Phaedrus Study Guide

Scholars disagree on the date of composition of Plato's Phaedrus. This Note

consults the version edited and translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff,

Socrates"seems to allude to many of the

ideas Plato expressed in the Meno, thePhaedo, and the Republic" (xiii).
who note that the second speech of

Consequently, the date of composition has been placed with some certainty between
375 and 365 B.C.
Unlike many other Platonic dialogues, Phaedrus is literally a dialogue, a
conversation solely between two people. Through dialogue with the young speechlover Phaedrus, Socrates develops ideas on the nature of eros, rhetoric, philosophy,
and the soul. The German theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher noted
that the dialogue "usually bears a second title, 'Or of the Beautiful'; and has been
sometimes named, 'Of Love and of the Mind'" (48). Such titlesundoubtedly
additions by a hand later than that of Platotestify to a fundamental uncertainty
about the central topic of the dialogue. The first half of the dialogue treats the
subject of eros, whereas the second half makes what seems to be a clear break to
treat of rhetoric. Does philosophy, or the Mind, serve as the unifying theme? This
meta-question lies behind the many questions that the dialogue raises directly.

Phaedrus is in many ways a strange, un-Socratic dialogue. For one, Socrates

leaves the confines of Athens. Once in the countryside, he is inspired by the divine
madness of the gods and Nymphs to produce speeches. Given Socrates
demonstrated aversion to long speeches, Socrates magnificent second speech is as
surprising as his overpowering desire to hear Lysiass speech on love.
What did this mean to Plato? Did Plato believe the views presented by Socrates?
Remember that there are always at least two conversations in a Socratic dialogue:
one is between Socrates and the interlocutor, and the other is between Plato and the
reader. What does Plato lead the reader to think about while examining the
interaction between Socrates and Phaedrus?
For a more comprehensive introduction to the dialogue and its place among other
Platonic dialogues, see the introduction to Nehamas and Woodruffs edition of the
dialogue.

Phaedrus Summary
Socrates meets Phaedrus in Athens. Phaedrus has spent the morning
listening to Lysias deliver a speech on love, and now he desires to take a walk

outside the city. Since Socrates expresses a keen interest in hearing Lysias's speech,
Phaedrus manages to lure him out to the countryside. Phaedrus has a copy of Lysias's
speech at hand and will read it to Socrates.
Lysias's speech argues that in a pederastic relationship, a boy should give his favors
to an old man who is not in love rather than one who is in love. The lover, Lysias
claims, is mad, and as such is given to unhealthy tendencies that cannot benefit the
boy. The non-lover, on the other hand, will offer the boy a stable and educational
friendship.

Phaedrus believes this speech to be excellent, in the sense that it offers an extensive
argument for the topic at hand. But Socrates does not share Phaedrus's admiration.
He counters Phaedrus's point by suggesting that Lysias was more interested in style
than content. Moreover, in terms of content, Socrates claims that he can make a
better speech based on ideas borrowed from other writers.
Socrates first speech provides a counterpart to Lysiass argument. Rather than
presenting the benefits of the non-lover, Socrates addresses the negative influences
of the lover. Love, or eros, is a form of madness in which the inborn desire for
beauty overwhelms ones sense of morality and control. Such madness destroys both
the soul and body of the boy and will bring him no benefits. Socrates concludes his
speech with this argument.
Phaedrus, however, remains unsatisfied: he had thought that Socrates was about to
proceed and present the benefits of the lover. Socrates justifies his conclusion by
saying that he was inspired by the Nymphs and did not want to be carried away. But
as Socrates sets out to return to Athens, a divine sign appears and warns him against
a premature return. Socrates interprets this as a sign that he has offended the gods.
He thus sets out to remedy the situation with a second speech on

eros.

Socrates' second speech, known as his Great Speech, establishes the overarching

eros in life. There are four types of divine madness, derived from
Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and Aphroditethe last being eros. In order to
importance of

understand that love is a divine and beneficial madness, Socrates likens the soul to a
chariot with two horses and a charioteer. The greatest good for the soul is to grow
wings and fly through the heavens with the gods. If the soul is strong and controls its
horses, it catches sight of such true Ideas as Beauty and Self-Knowledge beyond the
heavens. The souls of men, however, all have a bad horse and will eventually fall
back down to earth. Now, when the soul catches glimpse of a beautiful boy on earth,
it is reminded of the vision of Beauty that it saw beyond the heavens. The resulting
yearning is eros. The soul that can control such yearning will be granted the
philosopher's boon--an early return to heaven after three thousand years instead of
ten thousand years.
After Socrates concludes his Great Speech, the dialogue transitions to a discussion of
rhetoric and writing. Phaedrus has been influenced by the sophistic view of rhetoric,
which states that persuasion trumps truth in the art of rhetoric. Socrates challenges
this argument by demonstrating the harmful influences of speaking without knowing
the truth. Rhetoric, in fact, directs the soul. As such, the rhetorician must understand
the souls of different audiences and speak accordingly. Such understanding cannot be
gleaned from books on rhetoric. True rhetoric involves dialectic, which involves
collecting and dividing knowledge of a subject in a natural way. This art of dialectic
can can only be acquired by philosophizing systematically about the nature of life
and of the soul. According to Socrates, then, the true art of speaking is reserved for
philosophers.
The last topic of discussion between Socrates and Lysias addresses the technology of
writing. Socrates tells the myth of the god Theuth, who discovered writing and
transmitted it to the Egyptians. When Theuth presented writing to King Thamus of
Egypt, he heralded it as a device that would increase wisdom and memory. But
Thamus replied that writing would increase forgetfulness rather than memory. For
instead of internalizing and understanding things, students would rely on writing to

remind themselves of various matters. Moreover, students would be exposed to

many ideas without their properly being thought. On a related note, Socrates
criticizes writing essentially because it is not speech: it cannot discern between
audiences and cannot respond to questions or criticism. The philosopher, then, would
only use dialectic writingand even then, only for his own amusement.
After reaffirming the importance of philosophy to both spoken and written discourse,
Phaedrus and Socrates set out on the path back to the city.

Phaedrus Character List

Socrates
Socrates is the friend and occasional mentor of Phaedrus. For more about Socrates,
see "About Plato" under "Additional Content" or follow this link to

Socrates.

Phaedrus
Phaedrus is a friend of Socrates and a devoted follower of Lysias. He loves speeches
and aspires to be a great orator.

Lysias
in absentia in the dialogue. He is the son
of Cephalus, who appears in Plato's Republic.
Lysias is a famous rhetorician named

Phaedrus Glossary
apolis
Outside or removed from the city (polis). Thematically, as in the Phaedrus, apolis
often opposes the rational order of the city with a disorder or madness.

ecstasy
Great happiness; an older meaning is of a frenzy, pointing to distress or
enchantment, as if one were "standing outside oneself" (from the Greek ekstasis, ek
= out, stasis = standing).

elenchus
A refutation based on logic. The Socratic elenchus refers to a series of questions and
answers designed to elicit the truth but which generally just refute an incorrect
argument without reaching the truth.

epideictic
A form of speech that displays rhetorical skill for its showy or exhibitionist character;
a kind of rhetoric aimed at showing the qualities of a subject rather than at making
plans.

etiology
The reason behind an occurrence; the cause or causes of a disease or condition; why
something is what it is.

logos
an Ancient Greek term meaning "word" or "speech" or "argument," pointing to
principles of logic and reason.

paean
A hymn or song of praise or triumph.

pederasty
A sexual relationship between an older man and a younger boy, particularly common
in Ancient Greece.

polis
A city or city-state in Ancient Greece. Thematically, the polis is associated with
rationality and order (as opposed to apolis, or what lies outside the city).

summum bonum
The greatest or highest good.

Phaedrus Themes

The Polis
Socrates is a man of the city, or the polis, whether or not he agrees with its
regime. Because he derives great pleasure from conversing with the citizens of

Athens, he has no reason to set foot beyond the city walls. In the Phaedrus,
however, Phaedrus manages to lure Socrates out to the countryside, where Socrates
appears entirely out of place. Outside of the polis, nymphs and gods possess
Socrates and inspire him to deliver two speeches. The setting thus plays an important
role in the dialogue and may serve to demonstrate the characteristics of a particular
type of madness (see Madness below).

Myths
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates evokes the possibility of demythologizing
the myth of Boreas and Oreithuia. Given enough time, he claims, one presumably
could retell the events covered in the myth with natural and logical explanations.
Nevertheles, myths in their metaphoric aspects prove useful to Socrates. Throughout
thePhaedrus, Socrates refers toand even inventsvarious myths for the sake
of his argument. Perhaps Socrates uncharacteristic respect for myths and traditional
theology can be attributed to the setting outside the polis. Beyond noting the
narrative influence of the gods and the nymphs, however, we should ponder the role
that myths play in the dialogue. Does Socrates reliance on myths undermine or
support his philosophic speculations?

The Platonic Soul

Socrates likens the souls of men and gods to chariots led by two winged horses. The
gods possess horses of entirely good breed and are thus able to fly in heaven
eternally. The souls of men, however, are all burdened by the combination of a good
and a bad horse: inevitably, they are dragged down to earth. Once on earth, all souls
must wait ten thousand years before growing back their wingsexcept for the
philosophers, who can sprout wings and return to heaven in three thousand years.
The human soul plays a crucial role in the Phaedrusbecause it is linked to both
eros and rhetoric; can these things keep both horses, or at least one or the other,
under control? Taking a correct approach to eros and rhetoric qualifies a soul as
philosophic, and such a soul is consequently granted the
an early return to heaven.

summum bonum of

Madness
Madness is at first criticized for its negative influence on a pederastic relationship. It
makes the older man irrational and excessive and as such deprives the boy of a
reliable, friendly mentor. In Socrates second speech, however, madness also is
shown to be of utmost importance in life. There are four kinds of divine madness
deriving from Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and Aphroditewhich provide the soul

Phaedrus discusses in particular the fourth kind of

madness, which is the madness of love, or eros.
with great benefits. The

Eros
Platos Republic treats eros as a dangerous but important part of the
philosophers soul. Similarly in the Phaedrus, Socrates shows eros to be a divine
madness that a philosophers soul must be able to control. In a pederastic
relationship, eros arises in those who have managed to glimpse true Beauty while
traveling through heaven. A boys beauty triggers the memory of this ideal Beauty.
The soul consequently yearns to approach the boy. When this yearning is controlled
modestly, the man will have fulfilled his part of the Platonic relationship and
contributed to the well-being of his soul. Such is the condition of any beholder of
beauty who controls his desires for the sake of his soul.

