Operation Northwoods

/
AssassinationRecords Review Board

Flnal DeterminationNotification
--AGENCY--JCS
- --- -------- -------RECORDNUMBER
REOORD SERIES
202-10002-10104
JCS CENTRALFIL2S 1962
AGENCYPILB 1'"UMBR 3360 (1 FED 62)
October
20,1m
Status of Document:
Poslponed in Part
Number of releases of previously postponed informatio n: O
Number of Postponements: 5
Postponement It (Page DJSM-2,25
July 1962,pg 2),
"
Reason for BoordAction; The texl is redacted because ii touc.heson a matter currently relating to the
military dclcn.sc,intelligenceope.rationsor conduct of foreign relations o( the United Sb.tes that properly
my be po$1p0ncd under Section6(l)(C) of the JFKAct.
'
Substitute
l.on$UgeoOp=tionI Dei.m
Release Date: 10/2017
...__,;_
---.:_-
.. t ostponement #2 (Page JCS 1969/347,2Moy 1962,ppJ,
-17'~
Rc.'\SOn
for Board Action: The te)(t is redacted becau.scit touchcsona m3ttcrCW'ttntly rclnting to the
military dclCl'ls<l',
intcll.ig:cnce
opera.lionsot condud of foreignrelations of the United States \Mt properly
may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFKAct.
rSubstitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017
P06tponement I 3 (Page JCS 1969/347,MaritimeSupport, Operation Mongoose,8 May 1%Zpg I),
Reason for Board AdiO!C The text is n?dact-ed

because it touches on a matter (Uffer\tly reJating to tho
military defense, inteJJJgeneeoperations. or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
,
may be postponed underSection6(t)(C) of the JFK Act.
Substitute~gc
OpetalionalDeW!s
Rcl<aseDAie:10/2017.
P0<~ent
# 4 (Page JC!S19691389,23 July 1962,pP,1415),
~n
for Bo.trd.
Adioii.:i1lletext is reclactedbause ll t0\&Chc$on o.m:ittctcuncntfy-relatingto the
milita.i);
acfet1SC
, in.talliie:nce
~ations orconi:luctof fora~ relationsof theUrutoa
Stntcsthatproperly
may lie Jl(>Slj>oril
lindcr Stion .(l)(C)of die JF]<ef
Act.
Suostiiure l.anS!'s gpc.. tional Di:tails
ReleaseDate: 10/2017,
Pos~ent
f 5 (Page OP605F/6 ,; Set 000374P60

)/U AP,iil1962,pp 2-4Y.
~on forBo.vdAction.:fhe textisredarte<t.

becauseiJtoudieson a m.auerfurrcritly:
-rel3ting
to tKi
milila!f defense,irittlligtnee ~lions
orconcl~ctof foreignrelationsof theUnJteaStatestliatpropcily:
maY,be P,OOIP!!!'edulil!CTStion6(1K'e) of the)Fl< Act.
Substitutel:an~ g'?' ~tlonal
Details
Relwe Date, 10/2017,
ril ReviewComP,leti@:10/1~/97
I
Date
Page
10/09/9 7
1
JFK ASSASSINATIONSYSTEM
IDENTIFICATIONFORM
AGENCYINl'ORMATION
AGENCY
RECORDNUMBER
RECORDSSERIES
AGENCYFILE NUMBER
JCS
202-10002-10104
JCS CENTRALFILES 1962

3360 (7 FEB 62)
DOCUMENT
INl'ORl1ATION
ORIGINATOR
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS
JCS
NORTHWOODS
00/00/62
197
U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTIONIN CUBA
PLANNING
, CUBA
CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONMONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
\
COVERTOPERATIONS,CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEANSECURITY
PATROLPOSTS
INVASIONOF CUBA
JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTION

DOCUMENT
TYPE PAPER, TEXTUALDOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS lC
CURRENTSTATUS RELEASEDWITH DELETIONS
DATEOF LAST REVIEW 10/07/97
OPENINGCRITERIA
COMMENTS JCS Central Fil es 19 62, Box 29. JCS Record case,
Name Nort hwood~,
containing
JCS Papers
recommendation to invade CUba and

US military intervention.
(R) - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
related
pretexts
Code
to JCS
to justify
--
- -
Date
Page
10/115/97
1
JFK ASSASSINATIONSYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------AGENCYINFORMATION
AGENCY
RECORDNUMBER
RECORDSSERIES
AGENCYFI LE NUMBER
JCS
202- 10 002- 10 104
JCS CENTRALFILBS 1962
3360 (7 FEB 62)
INFORMATION
DOCUMBNT
ORI GINATOR
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS
JCS
NORTHWOODS
00/00/62
197
U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTIONIN
CUBA
CONTINGENCY
PLANNING,CUBA
OPERAT
ION MONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
\
COVERTOPERATIONS, CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEANSECURITY
PATROLPOSTS
INVASION OF
CUBA
JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTION

I
'
DOCUMENT
TYPE PAPER, TEXTUALDOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS lC
CURRENTSTATUS RELEASEDWITH DELETIONS
DATEOF LAST REVIEW 10/07/97
OPENINGCRITERIA
COMMENTS JCS Central Fi l eo 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case , Code
Name Northwoods,
containing
JCS Papers related to JCS
reconunendation to invade Cuba and pretexts
to justify
US military
intervention
.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------[RI - ITEM I S RESTRI CTED

-
.....
:Ir f?
C/ j p
qf)Pr-
, I)
..
:io2-Joco
2..-f@ft(i . f
Declassification Revi ew/Phstnonement Form
Originator:
Date:
"
"
c If No@Mo~
J" J
\
/t1 111/ it I
Pas<:#
9f Pn:;tpnnement
Rea::on
forPo~tponement
IAWSection
6 of JFKAct
1)Sb > NO ~~S
~Cl,:)1110
w.~~tc)tl~
~Of~
6mro r
EXEMPTED
FROMDECLASSIFICATION
BY IOINTSTAR' t M8f
BXEMPTION:
DATE:
<iV}(!)
a~c
-"r-"0.,.1
....
19
....
gz~~
NOOBJtCTION
NA'IIOtlALSECUPJlV
COUNCIL
lb.,.,~ i.,,,.y
" .
-:IDN
I'FEDSW~TES INFORMATION A!GENCY
@FFICE @F THE ~ENERA'LC@UNSEL
DECLA'!
SSIFICAWION UNIT
11HIS ~ GENCY HAS DECLASSIFIEDA'I!JL@F

