The Dynamics of Joint Thinking between Adversaries in International Conflict: Phases of the

Continuing Problem-Solving Workshop

Author(s): Nadim N. Rouhana
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 321-345
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995

The Dynamics of Joint ThinkingBetween

Adversariesin InternationalConflict:Phases of the
ContinuingProblem-SolvingWorkshop
Nadim N. Rouhana
Departmentof Psychology
Boston College and Centerfor InternationalAffairs
Harvard University

Thispaper presents the continuingproblem-solvingworkshopas an intervention

method designed to achieve joint thinkingbetween adversaries in deep-rooted
internationalconflict. It delineatesfour planned workshopphases and describes
their developmentin an actual continuingworkshopbetweenhigh-rankingIsraeli and Palestinianparticipants. The paper highlights the differencesbetween an
interventionmodel, with predesignatedphases, and a natural small-groupprocesses model and suggests how to use the latter in planning the intervention.It
examines the role of the thirdparty and thefunctions of interventionin each of
the workshopphases. It also shows how the larger conflict on the ground interacts with each phase and so affects the evolutionof the relationshipbetweenthe
workshopteams and the progressionof the workshopphases. Thepaper anchors
the method in the theoreticalpropositions that the needs theory advances about
the causes of deep-rootedconflicts and the approachesto their resolution.
KEY WORDS: ethnic conflict; conflict resolution;international;unofficial intervention;problemsolving workshop;Israeli-Palestinianinteraction

Introduction
Efforts for resolving internationalconflict were for a long time the sole
domain of official diplomacy. Within the official process a numberof forms for
reachinga settlementbetween partieshave been used: negotiation, in which two
or more conflicting parties develop a mutually acceptable settlement by using
cooperative or adversarialbargaining(Zartman& Berman, 1982); mediation, in
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which an agreed-uponthirdpartyhears both sides, suggests ideas for a compromise, and bargainswith the adversariesuntil agreementis reached (Berkovitch,
1992; Rubin, 1992; Mitchell & Webb, 1988; Zartman & Tuval, 1985); and
conflict management,in which the statusquo partytries to avoid escalationof the
conflict without changing the essence of the statusquo. The underlyingassumption of all these forms of conflict settlement is that the disputed resources,
interests, or goals are negotiable and that a compromise is achievable between
the partiesgiven the right timing and the right balanceof power (see Zartman&
Berman, 1982; Zartman& Touval, 1985).
These methods of settling conflict have been applied to a broad range of
internationalconflicts with variousdegrees of success (see Berkovitch& Rubin,
1992; Kriesberg; 1992; Kriesberg& Thorson, 1991; Saunders, 1986; Quandt,
1986). However, it seems thatone type of conflict, termed"deep-rootedconflict"
(Burton, 1987; Mitchell, 1990) or "protractedsocial conflict," (Azar, 1990) is
particularlyresistant to traditionalofficial interventions.It tends to evolve not
only over negotiable interests, but also over nonnegotiable human needs and
values. Many protractedconflicts are in fact caused by the denial (or the perception of denial) of one or both parties' underlyingcollective human needs-for
identity, security, recognition, political participation,inclusion in the political
process, distributivejustice, and the like (Burton, 1987; Azar, 1990; Mitchell,
1990).
It is often simplistic to reduce the complexity of such conflicts only to a
clash of negotiable interests, because many of these conflicts are over the very
identityof the conflicting parties(amongotherneeds), not over intereststhatcan
be suppressed, socialized away, permanentlycontrolled, or negotiated. Accordingly, for a settlement to be long-lasting, it should, in addition to facing the
parties' interests, adequatelyaddressthe unaddressedhumanneeds of both parties, otherwise new crises will soon reemerge. When states or dominantgroups
within states use coercive repression and cooptation to resolve such conflicts,
they arrive at a temporarysettlementthat masks the potential for future explosions.
A methodis needed thatprovidesthe setting and the means for the partiesin
conflict to get involved in analyticalproblem-solving,to understandthe needs of
the other party, and to work together to develop new ideas on the basis of the
needs, concerns, and constraintsof the parties. As Burtonstates, "needs which
cannot be compromised, cannot be subject to some legal judgment, cannot be
bargained. .. [require]a process thatenables partiesto conflicts to ascertainthe
hidden data of motivationsand intentionsand to explore means by which common human-societalneeds can be achieved"(Burton1987, p. 16). To be credible
and workable, ideas for the futuremust equally considerthe needs and concerns
of both parties. Only such solutions stand a chance of being acceptable to the
societies in conflict.

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323

As formal representativesof parties in conflict get togetherto negotiate or

bargain, they sometimes get involved in analyzing their conflict or thinking
together how to reach an acceptable agreement. In some instances informal
contacts between the negotiators provide settings that are conducive to joint
thinking about the conflict and its resolution. But none of these forms is structurallydesigned to encouragepartiesin conflict to analyze their conflict systematically, thinktogether,orjointly produceideas thatrespondto the parties'needs.
Official negotiationsentail a high degree of publicity,representationand defense
of official positions, limited time frames, pressurefor instantdecision-making,
and, above all, commitment to winning the conflict with the enemy. Thus,
systematicanalyticalinteractionbetween adversariesis hardto accomplishwithin the framework of power bargaining, official negotiations, mediation, and
similar forms of conflict managementembedded in the power paradigm.
Recognizing the internalconstraintsof official diplomacy, scholars of conflict resolutionhave developedseveralunofficialapproachesto providepartieswith
the propersettingfor analyticalthinkingandjoint problem-solving(Burton, 1969,
1987; Azar, 1990; Kelman, 1979; Fisher, 1983). Some unofficial third-party
interventionapproachescan thus be seen as complementarymethodsdesigned to
achieve the goals thatofficial diplomacyoften precludes,underestimates,or finds
hard to accomplish. One such method is the continuingproblem-solvingworkshop. For some years, my colleague HerbertKelmanof HarvardUniversityand I
havedevelopedthis unofficialapproachto third-partyinterventionandappliedit to
the Palestinian-Israeliconflict (Kelman, 1992; Rouhana& Kelman, 1994). The
method, designedto contributeto the resolutionof intercommunalandinternational conflict, builds upon the interactiveproblem-solvingapproachthat was developed by Burton and his colleagues (Burton 1969, 1987) and Kelman and his
colleagues (Kelman 1979; Kelman& Cohen 1976; Kelman 1992) over the last 20
years. It is designed to providepartiesin protractedintercommunalconflicts with
the properconditionsfor controlledinteractionthatcan lead to joint thinkingabout
theirconflict in orderto jointly develop a vision of peace, mutualassurances,and
workableideas acceptableto both of them, and to introducethese ideas into the
political discourse of their respective societies.
Reaching the point where constructivejoint work can occur takes a lot of
time and requiresseveral meetings. It is our experience that conflicting groups
who meet in such workshops move through dynamic phases of interaction,
steered by the thirdparty, in orderto achieve joint thinking. Chufrinand Saunders (1993), for example, working within the forum of the DartmouthConference, examined the stages in the developmentof the relationshipbetween influential Soviet and Americancitizens who had met more than 20 times in a decade
as a task force on U.S.-Soviet interactionsin regional conflicts. The goals and
structuresof the Soviet-Americanmeetings differed from our continuing workshop, and the conflict between the superpowersdiffered from the protracted

