People vs.

Marti
FACTS:August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly
Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders
carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita
Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused
and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves.
Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau
of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted
from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter
and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried
marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane
wrappers.
The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred
in admitting in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained
in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
HELD:Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much
less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy, protection against whom, protection against the STATE.
Stonehill vs. Diokno
Facts:1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search
warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and
premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were
conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's
premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their
issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general
warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from
being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner.
The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's
residence.

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by
virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought
to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of
state authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly
claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the
government without the latter transgressing appellants rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the
same should not be admitted.
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the
search and seizure in both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but
not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of
action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate
and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation,
and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been
impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right
which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the
corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from
the offices and the premises).
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the
premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure
of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.

Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory

injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents
be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that
the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the
items.
Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants
was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the
correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied
the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by
the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a
tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar,
petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant
did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the
witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general
warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in
the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with
specification the subversive nature of the said items.
Tambasen vs. People
Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant
alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in his possession at

his house M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite
sticks and subversive documents, which were used or intended to be used
for illegal purposes. The application was granted.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized 2
envelopes containing P14000, handset with antennae, transceiver with
antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted papers and
handset battery pack. In October, petitioner moved that the search and
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In
December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money
seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be limited to the specified
items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of
the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination of legality of seizure
of the articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in
the search warrant was legal.
Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search
warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The police acts
beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described in
the search warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to
limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion;
that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that abuses
may not be committed.
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money
seized.
Soliven vs. Makasiar
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others,
was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself
filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory
cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from
suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be
sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would
be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a
president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness
for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person
other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the

Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in
a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
Morano vs. Vivo
Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the
Philippines on November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She
left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai
both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived
in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the
Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they
posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah
married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on
September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the
Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions.
The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August
31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her
son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with
a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest
and will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is
unconstitutional.
Held: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's
visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may
therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject
to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must
depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from
the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter
undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port
of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has
ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor

cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country and
complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. The
gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her
entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not
particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an
effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who
has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the
first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then,
the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle
which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision
that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make
her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to judicial
action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the
State's power of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman
to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage,
but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the
provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character
may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again
throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we
are confident, is impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien
wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses.
Harvey vs. Defensor
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following:
American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen
Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended
petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew
Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was
found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the
after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been
under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and
photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as
boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the
child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were
apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the
CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for
pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were

instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation
of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative
Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date.
Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April
1988.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and
detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID
agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it
violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners
was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3
months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of
arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule.
1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.)
Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done
was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its
validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is
or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in
accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in
relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides

that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed
as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is
essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended
to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the
authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and tranquility of the people.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the
validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners.
The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities
received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the
rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples
Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the
arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime together
with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and
crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed
prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result
of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than
members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as
soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and
the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient
to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free
from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but
hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and
that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act.
Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs.
Marti --Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti
informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and

gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to
examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the box
to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and
found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed
against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and seizure.
Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may
only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the
exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a
private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as
an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution
People vs. Sucro
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to
monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro
was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was
transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie
Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While
the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt.
Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama
crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and
threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the
marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.

to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE
CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the
accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is
presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.
People vs. Sy Chua
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate
Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential
informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a
team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur
Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted
as their back up.

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo
and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a
cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which

just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accusedappellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2
Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as
police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right
back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which
yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he
saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly
confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the
twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accusedappellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the
scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and

narrated a different version of the incident.

(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her
and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route
along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder
Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man
approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention
of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made
him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a

Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an

absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers

policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet
and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car
keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers
companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at
the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others
searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a
bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered
his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened
the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were
being taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions,
yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence,
this appeal to the Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu
allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.
Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that
the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel
and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more
time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and
frisk.
The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected
and in their allowable scope.

Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and
purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.
With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stopand-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It
should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in
the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the
search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accusedappellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he
was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk
principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent
search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines

the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a
search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this
exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

People vs. Malmstedt

Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael
Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for
the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country
sometime in 1982 and 1985.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival

thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and
stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11,
1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989),
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command
(NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for
the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The
order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group
composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police
Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going
towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the
bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when
accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the
officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out
to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before
he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from
the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags
and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy
bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did
not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags
that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation
room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also
contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
ACCUSEDS DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his
defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also
claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch
bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were
merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with
him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they
decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the
crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was
illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the
prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore
the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant
may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal

knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the
NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the
personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
People vs. Amminudin
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his
bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It
was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana
leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with
him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and

trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually

convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that
all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and
two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was
carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the
chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.
He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC
rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time
and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto,
which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest,
he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done
so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be
appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is
acquitted of the crime as charged.
Pita vs. CA
Facts: In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila
Police, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the
publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from
confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a
violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He
then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
against indiscriminate seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of
obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the
stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no
answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic)
seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or
not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the
case for lack of merit

The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the
press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court
warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis
simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and,
in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits
without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was
merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?
Held: No. Petition granted
Ratio: Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided
by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
(Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said
to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been
drawn nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense
that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work,
rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both
cases are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final
arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make
the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law
enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which
expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to
wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards'
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.

The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes

"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize
the constitutional dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a
climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague
theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For
obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So
is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to
the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter
of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and
women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court
has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear
and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But
the burden to show this lies with the authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof
of the existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a
political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The
burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger
that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to
stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by
way of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can
conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned
by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process.
The PDs dont give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed
acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of
Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed.

The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal
provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because
there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who
ought to be "punished".

Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the
raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to
make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.