I!T
Sffl 'SiHOJ1DING IN WIS D@Cl!TME
NWIN
COMPLI:NNQE WI1\H
17HE;JFKA!C:T
~
I DECLAS~ro 6
y USIP.-G
(. YEA!l -
MONill
OP.Y
~~
\ AUiHORliY:_
-t-J,.~i&~
~
A'-'
~
e.
..
.-
'
'-11
SltCTION
SOUR C E
SC
JCS PAPERS
JCSM 103 - 62,
28 Feb 62
JCSM 158-62
28 Feb 62 DepSecDef
1 Mar 62
SM-240 - 62
1 Mar 62
SM-241-62
l Mar 62
SM-242-62
l Ma.r 62
:r
SM-243 -62
8 Mar 62 .
JCSM-166-62
13 Mar 6~ . CJCS
10 Apr 62
JCSM 272-62
8 May 62
JCSM 365-62
8 May 62
JCSM-365 -62 .
8 May 62
DODrep CSG
8 May 62
8 May 62
{! May 62
DODRep CSG
DODR ,p CSG
T
T
T
PAEPAFU!l: O OV
xx
.
JCSM 367-62
25 Jul 62
DJSM 909-62
27 Jul 62
JCSM 564- 62
7 11.ug62
DJS Unnumbered
8 Aug 62
CJCS Unnumbere<
31 Aug 62
CJCS Unnumbere,
31 Aug 62 DepSecDef
.r
1,
NO.
,,
13 Jun 62 CJCS
IR A CCESS
REM ARKS AND/OR SUB J ECT
II
1,
NO .
~~tl~~~lfIfD
NORTHWOODS
8 Feb 62
SE:.f! 5B:C ,
NO,
'
SUBJECT
DA.TE
'.
JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF
WAS HI NGTO N, D. c. 20301
3360 (7 Feb 62)
1,
...
JCS RECO RD CASE NO.
1,
- -
.
II
'
CLASSIFICATION
SPECIAL ACCESS
JCS
'
P'ORM
JAH
NO ,
G9
2:
i!!Q
I f\i\lfl"~----------'
11111,l'1.,11 II
1
:nv,.
\i,VII ~
JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS
- -
..
~~~~
ff:rif:n__
==---...,....--,!tll.iim:l~"
~
R&
RABR.
TARIAT
~-r
,. --, JOINT
....SECRE
.
P'l&.c~O.
t;rHo's
~
111
C:PIOD8 IHOl!i:X
3360 (7 Feb ~)
JC
S CAS
E FIL
E""""'-R
. SHE
El
_E COV
Code.- NO
RrBWOODS
Nnme- - CRAIG; B/Gen,
3330
5740
"CQU'il:9T
tNlTIATKO
e1111ao,-..
ay
NORrBWOODS
(S)
1/.'lt/>/'/41
-
Report by Gen, Craig""'; Referred to JCS
7 Feb 62
Deci sion on Jcs .1969/303
8 Feb 62
Report ; Referred to
JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/306
A Report
A
- Referred to the Chiefs
13 Feb 62
15 Feb 62
20 Feb 61
Report - Refered to tlie Chiefs
20-Feb-62
Decision on JCS 1~69/310=
20 Feb 62
to -JCS
A Report - Referred
.-
. .
1969/311
27 Feb 62
to JCS
1969/314
i<
...
A Report RefeITed to JCS
.,
,,;
' "--1r
,-~
"
1969/316
Decision on JCS 1969/314 & 1969/316

to JCS
12 Mar 62
f'
1969/313
A Report - referred
)t'
1969/310
20 Feb 61
Decision on. JCS. 1969/311
A Report - Ref~ed
l-'H1/,'PJI
'
1969/303 'f;:--
ik
.9119/321
+--
1969/324
'>(."'
1969/325
1,3 Har 62
7 Mar 62
A Report ReferTed to JCS,
De~ision on JCS 1969/324

A Report - RefeITed to JCS
27~.ar-62
A Report Referred
to JCS
29 Mar 62
A Report refrred
to JCS
29 1:1ar 62 '
?.27
,Decision on JCS 1969/328
30 Mar 62
J..,_.
l'.ar 62
1969/327
1969/ 328
-'ji.
.l'--
R,~I,-,
11
Controlled
Distribution
THIS Ja TH ~O I NT CHIEP'O Orr 8TA P', MASTER
CASE P'lut COPY.
IT MU8'1" BE Rl:T\IANltO
TO THI:
Al:81:ARCH AND RECOAO& ANAI.V818
DR., DOCUMENT& D1Vl8ION
.JOINT 91:CAKTARIATt
ROOM '1Dt40,
1
WITHIN I DAYIJ OF TH'C DATE DORROWl:D UNLESS OTHCRWI OE 9PS::Clfl'U:D
Jll:NTAGON,
GOSReview 16 SEP1974
--
,
r
1'
. -
'/
'
D
UNCl~~
No 1s
INDEX
page 2
.'
..
f..11:QUCS,T IHITlAflD
ISY
NORTHWOODS
(S)
Paper
A 'l'tjkd:itgRefeITed to JCS
DATS
AoCNCY
' euaa:o,....
'
to JCS
A Report Referred
Decision .on ' JCS 1969/334

II
Report Referred
NO
.lCD P,AP&R NO.
9...Apr-62
1969/334
9...Apr-62
1969/335 ~
'f_,
10-Apr-62
to JCS
A Report RefeITed to JCS

Decision
Jl'APltR
10-Apr-62
Report RefeITed to JCS
1,
~)'
,csCASEFILE
. COVER
SHEE
.~&RA
.BR
., JOINT
SECRETARIAT
'..33~ ~Feb-62)
CAoe
.').)
on JCS 1969/343
27-Apr-62
1969/343
'i(b-
27 Apr 62
1969/344
,-
1-May-62
1969/347
,tr
8-i,<.ay-62
'
!Hlay - 62
9-May-62
1,
A Report referred
to JCS
12....June-62
1969/366
II
A Report [ Referred
to JCS
12....June-62
1969/367
1,
,,
13 Jun 62

A Report Referred
.
15 Jun 62
to JCS
2.3Jul
Decision on JCS 1_969/389

A Report Referred
62
1969/389
27....Jul-6'2
, A
to JCS
2 Aug 62
1969/3 92
-.
Decis ion on JCS. 1969/39 2
8 Aug 62
.
,,
1,
A Repo~t - "eferred
to JCS
31 Aug 62
1969/411
A rleport - Referred
to
31 Aug 62
1969/412
.I(:
JCS
Decis i on o~ Jes 1969/411
31 Aug 62
31 Aug 62-
A Report Refer!ed to JCS
1 Sep 62
}.969/1,l,3
-k--
.
II
I
"
THIS
18 'rHI:
R:8rtARCH
PENTAGON,
JOINT
CHl'!CP'8
OJI' STAPP'
ANO RECORDO
ANALYOIO
WITHIN
:I DAYS 0,. TH
MASTER
CA.Sit
on: 1,. DOCUMENTS

DATtt
BORROWGO
R!!FElRU:NCE: PAR.
P'ILl!t COPYt
I T MU3T
DE RKTURNED
DJV l 810N,
.IOJNT 8 E:CRl!:TARIAT,
UNLEtOO OTHERWISIC
&PEClfl'lttD.
AE3(4) JAi
'TO THE:
ROOM
'"i'i:co.
!1760.1
'
f,0ntrolled
Distribution
'
'
.---.... ... - ..
SPEBIAL
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
25 , O.C ..
8 August 1962
...
.' '
MEMORANDU
M FOR T}ffi SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
' Subject:
Consequences of US Military
in Cuba (TS)
Intervention
.. .
...
1. On 2 August 1962, the CQief of Operations, Operation

Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative,
Operation
Mongoose, to~preoare a paper for distribution
to the Special
Group (Augmented~ on 8 August 1962 . Tne specific requirement
is to set forth 'Consequences of (US) Military Intervention
( in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, . uni ts and equipment),
effect on world-wide ability
to react, possibility
of a
requtrement for susta ined occupation,
the level of national
mobilization
required,
and Cuban counteraction."
2 . It is recommended that you approve the attached
to the Special Gr9up (Augmented) .
memorandum for distribution
If more specific and detailed information is required by the
Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally.
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDEDFROMAUTOl,!A'i'IC
REGRADillG;
DODDIR 5200.10
DOES l!OT APPLY
N8FBRNa
l_______
_...,..~. --:f-."iJ P SEBRET
SPECIAL
HAfJBLlfl8
. ..
-,....
...,,_.
.. ,.. '. . ...
- - ...
,...,
,. -'.:'.;);[~~l.~S~\f.ltl
.:_
:.t
...
... - . ~ .... r, . . ,,
.. .,. .. ,
'L
,. .. .;::..~r : . . . ..~.....:.\ .: ::~

~' _.':_
..:,:..~...., ;, .~
{
-<'
.
...
.
, ..
' ,: ' .... . . 'I.,
...
,-;,
., , ; .. . ~ :
"" . r.c,, .. :: ..,:_;.. : .:,

... '~,
,i,
'
: -:
:: .. ~ :.f'
\ : . . :
"'.
: ::
~-
, I
' ~'-'
..
..
.. .
: '. ;
..
r" .....
.1ur ~t.ll& I \ } lr&l.lAL till NULlI'4}
..
rettl uun1
/ {0 ///~"'/
7 '
~Ntl~S~\f
\lD
7 August 1962
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE DIRECTOR,JOINT STAFF
Subject:
1. Pursuant
Consequences of US Military Intervention
.
in CUba {TS) {JCS 1969/392)
.. : ,
to the discussion
meeting of the Operations
Deputies,
is submitted for addition

subject
11
paper:
'
of the subject
item at today's
the following material

r: .
to Enclosure
A {page 4) of the
,,
3. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, while agreeing
that positive
and successful
is ,.f.ui~y within current

that the attached
appraisal
military
intervention
US capability,
rs of the opinion
memorandumis unduly optimistic
of the force requir .ementa, duration,
sequences of such an action .

reservations
in Cuba
with respect
in its
~nd con-
He has expr essed the following
to the several
elements of the
analysis:
11
a . Cost (personnel , units,

I notice that
this
and equipment)
element is treat ed in
t erms of the magnitu de of force commitment and no specific

estimate
is made of coat in terms of personnel
material
consumed, and equipment -to be replaced
itated,
Even if this
I do not consider
treatment
is considered
caaualtie~,
or rehabilacceptable,
that the ground f orces now.shown are adequate
for the intended purpose within the indic ated time frame .
If the Castro regime is to be confronted
of overpowering force,
capitulation,
infantry
I consider
divisions
and casualties
with the prospect
reduced by early
that a minimum of three
should be introduced
(3)
immediately after
entry point has been seized by amphibious/airborne

11
'b. Level of National
Mobilization
force levels
assault.
Required.
(1) Adequate ground combat forces

in our current
an
are available
even if the scale of i ntervention
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
\
- -'fBP SEC
ftET SP
ECIAL l!A~
fJ~
IHB N6F8Rt~
,......7
1,i I
1!, ~-u}
a>r 1htM
iur ~ttlltl
.ur.riULI~
; N8F8RN
.A~
UNtl~~S\f
,~~
. ..
is increased
as indicated
above ,
not appear to apply with respect

military
government/civil
of the intervention
.readiness
prior
only to direct
capability
units,
mobilization
, commitment
,
in these areas.
consideration
additional
of our
tensions
in
mobilization
during ~he Berlin
on World-Wide Ability
A critical
to React.
point here is the duration
I,
involvement ?f maJor elements of our strategic
I,
Cuba.
From examination
assessment
and deploy forces

control,
install
level
of
reserve
of time and distance
of the probable
agree that the indicated
factors,
of opposition,
in
and
I cannot
time frame is adequate to introduce
of this magnitude,
an effective
establish
.
effective '
new government, turn over control
to that government, withdraw and rehabilitat:e
our forces,
and place those forces
posture
in a renewed -readiness
in
CONUS
. In my opin i on a mi.tchlonger time would be involved
and during this period our ability
would be seriously
11
I!
,,
,,
,,
....
crisis,
1,
..
to resort
is addressed
to respond quickly to heightened
" c. Effect
I,
and
in CUba, Restoration
approach i ng ~he scale -of that undertaken
I,
~r all elements
. it would appear necessary
other areas might well require
I,
airlift
does
force are to have the same degree or
(2) The foregoing
I:
to tactical
affairs
and preparation,
to partial
The same situation
reduced,
'd, Castro - CUban Counteraction.
that Cuban defensive

initial
res:l.stance,
plans are believed
keypoints,
warfa1e.
This statement
Intelligence
The statement
is made
to contemplate
a strong
followed by a determined defense of'
preselected
military
to respond to other crisis
Estimate
and finally
by protracted
is from the current
which also states
establishment
guerrilla
National
that the present
as a whole is politically
rel i able ,
SPEGIAL
l~NBtltJBNtffiRN
.,ur
I,
..
'
~t41t.I
If Castro's
H
lt~S~\f
ttrIIt"U11n
lrE.&.IAb~ A
Cuba is only partially
of its
:i
defensive
plans,
successful
combat operations
could be of
considerably
longer du.ration thananticipated
and materiel
casualties
11
increasing
e. Possibiiity
Occupation.
with personnel
proportionally.
of a Requirement for a Sustained
The present
real probability
in the execution
wording makes no mention of the very
that a US provisional
military
government
,.
would be required
the size
for an extended period
(44,206 sq, mi.) and population
its long history , f political

sustained
and extensive
constituted
authority,
I consider
occupation
civil
affairs
of Cuba,
tradition
of
resistance
to
phase appears
that a cl~an-up and

divisions
and associated
I
period.
'
government/
for a considerable
to the need r.or a military

capable of directing
of Cuba until
the civil
we can organize and install
regime capable of responsible
This period of transition,

rehabilitation
and its
to the assault
it more probable
.establishment
and ~conomic affairs

a successor
subsequent
would be required
This is in addition
Considering
(6,743,000)
and terrorist
force of three infantry
support units
.
guerrilla
the estimat .e that only a division-,size
force will be required

modest,
unrest,
or time,
re-organization,
self-government.
and economic
might well continue for several
years.'
11
~~
C, H, HAYES
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Chief of staff (Plans)
l '
TQPSECRET
SPfetAL
IIAMBLIN6
. .....,
~
'
.' REl)JWIDUJ:i"Pon
ll'!m JOill'l'
Sub,1oct:
. .,
.~
.i:r
.........
... .... j
... ,. !
:....
l'
.,.-.,;_
<-
f
j,
:fj;,
jY).
'"""":t-'
'
<
. i
'
. i.
l'ago 12. -par~~pli
. ~(3) us N!litlli,:
"
1tl
..
-~
'
raco....,nd thilt tho rol l'oii1r~ ~

a l>e mtde in order
to take tull co~~nco
or the 1190:ubi e roqu1ron:cnt ft:tr'
reducing m.1.litocy, ronct1on t11:a to ~eoa than el.Ehto~a
(l!l) <fuya.
.
.......
.-~:r.~
...J
.
doloto
!'
Ja(3l r cha~
~o road O.Dt"o~ova1
R~3Ction
W1tb no prior
.US anri Cuban ceul~ l .tioa.
ency 'Plan No. 2; Qiba (S)
I h!-~ve rov.11:,,ed subJect ~~r (JCS 1969/389) onil
i.
VS Con~
C!!IEFS OP Sl'AW
wam1nc ,
1n l:ll.D1'111111
roeult
iG-'lfleil-t1a-:-~~ai
..
ron:aimar or porag,-:iph throut)I {<i~-weaUeP..~&
i~<i-eete~l}Y
(b) A rcgttiz, m nt to reduce s1en1r1 car,t1 1 tho
1?.ND&uault pt,rlo<.l l-tOuld r..cccosit!Jte !.ncrcmntal
cotmitmnt
,or,,us rore3JS RO they could 1:o asu2Jtl>led a.nd emplo:,,:cd 'l"ha

: ~1ma ...,,p1r6d, ,'to p,i1n o&5ont1Bl us 1>111t3!7 control
l!PPN>Cl.ob
'fy o,: tcn<lad.
"'. .
t>.Cl<
1on tir.i~
' tin n1rliorne

tcllo,rod
'
....
Ro:,evor 1 reduo t ron or us c111tar:,
""':Y:ti<> ct: overriding'

acn.,ult
1t.tportanco.
c<>ulclbo 1n1tiatccl
in l' i va
(5) AA)'&
EXCLUDEJi:-i-1:;v, .t.lli'O
l,UTIC
RECRADI
IIC: 000 018 ~200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY
...UNtl~l~\f
.
110..
m:-;
In tlUCh caee r
b}" 01,-1:1,:,.dod unit!) as OO{')non a1ri'1elds
EXCtuom Ffl:OMGOS
u:ay bo
nro
..
~f
!
...~ .. . .. . ..... ~. .
.. ,
/
,,
..
........... ~.1,':i..';
. ..
'
'
r: .
S8CUl'<lCL, lfa!Y4:'4~1M
'
within
eiy.llt
o thcz
nraph!bious
bG com:nitted
(8) da:vs1 1'oll0\< on to,:,oen 1<ould be oor..mitted

Incre~ntal
becoo,:, evnilable.
illcreanod
!'OX'OGDoould
oo=J.toent
th<J risk ot hoav1er eooualtioa
01' .Corcc3
on bot fi u1dcc
..
(ol 'Ihe Cuban c1tuot.l.o:1 could demand more 1"",i:::G1ate
... ;I.
--.
rooct1on
~.,...
,1
~"
,:f,I, :
,tlia Cormuniot
,Pl'OV1do
-~~,
,. ': i .
to .._~- r:ipid . comitment
'
PONOI', llt1V8l wntirc
3, 'l'o be ao,.,;1etent
"(3
...,
"~
or air
11
14, psragrapli
sentonco:s as
us m111tacy plt111:1will
!!n-' 1!l1ti&t~ l'll_or :a . blooklldo pr.I.or to tbc eir~o=/e::,ph!l>!.::-.!:

O.SMUlt.
.,,;
C-Jban aovcrnaient.
11!.tb ch8Jl&cs roc<Xm11cndedabove, pago

3b(3) ilhould bo changed 1n tho 1rat 1;-.,0
1
_ l l0M1u
1
i' .
IC
-.
'
D. l!I.L..,--Y
J'\c!::1.trttl, US!J
!C,,1:3=
V!co
TOP SECR -NOFORN

SPEC! HANDLING
- --
D1.r~ctor
2
,,
'.
--
-
....
........ !,,<:
.v ..
,. _, '
.._,......
N~
='.
...: ....'f"':.:..1,.-~l(
,r~'.~.~
'l'O
CONTROL
DIVISION:
.\.
.. ~ I. '
, .,:' ,:., ,::.;'~
~~
. . ..
....,..,...,
.
., .... ...'
JllS~il969Y389- NOR'ffll!OODS
(S)
tt
~t their
'
meeting on 25 JulY, 1962 the Joint Clliefs
considered the euliject paper along with

this
,.-.,(~--
":'-~
...~
.....~. .
- .'
'
I.
sub3ect,
,..
~.
'&,...,
dated 25 JulY,, al "J. of which were tabled at tliJ.s
<<,,!')
$,!..~~~~
;~ d
f .'..-
-,_...,
.-
t o refer
."'>, ,.,.
~ eed to !llerer this item. It was also agreec1

the sutiject paper and al ~ purples to General Harris
tor revision
.:.:.1:tm3
<(-"Y,,.T"'I
in the light
of the discussion
Further , it was e,s,,eed to have tliis revision
-;~
Chiefs on an individual
obtained,
basis;
held at the meeting

circulated
should suoh approval not be
tliJ.s item will be rescheduled on the Pr1day,
'!SeDda.
.....'
~J.
ING
Colonel, USAF
Seoret!U'Y
:<:'::!
.~;~.
Copy to,
..., . .
.
General Harrrs
..~
.' .
Hith
~ (
/ ,(t'\
'~Ntl~~
lfllD
- ~"~!ET
E<ClUDEI>
FROMGOS
'irf,
July
. I 715 )OP1-151 a:,
>,ili:illili
26 AL ,,...
s,,.,
1111:
-,,t~
3'
Nt~OIN
iii
--
COPY OF
COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
REPORTBY THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
SURVEY
GROUP
CARIBBEAN
to the
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

on
US CONTINGENCY
PLANNO. 2, CUBA(S)
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY
,.~NCll~~lf
ltO
TOPOEG
-AfJa&P~GIAt
IMrN
8tING tMJ,URN.e
1
I ..
US CONTINGENCY
PLANNO. 2, CUBA(S)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested*
by the Chief of Operations,
MONGOOSE,
to develop an interagency
military
intervention
Operation
contingency
plan for US
in Cuba.
ASSUMPTIONS
2. It is possible
in Cuba.
that
A resistance
a spontaneous
could occur
the Communist Cuban
movement against
government could develop a situation

may desire
uprising
that
the United States
to exploit.
3. The United States
will pursue
the overthrow
of the
Communist Cuban government.

FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLEM
4. The Department of Defense/Joint
repr.esentative
to the Caribbean
for the preparation

which include
wide-spread
to eighteen
plan.
in a situation
of open,
in Cuba.
of forces
will permit
execution
of
Plan No. 314-61** at any time subsequent
(18) days after
6 . For additional
Enclosure B.
plan for US actions
intervention,
5. Normal readiness
CINCLANTOperations
Survey Group is responsible*
of a contingency
military
revolt
Chiefs of Staff
the decision
facts bearing
to implement the
on the problem see
DISCUSSION
7. 'For discussion
see Enclosure
c.
CONCLUSIONS
8. The plan attached
response
at Enclosure
to the requirement
* Memofor representatives
A provides
for a contingency
suitable
plan.
of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, f1~m

B/G Lansdale, subject,
"Spontaneous Revolts . in Cuba,
Contingency Planning," dated 14 Jime 1962; on file in Gen
Harris' office.
,
** CINCLANTContingency Operations Plan No. 314-61 (cuba) (s),
dated 22 July 1961, as amended; on file in JoinG Secretariat.
' I
~NtlASSlf
ltD
RECOMME
NDATIONS
9. It is recommended that:
a.I The contingency
~J,lQ
plan at Enclosure A hereto
forwarded to Chief of Operations,
be approved
Operation MO
NGOOSE,
through the .Secretary of Defense.

and
b. A copy of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT
CINCSTRil<E.
c. This paper NOTbe forwarded to US officers
assigned
to NATOactivities.
d . This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation,
United Nations Military
a TOPii~RrEi
.'
Staff
Committee.
DRAFT
~Ntl~~lf
ltU
ENCLOSURE
A
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
SUbject:
l.
United States
Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)
As requested ' in memorandumfor representatives
State,
of
Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, subject:

Contingency Planning,"
"Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,
dated 11+June 1962, the attached
plan is forwarded for your approval,

the Chief of Operations,
prior
intervention
principal
forms.
of confronting
methods of
dealt with in this plan take three
These are,
a. A deliberate,
to
Operation Mongoose.
2. It will be noted that the alternative

military
to delivery
in descending order of magnitude:
orderly,
large-scale
operation
capable
the Castro regime with the prospect
of
over-powering force.
b. An accelerated
initial
reaction
and amphibious forces building

of the primary plan.
c.
An
military
up as feasible
This method enta1is
longer time to establish

probability
of greater
fully
effective
casualties
immediate and continuing

forces and facilities
revolting
tions.
by lesser
airborne
to th,e scale
greater
control,
risk,
and the
on both sides.
air attack
on Castro
to support and assist
the
forces and to pave the way for subsequent opera-
3. The above described

tially to current
in Cuba.
alternative
CINCLANT
plans for contingency
~. This plan was coordinated

during preparation
methods conform essenoperations
with the Department of State
in order to be consistent
with and
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5200.10 IX>ESNOTAPPLY
Enclosure A
(Amendedas directed
by the Joint
Chiefs of ~taff
- 27 July 1962)
.. 111r ~ttiKtl
N9sf8
-RN
complementary to the alternate

addresses
limited
5.
the contingency
to US actions
Operations
of State,
less
outlined
Central
plan prepared by State which
of an internal
Cuban revolt
than military
intervention.
within
Intelligence
but is
this plan for the Department
Agency and US Information
Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Enclosure A -,
(Amended as directed
by
the Jo\'1.t Chiefs of Staff
- 27 July 1962)
.~NtllS~lf
llD
I
TOPSEGRET
SPECIAL
HANB~ltt8
.NOFOftN
-
:Aili
IIrx
& w1 1;,
~
. t!:f 11 t RIMI :~. alf411t1
n1
F\J
a
"ue
r-os
nr
ns
APPENDIX TO BNCLOSUREA
UNITED STATES CONTI NGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)
,,
Appendix t o
Enclosure A
1ttt' &tl;Kt I
~~,xrtGIil NANBLIN
-8~ N8F8RN-
UNtl~SSl~lt
DRAFT
5412 SPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED)
25, D. C.
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM
FOR: The Secretary
Subject:
1., The attached
of State
The Secretary
of Defense
The Director,
Central
The Director,
US Information
United States
Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)
plan delineates
pursued by the United States
Intelligence
Agency
the course of action
to be
in the event that US military
intervention
is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread
revolt in Cuba.
2. Subject plan is effective
for the conduct of operations
for planning on receipt
and
when directed.
3. This document requires special

releasable to foreign nationals.
handling and is not
FORTHE 5412 SPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED):
EDWARD
G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
..
TOPSE6RET
SPE61AL
IIANBLIN6
N8F9RN
. I ur ~~tilttI
;:v~t't~IAL
NANDLIN{J)
MOFQRN
TITLE PAGE
1. The title
of t his document is:
UNITEDSTATESCONTINGENCY
PLJ\NNO. 2, CUBA(S)
2. The title
of this
plan may be referred
document is classified
to as the Caribbean
Survey Group (or,
CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified

Cuba.
3. This document contains
defense
information
793 and 795, title
or revelation
of the contents
4. Reproduction
permission
supporting
t hereof
Its
transmission
in any manner to an
by law.
of OJ)erations,
Operation
Distribution
will be restricted
US government agencies
specifically
the plan on a "Special
Handling - Not Releasable
Nationals"
to
the nation a1
except as necess ary for the preparation
plans.
related
of t his document in whole or in part without
of the Director
is prohibited
affecting
u~s.c.).
18;
person is prohibited
unauthorized
unless
the meaning of the Espionage
of the United Stat es within
Laws (Section
SECRET. The
requiring
MONGOOSE
of
to those
knowledge of
to Foreign
basis.
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
7
~Ntl&S~lf
ltD
TOPSE6RiTSPEC~AL
H-A
N-DLING
NOfflflN
.. 1 ttr
N9F8RN
atGnf I '~JJ
:Sl'ttilAL
. NA
.NULllf,
US CONTINGENCY
PLANNO. 2 1 CUBA(S)
TABLEOF CONTENTS
Letter
of Promulgation
Page
Page
Page
Table of Contents
Page
. Page
Page
Title
Distribution
List
Basic Plan
EXCLUD
ED FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADI,NG:
8
T9PSE8RET
SfEelAL
H"A"N1Jtlfl0
J VF
cltbftt I
iJ'J,
3rttilAL
NANYLIN~w
NHFHRN
UNClAS~ltltU
US CONTINGENCY
PLAt-lNO~., CUBA..:.-J.l
DIS1'RIBUT:O
'Ofi LIST
AGEUCY
COPYNUMBERS
Department of Stace
Departm'3nt of t>e; 13nse
*Department of the Treasury
*Department of Justlce
*Departrnemt or Health,
F.ducation and Welfare
*Department of Agriculture
Central. Intelligenee
Agency
US In.1'orr,:ation Agency
*Federa! Aviation Agency
*Bureau of the Bude.et
*Distri\Jution to asterisked agencies will not be made until

such time as 'their particiy:; .tion 16 required in planning or
implementatj_on of the plan.
Whendistribution
is mad'3 to
th~se agencies, only those por~!o~s of the plan which pertain
wll l be d!ssere:i.!"~.ted.
to their participati"n
EJ!:C!.UDED
1''ROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADitfG;
1)',j;)
DIB 5200 . 10 DOES NOT APPLY:
9
'
TOPSECRET
SPE~IAL
HANDLING
'NOFORN
I , .
UNGlA~~ltltU
UNITEDSTATESCONTINGENCY
PLANNO, 2, CUBA(S)
Reference:
Memorandumfor Representative?
of State,
Defense,
CIA and USIA, from Chief of OperationsP. Operation

MONGOOSE,
subject:
Contingency
"Spontane?US Revolts
in Cuba,
dated i4 June 1962.
Planning",
Department or State
Task Agencies:
Department of Defense
Central
Intelligence
US Information
Agency
Agency
1. Situation,
a. The purpose of this plan is to define

action
to be pursued by affected
of
of the US
a decision
Government in the event that

the United States
agencies
the courses
undertake
military
is made that
'
intervent:!.on in
Cuba.
b. The .:1.ssumedsituation
spread revolt.
in Cuba is open, wide-
This contingency
initiated
situation,
activated
for mid-June 1962.
the situation
similar
include
to that rumored as being

US actions
for implementation
internal
revolt
to exploit
the use of US military
c. It is assumed tha t this

under the following
may be a non-US
plan would be implemented
conditions,
and
under situa tions
has created
force.
a chaotic
~
.
would be considered
less
severe.
situation
An
in
Guba where:
(1) The revolution
is open and threatens
the Communist regime;
EXCLlTJ
)ED FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DOD r::R 5200 . 10 DOES NOT APPLY
'... .
l
<
::;i
10
U~ClA~~lf
l(D
.NOFORN
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLIKG
(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionarie

and;
(3) Leadership
of the revolt,
s,
unable to overthrow
the government or sustain

requests
assistance
the revolution
d. The United States

that a rebellion
diplomatic,
unfriendly
forces
outbreak.
covert
morale,
will
More probably
to initiate
and mi~itary
disposition
necessary
preparations.
and equipage of
will be assumed to be as described
estimates
it will
which will prov:i.de some
and the opportunity
e. The strength,
actual
notice,
revolt
propaganda,
the
be able to determ in e
that the assumed situation
evolve from a localized
current
may, or may not,
at once and without
advance notice
and/or
(OAS),
is imminent before
However, it is unlikely
occur all
indefinitely,
from the United States
Organiz ation of American States
1ft
of the United States
Intelligence
in
Board
(USIB).
2 . Mission.
.
The United States
in Cuba through all
military
force
will suppor t and sustain

its
resources
to assure
including
replacement
the rebe,llion
the use of US
of the Communist regime
with a new Cubi-.n government accep t able to the United States.

3. Execution.
a . Concept of Operations .
(1) When the li ke liho od or emergence of a CUban
revolt
it
becomes apparent
to the US intelligence
will be j.mmed:l.ately brought
5412 Special
to the attention
community
of the
Group (Augmented) through the Office of
the Chief of Operations,

of the situation
Operation
MONGOOSE.Eval\1atj .on
by the Sp0t!~.:l Group will determine
whether
11
"NOFORN
SPECIAL
HANDLING
TOPSECRET
:!)>'UI
II n 11U L I 11'!_.;9
LUlftL
or not the President's
decision
_nurunn
should be sought to
imple n;ent this plan .

(2) The initial
---
stages of a spontaneous rev:olt will
..-- ......~ .....-.-..'Y"'''_:_ ....

..~- -- ...,....._--- - ;
--
be supported by the Unite d States

covert operations
and other actions as necessary, but

"--..
the appearance of non-US involvement should
maintaining
t/
the revolt
through propaganda,
-- .--,,~
...
---
In the event that tte revolt
fail.
as a popular movement against

United States
spreads
the Communist
regime, the
,,
should be capable of rapid military
action
to forestall
a concertedaid
the interest
of humanity and the mission of this plan.
(3) US Military
reprisal
program in
Reaction.
(a) With no prior

days of preparation
assault
drastic
warning and 'with eighteen

a coordinated
(18)
airborne-amphibious
could be executed which, it is anticipated,
would gain control

the principal
of key military
centers
installations
of population
ten (10) days and result
and
of Cuba within
in minimum US and Cuban
casualties.
(b)
assault
requirement
period would necessitat
ment of US forces
ployed.
to reduce significantly
appreciably
tary reaction
circumstance
US military
extended.
the time required
control
However, reduction
In such case, air and naval forces
airborne
( 5)
assault
ill~
of US miliimportance.
could attack
support of the rebel Cubans with little

the ti me ;; c.ecision: . is l!lade.
to
of Cuba could be
time may be of overriding
coul d be i P.itiated
commit-
as they could be assembled and em-
Under .this
gain essential
e incremental
th e pre-
in
delay from
air assault
within eight (8) hours, an

could - be initiated
within five
days and a Na,y/Mari ne amphibious . force
could be comm
itted
three
(3) days later
with
12
~t
[
by t he Joi~t Chiefs of Staff

'
- 27 July 1962)
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NOFORN
I Uf
OtlJR[
It UI U I\H,
a build up to the full-scale
effort
to follow.
(4) Execution of this plan will . be in two (2) phases:

(a) Phase I.
After Presidential
phase will be undertaken
decision ., this
by the Department of Defense
supported by other agencies of the government,

will be initiated
by overt US mili:tary
Cuba under the direction

control
operation
quicldy
strength
resist
at such time as essential
is gained over the island,
is to be conducted as rapidly
to confront
on
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and will be terminated

military
assault
The
as possible,
Cuban forces with sufficient
beyond enemy
._,,capability
and to reduce rislt to US units initially
deployed,
It
to be clearly
to
with a view toward early capitulation
Cuban military
of
units and avoidance of needless
loss
of life.
(b) Phase II.
essential
Following the establishment
US military
control
phase will be primarily
of the island,
Cuban government friendly

efforts
will be directed
affairs
and military
tary operations
this
concerned - with the restora-
tion of law and order and the establishment
policy established
of
of a new
to the US.. US military

primarily
to matters of civil
government in accordance with

by the Department of State.
essential
for the.elimination
Miliof
small pockets of resistance

and order throughout
and restoration
of law
the island -will
..' continue. Major
US combat forces will be w~thdrawn as early as

security
may permit.
Operational_r'esponsibility
the Department of Defense will
.
cease at
Department of State assumes responsibility
administration
of
the time the

for civil
of Cuba.
13
,.
~~tl~~~lfIf~
,
.NOFORN
- TOPS~CRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
___..__ _
HUI Ul\11
b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1)
When directed
by higher authority,
or as the
situation demands, the Department of Defense ;will

.
ini t iate preparatory actions for US military interventi on in Cuba,
positioning
current
(2)
Chiefs
These actions
forces and equipment by execution of
cover and deception

Upon final
decision
plans .
of the President,
of St aff will direct
intervention
may include pre -
execution
the Joint
of military
plans for Cuba.
(3) In concept,
with a blockade,
initial
military
operations
commence
concentrated
air strikes
and coordi-
nat ed Naval gunfi

. r e to effect
destruction
of enemy
air power and to neutralize

possible
and destroy as much as
of the enemy tank, armor, artillery
, and
- -- - - - - ---
'
14
(Amendedas directed
by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
ll!l
~~\~
~
TOPSECRET
?1 July 1962)
NOFORti
HANDLIKG
I UI
OLOIILI
''
. ,.
. ...........,., .... ..._.......
(5) At such time as essential
is gained in Cuba, matters
of St at e .
of civil
affai rs and mili -
military
est ablished
This includes
US milita ry control
tary government will be given priority

in ac cordance with policy
and under ta ken

by the Depar tment
pr9vis io n for a provisional
government pre pared t o as sume full
executive , and judicial
control until
can be turned over to other autho rity

an expedi t ious and orderly
manner.
le gislative,
such functions
on direction
in
Remainin g re si st ance
element s of the Commun

is t Cuban government
, ar med fo rce s
..
.
or other groups will
be isolated,
contained and destroyed
or ca pt ur ed as ra pi dl y as poss i ble .
units
US military
will be scheduled for early r~turn
States
consistent
with security
combat
to the United
considerat ions.
c. Department of State Operations
Cl) Phase I .
The Depa rtm ent of Sta t e wil l seek t o
place t he United States
in as broad a multilateral
context a s possi bl e .
(a) Immediate l y sound out Latin American
Governments to determine whether the United States
can count upon a 2/3 majori ty decision
th e us e of milit ar y forces under Article
authorizing
6 of
the-Rio Treaty.,.
i -
by the Joint Chiefs of sta ff - 27 July 1962)
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HAND
LI.NG . NOFORN-
1,u1
'9rt11tfr..:.
SP~ret'At
Hltfltl:1ff
! s Ni-f!O
iltN
~Ntl~~~lf
IfD
(b) If 2/3 majority
is available,
Council of the Organization
request
the
of American States
to
convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers

under Article
6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organi-
zation of American States
(OAS) decision
authorizing
use of force.
two Latin
(c) Seek agreement from at least

American nations
(preferebly
not Nicaragua or Guate-
mala) to provide token forces
to join United States
forces.
(d) If 2/3 majority
the anti-Castro
cannot be mustered, recognize
forces as the Government of Cuba and,
in response to its appeal for help,
come to its
with United States military
assistance
whatever foreign
forces and
token forces have been made available.
(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of

significant
developments.
(f) Inform all friendly

and the reasons
of their
obtain public expressions
support and of their
Castro forces.
violence
therefor;
governments of our actions

sympathy for the anti-
Warn them to expect communist directed
and offer
them assistance.
(g) Notify the OASand the United Nations (as

appropriate)
of our actions
them in these international
bodies.
(h) Engage in all-out

propaganda stressing
action
and be prepared to defend

psychological
the morality
designed to assist
warfare and
of United States
the Cuhan people throw off
the bonds of communist er!Zlaven,ent .

(a) Provide imrc<?<:'
:.::, .o;
other assistance
1;,:,
,.
16
<::!
n:'?", 3m 1(:;r
._,_
.... ,.,.._,.
t0<"!onomicand
(b) Turn over as rapidly
as possible
Government for administration
of the territory
by United States troops and assist

to the extent feasible
to the Cuban
that government
as it requests.
(c) Make preparations
to provide the Cuban Govern-
ment with long range economic assistance

(d) Take measures to assist
to control
taken
the Cuban Government
entry into and exit from Cuba.
(e) Re- establish
the United States
country team
in Havana.
d . Central
Intelligence
AgencyOperations.
(1) CIA operations
against
Cuba are controlled
component of CIA Headquarters,

elements are located
Washington.
in the vicinity
with sub elements at other Florida

(2) In the event of localized
covert support to the revolt
Operational
of Miami, Florida,
locations.
revolt,
CIA will give
through introduction
communications, arms,equipment and trained

appropriate
by a
of
personnel
as
and feasible.
(3) \\!hen US Military
intervention
is directed
and
contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fUlly support

the military
actions
in accordance with the JCS/CIA

Agreement,whether it is implemented
CommandRelationship
or not.
(~) Liaison
prior
arid communications will be established
to implementation
of CINCLAN~
and subordinate
(5) CIA will support military
tine intelligence,
political
counter intelligence,
and paramilitary
(6) After the initial

quent consolidation
designate
selected
based personnel
assault
propaganda,
and during the subse-
and occupation phase, CIA will

from CIA Headquarters
b~se, . Florida,
conduct clandestine
by clandes-
operations,
personnel
or CIA operations
and objectives ,
operations
plals.
operations
Ultimately,
a permanent CIA station
17
to proceed to Cuba and
in support of US forces
.
the QUlk
of CIA Florida '
will be transferred
I
and/
and bases.
to Cuba to establish
~Ntll~lf
l~D
1
5 aa
9pfe11Al'L
m1tf
A'N
D1~ltf8
N,OtNl7it
. .f u-Psre,~
T
e , United States
(1)
factual
Information
Agency Operations.
The Agency will pro~vide compl:te,

and impartial
informational
taneous revolt , in its
initial
phase ,
but strictly
coverage to a sponThe purpose of
such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and

of the hemisphere,
fully
informed of developments,
to s et the stage for possible

action.
and
subsequent courses of
Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the
appeara1ce of US involvement during this phase so as to

nullify
possible
later
charges of US intervention
Cuba or other Latin American governments)

revolt
fail .
In this
context,
phase must carefully
refrain
(by
should the
the Agency during this

from a type or tone of
coverage that might be construed

(2) In the event of direct
as incitement
US involvement,
to riot.
the Agency
will:
(a) Assign informational
Defense Psywar units
specialists
to work with
during combat operations .
(b) Staff up a regular
USIS unit to move into
Havana with the Department of State contingent
at
the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical
equipment and r~sources
operation
necessary
to support a USIS
in Cuba.
(3) Ba.sic considerations
support of direct
US military
in Agency informational
action:
(a) Medium wave radio should receive

attention
for any overt combat operation
Immediately upon securing
priority
in Cuba.
any beachhead or other

'7
enclave on the isl:r~.1d, and perhaps immed:iately prior

to or concurrent
,..._.
_'21 such actinn,
broadcas~:;.ng shoul c begin.
18
--
--
massive medium wave
A beefed - up Guantanamo
~~tl~;if
ltO
IIJJiiO
PR.iz
~SiliG~R
el'Ji;..,gf;f>~f
fflt[M1f:
'1111
tffllfflffl
~Nrtrlffl.1ft,
7 Nftiffr-
a 111
transmitter,
leased
transmitters
and, as soon as possible,
station(s)
U.S. Florida
should be assigned
wave facilities
necessary
will
task,
also be increased
Short
to provide
backup.
simple and direct,

personal
order,
floating
captured Cuban,
to this
(b) The messages of this

safety
rights,
facilities,
reassuring
the people of their

of their
individual
on the maintenance o.f p'J.blic
the distribution
all done hopefully
of food and medical attention,
in a Cuban context
the minimum of reference

credibility
phase should be
and the protection
instructions
power necessary
initial
and with only
to US military
forces
and
to maintain order and to assure
of the inevitability
of Castro's
rapid
and complete defeat.

(c) Care nrust be exercised,
anti-Castro
particularly
Cubans, toa.roid alienating
port by immediate talk of vengeance,

of possible
benefits)
with the
possible
sup-
or of indications
loss of any gains (housing,
land,
social
which might have accrued to the peasant
and
worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively
in Cuba, wall posters
and leaflets
themes of the broadcasts

and utilized
high rate
of literacy
reiterating
the
should also be available
as soon as practical,
air drop ahead of military
action
the leaflets
by
where deemed
advisable.
(e) Any provisional
have a news bulletin
instruct
( f)
military
for factual
government must also

news summaries and
i ons to t he civilian
population.
:::r. all
planning,
psy~"oloi;ical
tion sho,1-ld be giv \n to avoiding
special
atten-
in so far as possible
19
~~tl~~Slf
If~
D
TOP&EGRET
6PEOl~
H~
:ttl+llftt
, ,N~
LUI' t;t~KtI ,_w~fECIALHANBtlM

& NOFORN
any indications
ante,
all
reassure
of plans to ret\ll'n to the status
information
quo
output should be designed to
the 'populace that the US supported movement
is designed to carry forward the realization

social
and economic aspirations
of the
of the Cuban people.
f. Depart ment of the Treasury

Department of Justice
Deuartment of Health.
Education and Welfare
Department of Agriculture
Federal
Aviation Agency
Bureau of the Budget

Supporting
expedite
functions
will
be undertaken
and promote the efforts

a. As requested
to assist,
of Task Agencies:
by Task Agencies, prior
plan implementation,
b. As requested
to
and
by Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.
4. Coordinating
Instructions.
a. Implementation
of this plan will
be as directed
by
the President.
b. Military
operations,
including
military
activities,
directed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
of military
will
clandestine
be conducted by CINCLANT
as
government activities
by CINCLA1'1T
as directed
accordance with policy
c. Political,
the Secretary
in Cuba will be conducted
establi ?hed by the Secretary
in
of State.
and economic operations
in accordance with policy
established
will
by
of State.
d. Supporting plans are required
from all
""'"'
D!::ct
coor~!~
-planning purposes.
- - --- ______..
_b:__
~ ~~ag .!:_
nci ~!l2

in current
--
Task Agencies.
-...
__.....,
.l9:.
.~w.'.@.~U
!'
One copy of supporting
provided Chief of Operations,

maintained
The administration
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
psychological
be accomplished
and para-
plans is to be
Operation Mongoose, and
status.
20
Q
by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
- 27 July 1962)
SPEElt~
IIANDLl~u
1
. IUI' tiECKEf 5PECIA
L H,ANI
~~
e. During implementation
Operations,
NiffRN
~~:~ll~\f
ltO
of the plan the Chief of
Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator
for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency

activities.
The coordinating
in the Pentagon,
,.
will be established
Office of the Joint Chiefs of ,,Staff,
Room 2 B 913, telephone
office
by the Joint
extension
59710.
21
Chiefs of Staff
- 27 July 1962)
TOPtfCtfT SPE~,A.~KAN
DHNG . NOf-.&R,N
.
I YI' :;tt;KtI / 51'Lti1At

IIANDLIK
J N&FftRN
UNtl~SS\f
IEO
ENCLOSUREB
FACTSBEARING
. ON THE PROBLEM
Chiefs of Staff , on 22 May 1962 approved
1. The Joint
CINCLANTOperational
US preparations
2. Planning
Plan 318-62* which provides
ln Cuba.
for mili tary intervention

for US military
a react ion time reduced
j.ntervention
to five
cover for
in Cuba w1th
(5) days i s currently
process but has not bee n appr oved by the Jo i nt Chiefs

Staff.-l!*
3. CIA operations
"w"which
Task Force
Washington,
CIA unit
D.C.
located
at other Florida
operation
against
Cuba are controlled
in
of
by Commander,
is a component of CIA Headquarters
The primary operational"

in the vicinity
location s ,
in
element is the
of Miami., with sub elements
CIA will
in the event US military
support
action
the milit a ry
is taken against
Cuba.
4. Sub-paragraphs
plan,
outlining
of the execution
separate
departmental
paragraph
of the basic
and agency particip~tion,
were prov ided by the agency concerned.
CINCLANTOperations
Secretari .at
** CINCLANTOperations
Secretariat
Plan No 318-62;
on fj .le in Joint
Plan No 316-62 ; on file
in Joint
Enclosure
22
TOPs.ECBET
iSPEC
IAL-11,A,Nll
ING . N&fiR.N
ur atbKtl
...._~
,. ;)rtl,IAL
. ._..1
HANYllt'
_y
NUIUKN
ENCLOSURE
C
DISCUSSION
l, The approved military
plan for US intervention
can be executed in eighteen

no warning;
time, unless,
clearly
to reduce this reaction
such preparatory
to imminent military
at this
measures can be
action,
time for a Cuban operation
Extensive troop
which may not be
executed within the next few years is of questionable

Similarly,
prestockage
and activation
of supplies,
being required
if such preparations
in the foreseeable
2, It is unlikely
without active
fleet
itself
have no likelihood
US military
of
-'
future,
for an appreciable
and positive
of forces
does not
that a . spontaneous uprising
dev~lop and sustain
value.
pre-positioning
of ships from the reserve
appear justified
of
that funds will be
pre-positioned
of course,
related
training
(18) days from a condition
It is not anticipated
expended nor units
in Cuba
in C11bc1.could
length of time
sppport.
It is
expected that the United States would ma.1ntain an appearance

of non-involvement
therefore
prior
important
that US forces
response than eighteen

and, second, to react
reprisals
to any decision
a revolt
acts or
by the Communist Cuban government.

risks
ting US forces
in incremental
to be faced.
The most rapid reaction
as directed
involved in commit-
deployments such risks may have
employ air power, which is currently
possible
in Cuba.
would be to
being planned by CI1~CLANT
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
be the difference
as rapidly
to sustain
to irrational
3, Although there are increased
uprising
It is
be capable of more rapid
(18) days, first,

adequately
to intervene.
between success or failure
This air plan could

of any popular
'.l.'heuse of air power should be followed
as possible
by the air-dropped/air-landed
assault
as planned in CINCLANT
OPLAN316-62, with follow-on amphibi?US
forces
introduced
as soon as feasible,
and a build up to the

I
full.-scal.e
effort
of CINCLANTOPLAN3111-61.
,.
23
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
NANQLING
N9f9R~
,,.
-
1
..,
..
UNtlASS~
lD199.SEeRET
13 June 1962
.,,.
......
.~:
Decision on,
1,,~;,
"".
SPr.fCIAh
HAND
UING
REQU!
~E~
;
JCS il.969/366
.,... _
NO
OO
RELEASABLE
liO~OREIGN
NAJl0N.Al1
~ (NORTHWOODS)
(S)
At their
' .,
_,..
......,,...
meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chie fs of
%JCS Representative
Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD
to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9'bf
the su~jeot Raper, as amended 1n the Appendix to Enclosure A
--~
.;.J
;>:-,-~
,'.;(,~}.,j
>)S~Mf.11
ffi
...,,......']
' .
,.,,
~4
... ...
.;
"complel<ity ot" and deletion
of the words "an<Sincrease
the risk of Soviet retaliation

redesignated
elsewhere . " from the end
Additional ly, paragraph 2 rs
as par agr aph 3
;,
-~*'~
ii
b.
Deletion of paragraph 3.
c.
Deletion of the word "However" trom the beginning
of the first
sentence of paragraph 4 and of the words
"in the race of 1noreaoed riak of Soviet countermeasures
:~
~~?
:,-.
\
elsewhere."
from tn e end ot the sentence.
al l of the last
. ...~ 1
'.
.. .
Additionally,
sentence of paragJ1aph 4 is deleted

is redesignated
-:'~:..'i."
:'/11
'
1n the second sentence or
!'d8 "urgency for" tor the t>rde

paragl,'aph 2, of the WO
or the sentence.
....,. ~1
-~
.!!. Substitution,
and
as paragraph 2 .
jt(
rM~
Copy to1
DIOOI
tl.II>O
Colonel, USAF
1:)(0.UOEI>
fOOM
GOS
Deputy, Secreta J,'Y;
Of~-
C't'uif" 'J CCIOh
wJ.I. - - -
PoRt!S s e:.;' .
..
.!
.--:;.
us;
UN&tAS~tf
IfO\
S6REI
il.3 JUne 19.92
-,.c-,
-
" ": '
...
.:,. ;,1.,,. ,
~
.;
Dec1s1on on:
...
-: :-
JCS
19.99}366
. .
. . ,(NORTHIIOODS)
. (S)
... .
"
.. ...
.
At tl\e1r meeting on 13 June 19o2 tne Joint Chiefs

or St ate approved the recommendations
oe BOENCraig
as
set fortti in paragraph 9 of tl\e subjec ~ paper, as amended

1n the Appencl1.x
A b;:t:
.. to EilclQsure
.
. .
..
a. Changes to par!!SI'apl\ 2 an~, r ei1e11:tgpat i on

as paraaraph 3 ,
b.
".. :i: I
. .
, ....
.-
Deletion ot paragr apl\ 3.
Changes to para&I?aph 4 and redes1gnat10 .n

as paragr aph 2.
.,
.....~
'
-~
. .. -
,
"I
'. :
'
..
..
..:,<::~
Copy, to,
EXCI.UDED
fROM GOS
General Cra1g
~,.:
.....
,.
. ..
........
.
.....'
..;-i,.&,. ....
.,. ,. ...
..
. ..J..-~
I ur
.)[ " Rt I Ji .)r [ I, 111L
nAnuLIft''jj
nu~., uHn
COPYNO.../__ OF .2 O COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
12 ,Tune 1962
REPORT
BY THEDEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
AND
.QN_.THE
JOINT' CHIEFSOF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP
to the

on
SOVIETBASE IN CUBA (S)
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
DODDIRECTIVE5200. 10
.
DOESNOTAPPLY'
.~NtlA~~ltitu
.
JOP SECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NO
FORN
.
'
.,, II r btliKt I _:ll~rtl:ilAL HANuLIN'j.i
NUt
UKN-.,
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA(S)

PJIOBLEM
1. In response
Operation
to a request*
from Chief of Operations,
Mongoose, to determine
for the United States

a ~ilitary
an appropriate
to take in eve nt that
course of action
the Soviets
establish
base in Cuba.
FACTSBEARINGON THEPROB:W1
2. The problem etated
' posed by Mr. Robert
above was initially
Kennedy at the meeting of the Special
Group (Augmented) on
22 March 1962.
3. The Joint
complexities
attending
have previously
military
Chiefs of Staff ~ ' noting
intervention
before
the release
active
duty.
4. US military
final
the delay of US intervention
recommended** that
should be undertaken
a national
in Cuba,
policy
of early
be adopted by the United States

as soon as possible
or National
intervention
and successful
the fnc reased
and preferably
Guard and Reserve forces
,nll
overthrow
which
be required
to assure
on
the
of the Communist Cuban
government.***
DISCUSSION
5. For discussion
see Enclosure
B.
CONCLUSIONS
6. The Unit ed States
cannot tolerate
the permanent existence
of a communist government in Cuba.

7. Military
to overthrow
intervention
by the United States
will be l'cqu:I.X'ed
the Communist Cuban regime:
* Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen.

Operation
Lansdalet subJect: "Status or RequE!sted studies,
1962,
on
file
in
Gen.
Craig's
office.
June
Mongoose', dated 8
** JCS 1962/335
*** "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose", dated 14 March 1962,
on file in Gen. Craig's office .
. ~~t\~~~lfltO
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
..
: UF
.)[bftt
8. The establishment
the complexity
the risk
of a Sovie 't Base in Cuba will
of US military
of Soviet
nuroHn~
.,
nAnlJtlNl>
I ,.)/i.lrtl,IAL
action
countermeasures
increase
in Cuba and increase

elsewhere.
RECOMMENDATIONS
a. The Memorandum at Enclosure
which reflects
Secretary
the above conclusions,
of Defense for approval
Memorandum for the Special

tabled
A, with its
in order
that
to the
the
for 14 June 1962.
b This paper NOT be forwarded
to commanders of unified
commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded

to NATOactivities
to US officers
assigned
d . This paper NOT be forwarded

Delegation,
be forwarded
Group (Augmented) may be
at the meeting scheduled
or specified
Appendix
United Nations
Military
to the Chairman, US
Staff
Committee.
1 ~1r1~,
. TOPSECRET
SPE
HANDLING
NO.f
ORff
I u 1
p.)LhAL 1
.y "'
c1,111L
n11nuL1n
1~
nor
u1cn.,
ENCLOSUREA
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FOR SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Subject:
1. Reference
Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

is made to Memorandumfor the Special
(Augmented) from Brig.
Gen. Lansdale,
subject:
"Status
Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June.
Requested Studies,
memorandumrequested
the opinion of all participating
having membership in the Special .Group concerning

course of action
the Soviets
establish
2. The Joint
attached

a military
Chiefs of Staff
Group
of
This
agencies
the appropriate
to take in the event
base in CUba.
recommend approval of the
memorandum as the position
of the Department of
Defense.
For the Joint
Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTO!IATIC
REGRADING
DODDIRECTIVE5200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY
~tttl~~~lt\tU
Enclosure
., TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NO
fORN)
,..
1ur 3tbnt
I * ~rttilAL H3NULIN'
1
NUFORN
~- UNCllSS\f
\ED
APPENDIXTO ENCLOSURE
A
DRAFT
FOR THESPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED)
MEMORANDUM
Subject:
1. In response
from Director
to a Memorandumfor the Special
or Operations,
Operation Mongoose, sul:iject:
Department of Defense has considered

Soviets
the problem of an appropriate
should establish
a military
to take in event that
the choice of US counteraction

threat
vention.
It is considered
be the only solution
on the island,
is between long term acceptance
in the caribbean with an increasing
to the United States
the
base in Cuba.
2. In the event that a Soviet base is established

a communist state
"Status
Operation Mongoose," dated 8 June 1962, the
of Requested Studies,
course of action
Group (Augmented)
military
from the South, or US military

that the latter
course of action
compatible with the security
of
interests
interwould
of
the United States.
3. It is believed
that military
forces will be required

Cuban regime.
increase
intervention
to successfully
Establishment
by United States
overthrow the Communist .
of a Soviet Base in Cuba would
the urgency for US military
action
in Cuba.
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
EXCLUDED
DODDIRECTIVE5200,10
DOESNOTAPPLY
Appendix to
Enclosure A
(Page revised
as directed
by ''the JCS, 13 June 1962)
~~tl~~~lfltD
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NOFORN
., ,
'
11L'1nL 1 --~~11r.[1,111L
IUI
NUtUHN
.,
nAnULIN
JM
UNtll~~lf
l~O
ENCLOSUREB
DISCUSSION
cannot tolerate
permanent existence
of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere.
The present
regime in Cuba provides
communism with a base of operations
for espionage,
and subversion
sabotage
The stability
threatened
of some governments in Latin

by the overt
government.
increases
against
and covert
Continued existence
the probability
Latin America.
America is al.ready
actions
of the Cuban
of this communist government
that one or more other nations
in
Latin America will become communist or communist dominated .

will greatly
States
increase
the problems currently
and the Organization
unlikely,
it is ,possible
military
~or the Sino-Soviet
Establishment
3 . Time favors
They are provided
subversion
the possibility
resistance
to continue
in Latin America.
measure& by police
of internal
state
uprisings
to meet
with
Increasing
methods decrease
within
defenses
and could lengthen
Cuba.
strengthens
the time required
of the government and the island.
indoctrination
of the Cuban youth creates
for a co1mnunist underground

government.
around
The
the
which must be overcome in the event of US military
intervention
steadily
Bloc to establish
of such bases would increase
with the opportunity
steady improvement in military
control
While considered
the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.
efforts
security
the United
were developed or shifted
US defense coats as forces

the threat.*
internal
of American States.
bases in Cuba similar . to US installations
the bloc periphery.
their
facing
This
This creates
increasing
after
to secure
The continuing
a growing nucleus
the elimination
a problem for the future
of the present
which is
in magnitude . *
JCS 1969/335 .
~Ntl~~Sl't\
t(
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
DODDIRECiIVE 5200.lO
DOESNOT APPLY
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLIN&nc10Hftfi
-. .
I U 'I
IJLIIRL I
3, There is nothing
establishing
their
Soviet base,
or bases,
retaliation
also generate
n11nuL1n
. nurunn
.,
tllllll!
!} l)f
'->
.!'
to prevent
the Soviets
ovm base in Cuba.
from eventually
US acceptance
1n Cuba might avoid the risk
to US military
a greater
from the improved Soviet
action
eventual
general
but such acceptance

risk
of a
of Soviet
would
war posture.
Enclosure
U~tllSS\f
\ti
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NO.fORN
'l ~,.,...
-~..\ IUl1
1,'")~tlilA ll nANULll1li
t:r Ut UHN
~:-
.}
THE :JOINT, CHIEFS OF STAFF

. WASHINOTON
i , .
15, D.e.
.. ..
13 June 1962
r:
.~l'j .. .j
,, , .,.,. I
....
..,,,..
' """1
MEMORANDUM
FOR,THESECRETARY
OF DEPENSE
., .
SubJact:
~ ~,.j
~~
'
l. Reference is made to Memorandumfor the Special Group

(Augmentei1) from Br~dier
General Lansdale, subJect:
"Status
of Re(!l/ested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This
memorandumrequested the OP.inion of all psrt1c1()!!t1ng agencies
having memliership 1n t ile Special Group ooncer ~
the appropriate
course of action for the United States to take 1n the event the
Soviets establish a military base in Cu~a
' ,;
~~~~:~
.-
.
.
2. The Joint Chiefs or Staff recommend approval or the