Rhetoric
The second half of the Phaedrus explores the nature of rhetoric. Socrates and
Phaedrus discuss the good and bad of rhetoric, its relationship to philosophy, its
composition and structure, and finally the difference between the rhetoric of writing
and that of speech. The discussion also serves as a critique of previous speeches.
The topic of eros, however, for the most part is not explicitly mentioned--yet the
persuasive power of rhetoric often makes use of eros. Although the discussions of
rhetoric and eros converge in their implications for understanding the nature of
philosophy, the apparent disjunction between the two parts of the dialogue remains a
popular topic of debate.

Writing
At the end of a discussion about rhetoric, Socrates invokes the myth of Theuth to
criticize writing. The problem of writing, in essence, is that it lacks a speaker, or
father. Unlike speech, writing is made of permanent marks and cannot be changed:
it can neither defend itself nor distinguish between audiences to modify its argument.
As such, Socrates claims, most writing is inferior to speech. A great deal of discussion
has targeted this trenchant critique of writingfor one, because it appears to
undermine the very writing of the Phaedrus. For this reason, a reader might
intentionally look for signs that Plato is trying to "speak" to readers through the ins
and outs of the dialogue--and might discover something that Plato has left for the
deepest readers to find.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Introduction: 227a230e

Socrates meets Phaedrus while walking through the streets of Athens.
Pheadrus says that he has been sitting all morning with Lysias, the son of

Cephalus, and now desires to talk a walk outside the city walls. Socrates asks how
Phaedrus spent his time with Lysias. Apparently, Phaedrus and other men listened to
Lysias deliver a speech on love. Phaedrus recounts: Lysias argues that it is better to

give your favors to someone who does not love you than to someone who does
(227c).
Socrates expresses a keen interest in hearing Lysiass speech. But Phaedrus claims
that a mere dilettante like himself could never recite the speech in a manner
worthy of Lysiasmuch less from memory (227d). Socrates retorts that he knows
Phaedrus well enough to see through this pretense. According to Socrates
conjecture, Phaedrus asked Lysias to repeat his speech many times and even read
over Lysiass text in order to commit it to memory. He then set out for the country,
where he could practice reciting the speech. Along the way, he happened to meet
Socrates. Although Phaedrus desperately wanted to recite the speech, he feigned
reluctance coyly.
Without commenting directly on this conjecture, Phaedrus agrees to let Socrates hear
the speech. He maintains, however, that he really did not memorize the speech
verbatim. He thus proposes to summarize the general sense, listing all the
arguments in proper order (228d). But once again, Socrates sees through
Phaedruss deception. Noticing an object in Phaedruss left hand, Socrates surmises
that Phaedrus has a copy of the original speech and merely wanted to practice his
own speechmaking. The truth now revealed, the two set off to find a quiet spot to
read.
As they approach a plane tree on the banks of the river Ilisus, Phaedrus asks Socrates
whether he believes in the legend of Boreas and Oreithuiawhich allegedly took
place on the banks of the Ilisus. Socrates declares that it would not be out of place
for [him] to reject it, as [the] intellectuals do (229c). But he consequently would
have to find ingenious ways to explain the legends many fantastic aspects in a
rational manner. Such demythologization would take a long time. And Socrates claims
that he has no time to waste over such matters, since he is still unable to know
himselfand it seems ... ridiculous to look into other things before [he has]
understood that (230a).
In the meantime, the two have reached the plane tree. Socrates expresses a deep
appreciation for the loveliness of their natural surroundings, to which Phaedrus
responds that Socrates appears totally out of place (230c)for Socrates habitually
stays within the city, where he can learn from people. Only with the prospect of
hearing Lysiass speech has he been lured into stepping outside the city walls.
Analysis
Socrates thrives in the culture of the cityin ancient Greek, the polis. As a
philosopher, he devotes himself to talking to various people in Athens and learning
from them (230d). He always stays in the city and thus appears totally out of place

Phaedrus,
the only Platonic dialogue that features Socrates leaving the city is the Republic.
But even in the Republic, Socrates would not have needed to step foot outside
on the rare occasion that he sets foot outside it (230c). Apart from the

the city walls to visit the Athenian port Piraeus (Nehamas and Woodruff, x).
The

Phaedrus, then, features a unique and strange setting.

Equally strange is the fact that Socrates leaves the city for a speech. Plato portrays
Socrates consistently as one who neither enjoys nor practices long speeches. Indeed,

Socrates preferred mode of discoursethe Socratic methodinvolves a series of

short questions and answers known as elenchus. Yet, in the Phaedrus, the
prospect of hearing Lysiass speech reduces Socrates to a sort of hungry animal
who will follow Phaedruss copy of the speech anywhere (230e). As Alfred Geier
notes, there is a touch of madness in Socrates here (145). What has come over
him?
Socrates explains that Phaedrus has found a potion to charm [him] into leaving
(230d). The word translated as potion is the ancient Greek pharmakon, which
can refer either to a medicine or a poison. This pharmakon is none other than Lysiass
speech in writing. Taking this fact as starting point, the French critic and philosopher
Jacques Derrida has expounded a reading of the Phaedrus in his influential essay
Platos Pharmacy. Derrida and other historical readings aside, however,
the Phaedrus does not make clear why a speech on love should represent such a
powerful attraction for Socrates. Even so, once Socrates leaves the city, his touch of
madness acquires a clear etiology.
We have seen that Socrates is a man of the city or polis. In ancient Greek culture,
the culture of the polis is often associated thematically with rationality and order
particularly when opposed to madness outside the city (apolis).
Euripidess Bacchae represents one such example, and the Phaedrus follows
in the tradition. Outside the city, Socrates will be inhabited by gods and nymphs to
produce elaborate speeches of his own. Moreover, his daimonion, or small
demon, which we see occasionally in other dialogues, will appear to counsel him
against returning prematurely to the city (242c).
The final point of note in the introduction invokes the famous ancient Greek aphorism
Know thyself. When Socrates claims that he has no time to explain away the myth
of Boreas and Oreithuia, he invokes the inscription on the stone at Delphi: on one
side is written, Know thyself; the other side reads Nothing in excess. The two
sides of the stone are very close to suggesting a duality between reason and
madness, or polis and apolis. In addition to eros and rhetoric, the Phaedrus also
treats the theme of madness and thus may reveal the benefits of some excess
notwithstanding the oxymoronic nature of the phrase.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Lysiass Speech:

230e-234c
Lysiass speech takes the form of an imaginary address from an older man to a

younger one. In the opening, the speaker claims that he can still get what he is
asking for (i.e., sex) without being in love with the boy (231a). He proceeds to raise
multiple arguments against love in such a relationship:
(1) The lover will regret giving favors after his desire subsides, while the non-lover
will view favors like business transactions.

(2) The non-lover will be able to indulge in pleasures without having to worry about
their negative impact on his business or personal life (i.e. he cant complain about
loves making him neglect other matters; 231b).
(3) The lover will treat former lovers (i.e. boys) poorly when he finds a new object of
desire.
(4) There is no sense in giving sexual favors to a man in love, since such a man will
admit that hes more sick than sound in the head (231d).
(5) Love limits ones choice; it is more likely to find someone who deserves your
friendship if one does not care about love.
(6) The boy who is afraid of the stigma surrounding relations with an older man is
better off with a non-lover, since the lover is more likely to boast about his relations.
(7) Whereas lovers will always be seen as giving in to desire, people will not fault
non-lovers for spending time togetherfor one has to talk to someone, either out of
friendship or to obtain some other pleasure (232b).
(8) Lovers are jealou,s and jealousy often leads to enmity; relations with a non-lover,
who has attracted a boy with his personal merits, will always lead to friendship.
(9) Lovers are usually first attracted to a boys body rather than his character, so
they may not want to remain friends afterwards.
(10) A lover is easily carried away in excessive pleasure as well as anger; such
excesses are not conducive to a long-lasting friendship.
(11) Contrary to what a boy may think, strong love can exist without erotic love, just
as we have trustworthy friends and family.
(12) It is proper to give ones favors to those who can best return them rather than to
those who are in the most need: friends often criticize a lover for bad behavior; but
no one close to a non-lover ever thinks that desire has led him into bad judgments
about his interests (234b).
Finally, the speaker declares that the speech does not urge boys to dole out their
favors indiscriminately to non-loversat least not any more than a lover would ask a
boy to give in to all his suitors. The goal of the speech has been to benefit both
parties rather than to cause harm. The speaker concludes: If you are still longing for
more, if you think I have passed over something, just ask (234c).
Analysis
Lysiass speech addresses the practice of pederastya sexual relationship between
an older man and a younger boy. Although such relationships were often shunned in
the public eye (cf. 255a-b), they occurred commonly in ancient Greece and
particularly in Athens. Pederasty did not necessarily interfere with relationships with
women; the older man could be married, and the younger boy often married later in

The Use of Pleasure, Michel Foucault treats the

complicated sexuality of the Greeksin part drawing from K.J. Dovers study Greek
Homosexuality. For the purposes of this essay, suffice it to note that an age
life. In the fourth part of

difference between males was the defining feature of pederasty. As Nehamas and
Woodruff point out:

What the two participants. . . took from their relationship was, at least
in theory, radically different: the older man received pleasure; the
younger, education and edification. (xvi)
Lysiass speech takes the general model of pederasty and expounds a strictly
utilitarian version of it. Erotic love, or Eros, according to Lysias, represents a mad

force that drives the older man to excessive, irrational actions. It is a turbulent force
and as such it should be eliminated entirely from relationships. What remains
between the non-lover and boy will be useful to both parties: sexual pleasure for the
older man and an allegedly better education for the younger boy. Love essentially
introduces entanglements that interfere with what matters for both parties. The
speech repeatedly suggests the importance of sex, as in the following lines with
sexual entendres: I dont think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for
(231a); what is most important to you already (232c); If you are still longing for
more, if you think I have passed over something, just ask (234c).
It remains questionable whether erotic love can really be excised from sex in the
manner that Lysias proposes; we do not yet have a counter-argument to compare
with Lysiass argument. More importantly, if this speech is to have relevance for
readers today--beyond the issue of love vs. sex--we should be considering the
implications of the argument for the relationships among actions done for utility,
those done for pleasure, and those done because they are inherently good.
In addition, knowing that the subject of rhetoric is to come, we should be thinking
about what parts of the soul are acted on by the art of rhetoric--the parts that love,
the parts that seek benefits, or the parts that seek the good--or all of the above. Does
the person listening to a rhetor put himself in the position of the lover, should he
focus on utility when listening, and should he seek to be educated rather than drawn
in uncritically by the rhetoric?