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conflict between Palestinians and Israelis; nonetheless, Chufrin and Saunders

describedfive distinctphases-some of which overlapwith the phases described
in this paper.
Planning the phases of a continuing workshopis of crucial importancefor
facilitators, since it enables them to set an appropriateagenda (one that participants will accept and respondto), trackthe group'sdevelopment, identify when
the group is ready to move to new levels of work, and identify when the group is
"stuck"in one phase and needs some strongerfacilitationto move on to the next
one. Planning is also vital because throughoutthe duration of a continuing
workshop, the larger conflict will evolve. Developments on the ground will
greatly affect the interactionbetween the workshopmembers. In highly volatile
conflicts, facilitators may even find it necessary to reestablish an established
working relationshipif a prolongedperiod has elapsed between workshops.
In this paper, I will lay out the various phases of the workshop'sdevelopment;describe the role of the thirdpartyand the functionsof interventionin each
phase; and show how the largerconflict interactswith each phase and so affects
the evolution of the relationshipbetween the workshop teams. But first I will
describe the method itself.

THE CONTINUING PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP METHOD

The continuing problem-solving workshop is an unofficial approach designed to contributeto the resolution of intercommunaland internationalconflict. At the center of the methodis the problem-solvingworkshop,which brings
togetherinfluentialparticipantsfrom conflicting parties. The method is designed
to provide parties in protractedintercommunalconflicts with the properconditions for controlledinteractionthatcan lead to joint thinkingabout their conflict
in order to develop new ideas about its resolution. When selecting participants,
majorconsiderationis given to their access to leadersand public opinion in their
communities. Participantsshould ideally occupy positions from whence they can
feed new insights or ideas into the political discourse in their societies. At the
same time, participantsshould not be official representativesof their government, so they do not hold official positions and are thus more likely to get
involved in joint thinking(see Rouhana& Kelman, 1994, for a detailed account
of participantselection). The continuingworkshoprepresentsa significantstep in
the evolution of the interactiveproblem-solvingapproachin that it provides a
forum for participantsto reach the stage of joint thinking, which is less likely to
occur in a one-time workshop.
In the continuingworkshopon the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, a small group
of highly influentialIsraelis and Palestiniansagreed to participatein a series of
three workshops beginning in the fall of 1990 for in-depth examinationof the

Dynamics of Joint Thinking Between Adversaries

325

conflict with the express goal of fosteringjoint thinkingand producingnew ideas

about the future of their two communities. The group actually met four times
between November 1990 and July 1992 (in additionto threeone-day consultation
meetings with subgroups,which were held in Washington,the Hague, and Jerusalem). The first meeting was held in the aftermathof the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait and before the Gulf war, and the fourthmeeting was held just after the
Israeli election that broughta Labor-ledgovernmentinto power for the first time
since 1977.
Each workshop lasted for three to five days. Except for preworkshopsessions built into the first and second workshops,in which the thirdpartyconvened
separately with each party for half a day, all of the sessions were held in the
presence of all parties. The majorityof sessions were held in the full plenary.For
some sessions, the plenarywas divided into mixed subgroupsto work on defined
issues. In all sessions, trained assistants took notes as close to verbatim as
possible.
For each full day, participantsmet for four sessions of an hour and a half to
two hours each. The four third-partymemberstook turnschairingthe sessions.
Sessions were held in the hotel or residence where participantslodged. Meals
were served in rooms designatedfor workshopparticipantsonly. Special dinners
and group trips were arrangedoff the premises in order to give participantsa
chance to interactin relaxed informalsettings.
The meetings were facilitated by a team of social scientists'-the third
party-who are knowledgeableaboutthe problem-solvingmethod, international
relations, group processes, and the dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeliconflict.
The third party sets the terms of reference under which the workshops are
convened. Some of these terms are designed to introducesome symmetry into
the workshopin orderto correct for asymmetriesthat exist in the conflict itself.
So, for example, it is left up to the participantsin each groupto define their own
partyto the conflict in orderto preventany partyfrom exercising a veto over the
other side's representation.The compositionof participantsin each group and of
the thirdparty are similarly designed to addressthis issue (Rouhana& Kelman,
1994).
The meetings are governed by a set of ground rules that are designed to
facilitate analytic discussion and lead to joint thinking about the conflict. For
example, the facilitatorsemphasizethe privacy and confidentialityof the discussions, encourageanalyticaldiscussions thatfocus on the causes and dynamicsof
'In addition to the author, the third party consisted of HerbertC. Kelman of HarvardUniversity,
HaroldSaunders,Directorof InternationalRelations at the KetteringFoundationand formerAssistant Secretaryof State for Near Easternand South Asian Affairs, and ChristopherMitchell, Director
of the Instituteof Conflict Analysis and Resolutionat George Mason University.The workshopwas
organizedby HerbertC. Kelmanand the author.The consultationmeetings in May were led by the
organizers. The entire third party facilitated at all workshops except for Belgium, which Harold
Saunderswas unable to attend.

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the conflict ratherthan blame and polemics, and emphasize that their role as
facilitatorsaims to stimulatemovementin the process of interactionbetween the
parties and not to mediate or arbitrate.
The agenda, which is set by the third party,is based on two main factors:
The sequence of phases thatour model of interventionconceives, and the dynamics of the largerconflict between the two parties. The workshopis conceived as
an interventionmodel in which the third party, while taking into consideration
the naturaldynamics of the group's evolution (as describedby a group development model), steers the interactionthrougha sequence of phases accordingto a
presetplan. The phases themselves are in part,therefore,a functionof the design
of the thirdparty.They reflect the agenda, which is structuredon our conception
of the direction in which the process should advance and the sequence of steps
that the workshopshould take. The sequence of phases will be describedbelow
in detail.
The continuing workshop was designed to deal with the bilateral conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians, not the overall Arab-Israeliconflict. This
reflects the emphasis the intervenorsplace on the conflict between these two
communities. Such a bilateralemphasis is not essential to the method, although
problem-solving workshops have been mostly applied to two-sided conflicts.
The applicationof the problem-solvingworkshopto conflicts involving multiple
parties would probablyrequiresome modificationsto the method.