attached memorandum as the position or the Department or
Defense .
For the .Joint Chie.fs of Staff:
:I
.....:..-:1
rf7,i.
SYST
~MATI
C!t!.l~J~ '
BYJ(;S ON . _
1.; _
COTI
.
.P-.!!oSS
..lfiCAT/01
-.. ;;~ 1..::-N
- UEO
~)~
.,..,....
--
'
EXCI.UDED
FROMGOS
...
"
EXCLUDED
FROYAUTOlt\TIC
RECRADIHG;
DODDIR 5200,10
DOESNOTAPPLY
.,
NO(ORN,
... ..,
. ...
. . . ...
-... ---- --~-........

;~,
...
11 1 1 1111'
I U G
1 V
t.11
IS i I
UNCl~~S\f
\tu
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED)
Subject:
l.
..
Soviet Base 1n CUba (S}
rnresponse
to a memorandumfor the Special
(Augmented) from the Director
of Operations,.
_ of
Mongoose, subject:
"Status
- .....
Group .
<Jperation
Requested Studies,
Operation
Mongoose", dated,,_8 Jun e 1962, the Department of Defense has
considered
th e problem of an appropriate
course of action
to take in event that the Soviets
should talce steps to establish
a military
base in Cuba.
2 . In the event of such a contingency,
the choice of
US counteraction
is between long .term acceptance
communist state
1n the Caribbean with an increasing
threat to the Urilted States

intervention.
Our present
interests
military
from the South or US military

view is that the latter
of ,ac t1on would be the onl-y so 1ution

security
of a
course
compatible with th e
of the United States.
'
EXCLUOfOFRO,'A
GDS
.
.......
:. .'i..
NOFORN
.. .,,.
' .
v.
,1
Of&W;:aaa
..
2 May 1962
COPYNo.L._oF~COPIES
SPEGIALDISTRIBUTION
REPORTBYTHE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
AND
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
ONTHE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP
to the

on
MARITI
ME SUPPORT.OPERATION
MONGOOSE
(TS)
CSGWG
CONTROL
# _t;_-./c2.
__ .
EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODD1R 5200.10
DOESNO'l'APPLY
1
EXCLUDEDFRO/ii GOS
I
J
MARITIME
SUPPORT,OPERATION
~!ONGOOSE
(TS)
THE PROBLEM
l , To respond to a request
a report on ways of putting
speed boats out of action.
by the Secretary
of Defense for
the Soviet furnished
Cuban high
FACTSBEARINGONTHE PROBLEM
2, On 14 March 1962, the Secretary
a report on ways of putting
speed boats out of action.
of Defense requested*
Cuban high
3, On 16 Narch 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations was

requested
to submit a report
on ways of putting
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
Cuban PT boats out of action.
4, On 3 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary
informed the
of Defense that the Navy was studying means to put
the Cuban PT boats out of .action.and
that report
would be submitted when the study was completed,***

5, On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations
the requested report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,****
attached (Appendix to Enclosure),
submitted
Copy
CONCLUSION
6, The Memorandum,Enclosure,
together
for the Secretary
with its Appendix, is an appropriate
request
from the Secretary
putting
action,
of Defense,
response to the
of Defense for possible
ways of
Cuban high speed boats out of
RECOMMENDATIONS
7, It is recommended thats
a, The Enclos ure, together
reflects
the above conclusion,
to the Secretary
with its
Appendix, which
be approved and forwarded
of Defense .
*Memorandumon file in General Craig's

**CM 610- 62 dtd 16 Mar 1962
***JCS 1969/325
****On file in General Craig's office.
office.
.... .,.
r
:
.,'
9 ll'A1f11t1
1Ji
H rX.frfrW..: iP6)1ttA4:
N:]J7171N9fflft
,t,,.
UNCl~SSlf
If0
b . This paper NOTbe forwarded to commanders of l.lllified
or specified commands,
c, This paper NOTbe fo~warded to US officers
to NATOactivities.
assigned
d . This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation,
United Nations Mi-litary Staff Committee.
. .
,.
3
,,
..
7
Itrii liirl 2f'S1"EffAt
9A1t8ff'N
~mr
,.m~
~NCl~!~lf
IfD
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Subject:
l,
Maritime Support,
Operation Mongoose (TS)
In response to your question*
of whether there is some
way of putting
Cuban high speed boats
out of action,
the enclosed memorandumfrom the Chief of Naval
Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

is forwarded for your information,
2. The enclosed memorandumsets forth
clandestine
of action
ways and means of putting

but states
some possible
the Cuban P'1' boats out
in substance that none can be covertly
executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until

information
is obtained on the degree of security
afforded the boats and a pattern

established,
of operations
3, The Navy will continue to watch closely

dispose of them when an opportunity
more
protection
has been
the activities
of the Cuban PTs and will recommend appropriate
*Memorandumon file
covert/
means to
is presented,
in Brig General Craig's
offi ce.
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY
zwtUf
Enclosure
E,oR,T SPFClaAl
NMDtlftt NOP
OR'ff
1
IIANfJtlM
s
DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
OFFICEOF THE CHlEF OF NAVALOPERATIONS
25, D,C.
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
OP605F/br
Ser 000374P60
April 1962
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF
Subject:
Maritime Suppor.t, Operation MONGOOSE

(TS)
References:
a. CM610- 62 of 16 Mar 1962

b . CNOmemofor the JCS Ser 000314P60
of 20 Mar 1962
1. Reference a requested
provide
specified
the Chief of Naval Operations
information
on PT type craft,
support needs, and ways of putting

data on PT craft
and possess
a credible
maritime support.
(up to 45 knots),
highly maneuver-
armament consisting
of 4- 25 mm
(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes)

12-16 depth charges.
operations
In overt conventional
and from
naval war
these boats would be put out of action
quickly,
although an anti-PT defense would have to be established

protect
our troop/cargo
eliminated.
be aircraft
carrying
rocket/gunfire
3. There have been no reports

PT1 s.
They have been delivered
offloaded
ships until
The primary means of destroying

delivered
and sailed under their
boats are presently

in early April,
located
were still
PT craft
and surface
would
ship gunfire.
of the Cuban
by Soviet ships to Havana,

own power to Mariel.
Four PT's,
in Havana at last
Eight
delivered
report,
expected to move to Mariel in the near future.

to put these boats out of action
to
the PT's were
on the operations
at Mariel.
but are
The only way
while they are in port is by
means of agents or swimmer (UDTtype) sabotage .
Cuban
Reference b provided certain
and specified
2. The Cuban PT' s a r e fast

able,
maritime
high speed boats out of action.
to
Operations
Appendix to Enclosure
TOPOEORET
OP[IMAL
ll~NILINO
ur ~t6HE
'I
NOFORN
within harbors to put these PT' s out cf action ' 'Sre risky
l
in that there is a probability
that agents/stiinuners
captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity.

the PT's commence to operate,
be studied
their
so as to establish
side 01' their
harbors.
After
or operations
A wider spectrum of actions

a:f'ter their
with
pat .tern of
is established.
4 . Possible
CUban PT craft
covert/clandestine
ways and means o:f' putting
out o:f' action include the :f'ollo~ng:
\C/
'
U
Ntl~~~lf
\iD
Append1~ to Enclosure
,
r
will
.methods to dispose of them out-
less risk should become practical

operations
pattern
would be
C'DCOJ11
111 llftl
111ft
'
UftPftftH
..
1 UI
'1Lu.1tt I :!
artGIAL. nJtNOLl[
.\j NOfORN
-
- ..
r,
\c/
..
---
UMtl~~S1f
\tO '
Appenp1x to Enclosure
TOPSEGRE.I
SPECIAL
HANOl'ING
;t:~:
1ofnD11
- -III-IIUI-Ff--ili)t:1[
uu11n,
[:Tl--
~r [
l, IHL
IIAn11L11\.l
RUt UKN
ijtltl~s~lf
\~ij
5, Although the Navy has ways and means available

or neutralize
the . CUban PT boats,
to
none can be covertly
executed :!,n Cuba w:!,thout undue risk of exposure until

. 1irormation
protection,
..
'
is obtained on the aegree of the~r security

Under conditions
of overt warfare,
quickly dispose of the Cuban PT I s.

to watch closely
the activities
recommend appropriate
opportunity
'
more
the Navy can
The Navy will Continue
of the Cuban PT's . and will
means to dispose of them when an
is presented.
/s/ George
,<.Anderson
GEORGE'W, ANDERSON
~Ntl~~lf
l(ijppe~dix
to Enclosure
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
- "NOFORN
-.'
..
_,. .'
. ....
. ..
.,.
. .
,
,-
At
.- ..;i
19.62 the
p11ge 15,
J
. ..
ll .
In aer t:1m!, 1:n alll)11ar~apb 2 a on p11ge 5 ~ ot the
words "key, strategic
~i
-~ ...
...
,-. .....
.",
areas
s e1ze
11
, , M;. ~~
c.
"
... ~
(
:,,
the t i rat sentence ot
"pr i or t o D-<I~ " at the end ot that sentence.
' ..
.....
~.'""''1.'''
1:n
to:, t lie word "are" aa wel'l! as the aild1t i on ot t he words
...
.:..-
Su1lat1tution,
Addit i onal ly,,
..
".JM~/I!
-.,..
.......
....:~:.
""'.
""
..
'.
" ....
.
:.
.'
~~...
40'
Furt her, in t lie second sentence ot
. .....
V, .j
'
the wor.d "sucli 11 1a autist:1tute i1 for the word "essent l al 1!
,..___
., SY
STEMA
TICA\.!,~-
,'1#
BYJCSGN.1.'i. . - ~!. - --Cl:ASSiF

,ICATiON
Oim~UED
-
___.::
-~- -- -
-..:..
SPfCIAL
H~ND
HING
REQUI
RID;
NO:ii REl.r~
SAB
t E iJiOf ORfilGN NA\lil9flr,;ll.S
- l -
U~OOASSl~l;-?
10:
~~
oooh
..._. ...........
.__._,._.,_ ...,
~
. SREGl!
INn
.... '
REQDiRED
..
No,uRELAs/~~ 101tW E1GNNAf 10NA

ts
.J
(Dec on JCS i99 9:Z392 - Contd)
...
' ;,
'
. > ). 1
....
......::
.!!. Changing SUl>P.aragraph4 6 on page 7 by,,

-~ .J-'
(2) Insertion
,.
or, tlie
or a new second oentence to
"There ~ be a reqUirfelllent for

.
ampll1biow, iif.t fo r rapid redeplo;y1!!entand counterr ead as follows,-
.;,.....#l
~l
. .'
"'""'--
l'
sentence,
word 11only"
~~
.~7,,;
tlie tirst
'
se ntence, of the words "30 to 45" for tile wor~
"ap11rox.imateg, 20" .
i,.
J
.'
In sertion,
at tlie ~ g1nn1ng or th e \r1rst
sentence
of. Blll>P,aragraP.h4 o on P!!Se 7 of the words "It is estimated

that t he".
S. Deletion,
after
.......,,
!f. Deleti on, in the second s entence or slll>par!!,graph5/ o
.,~<,"
,
.
..._..-...
in s~bparagraph 4 don P!!Se 7, of all

the worda "wowd tie f'ull,y committed".
on P!'&e 8, or al 'l! atter

.
'!. Deletion,
wj1i-j
iii the iaat
on page 8, or all alter

capabilities".
. .
tile worits "tars<!~
1n Florida"
sentence gt sllbparBgl'.aph 5, ~
the words "constantly
'
incr easing
.
- 2 -
sff
fBIAnW!lu
1NG
REQUIRED
'
......,,, ..
'
-.
NOTR1:LEASAB
L "J;Of0 REIG
N NA'l'IONA
l::S
"?:','".
. ...
~
.,,,
"
,..
".,
......... ,.~ ,. ... .
........
---~~~
-<--
.... ~
..
-;...
";~
)[ ff ,..-
. . SPrEOIAL
HAtS
ilb
lNQ
REQO{RED
.
NO'JiREtEASAB
liE i!iO FrOREIGN
Ni\T!10NA
U:
S'
8 AtlgUl!t 1992
{Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)
~
~ ,..
, ....
..
..
...
.J!. Clian~ng tb end or tbe r1rat sentence or

oono1at ot awistant1al
Army tollow-on forces w1tb
sucb otber sea and air siwport as
may: be
required ."
..
,~
- ,..,
~~a
' '
}~
.....
Colonel , USAF.
Secretary
.'. 1
. "'
.:.. .. i
.
.:~
.,
,I
Copy to:
. ./
General Harris
ijKCl~~\f
\EO
- 3
~RECiJ\L
HANDLING
REfflimE
NO'fRELEASABLE
liO FOREIGN
NAT
1IOII
fxt''n
it
J: . ~j
,~!~
1-1<
v r vnu._:x
~
C.f 1NOtiNQ
' =-
~,- .
.
. ~~/lls,'
/:
I
ntE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAPF
~ "4'-,;?ti;
.
WMHINOTON
~:
-~
......
:~1
..
.. '
(j __
,
U, D.l;.
IIM~lA~~1f
f
.::;:/1_~/./Vfa.;J..,
. UR\I-~~ ltO
t
SYST
r1,1n~~l
lYRE'ffil ,
DYiGS't!/
/;~'.l_CA[,.filj{o;;
r;;;~;
QP" -.-~
MEMORANDU!1
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
....
----
- ~
Subject~ -., JCS 1969/392 The Consequences ot VS Military
Intervention
in CUba (TS-)
! n , -
.l. I ha-ve reViewed .the aubJect paper and reeon:mend the

following changes be made 1n order to amplify selected
)laragraphs therein as requested by Mr." Gilpatric
on : $....
o August 1962,
.I
..
--~:
...
'.
'
:..~~
...~:;,
......
.., ...
.
'1
'
. .. ..
~"1
. . ,;
. l
,~,N
a, Page 7, paragraph
as follows:
.
.
sentenoe
:~..-,...~_.
""To replace
the airborne
troop drop cap ability
by 14Air Reservesquadro
nii'; fl: ' idll- be .
represented
noccsascy . to degrade tbeatcr :1irlift
capal>ilitics
to the following extent for approxiroately
15 days.:
. ..
.
.
.
.
11
.(-1) Loss or .93% o~ PACAP.tot,al airlift
an.:.
15~ or VSAFEairlift;
or
'
.,:
.. 1
.~.--::~
t!1.
'
"-,l1
'I.I .
'
;, (2) Loss or 100% ot VSAFEairlift

PACAFairlift;
or
. ...
,j
"(3) Loss or
of USAFEairli!t.
1t
..''1i"
4 .d add new laot
,,
:..:
..'
.~-:
.i
i
ffl
.......
,.
...
PACAFairlift
.
50%
and
TOPSECRET-NQFORN
EXC!UOf
O fROAI CDS
"'"""
... ...
.....
"
and so%ot
b,. Page 15, para~apl1 4 - change to read as follows:

.. .
.", - "4. Effect on Wo1ld-llide Ability t o React - The
strength
or the .cuban opposition
and the resultant
lehgth of the operation
will determine the total effe~t
to react elsewhere.
When the
..
UP.on th~ VS capability
assault
forces have been committed to the CUban operation,
1;he stratc ic Arm l'orce:; In CONOs
would be sfiort the
oiippor n 1orcea sucn as en 1neer me ca
ary
o ice, s1 na an
e 1co er un1 s 01~ e re.ma n ng
11ve
v1s1ons.. Pres
ng ac evemen ot . .
. o
~cogo1zed, however, that certain corabat ana sUPport .
. , elements Will have to be retained in CUba for counter-
.. guerrilla
and mili ta ry government operat1on 'st, aREl .
tRat-eA3iAeeP7mea!eal7JitllitapY-peliee
,-ai5RilaAEl
. eiv!l-affaiPBYAlta-wlll~e-pe~wiP&Elte-e~ppept-tReee
' 8AEI-B\il1t81y,8BV8Pllale~t-epepati8R8
These support
units ...
.1
,i
~~:,~
f
:'t'
., 1
.l
'
,
-~,,
79%or
.-,~
f~l(ll!->~~ING
---
,-:,r;,~, ,o,~,~
c..
.. . . EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC
.. ;
: ... . ' ..
REORI\DIIIG; :JOD DIR 5200, 10