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Socrates'

Challenge of Lysias: 234d-237b
Socrates declares that he has shared Phaedruss Bacchic frenzy and is
now in ecstasy after the delivery of Lysiass speech (234d). Phaedrus is skeptical
about Socrates sincerity, but for Phaedrus, the speech is a serious matter. He asks
Socrates: Do you think that any other Greek could say anything more impressive or
more complete on this same subject? (234e). But Socrates answers the challenge
and critiques the speech.
Socrates wonders whether the speech should be praised for its content rather than
its style (such as its turns of phrase, clarity, and so onits rhetorical elements).
Praise of content fuels Phaedruss argument in favor of the speech; he believes that
Lysias has omitted nothing worth mentioning about the subject (235b). But
Socrates disagrees, suggesting that Lysias himself views style as more important
than content. To support this point, Socrates points out the redundancy of the
speech: it is as if to demonstrate that [Lysias] could say the same thing in two
different ways, and say it just as well both times (235a). Socrates also refutes
Phaedrus by claiming that Socrates can make a better speech himselfnot with
original ideas but with ideas borrowed from Sappho, or Anacreon, or some other
prose writer.
When Phaedrus presses Socrates to give such a speech, however, Socrates beats a
hasty retreat in several ways. First, he states that it is very difficult to make a speech
that differs so much from the previous speech. He concedes, however, that Lysias
makes an irrefutable argument in praising the non-lover for remaining more rational
than the lover. Socrates now praises Lysiass speech for its skillful arrangement as
well as its more original, tangential points (236a). At this point, Phaedrus allows

Socrates to presuppose that the lover is less sane than the non-lover in his own
speech (236b). When Socrates continues to resist, Phaedrus declares that he will
make Socrates speak by force if necessary. Finally, Phaedrus convinces Socrates to
speak by threatening to withhold all future speeches.
Analysis
This section is all about maneuvering and about speeches, though the content of the
contested issues is never far from hand. Phaedrus expects Socrates to praise the
content of Lysiass speech, but Socrates first reaction is to marvel at the speechs
ecstatic effect on Phaedrusand consequently on himself. One way to understand
Socrates reaction involves the opposition between style and content. What struck
Socrates about the speech was not its argument but how the argument was
delivered. More precisely, Socrates was struck by how Phaedrus delivered the
argument that had been written down. Alfred Geier reads, in this passage, a
ravishment on Socratess part by Phaedrus (160-1).
As for Lysiass speech itself, Socrates raises two points of criticism in response to
Phaedrus: first, that Lysias also is more concerned with style than content; second,
better arguments about love have been made elsewhere, perhaps by the poets
Sappho and Anacreon, or even by prose writers. In order to corroborate this second
point, Socrates claims that he can make a better speech. This speech will contain no
original ideasfor the Socratic philosopher is like an empty jarbut derives his
speech from words that he has heard from others (235d) and which have stood up to
scrutiny.
In relation to this idea of the empty jar, it is interesting to recall that Socrates was
willing to reject the myth of Boreas and Oreithuia by a process of demythologization.
Are the words and ideas that fill his empty jar not all sorts of myths? After all, do
poetry or hearsay stories contain any more truth than the myth of Boreas and
Oreithuia? Indeed, even as Socrates readies to deliver his own speeches with careful
logical reasoning, he will himself be forced to rely on myths to illustrate his
arguments. This section leads us to think about the relationships between poetry and
prose, myth and argument, and oral and written delivery of arguments.
What finally motivates Socrates to give a speech is the threat that he will no longer
be allowed to hear speeches by Phaedrus. (CompareLysistrata.) The
maneuvering in this section yields insight into what motivates Socratesor, at least,
what Socrates wants Phaedrus to think about what motivates the philosopher.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Socrates' First

Speech: 237b-241d
Socrates invokes the Muses at the beginning of his speech. The speech tells the

story of a boy or youth who had many male lovers. One of these men persuaded the
boy that he was not in love, though he loved the lad no less than others (237b).
The man made a speech to convince the boy to give his favors to the non-lover
rather than the lover.

The speaker begins by noting the importance of understanding the true nature of a
particular subject"for otherwise the inquiry will end up in conflict and confusion
(237c). In the case of the boy and the non-lover, the speaker asserts that they must
first define love and its effects. Love is a kind of desire. Yet men who are not in love
also desire the beautiful. To distinguish a man who is in love from a man who is not,
then, one must realize the two principles that rule men: the inborn desire for
pleasures and the acquired judgment that pursues what is best (237d). When the
former is in control, the state is called outrageousness (hubris). When the latter
takes command, the state is called being in your right mind ( sophrosune)
(237e-238a). Outrageousness has several names, among them the desire for food
(gluttony) and the desire for drink. But the desire that is the most powerfulthe one
that has led to this very speechis the desire to take pleasure in
beauty:

eros (238c).

At this point, Socrates breaks off his speech and notes that he is in the grip of
something divine (238c). He attributes his peculiar flow of words to Socrates
physical location:

Theres something really divine about this place, so dont be surprised

if Im quite taken by the Nymphs madness as I go on with the speech.
Im on the edge of speaking in dithyrambs as it is. (238c-d)
Socrates resigns himself to the divine force and continues his speech.
The speaker next asks rhetorically, What benefit or harm is likely to come from the
lover or the non-lover to the boy who gives him favors? (238e). Since the lover is
driven by outrageous desire, he will surely seek what is most pleasurable in his
boyfriend. Such a sick man takes pleasure in the weaker rather than the stronger,
so the boy will necessarily be weakeror the man will try to make him weaker. By the
same token, the man will delight in the boys mental defects rather than his
strengths, and the mans jealousy will steer the boy away from positive influences.
Such a man will serve no use as mentor or friend, since he will retard rather than
develop the boys intellectual development. As for the boys physical development,
the same can be said: the man will prefer a soft, unmanly boy to one over whom he
can wield total control. Furthermore, the man will also prefer a boy lacking family and
possessions, so that he can continue to pluc[k] the sweet fruit from the powerless
and dependent boy (240a).
The lover thus becomes basically an obsessive and controlling lecher whose company
is entirely vile and distasteful. In this sense, the lover is worse than a flatterer or
mistresswho at least bring some immediate pleasure. And while the lovers love
itself is harmful and disgusting, the love will also eventually fade (240e).
Afterwards, the boy will be forced to chase after his undelivered rewards, angry that
he has given favors to a lover rather than a non-lover. The lover has been harmful to
his property, harmful to his physical fitness, and absolutely devastating to the
cultivation of his soul, which truly is ... the most valuable thing to gods and men
(241c). The speaker concludes: Do wolves love lambs? Thats how lovers befriend a
boy! (241d). Socrates thus concludes his first speech, stating that
have to accept this as the end of the speech (241d).
Analysis

Phaedrus will

Socrates first speech provides a counterpart to Lysiass argument. Rather than

presenting the benefits of the non-lover, Socrates addresses the negative influences
of the lover. Eros can be a form of madness in which the inborn desire for beauty
overwhelms ones sense of morality and control in pursuing what is best
(i.e., hubrisoverwhelms sophrosune). Such madness destroys both the soul
and body of the boy and will bring him no benefits. Note that in
general,hubris could overwhelm
person desires as beautiful.

sophrosune with regard to anything that a

Socrates does not go on to argue the merits of the non-lover, since such an argument
would put him in Lysiass position as seducer. Readers at this point should want to
know more about how the desire for the good, or even the desire for the beautiful,
differs from the outrageous eros of the lover. But Socrates has engaged in
competition with Lysias as an orator rather than as a philosopher. As Nehamas and
Woodruff note, Socrates produces a counter-epideictic speech and makes an implicit
claim to have beaten the orator at his own game. This makes for a peculiar
situation, since Lysias is one of the great orators of the time, while Socrates officially
disavows any knowledge of rhetoric (xviii).
To justify the quality of his speech, Socrates evokes the divine forces of the Nymphs,
saying that they have possessed him with speech. As he breaks off mid-speech, he
claims to be on the edge of speaking in dithyrambs (238d). A dithyramb was
originally a choral poem sung in the worship of Dionysus or Bacchusthe god of
fertility and wine, who often inspires madness. In The Birth of Tragedy, the
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche described Dionysian forces of madness as
antithetical to the Socratic or Apollonian embodiment of reason. In what light, then,
should we see or trust Socrates putatively divinely-inspired speech?
The question has inspired much debate in Phaedrus scholarship. As Graeme
Nicholson notes, some have seen in Socrates speech a real concern for the welfare,
especially the moral welfare, of the boy, whereas others have seen Socrates as
repressing his own eros, and, owing to self-hate, painting eros in ugly colors
(120-1). It is also important to remember that we owe this depiction of Socrates
toPlato. At this point, as at so many other points throughout thePhaedrus, the
reader is invited to consider why Plato introduces such ambiguities and thematic
layers in the dialogue.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Socrates'

Recantation: 241d-243e
Phaedrus objects to the abrupt conclusion of Socrates speech, having

thought that Socrates was about to explore the merits of the non-lover. Socrates
explains, however, that he stopped in order to prevent himself from getting too
carried away. He says to Phaedrus: Dont you realize that the Nymphs to whom you
so cleverly exposed me will take complete possession of me? (241e). It should
suffice to say that every disadvantage of the lover has its corresponding advantage

in the non-lover. Socrates fears that his speech may become excessively epic, so
he sets out to cross the river on the path back to Athens.
Phaedrus holds Socrates back, suggesting that it would be better to wait for the
noontime heat to pass. Abruptly, Socrates praises Phaedruss speechmaking abilities
and declares that Phaedrus has inspired to him to produce a second speech after all.
As he was about to cross the river, Socrates explains, he saw a familiar divine sign
(hisdaimonion): whenever it occurs, [it] holds me back from something I was
about to do (242c). The sign has made Socrates understand that he has committed
an offense against the gods. Both his own speech and
foolish, and close to being impious (242d).

