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CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean

Mawis, 2-B LPU 2014

RULE 7: PARTS OF A PLEADING


Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number
if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or
petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with
an appropriate indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. (1a, 2a)
Section 2. The body. The body of the pleading sets fourth its designation, the allegations of the party's claims
or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading. (n)
(a) Paragraphs. The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered
to be readily identified, each of which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so far as
that can be done with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding
pleadings. (3a)
(b) Headings. When two or more causes of action are joined the statement of the first shall be prefaced
by the words "first cause of action,'' of the second by "second cause of action", and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the
complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the
second cause of action" and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to
several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect. (4)
(c) Relief. The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or
other relief as may be deemed just or equitable. (3a, R6)
(d) Date. Every pleading shall be dated. (n)
Section 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him,
stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to
be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel
who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or
indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to
appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon
"knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
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Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)

QUIMPO VS. DELA VICTORIA


2 May 1968 - Respondent Victoria filed before the CFI a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against petitioner Quimpos.
28 June 1968 Respondent Victoria filed another case before the City Court of Davao for forcible entry over the
same property against petitioner Quimpo.
Petitioner Quimpos moved for dismissal of forcible entry alleging the pendency of the quieting of title case. He was
declared in default. City Court ruled in favor of respondent Victoria. MR was denied. He appealed to CFI raising the
same issue about pendency of quieting of title, but the same was denied. CFI issued a writ of execution. Hence,
the appeal.
Issue:
1.

2.

Whether or not the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the
verification of the corresponding complaint being void (note that this is the first time this issue was raised
on appeal)
Whether or not the lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry filed a month after
an action for recovery of possession and quieting of title had been filed by respondents against petitioner
over the same cause of action, the same subject matter and the same parties;

Held : Petition dismissed.


First issue:
It is pointed out in the first assigned error that since the verification in the complaint for forcible entry does not
comply with Section 6, Rule 7, of the Revised Rules of Court, the complaint is void; hence, the City Court, and
subsequently the court a quo, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.
The verification in question states:
xxx xxx xxx
I, CATALINO DE LA VICTORIA, under oath, allege: that I am one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled
case; that I have read the allegations thereof; that they are true and correct.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides:
... Verification. A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has
read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge.
Verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief shall be
deemed insufficient.
Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred to the allegations in the complaint as
having been read by him. However, while he stated that "they are true and correct," he omitted to state that said
conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically inferable since affiant was a
party and it does not appear that he was verifying upon information and belief. If petitioner entertained doubt
about the true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be made more definite.

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Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not render the complaint for
forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several decisions that
the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal. Villasanta vs. Bautista.
While it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of Court requires the verification of the complaint for
forcible entry, the insufficiency of the same, or its being defective, is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the City Court or
that of the court a quo to which the case was later appealed
It will also be noted that defendant-petitioner raises the question of jurisdiction for the first time in this appeal,
hence, he is now barred by laches. This Court ruled in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy that
... a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A. L. R. 79).
Second Issue:
With respect to the second assignment of error, one the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court is the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause.
In order that this ground may be availed of there must be, between the action under consideration and the other
action, (1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity on the two
preceeding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will
regardless which party is successful amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.
While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and Civil Case No. 6005, for
quieting of title, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for in the said cases are not the same. In the former case,
to the legal right claimed is possession, while in the latter case, the legal right asserted is ownership.
While the fact that triggered both actions was appellant Quimpo's forcible invasion of respondent's titled property
in March of 1968, on the pretext that the part of respondent's land forcibly entered and occupied by him was part
of the area covered by his pasture permit from the Bureau of Forestry, still the causes of action in the two cases
are distinct from each other. In the action to quiet title the question involved is whether the pasture permit could
include property for which O.C.T. No. P-2385 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao province had been previously issued
to appellees de la Victoria. But in the forcible entry case, the issue is whether, assuming that Quimpo's pasture
permit were valid, he had the right to forcibly eject the prior occupants, who were appellees de la Victoria, even
destroying their improvements. In other words, in the quieting of title case, the Court must decide who had the
better right. In the Municipal court, the issue was, in effect, whether an owner can take the law in his own hands.
That he can not do so seems incontestable: it is not so much a question of possession as it is one of law and order.
To require appellees de la Victoria to acquiesce to the high-handed conduct of appellant Quimpo, and to submit to
his tour de force, until the superiority of their Torrens Title is finally adjudged, after God knows how many years, is
undoubtedly against all justice and equity.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MILDRED R. SANTOS,


IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF, AND/OR ASBT INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICE, INC., LORD NELSON SANTOS, DANILO BALCITA, NICSON
CRUZ, PEPITO MANGLICMOT, AND ALLAN ARANES, RESPONDENTS.|||
Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On December 5, 1995, private respondents Lord Nelson Santos, Danilo Balcita, Nicson Cruz, Pepito
Manglicmot, and Allan Aranes (Santos, et al.) were recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc. (Sameer) as aluminum products manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. of Taiwan
(Ensure).
Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for Ensure. However, they were repatriated even prior
to the expiration of their contracts. Consequently, in July and August 1996, Santos, et al. filed complaints

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against Sameer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, underpayment
of salaries, and unauthorized salary deductions.
On November 3, 1997, Sameer filed a third party complaint against private respondent ASBT International
Management Service, Inc. (ASBT). It claimed that the latter should be liable for all the contractual
obligations of Ensure since Sameer's accreditation was transferred to ASBT on June 9, 1997.
LA rendered decision in favour of respondents and making petitioners as sole liable. Sameer appealed to
the NLRC alleging, among others, that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
decide the third-party complaint.
NLRC set aside the decision and absolved petitioner from its liabilities in view of the transfer of
accreditation to ASBT Management Services, Inc. Aggrieved, ASBT moved for reconsideration. The NLRC
denied the motion for lack of merit.
ASBT elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Court of Appeals denied due
course and dismissed ASBT's petition on the ground that the attached Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping was signed by Mildred R. Santos as President of ASBT without any proof of authority to
sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings. ASBT filed MR, submitting the necessary board resolution
authorizing corporate president Mildred R. Santos to represent ASBT before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court granted the motion and decided in favour of ASBT.

Issue/s: (I focused on the related topic, Petitioner lost)


WON there was forum shopping committed by ASBT when it filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA?
Held:
NO. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. There is
forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.

MARY LOUISE R. ANDERSON, PETITIONER, VS. ENRIQUE HO, RESPONDENT|||


Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On June 5, 2003, Anderson filed a Complaint 4 for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho (Ho) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. She alleged that through her mere tolerance, Ho is in
possession of her parcel of land at Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-193368.
In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Ho denied that his occupation of the Roosevelt property is
through Anderson's mere tolerance. He claimed that since Anderson is an American citizen, he managed
her affairs in the Philippines and administered her properties in Quezon City and Cebu. For all these,
Anderson did not pay Ho a single centavo and instead executed a written document dated January 14,
1999 which states that as partial payment for Ho's services, Anderson is authorizing him to make use of
the Roosevelt property as his residence free of charge provided he vacates if there is a buyer for the lot
and that the balance of Ho's compensation shall consist of 10% of the proceeds of the properties. In view of
this, Ho averred that he possesses the property not through mere tolerance but as part of his
compensation for services rendered to Anderson.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court


Dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. It gave much weight to the written document executed by
Anderson wherein she gave her consent for Ho to occupy the Roosevelt property provided that the latter shall
vacate the same if there is already a buyer for the lot. There being no allegation that the said property already
has a buyer, she could not eject Ho therefrom.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
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Affirmed decision of MTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court dismissed Petition for Review as the certification against forum shopping was executed not by the
petitioner herself but by her counsel without attaching therewith any special authority to sign on her behalf. MR
denied. Hence this petition.

Issue/s:
WON there exists justifiable reason in this case as to relax the rule on certification against forum shopping?
Held:
NO.
In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson's Petition for Review on the ground that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do
so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her
failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance.
It must be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent
correction. And while it is true that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as
substantial compliance, it "did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal
approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping.
Unlike in Donato, and the other cases cited by Anderson, no sufficient and justifiable grounds exist in this case as
to relax the rules on certification against forum shopping. Moreover, simultaneous with the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration, the proper certificate of non-forum shopping was submitted by the petitioner in Donato. Notably
in this case, the SPA was submitted two months after the filing of Anderson's Motion for Reconsideration. It took
that long because instead of executing an SPA before the proper authorities in Hawaii and sending the same to the
Philippines, Anderson still waited until she came back to the country and only then did she execute one. It thus
puzzles the Court why Anderson opted not to immediately submit the SPA despite her awareness that the same
should have been submitted simultaneously with the Petition for Review. Hence, it cannot help but conclude that
the delay in the submission of the SPA is nothing but a product of Anderson's sheer laxity and indifference in
complying with the rules.

ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA MORALES, LIZA


OCAMPO, QUIAPO CHURCH VENDORS, FOR THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED AS THEMSELVES VS. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE GEMILIANO C.
LOPEZ, JR., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA

On August 5, 1986, petitioners instituted in a special civil action for prohibition against the Acting Manila
City Mayor, respondent Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr before the SC. Petitioners claim to be five of about 130
licensed and duly authorized vendors of religious articles, medicine herbs and plants around the Quiapo
Church. They alleged that their licenses were revoked by Mayor Lopez for reasons unknown to them. They
also sought a temporary restraining order in view of Mayor Lopez' actual threats of physical demolition of
their business establishments.

On the otherhand, on July 7, 1986, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" (Civil
Case No. 86-36563,) against Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. was filed in RTC Manila by
Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc." ("Samahan".) Samahan is composed of
300 individual owners and operators of separate business stalls around Quiapo Church. The president of
the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo are two of the five
petitioners. The three other petitioners are Samahan members.

The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts as those in the case at bar. The members
of the Samahan had been legitimately engaged "in their respective business of selling sundry merchandise,
more particularly religious articles, flowers and ornamental plants, and medicinal herbs;" they had been
religiously paying "the corresponding license and permit fees imposed by prevailing ordinances of the City
of Manila," but this notwithstanding they had been given written notice emanating from the Mayor's Office,
advising of the cancellation of their permits and their possible relocation to another site.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners acts consitituted a case of forum shopping
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RULING:
Petition is denied for lack of merit. RTC was ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 86-36563 and to conduct no further
proceedings.
RATIO:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum shopping. The Interim Rules and Guidelines provides that no
such petition may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court 'if another similar petition has been filed or is still
pending in the Supreme Court' and vice-versa. The Rule orders that "A violation of the rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned." The rule applies with equal force where the party
having filed an action in the Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition and a restraining order or
injunction in the regional trial court (or vice-versa).
There is an identity between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, as regards the parties, interests
represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the
ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens. The same identity also puts into operation the
sanction of twin dismissals just mentioned.
It would seem that after the filing by Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo of the petition in this case, "for themselves
and all others similarly situated as themselves" (i.e., the members of the Samahan; who are vendors in the area of
Quiapo Church) came to the belated that in view of the pendency of the identical action filed by them in the
Regional Trial Court (Case No. 86-36563), they were vulnerable to the accusation of "forum shopping," and thus
amenable to its dire consequences. They also alleged that they were forcibly brainwashed by Atty. Reynaldo Aralar
and his associates to accede to the invitation of the said counsel to appear for them and file the case that he was
furnished the status quo-order of the same case pending before the Regional Trial Court Branch 45 of Manila.
Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo themselves were among those who verified the petition at bar before a notary
public. And the claim is undermined by the misrepresentation in Buan's and Ocampo's "Joint Affidavit of
Withdrawal" that the status quo order in RTC Case No. 8636563 was still subsisting and the case still pending trial
when in truth, the case had already been dismissed and the restraining order lifted by Order of July 27, 1986.
Also, not one of the petitioners or the "others similarly situated as themselves" had a valid and subsisting license
or permit as of the date of the filing of their petition on August 5, 1986. All licenses and permits already expired
confirmed by the few receipts submitted by petitioners which all set out expiry dates before August 5, 1986. The
petitioners thus have no basis whatever to postulate a right to ply their trade in the Quiapo area or elsewhere. The
argument that the non-renewal by the municipal authorities of their licenses was in effect a cancellation or
revocation thereof without cause is puerile. Therefore, the action for prohibition has become moot and academic
by the occurrence of the acts sought to be inhibited. The petitioners' permits and licenses have all expired and
there can be no occasion whatsoever to speak of the inhibition of any revocation or cancellation thereof. And the
"physical demolition of their respective business stalls" has already been consummated.