DOESNOT IIPPLY.
URttl~\f\IO
:"-.'"'
-::.
.., :
."
\ - ::--
,.
().- ,;~
.' ' .
J . . _.,.:. "
.-.....t
~~~ll~~lfl~O
a~d net1 sentence
c. 'page 15, paragraph _4, ~ast 11ne
. , j
"''
as to lrr
lows:
. "'1
"cor.11n1.tte<1
to a CUban OP.era'tion. To re15:
lace the
airbo,m~ tro9P. drop capability represented by 14
Air ~ser~e s~uadrons, it will be necessarY, ~o degrade
theater airlift
capab1~ities to the follow i ng extent
tor appr oximately 15 aliys:
.
l~
"a.. Loss ot 93~ or PACAPtotal

of USAFEa1rlit; or
airlil't
'lb. Loso or 100%of USAFEairlif
ai 'rl ift;
ct antl 50% of PACAF
or
"c. Loss or 70% or PACAFil.i.rlift

USAFEairlift."
The readiness
posture
or SAC,
and
and 50% or
,:;;1
..
~!S't
i
.1
--i
'
'
HERBERTD. RILEY
:Vioe Admtral,
Director
USN
.,
-~!
-.
.......
....
;q,
UN~l~~gf
\lO
1::
~ ~-~""'""'
..
"
..
~:.:::,. .
Oii 7,
t' 1:.'I
.
\>, ' j
., J
', .. :l
A)lglll!t 1962 the Joint Chiet'a ot Stiitt' t entatively
jJ'.
JCS Representative,
approved the reco11111endationaot t he DOD
Operation MongQoaa
, aa aet forth in par!!g,;'.aphi or the aubJect
paper
words
b.
11
the
the neoeaa1ty tor 11

.
.
The a<ldit1on, to the end or the t1rst
.
.
.,
to obviate
sentence
ot aw,~ &rl!Sr.aPh3 o, of the words, , however, CINCLANT

~
Headquarters USAFhave been requested
alternative
Purther,
to pr.epare
plans not 1nvolv1ng any mobilization."

1n the second sentence of aubpar~aph
3 c,
the word "other" 1& eu.bat!tuted for the word "add1t.1onal".
oea have been committed to the Cuban operation
the
strat egic Aral forces 1n the CONUS

woUld be short the
.
J!.. 'l'ne 1nsert1on, 1n aubpar~aph
# d, or the
word "CONUS"lietore the wordli "MATSa1r11rt"
and the
Copy
r- ~l ;,- ot
:Z copies each
ot
.;1; pagos se l":le~,.JCII- -
'
-- .....
..
._.,...
.......
'
___
,. .
.,
..
'
.;
.,
t . t
..............
,-1
,~,...
......
"'""'"""";;
..... ! ..........
.,.
.
'
'
,~-'~"'',""t
eentencea.
;r .. :-~
- , ,
- I
V-,...,,,,.U
. ..~
-(
memoranaumcontained 1n the Appenifi.xto Enclosure A (in thia

.....
..... ,..........
_,,,,--~.,
,,,.q.-,'~,
,tiJ.."rltf:1
..
...
... ,
,...,._.._,..
'
the Marl.iie Corpa,) .

s~oUld disP.atoh an apP.rOP.r1atemeasi,.ge implementing the action
(NOTE SubJeot message was
~-..........
..,... ~:..i
.-~.:..: -,(
to
pleas e
'<' I
,:
.
.
Cop,: to1
'
General Harris ~
/UJ
R~f]lRff
....
UNC
!A~~lf
IfD
...,.........................
_...
11'HE JOIN1' CHIEFS OF STAFF
U P"_,:Z?it ...lf)
_(#
.3-..0.
/ , o II
WASMINGTON
u, o.e.
..u,
....... .
SYS
J<!/,~T!CAU.
Y)ll.'j!~ r,.,. <J\l
31 !CSOH___0-l~fi(.W,~ :.O
CL\SSiflC~
TICII
COilTUJUE.D
.
.....
.. , T, .-:
--
....
MBMORA.NDlJM,
F._9RTHE SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
;\Sul)Ject:
~J '
united States
Cuba (S~
Contingenc Y, Plan No. 2,
'
l. As requested in memorandumfor re presentatives

of.
State, Defense, CIA and VSIA from Chief or Qperations,
Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts 1n
Cuba, Contingency; Planning", dated 14 June a962, the
attached plan 1a forwarded for your approval, prior to
delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.
'
methods of
2. It will b1! noted that the alternative
mi11ta i<:\r,
intervention dealt with in this plan ta'ke three '-'- --
priheipal forms. 1hese are, in descending order or
magnitude:
""i 1
- .! ~
:~. .
.;
a. A delibe J:'!t;e, orderly, large-scaie operation

capable of confronting the castro regf'me w:fth the
prospect of over-poweril)S force.
'
.....~
. .,,.,
b. An accelerated initia l reaction by lesser .

airborne and amp~ibious forces building up as
feasible to the scale of the primary, plan. Tti1s
method entai l s greater risl<, longer t'1.meto establish
tullY, ef.fective contro ,J, :ind the probab1'11py or :greater
casualties on both sides.
c. An immediate and continuing al.r attack on castro

milita~
forces and rac 1'1.it1es to support and assist
the revol ti!!S rorces and to pave the way for subsequent
operations.
'
ii
~~
. 3. The above described alternative

methods coni'orm
essentially, to current CDICUANTplans for contingency
operations in -Cuba.
,,
,
.' 1.
'
.I
'1>~
EXClUOEI>
FROMGOS.
EXCLUDED
?ao~ AUTO~ATI
C
nEORADl!IG;OOD om 6200. 10
l>O&S110_1'
APtLY
....,.
tlBFOAN
--- -----::
-_.
.
.
.
---~
Ntt~SS\f~
t.
r:-----:---- - - .
-
.
...;-~+:..-. :~
'
_:j ~"
~... ~ .. '
.
.......... '',
. .. ..
I Uli'
)U
'
UNttn
~,;,
..
I
f:
. 4. 'l'h1S plan was coordinated with the Departrnen_t of

State ijur.il)g preparation 1n order to be consis te nt wi th
and complementary to the alternate plan prel),<lred by State
w~1ch addresbes the contingency of an internal CUban
revolt but 1s limited to us actions less than m1'l1ta:ry
1ntervent1on.
5. Operat1ons outl1rted with i n this pl an for t he

~P.lllii~t~~n,s~;~~yc;~;!;a~r!~~~~;,n;:c:s
concerned.
"""
. ;'I,~
"'
~
.,~
,
:~;~ c; nd
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

'
..
Jo:l.l'it
.;J!
-'
~I
'
Encl osure:
Pl'an
'
I .
;
ONClASSltl
t
2
fOPSECR
,El SPECl1N
L ffllNDL
ING NO
RORN
.
~;;'{..;.:k4',4.,.;
...,~'' ' ..,..;.,,..;:
,.;:;\.,..;...,:....,..,-.
-...- ~., " .......
-.....~,--<c-.. ,. .
I..~ -
...' .
..
.... .
, ,.......,
....-1..,,
.
.........' ..
JCS 1999/,389
S'ISTEMA
TCAmR
/
~I VE
D
BYJCS011- - ___
:<:.
~~
!1\tlSSlfl
C,U,
-~
H. UED
--.-/ '
At t l!!lir meeting on 27, JUl.Y, 1962 the Joint Chiefs of.

Stat.f approv ~ the recol11!11endationsof the DOD/JCSRepresent -
- '"..
'" .
. .!
''':'.' ,<!v'
ative to t he Caribijean Surv1!3'Group as set forth in para~aph

of t lie
.
...,a-.
Til e deleti
on, !.'rom the 6eg1nn1ng 01' the
<
' ,
'
'
l ast sen t ence 01' suijparagraph 3 b (3) (a:) of t he
'
.,.1
J.::.>t..e':.,X.':l
. ....,....,.,..,....
,.1
.....
~.
~11
!
.,.W ..:.&.,C,W,,1
....... '
'
Appendix t o Enclosure A, or the words ~wlien rel.1.eved

b;y;~
units".
b.
S\l])st1'tu t 1on, in subP.aragrap hs li\ b and !I d
of\ the :A
ppendix to Enclosure A, of tli e word "C,INCLAN'l'"
ror tlie words "the designated
...
.2. CSAPM229-62 itself

.
of paragraph l b.
~-
27,. Jilli
unified
oommander"
amended by the wi t hdrawal
Marine Corps Flimsy, this sullject,
dated
1962 i M el t amended !by re \fision of the propo1red
paragr l!Pli 2 o,conta1ned in paragraph 2,so as to read \ "c. l\:!, inmedi ate and continuing a1r at e'aok on
..
....,..,,~
and rac 111t t es to support and

Castro m~l 1tar:,,; fQ.I;!>
aee i st the
revolting f orces and to pave the way for
subsequent opera tions."
.....' .'
Copy, to,
'
,...
. .. . .
.......,..
,
Decision on:
JCS Q969:/'3$9
, (NORTl!liOODS)(S)
'
At their
~"
"::
.',,,.,
).~~
.-....
...,
........
--~
,< ;AV - ,,C.
of Staff
meeting on 27, July 1962 the Joint Chiefs
approved the recol!llllendations of BOENHarris as
set forth in paragraph 9 of the subJect paper as amended

by:
.!!. A change to subparag;,aph' 3 b (3) (a) of

.
tfie Appendix to Enclosure A,
Changes to subparagraphs
.
~
....,...
_.:
4 band 4 d of the
'
Appendix to .Enclosure A.
,...._
.
s-.u ..,
-~),:./,,',.:.,
. "';-:~.'f"J.
.2. CSAFM229-62 itself

or paragraph lb.
amended by the withdrawal
!!_. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this
subJect,
dated
27, JulY, 1962 itself
amended in paraSJ1!1P~2 by changes

to the ppoposed paragraph 2 c.
SYSUIM
TC
II
BYJCSON.,
cv~11:c
.~
..' ~. .,,..
..:
--
..
'$ - .:.
-~"ii f .
~<}}INGE
~~~~
'.
~~~~,
Colonel, USAF
secretary
Copy to:
General Harris
'' ,..
"
'-''"'\\1
..;';~"N;.:,
--.:~.....
:"tJ;.~.._
....
-~""
EXClUl>ED
FROMGOS
., f.
-..
''
~'"'"\
-~
...
8 May 1962
..
""
II~
.
"
...
~. . .
..
. .
,....
JCS 1969/344
~
l..fh',, ,,( ' !
1
....
-:t ....w.-,,;
"
-~
1) (S)
(NORTIIIIOOD8
On 8 Mg 19Q2 the Jolnt Ch1ers ot Starr aPl.roved
~1
.......:
'
ING
Colonel,
Al!
Deputy Secretary
'
... .
'-'
:,.-.~.
Copy, to:
... .
General Cralg
~Ntll~lf
l~D
EXQUOEOfROM GOS
.... "
~~
.....
-.....
~...,
.--~ ...
.....
.
,.
' '4':'\t,
., ..
'"
'''""Yl'~
:o:,.-,-~....
- "
ot
'
'
~ oe>pi o3 edch
paa:ea aerh s
'
'
-.
:,-:.
..H;"I',:.:
:~.;_.~
. '-~-=.._.,_..:.
,,,.
C::.. ~-:.:;r~ ~
.,._ ...............
-: ~-~-.."/
.........--.,,
~--..-___ .,_~
',.,.
... ,. ....
'
..
~ <'9<
.. _ ..........
--~~{>............
"'"''"",.
'
t
...............
.
- . !
'---'t.:
........
,.
.
>.... ..~*
. .. '
. ;,c".c r-
k,,
Deo1>e'l:01
won r.
.
.'
..
JCS 1969/344
(NOR'l'BIIOODS)
(S)
..
on 8 May 1962 the Jo1nt Ch1ers or Starr approved

BOEN
Craig's recollllllendat1ons as set forth in paragraph 11
... .. , :"':~.1;,r, ..~"':!t.
. ,'
.
.
'
. ' ~ .o:I) t lie subJeot paper. .
. ' ,
7',.;,. ~. ___ ,.,,
..
.,.' ,.,..
'
;:'.;~~~;
...
,.:,,,:..l,''I.,''':
c-,....,.,.,.r
~~
-~-'
!
:::"'""':
oDl-.vGE~t..dl,,
Colonel, !BAI"
Deputy Secretary
.''.'.. ..,
.., ~~~
z r i
't, ., ,;,..... .i
llNClASS/FIEO
..
...,.
. ..
.'
'l
"PEGl~L
NANDl~
~G N9FORN...
-
7/:i Yj/
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF"
I
l
i
t
1962
May
MEMORANDUM
FOR THESECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
.
DODTask No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE
Subject:
l, Pursuant
.-t--l I C/tf
JCS!1-365-62
WASHlNGTON :U, D. C.
to the requirements
I'
.. .
set forth
No. 38 the Department of Defense

was
.
. requested
'
the prese~t
..,.arrangements
for granting
in DODTask
to review
asylum to Cuban
refugees
at Gu!lntanamo Naval Base, with the view of
granting
asylum to all
Cubans so desiring
it,
at the
Naval Base..
2, The Joint
Chiefs of Staff
recommendations outlined
recommend that
in the attached
the
memorandumbe
approved,
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
G, H, DECKER
Acting Chairlll<!n
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
i
I
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROUAUTO~ATIC
REGRAD.mc: DOD !>IR 5200.10
DOC:S!IOT ,\..OPLY
JgpSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDtlNG
N8F6RN
.-~.J, , t. . ... .:.~..
~;,j
...
.
~
<
,.
. ..'. ....
\
rl
,l
. ,. , . . : ~. ;:.;-_~i~:.
. . . ,, .... ,. .
.. l '''
..... . ,~.
. ..
'/
~':=){'.. . \ ...
w:-: --~..
, , ,:t,,:.. ' .
!11,..
._
...
!
. . . :., -r ..
. . . .. . :,.... r"' .. .
. !....-~',.. ... . . .
.. ,:
~,... .. ' .:,...:;: ,
~ ' f ' '
.. .
.. . ....
"
II
,.
' .
.. ..... ..
..
..
..
.,,..
...
..
'
..
. '
',
,.---
....U~CllSS\f
.
.. . \0
....
... .
.UNCl~~ilf
. IfD
---"
,4.
1 SP
'TOPSECRF
.ECIAL
....
.'
.' '
THE JOINT CHIEF"S OF" STAF:F"
WASHINGTON 2.5. D.C.
,
,,.
..
8 May 1962
.
MEMORANDUif'FQR
THE
CHAIRMAN,
JOINT
CHIEFS
OF
STAFF
,,
''!-- ,
Subject:
JCS 1969/347 - Maritime Support,
Operation Mongoose (TS)
J.
1. en14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense inquii.ed

whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished
Cuban PT boats out or action.
2, The attached memorandumfor the SecPetary of Defense
forwards a memorandumfrom the Chief or Naval Operations,
which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting
the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance
that it is not practicable
to carry out the operations at
this time and that appropriate recommendations will ' be
submitted at a later date.
..-3. Some pos,i.i:ble ~/ay-s '0~"'" '
out or action
4
- . ,-
enumerated a ,
,11.
4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo
for the Secretary or Defense, together with its enclosure,
to the Secretary or .Defense .
on 7 May 1962 fer transmittal
. It is recommended that you approve and sign th ~ attached
memorandum
' for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards
the CNOreport.
..
.
....
.
,
..
.
,.,
.
'.,:-'
.
;
..
'
:
.
t
{'. .:.::~.?.~~
-.
. ,.....
r
~
,.~ # ~ ~
tf' ..
"
WILLIAMfl, ciAIG
Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCSRepresentative
Caribbean Survey Group
El(ClUOEDFRO/,\ GOS
EXCLUDED
FRO~ AUTOllATIC
RECrvu>IJ:G;DODDin 5200,10
. DOES NOTI.PPLY
~Ntl~~~lf
IfD
t
-------
-TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
UANDLl~jG
NOF9RN
-
..
"
'
..
,
,f!.
~NClA~~lf
110
..
--..
- -'---
f.9P
WASHINGTON
25, D.C.
8 May 1962
MEMOilA;
,;l)UHFOR 1'HE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DODTask No. 38, Operation MO~GOOSE
Su;:;;ject:
!'
1 . In accorda ,;ce 1,:ith Task No. 29 the P.epartment of

Defense was requested to u:1dertake a review of the :9resent
arrangements for the use c f G,:antanamo Naval Base for
asylum. The re .view inc1ude<.l all legal, political
and
security- ,asp ects in addition to development of recommendations on tn~.,feasibility
and desirability
of grarrting
asylum to all Cubans so desiring at Guantanamo Naval Base
',
'
.
,,
2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document

,,/
responsive to this task on .8 May l9.62. It is recommended
that you ~pprove and sign the attached memorandum
forwarding the results of this review to the Secretary
of Defense.
i
1
il,?r
I -~1(;~
'#
~l'.IAM
H. CRAIG
'
Brig General, USA
. DOD/JCSRepresentative
.'
..'
'
. .f
0___
SYS1EMA
TICALLY
}Af)J
B'IJCSOill____.J:'.-.--,
ClJ\SSIViC/\T
IOtl,
CO;;,U~
.
l
EXCLUDED
FROMGDS
EXCLUDED
FRO!!AUTC!it.TlC
REGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10
DOES lfOT APPLY
UNClAS~lf
If0
IOPiEGRET
SPE61Al
IIANtttNft
NftFORN
. :,......., : ~r, : :. . .;,
' . .
- - "':')I"
::,.:.
..
.. . .,. . .
. ,.
,.
'
'
. .,:,,
.,
,.~'\ ;~ I
J\ ...
. .. . \,,., " ,' 1~.:
. .: , ..
. ,, : 1'1,,
.
.
...
..
.. ..
.1 , ; .:,,;,,.: ... . \'i,:,\:
: .. ..
,
.
.
..
.
\
'
......
...
'1( )
'
'
:' ,,'
.
f
...
... .. "i'. .
:..: ..:. .;..~ ;f' { :. .
.
..
-.- ...
....
:
-r, .
, . ...... 't ....... f'"1"'
' .. ..
';
~~
.. ..
..
.. ~.
.., . ..., ~ : , .. . .1:

. ...: . "'
'.:',:.>;: ::
. ...
....
:."'.: .
J ,:.
( o:
.
.
..
' . ,.
~:
... : ' ,; '.....
' .. .
. '.
.. .
. .
,. . . . .
I
..-
...
. , ;
.. .
":-
!: .
..
\
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
... .
JCSM-367-62
8 May 1962
., .
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
'
Sub~ect:
Maritime Support,
Operat1on .,.M~ngoose (T~)

'
1. In response to your question of whether there 1s some
way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high sp~ed boats
out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of
Naval Operatio ns has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and is forwarded for your information.
2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible
covert/clancl.est1ne
ways and means of putting the 1CUban PT
boats out of action, but states in substance that none can
be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of
exposure until more information is obtained on the degree
of security protection
afforded the boats and a pattern
of operations
has been established.
3, The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities

of the Cuban PT 1 s and will recommend appropriate
means to
dispose of them when an opportunity
1s presented.
!'
:l
For the Joint
Chiefs of Staff:
. I
'
G, H . DECKER
Acting . Chairman
Encl:
Memofrom CNO
EXClUDE'D
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAIJTOIIATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200 .10
DOESNOTAPPLY
N9FOR.N
'
...,. . ,- ' . - : ~- ,.. . -. . . :. ..f
.
ft
. . . .. ..:.
..
...
. . . ; ,: .;'J' , . . .'
- .....::rr. . : .. ....
. - .:
. ., .,.
, '
I-
'
"
,, : ,,
,,:,
'
'\ti'
'
"t.:,,.-;
.: l'''
: ,,'i , ,t,({I~\' .,
,
'
'o
. .. ~ ,.
\ ..
...
'""la .
'f\.:t: ; .., ....
. J:,~:;:f1' .
~
J
o
f '
., \ .. ..
: .-, . .~;, , ,
.. , ' ''
J.~
~ -"'
'
'
'
-:.. , . / '
..
..
. ,.
._ , : ,
'~'
'
'
": { _. r--
. ,.
' 'I,,
'
'
.,. .. :
'o
."
II
.
1,
.....
. ,
..;
: ,
.. ,_
..
(
EBIA
L IIA'I
u"F8HH
TUPaEGHET
11BI
t I'Bl"
h .::;, nu
-,SP
'
UNtllS~\f
\EO
DEPARTMEN'l'
0 HE NA'r.l
OFFICE OF '!;i-iE CHJEFOF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON
25, D, C.
. .~ I '
In reply re .fer to
'
OP605F/br
Set' 000374Pfr>
l
24 Ap3:il: 1962
FOR THE JOINT CHmFS OF STAFF
ME!~ORANDUM
......
Subject:
', ,,Maritime Support,
R~ferences:
MONGOOSE
(TS)
a. C!'1610-62 of 16 Mar 19"62

b. CNOmemo for the JCS Ser 000314P6o
of 20 .Mar :1.962
Ref~~cn~c a requested
l.
Operation
the Chief of Naval Operations
provide
specified
support
needs, and ways of putting
in:f'ormation on PT type craft,

the soviet
to
maritime
furnished
Quban
I
high speed boats out of action.

.data on ~T craft
and specified
Reference
maritime
b provided
certain
support.
2 .,.-Th<J
-,C~can PT s , ar;i fas .~:-,{up to 45 knots ,) , :hlghly
able,
and possess
a credible
~twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo

12-16 depth charges .
operations
although
protect
these
armament consisting
tubes
be aircraft
carrying
delivered
rocket/gunfire
They have been delivered
offloaded
ships until
The primary means of destroying
3. There have been no reports
"
naval war
boats would be put out of action
our troop/cargo
quickly,
and sailed
boats a1e presently
under their
located
in early April , were still
PT craft
of the Cuban
ships to Havana,
own power to Ma!'iel.
Eight
Four ~T' s, delivered
in Havana at last
report,
expecte,I 1:o move to Mariel in the near future.

to put these boats out c.f actit,n
would
ship gunfire.
on the operations
at Mariel.
to
the PT's were
and surface
by Soviet
mn1
and from
an anti - PT defense would have to be established
eliminated.
PT's .
of 4-25
(t:wo torpedoes)
In overt conventional
W!11f:uv~1-
but are
The only way
,~hile they are in port is by

'
means of agents or swimmer (UDTtype)
sabotage.
Operat i ons
EXctUDfi> fROM GC~

I
_ ...... 1 ... .
"'.4""1hJ
1n that
thei:e 16 a probabiJ,1 ty ~hat a,i;eni,s/c>timmoro
captured
with subsequent
exposure and US complicity.
the PT's commence to operate,
their
be studied
methods to dispose
so as to establish
side of their
less risk
operations
.
harbors.
pattern
cov;;.t/clandestine
out of action
after
After
their
Will
of them outWith
.pattern
of
ways and means of putting
include
('nrfl 111
! ;
would be
of operation~
A wider spectrum of actions
should become practical

.....
is established.
-.
. ...,
11. Possible
11 I Ii
the follo~11ng:
nI
111n
..
."
ii Ii F
u H IIAMUtltJO
,: ---ii iiiJ
'ff~~t;-ttrbtl1l'ltt-11~
..~.;\JxSi
l~'t:1Jr~llllt1L't-iitAi~;;:;;:;===::;:;;:::::::::
~
I\ "\
"
.....- I tJIl
OtOHt!
--- .-..-
'
the Cuban PT boats,
protection
is obtained
.
none can be covertly
on the degree of their
Under conditions
of overt warfare,
quiclcly dispose of the Cuban PT I s.

to ..watch closely
the a ctivities
to
executed in Cuba without undue ri~k of expo~ure until

information
---
-~-,.--.~ ...
5 . Although the Navy has ways and means available

or neutralize
...
more
security
the Navy can
The Navy will continue
.of tl:;e CU'bc:nPT' ::; :md wi:!.:!.
recommend appropriat e means to dispo se of them when an

' opportunity
i s pr esen ted.
/s/ George W. J-1'1derson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON
'
I
!
.,.
.
#>o,
..
THPSFP.RFT
IIA"'A I Ill
f' . 1111 r n n 11
tT
9 April
1962
COPYNO.
OF_.,,...~ COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
ONTHE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP
to the
on
CUBA(TS)
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:DODDIR 5200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY
~
l
CUBA(TS)
THE PROBLE~I
1 . To develop the position
with reference
to two questions
to possible
Chiefs
sentences
of Staff
posed by General Taylor at
Group (5412), 5 April
the meeting of the Special

lated
of the Joint
for the invasion
1962, re-
prisoners
as
follows:
a. Do the Joint
States
Chiefs of Staff
believe
that the United
should intervene?
b. Does the United States
have the capability
to
intervene?
2 . Past considerations
of the Joint
been reviewed for opinions

Taylor's
first
both studies
Project
question.
Chiefs of Staff
or decisions
TWo studies
were directly
related
have
to General
are appropriate;
however,
concerned with the current
CUba
(Mongoose).
a. The first
study , * dated 8 February 1962:
A significant
the Joint
conclusion
Chiefs of Staff
of this
believe
study states
that
the overthrow of the
conununist Cuban Regime can be accomplished
without pre-
cipitating
effect
public
general
opinion if,
created
that
there
war and without serious

among other
is an urgent,
things,
on world
the impression
humanitarian
is
requirement
to re1:1tore order in Cuba.

b . The second study,**dated
This study repeated
16 March 1962:
the above decision,
* JCS 1969/.303
**
JCS 1969/313
but further,
'
2
--- ---,~SPE61At:lfjNBtlfC~nrrs
N
8fl RN
:*<.. .
7
--.. ""0 Af n UATtOtlALARCt1vS
RE.. """""'
1 1
UNtl~~~lf
le
0
appended a list
sufficient
of circumstances
provocation
for US military
One of the situations

seriousness,
which could be considered
listed,
intervention
in Cuba.
which depended upon degree of
is stated:
"Eltecution of prisoners
taken in the abortive
attempt
of April 1961."
3 . For additional
facts
bearing
see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
4. For discussion
see Enclosure
C.
CONCLUSIONS
,. The Secretary
meeting of 10 April
of Defense should be advised during the

that execution
ers should be exploited
(with pretexts
ganda campaign if necessary)

intervention.
6. The Secretary
is no question
deliberate
after
by the US as justification
for
of Defense should be advised that
there
of US capability
to intervene,
and that the
is more prudent than the faster
course of piecemea l force
the question
the context
within 18 d~ys
but riskier
commitments.
7. Inasmuch as the Joint

of US military
Chiefs of Staff
intervention
have not addressed
in Cuba except within
of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable
action
or the President
that
and an expanded propa-
course of impl ementing such action
decision
military
of 100 or more Cuban prison-
be recommended to the Secretary
that
of Defense and/
as the only course which provides
assurance
the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important
time frame of the near future.

RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Conclusions
of the Joint
Secretary
5 and 6 above be reflected
Chiefs of Staff
during :the'me~ting' ' with the
of Defense 10 April 1962.
as the positron
=-
u "
, "1' neet,,-1100A1.1,nG1-11\I
ES
RPR00UC 0
--,J;
T
Stflf
8t'A
't=fftffBtt~:e
BeUtJ
Ntf1NtNF!
1
: . ,
~f
ttl~~~lf
If0
b, The memorandumat Enclosure
Secretary
of Staff
of Defense to express
concerning
the context
US military
of Operation
A be forwarded to the
the views of the Joint
intervention
Chiefs
in Cuba outside
Mongoose.
c, This paper NOT be forwarded to commimders of unified

or specified commands,
d. This paper NOTbe forwarded to US officers
to NATOactivities
.
assigned
e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation,
IUr
I+
Staff
Committee,
N:Of.tRN
.,.... ,."
._.._ -
. :-.:;; :.
ENCLOSURE
A
UNCl~~Slf
If0
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FORTHE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Cba (TS)
Subject:
1. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff
believe
must be solved in the near future .

prospect
of early
regime either
political,
Further,
success in overthrowing
as a result
of internal
economic or psychological
they believe
that military
will be required
that the Cuban problem

the present
uprisings
intervention
communist
or external
pressures.
Accordingly
to overthrow the present
they see no
communist regime.
1 l,t,
cannot tolerate
permanent existence
r \. \"
of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere.

present
regime in Cuba provides
operations
sabotage and sl.ilversion against
The stability
America is already
threatened
of the Cuban government.
the probability
This Will greatly
facing
tion of American States.

possible
bases in Cuba similar
While considered
as forces
3. Time favors
internal
security
the
and the Organizaunlikely,
it is
, military
around the bloc
of such bases would increase

l
were developed or shifted
US
to meet
the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.
They are provided With the opportunity

th eir subversive
com-
one or
increase
Bloc to establish
to US installations
Establishment
defense costs
the threat .
of this
that
the United States
for the Sino-Soviet
periphery.
by the overt and covert actions
in Latin America Will become communist
or communist dominated.
problems currently
of some governments in Latin
Continued existence
munist government increases

more other nations
communismwi th a base of
for espionage,
Latin America .
The
efforts
to continue with
in Latin America.
measure s by police
state
Increasing
methods decrease
'
fXCtuofo FRO/,\ Gos
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5'200.10
DOES NO'r APPLY
(Page revised
as directed
5'
Enclosure A
by the JCS, 10 April 1962)
'',
--
--..-- -
'!
'
- - - ~ 0 AT TU tlATIONM.ARCt0.VS
nEPR............-
'
the possibility
of internal
uprisings
steady improvement in military

resistance
defenses
The
strengthens
the
which must be overcome in the event of US military
intervention
control
within Cuba.
and could lengthen
the time required
of the govern ment and the island.
to secure
The continuing
indoctrination
of the Cuban youth creates
for a communist underground

government.
steadily
This creates
increasing
4. The Joint
af ter the elimination
a problem for the future
Chiefs of Staff
military
general war.
They also believe

rapidly
for solicitation
rapid
action
essential
believe
intervention
of UN action .
milit ary control
that
the United States
in Cuba without risk
that
the intervention
of
can be
Forces available
of Cuba.
would assure
Continued police
would be required.
military
and the nations
and subversive
recommend that a national
poli cy of early
Cuba be adopted by the United States.
that such intervention

preferably
before
presently
be undertaken
the release
on active
as directed
military
Chiefs -0f Staff

intervention
They also recommend
as soon as possible
of National
and
Guard and Reserve
duty.
(Page revised
threat
of the Western Hemisphere
posed by the communist regime 1n Cuba, the Joint
forces
which is
enough to minimize communist opportunities
5, In view of the increasing
\1 in
of the present
in magnitude.
can undertake
accomplished
a growing nucles
by the Joint
Enclosure A
C~iefs of Starr,
10 Apr 6,
" --
--
t1
rill
--EOA.TTl-cEtV.llONAt . ARCt-0VES
R(PR\JU"'"'
UNClASSIF
ItV
ENCLOSURE
B
FACTSBEARINGON THEPROBLEM
1. With regard to the question
intervene
concerning US capability
in Cuba, implementation
assure forceful
to
of CINCLANT
OPLAN314-61 will
and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government
within 10 days after
forces
are committed.
As recently
as 3
April 1962 CINCLANT(in response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff

query concerning
the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN)has
advised that contingencies

against
Cuba have been recognized
hazards.
forces
CINCLANT
states,
"
and considered
10 days.
CINCLANT
quali-
judgment to depend on the following:
"a. Intelligence
current
to this commandconcerning the
available
strength,
Cuban military
capabilities,
forces
morale, and locations
is essentially
11
b. The amphibious assault
and PACOM
is,
than present
as an absolute
levels
in time to arrive
10. II
as reserve
forces
providing
as they and their
as feasible.
in
and put in motion
area on or before D plus
completion of the total
task in Cuba is OPLAN314-61, the situation

be considered,
at no less
army forces now listed
means of assuring
by the US in less
in LANTCOM
minimum, maintained
in the objective
2. While the fastest
now available
and improved and increased
the plan are reclassified
of
correct.
lift
"c. Certain of the "on call"
rapidly
acceptable
it is my judgment that the
of Cuba within the estimated
this
reaction
the campaign
in CINCLANT
OPLAN314-61 are adequate to gain essential
control
fies
which could complicate
than 18 days.
may require
A calculated
initial
risk could
piecemeal commitment of US forces as

tra nsportation
become available.
This
is CINCLANT
OPLAN316-61, and although not approveq by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
tative
reaction
was returned
to CINCLANT
for rewrite.
Represen-
times, proposed in OPLAN316-61 from a condition

Enclosure B
7
llNClASSJf1l!
J
of no warning were:
2 ABNDivisions
5 days
4 Marine BLTs
7-8 days
Artillery
and Armor -
Follow-on Forces
10-12 days
15-18 days
Enclosure B
t(
~,.:
ENCLOSURE
C
II
,.
DISCUSSION
11
l,
In addition
of Staff,
to related
additional
of the Joint Chiefs
considerations
factors
which support US intervention
Cuba, 1f 100 or more prisoners

a, GUidelines established
are executed,
are:
for Phase II of Operation Mon-
goose, already awroved by the Special Group, indicate

tary int ervention must eventually
of the Communist Cuban regime,
be resorted
b, The passage of time favors Castro rather

c, Justification
in
for US intervention
that ..mili-
to for overthrow
than the US,
will probably be more
convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related

a real and valid provocation
manufactured pretexts
which entail
The US could, however, bolster

vention,
military
if reqUired,
action.
affect
the faith
apparent disinterest,
invasion attempt.
the final
case for US
would
of refugee Cubans
attempts
to resist
the
that the US has ignored,

chapter of last
in Cuba could trigger
year's
Bloc diversionary
of the world (most probably in known
in other parts
trouble
spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore

Berlin
'
in
tactics
Islands,
for inter-
numbers of prisoners
and resolution
Communist regime, if they ,.feel
on
some risk of compromise,
the justification
and the Cuban underground in future
2, US intervention
than based entirely
to provide a stronger
d, Execution of significant
adversely
rather
to
or possibly
the Mid-East) and would likely
engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UNforum

for pressure
important
against
the US. However, the essential
element of the US plan against

1
CINCLANT
s OPLANstates,