Lysiass speech were

Love, after all, is Aphrodites sonone of the gods. And if Love is a god or something
divine ... he cant be bad in any way (242e). Socrates must therefore correct his
previous speech, in which he vilified love. He explains that he will use an ancient rite
of purification: when Stesichorus was blinded for speaking ill of Helen, he composed
a poem to retract his earlier statement (i.e., a Palinode). So too will Socrates
compose a Palinode to Love. He will wash out the bitterness of the previous speech
(for if it were to be heard by a noble man in love, it would make Socrates seem vulgar
and ignorant). All of this is music to the ears of Phaedrus, who is eager to hear a
second speech and promises to make Lysias compose a speech on the same subject.
Analysis
Socrates, it turns out, has proved to be a skillful rhetorician. Having completed a
speech favoring the non-lover, Socrates now will retract his earlier statement and
turn to argue the exact opposite. The nymphs and their divine madness play not only
a vital but a deeply ambiguous role in Socrates speeches: at first, they inspire
Socrates to argue skillfully against the lover; now, they will help him deliver his
second speech on the importance of eros, which seems to favor the lover.
The reader might have expected that Socrates was going to give his second speech
on the merits of the non-lover, but he is going to correct his first speech instead. This
leads us to think about whether the initial division between lover and non-lover was
fair after all. Would not it be best for someone to desire and pursue the goodand
also to be in love with it? Something seems inadequate in the non-lover who holds
himself back. Maybe there are two kinds of lovers: one for which eros is outrageous
and damaging, and one for which eros is not outrageous but suited to its object.
While the appearance of Socrates daemon is fitting to the setting of the countryside
where Socrates finds himself apolis and entirely out of placethe dialogue offers
no particular reason for its mysterious warning. Maybe Phaedrus is the kind of person
who would draw damaging conclusions from a speech against love, so love must be
re-mythologized in a way that will help Phaedrus make good decisions. Perhaps this is
why Socrates draws on the story of Stesichorus in order to purify himself in the
correct manner. Myths are useful, and while one may find it best to reject a particular
myth as untrue on its face, for various reasons it may not be worth ones time to do
so.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Socrates Second

Speech: 244a-257b

The second speech begins by denying that there was any truth in the preceding
speeches. The only reason a boy should prefer the non-lover over the lover is if
madness were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best of things have come from
madness, when it is given as a gift of the god (244a). There are several kinds of
such divine madness:
(1) The madness that accompanies the work of the prophetesses of Delphi and the
priestesses of Dodona, or prophets in general. (The speaker conflates the two similar
but unrelated words for "madness" and "prophecy"manike and mantike.)
This madness guides entire cities as well as individuals.
(2) The madness that consoles or provides relief to those in hardship, which can
occur in the form of prophecies, prayers, mystic rites, and consequent purification.
(3) The madness from the Muses, which awakens the soul to a Bacchic frenzy of
songs and poetry (245a).
(4) Love is the fourth kind of madness, which will be discussed at length.
The speaker sets out to prove that love is a beneficial and divine madness. This proof
requires an understanding of the soul, both human and divine. Every soul is
immortal: the soul is a self-mover and thus is incapable of being destroyed or
started-up; it has neither birth nor death (245c). As for the structure of the soul, to
describe what it actually is would be a divine taskbut it is possible to describe what
it is like. The soul is like the natural union of a team of winged horses and their
charioteer (246a). While the horses and charioteers of the gods are all of good
breed, men possess a mixture: if goodness graces one horse, than the opposite will
plague the other, making it painful to drive the chariot.
So long as the souls wings are in good condition, it will be able to fly through heaven.
But a soul without wings will come down to earth and acquire an earthly body, thus
forming together a living thing, or animal, and has the designation mortal (246c).
(The speaker thus rejects the view that gods are immortal beings made of body and
soul.) The souls wings are nourished by beauty, wisdom, goodness, and everything
of that sort, which lift it high up in heaven; but foulness and ugliness make the
wings shrink and disappear (246e).
A great procession of chariots flies through heaven, led by Zeus and followed by
other gods and spirits. There are many wonderful sights and places in heaven. The
banquet in heaven, however, takes place on a steep hill. While the gods chariots can
climb the hill easily, the other chariots struggle with the weight of the bad horse.
Once at the top, the gods stand on the ridge and gaze at what lies beyond heaven. Of
this place beyond heaven, the speaker will attempt to speak the truth:

What is in this place is without color and without shape and without
solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true
knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the souls steersman. (247c-d)
Beyond heaven, in other words, lies the Reality of such transcendent forms as Justice,
Self-control, Knowledge, and Beauty.
Those souls who are closest to the gods will also have a view of reality, though made
imperfect by the distraction of the horses. Many souls, however, will never make it to
the top. After great pains, they will fall back down without having seen reality,
uninitiated, leaving them only with their own opinions (248b).

All souls yearn to stand on the plain of reality and truth. The grass that grows there is
the right food for the best part of the soul; it nourishes souls wings (248c).
Moreover, the souls that manage to glimpse reality will remain unharmed until the
next circuit, whereas other souls will fall down to earth.
The souls will take different forms in their first incarnations: (1) philosophers, or
lovers of beauty, or cultivated men; (2) kings or commanders; (3) statesmen,
household managers, or financiers; (4) trainers or doctors; (5) prophets or priests; (6)
poets or other representational artists; (7) manual laborers or farmers; (8) sophists or
demagogues; (9) tyrants. Leading ones life with justice will improve ones fate within
this hierarchy. But a life of injustice will lead to punishment. Each soul must live out a
ten-thousand-year cycle, except for those who practice philosophy, whose cycle is
three thousand years. In addition, the soul lives through thousand-year cycles on
earth, at the end of which the soul will be able to choose its new kind of life based on
its experiences and recollections.
The reason the philosophers soul is able to grow wings in three thousand years is
because it stays closest to the reality beyond heaven. The philosopher stands closer
to the divine than other humans. This brings us to fourth kind of madness: that
which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded
of true beauty (249d). This is the best kind of madnessthe madness of love that
possess a man when he sees a beautiful boy. Of course, only a few souls remember
reality well enough for such madness to be triggered by earthly things. To those
souls, however, the radiance of beauty can be perceived vaguely, even on earth. By
contrast, less radiant forms like justice, self-control, and wisdom do not shine out.
The vision of Beauty on earth evokes a fear for the divine, followed by a deep
reverence. When a man perceives a truly beautiful boy, he feels a chill and then
begins to sweat. The stream of beauty flows into his eyes, warming him up and
feeding his souls wings. The soul experiences an aching and itching sensation akin
to that which a child feels at the first growth of teetha sensation that is soothed by
the flow of joyful beauty (251c). In the absence of the boy, the aching and itching
return as a throbbing pain; but the memory of the boy allows the soul to recover its
joy.
This mixture of pain and joy is love. Love enslaves the soul and makes it forget
everything else because in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty,
the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain
(252a-b).
The way the soul acts on earthincluding its relation to the boydepends entirely on
the god with which it traveled in heaven. An attendant of Zeus, for example, will be
able to bear the burden of this feathered force [i.e., love] with dignity (252c). But
one of Ares, the god of war, might act more belligerently and mistreat the boy as well
as others. The souls who will most likely be able to consummate their relations with
boys are the followers of Zeus, Hera, or Apollothose who show no envy, no meanspirited lack of generosity and who make every effort to draw [the boy] into being
totally like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted (253b). This path to
capturing a boy relates back to the structure of the soul.
As previously noted, the soul is composed of thee parts: two horses and a charioteer.
The horse on the right side is the better, nobler one, who is a lover of honor with
modesty and self-control (253d). The horse on the left is uglier and wilder,
companion to wild boasts and indecency (253e). At the sight of beauty, the right

horse retains a sense of shame and does not move, while the left horse leaps forward
in an attempt to jump on the boy. As for the charioteer, he yanks back the reins in
fear when he recalls the reality of Beauty standing next to Self-control. A struggle
thus arises between the three elements, at the end of which the bad horse is tamed
and the lovers soul finally follows its boy in reverence or awe (254e).
As for the boy, he may initially resist the lover. But he eventually allows the man to
spend time with him since good naturally associates with good. And as he spends
time with the man, the boy realizes that the friendship with a man inspired by a god
exceeds all other friendships in his life. Eventually, the boy also begins to feel the
effect of desire flowing through him. He thus has a mirror image of love in him and
acts on the desires to see, touch, kiss, and lie down with [the man] (255e).
Meanwhile, the bad horse begins to pull against the charioteers reins again. If the
man and boy practice modesty and self-control, they will follow the path of
philosophy and grow wings after death. And there is no greater good than this that
either human self-control or divine madness can offer a man (256b). But if the man
and boy let the bad horse slip out of control, they may consummate their
relationship, albeit sparingly. In this case their souls will remain wingless after death
but nonetheless will not slip further down, since they will have begun the journey
upwards by trying to sprout wings. In both cases, then, a lovers friendship brings a
boy divine benefits. A non-lovers companionship, on the other hand, only brings a
boy cheap, human dividends (256e). Thus
palinode.

