Appeasement Disadvantage

DDI 2016

1NC Shell
The United States is successfully employing a strategy of
containment in the status quo to limit Chinese
expansionism
Etzioni 16 (Amitai, professor of international affairs at George Washington
University, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Case Study of
Multifaceted Containment, Asian Perspective, 40(2), p. 187-188)
US officials often state that the United States does not seek to contain China (Carpenter 2011). In April
2014, for example, President Obama stated, Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain
China (Manesca 2014). Secretary of State John Kerry repeated the sentiment a month later, stating that
the U.S. does not seek to contain China (BBC News 2014a). However, there are often great discrepancies
between the statements made by top officials and the conduct of the states they speak for.

The

actions of the United States reflect a containment strategy that seems to

have evolvedrather than developedthrough complex interactions among various agencies, with the
Pentagon being particularly influential (Etzioni 2013). The strategys main element involves positioning US
or allied military forces along Chinas borders and in the regional areas into which China might seek to
expand. Thus, the United States has announced that it views the contested Senkaku Islands as being
covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan;
encouraged Japan to build up its military; developed military ties with Vietnam; reopened its military bases
in the Philippines; provided India with nuclear know-how and access to uranium, in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, as a means of inciting India to balance China; and moved troops and naval

All these moves draw a red line that, if crossed by

China, could lead to war. The so-called Asia pivot thus appears to be a thinly
veiled China containment strategy (Roach et al. 2015). John Mearsheimer has pointed out
vessels to the Asia Pacific region.

that involving regional states in various military alliances raises the risk that the United States and China
will engage in war due to reckless actions taken by one of the allies (Mearsheimer 2014). Barry Posen
concurs and points out that an alliance with the United States gives allies a false sense of security and
encourages them to challenge more powerful states, confident that Washington will save them in the
end (Posen 2013). (This point also applies to China in its relations with North Korea.) At the same time,
one may argue that the most basic foundation of the international order, supported even by many who do
not necessarily accept the liberal elements of that order, is that states may not use force to change the
status quo and must not invade other states. Thus, one might argue that for the United States to position
its military forces or allied forces in places into which China might expand would help stabilize the
international order. However, the same cannot be said of other elements of US policy toward China, as
highlighted by the US response to the AIIBs launch, which itself was of limited import. To proceed, I must
introduce a distinction between a strategy of all-encompassing containment and a strategy that combines
some forms of containment (especially military) with competition (especially economic and ideational) and
integration (especially the governance of international institutions). To distinguish between these two kinds
of containment, I refer to the first kind as multifaceted containment and the second as aggression-limiting
containment. Multifaceted containment seeks to block practically any and all gains by another power,
whether territorial, economic, or status (such as voting rights). By contrast, aggression-limiting
containment seeks to block only those advances that are made through the use of force, while granting
room for competition and cooperation. It is useful to think about aggression-limiting containment as a
flashing red light in some lanes and a green one in others, as opposed to a barrier that blocks all lanes. In a
previous book I examined the ways the United States sought to contain the USSR during the Cold War and
showed that the United States practiced multifaceted containment (Etzioni 1964). Thus, if the USSR sought
landing rights for its civilian aviation in Bolivia, the United States sought to block it. If the USSR granted
foreign aid to Ghana, the United States pressured Ghana to reject it. The United States sought to suppress
USSR ideological and cultural outreach. The USSR treated the United States the same, and the result was
high levels of tension that led several times to the brink of nuclear war. When President John F. Kennedy
unveiled his Strategy of Peace, he scaled back these nonmilitary forms of containment, which resulted in

US efforts to contain China have

not been limited to countering Chinese aggression , such as by posting military forces,
considerably diminished tensionsa dtente (Etzioni 2008).

building military alliances, conducting more military exercises, or ordering major weapons systems to
respond to a possible attack from China.

Instead, the United States has also sought to

block China in nonmilitary sectors. For example, the United States pressured
states on Chinas borders to resist Chinas economic overtures, blocked Chinese
efforts to begin negotiations on a free trade zone spanning the Pacific (Davis 2014),
cautioned regional states against depending too strongly on China for humanitarian aid, and pledged $187
million to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam in an effort to decrease Chinas influence over those

The United States also seems to be diplomatically and

economically working to halt the expansion of Chinas relative influence in
states (Var 2015).