THE PHASES OF THE CONTINUING WORKSHOP

AS AN INTERVENTION MODEL
The continuingworkshopis facilitatedaccordingto an interventionmodel.
That is, the thirdpartyhas a clear notion of the phases thatparticipantsshould go
through and sees them as importantand sequential. The logic of the model
assumes that participantsought to proceed in the specified order:first, presentation of concerns and needs, and only later joint thinking about solutions and
about barriersto reachingthese solutions (Burton 1987; Kelman 1992; Rouhana
& Kelman, 1994). In a group developmentmodel, by contrast, the group determines the directionand the sequence of the discussion. Groupleadersfollow the
naturaldevelopment of the group. In such a case, it is quite possible that the
group will explore possible solutions first and go to explore needs and concerns
later.
The third party steers the participantsthroughpreset phases yet is by no
means oblivious to the naturalflow of the group. To the contrary,timing the
movement to each new phase dependson the group'sreadiness, which develops
in the naturalflow of the group process. Facilitatorsshould also consider the
processes that characterizegroup behavior in a group development model be-

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327

cause the components that constitute the cement of any group, such as group
cohesiveness (Lewin, 1942) or interdependenceand pursuit of shared goals
(Sherif 1967; Deutsch 1973), should develop in the workshopif the participants
are ultimately to consider it a success.
While the literatureon group processes is useful for understandingthe
workshopdynamics, thereare uniqueelements in this experiencethatnecessitate
special considerationbecause they are likely to cause the dynamicsof this kind of
workshop to diverge from the usual intragroupprocesses in many respects.
Intragroupbehavior is defined as the interactionbetween two or more group
members who share the same self-categorizationor social identity (Hogg &
Abrams, 1988). The workshopis composed of two separateteams (and the third
party).Thus, it does not necessarilydisplay the same groupbehaviorexpected in
small group processes, at least not at the outset.
In addition to the conceptualdistinctionbetween an interventionmodel in
which the thirdpartyleads the participantsthrougha presetsequenceof steps and
the group development model in which the group leaders follow the natural
developmentof the group, there is anothermajordistinctionbetween the dynamics of the workshopand the dynamicsof a "natural"groupprocess. This distinction stems from structuraldifferencesbetween an intergroupmodel and an intragroup model. These differences are describedbelow.
First, there are two teams of participantsin the workshopwho compose two
distinct groups. Membersof each team participatein the workshopnot only as
individualsbut also, and mainly,as membersof theirrespectivecommunities. So
the workshop is not a collection of individuals who happen to be members in
conflicting societies but is composed of two distinct groups representingthe
societies in conflict. Indeed, the thirdparty is interestedin two internallycohesive teams whose memberscan work togetherand who agree on what the fundamentalneeds and concernsof theirrespectivesocieties are. The thirdpartyhelps
establish team cohesion by holding separate preworkshopsessions with each
team, particularlyif membershave not previouslyknown each other. In addition
to other functions, the preworkshopsessions give the membersof each team a
chance to meet and become familiarwith each other's views and experiences, to
develop initial bonds, and to begin working as a team before meeting the other
side.
Second, the two teams are not only distinct and cohesive, they are also in
conflict. For each team, the otherparticipantsare membersof the enemy. Indeed,
in our case, the political representativesof the two communitieshad refusedeven
to meet or negotiate for many decades.2 The thirdparty does not downplay the
2The Madrid Conference, which brought together representativesof both parties and other Arab
states for the first time in the history of the conflict, was held in Octoberof 1991. The Israel-PLO
mutual recognition was reached in Septemberof 1993. Three meetings of the workshopwere held
before the Madridconference.

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intensityof the conflict betweenpartiesin orderto make groupinteractionappear

more inviting or constructive.To the contrary,any achievementthe two groups
reach must be based on the reality of their adversarialrelationship.
Third, neitherthe thirdparty nor the two participatingteams are interested
in erasing the bordersbetween their groups, even in advancedphases (see Kelman, 1993). This is not to say thatinterpersonalcontactsacross the partiesdo not
take place or thatgroupboundariesdon't soften. But when interpersonalrelationships develop, intragroupmembershipremains an essential component that affects the type and depth of each relationship.That is to say, when across-theteams interpersonalrelationshipsdevelop, theircharacteris demarcatedto a large
extent by the individuals' membershipin their respective communities. While
membersmay discover areasof political agreementand develop personalregard,
respect, and admirationfor membersof the other team, they invariablyremain
two separate conflicting teams who want to keep the borders between their
groups distinct and not merge into one large group vis-a-vis their communities
and the outer world.
These boundariesare protectedby participants,possibly because they feel
that, to a large extent, they are representativesof theircommunities.The participants' high rank in their societies, their formerpositions, present access to the
public and to decision-makers,and their potentialfuture political roles all contributeto that sense of representation.
Fourth, the main level of analysis in the workshopis the intergrouplevel.
Participantsdiscuss the political needs, concerns, fears, constraints,and aspirations of their respectivecommunities,not theirpersonalones. When participants
do draw on their own experience, they do so to make a broaderpoint about the
collective experience of their community or about the larger conflict, not to
discuss their personal experience per se in the group. The discussion revolves
aroundthe dynamicsof the conflict between theirtwo communities, as specified
by the workshop'stermsof reference.In rarecases in which the thirdpartymight
use an interpersonallevel of analysis, they would do so only in orderto clarify or
examine a team's understandingof the conflict at large. So interpersonalstereotyping, feelings about the other members, individualmisperceptions,and interpersonalpsychological processes or interpretationsare all consideredunsuitable
topics of discussion in the continuing workshop.
Fifth, because the two groups in the workshoprepresenttheir societies as
describedabove, and because they interacton the intergrouplevel, the balanceor
imbalanceof power between the parties to the conflict is sharplyprojectedonto
the dynamics of interactionin the workshop. Often the priorities, needs, concerns, and fears-of one community,for example-may be broughtto the fore
of the discussion dependingon the power relationsbetween the two communities
in the larger conflict. The differentialpower each party to the conflict enjoys
affects the team's motivationfor joining the workshop,the importanceits mem-

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329

bers attributeto relevant issues of discussion, the sense of urgency about the
resolution of the conflict, and the level of knowledge members have about the
other party's internalpolitics and collective experiences.
These differencesbetween the two models notwithstanding,theintervention
model of the continuing workshop is sensitive to the naturaldevelopment of
groupdynamicsand makes use of it as one majorfactorin determiningthe timing
and proprietyof third-partyinterventionand transitionsfrom phase to phase.
Thus, the phases are, in part, a function of the third party's navigation
according to a preconceived sequence of steps and the sequence of phases is in
part an imposition of our interventionmodel on the group's work.
The interventionmodel also presumesthat the realizationof each phase is
an end in itself, as well as a means to reach the next step. So while reachingthe
phase of understandingthe other's needs is in itself important,since it provides
participantswith tools to analyze the other party's behavior, it is also a step
towardachievingjoint thinking, a prerequisitefor the group's ability to advance
new ideas.
The readiness for transitionto a new phase also depends on the conflict
dynamics between the two societies in the real world. For a smooth procession
from one phase to the next to occur, therehas to be readinessand ripenessboth in
the group and in the real world.
In this model, third-partyinterventionis essential because properand welltimed interventionscan increase group readiness. The third party should also
make use of opportunitiesin the real world by, for example, choosing the optimal
site and timing for workshop meetings.
In sum, three factors affect the phases of the workshop:the pre-planned
sequence of steps that is determinedby the interventionmodel; the naturalgroup
process; and the larger interactionbetween the two conflicting parties on the
ground.
Our interventionmodel conceives of four identifiablephases of interaction
between the two teams in the continuingworkshop.Next, I will describethe four
phases; in the following section, I will reporthow each phase actuallyevolved in
our workshop. The description is based on the experience of one continuing
workshop.Furtherwork is needed to establishthe generalizabilityof the dynamics to other workshops.
Phase 1: Cognitive empathy: From unilateral explication of one's needs
and concerns to comprehension of the other's. The first phase consists of slow
movement from each party's unilateralexplication of its collective needs and
concerns to the beginning of the cognitive comprehension of the collective
needs, concerns, fears, and aspirationsof both parties. The participantshear and
become aware of the needs of the other side. They show a good cognitive grasp
of the perspectiveof the other side, reachingwhat Stein calls "empathy"(Stein,
1988) or what White describes as "realisticempathy"(White, 1984). The term