EFREN O. LOQUIAS vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65

A complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners Efren O. Loquias,
Antonio V. Din, Jr., Angelito I Martinez II Lovelyn J. Biador and Gregorio Faciol, Jr. for violation of RA 3019 in
failing to give the salary increases and benefits provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers (R.A. 7305) and Local Budget Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, 60 and 64 for the health personnel of the
local government of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. Private respondents were officers of the Association
of Municipal Health Office Personnel of Zamboanga del Sur. Petitioners Efren Loquias and Antonio Din, Jr.
are the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur while other petitioners are members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the said municipality.

Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding "probable cause to conclude that the crime of violation of Section
3e of RA 3019 has been committed and that accordingly, the appropriate Information be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners filed MR with prayer to defer arraignment and pre-trial arguing that there is lack of funds and
failure to give salary increases and Magna Carta benefits were due to circumstances beyond their control.

Prosecuting Officers recommended the dismissal of the case. This recommendation was disapproved by
Ombudsman.

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Petitioners filed an MR alleging that there is no probable cause. Petitioners then filed the present petition.

ISSUE:
WON the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in approving the resolution charging the petitioners for violation of RA 3019.
RULING:
SC dismissed petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
RATIO:
Petitioners contend that they recognize the salary increases of the health personnel as a mandatory statutory
obligation but the same could not be implemented due to lack of funds and the Municipality incurred an overdraft.
They further argue that petitioners Loquias, Din, Martinez, Faciol and Biador were not yet elected as local officials
during the year 1994. Hence, they cannot be held liable for non-payment of salary increases as mandated by the
local
budget
circular
which
took
effect
in
the
year
1994
before
their
election.
Also, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, alleged that the petition does not comply with
Section 5, Rule 7 as the Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping were signed only by petitioner
Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and there is no showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his copetitioners to represent them in this case; that the petition raise factual issues; and that the municipality had
sufficient
funds
to
grant
the
statutory
salary
increases
and
benefits.
Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is
the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the
same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the
certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign
the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether
his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance
will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized
by
harking
on
the
policy
of
liberal
construction.
As regards Ombudsmans disapproving of the resolution recommending the dismissal of the criminal case. Court
ruled that it will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and
prosecutory powers. It is beyond the ambit of its powers to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the
public service. In Venus v. Desierto, Court stated that it ordinarily does not determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter,
to
file
the
corresponding
information
with
the
appropriate
courts.
With respect to the joint affidavits of waiver allegedly executed by private complainants for the purpose of
requesting the Special Prosecutor to move for the dismissal of the criminal case, this Court ruled in Alba v. Nitorred
that a joint affidavit of desistance is not binding on the Office of the Ombudsman and cannot prevail over the
provision of law which categorically allows the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute on its own
any act or omission of a public officer or employee, office or agency which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.

(ANTONIO AND ALFREDA) DOCENA VS. LAPESURA


FACTS:

Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on
occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case.
Trial court ruled in favor of Docena and Abuda. CA reversed and ordered Docena to vacate the land, excluding
the portion which Docena reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore, as shown in the Commissioners
Report, and to pay the plaintiff-appellant the agreed rental of P1.00 per year from the date of the filing of the
Complaint until they shall have actually vacated the premises. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was
dismissed.
Hombria filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted by the public respondent judge Lepasura, and a Writ
of Execution was issued therefor. Public respondent sheriff Garado issued an alias Writ of Demolition. Docena
filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ of Demolition, but denied on November 18,

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1998. Lepasura granted Docena until January 13, 1999 to file MR. On January 13, 1999, Docena moved for an
extension of the period to file MR until January 28, 1999. The motion was finally filed by the petitioners on
January 27, 1999, but was denied by the trial court on March 17, 1999.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the CA, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders dated November 18, 1998 and March 17,
1999, and of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of Demolition. CA dismissed on the grounds that the petition
was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803, and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners. MR denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Docena
HELD:
No.
The Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute
substantial compliance with the rules. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife.
Their residence is the subject property alleged to be conjugal in the instant verified petition.
The
Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed
only by the husband.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole
administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may
defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone
may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the
statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone,
without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the
husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the
petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly.
However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.
More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband
may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or
claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property.
The wife was in the province of Guian, Samar, whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid
application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his
behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is clearly uncalled for.
The rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.