Africa (Sun and Olin-Ammentorp 2014) and Latin America (Noesselt and Landivar 2013)

Concessions Bad add up overtime and China wont

change
Wolf 14 (Albert B. Wolf, 5-1-2014, "The Unipolar Moment is (Almost) Over:
Whats Next?," Times of Israel, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-unipolarmoment-is-almost-over-what-next/)
This is also known as engagement. Unlike other strategies driven by Who
gets more thinking, under engagement we stop worrying about how big a
slice of the pie China gets, and instead focus upon growing the whole pie.
Under this strategy, we give up none of our commitments. Instead, we take
up new ones. We attempt to influence Chinas present and future
behavior by using positive inducements (carrots), while ensnaring them
and us in a web of increasingly intricate international organizations Scholars
like Alastair Iain Johnston suggest that Chinas participation in international
organizations has had a moderating influence on Beijings foreign policy since
the days of Mao. Jeffrey Legro argues that since Deng Xiaoping, China has
pursued an integrationist strategy that has benefited its growth. Until
outside events demonstrate that its current strategy is not working or has
failed, Chinese elites have little reason to favor a course correction in a more
aggressive direction. Has this ever worked? Some would suggest that
engagement has never worked because declining states rarely try it.
Declining powers are wary of trying it for fear that concessions given to
rising powers today will be used against them in the future. China
could pocket concessions and use them later in order to further
Americas demise. China may also see this as little more than cheap
talk: a U.S. ploy to get its way and maintain primacy on the cheap.
After all, such a doctrine does not involve deeper defense cuts than what we
have now.

Relations spillover is a myth engagement with China

exacerbates military competition that makes conflict
inevitable
Van Jackson; 2015; Dr. Van Jackson is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New
American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, researching the
intersection of Asian security, strategy, and military trends. He is also a Visiting Scholar and Adjunct
Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in Georgetown Universitys School of Foreign
Service. Dr. Jackson has testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific, and is a frequent commentator in popular media and policy outlets. He is the
author of the forthcoming book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S.-North Korea

Relations; the diplomat; the myth of a US-China grand bargain; August 6 th, 2015;
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/155dfb3b07fc07de

A number of scholars have tried to advance the well-intentioned proposal

that U.S. concessions to Chinas many concerns will somehow facilitate a
peaceful order in Asia. While I agree with the sentiment and recognize that
there are areas of international life where Sino-U.S. cooperation is essential,
the idea that U.S. accommodation of China will produce a peaceful
and stable order in Asia isnt just unrealistic; its irresponsible .
Though it wasnt the first, Hugh Whites China Choice was an early and
pointed call for the United States to form a G-2 with China in which the two
countries would work together to set the terms of the regional order,
requiring that the United States accommodate the demands of a rising China.
Jim Steinbergs and Michael OHanlons Strategic Reassurance and Resolve
reiterates many of Whites points, but with better theoretical grounding. Lyle
Goldsteins Meeting China Halfway argues far more persuasively than many
in this lineage, and some of his specific recommendations merit serious
considerationnot least because they would incur no great cost to try. But
there are equally serious reasons to doubt the transformative
ambitions attached to U.S. concessions. The latest salvo in this America
must accommodate China literature hails from an accomplished political
scientist at George Washington University, Charles Glaser, writing in the most
recent issue of International Security. Glaser makes the sweeping and
somewhat unhelpful claim that military competition is risky and therefore
undesirable. As an alternative he suggests that if only the United States
would abandon commitments to Taiwan, China would be willing to resolve its
territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, thereby sidestepping
military competition. . Prior to around 2008, proposals for U.S.
accommodation of a rising China made much more sense, or at least
could be taken more seriously. But times have changed. Chinas
ambitions have changed. And so has its foreign policy behavior. These
contextual changes matter for whether and when accommodation can have
the desired effect. More to the point though, there are a number of problems
with the grand bargain line of argumentation. First, any proposal for a
Sino-U.S. solution to regional problems is by definition taking a great
power view of Asia that marginalizes the agency and strategic
relevance of U.S. allies and the regions middle powers. In the brief
period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken semi-seriously in
Washington, alliesespecially South Korea and Japanchafed. The regions
middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of China
and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could
ironically create a more fragmented order as a result. Including others,
at any rate, is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As
early as the 1960s U.S. officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional
issues spanning from North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no
avail. Second, and as Ive written about extensively elsewhere, Asia is rife with
security concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any