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"understand"is not used here, because it implies affective empathiccomprehension. The cognitive empathy by itself is already a significant achievement because the dynamics of protractedconflict are not usually conducive to such
comprehension.Rather,in such conflicts, it is characteristicfor partiesto ignore,
distort, or deny their enemies' needs and concerns.
The workshop, therefore, must begin with elaborate explication of these
needs by each team for the other's benefit. When each team describes its party's
needs, the other team is encouragedto listen and ask questions of clarification
first. In the beginning, even the ability to listen is often absent. Each team wants
to convey its own concerns more than it wants to hear the other's; when the
other'sconcernsare heard,they are generallyinterpretedby the listeningpartyin
a self-serving way, accordingto its own schema of the conflict.
The initial gap between each team's understandingof its own needs and
concerns and the other team's perceptions of them looks too wide to bridge.
Participantsbecome disappointedand sometimes angeredby how the otherteam
interpretstheircommunity'sbehaviorsand intentions.Faced with the otherside's
initial lack of understanding,members of each team find themselves giving
elaborate, passionate, and articulateexposes about their community's experiences and needs. The discussion, thoughhard, is useful, because each side gets a
firsthandand immediatedescriptionof the other'sneeds and concerns, unadulterated by the media, experts, or the analysts.
Duringthis phase, intragroupcohesion increaseswithin each team but some
interpersonalaffinity also begins to develop across the teams. Participantsmake
a clear distinction between personal relationship and intergroupconflict and
manage a balance of personalcloseness and intergroupdistance. In general, this
first phase occupies almost the entire first workshop.
Phase 2: Responsivity to the other's needs: Serious exploration of the
others' readiness and willingness to respond to basic concerns: The first phase
provides the participantswith a sense of satisfactionbecause they feel that their
own needs have been laid out and comprehendedby the other side and that they
have acquirednew insights aboutthe needs and concernsthat underliethe political behavior of the other party. But the groups are not yet convinced that the
workshopwill lead to any seriouscontribution,althoughthey have emergedfrom
the first phase with more confidence that the endeavor might be worthwhile.
Participantsdo not yet know whether the other group is willing to take their
needs and concerns into considerationwhen it comes to thinkingaboutthe shape
of a desirableagreementbecause, so far, the dynamicsof the workshophave not
allowed for such testing to take place. But it is each team's reassurancethat its
concerns are recognized by the other side and will be considered when thinking about an agreementthat will reduce resistance to getting involved in joint
thinking.
The second phase is, therefore, characterizedby serious explorationof the
other'sreadinessand willingness to respondto theirconcerns. Before getting into

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331

details, each team seeks reassurancethat the other will recognize the legitimacy
of its needs and concerns in whatever agreementis discussed. Thus, this is a
transitionphase that bridges first-phasecomprehensionof needs and third-phase
joint thinking by reassuringeach team that the other is aware not only of its
needs but also of their validity and is, therefore, willing to examine ways to respond to such needs in some form when exploring new ideas for resolving the
conflict.
A numberof difficultiescharacterizethis phase. First, its transitionalnature
introduces a lack of structure;for this reason, both the third party and the
participantsfind it hardto articulatethe requirementsof this phase. Second, this
phase usually begins in the second workshop,as the firstphase has been achieved
by the end of the first workshop. Although there is no assumption that each
workshopdistinctly coincides with one phase, it is importantto achieve the first
phase in the first workshopin orderto create, at least, the sense of possibility and
worth of mutuallyacceptablenew ideas. But regionaldevelopmentsin the interim can impede the progressionto phase two, as I will describe shortly. Third,
there is the psychological difficulty of taking the enemy's needs-often considered exaggerated, fake, insincere, or illegitimate-into consideration;this also
runs contraryto one's role expectationsas an adversary.
Towardthe end of the second phase, the workshopbegins to take the form
of one new large group, although it always remainscomposed of three distinct
subgroups. But the closer the workshopgets to the end of the second phase, the
more likely that the new group will emerge and become cohesive for its participants. It is in this phase of transitionthat the two teams begin developing a new
group membership-one of workshop members-in addition to their stronger
subgroupmembership.During this phase, one notices other changes in the participants of both teams. Languagechanges and becomes sensitized to the other
side, fine-tunedso the other group can "hear"what is being said. The cohesion,
the new interdependence,the building of workingtrustbetween the parties, and
the interpersonalrelationshipsthat develop in the process all add up to a new
outcome: The two groups are now ready to try to work together.
The second phase is achieved when the two teams establish a working
relationship.This relationshipis a preconditionfor moving on to the ultimate
goal of the workshop. At this point, participantsseem to be ready workshop
seems to achieve a stage of readinessto jointly examine ideas, develop formulas,
invent options, and examine new directions. This sets the stage for the third
phase.
Phase 3: The shift to joint thinking: Can we (the workshop members)
come up with ideas acceptable to both communities? Thinking together is the
mode of interaction between the participantsin which they consciously and
purposefullytake into considerationthe set of needs, concerns, constraints,and
fears of both parties when they consider new options and ideas in moving
toward improving the relationshipbetween their societies. Reaching this phase