Socrates concludes his speech and

Analysis
Socrates second speech, also known as his Great Speech, overshadows the previous
two speeches in style, length, and content. Although it is decidedly uncharacteristic
of Socrates to speak so imaginatively at such great length, many of the most
important Socratic (or Platonic) ideas derive from the Great Speech. As a paean to
eros, the speech can be broken down roughly into three parts: (1) the importance of
madness; (2) a picture of the immortal souls life and structure; (3) an exploration of
platonic love.
(1) Both Lysias and Socrates thus far have posited the corruptive and evil nature
of madness. In the Great Speech, however, Socrates paints a more complex picture
of madness. To be sure, it has negative influences; but in fact the best things we
have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god (244c). The four
types of madness are later classified as gifts from Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and
finally Aphrodite. Socrates suggests, then, that logic and reason ( logos) are not
sufficient for the highest modes of human life. As Graeme Nicholson notes, for
example, the barren intellectualism of Lysiass address, devoid of. . . all forms

eros, would signify the deviant situation in which the soul as a whole was
overshadowed by, subordinated to, logos (197). Socrates himself gives us a
of

converse example: outside of his usual intellectual confines of Athens, the Nymphs
and gods inspire him to deliver his Great Speech.
(2) The importance of madness reappears in the structure of the immortal soul as a
primordial, nonrational drive. Here the deference to straight logic yields to a simile:
the soul is

like a chariot with two horses. All gods and men have the same structure

of the soul. But whereas the gods possess perfect internal harmony, men must
struggle to subordinate a wild, dark horse. This dark horse represents the nonrational
and impulsive side of man, which is opposed diametrically to the rationality and selfcontrol that the good horse represents. Both in heaven and on earth, man must
constantly struggle to dominate his dark side. Note that the souls director, or
charioteer, somehow must act both on and with rationalityand more. While this
toil is eternalsince the soul is immortalthe reward is also great.
In the famous allegory of the cave in Book VII of the Republic, Platoevokes a
world of perfect Ideas, or Forms, that reside in a realm higher than that of man.
The Phaedrus paints a similar picture. When the soul grows wings and travels
through heaven, its ultimate reward is to see what lies beyond it: true Knowledge,
true Justice, true Self-Control, and so on. These are the perfect Forms that life on
earth can only attempt to imitate. Souls that are lucky enoughor practice enough
control over the dark horsewill be able to climb high enough in heaven to catch
sight of such Forms. According to Socrates, this upward voyage brings the human
soul its greatest reward.
(3) Eros, then, involves seeing beauty on earth and recalling the true Beauty seen in
heaven. As such, the madness of eros itself represents an essentially positive force.
The real danger of eros resides in the dark horse as it rushes impulsively towards the
vision of beautyspecifically, a beautiful boy. Many souls will give in to such impulses
and consummate their relationships with sexual pleasure. But the truly noble soul will
be able to reign in such impulses with modesty and self-control. Such a soul belongs
to a philosopher, who will be rewarded by a return to heaven after three thousand
years instead of ten thousand. And there is no greater good than this that either
human self-control or divine madness can offer a man (256b).
The popular notion of a Platonic relationship derives from the above discussion in
the Phaedrus. The phrase is often used to indicate a romantic relationship devoid
of sexual intimacy. Socratess definition of a good pederastic relationship, however,
does not exclude such intimacy on an absolute basis. So long as the man and boy
treat each other respectfully and thoughtfully, occasional, controlled sexual pleasures
may well be acceptable to the soul. Both parties simply must know their own limits
and keep the souls dark horse under tight harness. Again, this relationship is a
symbol of all such loves. As the inscriptions on the stone at Delphi remind Socrates:
Know thyself and Nothing in excess.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Transition to

Discussion of Rhetoric: 257b-259d
Phaedrus is deeply impressed by Socrates speech and believes
thatLysias will be unable to match it with a speech of his own. Besides, Phaedrus

notes, a politician has recently criticized Lysias as a speech writer, so Lysias may be
reluctant to compose a speech to begin with. Socrates defends Lysias, however,
stating that the man would not be so easily intimidatedand that the politician did
not mean his comment as a reproach. Phaedrus retorts that the most powerful and
renowned politicians are ashamed to compose speeches or leave any writings

behind for fear of being called sophists (257d). But Socrates makes Phaedrus
understand the contrary: the most ambitious politicians love speechwriting and long
for their writings to survive (257e).
Politicians are actually in awe of speechwriting, for their legislative resolutions are
much like speeches. Legislative writing begins by acknowledging the writer and
remains on the books when it is politically successful (258a). Such was the case of
writing practiced by Lycurgus, Solon, and Darius, all famous lawgivers in history.
Socrates posits that none of these men would reproach Lysias for being a writer. He
concludes: Its not speaking or writing well thats shameful; whats really shameful is
to engage in either of them shamefully or badly (258d). The question, then,
becomes how to distinguish good writing from bad writing.
At this point, Socrates notes that they have plenty of time to discuss the question.
Besides, the cicadas are watching them. They will laugh at Socrates and Phaedrus if
they see the two succumb to the midday heat and break off conversation. On the
other hand, if they see the two engaged in conversation, they will be very pleased
and immediately give [the two] the gift from the gods they were able to give to
mortals (259b).
Socrates explains this gift, which Phaedrus has not heard of. Before the birth of the
Muses, cicadas used to be human beings. When the Muses came into existence,
some people became so obsessed with singing that they died from forgetting to eat
and drink. These people became cicadas, to whom the Muses gave a gift: they begin
singing at birth and need neither food nor drink until death. And when they die, they
report to the Muses which morals have honored her. To Calliope and Urania, they
report humans who honor their special kind of music by leading a philosophical life
(259d). Thus, there are many reasons for Socrates and Phaedrus to discuss rhetoric.
Analysis
After Socrates concludes his Great Speech, the dialogue transitions to a discussion of
rhetoric and writing. This marks the thematic midpoint of the dialogue, coinciding
with midday. The following points have been introduced in order to be discussed: (1)
the social standing or reputation of the speechmaker; (2) the permanence of writing;
and (3) the difference between good and bad speeches, spoken or written.
Socrates offers further justification for continuing the discussion by commenting on
the singing cicadas. As Nehamas and Woodruff note: Consonant with the respect for
myth and traditional theology which his visit to the countryside has produced in him,
[Socrates] describes the cicadas as the Muses messengers (xxx). The cicadas serve
as reminders that the two friends should discuss philosophy instead of languishing
under the noon heat. Alfred Geier also suggests that Socrates tells the tale to
war[n] Phaedrus that he is in great danger of becoming like one of those men
who loved poetry without nourishment and so died and became a cicada (184).
Rhetoric, in other words, needs some sort of philosophic backing.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Discussion of

Rhetoric, Part I: 259e-266c

Socrates wonders whether a good and noble speech must address the truth of
the issue at hand. Phaedrus has heard that a good speech is merely a matter of

seeming goodand that persuasion is more important than truth. Socrates proposes
that they investigate this last notion.
Say, for example, that Socrates were trying to convince someone to fight on
horseback. And say that Socrates knew nothing about horses except that Phaedrus
believes they are tame and have long ears. If Socrates were to make a speech
praising donkeyscalling them horsesand advised Phaedrus to employ donkeys at
home and at war, that would be evidently ridiculous. Socrates and Phaedrus thus
decide that it would better to be ridiculous and a friend than clever and an
enemy (260c). But when a rhetorician who cannot distinguish between good and
bad advises a city that also knows no better, he is clearly sowing rhetorical seeds for
a crop of really poor harvest (260d).
Socrates notes that some may defend the art of speaking in the following manner:
the speaker does not force anyone to learn speechmaking without knowing the truth;
on the contrary, he advises others to come to him only after they have mastered the
truthfor only then will they be able to convince others of the truth. Phaedrus
wonders whether this is a fair defense. Socrates replies by evoking yet another
argument: such a defense testifies to not an art but an artless practice. For as the
Spartan said, there is no genuine art of speaking without a grasp of truth, and there
never will be (260e). Socrates invokes noble creatures to convince Phaedrus that
unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to make a proper
speech on any subject (261a).
Through a series of questions and answers, Socrates leads Phaedrus to deduce
several points. (1) Rhetorical art in general is a way of directing the soul by means
of speech (261a). (2) Rhetoric involves the same art of speaking, be the subject
important or trivial, public or private. (3) Artful speakers can take both sides of an
argument by making things seem similar or dissimilar. (4) To know the similar and
dissimilar, one must know the truth about each thing one discusses. (5) Therefore,
Socrates concludes, the art of a speaker who doesnt know the truth and chases
opinions instead is likely to be a ridiculous thingnot an art at all (262c).
The two men now turn to Lysiass speech for examples of the artful and the
artless (262c). But first, Socrates remarks that he himself does not possess any art
of speaking, for his speeches contain an example of deception notwithstanding
knowledge of truth. That said, the two proceed to examine how Lysias writes
artlessly. Socrates begins by establishing two points. (1) Some words like iron are
clear; others like just are more ambiguous. Audiences are more likely deceived
and rhetoric has greater powerwith the ambiguous words or subjects. (2) The artful
speaker must know the class to which whatever he is about to discuss belongs
(263c).
Thus, Socrates asks to which class love belongsthe clear or the ambiguous?
Phaedrus claims that love belongs to the latter, since Socrates was able to speak of
love first as harmful and then as the greatest good. Socrates proceeds to point out
that he defined love clearly at the beginning of his speech. He then asks:

Did Lysias, too, at the start of his love-speech, compel us to assume

that love is the single thing that he himself wanted it to be? Did he

then complete his speech by arranging everything in relation to that?