FUENTEBELLA vs. CASTRO


FACTS:

Castro is the widow of the late Freddie Castro. She engaged the funeral services of petitioner Rolling Hills
Memorial Park, Inc. (Rolling) for the interment of the remains of her husband.
During the burial it was discovered that the dimensions of the vault did not correspond to the measurements of
the casket. To make matters worse, the employees of Rolling measured the casket by using a spade. Castro
then wrote to the management of Rolling demanding an explanation for its negligence, but the latter did not
respond nor attempt to apologize to the former.
Castro filed a complaint for damages against the corporation and its Park-in-Charge Art Fuentebella, jointly and
solidarily, before MCTC of Bacolod City asking for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
costs.

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Rolling and Fuentebella filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the MTCC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because the amount of damages claimed is more than P200,000. Castro filed a motion
to withdraw the complaint, which was granted by the MTCC.
Castro filed a similar complaint with the RTC of Negros Occidental. Attached in the complaint was the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping required. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the certification is false because respondent had previously filed an identical complaint with the
MTCC. RTC denied the motion. MR denied.
Petitioners filed with CA a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. Dismissed.
MR filed by Rolling attaching thereto a Secretarys Certificate signed by Monico A. Puentevella, Jr., Corporate
Secretary of petitioner corporation, affirming therein the authority of Lourdes A. Pomperada to file the
aforementioned petition. CA denied MR stating among others, that there is still no showing that the said Mrs.
Lourdes Pomperada is duly authorized to act for and in behalf of the other petitioner.

ISSUE:
1.

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the basis of a non-existent rule

2.

Whether or not RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to order the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of a false certification

HELD:
1.

No.

It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf of the
principal party or the other petitioners has the authority to do the same.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure mandates that the petitioner or the principal party
must execute the certification against forum shopping. The reason for this is that the principal party has actual
knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues.
If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly
authorized.
This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons as Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91
and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural and juridical persons. Where
the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized
director or representative. This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, where the Court held that if the
real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum
shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.
Likewise, where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that only one of them executes the certification,
absent a showing that he was so authorized by the others. That certification requires personal knowledge and it
cannot be presumed that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions filed or
pending.
Hence, a certification which had been signed without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid
cause for the dismissal of the petition.
This holds true in the present case where CA accordingly dismissed the petition for lack of proper authorization of
the one signing it on behalf of petitioners. Lourdes Pomperada, the Administrative Manager of petitioner
corporation, who signed the verification and certificate on non-forum shopping, initially failed to submit a
secretarys certificate or a board resolution confirming her authority to sign for the corporation, and a special
power of attorney to sign on behalf of co-petitioner Art Fuentebella, who was sued jointly and solidarily with the
corporation in his capacity as officer of the latter.
2.

No.

An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and
litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire
proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present.
Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the submission of a false certification shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal sanctions. This is in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
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STO. TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL V. SURLA


17 August 1998

FACTS:
-

Surlas Complaint: On Dec. 26, 1995, Sps. Surla filed for damages against Sto. Tomas University Hospital
with RTC Quezon City alleging that their son, Emmanuel, born premature and confined in the Hospital, had
accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing harm on the child
STUHs Answer with compulsory claim: Asserted that Sps. Surla owed it P82k for bills, and claim for moral,
exemplary, attys fees for the unfounded and malicious suit filed against it
Surlas Reply to complaint: Seeking to dismiss counterclaim for its non-compliance with SC Administrative
Circular No. 09-04 requiring that a complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as counterclaim, crossclaim, etc. be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping
STUHs Rejoinder: Contending that the subject circular should be held to refer only to a permissive
counterclaim, an initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily connected with, the subject matter
of the plaintiffs claim but not to a compulsory counterclaim and that it could not stand for independent
adjudication i.e., since its counterclaim was compulsory in nature, the subject circular did not apply to it

RTC:
-

Dismissed STUHs counterclaim noting that the counterclaim does not distinguish whether the same should
be permissive or compulsory, hence this Court finds that the counterclaim referred to in said circular covers
both kinds
STUH filed an Omnibus Motion seeking a clarification of the courts Order; denied

CA:
-

STUH elevated to CA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 espousing that the circular should
apply even to compulsory counterclaims
Dismissed petition noting that the circular requires the original civil complaint, counterclaim, etc. to be
annexed and simultaneously filed with the required certification under oath to avoid forum shopping or
multiple filing of petitions and complaints; non-compliance is a cause for dismissal of complaint