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and getting the two teams involved in "jointthinking"is one of the main goals of
the workshop.But thereare inherentdifficultiesin getting involved in this critical
phase.
One main difficulty stems from the dynamics of protractedconflict itself.
This mode of "thinkingtogether"is not familiarto parties in conflict. Partiesto
protractedconflict think about how to win the struggle, how to rout the enemy,
and how to addressthe needs of theirown society. The two sides to such conflicts
are so far aparton zero-sumextremes and so concernedwith their own interests
and security in the face of the threat from the enemy that they are unable to
consider the enemy's perspective and realize that they, too, have needs and
concerns. Even when partiesmake offers, what usually happensis that one party
unilaterallyadvances a proposal that meets its own needs but entirely misses
those of the enemy, setting it up for rejection. That rejectionis taken by the first
party as furtherevidence that the enemy is not interestedin peace. Indeed, the
mode of thinking that we aim to achieve in the third phase is the complete
opposite of the mode of thinking that characterizesparties in protractedconflict.
Anothersourceof difficultyis thatthe thirdpartyis requestingeach groupto
in this mode of thinking with its adversary.But adversariesget
involved
get
involved with each other on the battleground,in debates, or aroundthe negotiation table. On the battlefield and in debates, adversaries want to defeat the
enemy, and aroundthe negotiatingtable they want to bargainhardto get the best
deal. Thinking together with the adversaryis a mode that contradictsthe traditional expectations of one's role as an adversary.Participantsare not asked to
negotiate or to simulatenegotiation, nor are they instructedto bargainor win, to
make a deal or develop one. They are not asked to representonly their interests.
They are instructedto thinktogetherwith the adversaryand take theiradversary's
needs and concerns into consideration.This new type of encountermight trigger
a sense of betrayalto one's understandingof her or his functionsas an adversary.
Participantsare asked to play the role of adversaryin a novel and unusualway.
This role comes into expression mostly in the thirdphase.
The third source of difficulty stems from the dynamics of the workshop
itself. The two groupsget comfortablewith the mode of interactionthatdevelops
in the workshop,the plenarymeetings, the explicationand representationof their
party's behavior and needs, and the understandingof the other's. For participants, these stages entail inherent intellectual satisfaction. In the third phase,
participantsare asked to switch into a new mode, to use new tools, break into
small groups (same team or across teams), formulateand draftideas, and work.
The thirdpartyis now requestingthe participantsto take yet anotherrole-a role
thatrelies not only on theircritical/intellectualabilitiesbut also on theircreative,
whimsical, and inventive capabilities. These proposedchanges generateunified
resistance from the two groups together. At this point, the third party is faced

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with a unified front of the adversaries that stems from the processes of the
workshop as a small group.
Given these sources of difficulty, the qualitativeturn from mutual understanding to joint thinking is likely to be faced with somewhat strong group
resistance. If it can be overcome, the workshopgenuinely entersphase 3. In this
phase, participantsrealize that they can jointly develop ideas and reach formulations that will respondto theirtwo sets of needs andconcerns. This contributesto
the formation of a new type of connection and relationshipbetween the two
groups. Now the two groups, thinking together and reaching new ideas and
formulationstogether, are developing and sharing a new group membershipthe workshop, in which a new "we" is being molded. "We"now means the
workshopparticipants,the overarchinggroup members, the group who is working together. Indeed, participantsdo shift to this new mode of talking, using
"we"to reflect theirnew sharedgroupmembership.But this does not, and should
not, come at the expense of their intragroupcommitments.To the contrary,the
strengthof the new relationshipbetween the two teams is based on each team's
unshakablegroup identity and commitments.
Once the workshop has reached this phase, participantsestablish a new
mode of interactionand can tackle the most difficultissues in the conflict. It is at
this phase that the group is most useful for creatingideas that can contributeto
reversingdeeply ingrainedconflict dynamics. Indeed, the two teams themselves
have alreadyreversedsome of the conflict dynamicsand overcome the powerful
expectations of the adversary role-a role assigned to them by the conflict
dynamics.
Phase four: Workingtogether: How can "our" ideas and formulations be
implemented or disseminated? Theoretically, the workshop is now ready to
continue for some time with the third phase and then move to a new actionoriented phase: working together on how to implementor disseminate the new
ideas and formulations. The possibilities of working together depend on the
value of the new ideas and on the cyclical stage in the conflict itself.
THE TRANSITION FROM PHASE TO PHASE
While the phases are distinct, the transitionfrom one to anotheris slow and
gradual. Often the transitionis accompaniedby some resistance from participants of both teams (giving the two groupsrareopportunitiesto form an alliance
vis-a-vis the third party).
But as in other groups, the timing of the pressureto shift gears is crucial.
The thirdpartyshould be sure thatthe groupis readyand thatthe shift to the new
mode is possible. The correctdiagnosis is critical in orderto avoid the common
errorof interpretingas resistance the group's unpreparednessto get to the new

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phase. Pushing the participantsprematurelytowards an inherentlydifficult task

can backfireand create a rift within the workshopbetween the thirdpartyand the
two groups. This can be detrimentalto the future of the workshop. Setting a
successful agenda (one to which the group will adhere) requires a thorough
understandingand an accuratereadingof the phases describedabove. Setting an
agendaitem-such as joint thinkingor asking one team to explain their society's
needs-at the wrong juncture can have a negative impact on the workshop
dynamics (such as strongresistanceif the two groupsare not yet readyto engage
in such an exercise, withdrawalif one or both groups feel that the thirdparty is
not reflecting the real dynamics of the workshop,or regressionto earlierphases
of interactionif the thirdparty is not aware of the readinessof the workshopto
move on). It is important,therefore,to develop and identify diagnosticsigns that
indicate workshopreadinessto move to the mode of joint thinkingand to define
some techniquesthatthe thirdpartyshoulduse at thisjuncture.This is one of the
areas where furtherwork is urgently needed.
The phases outlined above representthe broadest stages that a successful
workshop progresses through. Each one of these broad phases could be broken
into sub-phases that are not described in this paper. For example, Phase 1, in
which the participantsproceedfrom unilateralexplicationof theirown needs and
concerns to comprehensionof those of the others could actually be broken into
three subphases:(1) Unilateralexplicationof one's own needs and interpretation
of the other's concerns, without hearing the other; (2) beginning to hear the
other's concerns, but interpretingthem in line with one's own schema of the
conflict in a self-serving way; and (3) hearingthe other's concerns and attempting to interpretthem as the other sees them with some effort to grasp the other's
larger schema of the conflict. Furtherwork is needed to elaborateon these and
other subphases in the process.
Although the model postulates a sequence of phases in the group process,
the model is not entirelylinearbecause the groupgoes throughthese phases even
in a single workshop but in a more limited way and in less depth. In the
continuingworkshop,the groupproceedsthroughthe cycle of these phases again
and again but at constantly higher levels. The procession is conceived of as
repeatingthe cycles of these phases, each time with renewedinformation-sharing
and comprehensionand at a higher level. The speed of going throughthe phases
increases, thus getting the groupfasterto the phase of joint thinkingin following
meetings.
The group's readinessto move from one phase to the next depends on two
factors:The dynamicsof the interactionbetween the two teams in the workshop,
and the stage of the conflict between the two communities.Conflict is believed to
have its own distinct internalstages (Kriesberg, 1992). The agendathat the third
party sets for the discussion of the workshop reflects, on the one hand, the
dynamics between the teams and the dynamics of the conflict between the two