(236d-e)
Socrates suggests that Lysias began with his conclusion and put together the rest of
the speech haphazardly. In this sense, Lysiass speech does not fit the essential
model of a living creature with head, body, and legs in the proper places (246c).
The speech is like the epigram on Midass tomb, in which any line can be read as the
first line. But this argument has confused and upset Phaedrus, so Socrates turns to
his own speeches.
Socrates points out that one speech advocated in favor of the lover, while the other
was in favor of the non-lover. He then paraphrases what was said previously: there
are two types of madness, one human and one divine, and of divine madness, there
are four kinds, inspired by the prophetic Apollo, the mystic Dionysus, the poetic
Muses, and the lovely Aphroditethe fourth being the best. Treating his two
speeches together, Socrates wonders: How was the speech able to progress from
censure to praise? (265c). Given that Fortunes guidance was involved, Socrates
remarks that the answer holds two devices whose nature would be quite wonderful
to grasp by means of a systematic art (265c-d).
The first consists of seeing together things that are scattered . . . and collecting
them into one kind (265d). This allows one to establish a clear framework of the
subject. The second, in turn, consists of cut[ing] up each kind according to its
species along its natural joints (265e). So long as the divisions are made naturally
and appropriately, they serve as analytical tools. In effect, Socrates speech was cut
into two parts. The first one cut the left-hand part, which led to the discovery of the
left-hand part of madness (the dark side). And the second one, correspondingly, cut
the right-hand part, which led to the right-hand part of madness (the divine side).
Socrates praises this ability to discer[n] a single thing that is also by nature capable
of encompassing many and names it dialectic (266b-c). Phaedrus agrees with
Socrates on the point that rhetoricians like Thrasymachus do not possess the skill of
dialectic.
Analysis
Phaedrus has been influenced by the sophistic view of rhetoric, in which persuasion is
valued over truth. Socrates challenges this sophistic argument with a social argument
that expresses the importance of philosophic reasoning. If an orator speaks falsely
but convincingly, his speech could lead people or a whole city down a dangerous
path. Even if the orator harbors no negative intentions, it is dangerous to practice
rhetoric without knowing the truth. Socrates claims, therefore, that sophistic rhetoric
is not an art but an artless practice.
True rhetoric, from a philosophic point of view, directs the soul of both speaker and
listener. Insofar as the speaker bears social responsibility for his speech, the true art
of rhetoric must be grounded in philosophyideally by knowledge, but at minimum
with respect for the differences among truth, opinion, and falsehood. A speech must
aim to guide souls truthfully, and only a philosopher knows the art of grasping truth
in a systematic way. This art can be understood as collecting and dividingor a
particular kind of synthesis, summary, and analysis. For any given subject, a full
rhetoric of the subject must first sum up all the different possible meanings,
observations, and arguments pertaining to the subject; then, these must be
organized or divided along reasonable and natural lines, prioritizing some elements
and subordinating others.

How does the philosophers rhetoric compare to the speeches of Lysias and Socrates
so far? In the hustle and bustle of life, does a lover or a beloved have time to engage
in a philosophic rhetoric? At what point must someone give up on philosophical
completeness and simply make the best choice among the available alternatives,
perceived incompletely and perhaps incorrectly?
Socrates finds fault in the haphazard construction of Lysiass argument. Like the
epigram on Midass tomb, various points of Lysiass speech could be rearranged
without really changing the argument as a whole. Perhaps this serves to illustrate
how Lysiass analysis fails to follow the natural lines that divide a well-structured
argument. On the contrary, Lysias defined love at the beginning and arranged his
speech in a sophistic manner. Again, a concern for style without much regard for
content cannot characterize the art of speaking well.
Although Socrates notes that he also defined love at the beginning of his speech, he
divided his arguments into two parts. And by referring to his two speeches as one,
Socrates suggests that his arguments did not contradict themselves but followed a
dialectic progression. In a mirror image of the Platonic soul, Socrates first speech
addressed the dark side of madness, while his second speech addressed the divine
side. His discussion on eros thus encompasses not only both sides of the argument
but also both sides of the soul. As such, it reflects the truth of the subject as a whole
and guides the soul in a philosophic manner. Other rhetoricians, such as
Thrasymachus (who appears in theRepublic), as Socrates and Phaedrus agree, do
not possess such a skill of dialectic.
But does this mean that Socrates, who so often claims not to have knowledge, knows
enough about love and the soul to feel confident in his speeches? Socrates is not
himself on this day, being apolis. In fact, he has been able to articulate his speeches
only with Fortunes guidance (265c) and with the nagging of his daemon.
Has eros now been forgotten? Earlier in the dialogue, Socrates made a rudimentary
distinction between style and content (234e-235a). Whereas his speeches responded
to the content of Lysiass speech, the discussion of the dialogue has now turned to
style. The relationship between content and style is a question that Socrates
continues to develop in the ensuing discussion of rhetoric. Was the earlier material on
eros just a warm-up for this philosophical material, or is eros central to both rhetoric
and philosophy in such a way that eros was the perfect prelude to the second half of
the dialogue?

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Discussion of

Rhetoric, Part II: 266c-274b
Phaedrus remains discontented with the understanding of rhetoric
that Socrates proposes. After all, Socrates has yet to address many things

everything, at any rate, written up in the books on the art of speaking (266d).
The two thus enumerate the many devices of speech that have been discovered by
famous rhetoricians. After reaching the conclusion that everyone seems to agree on
how to end a speech, Phaedrus is satisfied that all the major devices of rhetoric have
been reviewed. Phaedrus emphasizes that these devices have a very great
power . . . especially in front of a crowd." Socrates, however, suggests that the fabric
is a little threadbare (268a). He raises several examples by means of proof:

(1) Suppose a man has knowledge of the material contained in medical books but no
practical knowledge. He claims to be a physician, since he can teach anyone the
physicians art. But this is evidently absurd. The man cannot really claim to be a
physician, for he knows nothing of the art [itself] (268c). (2) Suppose someone
approached a tragedian, such as Sophocles or Euripides, and claimed that he knew
the art of composing all sorts of passages. He may believe that teaching such an art
would mean teaching the art of tragedy, but evidently this would not be the case. He
knows the preliminaries of tragedy, but not the art of tragedy itself (268e). (3) Now,
suppose a great orator like Pericles has heard all the devices of rhetoric that
Phaedrus and Socrates have just enumerateddevices which people write as if they
are rhetoric itself. Such a person may be able to recognize the devices, but he would
remain ignorant of dialectic (269b), taking the preliminaries or elements of rhetoric
to be the complex art of speechmaking. One needs to know how to put these
elements together to properly compose and then deliver a good speech on a
particular topic for a particular environment.
Phaedrus is convinced by Socrates argument and now wonders how one can acquire
this art of the true rhetorician, the really persuasive speaker (269d). Socrates
suggests that, like many other things, natural ability plays a key part in becoming a
great rhetorician. But there are ways to improve ones rhetoric, and they are not to
be found on the path taken by Lysias and Thrasymachus. Socrates proposes an
answer by way of examining why Pericles was in all likelihood the greatest
rhetorician of all (269e).
All the great arts, Socrates states, require endless talk and ethereal speculation
about nature: This seems to be what gives them their lofty point of view and
universal applicability. In addition to having natural ability, Pericles learned from
Anaxagoras, who got his full dose of ethereal speculation, and understood the
nature of mind and mindlessness (270a). Socrates thus suggests that Pericles
understood something of the nature of the world as a whole. Consequently, he was
able to grasp the nature and soul of rhetoric and distance himself clearly from an
empirical and artless practice (270b). But Phaedrus does not fully comprehend this
progressionfrom grasping the nature of the world to grasping the nature of the soul
and to rhetoric. Socrates thus proposes to reexamine this view.
In order to think systematically about the nature of anything, one must take the
following steps (270c). First, determine whether it is simple or complex; if it is
complex, enumerate all its forms. In either case, determine its natural powerwhat it
acts upon and what about it is acted upon. Socrates states that any other method
would be like walking with the blind. Now, a teacher of rhetoric should be able to
apply this method to the soul and and demonstrate the essential nature of the soul
(270e). After all, rhetoric targets the soul to produce conviction. Any serious
rhetorician will thus classify different kinds of speeches and souls and explain their
different affects and effects. This is the only way, Socrates claims, to produce an
artful speech, be it written or spoken.
The problem is that since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul," the
orator faces an extremely difficult task (271d). He must not only learn but also apply
the theory of how to reach souls through words. To fully have the rhetors art, he
must know the nature of any and every potential audience in order to be able to
determine the right type of speech to use, and he must speak with the correct
devices at the correct times. Phaedrus agrees with Socrates that no other path leads

to the true art of speaking. But this path is evidently a major undertaking, so the
two set out to try to find some easier and shorter route to the art (272b-c).
Many people say that in order to be an able rhetorician, one need not know the truth
about the things that are just or good (272d). In law courts, after all, people only
care about what is convincing. An effective rhetorician, following this path, need only
address what is likely and pursue his argument from there. Here, Socrates invokes
Tisiass book on rhetoric, in which the likely is associated with the crowds opinion.
By Tisiass art of rhetoric, the following situation could well occur: if a weak but
spirited man were taken to court for robbing a strong but cowardly man, neither man
would tell the truth if the main criterion were effectiveness in persuasion. The spirited
man would protest: How could a man like me attack a man like him? and the
cowardly man, unwilling to admit his cowardice, would be forced to cover for himself
by inventing some sort of lie (273c).
This anecdote, in the eyes of Socrates, shows sufficiently that the shorter path to the
art of rhetoric is unacceptable. The effectiveness criterion and arguments from
likelihood, all too often, lead souls to embrace what is false. The only way to truly
possess the art of speaking passes through a long detour. This detour, Socrates
recapitulates, involves acquiring the ability to enumerate the sorts of characters to
be found in any audience, to divide everything according to its kinds, and to grasp
each single thing firmly by means of one form. Only with such abilities can one
speak and act in a way that pleases the gods as much as possible (273e). Indeed,
wise men say that a reasonable man must strive to please not his equals but his
masters, who are wholly good (273e-274a). Thus Socrates concludes the discussion
of artful and artless speaking.
Analysis
Having disposed of his sophistic views on rhetoric, Phaedrus remains unwilling to
relinquish all the rhetorical devices that he has learned from books. Surely, since they
have been discovered and developed by so many great orators, they must serve a
rhetorician well! Socrates offers several anecdotes in response. Several points here
are essential. For one, knowing the elements of something is different from knowing
how to put the elements together. That is, theory is not sufficient for practice. Just as
one who has read books on medicine cannot credibly claim to be an able physician,
so too must students of rhetoric learn more than mere rhetorical devices from books.
True rhetoric, Socrates repeats, is founded on dialecticor more broadly, philosophy.
A good rhetorician must be able to persuade souls and do it justly, not just effectively.
As Socrates points out in another dialogue, Gorgias, one of the greatest possible
evils is to know the truth but to intentionally put falsehood into anothers soul. How
can the noble rhetor avoid this evil? He not only must be able to apply the dialectic
method of collecting and dividing to any subject on which he must speak, but he also
must be able to use that method to understand different kinds of souls in order to
persuade each one according to its kind. Since the rhetorician must direct the soul of
his listeners, he must have a perfect understanding of the soul and be able to
distinguish between different audiences. What can he do for a mixed audience, where
the same speech might persuade some but lead others astray?
In order to understand the nature of the soul, the rhetorician must follow the Socratic
maxim Know thyself and strive to understand, to start with, his own soul. Thus the
true art of rhetoric requires philosophy to such a degree that it cannot possibly be

