G.R. No.

72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Facts:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in name of their
deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de
Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semiconcrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. On
May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother.
Trial Court dismissed the complaint as the right was not exercised within 30 days from notice. The
respondent court reversed the trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of redemption may still be exercised.
Held:
No.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
The right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The
complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the
second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course
that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be
necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be
any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in
1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure
that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters
were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we
do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed,
the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running
and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when
none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for
its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged
right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means
of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to
make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among
them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act
of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire,
to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose
to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which
the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted
properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and
Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between

the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention
of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of
the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.