Dynamics of Joint Thinking Between Adversaries

335

communities, and is designed, on the other hand, to advance the workshop

discussion toward the ultimate goal of joint thinking about new ideas for the
resolution of the conflict. It is of essential importance,therefore, to understand
developments in the larger conflict, workshop dynamics, and the interaction
between the two. This interaction,and the evolution of the four phases, are best
illustratedby examples from our continuing workshop.
HOW THE FOUR PHASES EVOLVED
IN THE CONTINUING WORKSHOP
Impact of the Political Atmosphere on the First Workshop
and the Beginning of the First Phase
The first workshop, which was held in Cambridge, Mass., in November
1990, took place at a time when avenues for political solutions between Israelis
and Palestiniansseemed almost completely deadlocked.All participantscame to
the workshopdeeply pessimistic, with the sense thatthings were rapidlydeteriorating on the ground and that violence was on the rise.
The sense of deep deadlock initially set in when in Israel the Labor Party
withdrew from a national coalition governmentwith Likud in March of 1990,
hoping to pull together a Labor-ledgovernment. But the Labor exercise failed,
leaving the government in Israel under unilateralcontrol of Likud. The Likud
governmentinvited ultraright-wingparties from Tehiyaand Tzomet to join the
government, giving Israel its most hard-linegovernmentever. Indeed, efforts to
convene an Israeli-Palestinianmeeting in Cairo based on the initiative of thenSecretaryof State JamesBakerended in failure. All efforts to bring Palestinians
and Israelis to the negotiationor even prenegotiationtable ceased in June, when
Baker announcedthe State Department'sphone numberand asked the partiesto
call on him if and when they were readyto make peace. Palestiniansin particular
felt that they had no Israeli partnerto negotiate with.
The dangerouspolitical deadlock that emerged in July was reinforcedby a
sense of pessimism promptedby the Gulf crisis that eruptedon August 2. First,
the world's attention shifted to the Gulf area away from the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Second, in response to Iraq's threats against Israel, the Israeli right
began reiteratingits position that the conflict was between Israel and the Arab
states, not between Israeland the Palestinians,and so marginalizingthe Palestinian problem or the need to address it. Third, Palestinianpublic supportfor Iraq
left a deep impact on Israeli society. For many Israelis, this supportconfirmed
earlierstereotypesand fears and was interpretedto mean thatPalestiniansindeed
wanted the destructionof Israel. Fourth, a crisis developed between the Israeli
left, a naturalpartnerin dialogue, and the Palestinians, because many Israeli

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leftists felt that Palestiniansupportfor Iraqmeant that the PLO and Palestinians
in general were not serious about a two-state solution. On the Palestinianside,
many felt thatthe Israeliswere too quick to judge and misinterprettheirbehavior,
particularlythe Israeli left, with whom they thoughtthey had some understanding. The feeling thattherewas no partnerfor peace on the other side was mutual,
and even spread to those on both sides who had hitherto thought highly of
dialogue. A deep pessimism permeatedthe broadestsegments of both societies.
This feeling was magnified by the absence of two Palestinianparticipantsfrom
the West Bank who were denied exit permits by Israeli authorities.
Moreover, both parties sensed that events were deterioratingrapidly. The
October8, 1990, incidenton the TempleMountand Al-Aqsa Mosque that ended
with at least 18 Palestiniansdead and dozens wounded created a chain of reactions and counter-reactions,the most prominentof which (by the time of the
workshop) was the stabbing of three Israelis in a West Jerusalemsuburb. For
Israelis, this introduceda new element:the loss of their sense of personalsafety.
For the first time since the beginning of the Palestinianuprisingin December of
1987, Israelis felt that their personal security in their own neighborhoodswas
threatened.This realizationevoked very strong reactions from all segments of
Israeli society. There was much public discussion-even among mainstream
circles-about preventing residents of the occupied territoriesfrom entering
Israel. The Israelileft introducedthe idea of "separation,"which was not clearly
defined, but it supportedkeeping the Palestiniansin the WestBank and Gaza and
preventingthem from entering Israel. The right began talking openly about the
mass expulsion of Palestiniansas the best solution to the problem of personal
safety. Incidents of Israeli mobs attacking Arabs who happened to cross their
paths in Tel Aviv and Jerusalemgave both publics a sense of unprecedented
deterioration.
Even before the workshop, we knew that the political developmentsrepresented a setback to the potential for positive Israeli-Palestinianinteraction.
Through our contacts with the participantsin the preparationstage, we had
learnedabouttheirpessimism and indeed skepticismthat such a workshopwould
be possible given the prevailingpolitical mood. We thereforeset the establishment of the possibility of workingrelationsbetweenthe participantsas one of our
goals for the first workshop.
In the preworkshopsessions with each separateteam, participantsintensely
reflected their understandingof recent developments and the mood in their
communities-a sense of deadlock, an atmosphereof deep pessimism, and a
perceptionof serious and unprecedenteddeteriorationin theirrelationship.It was
in this atmospherethat the first workshoptook place.
At the beginning of the first workshop,after self-introductionsby all members of the two teams, the chairingthird-partymemberlaid out the groundrules
again in the presence of all those involved in the workshop,the two teams, the

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third party, and their assistants, in orderto give a sense of contract-that these
rules committed all parties. Then the chair laid out the agenda for the meeting
and proposed a topic for discussion that was based on the above analysis of the
dynamicsof the conflict at thatstage, and the fact thatthis was the first encounter
between the two teams;thus the chairintroducedthe firstphase. It was clear to us
thateach team had come with loaded feelings towardthe other, and thateach side
to the conflict interpretedthe political behaviorof the other withoutreferenceto
the other's needs, fears, and concerns, as is often the case in protractedconflict
(Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990). It was likely thateach side's interpretationinvolved
cognitive biases and errors(Jervis, 1980; Pruitt& Rubin, 1986; Stein, 1989) that
only contributedto the sense of pessimism aboutthe other and the possibility of
reachingan agreement.The thirdpartytherefore,decided to raise the issue of the
deterioratingtrust and to ask about it in a way that broughtout the concerns,
needs, and fears of each party,as follows: We proposeda three-stepprocess to
explore deteriorationof trust(withoutacrimoniousdebate)in which (1) Palestinians express concerns and fears about Israeli actions and attitudes;Israelis listen,
not react, except to ask for clarification;Israelis might want to explain, especially if they feel attacked.(2) Israelisexpress concernsaboutPalestinianactions
and attitudes;Palestinianslisten, not react, except to ask for clarificationor to
explain if they feel attacked.(3) Open the floor for explanation,discussion, and
the possibility of offering reassurancesto the needs and concerns expressed by
the other side.
Reaching mutualcomprehensionof needs and concerns took a lot of tiring
and intense discussion, but it was a prerequisitefor anyjoint thinking, which had
to take into account at the same time the concerns and needs of both parties in
order to be creative and constructive.