achieved by anyone except a philosopher. As Graeme Nicholson notes, What the

dialectician practices . . . is the full Socratic art of thinking and living, and only that
gives an adequate buttress to rhetoric (65).
The rhetorician, then, faces a superhuman task. Even Socrates himself cannot claim
to have mastered the art of speaking, since he still struggles to know himself (230a).
He does not even clearly understand how his daemon intervenes to keep him from
making certain mistakes. Indeed, Socrates states repeatedly that his two speeches
stemmed from divine inspiration rather than his own knowledge.
Given the long path that leads to mastering the art of speaking, then, Socrates
proposes to look for a shortcut. As a practical matter, a shortcut seems absolutely
necessary, for how else could someone deign to persuade someone about anything?
As life goes on, people need to make decisions and cannot wait for philosophy or
philosophers to step in. Thus, Socrates appears willing to look for a shortcut. But this
is just one of many places where Socrates hides an ulterior motive; he intends to
reject the shortcut.
The shortcut they examine derives from the technique of appealing to the likely, as
found in Tisiass book on rhetoric. The problem is that, as shown by the example of
the weak opportunist beating the strong coward, the rhetoricians appeal to the likely
all too often obstructs rather than promotes justice and truth. This shortcut
resembles sophistry in that it can easily obscure justice and truth. The path that
leads to the true art of speaking, Socrates repeats, must pass through a thorough
study of dialectic and philosophy. In this regard, Phaedruscontains Socrates
advice to Phaedrus and perhaps to all speech-lovers: do not spend your time on
speeches, where the best you can do is make concessions to the likely, and where
the worst outcome can be truly bad, but study and live by philosophy. It seems better
to withhold assent if assenting sometimes leads to accepting falsehood into the soul.
But this path seems extremely impractical. Is there no better shortcut? Do we not
have to assent to many things on the basis of likelihood, just to make basic decisions

Plato presents us with a view of Socrates as a person who makes a lot

of provisional arguments without finally deciding that he knows anything
every day?

substantial. Maybe the shortcut involves seeing the true nature of rhetoric as
something provisional; that is, the art of persuasion is the art of moving souls without
going so far as to try to put either true or false statements in the souls of an
audience. He who would go that far had better be a philosopher, not a rhetorician.
That way, if people are persuaded to make decisions that turn out badly, the
rhetorician may be excused on the ground that he openly admitted that he really did
not provide anything more than an argument from likelihood.
If this shortcut holds, then the good rhetorician ought to learn how to express
humility and how to convey various degrees of certainty and uncertainty, unlike the
rhetors who claim to be able to speak persuasively on any subject.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Discussion of

Writing: 274b-277a
The dialogue now turns to a discussion of writing: What feature makes writing good,
and what inept (274b)?

Socrates begins by telling the story of Theuth.

Among the ancient Egyptian gods, there was one called Theuth who discovered
number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, as well as the games of draughts
and dice, and above all else, writing (274d). One day, Theuth visited Thamus, King
of Egypt, urging him to disseminate the arts around Egypt. For each art that Theuth
presented, Thamus offered his praise and criticism. When it came to writing, Theuth
said:

O King, here is something that, once learned, will make the Egyptians
wiser and will improve their memory; I have discovered a potion for
memory and for wisdom. (274e)
But Thamus replied that, as the father of writing, Theuths affection for writing had
kept him from acknowledging the truth about writing. In fact, Thamus asserted,
writing increases forgetfulness rather than memory. Instead of internalizing and
understanding things, students will rely on writing as a potion for reminding.
Moreover, students will be exposed to many ideas without properly thinking about
them. Thus, they will have an appearance of wisdom while for the most part they
will know nothing (275a-b).

Phaedrus protests that Socrates has invented the story haphazardly. But

Socrates retorts that the priests at the temple of Zeus at Dodona say that the first
prophecies were the words of an oak (275b). What difference does the origin of a
story make, so long as it tells the truth? In light of this argument, Phaedrus retracts
his criticism and agrees that Thamus spoke correctly about writing.
How is it possible, then, that a book on the art of rhetoric can possibly yield results
that are clear or certain? (275c). How could rhetoricians possibly believe that their
writing can do more than remind those who already know what the writing is
about? (275d). Socrates points out several related problems inherent to writing. (1)
Like painting, it has no understanding of itself and continues to signify just the same
thing forever (275d-e). (2) It does not discern between appropriate and
inappropriate audiences. (3) It always needs the support of its writer (or father); for
alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support (275e).
Socrates and Phaedrus agree, however, that such discourse also has a legitimate
brothernamely the living, breathing discourse of a man who knows, of which the
written one can be fairly called an image (276a). Socrates compares a noble writer
to a farmer who sows gardens of letters for his own amusement. Later in life, he will
have plenty of reminders for himself. Moreover, his followers will also be able to
appreciate these reminders in bloom. Socrates concludes by once again praising
dialectic:

The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it
discourse accompanied by knowledgediscourse capable of helping
itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but
produces a seed from which more discourse grows . . . Such discourse
makes the seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as
happy as any human being can be. (277a)
This concludes the discussion of writing.

Analysis
Phaedruss initial response to Socrates story of Theuth contains an implicit but grave
accusation of sophistry. Has Socrates not simply made up a myth to bolster his own
ideas about writing? Rather than sidestep the accusation by resorting to the empty
jar argument, Socrates proposes an entirely new line of reasoning (cf. 235d). So long
as a document or speech contains the truth, he claims, the source does not matter.
Although Phaedrus accepts this claim immediately, it remains unclear how Socrates
gained the knowledge contained in the myth of Theuth and Thamus.
The myth itself suggests the ambiguity of social consequences that was introduced
by the technology of writing. On the one hand, Theuth claims that writing serves as
an instrument to improve memory and wisdom; on the other hand, Thamus believes
that people will rely too much on writing and consequently lose memory and wisdom.
Insofar as both beneficial and harmful qualities are ascribed to writing,
reference to writing as a

Platos

pharmakon is appropriate. Earlier, Socrates referred to

the copy of Lysiass speech using the same wordpotion in ancient Greek, which
can refer either to a medicine or poison. Writing, like rhetoric and like administering
potions, appears to be a neutral art, one that can turn out either well or badly
depending on the content and the audience.
Socrates proceeds to emphasize the negative side of the pharmakonthat is
writing. The essential problem of writing is that it is a dead kind of speech. Unlike
living, breathing discourse, writing can neither change its argument nor respond to
criticism. Writing also lacks the ability to distinguish between audiencesan
important skill that Socrates requires of proper dialecticians (cf. 271b). Writing cannot
direct the souls of readers in a proper fashion; metaphorically, it requires a father
for guidance and support.
The key notion here, however, is that some writing can embody dialectic and thus
become a legitimate child that does not require the fathers presence. Which
writing embodies universal knowledge for a universal audience? Or does Socrates
mean the oppositethat the knowledge and the audience are so specific that they
include only the philosopher himself (and perhaps his trusted friends and students),
so that the writing must be for amusement and to trigger memory?
In between the universal audience and the individual audience, Socrates and
Phaedrus have focused on the public nature of rhetoric. In a courtroom or in the
political arena, rhetoric moves audiences. It directs souls. For this reason, Socrates
deems sophistry particularly dangerous, which is why noble rhetoricians and
dialecticians must know the souls of their audiences and use the correct manner and
content of speech. Writing, then, faces an impossible task if it is engaged in the
business of persuading souls: no matter how much knowledge and truth it contains,
no argument can be free of the potential to harm or misguide an audience. Besides,
casual readers will read philosophy in order to learn about philosophy rather than
to actually think philosophically, and a little such knowledge can be a dangerous
thing--just as a little book-knowledge of rhetoric or of potions can turn deadly.
But if the philosophical writing is fundamentally private in naturefor the
philosophers own amusement, or for his close friends or studentsthen its potential

for harm is largely overcome. Such writing may not be intended to move others,
though others may eventually find amusement in it themselves. Is even this kind of
writing possible? How can the writer ensure that the writing never gets into the
wrong hands, where it could be misunderstood?
The idea that writing is safest and most effective when it is shared privately is an
idea that returns us to the relationship between the young student and the nonloving teacher. In this private relationship, ideas can be exchanged intimately
between soulsmost of all through words, and secondarily through writingin an
environment where neither party intends to deceive the other for the sake of love or
some other passion, but both engage together in the philosophical pursuit of truth
and where their rhetoric does not depend on knowing all types of souls, but only each
others.