I'
control,
conditions
and most
Cuba is speed,
"Some 5 days subsequent
to gaining
should permit withdrawal of assault
forces,
"
II
9
Enclosure C
Tgg 1':E
9R~fM
S-P
f'fl~AtvIJMffl.~irNf.~;llfl"61li>t1-1
'
...,_
...._ i;s
l,.&.1.Ji.
- ----11
REPRQOUC.EO Af TI IE rV.110UAl AR~ flVES
1
2~iR,N i,
P~&fA
t IIANt~l
~~-
'
UNCi~~Slf
IfD
leaving
small military
guerrilla
units
mop-up operations."
shouJd be expected that

unavailable
although
to conduct civil
for other
Estimating
US forces
contingencies
the Marine Division
be in poor position
affairs
and counter-
from D-5 therefore,
committed to CUba will
it
be
for only about 20 days,
Wing Team from the West Coast will
for immediate redeployment
for some time
longer.
3. The fastest
means of applying
force
against
CUba would
be through the use of US air power (Naval plus .USAF), although

this would be an interim
deployed.
This capability,
a new and separate
plan,
.Cuban air power, reduction

and disruption
measure until
surface
now being prepared

could be utilized
of ground forces
forces
by
CINCLANT
will require
Florida.
(especially
10
of
armor),
systems.
in 6 hours in the strength
prepositioning
CINCLANT
as
for destruction
of Cuban communications and utility
This plan to be operable
could be
desired
by
of 12 Air Force Squadrons in
Enclosure
:- ,
:.. ..
2 HOFORN
IUI! 6[0ft[T
~;JfECIAL
NAHDLilffl
COPY NO./ ' OF;/ tJ COPIES

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTI'oN

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVEON THE
CARIBBEANSURVEYGROUP
to the
on
ESTABLISHMENTOF "PATROL POSTS11 (U)
E)(.ClUDEDFROMGOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:DODDIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
, JJ / \
UNClA~Slf
IfD 1 \ csGWG
CONTROL
#_o__j_
____
I
IOPS~Cftfl3Pf61
flt IIANBtlNG
'NDPORH
I yrt~
'
'l , ... ..
(;Kt I
--.
1111.LIIQ
I-l!An
Al 11.1.
Ctks.J N6PffRN
*
ESTABLISHMENT
OF "PATROLPOSTS" (U)
THE PROBLEM
l, To respond to a request*
from the Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE,
to examine the possibility
"patrol posts" in the Caribbean.
of establishing
ASSUMPTIONS
2. The term "patrol
or facility
II
posts
is assumed to include
which could contribute
infiltration
surveillance
any agency
to an anti-invasion
system.
and
Such an agency could be
overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national,

or multi-national
in nature.
FACTSBEARINGONTHE PROBLEM
3.
By
memorandum to the DOD/JCSRepresentative,
Caribbean
Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE,
requested
of establishing
attention
"patrol
an examination or the possibility
posts"
in the Caribbean.
was to be given to the possibility
establishment,
any invasion
to be purely US, in Haiti,

attempt at that
4. For additional
Particular
or such an
so as to guard against
country from Cuba.
Facts Bearing on the Problem, see
Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
5. For discussion,
see Enclosure C.
CONCLUSIONS
6. Cuban military
litary
meaningful m.1:
with the possible
forces
invasion
exception
against
is limited
a few aircraft
and/or small boats.
In the case of Haiti,
to a lightly
areas and the ent~e
to launch a
any Caribbean country
of Haiti.
the capability
coastal
armed invasion
Surveillance
using
of Cuban
Caribbean is within the capability
of the US Atlantic
Command. Forces of this
command, assisted
by military
of the country concerned,
are capable of
forces
combatting successfully
*Onfile
7
lack the capability
any .invasion
,.
in General Craig's
attempts
by Cuba
office
NUFbRN
M
'
I.J
- r
tteren
1Ll1"
1
1
..
11,r1t
~...1
11:& n1: IIA
r r,,t P(fj
)trKtl
-.
II
7. From a military
sea "patrol
posts",
of CUban actions
and indications
the value of surface
or intentions.
CUban threat,
supporting
an indigenous
"patrol
posts"
i.e.,
the possibility
ments with Central

'
infiltration
of the Department of State

for bilateral
communist infiltration
for the US to sponsor at this
collectively
for the "patrol
took recognition
a Special
taken to combat this

Consultative
threat
it
time the establishposts"
through
of the OAS,
of the threat
to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration.

the actions
agree-
and subversion,
9. At the 8th Meeting or the Foreign Ministers

member States
movement,
is questionable,
of arranging
ment of arrangements necessary

bilateral
agreements.
and
American governments to provide assistance
for defense against

is not feasible
Due to the
revolutionary
8. Based upon the past experience

in exploring
advance information
would be in acquiring
nature or the likely

subversion
point of view, the primary value or air-
posed
One of
was the establishment
Committee on Security
of
to study the threat
and make recommendations on measures wh:l.ch should be taken to

preserve
the peace and security
of the hemisphere.
It is
possible that this committee may develop a multi-lateral.

posal for such action.
10, An early availability
staging
facility
of an amphibious training
and
in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force
required
elements or the Atlantic
pro-
Fleet
as previously
expressed*
by the
I'
1:
Joint
Chiefs or Starr,
could assist
in the performance or the
II
functions
envisioned
for a US manned "patrol
post" in Haiti.
RECOMMENDATIONS
a, The attached
memorandum,Enclosure A, together
with
its
Appendix, which reflects
forwarded to the Secretary
11
the above conclusions,

of Defense,
* Decision on JCS 570/'51+7

3
T8P9E6RET
9PfeIALH'ftNfJt1tf
o
- - -
be
1UP~fCAi:T
-~ a,!tlALHANDLIK
8 N11PO
fKr
UNCl~SSltltu
II
b . This paper NOTbe forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.
I'
c. This paper NOTbe forwarded .to US officers

NATOactivities.
assigned
to
d. This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation,
Staff
Committee .
11
11
II
11
II
II
II
II
I
I'
rnp' 3t't fttf' SPECIXL

lfJN'fflffl"RlJFURN
1
1,
',
111rIiWHEl
(~ SPEtlitHXNDLIM
'
UNCt~~lf
ll~
EUCLOSUREA
DRAFT
MEMORANDID1
FOR THE SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
Subject:
It
Establishment
is recommended that
as above,
be approved
Operation
Mongoose,
of "Patrol
the attached
and forwarded
Posts"(U)
memorandum,subject
to the Chief
of Operations,
II
EXCLUDEDFROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
: DOD DIR 52od.10
DOES NOT APPLY
~Ntl~~~lf
liD
II
,.
5
7
-- -
Enclosure
l
I
TRPG5CR{JSPEOl~L
lltNffllG "IIJFulrN
Iii"
1.
IU[
A
DRAFl'
MEMORANDUM
FOR THECHIEF OF OPERATIONS,OPERATION
MONGOOSE
Subject:
Establishment
of "Patrol
Posts"
(U)
l. By memorandum to the DOD/JCSRepresentative,
Caribbean
Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE,
requested
of establishing
personnel
"patrol
an examination
posts"
from one or several
in the Caribbean manned by

countries.
was to be given to the possibility
to be purely US, in Haiti,

attempt
facility
"patrol
so as to guard against
posts"
surveillance
or multi-national
to an anti-invasion
with the possible
lack the capability
invasion
exception
against
is limited
a few aircraft
and/or small boats.
of the US Atlantic
to a lightly
areas and the entire
armed invasion
Surveillance
of the country concerned,
respective
countries
of Cuban
attempts
by Cuba.
In this
upon request
of the local
surveillance
to assist
respect,
the
American Countries,
has informed the Presidents
orally
by military
assisted
are capable of combatting
us through the Ambassador in the Central

Colombia and Venezuela,
using
Command. These forces,
any invasion
to launch a
any Caribbean country,
of Haiti.
the capability
successfully
Such an agency could be
and could be purely US, bi~national
forces
meaningful military
forces
and
in nature.
2. Cuban military
coastal
any invasion
For the purposes of this
system.
overt or covert in nature
attention
were assumed to be any agency or
which could contribute
infiltration
Particular
of such an establishment,
at that country from Cuba.
examination,
of the possibility
of the
that the US was prepared
to establish,
government, a system of air-sea
in seeking out,
and interdicting
within
. ,.
6
?
Appendix to
Enclosure A
T0P s,r,aq
snSPECIAL
s HAttnLlN
.G., .KOEO&N
1
_,,,,,
national
Jurisdiction
of armed forces,
of the requesting
agents
elements and otherwise

and frustrate
or supplies
to assist
armed assistance
sea "patrol
posts",
of CUban actions
nature
to such subversive
the value of surface
Haiti .
Cuban threat,
1.e.,
an indigenous
"patrol
in exploring
revolutionary
posts"
the possibility
movement
of the Department of
of arranging
assistance
for defense against
subversion
(aversion
agreements
with the US), it is not feasible
for bilateral
American governments to provide
to entering
communist infiltration
into bilateral
time the establishment
and
defense
for the US to
of "patrol
posts"
agreements .
5, At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers

member States
and
is questionable.
with Central
through bilateral
Due to the
infiltration
agreements
sponsor at this
advance information
of intentions.
4. Based upon the past experience

State
elements.
of view, the primary value of air-
and indications
supporting
landings
governments to identify
would be in acquiring
of the likely
subversion
point
attempted
by Castro-Communist
local
This cornmittment was riot afforded
3. From a nulitary
state,
collectively
took recognition
of the OAS,
of the threat
.posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration.

One of the actions
establi~hrnent
taken to combat this
of a Special
to study the threat
Consultative
threat
was the
and make recommendations
on measures which
should be taken to preserve
the peace and security
hemisphere,
It is possible
that
multiloterol
proposal
this
committee may develop a
for such action.
6 . By JCSM-5-62,* dated 4 January 1962, the Joint

Staff
stated
a requirement
staging facility
of the Atlantic
of the
for an amphibious training
Chiefs of
and
in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements

Fleet,
In reply to the letter from the Deputy
\
*On file
in Joint .Secretariat
..
1UltllS\\i{l~
Appendix to
Enclosure A
f8P 9E8RETlPfCIAt
HtftBtlN8NOFORN
..
Secretary
request
of Defense, dated 6 March 1962, which transmitted

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
of State stated
of military
a number of basic questions
policy toward the present

most careful
of our future
An
to our
regime, and requires
conducting an analysis
policy in regard to the present
early availability
of a US facility
critical
to be made of US forces
MAAGs,Missions,
government of
in Haiti,
in the performance of the functions
for a US manned "patrol
7. During this
post" in Haiti.
period,
maximumuse will continue
1n the Caribbean area (CINCLANT,CINCARIB,
and Attaches)
with Latin American military
in cooperation,
forces
posts.
where possible,
to perform the functions
envisioned
for the "patrol
operations
at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol
and traffic
in Haiti
consideration."
however, could assist

envisioned
facilities
with respect
(Duvalier)
The Depart ment of State is currently

Haiti.
tne Deputy Under Secretary
on 20 March 1962 that:
"The establishment
raises
the
11
For example, training

activity,
between that base and US naval installations
Puerto Rico provide effe "ctive air-sea

Cuba :and the island
of Hispaniola
8. In view of the foregoing,
surveillance
of eastern
including 'Haiti.
it is recommended that no
further
action be taken 1n regar d to the establishment
"patrol
posts)"
pr
in
of
r~:S7"/~(:.
Appendix to
Enclosure A
T9PEGRET
SPEGIAL
IIA
.NBLlrt8s NtFtftft
-
..,
111ru:1
il llfll:.,11v
fH'tlH~tHt\
1NR
WWs NU
~9RN
;
UNClA~l1tJt
J
ENCLOSURE
B

l. The Foreign Ministers
American States
(OAS) at their
of the ,threats
cognizance
of the Organization
ei ghth meeting* took
to the peace and security
Western Hemisphere as a result
vigilance,
acts of aggression,
subversion,
the continued
intervention
of such acts,
of Sino-soviet
and to make recommendations
2. As directed
eighth meeting,
With regard
with studying
resulting
thereto."
on security
of the OAS at their

a Special
Consultative
and has charged this
to the hemisphere
report
This Special
committee
and recommending to
the COASmeasures which shculd be taken to maintain

and security .
from
to the governments of
the COAShas established

the threat
any
powers in this
by the Foreign Ministers
Committee of experts
all
or other dangers to peace
or the preparation
the member states
to "maintain
for the purpose of warning against
and security,
hemisphere,
of the
of communist infiltration.
The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested

necessary
or the
the peace
Committee is to submit the initial
by l May 1962 and subsequent
reports
General Thomas D. White, USAF/Retired,

from the United States .
as available.
is a member selected
3. On 10 May 1961, the Department of State by message** to

US Ambassadors of Central
possibility
American countries
of coli!summatingbilateral
agreements with various
countries
and later
explored
the
multilateral
to defend agaiost
commuoist
1ofiltration
and subversion.
Respooses from addressees
indicated
most
governmeots were oot responsive to such
arraogemeots and opposition could be expected.
This
* Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Cooaultatioo of Mioisters
of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 68 (English) Rev., dated 21 Jan 62;
on file in Joiot Secretariat
** Departmeot of State message, Circular 1761, dated 10 May 6~;
oo file 1o Joiot Secretariat
Eoclosure
7
- -- - -
NOFORN
., ,. IUr l LtiNL1 . Iil'EOlA1L, II-A

NIN.i~
'},
0
~~tll~~ltltU
proposal
was discarded
Central
and instead,
American countries
the US Ambassadors to the
were requested
2 November 1961, to inform the Presidents

of hos.t countries
orally
that
by message* on
and Foreign Ministers
the US Government recognized
the
Ceri .,,,ean countri es as likeiy t a.rgets of communist subversion or

.
attack and that it was prepared to establish:, upon request of
a local
government,
a system of air-sea
surveillance
to assist
the national
Juris-
in seeking out, and interdicting
within
diction
of the requesting
attempted
forces,
agents
otherwise
or supplies
against
t o such subversive
indirect
present
aggression
aspiration
of President
"Serious
of armed
and frustrate
In respect to
question has
and other kinds of assistance
in addition
to the Haitian
circumstances,
elements.
stated,
as to whether materiel
made available
office
governments to identify
th e Department of State
been raised
landings
by Castro-Communist elements and
to ass i st local
armed assistance
Haiti,
state,
to that already
being
Government should be given in
particula~ly
Duvalier
because of the apparent

to perpetuate
himself
in
indefinitely."
4, On 15 May 1961, the Joint

to the Secretary
of Defense stated,
there may be overriding

the negotiation
Chiefs of Staff,
political
of such bilateral
by memorandum**
1</hile it is recognized
11
considerations
that
which dictate
and multilateral
assistance
agreements, they cannot be recommended from a military

point of view."
* Department of State message,

on file in Joint Secretariat
** Decision on JCS 1976/365
..
Circular
CA-388, dated 2 Nov 61;
10
Enclosure B
, N8f8RI::
1
r pr
1t
H!'I
,Jv
Sf ttlA[ iiA1ffltlN
~
1 1
ENCLOSURE
C
DISCUSSION
l . The communist threat
infiltration
Ministers
to the Western Hemisphere through
and subversion
was recognized
of the OASat their
action was initiated
8th Meeting at Punta del Este and
to find means to combat it .
of the COASSpecial
2. Cuban military
possible
forces
against
exception
The results
Committee should provide measures which
could be taken on a collective

combat the threat.
meaningful attack
by the Foreign
basis to guard against
lack the capability
and
to launch a
any Latin American country with the
of Haiti .
capability is limited to a lightly

aircraft
and/or small boats.
the
armed invasion using a few
3. Any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces would

serve only to further
unite the governments of Latin America
and lead to collective

of Non-Intervention.
OASaction under the terms of the Treaty

Further,
a Cuban landing on the territory
of another country could provide a valid

military
intervention
in Cuba.
from Cuba would be most likely
justification
Any attempt
to export communism
by infiltration
and would take the form of an indigenous
for US
and subversion
revolutionary
move-
ment, supported by arms from Cuba and perhaps Cuban volunteers,

and would be made to appear as an uprising
government.
4. Surveillance
of Cuban coastal
against
the incumbent
areas and the entire

of US aircraft
and/or ships
assigned , to ,1tlie .-Atl antic Comm1md.Also, US forces and facilities

in the Caribbeanare adequate to prevent any invasion of a
Caribbean country by Cuban forces .
view, the primary value of "patrol
advanced information
intentions.
From a military
posts" would be in acqUiring
of Cuba' s actions
and indications
The value of ground "patrol
posts",
governmental agr~ements could be effected,

View of the nature
TOP
of the threat
point of
from Cuba.
of
even considering
is questionable
in
111
r ,irRET,_;
,UP(tlAtIIANDLl'tlr?,
NO
FOIN
~NCl~~~lf
ll~
5. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there is little

military
justification
for establishing
use in the Caribbean area,
multilateral
the political
may have some value in gaining further

and in .strengthening
national
ties
Based upon the past indications

in regard to the negotiation
forces for
results
of such an effort
recognition
of the threat
between participating
countries,
from Central American governments

of bilateral
assistance
and the present
relations
appear feasible
for the US to sponsor a "patrol
agreements,
between the US and Cuba, it does not
the Caribbean area at this time.
post" concept in
Additionally
any consideration
of such a proposal must consider the possible
effects
on the
treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, if it is

to be used as a "patrol post. 11
6. In specific
regard to a ground "patrol
by memorandum*to the Secretary
dated 4 January 1962, stated

amphibious training
there was a requirement
and staging facility
that the Department of State,

the political
post" in Haiti,
considerations
subject
the
of Defense,
for an
in Haiti and requested

to political
involved,
assessment of
make necessary
governmental
a~rangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent

arrangements
on specific
requirements
Department of State has indicated

t .he present
regime,
The early availability
meantime, training
activity,
installations
operations
7. The most feasible
however, would
post" in Haiti.
In the
between that base and US naval
Cuba and the island

course of action,
air-sea
of Hispaniola
likely
to be acceptable
concerned, to contend with Cuban infiltration
OAS. Past indicatJons

and rational,
* ~ecision
on JCS 570/
lies
in collective
efforts
and
of the -
from governments of Caribbean countries
'
that collective
defensiqle
cxw
ntlft
is
at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal
of Caribbean countries
been to the effect
with
a thorough analysis
in Puerto Rico provide effective
surveillance
of eastern
including Haiti.
subversion
to negotiate
of this facility,
for a US "patrol
and traffic
to the countries
The
to US policy toward the present Duvalier
meet any requirement

patrol
a reluctance
Government of Haiti until
made with respect
that ar .e developed.
OASefforts
whereas unilateral
and actions
and bilateral
have
are
actions
ofilG
Gl:At:eVPDtrNrnty.
RDEflll~
7
J.::>
,,.__, - -
!_.,
"
,,,
case, appropriate
action,
consideration
of the recommendations for
to be submitted by the Special
of the COAS, should provide a basis

8. During this
interim
to be made of US forces
MAAGs, Missions,
forces
period,
to accomplish the objective,
maximumuse should continue
in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT,CINCARIB,
and Attaches)
and the Latin American military
to perform the functions
envisioned
for the "patrol
posts."
9, Any actions
to establish
Caribbean area would require

obscure the real
(civilian
Atlantic
surely
purpose.
"patrol
posts"
appropriate
"cover" to hide or
While several
means are available,
commercial interests,
activities
associated
Missile Range, etc.) ., the ostensible

invoke strong reaction
might jeopardize
as such in the
the over-all
with the
purpose would
from the Cuban government and

security
of "Operation Mongoose."
UNCll~~lf
l~D.
.\ ,
13
Enclosure C
1 .
..~ [ .,.
-..
'
,-,, I
" j.
..
THE JOINT CHIEFS Of," STAFF,
WASMIMGTON 25, D. C.
'
.3.Apr.1Jl l 962
JCS 1969/327
(NORTHWOODS)( S)
At their
Chiefs of Stil'f
. ... .
meetlllg on
:Z,7 March
1962 the Jolnt
note~ the aaaumptiona which had ijeen agreed
to lij the Special
Group for Operation
MONGOOSE.
..'
.., ....,-~
.
..,..I
. !
~~SN
Secrete ~
<>;c
..
............,,
.
~
,,~~
...'.
...
'
... .!'.
Cop,; for:
, , ~
enel'al Craig
.
-
,,
'-"-
~
'
..... .,''
.....-:,,.......:
~
-"
4.
~{<~
',&Y..,'}?'~
...
:......'
,:.~x:-.
~NttA~
lflbl
SPECIAL
HAN
DLING
REQ
UIR
ED;
NQif RELEASAB
l!.E TO ~OR
lilGNNATIONALS
.. ~
~
~-
!
....
.~-
.....
.....
:. --;
~-.
. . .. ~,.,:
... ..:..-
. - ~ ...;.~p ~ ."'I...~"'
~"'-
__
~...,_.....
-..
c t:., .;!;. .. t.....~
,,
--'
........
.. ...,.
........
........
.
~
'
1962
'
......, ....,
.JCS 1969/327' 1
(!JORTIIWOODS)(8 ~
"-f:, . 7,,
......-. ....
'
+~
-~'"
:lt their
me ets.,>g 'on
: ~;q, Marcli 1962 the
-'
,.,
,
'
!
=, d
-- 1
.
,.,,.
"'
.
~ =
ii. l!l'iOIJI!J
dm,;,,;, ..:.
Rear :ldiD1nl, US!J

Se cret 81'7
.
'
cop;70rori
General
'
'
Craig
.. ' t'
1' .
D
CLA~ IFi!::O l}Yf
JCS D'CL\!JS !S:;Ss.TE0N GRANCH
o;,r z . -. .2(..~1
~Y
~~
........
.-
. ..
URt~~SS
\flttl
.
.
~
'~~~
;,:r;r::,,;.;.
.:.:: : .,.,:;.
.,rrlZ
~j,~"--~
'
la
" .
=-it
<
'
<
"
.,.,
';~..,
',.....,
~
.."'"'
,,
-1'
'j
'
...
I:,~
V ,;,
.7
,,.
' ,
i;>'
~ ~
''
...
,.
I
.,, t,,
,
....
..'
.. 's,
.l
'
~,
.,
'.
',,
,.-
.:i.*t ' 'ii
~tf~
r'
i \
' ~
. ,
,... ~;,
,\i .-
..
'
... ~.t,,;,- ....i.... ~
.., .,,' .
,.
GUIDELINES,OPERATION
MONGOOSE
The Special
preparations
Group (Augmented) agreed that planning
would proceed on the basis
and
of the following
assumptions:
(extracted
from Gen Lansdale s copy of the "Guidelines",
dated
14 March 1962)
"a. In undertaking
government,
to cause the overthrow of the target
the United States
indigenous
resources,
that final
success will
will make maximumuse of
internal
and external,
require
decisive
but recogn i ze
US military
inter-
vention.
11
b . Such i ndigenous resources
used to prepare
thereafter
for and Justify
to facilitate
as are developed will be

this
and support
intervention,
and
it".
UNtllS~lf
\lO
f:XCLUDEO
FROMGl)S
,.
19bq/J1.,
di
wt
er SfeR'~Jts9:pee1At
IIANU~IIG
. rNllEDRN
121
11
,.
...,,
,.
~NCllSS\f
ltll
. I
,,,...,::;,
.....
-~
l
r.
JCSM-272-#72
.lO Apr11 1962

. : . . ............... .
,.
: ...,: .. ...
..
!r.,
MEMORANDUM
FOR 'l'HF. SECRET.ARYOP DEFENSE. .. . .....
,..:. .,. ,:.\ .
SubJeot1
Cuba
,.,. .
"that the
1. The Joint Chieta of Sta1'1' believe

Cuban
Further,
the:,
problem must be solved in the near ruturo.
nee no prospect or early success 1n overthrowing the present
oormnu!u.S~ree 1w either as a result of internal
up:irls1ngs
or external 'political,
economic or p.syoholog1cal pi~,i:.sures .
intervention
by the
Accordingly they believe that lllilitary
United States 11ill be required
to overthrow the pre:i ent
oolll!l!Uniat regi~.
2, ,The Un5.ted States cannot tolerate permanent exiatenoe

in the Western Hemisphere.
~'he
of' a comim.tn1at gove=nt
present res:ui n 1.n Cuba provides communiam id .th a base or
oper&.tions f'or e s pionage , oabotago and sul>v.,irsion against
Latin Jl.merica. '.!112 stability
of some goverrir.ients in Latin
Am:!r1ca is alr-e a<ly threatelled
by the overt anc. covert actiona
Continued existence
ot' this com- .
of the Cuban government.
that one or
mun1::it eo ven =n-t increases
the probabilicy
more oth er nations in Lntin Amerio~ will become communist
or cont":IUnist dominated . ~111s will sreatly
increase the
probler..s curr en tly !'ao1.l'.g the United States o.n<1 the Organization of Anwr:tc,1n State:;,
While considered unlil:ely,
it 1a
""'~.-C'J-r-4 - v u...,.v...,
~o
_,...........
~
. ,:.,wY ..,~'-' -'"'-' .1..v~
.,.,i .....
...,,:,u ....-wv'lt..s.'-'
v
.G---~""....l,,,.lish ll.L.L.
'".a.""",;,
baseo 1n Cub<l :;:tru. lm- to US :tnstallat1or.s
around t?w bloo .
periphery.
ltctab li sh=nt or such bases would increase US
deten ao coot:; no !'orceo were developed or shifted to meet
,,
.. :1I
----"""'-
. :1
--
_.__
the threat.
\
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and tho cornmuniet bloc.
, 'lhe:y ore provided with the opportunity
to continue with
their sub ver :Jive oi't'orts in Latin Jlnl:!rica, Increasing
internal
security
mea3UX'eoby police state oothods decrea11e
'
., .
. ..
EXCLtlDE
o FRo .
.REGR.
iDING. D .., "tiTC!.!.~TI
C
.
, OD DIR 5200 ,
.
DOES llO'i' /J'PLl:'
-!
;
' ..
'
.
EXCLUDED
fROM GOS
___.
.,__
r.
. . . . .
'!..
.,:.
,,4;,/ l
.. ..
. ..
I : ,
~ '
. I ;
:, .. " t !
J .,,
. : ' -~ .
'
., ,,: ,
'.\.
, . .. ' )" \.
'
..........
..: ; ~- :'".;{/ \
, .. l:.t,
' .,: : . . ; '!;( ' ' t
". . ,,.";
-~ rr;;
.. ....~
'-';,
.'.:.
-..
. .. ...~.
~ ..
_;....
r : '..: .
.
...
...
\ .~
"\ ..
, . . .:-t
.
.
....
... .
'
/ r '(
.. . ::. : .
. .. . ..
.
.}
f\
, ,
' " ~
fl'
;.
. .., . , ' 1' -.ortf,

,,,
':'-:!r~
....' . ., : .
. ..:.,
'
:..
~:
.... .
':
- /. , I
l\. 1,
,,.~
- ."'1 ," .,.

t .
'
~ .
....
./
..-
,.
..
..,: -:.:!~~~t~
lriail ;ii,
wa/
:,~:, ~.;_:.
:. ':......
~.
SYSTE
~IAT!CAl
~ P.EV,.' '/ED
-. .
... . ..
----., ,-,.,;,,':;
ltU
.. UNtl~~~if
....
-;..
.
..
...) ,
'',_.
\
.l
...
... ..' .
..
.
'
.
.. . '... . '
"I.
.: ; ; >
the pOll!Jib1liey of internal

uprisin,<;s within Cuba~ 'lbe
steady improvemnt
in m1litacy defenses strengthens
the
resiotance
t1hich must be overcome in tho evant or US
Jllilitar:,
intervention
al'ld could lengthen the time required .
~
to secure control ot: the government and the . island.
continuing
1ndootrination
or the Cuban youth creates a
gr0111l'lg nucleus
for a communist underground arter the
elimination
or the prescnt sovermuent.
'.l:n1s creates
a
problem tor the future which is steadily
1noreas11't!J: 1n
magnitude.
..,.~
4. 'nle Joint Chiera of Staf.f believe that tho Uni ted

States can undertake military
intervention
1n Cuba t1ithout
risk or general .w.ar.. 'l'hey also believe that the int ervention
can be aocompl1nhed rapidly enough to m1nim1ze ~ommunis't
opportunities
S:or solicitation
ot: IDl action.
Forceu
available
would ascure r apid essential
m111t/il'Y control of
Cuba. Cont1.nued police action would be required.
.'' .
5. In view or.the increasing m1litnl7 and subversive

threat to the united States and the nations of the Western
Hemisphere posed by the communist re~ime 1n Cuba, the Joint
Chie:f'o or Sta1':f' rocommen:I.that a :national pol:1.cy of early
military
intervention
in Cuba be adopted by the United
States.
They also recommend that such intervention
be
undertaken as soon as possible
and preferably
botore the
~l~a"'~
of Mriticll:/):1_ Guard and P.e!!!trve . i'9roea presently
on aot~ve duty.
.
.
?
For the Joint Chiets or statta
..-,
..
L. L. LEMNJ:TZER
Chairman
Joint Chiets ot Start
.,
f
2
'
--:,
~: .-:"
....
. ...'
,.
..
...
. . . : ' ; .....j , ..
. .. ... .\ .,,.... ...i"'

: '
. ! .
' '.:. ;:..

-->--::
,:~:.: .,..,. . .
::..-~'} ' . :~:. ,;;~>-.

:.
'
II
..
. ,.
..
..
I ~'
-- ...
..
. ...
\
...
:.-
'
:f
)
."
"
..;.,,_~N..,
__,,.,;,,_,..._,.
..,..,.,___
..
...
,.;,~.........~------''~~----
------------
.-... ..
.... I
1
--
14:.(
"".
I
.
EXP
~ ATORY
NOTE
One of tlie requiJ'ements wluch evolved r.rom the il'CS Meeting,

6 Apr1'l was to up-date JCS 2304730. 'l'bat document has been
reviewe! and UP.-dati:t,g appears 1.ri!essible for tile fol>lowii;,g
real ons!
a. JCS 2304/30 was written in April 1961 ~ c:i ~ and

forces involved 1il CINCL'ANT
~lan 312-60, from two battle
groups t o a force level considered adequate to cope with
the ,1.!nprovedCUbanm1>1:1
tarl( c;apatiility.
Force levels are
increased from two baf iJ~ groups to two divisions plus
a t llird divi sion in ireserve. This pl an was overtaken
by CINCiiANT
OPLAN
314-61, whlch turther increased the
total forces r eqw.red tc:i tile extent that the al!&!llented
plan 312-60 was supersede<!'. 1'he plan for CUba i:., JCS ,
2304130, therefore, is no longer valid; the plan should
in tact be w1tlidrawn.
...
b. Mucli or the related information included \ 1n JCS 23<>1+

t 30
not strictly
concernell witll the military plan is reflect ed
iii the more current P.aP,ers putilis~ed in support or t he
Cuban Project (Operation Moi;,goose).
''"
.,..~
- -~ .~-- .. .......
---. -...-----. -~-- . \.
.-. ;
. .
~
'.
,.....
... .. -~--,
,......
. ....
,.,...
..,....
~ .....
~
.....
.-.
,,.,. i'>~""'""".-. ~
.....
"",
....'
~,
... , 4'
..,.!.
., ..,
..,..
.......
, ...,..J'
19697334
,-..., ....
A~ their
... , .....1
....
..:,:v....
...~,JI
'
. ..
,v,,,.,,, ,.,.( w,,e'
. .
meeting on 10 Apr11 1962 the Jo1nt Cheirs o t, Sta rr
..:
..
-~-:.,,.
'
~;
~-~-4,.
-~
-..1''AA'
'
~,,.....t
--+.-:"'
"';
.........,;(
...........
<
~
-~4
"'""";
.......- ......,...'.""""
. .....
..
9 April 1962
Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS for the
10 April 1962
Subject:
US Intervention
in CUba
SecDef Meeting,
Back~round - At the meeting ~f the Special Group (aUgmented) on 5

Apr 2, General Taylor questioned the US course of action in
the event Castro decided to execute about 100 of last April's
invasion prisoners.
Inconclusive discussion led General Taylor