Reaching the End of the First Phase

The first phase dealt with deep-seated skepticism about the possibility of
renewed positive interactionbetween Israelis and Palestinians.Each team raised
a whole list of doubts, concerns, and new fears that had accumulatedover the
previous year and grown particularlyacute in precedingmonths. The open discussion of these issues in the presence of the other side and the response of the
other team to these concerns helped each side to gain importantinsights into the
other's concerns. Moreover, it clarified how assumptionsmade by each party
feed into the sense of deadlock and deterioration.
By the end of our first workshop,the first phase of mutualcomprehension
had been achieved. The insight that participantshad gained about the other side
broughtthe two teams to a stage wherethey could stay together.They had not yet
reached a stage of working together, but they became convinced that working

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together was possible, and was worth a try. While they came to the workshop
with a sense that there was nobody on the other side to deal with, they left
reconvinced that there were potential partners.Thus the first workshop reconstitutedfor each team a negotiatingpartneron the otherside, despite the political
difficulties on the ground. Still, there was no strong conviction that something
would come out of these workshops.
The Intrusion of Reality: Setbacks to Progress
and the Beginning of the Second Phase
The second workshopwas held in June, 1991, in the aftermathof the Gulf
war, which began on January15. The mutualaccusationsbetween Israelis and
Palestiniansduringthat period regardingthe conduct of the communitiesduring
the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war reached a new high. New powerful images
were createdon each side: For the Israelis, a vivid image was of the Palestinians
dancingon the roofs when an Iraqimissile found its way to a city in Israel;for the
Palestinians, the image was of Palestinians'confinement to their homes under
prolonged military curfew.
It was obvious that first we had to go back and catch up with what had
happened.Indeed, based on two preworkshopsessions, one with each team, we
realized that the two teams themselves were eager to examine each side's reactions duringthe war. It would have been inappropriateto jump rightinto a "phase
2" agenda. So the first item on the agenda for the second workshop consisted
once again of mutualexamination,the end resultof which only reestablishedthe
achievementof the first phase.
This process was also necessarybecause Palestinianmemberswho had not
been allowed to leave the West Bank for the first workshophadjoined us for the
second. This slowed down the explorationof mutual understandingabout the
war, since the new participantshad to catch up to the others. It was only toward
the end of the first day (of the second workshop)thatthe thirdpartycould present
an agenda item that would lead the workshopto its second phase. Participants
were told that what we had in mind for the next phase was engaging in an exercise in joint innovation. We asked them to select certain issues jointly, not in
order to formulateany agreement, but to develop a set of ideas that would be
mutually acceptable and mutually reassuring. They were told that they could
carry these ideas away with them and use them in their own writings, knowing
thatthese were acceptableideas, arrivedat with significantmembersof the other
party.In principle, these could be the basis of joint documents, but we were not
asking the participantsto produce such a documentyet.
Notice that the thirdpartydid not suggest any content at this early stage in
the interaction.This freedomof choice for the two teams, and the introductionof

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339

a new phase, led the teams to explore common items for the agenda. After some
discussion the participantsagreedon four items, two proposedby each side. The
Palestinianteam chose the right of self-determination,and the de facto on-theground situationin the occupied territories(land confiscations, school closures,
etc.). The Israeli group wanted to examine the right of return(of the Palestinians), and the relationshipof a futurePalestinianentity or state to Jordan.Each
groupwantedto explore each other'swillingness to acceptand recognize some of
their most importantconcerns and needs.
For example, in discussing Palestinianself-determination,the first of the
four issues, a majorgap was identifiedas the Palestiniansneeded to be reassured
that if they entered a political process, the end should be "guaranteed"selfdetermination,while Israelisfelt stronglythatthis would not be possible from the
outset. Why was it importantfor Palestiniansto get this reassuranceand why was
it hard for Israelis to give it? Answering these questions requiredfurtherexaminationof the principleof self-determination:to whom it should be granted(West
Bank and Gaza inhabitantsor all Palestinians);the question of nationhood;the
finality of a political settlement;and the relationshipbetween a West Bank and
Gaza entity and Jordan.In this case, the teams were not really ready for joint
thinking and generationof new ideas. They first wanted to make sure that their
counterpartsin the other group acceptedtheir needs. The participantsdidn't get
to complete examinationof all four issues. Subgroupsconsisting of members
from both teams were assigned to meet after the workshop and prepareideas
about the remainingissues for the third workshop.
This second phase in the workshop process continued well into the third
meeting, which was held in August 1991. In the process of exploring the same
list of issues, the participantssought and achieved mutualreassurancesthat their
parties' needs and concerns were being addressed within the discussion of a
desirable agreement, and that the other side understoodthese needs and was
willing to try to take them into account. Transitionto the thirdphase now became
possible.

Getting to Joint Thinking: Initiating the Third Phase

It was only well into our third workshop that the third party decided that
participantswere readyto switch modes and begin workingas a "jointlythinking
group."As in the other phases, the interactionbetween workshopprocesses and
conflict dynamics played an importantrole in our decision.
The thirdworkshopwas held in Bellagio, Italy, at the end of August 1991,
when the U.S. was preparingfor a peace process exploiting "the window of
opportunity"created after the Gulf war. By that time, U.S. Secretaryof State
JamesBakerwas alreadynegotiatingwith Israeland Arabpartners,includingthe

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Palestinians, about the terms of reference for initiating a peace conference and
negotiation, so it was clear that in terms of the cyclical stage of the conflict, the
two communitieswere ready to engage in a serious attemptto negotiate a peaceful settlementdespite the opposition within each community.This indicatedthat
the conflict was "ripe,"in the sense thatthe partiesto the conflict were willing to
seriously consider noncoercive options for the resolution of the conflict
(Kriesberg, 1987; Rubin, 1989), and it was possible for new ideas to be developed jointly. We concluded that both the dynamics of the workshop and the
dynamics of the conflict at large were converging to make the third phase
possible.
At this point, when the thirdpartyproposedbreakinginto small groups to
work on joint ideas, there was a sudden explosion of resistancefrom a minority
of members from both groups. The resistance, although not surprising,took a
somewhat sharp form when one Palestinianparticipantbegan questioning the
other team's political influence and awarenessof the asymmetryin the conflict
and in the workshop.Thoughthe issues were legitimatefor groupdiscussion, the
timing and the form were most probablyrelatedto the requestto "shift modes."
The thirdpartypersistedin its proposal, and the rest of the workshopparticipants
in fact coalesced aroundthe thirdpartyin supportof the agenda proposal. With
this ratherdramaticpassage, we moved into the third stage.
Achievements of Joint Thinking
In the third phase, the two groups managed to tackle some of the most
difficult issues in the relationshipbetween Israelis and Palestinians:Palestinian
nationhood, the finality of a political settlementbetween Israelis and Palestinians, and the attitudetoward Israeli settlementsin the West Bank and Gaza, all
issues that occupied the workshop for a long time. The workshop participants
agreed on joint formulationson the three issues. Near the end of the workshop,
participantstackled a fourth issue-the right of returnfor Palestinians(to their
homes and lands in Israel proper)-but time ran out before participantscould
resolve it. The groupcapturedthe dilemmaof this issue as follows: If the Israelis
would recognize a Palestinianright of return in principle, Palestinians would
forego implementingthis right;however, Israeliswere not preparedto grantthis
right because, according to an Israeli participant,it would be tantamountto
stating that their state was born "in sin"; hence the dilemma. But the prevailing
feeling among participantswas that they were likely to have come up with a
creative "solution"to this issue had therebeen more time, particularlysince they
were able to formulatea numberof draftson this issue. So the lack of completion
did not detract from the deep sense of accomplishmentwith which this phase
ended.