Phaedrus Summary and Analysis of Conclusion: 277a279c

Socrates and Phaedrus recall that they initially set out to
examine the attack on Lysias on account of his writing speeches, and to ask
As they conclude,

which speeches are written artfully and which not (277a-b). They have observed two
points integral to the art of speech: (1) one must know the truth and be able to
define everything on which one speaks; (2) one must understand the nature of the
audiences soul(s) and prepare every speech accordingly. Furthermore, anyone who
believes that he writes down matters of great importance should be reproached. For
the worthy man will only write for the sake of amusementand learning about what
is just, noble, and good. Such discourse can be called the mans legitimate
children and may spread naturally to other good souls (278a). The producer of such
discourse can be called a philosophera wisdom lover. On the other hand, the man
who dwells on his writings will be called a poet or a speech writer or an author of
laws (278d-e). Finally, after a prayer to the gods, Socrates and Phaedrus set out on
the path back to the cityand to their respective favorites, Isocrates and Lysias.
Analysis
See the analysis of the previous section for insight into the conclusion of the dialogue
from a philosophical point of view. Here, Socrates mainly summarizes what has come
before, reaffirming the overarching importance of philosophy for spoken and written
discourse. By extension, he disparages all those who dwell on their writings at the
expense of philosophical dialectic. The philosopher, Socrates repeats, would only
writeeven legitimate discoursefor the sake of amusement.
But having written Phaedrus and so many other dialogues, can Platojustify
thinking of himself as a philosopher? Arguably, the Socratic teachings could not have
spread so widely and lasted so long without Plato's writings. Is it perhaps legitimate
for an author to write of the dialectic discourse of others? Is there a way to produce a
piece of writing that can survive the test of time across various audiences and still be
philosophically or rhetorically valuable beyond a small, private group, without
causing harm by leading some readers astray? If so, perhaps the Socratic dialogue,
very carefully constructed, leaving the casual reader no worse off and providing
entertainment for philosophical readers, is Platos answer.

The return to Athens signifies a return to normalcy, at least on the part of Socrates.
But the mention of Isocratesa famous Greek orator, associated with the school of
Sophistsconcludes the dialogue on a troubling note. For if Isocrates is indeed
Socrates favorite, then are we to see that even Socrates fails to inspire his beloved
student to take up philosophy rather than rhetoric? The Socratic way of life, after all,
proves tragic, leading to Socrates death by poison. Is this the fate a philosopher who
abhors public rhetoric should expect?

Phaedrus The Technology of Writing

The critique of writing in the Phaedrus has inspired a great deal of commentary
with a historical focus. Such commentary views the dialogue in relation to the
historical transition from orality to literacy. In very broad terms, this transition
introduced profound changes to the structure of human thought: whereas a strictly
oral culture seemed to require externalization of reflections, the technology of writing
gave humanity an increased capacity for leisured internalization and introspection.
One could henceforth record, develop, and spread one's thoughts with greater ease.
But new technology often breeds suspicion. Much like contemporary anxiety over the
increasingly cold modes of electronic communication (e.g., email in the place of
postal mail), Thamuss dislike of writing in the myth of Theuth is often taken to
reflect Platos suspicion of writing as a new technology. Jacques Derridas famous
essay Platos Pharmacy, for example, treats Platos ostensible preference of speech
over writing as one of its subjects.
The changes induced by new technology, however, often catch us unawares. In the

Orality and Literacy, Walter J. Ong first glosses Platos

criticism of writing. According to Ong, thePhaedrus and so-called Seventh Letter
influential study

raise four main points: as opposed to speech, writing is inhuman, a thing, a

technological product; it weakens the memory of those who rely on it; it cannot
respond to new questions; and it cannot defend itself (274-77). Writing is cast
essentially as a passive, impersonal product that serves as a poor substitute for
speech. For Plato to make his objections strongly and effectively, however, he himself
chose to use writing (albeit in dialogue form and using characters other than himself
who are speaking). This allowed him to concretize and develop his ideas in ways that
were perhaps unavailable through direct speech. Moreover, we would otherwise not
have his objections passed down to us in the way he intended them.
Consequently, as Ong points out (based on Eric Havelocks studyPreface

to

Plato), the use of writing unwittingly turned Plato against the former oral tradition:
Platos entire epistemology was unwittingly a programmed rejection of
the old oral, mobile, warm, personally interactive lifeworld of oral
culture . . . Platonic form was form conceived of by analogy with visible
form. The Platonic ideas are voiceless, immobile, devoid of all warmth,
not interactive but isolated, not part of the human lifeworld at all but
utterly above and beyond it. (80)
By turning to writing, Plato was inadvertently influenced by the very paradigm of
literacy he opposeda paradigm based on seeing rather than hearing. The term

idea, form, Ong reminds us, is visually based, coming from the same root as the
Latin video, to see (80). The Platonic Idea resembles writing in that it is absolute
and autonomous. Like writing, it can be perceived and talked about; unlike speech, it
has no immediate presence on a human level.
Ultimately, history has resolved the disagreement between Theuth and Thamus in
favor of the former. As Ong shows in Orality and Literacy, writing has
restructured human consciousness in a way that has increased both wisdom and
cultural memory.
Such historical arguments remain entirely relevant. With regard to new modes of
communication, readers today may find themselves in a position akin to that of Plato
(through Socrates, a generation his senior) in the Phaedrus. Essentially
every argument that Plato makes against writing can be made analogously against
the Internet and electronic communications.
Consider, for instance, what "knowing facts" means in the context of being able to
retrieve all sorts of facts from a handheld Internet connection at any time, anywhere.
When Plato has Socrates say elsewhere that he knows many things but they are all
trivial, perhaps he means things that can be written down, like lists of rhetorical
devices. Knowing love or thinking philosophically is something else entirely. What
does the future hold for an increasingly technological world, where more and more
can be recorded or calculated outside of our minds?

Phaedrus Essay Questions

1.

1
What is the relationship between love (eros) and
rhetoric in thePhaedrus? How does the dialogue
formally link the two themes? Consider, for example,
the transition that occurs after Socrates' second
speech.
Suggested Answer
This is perhaps the most difficult of all questions
concerning thePhaedrus. It is almost begging the
question to say that philosophy serves as a bridge
between eros and rhetoric. But since the philosopher's
position with regards to oration remains ambiguous, it
is not entirely clear why the topic of rhetoric should
be treated so extensively. The transitional material
between the treatments of eros and rhetoric discusses
sophistry and appears almost arbitrary. Does this

serve as indication of a disjunction between the two

parts of the dialogueor the two horses of the
Platonic soul? If so, it seems unfair to associate one of
the topics with reason and the other with passion.
Instead, consider that eros and rhetoric have in
common something about particulars rather than
universals.
2.

2
What role do myths play in the Phaedrus? Do
Socrates' views on myths differ between the
beginning (229c-230a) and the end (275b-c)? Does
his reliance on myths undermine his speculations on
philosophy?
Suggested Answer
Whereas Socrates presents himself as skeptical of
myths at the beginning, by the end he is willing to use
any myth, so long as it contains truth. This does not
necessarily undermine his philosophic speculations,
insofar as philosophy sometimes involves a touch of
madness or requires something other than pure
reason. Mythmaking is a neutral art that can lead
either to truth or falsehood depending on the degree
to which a myth is taken literally or metaphorically.

3.

3
Socrates' criticism of Lysias's speech makes a rough
distinction between style and content (234e-235b).
Socrates suggests that Lysias was concerned more
with style, since his arguments seem haphazard
rather than presented in a logical succession. To what
extent are Socrates' own speeches logical? Do his
arguments ever seem contrived?

Suggested Answer
Consider that Socrates takes great care to construct
his speech logically, but he proceeds to deny the
content of that speech. Moreover, Socrates relies
heavily on myth at one point in thePhaedrus--how can
a myth be used in a logical argument?
4.

4
How wise is Socrates? Do you believe his claim that
he really knows very littlethat he is like an "empty
jar" (235d)? Does he appear to hide greater wisdom
anywhere in the Phaedrus?
Suggested Answer
This question can be explored in relation to any
number of Plato's dialogues. His claim of ignorance is
justly called the Socratic irony, given that Socrates
seems to have a lot of valuable insight if one reads
carefully.

5.

5
What is the reasoning behind Socrates' critique of
writing? What might be an example of writing that
Socrates would deem worthy of a good dialectician?
What about the Phaedrus?
Suggested Answer
This question could be approached from a historical
perspective (see "A Note on the Technology of
Writing"). Other answers would require creativity but
may be very rewarding. Unless one believes that Plato
wrote the Socratic dialogues for amusement, following
the argument that this is the only legitimate purpose
of philosophic writing, the Phaedrus would not qualify
as "good" writing. But is this argument valid? See the
analysis section on writing in this ClassicNote.

6.

6
Socrates mentions four kinds of madness in the
dialogue, those which derive from Apollo, Dionysus,
the Muses, and Aphrodite. The fourth kind is
discussed explicitly. Does the dialogue contain
examples of the other kinds of madness? Can you
think of other texts where Socrates' arguments about
the importance of madness might hold true?
Suggested Answer
Prophetic madness seems to be absent from
the Phaedrus. Socrates benefits, however, from the
inspiration of the Muses and Nymphs that is also
Dionysiac. Sophocles' Oedipus Rex and Ajax, and
Euripedes' The Bacchae all hinge on either prophecy
or madness.

7.

7
In the discussion of rhetoric, Socrates downplays the
utility of books on rhetoric. Merely knowing rhetorical
devices, he suggests, have limited use. To what
extent is this proven or disproven by
thePhaedrus itself?
Suggested Answer
The Socratic argument is that such devices can be
useful when one understands true rhetoric, or
dialectic. But one must know this art in order to apply
the devices properly.

8.

8
Consider the relationship of philosophy to eros and
rhetoric. Does Socrates present philosophy as a
guiding principle or as something that must be

acquired? Does the approach to eros and rhetoric

define philosophy, or vice versa?
Suggested Answer
Taking the correct approach to eros and rhetoric is a
sign of a philosophic soul. But this is not the same as
having wisdom, a central goal of philosophy.
Answering such a question ultimately involves
describing what the soul is and what it seeks.
9.

9
To what extent is the discussion of love in
the Phaedrus restricted to pederastic relationships?
Discuss how the arguments presented by Lysias or
Socrates would fit other types of romantic
relationships.
Suggested Answer
Lysias's speech as well as Socrates' first speech
addresses the specific dynamics of pederastic
relationships, though the principles seem applicable
to some other relationships. Socrates' second speech
works in a more universal framework, especially
considering how any person might trigger a
recollection of true Beauty.

10. 10
What is the relationship between rhetoric, dialectic,
and philosophy?
Suggested Answer
Consider these things as arts or methods with
different relationships to truth, opinion, certainties,
and probabilities.