to ask "Suppose Castro decided to shoot them all, what would
we do then?" Mr. Johnson, for State, expressed the opinion that
even this extreme would not provide sufficient
justification
for US military action.
Mr. Gilpatric,
for Defense and Gen
Parker for the JCS, indicated they felt both the noband the JCS
would stand firm for military intervention.
this
subject
a,
Do
- During the JCS meeting, 6 Apr 62, discussion

developed two basic questions:
the JCS believe
of
the US should intervene?
b, Does the US have the capability?

Discussion - Past considerations
of the JCS have been
for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's
question.
Two studies are appropriate;
however, both
were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project
reviewed
first
stUdies
(Mongoose),
a. JCS 1969/303, 8 Feb 62:

A significant
conclusion of this study states that the
JCS believe the overthrow of the Communist CUban Regime
can be accomplished without precipitating
general war and
without serious effect on world public opinion, if, among
other things, the impression is created that there is an
urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in CUba.
b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar 62:
This stud,y repeated the above decision, but further,
appended a list of circumstances which could be considered
sufficient
provocation for US military intervention
in
CUba. One of the situations
listed, which depended upon
degree of seriousness,
is stated:
"Execution of prisoners
attempt of April 1961,"
taken in the abortive
- In addition to these related considerations

of the
JCS,additional factors which support US intervention
in Cuba,
if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:
a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mongoose1 already approved by the Special Group, indicate that mil:
tary l.lltervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime.
b.
The passage of time favors Castro rather
than the US.
c. Justification
for US intervention
will probably be
more convincing to the rest of the world 1f it can be related
to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely.
on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.
UNCl~!~if
IfD
,.
EXaUOEDFROM GOS
1
TOP&EORET
i,_) S
Pft1II[ =11Norrt
.1r 1" 1N8NR
N7 SI
1
Uitll~~\t\
~.
The US c~uld, however 1 bolster the justification
for intervention, if reqUir ed to provide a stronger case for US
military action.
d, Execution of significant
numbers of prisoners would
adversely affect the faith and resoluti on of refugee CUbans
and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the
Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored in
apparent disinterest,
the final chapter of last year's invasion attemp t.
- With regard to the question concerning US capability
to intervene in CUba, implementation of CINCLANT
OPLAN314-61
will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the CUban government
within 10 days after forces are committed .; forces can be committed 18 days after the order is given. As ~ecently as 3 Apr
62 CINCLANT(in response to a JCS query concerning the adequacy
of forces in his OPLAN)has advised that contingencies which
could complicate the campaign against CUba have been recognized
CINCLANT
states~ " , it
and considered a99eptable hazards.
is my judgment that .the forces in CINCLANT
OPLAN31~-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated
qualifies this judgment to depend on the
10 days, 11 CINCLANT
following:
"a. Intelligence
available to this commandconcerning the
morale, and locations of
current strength, capabilities,
CUban military forces is essentially
correct.
b, The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM
and PACOM
is, as an abso lute minimum, maintained at no less
than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.
11
c, Certain of the I on call I Army for .ces now listed in

the plan are reclassified
as reserve forces and put in
motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before
D plus 10. 11
11
- While the fastest uieans of assuring completion of .

the total task in CUba is OPLAN314-61, the situation may require initial
reaction by the US in less tha~f1~2QY.A.:.~A calculated risk could be considered
providing '~~s
eelncommitment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation
become available.
This was proposed in CINCLANT
OPLAN316-61,
and, although not approved by the JCS, was returned to CINCLANT
for rewrite.
Representative
reaction times, proposed in OPLAN
316-61 from a condition of no warning were:
ABNDivisions
4 Marine BLTs
Artillery
and Armor
Follow-on Forces
2
5 days
7-8 days
10-12 days
15-18 days
- The fastest means of applying force against CUba

would be through-the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF),
although this would be an interim measure until surface forces
now being prepared by
could be deployed,
This capability,
CINCLANT
as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for
destruction of Cuban air power reduction of ground forces
(especially armor)L and disruption of Cuban communications .and
utility
systems. Tnis plan to be operable in 6 hours in the
strength desired by CINCLANT
will require prepositioning
of 12
Air Force Squadrons in Florida.
- US intervention
in Cuba could trigger Bloc ~iversionary tactics . in other parts of the world (most probably in
known trouble spots such ~s Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the
... .
!Pf SiCRET
- Jl'ECIWL
HtNIJtl!SN&F&RN
Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would
likely engender propaganda campaig~s to include use of the UN
forum for pressure against the US. However, an essential and
most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed.
CINCLANT'sOPLANstates, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining
control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces,
leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and
counter-guerrilla
mop-up operations,"
Estimating from D-5
therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to
Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about
20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West
Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for
some time longer.
Recommendations a. SECDEFshould be advised during the meeting of 10 Apr
that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign
if necessary) by the US as justification
for intervention.
b. SECDEFshould be advised that there is no question of
US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course
of implementing such action within 18 days after decision
is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force commitments,
c. Inasmuch as the JCS have not addressed the question
of US military intervention
in Cuba except within the context
of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military
action be recommended to the SECDEFand/or the President as
the only course which provides assurance that the Communist
Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of
the near future,
Opinion as to Recommendations:
Caribbean Survey Group._________
Director,
__,,Concur) (Nonconcur).
Joint Staff
Talking Paper prepared by:
Concur)(Nonconcur)
Colonel C. s. Seamans, USAF
Contingency Plans Branch, J-5
Extension 59057
UNCl~SSir
ttu
I
J
:~
..:~
.. .
~
._
'
!
'
.......
.....
..
....-.--~
.,,..
-;.
3 :Apr1.l!1962
. -;::::
.-
.
..~
.
>
., .
.. .~-~v .t ':', ,
>
..;
,,,
' ..:;.~
.. .
~
, ',,
....
~~1
.,~~
.. .
,.
.
'
:--';,11
..
.,
. ',;,. .'t; .....

, ..
i: ,:,,:i
. ......:
.
--dl.t~r
~~ Jt,e.~
,.\" >,.,,.
om ~QI Hirc!_l1:-the. Jo1iit

_~h!:-~a... ., ' .. ~. .--';/;
,
- ,,
orstiti ':t.w.iil:v.l'ci!
,'.(i;
!ie torv a'rillns ot a memo
~uai (ox ~626':!'62)'t .'
'with
I.lie s=
tary ot De!'ense,
;
...;.;,,~ ,
-,,-.
,..,,.,,_,,~
J~
. ., . !
......
Rear :Admiral,
Secretary
,,.~
!
...
. . .
...........
_:.-:;;;
...
~~
1'Sli
Oop:,: tori
Goner il! Craig
.;,. .':_:':.~ : :
.. DCt A8Siff1ED ~Y: .
:. . ,:
JQS D~CLA$$lFIC:',TION SJt..fJCfi

DATE., .
~:f..~1,-f!/
. ,. '!.
...
-..-.
',%~
....:=,~
.
...,-
fllQUl>El>
I FROMODS
- . -i
''I
...:~_,
.;.
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
'
!.
"
~NtlA~~lf
ltO
13 March 1962
t
I
!
\
MEMORANDUlI
FOR Tim SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
'
\
'
..
SUbJect:
'
2. The .Joint Chiefs of .Staff recommend that the

proposed memorandumbe forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there
will be similar submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
tillle-phased plan.
Individual projects can then be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
..
1:
'
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be

for developing military
given the .primary responsibility
and para-military
aspects of the basic plan.
It is
for both overt and
recommended that this responsibility
- covert military operat~ons be assigned the Joint Chiefs of
Staff .
For the Joint Chiefs of staff:
!
!
. '
.r
for US Military Intervention

, .. .
l . The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached

Memorandum.Cor the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a.'-:r._equest of that office for brief' but precise
description
of pretexts which would provide justification
for us military intervention
in Cuba
.I
Justification
in Cuba (TS)
.-
'
S'IS1EM/HI
CALL'lll~'IEV>.J:f}L
. / o<i
'
---,ifr.~f-::!Ef..
BYJCSON --~.d.
CLASSIFICATIO!l
.C NTINU.;Q.
.----:-
-:::,. ':'""__:::.~..
L. L. LE1'1N1:TZER
Chairman
Joint.Chiefs
pf s
l Enclosure
Memofor Chief of Operations,
E)(CI.UD6>FROMGD$
Cuba Project
EXCLUDED
FROMAIJTOII.ATIC
BEGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10
DOES IIOT APPLY
" :ri UP-SFGR

FI SPFC161
r
HAtlBtltlC
N&FORi
...--~~:-...~ :-::
:-::~:-.t ','::~- =
-:::-~F:~
:;:;,:f~,;~"1'
......rr . .::.::- -~: ~=-;..~~
.- .- ..-~
',~~:~
:'J7 ,.;;,:-r

'
. :
', . :\
!\ J 1.i ~\,
. ,,-
..
t,...
. 11
.. ; : . ,.
'
: ..\ , ...::;:: . ... . :. ..._:

.~
.~..
: ~:.:;rt;..,, ..4".
:;. -~,.
.
.
. .... . ... , ;. . .
. ''-'
.,';., ~ I; .
....~ ,,..:.,.;::.: .:,.,..'
..
~,"\ c. J'~
.
, , (,t.t,,r
.'
t : . :~''
.. . .-.. tif....
! .', ,
. .' : \ :
... : . ..:. . :,>,.~,:--:. : . ~, .-~ .: .. ...

',"
'
..- ,
.. ,,' ;~. ~...~:"t'1

~
., '.., :......
..... ... . . t
' '. \.,; ; , .:..
., ','-.~"r"./j .,.,,
{,' : :_:?.~ / , ' . . : ; ..-.
. ;"';"'
.,.
., : ' ' :
..
!"
. .... ..-/
..
'
.. .. '. ' .. '~-'

'
,.
. ~ ,
I : ,
':.
"'
.,
'<,,~
,t .
'
, . ...
,
.--...,..
..; ~ ...~ .. :
.
; ""
..
..
, ,
...
'
.1
''
'
'.
..
,
/'
.,
""'
c rf;ftiit$iltli:S111i
fif.51
: K1
'.
1..__
TOP SECRET
COPYNO. __
JCS 1969/321
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
12 March 1962
Page 2165
NOTEBY THE SECRETARIES

to the
on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
A
report*
on the above ~ubject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J.
INGELIDO
Joint
Secretariat
' . 'i
* Not
reproduced herewith;
on file
in Joint
Secretariat
EXCLUDEDFROM GOS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
; DODDIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
..
9 March 1962
COPY OF
COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEYGROUP
to the
on
CUBAPROJECT(TS)
The Chief of Operations,
t hat he be furnished
on this
matter
Cuba Project,
the views of the Joint
has requested
Chiefs of Staff
by 13 March 1962.
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
,.
JUSTIFICATIONFORUS MILITARYINTERVENTION
IN CUBA(TS)
THE PROBLEM
by Chi.ef of Operations,
l. As requested*
Chi.efs of Staff
Joint
are to indicate
Cuba Project,
brief
but precise
of pretexQ3whi.ch they consider
description
Justification
for US military
the
would provide
intervention
in Cuba.

2. It is recognized
for US military
that
any action
intervention
whi.ch becomes pretext
in Cuba will
lead to a political
whi.ch then would lead to military
decision
action.
3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of

actiwn proposed** by the US Navy relating
instances
to generated
in the Guantanamo area.
4. For additional
facts
see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
5. The suggested
coursesof
action
appended to Enclosure
are based on the premise that US niilitary

result
from a period of heightened
place the United States

iable
grievances.
forum
national
US-CUban tensions
in the position
World opinion,
should be favorably
intervention
will
which
of suffering
justif-
and the United Nations
affected
by developing
the inter-
image of the CUban government as rash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable
threat
to the peace of
the western Hemisphere .
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized

present
time it will continue
there can be reasonable
to hold good only as long as
certainty
in Cuba would not directly
at the
that US military
intervention
involve the Soviet Union.
There is
Memorandumfor General Craig from Chief qf Operations,

Cuba Project, subject:
"Operation MONGOOSE",
dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandumfor the Chairman, Joint Chi.efs of Starr, from
Chief of Naval OperatioDs, subJeot:
"Instances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1g62,
on file in General Craig's office.
2
,.
TIJP-S!tRE
T
1
. ~Ntll~~lf
IfD
as yet no bi l ateral
mutual support agreemen
e USSR
to the defense of Cuba, Guba has not yet become a member of th e

War~nwPa ct, nor hnve the Soviets established
in Cuba in the pattern
Soviet bases
of US bases in Western Europe.
since time appears to be an important

the Cuba problem, a l l projects
factor
Therefore,
in resolution
of
are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION
7. The suggested
satisfactorily
courses of action appended to Enclosure A
respond to the statement
these suggestions'should
suitable
integrated,
objective
be forwarded as
for planning purposes,
from other agencies,
of the problem.
a preliminary
and together
However,
submission
with similar
inputs
provide a oasis for develop ment of a single,
time- phased plan to focus all effort s on the

of justification
for US mili t ary intervention
in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
a . Enclosure A together
forwarded to the .Secretary
transmittal
with its attachments
of Defense for approva l and
to the Chief of Operations,
b. This paper NOTbe.forwarded

or specified
should be
Cuba ProjectA
to commanders of unified
commands.
c. This paper NOTbe forwarded to US officers
assigned
to NATOactivities.
d. This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation,
,.
Staff
Committee.
T18P-mifi
,i&R
E{ss :x
9pee
I#t rHtff
stt:1
N1rtr
*'N8f&Rff
m-- ,,.,
ENCLOSURE A
DRAFl'
FORTHE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
MEMORANDUM
Justification
in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint
for US Military
Chiefs of Staff
have considered
Memorandumfor the Chief of Operations,

responds to a request*
description
of pretexts
for US military
of that
2. The Joint
office
for brief
s.1m1lar submissions
tion
projects
submission suitable
It .is assumed that there will be

for developing
these .inputs
a t.1me-phased plan.
oan then be considered
basis . _
on a case-by-case
3. Further,
it .is assumed that
given the primary responsibil.1ty

para-military
justifica
from other agenc.1es and that
will be used as a basis
that this
but precise
Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed
for planning purposes.
)-
which
in Cuba.
memorandumbe forwarded as a preliminary
Individual
the attached
Cuba Project,
which would provide
intervention
Intervention
--
- _....
aspects
responsibil.1ty
operatiorsbe
a single
agency w.111 be
for developing mil.1tary and

,---
of the basic plan.

for both
---
assigned the Joint
It is recommended
_______
overt
covert
military
- - -and
...._._
...
..
Chiefs of Staff.
* Memorandumfor Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba

Project, subject, "Operat.1on MONGOOSE",
dated 5 l4arch
1962, on file in Gen Craig's off.ice
Enclosure A
APPENDIX
TO ENCLOSUREA
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FOR CHmF OF OPERATIONS,
CUBAPROJECT
Subject:
Justification
for US Military
in CUba (TS)
Intervention
1. Reference is made to memorandumfrom Chief or Operations,

CUba Project,
for General Craig,
subject:
dated 5 March 1962, which requested

I,
description
or pretexts
brief
for US military
inter -
vention in CUba.
2. The projects
I,
but precise
which the Joint Chiefs of Starr
consider would provide Justification

1,
"Operation MONGOOSE",
~a a preliminary
listed
in the enclosure
submission suitable
hereto are forwarded
for plann:t.pg purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar
submissions !'rem
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis

for developing
a time-phased plan.
can then be considered
./
suggestions,
projects
create
intervention.
or incidents
unrelated
irresponsibility
1,
1,
1,
1,
I
properly
should be
on a .specific
ultimate
to be combined with other seemingly

impression
directed
as well as the United States.
be pursued .
objective
or Cuban rashness
on a large scale,
integrate
national
and
,/
The plan would also
and time phase the courses of action to
The desired
of suffering
irresponsible
and
at other
resultant
from the execution
this plan would be to place the United States

position
for
Such a plan would enable a logical
events to camouflage the ultimate
the necessary
countries
from the
which would provide adequate justif~cation
US military
build-up
-K
selected
or from other sources,
developed to focus all efforts

objective
projects
on a case -by - case basis.
3. Thia plan, incorporating

attached
The individual
defensible
grievances
of
in the apparent
from a rash and
government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
image of a CUban threat
to peace in the Western
Hemisphere .
~NCll~~lf
l~D
,.
5
Appendix to
Enclosure A
1~ll&fDr SfC
Hn-- SP
'fettl-'71ftNl
re
~tNJlf me;;,.,w..'
:.:STUP
Sf8R[T
C, IP~GMt
HtN:fftt
le'... ttO
'FitRtfn
nmn
UreGLA~~lr
itu
4. Ti.me is an important factor in resolution
of the Cuban
1
problem.
projects
Therefore,
the plan should be so time -phased that
5 . Inasmuch as the ultimate

intervention,
for - developing
-~
objective
is overt military
it is recommended that primary responsibilit
and para-military
military
...
for both overt and covert military

Joint
the next few months .
would be operab l e within
aspects
operations
....,..
of the plan
be assigned
the
Chiefs of Staff.
,.
Appendix t d
Enclosure A
~NCl~~~lt
1.tv
f Ofm-&fllf,fmfnll~DlrA,
~ ltAIOl~iN
-nrf:w-
..
ANNEX
TO APPENDIXTO ENCLOSUREA
PRETEXTS
TO JUSTIFYUS MILl'l'ARYINTERVENTION
IN CUBA
(Note :
The courses of action which 'follow are a preliminary
submission suitable
arranged neither
only for planning purposes.
chronologically
Together With similar
nor in ascending order.
inputs from other agencies,
intended to provide a point of departure

of a single,
integrated,
permit the evaluation

of cumulative,
intervention
of individual
actions
such a plan would
projects
Within the context
designed to lead inexorably
of adeqo.ate Justification
for US military
in Cuba).
1 . Since it would seem desirable

provocation
to use legitimate
as the basis for US military
a cover and deception plan,

actions
they are
for the development
time-phased plan.
correlated
to the objective
They are
intervention
to include requisite
in CUba
preliminary
such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial

reactions .
Harassment plus deceptive
CUbans of imminent invasion

posture
effort
throughout
2 . A series
actions
to convince the
would be emphasized.
execution
change from exercise
to provoke CUban
OUr
military
of the plan will allow a rapid
to intervention
if CUban response
of well coordinated
jstifies.
incidents .will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine

appearance of being done by hostile
a. Incidents
chronological
(1) Start
to establish
Cuban forces.
a credible
attack
(not in
order):
rumors (many).
(2) Land friendly

to stage attack
Use clandestine
radio.
Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly)
saboteurs
inside
the
base.
(4) Start
riots
near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans),
7
~~tl~~~lfltU
Ti- 6EG
RRww
f Pf8ftHltftB
'Mtffr
1
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
:.JOPSERRET
--'
llili
(5) Blow up ammunition inside
the base; start
!'ires.
(6) Burn aircrai't on air base ( sabotage )

(7) Lob mortar shells i'rom outside 01' base into base .
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault
or vicinity
teams approaching i'rom the sea
of Guantanamo City,
(9) Capture militia
group which storms the base .
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires

(ll)
Sink ship near harbor entrance .
!'or mock-victims
(may be lieu
-- napthalene.
Conduct .funerals
01' (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing

operations
artillery
o1'1'ensive
to secure water and power supplies,
destroying
and mortar emplacements which threaten
the base.
c . Commencelarge scale United States military
3,
several
"Remember the Maine" incident
operations.
could be arranged in
forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel
in the CUban waters.
anywhere
We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity
01' Havana or Santiago as a spectacular
01' CUban attack
i'rom the air or sea, or both.
01' CUban planes or ships merely investigating

the vessel
could be i'airly
was taken under attack.

would add credibility
have heard the blast
f'ighters
crew.
The presence
the intent
01'
compelling evidence that the ship

The nearness
especially
to Havana or Santiago
to those people that might
or have seen the !'ire .
follow up with an air/sea
result
rescue operation
The US could
covered by US
to "evacuate" remaining members of' the non- existent

in us newspapers would cause a helpf'ul
Casualty lists
wave 01' national
indignation.
4 . we could develop a communist CUban terror
the Miami area,
in other Florida
8
cities
campaign in
and even in Washington.
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
~~tl~~~ifltD
!Pf8lA'tHNI ~IN&
criNGii'&R
N
1
..
IOP1f8R[rJ-~ &Pi,e1,k
willA
NltlN~ rrNlfDRN
SF
The terror
campaign could be~~~l~~lfjf~
haven in the United States .

enroute to Florida
on lives
extent
(real
projecting
s.
of prepared documents
Cuban involvement also would be helpful
against
a neighboring
of the 14th of June invasion
filibuster
Caribbean nation
Haiti,
present
and possible
Dominican Republic,
others.
within their
c-46 type aircraft
We
clandestinely
can be magnified and
For example, advantage
of the Dominican Air Force to
national
air space .
coul d make cane-burning
Soviet Bloc incendiaries
(in the vein
Guatemala, ahd Nicaragua at
These efforts
can be taken of the sensitiVity

intrusions
efforts
for exposure.
ones contrived
could be
of the Dominican Republic).
know that Castro is backing subversive
against
in
government.
A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported"
additional
even to the
chosen spots, the
bombs in carefully
the idea of an irresponsible
simulated
attempts
to be widely - publicized.
of Cuban agents and the release
substantiating
We could foster
1n the United States
of woundir.g in instances
arrest
seeking
we could sink a boatload of Cubans
or simulated) .
of Cuban refugees
Exploding a few plastic
ban refugees
"Cuban" B-26 or
raids at night.
could be found .
This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist IUldergl'OUl1d1n the

Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted,
on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircrai't

additional
surface
provocation.
by US pilots
Harassment of civil
shipping and destruction
attacks
to announce such fact.
as complementary actions.
11' the pilot
risk inherent
However, reasonable
be produced from US resources
that they
of the transport
The primary drawback to this
appears to be the security
on
drone aircraft
painted would conVince air passengers
saw a Cuban MIO, especially
ing an aircraft.
air,
of US military
by MIO type planes would be useful

An F- 86.properly
could provide
were
suggestion
in obtaining
or modify-
copies of the MIO could
in about three months.
Annex to Apperidix
to Enclosure A
~~tl~~~lfIfD
--i1 P:IPIM
w;;im
n; [- IIIIJl;l1J;
:;:;
..:tteftP1
zw-
-',TOP
, NOFtlN
7, Hijacking attempts
against
civil
a1r and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing

government of Cuba.
civil
and military
Concurrently,
convincingly
genuine defections
air and surface
8. It is possible
to create
craft
civil
airliner
which will demonstrate
has attacked
and shot down
enroute from the United States
to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela.
The
be chosen only to cause the flight
route to cross Cuba.
plan
destination
The passengers
could be a group of college
holiday or~
grouping of persons with a commoninterest
support chartering
a.
a non-scheduled
aircraft
An
aircraft
Miami
students
At a designated
substituted
for the actual
loaded with the selected

carefully
for a civil
aircraft
civil
organization
aircraft
passengers,
and
registered
time the dl!Plicate
prepared aliases.
to
flight.
belonging to a CIA proprietary

area.
would
off on a
at Eglin AFBwould be painted
nwnberedas an exact duplicate
in the
would be
and would be
all boarded under
The actual
registered
would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft
and the actual .
aircraft
will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida.
From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft
will descend to minimum altitude
into an auxiliary
field
and go directly
at Eglin AFBwhere arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers

aircraft
to its
original
status.
and return
flight
over CUba the drone will being transmitting

national
distress
is under attack
plan.
by Cuban MIO aircraft.

by destruction
by radio signal.
,.
he
The translliission
of the aircraft
which will
This will allow !CAOradio
10
~~tl~~~lfIf~
f9P &ECRf:T
CtPf&l
t~ llANB+lNQz
1
When
on the inter-
frequency a "MAYDAY"message stating
will be interrupted
be triggered
the
The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed
of CUban
should be encouraged.
an incident
that a Cuban a1rcratt
a chartered
measures condoned by the
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
-..
NC
rlftiK
~ NOiiHN
: NlP SECRE
I @fj SPffflf
'
has happened to the aircraft

"sell"
the US what
in the western Hemisp~ere to tell
stations
instead of the US try:tng to
the inoident.
9, It is possible
to create
an incident
which will make it
appear that Communist CUban MIGs have destroyed

over international
waters in an unprovoked attaok,
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airora.ft

in trail
from Homestead AFB, Florida,
Their mission will be to reverse

These aircraft
frequent
least
actions
b,
in southern Florida.
of these flights
however, they would be
to carry live anununition in the event that hostile

were taken by the Cuban MIGs,
one such flight,
On
tail-end
a pre-briefed
Charley at considerable
pilot
interval
While near the Cuban Island this pilot
would fly
between aircraft.
would broadcast
by MIGs and was going do1m.

he had been JU111Ped
calls
at
to rema1.n at
Crews would be briefed
12 miles off the CUban coast;
required
of CUba.
course and s1.mu1ate fakir
would conduct variations
intervals.
will be dispatched
to the vicinity
for an air defense exercise
aircraft
a USAFaircraft
would be made.
The pilot
that
No other
would then fly directly
west at extremely
low altitude
and land at a seoure base, an
Eglin auxiliary.
The aircraft
would be met by the proper
people,
pilot
quickly stored
and given a new tail
number,
The
who had performed the mission under an alias,
resume his proper identity

of business.
The pilot
and return
and aircraft
would
to his normal place

would then have
disappeared.
c. At precisely
the same time that the aircraft
was
presumably shot do1m a submarine or small surface craft

would disburse
F-101 parts,
parachute,
etc.,
at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart.
returning
to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. search ships and aircraft

and parts
The pilots
of aircraft
could be dispatched
found.
ll
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
JEBRET
t 6P[-8t.M
.lJtfjN.DiitcD
.'
urec
AS'1
~1tu
ENCLOSURE
B
.
FACTSBEARING
ONTHE PROBLEM
l. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff
that US unilateral
acts against
US forces
or property
in Cuba can be
which would serve as an
upon' which to base overt intervention.
2. The need for positive
covert
intervention
stated*
in the event that the CUban regime conunits hostile
undertaken
incident
military
have previously
efforts
to foster
action
an internal
was indicated**
unsuccessful
in the event that current

Cuban rebellion
by .the Joint
are
Chiefs of Staff
on 1 March 1962, as follows:

11
revolt
determination
is impossible
that a credible
of attainment
9-10 months will require

positive
US military
3,, It is understood
preparing
suggested
for US military
during the next
a decision
to develop a Cuban "provocation"
internal
as Justification
for
action."
that
courses
intervention
the Department of State

of action
also is
to develop justification
in Cuba.
* JCS 1969/303
**
JCS 1969/313
12
T8P9t8ttet
Enclosure BI
:s. D.C.
WASHINGTON
..
'
Sfol'-240-62
l ?,:arch 1962
,.
'
J ...
..
._..: .
: ..
.,
:-
J>lEMORANDID1
FOR THE CRlEP OP STAPF, VS ARM?
Procedures to be Followed 1n .Handling

Central Intelligence
Agency, State
,
Department and US Information Agency
.