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341

This phase of the workshoprequiredthe thirdpartyto drawon new methods

and tools to best utilize the willingness of the group to thinkjointly. The main
method that we used was to discuss an issue in the plenary,with all participants,
until the two groups felt that a joint formulationwas imminent.The plenarythen
selected a subgroup(from both teams, often without a third-partymember) to
work on a formulationthat would capturethe essence of the group discussion.
The subgroup'sformulationwas broughtback to the plenary and finalized. We
also experimented with other tools such as joint drafting and brainstorming.
However, we need to develop more tools to meet the unchartedchallenges of this
phase.
The participantsthemselves ended the third workshop expressing overwhelming support for the effort and urging its continuation, even though the
initial commitmenthad been for three workshops. Participantsarguedthat having reacheda mode of "jointthinking,"it was particularlyimportantto continue
to tackle more thorny issues as a group.
Toward the Fourth Phase
We estimatedthat because participantswantedto continuebeyond the third
workshop,and indeed, participantsfrom both sides urgedus to do so, we needed
at least one more workshopto develop and formulatemore ideas and then move
into the fourthphase of joint action. There was a gamutof ideas on how to work
together and disseminate the joint formulationsthe groups had developed. The
participantswould have needed to decide what was the best mode to work
togetherand for what goals, given the dynamicsof the conflict in the region. But
our estimationwas thatboth the dynamicswithinthe workshopand the dynamics
of the conflict in the region allowed us to move smoothlyto the fourthphase. The
group was certainlywilling to engage in thinkingaboutways of workingtogether, and the new dynamics of the conflict were making such an option more and
more possible. For example, in early 1990, when we began talking to potential
participantsabout the workshop, we consciously avoideddiscussing joint drafting or formulationsof ideas because at that stage of the conflict this was still
premature.By the summerof 1991, this had become possible because of developments in the conflict itself. There was a sense that time was runningout for a
peaceful settlement under a Likud government and a massive wave of Jewish
immigration to Israel. This introduced a sense of urgency that pushed both
parties toward trying new and untested avenues.
The following developmentsin the largerconflict made the fourthphase in
the workshophardto achieve. At the end of October1991, the peace conference,
underthe sponsorshipof the U.S. (and the formerU.S.S.R.), opened in Madrid
with the participationof Israel, the Palestinians, Egypt, Jordan,Lebanon, and

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Syria. This conference introducednew realitiesthat all threepartiesto the workshop had to consider. Three new factors were now introduced.First, it was not
clear what the functions of the workshop practiced in a prenegotiationstage
would be after the negotiation stage began. The political realities changed and
the workshop organizers and participantsneeded to adjust its methods, goals,
and functions to these realities. As long as these adjustmentswere not made,
reconveningthe workshopwas seen as premature.Second, some participantsfelt
that the meetings could be construed as a "competing"process parallel to the
formal talks. They argued that this perception, even if inaccurate, would be
detrimentalfor the workshop and its participants.Third, when the negotiation
teams were named, it turnedout that most of the participantson the Palestinian
workshop team became involved as negotiatorsor advisors. We therefore decided to consult with participantsto examine the need for reconveningthe workshop and the new functions it might serve in light of political developments.
After the consultations, we held one more workshop. This last workshop
took place afterthe Israelielections thathad introducedfurtherdramaticchanges
in the region: a Labor-ledgovernment won on a platform calling for serious
negotiation with the Palestiniansand the Arab states. The workshop meeting,
therefore, focused on the functions of the continuingworkshopin light of these
developments, and on updatingand discussing new possibilities after the Israeli
elections. We never got to the fourthphase, becausepolitical developmentsmade
it impossible to do so within the existing structureand conceptionof the continuing workshop.But in theory,the fourthphase is the naturalfinal developmentof
the continuing workshop.

CONCLUSION
The continuing problem-solving workshop evolves through a number of
discernable phases. The third party in the workshop facilitates a process that
takes the participantsthroughfour phases mandatedby a logic of the intervention
model. In the first phase of the workshop,participantsinteractas two separate
teams engaging in an activity characterizedby unilateralexplicationof theirown
party's needs and concerns. By the fourthphase of the workshop,they achieve
psychological and cognitive preparednessto work together; in this phase, an
element of common identity of membershipin the workshop develops and a
sense of interdependence,cohesiveness, and desire to succeed in their effort
becomes evident.
The process of moving throughthe fourphases of the workshop,as outlined
and describedin this paper, is determinedby three main factors:the phases that
the interventionmodel plans;the naturaldynamicswithin the workshop;and the
political developmentsin the largerregional conflict. Each of these factors, and
their interaction, can either hinder or expedite the progress from one phase to

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Adversaries
of JointThinking
Dynamics

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another.Progressfrom the first stage to the fourthis not entirely linear because
each workshopmight comprise all phases, albeit some only briefly. In addition,
interactionbetween the three factors can also produceunexpectedregression to
earlier stages. Therefore,profoundunderstandingof all three factors is required
for constructive facilitation of the workshop process. The implication of this
point is that thirdparties involved in similar activities need at least two areas of
expertise: group process and regional conflict dynamics. (For other third-party
requirementssee Rouhana& Kelman, 1994.)
Analysis of the continuingworkshopprocessesanddiagnosisof the phases is
importantfor third-partyintervention.Diagnosingthesephasesduringa workshop
will help third parties track group development and intervene in a timely and
appropriatefashion in order to lead the workshop teams one step further.For
example, this will help identifywhen the groupis readyto move on to a new phase
or when strongerinterventionis needed to facilitatemovement. Indeed, identifying the propertiming for interventionis one of the crucial challenges that third
partiesneed to cope with. Conceptualizingthe phases will also help thirdparties
design tools and techniquesthat meet the requirementsof each phase. Such new
tools and techniques are particularlyneeded now that many practitionersare
considering the applicationof this method to various intergroupconflicts.
By providingthe setting for interactiveproblem-solvingand steeringparticipants towardjoint thinking, the continuing workshoppresents an intervention
methodthat is particularlysuited for deep-rootedethnic and nationalconflicts. It
provides participantswith the opportunityto explore the needs and concerns of
the conflicting partiesand directsthem towardcognitive empathywith the other
party's needs and concerns. Moreover it sets the stage for joint thinking that
emphasizes the creation of new ideas that respond to both parties' needs. It
diverts the parties from the dynamics of negotiation and bargainingbased on
power politics andprovidesparticipantswith a settingconduciveto joint thinking
and generationof creativeideas. In addition,a continuingworkshopprovidesthe
necessarytime to help createthe readinessto move the process forwardand other
conditions that are not availablein one-time events. Participantshave the time to
examine between sessions ideas developed in the workshopon the ground with
constituencies, leaders, and others, and to bring back modifications or new
ideas. By reaching the phase of joint thinking and working together, and by
producing new ideas that meet the needs of their two societies, the continuing
workshopoffers a unique contributionto the resolutionof deep-rootedconflict.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express my gratitudeto ProfessorHerbertC. Kelmanof Harvard
University and ProfessorNormanBerkowitzof Boston College for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article.

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Work on this article was supported, in part, by a grant from the United
States Instituteof Peace.

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