ISSUE: WON CA erred

HELD:
-

Partly
STUHs counterclaim consists of 2 parts:
o For unpaid hospital bills

Circular applies and thus was properly dismissed


o Damages, moral, and exemplary, plus attys fees

Language of the circular suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory


pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief

Not initiatory and thus not covered by circular

PARADERO V ABRAGAN
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1 March 2004
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the RTC Iligan Order granting issuance of a writ of demolition against
petitioner

FACTS:
-

On 20 Feb. 2001, Jaraba filed with MTCC Iligan an ejectment suit against Paradero claiming that Paradero,
without his consent and by means of strategy and stealth, occupied and built a house on a lot registered in
Jarabas name
o Paradero failed to file an answer
o Jaraba filed a Motion for judgment
o MTCC ruled in favor of Jaraba finding allegations to be true
Petitioner Paradero appealed to RTC Iligan while Respondent Jaraba moved for the immediate execution of
the judgment pending appeal, which was granted
Petitioner then filed an Urgent motion for reconsideration and/or lifting the Order and Fixing of the
supersedeas bond
o Petitioner was asked to produce SC ruling authorizing the RTC to fix and approve supersedeas
bonds
o Petitioner then submitted a Manifestation in compliance with the Order of SC and Urgent motion to
order the Clerk of Court to receive/accept the monthly rental deposit of P2k
RTC denied peitioners MR and Motion to fix the supersedeas bond because defendant failed to show any
good cause sufficient for SC to exercise its discretion in her favor
o And her failure to file a motion for fixing the supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal
from the time her counsel filed the notice of appeal to the time she filed the motion to fix
supersedeas bond is not consistent with her desire to stay execution of the judgment
o Even if she was allowed to post supersedeas bond, there is still the issue of periodic deposit of
future rentals to ensure payment of rentals accruing after the judgment of the inferior court and
until final judgment on appeal

Defendant-appellant failed to comply with this mandatory requirement in order to stay


execution despite time provided
A decision was then rendered denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision of the MTCC
o Petitioner filed 2 MRs but were both denied
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with CA challenging the affirmance by RTC of MTCC, and filed the
instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
Respondent also prayed for the instant petition to be dismissed because of forum shopping

ISSUE: WON petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping

HELD: YES
-

Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other
For litis pendentia to exist:
o Identity of parties or at least such parties are those representing the same interests in both actions
o Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts
o Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to
res judicata in the other case
In the case at bar, the parties to the instant petition and in the one filed with the CA are identical; rights
asserted are the same (to maintain peaceful possession of the subject lot); similar reliefs are prayed (nullify
the order of execution pending appeal and writ of demolition)
A judgment in the present certiorari case on the validity of the order of execution pending appeal and writ
of demolition will pre-empt and amount to res judicata on the petition for review before the CA

Rule 7: Parts of a Pleading (Forum Shopping)

FIDEL O. CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, VS


METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ATTY. ROMUALDO CELESTRA, ATTY.
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ANTONIO V. VIRAY, ATTY. RAMON MIRANDA and ATTY. POMPEYO MAYNIGO,


J. Chico Nazario, August 19, 2009, G.R. No. 182311
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for review via Rule 45 seeking to overturn CA decision that affirmed RTC decision dismissing
petitioners action for damages against herein private respondents.
Fidel Chua is president of Filiden Realty. Said corporation borrowed from Metrobank, providing a parcel of land as
collateral. Upon demand, Filiden Reatly was unable to pay and thus Metrobank moved to foreclose the property.
2001: Due to alleged irregularity on the foreclosure procedure, Chua filed in behalf of Filiden Realty a case for
annulment, injunction, and damages against Metrobank. He subsequently impleaded the three private petitioners
herein as counsel of Metrobank and the Register of Deeds of Paranaque for allegedly colluding in an allegedly
fraudulent contract of sale arising from the foreclosure. Chua alleges that there was no auction sale. Case was
dismissed, MR dismissed. Appealed to CA.
2005: Chua and Filiden Realty filed a case for damages against herein respondents plus additional defendants
alleging that through the private respondents colluded to make it appear that there was a public auction, when
there was none, thereby dissuading other prospective buyers, depriving petitioners of unrealized profit of 70M.
12/2005: Chua filed for consolidation of the two cases, respondents opposed the consolidation and prayed for
sanctions against Chua for forum shopping. RTC granted motion to consolidate. On MR of the respondents, RTC now
granted the MR dismissing the second case on grounds of forum shopping.
CA affirmed decision, MR denied. Hence this case.
ISSUES:
WoN the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although
with different prayers.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribe the splitting of a single cause of action:
Section 3. A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others.
Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a
cause of action. 35 A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can violate
various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless
of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.
There is no question that the claims of petitioners for damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV05-0402 are premised on the same cause of action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents in
connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject properties.
More discussion on forum shopping:
Three ways to commit:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes
of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
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Rule 7: Parts of a Pleading (Forum Shopping)