Req1.1ests for DODSupport 1n Connection
,
with the Activities
of the caribbean
',,~ . Survey Group ( cso) ( s)

Subject,
ot Defense
The Department
prepareii
'
..
.
'
...
to as 's'ist the Central rntetI1genoe
Department
of State . and the . US Information
activities
connected
Caribbean
The enclosure
such requests
Agency 1n.
sets
by the Services
to be followed
Agency, the
ot the
with the operations
Survey Group,
procedures
. :lI
... 1
..
!
haa been req1.1ested to be
torth
the
1n handlin$
for support.
.. Por the Joint
11
1,
''O,
''l"'!'F!). .
-~,...-,...''T
,..,.'r.t,~!. ."LV~
UI
'
,:i
l. . .
,., , 1
,/,/ \
.. ! ---
--
"'::::,__~
":
''
' . '
Y,i.
. C) , , .~.,T,CNCtl!ffil:UEO '
-
--~
'. .
,-,,- .
'---'-<
I
I
..
F. J. BLOUIN
.. .
- ...
RAdm, USll
Secretar;r
Enclosure:
Subj as above
:.
I
Chiefs ot Sta.tr,
..
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
'
EXCLUDED
FRO!!AUTOllATIC
REGRADIIIG;
DODDill 5200.10
DOESIIOTAPPLY
...,
'
,,
-:
;,J'~
. .. .
-
''
'
,.
II
; .-: : . :.::
.
,,! .\ .
,1,+:
.. r: \.., ,,,';. ,....':.
;.,,-=
~/'
: ' . .: ; , ,,
.~ :n=: ..\:.~'
.~
":',
.... . .:.,:
" .,:, ; , ..
:? : :'i,\ .'
. .
- "<;.
. , ....
.:
. t
.,
.
~ ,
. . :
i.:'.~
.:.::,.(..
.I
; .,, , . :
.... ,.
1'
II
11
I,
.,, , ...
.... :.,:....:... : ...... ~ \ , .
,~ r,; -..~ . , . . ..:,.: ' ,
,
. ~;
:.
-~ i ... .. ~
.
.:.. , ., .,t
. ..
t
.. , ""
, ,
..
, ..,)
I!
- -. .
'
, '
.;
.f.
" .
I
I
~-~
_ ,,.
...
)t.~
:;_ -:--
..
',", ~.,,. .f. ,. ';.
:.- ~.,.,....
' '.}
... .. ..,~
..
:.
':
;_,: .... ;, ,~..~: :~;,:( .: . . -~.:
.
J
...
.:.: ::~... .a
.. .
..
rr'
.-
.I :
. ,I
.I
U~Gtl
\i\t9
'
...
..,,-
II
.:.:~~~;!
.
'
l March -1962
..
'
MBHOIWmUM
FOR 111&emu OP' OP~TIOIIS ,, C1JU Plto.Jl!Cl'
SW>ject, Procedures t,.or llOl)

~
approve4.
tlle attached p~er,
..
~=i'ilionauo_n.
..:t,
..
"',)
port of, tile Op!>_rattou
of. CU, thi State l>ip_ytii~
, ~ tbi USU
alid Mr. Gilpauic
21ie Joint dliara or Stitt
.. ,,,..
!lave
1'll ro:r.var4e4 ror
. vbich
.
"
.-:.
;
'
WILLL\MB. CRAIG
Bri' General, 118A
l
.
l)QI)JCS Representative
CUibbean
Burii t
Group
....,.,..,1
.....--:.".
-.
..
. ......
,l~
..
.,..
.,
'
EXCLUDID
FROMGO$
.....' .
..."'----~
. ,;
-~
...,.~~~"
_[@RSERE
f_NFRN
..
ik~'ft
....,,."(,,.
... . ,-,
SPECIAL
HAND
lllNG
' \
.... ....,. -
.; , .-.< ... -, .... _,,,
'"""
'
.... ,,
' .
.
1
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFer1se

WASHINGTON 2.S, D.C.
'I
28 Feb 1962
. ..
.
<
'
..
. ..
.. MEMORANDUM
FOR THEDOD/JCSREPRESENTATIVE
Caribbean Survey Group ,..
..
II
Subject:
Cuba Project
11
,,
'
The, attached
.,
Ii
forwarding
procedures
are approved for
to the Chief of Operations , Cuba Project,
.'.
as the DODpos i tion with respect
'
CIA, the State Department,
.'
connected with the Caribbean Surv ey Group;
11
!
'
to suppor t of the
and USIA activities
'
11
II
:i.
.
.
'
:Enclosure :
DODProcedures
II
'
I
I
""I,\
~ClllOEI> f"'-'
GOS
i
'
f
'j
___
oo
_ Es
_ uo
::..:
T~AP
:::.:.;
PL:::Y
~--
+&P
&E
6RE+11ilt.E
&lt~ ~atNi~II S N1Q~~ uJ
1
i---
EXCLUDED Facu AUT:J

''ATI'
REGRAD
I ''G
"
~
1
; DODDIR . 5200, 10
-----:-~
-.
-...
- .,~-;-- .-"!-:...--;.
t,
'\
.. .. ..
.-. . ..t . . . .,.
, .; :: 1:,:--,~ -..
,.
..
,# ,
..'
, . .,:
~
11
:t
.,
..
..
-
..,...
.."
I
;JI
U,
AJlMU.eH' ,,......!l!it.llN!llffl
...._ .
t3J;h Hf -I ' . sn!e&FId ff I

.......
' ,.I
ENCLOSURE
..
..
' BE FOLLOWED
PROCEDURES
TO
IN HANDLING
CIA STATEDEPARTMENT
AflD
us~!1..REQt1ESTSF0?.
.
DO!) SUPPOP.TIM C,CNNECT!ON':!ITE ~EE ACT!'.'!T!ES
OF THE CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP(CSG) (S)
1. \~11
en approved by \he
Secretary
of D~fense the DODwill
.....
support full y on a high priority I basis requests
for support
..
received in :~i tihg f~o~ the CIA, the ~:ate Department, and the
Agency in connection with the activities

,.. .
..
of
2. CIA, State
..... Department and the US Information
Agency
US Information
the CSG.
',
should submit requests

Defense (Assistant
for DODsupport to the Secretary
to the Secretary
Operations)~ . ID
hese .requests
m~tion of the overall
and should include
assistance
to permit a determination
the requested
project.
of .such a request
in writing
to the Secretary
will forward the request
Representative..
the following
of Defense (Special
to the DOD/JCS
of tne CSG
b, The DOD/JCSRepresentative
will consult
with the
and then secure the comments and recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

request
infor-
will apply:
Operations)
Services
suf.ficient
for accomplishment of the mission
is in support of this
a. The Assistant
'
-should -contain
a code word to indicate
3. Upon receipt
procedures
of Defense (Special
plan or project
of the equipment best .suited
of
He will then return
with recommended action
for decision.
The Services
to the Secretary
the
of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will be advised of t~e decision.

~. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agenc:<_z
-.... .
requests for DODsupport involving s.tgnificant numbers of
military
personnel,
supply will require

prior
to the
amounts of equipment, or equipment in short

the approval of the Secretary
.
furnishing
of Defense
of such assistance.
Enclosure
EXCLUDED
.FROM GD&
/
.J . --. . ....,
p
the Department of State and the US Information

DODwill be retained
and- consistent
under the control
Agency from the
of the DODwhen f easible

.
with the accomplishment of the mission.
6. As determined by the -Secretary
of Defense DODagencies
will be reimbtirsed for support rendered CIA, "the Department

of State and the US Information
existing
procedures.
within the resources
Agency in accordance
'
,., .
Otherwise,
available
with .
such support will be provided

to the DOD. Determination
of
reimbursement wilL not in any way delay the implementation

the support
7, Advance security
projects
that
planning will be made a part of all
provide support to the CIA, the Department of
State and the US Information
Agency.
This advance security
planning will be in conformance with the provisions

Directive
of DOD
5200.1, dated 8 July 1957,
8. In the event the Services

direct
of
requested.
receive
requests
for support
from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information
.. Agency, which involve significant

personnel,
amounts of military
'
short supply,
number s of military
equipment, or equipment in
they will inform -the DOD/JCSRepresentative
of
such requests.
Enclosure
; .('f-.
,..;
..
__,...'---,
~ , ~--'--
~1
... .,i,j'
"'
-:: ... :,,:.-.
"" . ' .
".;,.--t
. ........ ...
'fJ-', .......
-.. .,,. "'"
.,:Utttl~S\f
\\; '
.....
""'- -1
'
.. A'.Q9~Jril):O!lilliJ!!a
...,,~
7 Bebrua~ 1962
,..
L.
;..
I
At t he1r meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs
<
:~
or Start approved the recOl!llllendatlona or the DODRepreaentat ~
. .
L:
i'.
....;; t ~ ~~!.1
~
1b~e!!!' survey Oro!II)aa a~"' .rorth ~ --p~ ~ a~~--~~.:..__
...,,, o!!" the ~siiliJect pape~;'-as
ameni1ed"b;y chinglffs tlie lJi'"
econi1 para- ,
. t
,.
graph 0 Enclosure A ao ae to reai1: , _
'
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend t hat
.. "2.
.,
'ltlie attacl\ed proposal be adopted aa the otticlal

position
DOD
and forwarded to the Olilef or Operations,
Cuba ProJect . "

It was also agreed that General Craig sholll<I.convey-to
the Deputy-Secretary- or Defense the Joint Chiefs' position
'
f.
I
..
'
the access 11st would be extended Ito inc lude the tour Se~v1ce
Intelligence
Corpe.
'
f\'Olil - IIJE.wL ING S
.'
l .
De
~ut
;-....,
--- ---,. -1..
Cl)leta, the Deputy-Connander 01' TAC,r the
~. ---.
Comnander, olJ.COIW!C
~ and the Col11118nder
ot
...
___
.~
EXCWDEI>
,.__,,,
,
-. FROMGOS
the -18th Ai;; ~me

'
VJ i\ -.;IJ1
<:...-
t~
J ruc.C.v Q,:,t)
i--
. . '~...
. fJ
'
7 February 1962
Decision on:
JCS 1969/303
( NORTHWOODS
) ( S)
At their
or Statr
meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Cniefs .
a!)proved BOEHCraig's
in paragraph
recommendations as set forth
13 of the sub Jeot paP,er, as .amended by changes
in the second paragraph of Enclosure
A.
J=
....
_
'
. .....
lJJ/4
-'J
ff
?~
....
~
M.~<71INX.O'}.J<.LX..ID0<-<1.,,,--
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary
Copy to:
'
General Craig
UNCl~~!lf
IW,-o~
mfiryf _f&>)tt1<
,,..G'
Bl
./ -
./
,y
ir]lfrl~
..
~~
: -:
ti , , - .~
COPYNO.
l March 1962
to the
HOLDERSOF JCS 1969/311
A Note by the Secretaries
on
(S)
NORTHWOODS
Holders are requested

Decis i on On and to destroy
with security
to substitute
the attached
the superseded
Decision
revised
On in
regulations.
F.
J.
BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint
Secretariat
.
EXCLUoro
FROM
GDS
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
RF.GRADING;
DODDIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
UNCl~~~HR..-$
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
accordance
! .._
~RET
.
2nd N/H of JCS 1969/311
.. \,
I ;
51 ~
calkP&c
&:
'.S:~:@.
~P.:
revi
COPYNO.
JCS 1969/311
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
20 February 1962
Page 2152
to the
on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
A report*
consideration
on the atove subject

by the Joint
is submitted
for
Chiefs of Staff.
F.
J . BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint
Secretariat
'
* Not reproduced;
on file
in Joint
Secretariat
EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY.
rwr
-m!!!fr""...""."
JCS 1969/311
f.XCWDEDFROMGDs
' 2152
~U.1
'
,,
:@lWNW.,ifn{fiiMae
1.:
ffi@@n:tr
SiSJ1Biir-'rl
Y
COPNO.
JCS l969.Z3ll
SPECIAl.D,ISTRIBUTION
J0INT CH]EFSOF STAFF
DECISIONON J.CS,1969/311
A Note by th~ Secretar ies
on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
Note by the Secretaries
1. At their
of Staff
meeting on 20 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs
approved the recommendations in paragraph l of
JCS 1969/311 as amended by changes in paragraphs
l, 3b, 4 and
6 of Appendix l to Enclouvre C.
2. At their
of Staff
dations
meeting on 23 February 1962, the Joint
reconsidered
in paragraph
Chiefs
JCS 1969/311 and approved the recommenl, amended as indicated
further amended by changes to paragraph

of Appendix l to Enclosure C.
3 .' The memorandumin Enclosure
above, and as
2 and subpar<1.graph 3b .
was forwarded as JCS(4-l58-62,
dated 28 February 1962, to the Secretary
of Defense.
randum in Enclosure B was forwarded to:
Chief of staff,
by SM-240-62; Chief of Naval Operations
The memo-
US Army
by SM-241-62; Chief of
Staff, US Air Force by SM-2#2-62; and Commandant of the Marine

Corps by SM-243-62. All SM's were dated l March'l962.
'.
4. In tliat the Commandant had expressed direct~ concern of
the Mnrine Corpe in thls
matter,
US Code 141 ( c), applied
and were followed ..
5. ,This decision
tfie provisions
'
of Title
now becomes a part or and shall
as the top sheet or JCS 1969/311.
.
'
10,
be attached
..Mt' tltlilltl
PROCEDUREST-0 BE FOLLOWEDIN HAfJDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT,
N WITH THE AC'rIVITI!!:S
USIA Ri!:QUESTSFOR DODSUPPORT IN CONNECTIO
OF '.!'HE CARIBBB!\N SURVEX GP.CUP (CSG) (S)
1 . WhP.n approv, ~d hy t:.!,e S.;,cretary

su pport
fully
of Defense
the DOD wi ll
on a h:i.gh pr .i o,r 1~y hac:l.s reques t s for
recei ve,1 ii::. vrci ting

US Information
f ro m the CIA, the
Ageney in conn,~ction
State
with
support
Department,
and the
t he a ct.l. vi tiez
of
the CSG.
2. CIA, State
should
ancl the
s1~llmi.t rcqu,~,;t s for

<Assist(.l.nt
De.tense
Ope ratj_ons)),
mation
Depart:nent
US l nf o:rmatj.c: 1 Agency
DOD su pp ort
an d shou J.d. include
pl an or project
a cod~ word to in:licat

project
3. Upon recei 9t of such a rcqt,est

wi ll
will
Repres.,ntative
to the
will
for
military
personnel,
consult
with
the
co1e1ments and recommend a tions
of . Staff.
The Services
be advised
will
(S pecial
to t he tlOD/JC S
will
He will
wi t.!1 r ec orn.m
ended action
requests
prior
secu::-a the
Chiefs
4 . CI A, State
supply
of l)efense
of the CSG.
de cision.
for
s t ha request ed
in .-1ri t i ng the following
forwa::-d the req1 !e st
a nd then
request
of the mission
Sec;:-etary
b. The DOD/JCS Representative
Joinc
ion
ap ply:
a . The Assi,stant
Oi;e rations)
info r-
to permi t. a determinat
accom~>lish ment
assi s tan<;e i s in S'v.pport cf this
of the
:r of
'hese reques i:.s should. conta .in sufficient
of th9 e111ipment bes t s uite d for
Se rv ices
Secrctar
to th..; ,"Jecretal.';r of' Dei\onse (Special
of the: over all
pro cedures
to the
then
return
t o thP. Secretary
and the
Joint
the
of Defense
Chiefs
of Staff
of the dc,cision.
Depart ment and the
DOD support
require
involving
amounts
significant
of equipment,
the ap proval
to the furnishing
US Infor mation
1
by the
Joj,nt
numbers of
or eq_ui,ment
of the Secretary
of such assistance
P.gency
in short
of Defense
Enclosure A
Chi.efs
of Staff
on 20 & 23 Feb
1I!r xt JilCJ
!s ~MWitA
L
5.
Military
the Departmerrt
DOD will
p ersonne l and/or
of State
be retained
and consistent
under t he control
be reimbursed
fo~ support
end the US Information
exj .sting
!J?'Ocedures.
reimb tusement
1,.ill
Agency in accordance
~Vo.ilable
that
will
not in an.y way delay
pro v:lde support
of
the implementation
will
be made a p art
of
This advance
security
of DOD
da tea 8 .l\:ly l 95'i .
8. In the eve:1t the Servi(;es
receive
from t he CIA, the State
Department
Agency , which involve
significant
they will
inform
requests
f or sup port
and the US Infor mation
numbers of mili ta1y
amounts of mil::. ta..:-:r equipr.ient,
supply,
of all
tn the CIA, the Departme nt of
be i.n confo.rmance w:i th the previsions
5200 .1,
personnel,
be provided
to the DOD. De ter mination
Sta te :ind the US Inf or.matio!1 Agency .
direct
with
such st:ppo1t wtll
7. Advance sac \:ri ty planning
short
CIA, the Department
request~d.
the support
Directive
of Defe nse DODagencies
rendered
Othsrwise,
withi : , the resources
planning
of the DOD when feasible
by the Secret.,.ry
of State
projects
Agency from the
with the e cccmplishm en t of the mission.
6. As determh1e<l
will
and the US Information
or equipment
the DOD/JCS Representative
in
of
suc h requests.
Enclosur e A
0
(Amendea as d irec ted by the Joint
Chiefs
of Staff
20 & 23 Fe b lii2
E:NCLOSi.i'RE
B
MB;MORANilUM
FOR: Secretary of State
Di.:i'ect0r , Central Intell i gence Agency
Di;:'ectox, United Stat es Infor mation Agency
!'ro ceduro :; to oe Follcwed in Handl ing
I:equsts f.or DODSupport in Connectio:-i with
the Activities
cf the Car:!..::>
tea n Survey Grot:.p
l . Refe;-ence is ir.ade to the ac tiviti
es of the Caribbean
Survey Group (CSG).

;,. Requests for DODsupport
of th P. CSG sho'.l.ld be submitted
Defe nse (Assistant
Opera t i 0ns)).
in connection
in writing
to the Secretary
In order to i':icilita
te and expedite
infor mation of the overall
a determination
of the personnel
for accomplishment
to the Secretary
of
of Defense (Special
furnis h.in g of such support , each request

sufficient
with t he activities
the
should contain
plan or project
to permit
and / or cquir, ment best suited
of the miss i on and an agreed code word to
in di cate tha t t he r equested
ass istanc e is in !;Upor t of thjz
project.
J. In re gard to the fu.,ding of the operations,

desired
t hat,
as determin0d
by the Secretary
it is
of Derens e , DOD
agencies
be re i mbursed for 1;uppo:rt r endered in accordance
existl.ng
procedures .
Determina tion of rei:nbursement
in any way delay tba implementation
with
will not
cf the support requested.
!n t he event agreem'3nt cannot be reached quic kly on t he

funding,
later
! propose t hat the fundi ng problem be resolved
at a
dats .
4. I trust
that yo,l will
that the abov'3 meats with your approva l and

inform me accordingly.
Enclosure
....
19....
NO
FORN .,w
rvrcr
DfiiMbiu:. -OFORN:i
$~
- CbiJR~r~,~iiiiliiiliiii,.
- - .7zi
1:w - ,..,-
SPECIAL HANDLING
GLiJ
-
SPECJA
L fJANDliN
G
II
REPORTBY THEDOD/JCSREPRESENTATIVE
OF
THE CARIBBEAN
SURVEYGROUP
to the
on
PROCEDURES
TO BE FOLLOWED
IN HANDLIN(L
C!A, STATE
DEPART!'P.i
~T ANDUS INFORMATION
AGEN
:J:? IiEQUF..rsFOR
DODSUPPORTIN CONNECTION
WITHT".tfilf :}: 'l i'.LTIES
.)!,' THE CA
P.IBBEANSURVEYGROUP( ~l
--
l.
'Fae
reconunends that the Joint
of the Caribbean Survey Group
Chiefs of Staff:
a. Note the contents
of Enclosure
b . Approve and forward Enclosure

the Secretary
to Enclosure
II
11
'I
A and Enclosure
B.
C, with Appenc!ices, to
of the proposed procedures
C) by the Secretary
Chief of Staff,
of .Defense,
(Appendix l
transmit
US Army, Chief of Naval
US Air Force and the Commandant
'
r--- -- - -- r,: - - l.
.Joris 1:o'J'
1,Y
--- - ... .. ---- - EXCf,IIL'!-;OFHVM
':'ti:.l~.1i C
llEGl!AJ/ll:C: D:JD Flfl! 5200 . 10
lt i'f
EXCLUD
ED FROM GOS
SP ;ICCJJ!
M
cy......
L ..oi....-?..<?,1opi
e~
NOFORN
SPECIAL
HANDLING
Amended as directed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 February l;-9,6;:? r,'.irT

,
11
,,
9
10
II
-,
of the Marine Corps.
C:11
Enclosure D to the Chief ofStaff,

Operations,
of Defense.
c. After approval
'
'
,,
:iji@KN~t!~r
::ww
'"
-
ENCLOSURE
A
DRAF
T
.,.
~-
- ' .", d1 .,
. t.,. t . .. L... ...
;
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
Subject:
Procedure to be Followed
telligence
Agency, State
atio n Agency Requests for
tion with the Activities
Group
1. The attached
mends procedures
in Handling Central .InDepartment and US Infor mDODSupport i n Connecof the Caribbean Survey
memorandumfor the Secretary
of Defense recom-
to be fo ll owed for DODsupport of the operations
of the Central
Intelligence
Agency (CIA), St~te Department and
US Information
Agency (USIA) in connection
of the Caribbean Survey Group.
with the activities
Past experience
indicates
the
need for such procedures.

2 . The recommended ~rocedures
conference.held
are based upon the results

of Defense on 30
with the Deputy Secretary
January 1962 by the DOD/JCSRepresentative
on the CSG.
3. The procedures recommended to the Secretary

will
State
afford
fu ll DODsupport to the operations
Department and USIA in connection
4 . The proc edures provide

requests
requests
to the DOD/JCS
- Representative
ations
will
~f the DOD
.
Department arid
in turn refer
Chiefs of Staff
with recommendations
and then
to the Secretary
WILLIAMH. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
SPECIAL HANDLI
NG
v'atass cr
2
the
on the CSGfor evaluation.
Defense for decision .
7 . 7 . 18!1.~efl!B'J.'-~eiffi:'
of
secure the comments and recommend-
of the Serv i ces and the Joint
forward the request
of
point of view of
for the submission in writing
of Defense, who will
The DOD/JCSRepresentative
of the CIA, the
t he best interests
for DODsupport by the CIA, the State
USIA to the Secretary
of Defense
with the activities
the CSG. At the same time, from the over-all

the US Government, it will protect
of a
Enclosure A
SPECIAL
HANDLIN
G
of
.-
sr1
G
IALHAN
DLJ
NG
.;. 'l.}ti' -,1

II
~ ~
ENCLQSUREB
MEMORANDUM
FOR RECORD
Subject :
Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense

and his Reaction to Original Proposed Policy
for CIA Support by the Department of Defense
of CaribbeanSurvey Group (30 January 1962)
Mr. Gilpatric
did not like this
the paper was too negative
paper at all.
and restricted
towards an enemy like we are dealing
as though a policy
with the Germans or Italians,
not a fellow ,!.;partment of our Government.

operation
with the blessing
him as a most important

important
request
the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
for th0ir
The Secretary
after
the advice of the Joint
considering
the decision
will
of individual
Chiefs of Staff,
of the Secretary
actions
in minutia regarding
regardless
required
of Defense .
on each case.
actions.
what
This
in a case-by-case
basis.
We
We do not want
This is a red line priority
problem and must be handled with dispatch
other details.
evaluat J.on and
Chiefs of Staff.
We do not want to get involved

do not want individual
it and
of Defense will determine,
be, not the Joint
is the prerogative
When a
will evaluate
recommendations.
involved
the most
m:ts sion we have in the government today.

comes in from CIA, you (Craig)
masses
an:l approved by
This is probably
request
decision
T:~.s is a red line
of the President
task.
He indicated
and without getting
expenses and reimbursement
or
Depar1;ment of Defens .e may have to do it themselves
who foots
to reimburse
the bill.
In some cases,
if so determined
CIA will be
by the Secretary
of
Defense.
This is a matter which must be decided by the
Secretary
of Defense - not the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Department of Defense budgets for some CIA support.
The
We have
equipment of some types lying around not being used and should
not require
reimbursement
for this
must be decided by the Secretary

an evaluation
$
by the Services
type,
as a general
of Defense after
and the Joint

3
rule.
considering
Chiefs of Staff.
Enclosur e B
This
[PlCIAL
rn!ff:
NoFv,.a
LING
y o&
'H~
NOtF
~G
There are some assets sf!L 1AL

without and should make
these types available to the CIA without necessarily
being
reimbursed
for it.
Mr. Gilpatric
Chiefs of Staff
Joint
does not object
to the
recommending to the Secretary
of
Defense what equipment should be used for accomplishment of

stated
mission and specific
Gilpatric
projects.
that we were not trying
I explained
to obstruct
that we read our message loud and clear.

Bob Kennedy's instructions
cant add anything
He indicated
Saturday
that llr. McNamarahad been

developments
'
security,
as expressed
to me last
Mr. Gilpatric
etc.
the people necessary
regarding
said I could inform
the project
1n order to get
This was up to my judgment.
that I was the DODRepresentative
make recommendations
concerning
requests
and Chiefs should determine
Mr. Gilpatric
for CIA support.

that the Services
the proper personnel
to be used for specific tasks
and
since they were better
and limitation
made
and he wanted me to
I emphasized the urgent requirement
as to capability
Saturday
numbers in the Department of Defense who
knew of the project,

the job done.
"I
that he would inform him in regard to Mr.
McNamara's apprehensions
it clear
which ho stated:
on the Hill and had not kno~m of latest
project,
concerning
I showed him Mr.
my meeting with Mr. McNamara of last
with Mr. Gilpatric.

on this
the operation,
to that."
I discussed
preoccupied
concerning
to Mr.
of their
equipment
qualified
equipment and personnel
than the CIA.

In summary, Mr. Gilpatric
lishment
that
of a policy
the decision
was the prerogative

Chiefs of Staff.
on this
subject.
the need for the estab-
He was most emphatic
as to whether or not a request

of the Secretary
and recommendations
@p?!ti.#Jifi:;
NOFORN
S EC
LING
was approved
of Defense NOTthe Joint
However, the Secretary
to have evaluations
..;ii.,.-
recognized
of Defense would like

of the Joint
Chiefs of
j;,'
T\lllffli
SPEG
l;\LHANDLING
Enclosure B
JjNmJ~lf
~
iBIJ!~r.ffl~~LHAND
LING
.NOFORN
,
Staf f available
f or consideration
on the subject.
He considered
original
in making impor tant

the approach
iecomrnendation s nmch too neg a tive
adopt a more positive
approach
decisions
used in our
and directed
me to
in a new proposa l .
WILLIAM
H. CRAIG
Brig . General, USA

DOD/JCS Re9r.esentative,
Car i bbean s,.,;rvey Group
'
4,d . Ff~
.il C'Jtfl~fl!ff
- NOFORN
L HANDLING
..,e
...,
~.."".
Enclo s ure B
{(
,.
'FOP
SfC~ET
-v
U&.JV.IM.J4
..1,v..1. ,
"''
NU~OKN
SPECIAL
HANDLING
ENCLOSURE
C
. I
DRAFT
.Wf'S~CRET
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
1
Subject:
Procedures to be Followed in Handling CIA,

State Department, and USIA Requests for
DODSupport 1n Connection with the
Activities
of the Caribbean Survey Group.
1. Reference
is made to the memorandum for Brigadier
General William H. Craig, USA, from the Assistant

Secretary
of Defense,
subject:
"Special
to the
Projects",
dated
17 January 1962.
in***
Intelligence
operations
and materials
and invited
role
Agency and Department of State
as Defense conunitments of men, money,

conc<!l'ning the Defense
and contributions.
State
of the Central
for DODsupport
Intelligence
Department and the US Information
of State,
5. Issuance
Agency in connection
of a recommended memorandum for
the Director,
and the US Information

gover nin g DODsupport
Agency, the
of the Caribbean SUrvey Group ( CSG).
4. Enclosure 2 is a draft
t he Secretary
Central
Agency settin g forth

of the operations
Intelligence,
procedures
of the CSG.
of the recommended memoranda should assure
the procedures
7
8
10
11
1 recommends procedures
with the ac ti vi ties
formal recommendations
of the operations
that
to assist
are required."
3. Enclosure
~lb. Department of Defense must be prepared

Central
2. The refE:,:cmced memorandum states:
fully
governing DODsupport
of the operations
of the CSG are followed.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Enclosur e C
,, :.
' . '....
OFOR
N
'
ENCLOSURED
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
Subject:
Chief of Staff,
US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff,
US Air Force
Co:nmandant of the Marine Corps
Procedures
to be ,Followed in Handling Central
Intelligence
Agency~ State Department and US
Information
Agency uequests
for DOD Support in
Connection with the Activities
of the Caribbe an
Survey Group (CSG)
The Departr- ,,:,;-.t of Defense

to assist
the Central
has been reques a,:,.'. to be prepared
Intelligence
of Stat e ,. and the US Information

with
the operations
clost.re
sets
in handling
forth
Agency (CIA),
Agency in activit:
of the Caribbean
the procedures
such requests
for
the Department
.~s connected
Survey Group.
The en-
t.o be fo1. lowe d by ri1e Services
support.
EXCLVDE
D 1,'H
) i
-. \. .J AU-':J!!
.\ w:-,...
'..-tn , : DODi>IP r.... - \.,
DOP
S ~
!o~ ~ v~oo.10
flZGR:'.r:
- "C
-
10
qp SF('.RET
.,,
APPLY
'~ J
Enclosure
.'
l"
D,
: I
SECRFJ.'
. '
. JCSil969X.303
COPY, NO.
---
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
8 February il.962
JOINT , CHIEFS OF STAFF

'
DECISION
~N.JCS .1969/303
............,
A Note by the Secretaries

on
NORTHWOODS(S)
Note by the Secretaries
.....
1. At their
Staff
meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint
approved the recommendations 1n paragraph
Chiefs of
13 of JCS
1969/303 as amended by changes in the second paragraph of

Enclosure A.
2. Thia decision now becomes a part of and shall
as the top sheet of JCS 1969/303.
be attached
F. J. BLOUIN
svsrrr,t~
TIC
ALLY REV!fW
~IM, (7(/
BYJCSON-----'d.-O;:'.'lL4't
<1-(..
'"';.~
ClASS
;FiCATiO!'JCO~Tif;UE
O
.:.....
M. J.
INGELIDO
Joint
Secretariat
Ql,\GDS
EXCLUDED
FR
,.
..
. ;.,
' .
f.~t
'-'
.
1
7 February
COPYNO-- - -SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
UNt!~~~lf
If0
1962
Page 2144
NOTEBY THESECRETARIES
to the

on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
report* on the above subJect
tio n by the Joint Chiefs of St aff.
A
is submitted for considera-
F. J . BLOUIN
Not reproduced;
on file
in Joint
; rre
INGELIDO
Joint
Secretariat
Secretari at
fXClUDEOFRON.GO,
9BF
JCS 1969/303
M. J.
2144
,.
~NCl~~~lf
IfD
~ JOP SECRET
NO
n,~Rf._,
TOP SEC
!!
!~!~il
\:lliJ~~
SPECIA
i. HAriDUN
G 'Jr!\_r..
11
II
1,
1,

OF DEFENSEANDTHE
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
SURVEYGROUPTO THE-C~N,
CARIBBEAN
,,
on
CUBANPROJECT
1,
'
II
I
I prt
' c,(Z
EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
-~ri! YEcRET
--BXCLun
~;-i,'Ri~;
~i~
::,"
i.c
,\!'IC
I
!!ECRAJJ
:NC:: DODDIll ~,!OU. JC
r,01,
:s 110-r,._1
1,1s
TOP
I
. .
.,
"
. !',:,; ..:/''L
' .
..' ~
;
.i
f'
'"), _.,'i, l_".''

-,.I/ 1t"'
~ '/" N !tll ,, --,

ic>}Jt.),.''-" ,J~ jJ~
ll
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOl"oRN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
POSITIONOF DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE,CUBAPROJECT
THE PROBLEM
1. Au requested
by the Chief of Operations,
oine a firm US position

to o.o ~<:)1~
regarding
Cuba Project*
the stal<e and role
of the Dspartment of Defense in the event US assistance

requ ,,:;ted in support
of Cuban insurgent
efforts
is
to overthro11
the :3 stro government.

ASSUMPTIONS
~,;. i,:-,,.,nal Security
Policy concerning
overthro11 of the
~.'::;:;;~o :r :;f:s.na i s as agreed at the 9 May 1961 meeting

,\:. ~ 1::..1 :s,~r.'lLl~it y Councl.'l . *
1'~11
..'
:,.,_.
. :::-cuation in Cuba will be, a s re~lected
Nat:!," iel .-:ntelligence
of the
in current
Estimates.***
., . Op-,,iit i<:>
YI'; o.,c;'iinst
the Castro government will be covert
~ ":~.\':.;. fa v.:s, :.;,,e Castro government.

FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLE
M
~, At the 5 May 1961 meeting''"* or the National
Coun:!il it was agreed that US policy
the downfall
determined
of Castro.
close
toward Cuba should aim at
Other signif:icant
elements
of policy
at that meeting were :
a. The United States

vention
Security
in Cuba at that
the possibility
b. The United States

or attempt
should not undertalce milit ary inter time but should do nothing
of military
intervention
to fore-
.in the future.
should not impose a naval blockade
an air war against
Cuba.
Memorandumfrom Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for

Brigadier General W. H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special
Project" dated 17 Jan 1962, not on file in Joint Secretariat
Y... >- Enclosure
to JCS 2304/36
'*'** SNIE 85-61, dated 28 Nov 61, also NIE 85-62 to be pub!l.ished
7 Feb 1962, both documents will be available through Joint
Secretariat
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NORORN
.
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
U~CllSS\f
\E9
'11"
I.! i
fogenqy.,
Intelligence
,d~
~~~dent
~a J, the Central
e.tiMl.' de V~ ~nts,
~.
elements
t.;.).~
)\
"'sb.oi.,d mal{e
study c;>fpossi'b+e wtakn~ssr,~ , !1l'ldvulnerabili~ies
a :;,;)tailed
i,1
!,',
SPECIAL HANDLmG REQUIRED

