Iloilo received information
that a woman with long hair, wearing maong
pants and jacket, and Ray Ban sunglasses
would be transporting marijuana along the
39

national highway. According to the tipped

information, the woman would bring a black
traveling bag and would ride a trisikad. A
mobile patrol in the poblacion of Dueas and
along the national highway was conducted and
they passed by a woman who fitted the
informers description. She was standing along
the national highway holding a black traveling
bag in a trisikad. They alighted from their car
and asked her who owns the traveling bag. The
woman denied ownership of the bag but
trisikaddriver, later identified as Isaac Lamera,
the latter pointed to the woman as the owner of
the said bag. Hence both were arrested.

Ruling of the Court:

On the first issue, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the positive testimony of the
apprehending policeman outweighs appellants
negative testimony.
Furthermore the testimony of Lamera, the
trisikad driver on the witness stand materially
contradicts his sworn statements . A witness
who makes two sworn statements which are
contradictory to his testimony in court
impeaches his own credibility.

Appellant denied her involvement in the drug

transport. Lamera, the trisikad driver, also
testified that he had no involvement too.

On the second issue,basic is the rule that no

arrest, search or seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority. The Constitution guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained
in violation of said right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

The court found for the prosecution,

disbelieved the defense, and convicted
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as
amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00 and the costs.

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription

against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions,
as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.

Issues of the Case:

(1) WON the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses credible and sufficient to prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) WON appellants warrantless arrest legal,
thereby making the bricks of marijuana leaves
allegedly seized from her admissible in
evidence.

Moreover, a lawful arrest without a warrant

may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances:
40

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest

police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.

(b) When an offense has just been committed,

and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39, finding
appellant
ERLINDA
GONZALES
Y
EVANGELISTA, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal transport of marijuana is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
and the costs.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner

who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant

41