SWEDISH MATCH PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE TREASURER OF THE CITYOF
MANILA
CJ. Sereno, G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The authority of a board resolution for a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping is a defect that can be cured,
not an error that is fatal in the case. The court can order its correction upon discovery. The Courts can also
exercise liberality in hearing cases with defective Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. In several cases, it
upheld that the position of the person signing the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping is compliance enough.
As in this case where the signee is the Finance Director and the subject of the case is a tax refund
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for review via Rule 45 seeking to overturn CTA decision of dismissing the complaint of Swedish
Match for a Refund of Taxes as ruled by RTC originally.
Swedish Match paid taxes to the City of Manila under Sections 14 and 21 of the Manila Revenue Code.
Assenting that it was not liable to pay taxes under Section 21, it wrote a letter to the City of Manila which was left
unheeded. Following this, Swedish Match filed a Petition for Refund of Taxes.
RTC of Manila dismissed the case for Swedish Match failure to state the Authority by which a certain Tiarra Beleno
signed the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. MR denied.
CTA denied appeal, CTA en banc denied petition for review, hence this case.
Petitioners argue:
Anent the procedural issue, petitioner argues that there can be no dispute that Ms. Beleno was acting
within her authority when she instituted the Petition for Refund before the RTC, notwithstanding that the
Petition was not accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate. Her authority was ratified by the Board in its
Resolution adopted on 19 May 2004. Thus, even if she was not authorized to execute the Verification and
Certification at the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification by the board of directors retroactively
applied to the date of her signing.
Respondents argue the case of PAL v FASAP where the case was dismissed due to the initial failure of the
corporation to provide a board resolution for the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
ISSUES:
WoN the petitioners have complied with the requirement for the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
HELD:
YES. A verification signed without the authority via a Board Resolution is defective. Nonetheless, such
defect can be cured subsequently by court order. The said lack of authority is not fatal and may be cured
still:
A verification signed without an authority from the board of directors is defective. However, the
requirement of verification is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading and non-compliance
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.17 The court may in fact order the correction of
the pleading if verification is lacking or, it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified,
where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with so that the ends of
justice may be served.
(Court cited numerous cases and then summarized it) In summary, we have held that the following officials
or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager
or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
Point is that the Court have entertained petitions before without authority via a board resolution on a case
to case basis depending on the circumstance and the petitioners standing. In this case:
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Additionally, it may be remembered that the Petition filed with the RTC was a claim for a refund of
business taxes. It should be noted that the nature of the position of Ms. Beleno as the corporations
finance director/manager is relevant to the determination of her capability and sufficiency to verify
the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the Petition. A finance director/manager looks
after the overall management of the financial operations of the organization and is normally in
charge of financial reports, which necessarily include taxes assessed and paid by the corporation.
Thus, for this particular case, Ms. Beleno, as finance director, may be said to have been
in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the claim
for a refund of the corporations business taxes.

Given the present factual circumstances, we find that the liberal jurisprudential exception may be applied
to this case.
However, this Court finds that the belated submission of the Secretarys Certificate constitutes substantial
compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
A perusal of the Secretarys Certificate signed by petitioners Corporate Secretary Rafael Khan and
submitted to the RTC shows that not only did the corporation authorize Ms. Beleno to execute the required
Verifications and/or Certifications of Non-Forum Shopping, but it likewise ratified her act of filing the
Petition with the RTC.

ON DOUBLE TAXATION:
There was double taxation. Accordingly, respondents assessment under both Sections 14 and 21
had no basis. Petitioner is indeed liable to pay business taxes to the City of Manila; nevertheless,
considering that the former has already paid these taxes under Section 14 of the Manila Revenue
Code, it is exempt from the same payments under Section 21 of the same code. Hence, payments
made under Section 21 must be refunded in favor of petitioner.

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