NOFORN
t:ti\ifTED !>J:STRIBUTION
..."'
~11,
c . The dl;'ecj;i ~n, of
i, Ji
~ lll'
1' 'II"
.\ e;ll
., 11
\\.., 1i
ll\). .11
\\.
c'o~~oi
i~ !)b, /, 'l<f!ISno'fe d.
....
' . ...
~~~ ~nc:i,osure B.
Which exert
7. For ad~ittonal
raqts,
'
DISCUSSION
.''(
8. For discussion,
:,. Th9 oasic
see Epclosure
C.
CONCLUSIONS
,tr1; ,
imP+!
cation~ of Castro's

mi+itaryl
Communist
gov0 n .if;l?.:. <,re as follows:

~
'
a.
l (, e),.1)9ses t ~E! Western
b:x<:~:::-; ':hreat
~..;. ':.:.cm,,~.
to fts
Hem113phere j;o an increasingly
secr4"ty.
'!'his increases
vulnerabitity
anq d~f!;mse costs
-:i:"e lc ;:.~d Qr shifteq
to ll!eE!1i1(h1s threat.
o.
t,: : ."J
;,
..
i::,c::r
};-"' 1 c, re r
had for " spreading
t ~,,:; W,,fl ce;-n ijemispqe f e .
as forces
j;he most effective
Communism throughout
'fhif! in turn
:;.,, -~ r,,.,.;iibil :\ty th~Ji additional
Latin
greatly
increases
American countries
.') 1 ,~01r.,
, .:nder Conqunist control.
Elilnination
; ,~:.:) would demonstrate
to the other
nations
th<! United
not tolerate
such intrusions.
States
will
'
.
Communist control
result
are
p:".'o,, :~.:~: the Soviet; Union with
'. 1.
our
qf additional
cquntries
of this
of the world
that
would or could
in:
(1) Ipcreaseq
pther
Communist capability
.
. Pf the' Western
.
In 1,;rqa5~q
natipns
(2)
for
attack
on
Hemisphere;
.'
.
Conununist
.
....' . ' capability
:
for
spreading
Commun+~~ ttif9 ~ 1~u,y ~ pi~ Arn~rica;

'
'
(3' ~p~.lQ~~
o;f
areas!
strate~1
f!9!lf
ft,r"
;i
..
fi r,~t ~fr~r~
.'
t .
'
~xf s~ipg and /or poj;entia;

bases, trainin
1
!1f'
apd ris~ts, ~!3 well i;is sour~es of
~,g~~f!ary
. , .
~o or milita;-y
!
qapaqility;
SI']i:CIAL HA-NDLINO
RE UIRED'
2
DIS!ffiIBUTION
' 'll'
~
)ll) ~ Jt;'Cl.ttlf~1~
SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRED
NOFORN
Lil{CTE'DDISTRIBUTION
(4) An increased
the Panama Canal
10 . .['he urgency
threat
through
t o US usage
subversion
of the requirement
and control
and sabotage.
to remove the Communist
gove~~nm,.,,,t .from Cuba is made apparent
by Castro's
incr 1asir, i:; capabilities
other
West ,;:n Hemisphere

the :t,.:~nisphere.
for
attacking
and i'or spreading
This
coe;,.'r;es of aci;ion
constantly
nations
of the
Communism throughout
sen:ie of urgency
within
of
is gre ,,tly
t,he capability
increased
if
of t.r.e Communists are
con :~:~'ierad:
,,. '!:.,,~ Soviets
cou). ,,1 establish
:,!\J.!:i ~y~::i.cm:.s,s :tlcs with

:1,;:.m,.'.:r: the
missiles
nuclear
set
that
~r.
:,:,~~
..; ,l'1~re.
1
for.th
the Connnun ist
a:>ove,
regime
The Department
acc,:-:;.~:ab:, :: to the U"i ted

Bloc reactions
Com,;,,mlst
recognized,
it
accoinplished
serious
States
without
ef 'f'ect
that
of Def ens<?. is prepared
other
3 a govern ment
ty of
than Cuba is
general
opinion
to
C..:ba to the extent
the project
precipitating
on wor ld public
of! the
Whil e the possibil1
in areas
ls believed
~he Df.lpartment
requ i raments
and installin
.
bases
in Cuba i s
ov,, .: ,.!.y ()1:.;

,po1't any popu la r movement inside
of ,; " ;tJ .rrr,; the Co!iu,1unist regime
air
joi: ,i; con t r ol of the
i nf'):,,;:a t;,<:,-~e :~th the minimum security

i/cG :-.,~:~n
sea and/or
wc:rhe ads ; or they could
and maintain
factors
of ~;;f en ,,,,. holds
land,
if
objective
can be
war , and without

the following
four
cond :i.tion::, pre vail:

a. If the :impression
ur~ent,
and /or
is created
humanit ar :i.an requirement

the Unitecl States
assistance
that
to restore
is responding
fro m a government
there
. -
is an
order
in Cuba
to an appeal
representat
f or
i ve of the
Cuban people.
NO!.'
' ORN
.LrMl'l'ED'DI STRIBUTION
j, )' ;'
:tJ'' .'......
,
:t
Jti>h i1':t'
...
")> !l,; " :,> l'\ !.l.''
'
<,;!'Ii
.';-
'f
(\I);p) ~ :[~
<Cill /fi:'/!'
NOFORN
LI M
"'firED DISTRIBUTION
UNtlAS~lf
IEU
b. If it
is announced
t l~,t the United
States
to the overt
and/or
n,ov tn i :l.nto Cuba for

hold'. V,~ free
prior
other
the purpo s e of restoring
elections,
and that
capability
to maintain
action
members of t he OAS are
they will
w.:.thdiaw as soon as the new go vernment

h!;.ve the
military
order
immediately
advises
order
and
that
they
wit ho.1t furt h er
a:,is 1sta nce fiom OAS na tions .

c. If the military
.'<:, poss i ble
operation
and with
is
sufficient
force
Hl .;,0 ~ ,,.:.::1..!.ilty to ta k0 effective

~f
"J!:,
5.f
the Cuba n regime
1;.-; :'cc<:os or pro;:,erty
as quickly
so that
counter-meas
~;h\; .::;:istro re 3ime :'.!.sreduced

"l,
conducted
the Communist
ures
in support
to a minimum.
co ~l'.i ta b.ost:1.1e acts
agai nst
whi ch woulci .set',,, as an incident
u_.
, ..;n
w~..lch to base overt US intervent~ .c.1s . In this event,

.~)~-.,~.i.~r.bJ.e portions
of a, b, and c abovg apply .
. , ;c::>
~1tmen 'v of Defense is a l so prepar ed to cove :rtl;<i
lt:. 'l'I":..:-
pro v: .d!.
~.i.1.~~v
oil":.
t ,) :;!A and State,
to :;::iy US 3.pproved popular
or thro ug h these
movement inside
sup;~ !.:les, t::-ani:::;>ortation , personnel
agencies,
Cuba, in terms
of
and bases .
RECOMMENDATIONS
J.::.
It 1. :, r-c ,;ommended that:

a.
.r:1e memorandum at Enclosure
t h,~ a.,ov.e c on clu i:i ons,
be forwarded
A he!'eto,
which reflects
to the Secretary
of
!)e.f"
ensa ..
b. This pa p er NO'!' be forwarded
to comma nders
of unifie d
or specif ie d co nunanrl s.
c. Th:ls paper
NO'r be f orwarded
to US officers
NOT be forwarded
to the Chairman,
assi gn ed to
NA1~0activities.
d. This paper
Delegation,
United
Nations
Military
Staff
US
Committee .
SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRE
D
NOFORN
LI MI 'l'ED DISTRIBUTION
' 'I'"
. :1.r.
II., t
, ur 1)1:.llQG
Subject:
1.
Pursuant
MEMORANDUM
POR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Cuba
to the objectives
of the Caribbean
the Department of Defense was requested*

position
with respect
to the Department's
Survey Group,
to construct
a firm
stake and role
in the
removal of the Communist regime in Cuba,

2. The Joint
proposal
Chiefs of Staff
recommended that
be adopted as the official
to the Chief of Operations,
DODposition
the atta~hed
and forwarded
Cuba Project.
*Memorandumfrom BrigGeneral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for

BrigGe ,.;eral W.H. C~aig, USA, subject:
"Special Project",
dated 17 Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat
As amended by JCS at meet~ng on 7 Febraary
ter 9E1fKfT
1962
?t
tro
...
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LilgTED DISTRIBUTION
APPENDIXl TO ENCLOSURE
A
DRAF!'
''
FORBRIGADIERuENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, c,1ba ProJect
MEMO
"l,\?,'-)'JM
Cuba Project '.'
Suoject:
P.eference:
Memorandumfrom Your Office for

BrigGen w. H'., craig, USA, subJ :
"Special Project",
dated 17 Jan 62
1. As requested
in re f erenced memorandum, t~1e position
the D,;opartment of Defense,
with respect
to the military
of
stake
anc. ;_...,).e :~n the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has
bee,, dc';.mr,,ined baEed upon the following
, . National
Security
Policy,
factors:
determined
b the ~SC during
,_,;,;. ir.c,,:,t:ing of S )lay :.961 .

b. Current intelli
gence estimates
c . );:)er,..t~.Onb against
e t le.;.;<,:;in:i.tially
d. Time favors
a.
the Castro regi me will be covert,
the Castro government .

implications
of Castro's
:cceX9oses
:H)riow,, threat
vulnf:: ability
the Western remisphere
to its
securi
and defense
to meet this
b. It provides
control
our national
are developed
threat.
the Soviet Union with the most effective
that additional
of additional
increases
Latin Jl.Jnerican countries

Elimination
to the other nations
will not tolerate
Communismthroughout
This in turn greatly
come under Communist control.
States
increases
cos r s as forces
the Western Hemisphere.
demonstrate
to an increasingly
tr. This
base they have ever had for spreading
possibility
Coriun
w1ist
as follows:
~t~~,
or shifted
in
2 . The b=?
.sii:; military
gov~?:nme::
: >;
cf the situation
will
of this base would
of the world that the United
such intrusions.
countries
the
Coimnunist
would or could result
in:
...
Appendix l to
Enclosure A
SPIDIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
Nol{FORN
trMrTEo
pJ;JfS:iJJB'itBgq~
J6l
J~ ir.'"Jr
1.,,
,;
fC8?Erl,PE61~t =l~A"NtLit~
rw=tttffiR
N
I UC
(1) Increased
other
nations
of the Western Hemisphere .
(2) Incr easedCo mmunist

Communismthroughout
(3) The loss
training
of strategic
Latin
capability
facilities
materials
for spreading
Ameri ca.
of existing
areas,
capability
ij~~~~~f
Co~.munist capability-for
and/or
potential
and rights,
necessary
as well as sources
to our ~ilitary
(4) An increased
threat
to US usage and control
of the Panama Canal through
subversion
3. The urgency of the requirement
and sabotage.
to remoye the Communist
government
from Cuba is made apparent
by Castro's
increasing
capabilities
other
for attacking
Western Hemisphere and for spreading

hemisphere.
courses
bases,
nations
within
of the
Communism th'roughout
This sense of urgency is greatly
of action
constantly
the capability
increased
the
if
of the Communists
are considered:
a. The Soviets
could . establish
land,
sea and/or
air
bases in Cuba ,
b. The soviets
could provide
Castro
with a number of
with nuc!l.ea r warheads;
ballistic
missiles
furnish
the missiles
and maintain
or they could
Join t control
of the
nucl ear warheads.

4. In view of the factors
Defense holds
that
above,
The Department
of Defense is prepared
any popular
ousting
the Conununist reglme and installing

to the United States.
:l.n areas
world public
opinion
a government
the possibility
other
than in Cuba is
of
can be accomplished
war, and without

if th e following
2
of
\~tile
recoe;nized , it is believ ed that . this

e;eneral
to overtly
movement :Lnside Cuba to the extent
Communist Bl oc reactions
precipitating
of
of the l1estern
requirements
support
acceptable
the Department
the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security

Hemisphere .
set forth
UNtll~Slf
\EU
serious
conditions
effect
wi thout
on
prevail:
Appe:1dix l to
Enclosure A
~NClA~~if
IfD
ezdl'il
f
a TS%
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
f;""ri',;
Jf~ DISTRIBUTION
a. I f the impression
is created
h'J.~anit ~.ri an requirement

Ur:~~c:3 s cates
t hat there
to restore
is r espo1:.:li ng to an appeal
representative
;:,. :r it
a ct.ion
is announced
that
mc-1ing into
order
the United
inc ident
for assistance
States
to the overt
and/or
the
from
ad vises
military
members of the OAS are
of res~or.:l.;;g order
and th :;.t they will
as the new government
in Cuba and/or
Cuba for t!le purpose
t ree electio!'ls,
is an urgent,
and holding
im.>nediacel y withdraw as soon
that
they have the capability
t c i11alntain order \11thout further
assistance
from the OAS
natiom; .
c.
:er th e, milj, :;ary
operation
is conducttid
a:,. .<'Jc.;r,:::~
le and w:,th s~ficient
B).o-:i's ability
to take
force
effective
w!'dch
pc!'t:1.onv
c t'
support
movement inside
personnel
US intervention.
acts
again st
as an incident
In this
event,
upon
applicable
,,..-
'
a, b, and c above apply.
5 . The i)':l1.w
rtment
provide
in support
to a m:,,1imum.
or prope rty whi ch would serve
to base overt
cl<ly
t hs.t the Conununist
:)r , 11 the Guban regime commits hostile
U~ forci!s
c;..\ j
counter-measures
o,' the C>.istro re g1:'ae is reouced
c.
,10
as
of Defense
to CIA or State,
Cuba, in tenns
is also
prepared
or any US approved
of supplies,
to covertly
popular
transportation,
and bases .
~NtllS~lf
llO
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED
DISTRIBUTION
i1'
:i,, ,;.
~
JI,"\!
'(..~ ,~{
;,;.
, 1,u .j ~.
N >
I , ir
~
11
,,
FACTSBEARINGON THE PROB.LEN
1. The over-all
II
plan* f:c,r the overthrow of ;;he Castro
gove1.:i:r.ent is respon:'live
"'l'h N
to the following
IJS objec t ive is to help the Cubans overth.'ow
th:-: Coi:imun1st reg i me from within
'
objective:
Cuba and institute
r.eu go:arnment \'11th which the United States

peace.
evident
aideC mat,1, j.al ::.:1, moi'lly and financ :tally

Bloc, h,!l.f' jecome, firmly
in
e:1trenched.
th i.t the Castro regime,

py the Sino-Soviet
Ove,:, the :9ast two and one -
half yea ,:,:., th1: cas c:::-oregime has gradually

on the s :,.r,o- Soviet model.
The first
inunec:l!<tc, ;repla:..emer:-c of the existing

force
can live
11
2. It :ts becoming i ncreasingly
state
by 1evolut1ona1y units
the J?evol\,;t;ion :i.n th~ hills
built
up a police
ste:,; was !;h e
Cubar, Ar':Oyand police
which had fo~>.

ght with Castro durin g
and in the underground.
Changes 1n
the Navy ::i!ld. A:!.i Fol'ce were accompl ished through purges of top
personnel.
tion
TOW<lrd~he end of 1959 as d i sillusionment
over the drift
toward closer
Soviet Bloc began to crystal1ze

the regime again
shifted
II
newl y -formed civilian
Ii
looked upon this
'
.force.
its
basis
federation
the militia
Speci.fically
tilitia.
maintained
its
Castro
military
status
as
under labor union and student

lines
and the chief
o.f the corresponding
took over command of the militia
trained
Dr.
On 29 Septe mber 1960, Castro reorganized
along military
district
time to tlte
as a presumably more reliable
organization
leadership.
armed forces,
of power, this
worl<er-peasant - student
militia
with the Sino -
wi t hin the regular
For almost a year the militia
a par a-military
military
association
and opposi-
officers
commanders and military
units .
rep l aced the original
training
was accelerated
militia
"'Program Review by Brisadier General E. G. Lansdale, USP.F,

subject : "The Cuba Project",
dated 18 Jan 1962; not on ',
.file in the Joint Secretariat.
Enclosure B
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
.NOFORN
LIMI TED DISTRIBUTIO
N
'f' H. m
",!!'
p __ 'iii
.. (..
"' iill
' :a
..,.,.,JeAi!i
~, tK
......
....
r:-
"IL
. '
..
SP.R\JIAL ::.\NDLING
REQUIRED
-
"'7, W,< ""1""n\; ;>, ...tm
Lf!l:fTED))I STRIBUTION
3 . Sir: ,;J.taneousl y, the Castro regime was al s.:i bu i ldin g its
I n Jur ,e 1961, the process
sec1:.:.:::.ty :,etwork '*.
the ,3ata~. U.shment o:? a M:i.n:Lstl"Jof Interi.)r

for :'l?.
.:tni".~tning
"put, !.i c order" .
uni ts under
a' _i;o gave the Ministr~ : authority
of ''11ommj:~tee; ; for i:,

',.a D(:;'ense
the
tl 1e nen nun~.stry.
to su:_9erv11Je the activities
of the Revolu ,;i (1n11
These
conm;~.tte. 1.-..
ar<; raapo\ ,.sib:..c !'or inf'orming
autl \c :i..'.;.."::ieao~
rev o~Lutiv,;~,ry '' r-cti Vi tie;;
.\ car,:;iaign is under way
or attitudes.
to ei,!;ab ~.;;,h J.Cl:J

,OOC or such committees
with
membe~a ~.,, of x'.~,,es,
churches,
factories,
and comb~.;::~.1g it
schools,
l'li'~i1 a vast
reg iJ'1e hi>.s estf.'.olisl:.ed

model.
4 . !n .:;.,ppo:..t of this
system
military
f'orGes have be e,, equipped
Czechoslovakia
mode;:on wea.!JOns and th at there
equip!.!ent for the force
indicate
that
includes
EW radar,
that
and possibly
the Castro
operations
rar
and internal
materiel
in bein g .
is rather
control
are being
beyond that
security.
the Western Hemisphere,
systems,
Ji -
equipped
surplus
of
, and
It becomes obvious
and equipped
for
law and order
a continuous
and is a Cor;u
nunist
with
Some accounts
to maintain
This represents
In-
advanced fighters,
trained
required
Castro
rrom the Sino-
sophisticated
Department of State White Pap.er, subject:

in Cuba" , recently
published but undated;
Joint Secretariat
TOP59BB'll
.-
build-up,
and Russia, ,
is well
medium range rockets.
forces
the Castro
is in Cuba an actual
nulitary
short
co>.~eratives,
the Communist Bloc
with arms and materiel
i.e.,
!:ire
0l1
and securj.ty
forJM ti on :t~i,,ic,'\\tes the Cuban force
certain
"v11lunteer"
50,000
networ k or :i~,t'or:ners,
a security
Sovj,et Bloc covntries,
counter-
11
By centra :i.:J.~;i,,g ',l~.a pol 'i ce tr.notion
resid,; ).1;.
::.,:.:. are ?.s, e t c.
w1th
w::5;h reu ponsib i lity
The dec:::-ee ce ntralizes
var5 .:,,la pc,).ice and invest,igation

It
\lUlminated
threat
~tronghold
to
for the
"The Castro
not on file
Regime
in
Enclosure
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
~Ntl~S~lf
llD ?\ifnu; l'i'
1~~~
""r1
"2tf3?le:
%Uk&!f~
.~r'*....
a T?P
NOFORN
continued
spread
inter-American
of Communism to other
countries
of t he
System.
5. In response
to a request*
the !),z!'e';';Se Department

thrc ,u of the Castro
the e vent formal,
beco :,,2 necessary
has already
government
overt
in April
p l anned for
by use of military
force .
w,c, ,:,;:>l,:,1.,m
ent of sizeable
US forces
In
in Cuba should
are now two US military

be .implemented .
196 1
the over-
conum.tment of US forces
there
c.lt ,,. ; o:' which could
by the President
plans**
Both plans
in being
provide
and are des.1.gned,
for
among
o:,:":~ '::,::,,:;;;, toward the over -throw of the Castro- government as

a. ::::"1CLANTOPLAN314-61, * * approved**"
,:;:,., ,:1:, pr ovides
for ~1a simultimeous
amphibious
...,, ,.%'.J . within
18 days aft e r the execution
: .~.. pr ; ,_,,.. a) .ert
OY.'
prepos it ioning
,:,::,sa: . ':. :lt. :is e:,;:timated
that
overthrow
forc e s, provides
forces
initi
order.
al l)',
for
an airborne
However,
Joint
of' Cuba .
Cr1iefs
the intial
of Cuba would
no est.imate
This latter
of Staff,
for
assault
a \\faster
within
commit ment
5 qays
si nce t h is plan de ploys

i .s made concernin g th e
le ngt h of ti me req uir ed for overthrow

control
After
i n 10 days .. I./
of the exec u tion

fewer
assUJm.ng
of th e Castro
control
b . CINCLANTOPLAN316-61 , ** designed
er US
a,id airborne
order,
of forces.
0p ver r, .,, ;, ,; <<Lti , he gain of essential
r.~ assured
by the ,Toint Chi efs
p lan,
of the gover nment or

not yet approved
is .in process
of J!:nino:ttl revision
by t he
:lfy
CL'lCLAN'l'
.
~- JCS 23011/29
.,.... CI NCLANT Cont inge ncy Operations
Plan
Plan
CINCLANTCont1n~ency i)p erations
plans on .file ln Joint Secretariat
., ..,..,.. J CS 20 18/306
Enclosure
NOFORN
~NtlA~~lf
IED
SPECIALHANDLD~G
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LilUTEDDISTRIBUTION
ENCLOSUREC
DISCUSSION
1. Although it
is possible
that a Cuban counter--revolutionary
l eader ~ould emerge with sufficient

Casf :.. ~lements to unite
eve ntuality
in an attemp t to '3eize power, such
does not seem likely
,by the United States_
To date,
Pl c,.:uce .such a leader.*
o; by rn,.tural
casues,
a:i:i.<'l
st certainly
appeal to enable the anti-
unless
exiled
Cubens have f'ailed
while unsettling
not prove f'atal
on the government,
to the regime.**
or insurgent
undertal<e a signif'icant
the government with any reasonable

2. Even a cursory
defend Cuba indicates
and supported
to
Even the loss of' Ca!::t!'o by assassination
f' ::;:,e ~x:.ecte d that no Cuban leader

i n:lepe: :dently
fostered
plan in signif'icant
vention
by the United States.
force,
ef'f':-2t against
cJ1ance ot success.
military
overt
preparations
attempt
the Castro government can only be accomplished

military
It is theregroup can
subversion
loo k at Castro's
that a purely
woul:d
requiring
to
to overthrow
by a well conceived
military
inter-
3. As lon ; as Cuba does not become a member and an accepted

military
partner
a result
exist_
of' US military
of' the Warsaw Pact the threat

int ervention
of' general war as
in Cuba does not appear to
4_ It is expected that the Castro gover nment will avoid givin g

the United States
For this
an attack
suff'icient
provocation
f'or armed intervention_
reason Cuban f'orces are not expected to be committed to

on the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.
Neither
is it
* J-2 DN-400-61, "Af'ter the Assassination

of' Castro ' What?"
dated 27 Octooer 1961; on file in J-2
** SNIE 85~61, "The Situation and Prospects 1n Cuba", dated
28 Nov 61; on f'ile in Joint Secretariat
Enclosure
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOF
ORN
.LllUTED DISTRIBUTION
p
.~,
~1
It'
~N~!i:s.lf~~lli
,.. tw.
~ M ,~~
~,h, J1--
,, TOP
zW El
expected
that
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
Castro will
knoim or apparent
at inf ilitr
and subversion
5 , :i:t is postulated
Ca~Cl' O,
policy
be necessary
a ~electe d Cuban insurgent

pr 9pared to sustain
that
to progress
in fo llo l'ling
of aiming at the downfal l of

attemp t from the outset

program t .;
such insurgent
overt military
including
and decisive
to become
of other Latin American states.
therefore,
national
::.t l'lill
co.1clusion,
relationship
between his government and communist attempts
ation
tt. , (:;ablished
allow a definite
to support
and to be
successt'ul
interve r,tion as the final
step.
6 . Ii ; is clear
that
or th~ unrortunate
the United
on of the political
miscalculati
of l?idel Castro in the desire

It would appear that
Stat es cannot arrord
repetition
D.Sl)irations
to sss ar1 e::1

d to ,the Ba :;ista regime.
a sign:l.ficant
lesson
of th:l.s costly
mistake
is the requ:l.rement for emphasis and improvement in US intelligence

efforts
to evaluate
personalities
the true colors
of potentially
and groups which eventually
recognized
and supported
revolutionary
capable
may have to be
in ruture
counter-
undertal<ings.
7, The basic military
implicatio
ns or Castro's
Conunun
ist
government are as rollows:

a . It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
serious
threat
vulnerability
shifted
to its
security.
and defense
to meet this
b, It provides
costs
This increases
as forces
US will
additional
Latin American
Elimination
to the other
not t olerate
countries
Conununism throu ghout
This in turn greatly
addit ional
under Conununis t control.

would demonstrate
or
the Soviet Union l'lith the most effective
the Western Hemispher e.

ty that
are developed
threat .
base they have ever had for spreading

possibili
our national
incr eases the
countries
of this
will
come
base i n Cuba
nat i ons of the world that the
suc11 intrusions
Co11ununistcontrol
would or cou l d result
of
in :
Enclosure C
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
'LIMITEDDISTRIBUTIO
N
s -Wt~zr:r~*.W.~f,,
'..
..
, . , , .,,
'!
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
uTSPer
(1) Increased
nations
Coromunist capabil~ty
Communist capability
r.:;munun
i sm throughout
(3) The loss
ing areas,
strategic
of existing
facilities
and/or
potential
and ri ghts,
materiels
threat
subversion
as well as sources
capability.
to re move the Co~un ist

by Castro's
for attacki: ,6 ether
constantly
nations
oi' the Western
'
Communism t hroughout the hemisphere .
of urgenc:r is greatly
the capability
of
and sabotage.
governme:1t from Cuba is made apparent
Hemisphere and for spreading
train-
to US usage ~"le! control of the
8. The urgency of the requirement

capabilities
bases,
to our m:.lttary
necessary
P~~ru.,a Canal thro~h
within
for spreading
Latin America .
( 4 ) An increased
This sense
on other
of the Western Hemisphere.
(2) Increased
increasing
for attack
increased
if courses
of action
of the Communists are considered:
a. The Soviets
cvuld establish
land,
sea and/or
air
bases in Cuba.
b. The Soviets
ballistic
Castro with a number of
could provide
111issiles with nuclear
furnish
the missiles
nuclear
warheads .
and maintain
9 , In view of the factors

Defense holds that
warheads,
joint
set forth
requirements
movement inside
of the Western Hemisphere.
believed
general
this
of ousting
can be accomplished
se rious
if the followin g conditions
any
the
to the
of Communist. Bloc
other than in Cuba is recognized,
war, and without
gaa:mem:t &-n *'
support
a government acceptable
Whil e the possibility
in areas
that
to overtly
Cuba to the extent
Communist regime and installing
reactions
of the
above, the Depart ment of
The Department of Defense is prepared
United States.
control
the Conununist regi me in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security

popular
or they could
without
effect
it is
precipitating
on world public
opinion
prevail:
3
Enclosure C
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOF'ORN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
.. I'
di ~ttt .iW!tW#'!l.ft&
'
a
SPECIALHANDLING
HEQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
,[QESEP
a. If the impression
humanitarian
requirement
the United States

!' Pc:-<
, a
is created
the United States
are moving into
is an urgent,
to an appeal for assistance
is responding
government representative
that
there
order in Cuba and/or
to restore
b. If it is announced incident
action
that
to the overt nulitary
and/or
other members of the OAS
Cuba for the purpose of ,::al'ltorin r.; order
and holdin g free
and that
elections,
the; ' Vi.'<.

11 immediately
withc'.ra~L as soon as the new govern ment advises

have the c,ipability
to maintain
that
order without
they
further
assis-
tance from OAS nations.

c. If the military
as possible
Bloc's
ability
support
operatim : 5.,:; conducted
and with sufficient
force
to take efi'ective
as q\.ickly
.
so that
the Communist
counter-measures
of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.
d. Or, ii' the Cuban regime col!U'nits hostile

against
US forces
incident
event,
or property
acts
which would serve as an
upon which to base overt US intervention.

a~plicable
10. The Department
provide
in
support
approved popular
transportation,
portions
of a, b, and c above apply.
of Defense is also prepared
to CIA, or through
movement inside
personnel
In th:l.s
to covertly
these agencies,
to any US
Cuba, in terms of supplies,
qnd bases .
Enclosure
REQUIRED
SPECIAL HANDLING
NOFORN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION

Operation Northwoods

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Operation Northwoods

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

/

AssassinationRecords Review Board

AGENCYPILB 1'"UMBR 3360 (1 FED 62)

Number of releases of previously postponed informatio n: O

Postponement It (Page DJSM-2,25

July 1962,pg 2),

.. t ostponement #2 (Page JCS 1969/347,2Moy 1962,ppJ,

P06tponement I 3 (Page JCS 1969/347,MaritimeSupport, Operation Mongoose,8 May 1%Zpg I),

Reason for Board AdiO!C The text is n?dact-ed

# 4 (Page JC!S19691389,23 July 1962,pP,1415),

f 5 (Page OP605F/6 ,; Set 000374P60

~on forBo.vdAction.:fhe textisredarte<t.

Relwe Date, 10/2017,

JCS CENTRALFILES 1962

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTION

recommendation to invade CUba and

(R) - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTION

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[RI - ITEM I S RESTRI CTED

Declassification Revi ew/Phstnonement Form

1)Sb > NO ~~S

11HIS ~ GENCY HAS DECLASSIFIEDA'I!JL@F

JCSM 103 - 62,

REM ARKS AND/OR SUB J ECT

3360 (7 Feb 62)

JCS RECO RD CASE NO.

JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS

Report by Gen, Craig""'; Referred to JCS

Deci sion on Jcs .1969/303

Decision on JCS 1969/306

- Referred to the Chiefs

Report - Refered to tlie Chiefs

Decision on JCS 1~69/310=

A Report RefeITed to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/314 & 1969/316

Decision on JCS 1969/321

Decision on. JCS. 1969/311

Decision on JCS 1969/313

A Report ReferTed to JCS,

De~ision on JCS 1969/324

Decision on JCS 1969/325

Decision on JCS 1969/327

,Decision on JCS 1969/328

Decision .on ' JCS 1969/334

Decision on JCS 1969/335

.lCD P,AP&R NO.

A Report RefeITed to JCS

Report RefeITed to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/344

Decision on JCS 1969/347

Decision on JCS 1969/366

Decision on JCS 1969/367

Decision on JCS 1_969/389

Decis ion on JCS. 1969/39 2

Decis i on o~ Jes 1969/411

Decision on JCS 1969/412

A Report Refer!ed to JCS

on: 1,. DOCUMENTS

1. On 2 August 1962, the CQief of Operations, Operation

,. .. .;::..~r : . . . ..~.....:.\ .: ::~

"" . r.c,, .. :: ..,:_;.. : .:,

.1ur ~t.ll& I \ } lr&l.lAL till NULlI'4}

Consequences of US Military Intervention

meeting of the Operations