understanding reached with China would leave unresolved many of

the regions latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain
proponents forget that China and the United States only have real conflicts of
interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and
some other Asian stateTaiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United
States only becomes part of the picture because of a commitment to regional
order, including its alliance network. Third, as its recent stock market crash
makes all too obvious, China remains a fragile superpower, to quote Susan
Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situationcorruption, growing
wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government
legitimacymake it an unpredictable player. Nor is China showing meaningful
signs of political liberalization. Theres so much brewing underneath the
surface in China that dealing with China today as if it were a
hegemon tomorrow assumes too much, and grants China too much
credit too soon. Fourth, theres a defunct theory thats been smuggled
into arguments about changing Chinese behavior through U.S.
accommodation. Political scientists call it neofunctionalism, a term rarely
used these days, even though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain
arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to
account for and push for European integration. The basic idea involved an
assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would
spillover into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity
among nations, it was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane
socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become
largely discredited. Nevertheless, echoes of neofunctionalism remain in
contemporary claims that properly calibrated restraint,
accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect
on a relationship. Ironically, these arguments tend to come from
scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can
induce China into resolving its East and South China Sea disputes by
giving it Taiwan reflects precisely this type of expectation, as do
calls for the United States to make small concessions to China in
hopes that it will enable a more stable situation . None of this means
that accommodative gestures or strategies should be outright dismissed.
There were numerous periods of detente with the Soviet Union during the
Cold War, and that rivalry was much more confrontational. China and the
United States, moreover, have a number of overlappingnot just conflicting
interests. I might even go as far as saying that neofunctionalism has a bit of
a bad rap; there are times when trivial or non-costly forms of cooperation can
lead to greater and deeper cooperation, but political scientists havent
convincingly figured out what those conditions are. But grand bargains
rarely work. Theres a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S.
commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to
resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not
suspend military competition because that involves more than
present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions,
territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless

of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today,

military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to
force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that cant be
sacrificed for political promises. Chinas concerns will only be assuaged
when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it
possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the
regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as
long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a
force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of
the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.

Uniqueness Extensions

China Rise: Territorial

China transitioning away from peaceful rise
characterized by territorial ambitions
Stephen F. Burgess; 2016; Department of International Security Studies,
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base; Contemporary Security Policy;
Rising bipolarity in the south china sea: The America rebalance to Asia and
Chinas expansion; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1149968
For seven decades, the United States has exercised leadership and dominance in the South China Sea (SCS) and much of Southeast Asia (SEA). From the Second World War
onwards, the United States led in ensuring free seas and open skies in the SCS and from the 1970s led in promoting free market economies and bringing globalization and
its benefits to most states in the region. American companies, as well as those from Japan and South Korea invested heavily in the region, which helped to spur rapid

the period of American leadership and dominance is Coming to a

close, as the rise of China has raised the prospect of a challenge to the status
quo and instability and a bipolar balance of power in the region. Since the
1990s, Chinas influence has grown rapidly in the region, as trade has soared
and investment and aid have grown. At the same time, China has continued
to reassert its claim over the entire SCS as its sovereign territory, within the so-called ninedash line, and rejected multilateral and legal solutions to the growing dispute .
Instead, Beijing has chosen to pressure weaker states, such as the Philippines
and Vietnam, on a bilateral basis to accept Chinas claims . Coincident with apparent American
economic growth. However,

weakness after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2009 continental shelf submissions by Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the

), China became more assertive regarding its claims in the SCS,

which marked a shift from its peaceful rise strategy .1 Chinas coast guard backed by the Peoples
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has actively defended those claims, and China ostentatiously deployed an oil platform in 2014 in an area of the SCS claimed by Vietnam and
built seven massive outposts with military facilities, including airstrips, in 2015 in areas claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. As a result of Chinas growing power and

SEA is becoming increasingly bipolar with China as the rising, revisionist

power, which is seeking to gain dominance over the SCS and limit access for
the United States. Chinas continuing rise and vital interests in the SCS and
efforts to fortify its claims within the nine-dash line will pose an increasing challenge for
American naval vessels and military aircraft to maintain freedom of
navigation (FoN) and open skies in the SCS, as well as those of its allies and partners. The
influence,

United States may eventually be unable to ensure FoN and open skies and assure allies and partners. The United States announced a rebalance to Asia in November
2011. Part of there balance was intended to deal with Chinas rise and assertive actions in the SCS and East China Sea (ECS). The rebalance also included increased
engagement with China through a strategic and economic dialogue. This article analyses the pressures from China that are creating bipolarity and stressing American
alliances and partnerships in the SCS and driving regional instability; it also determines how China might be influenced to change its behaviour from expansion to
cooperation and the role that the American rebalance and its allies and partners might play. In their book, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes, Sarah Raine
and Christian Le Mire outline four different scenarios for the SCS: (1) Nobodys sea: stable cohabitation (bipolarity). (2) Somebodys sea: regional hegemony (US
hegemony or Chinese hegemony). (3) Everybodys sea: managed mistrust (UNCLOS). (4) Sea of conflict (unplanned or planned).2

Competition Now
Competition characterizes the relationship now
cooperation disincentivized
Yan Xuetong* and Qi Haixia; 2012; Yan Xuetong is Professor of
International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International
Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of
International Relations, Tsinghua University. They are the co-authors of
Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: ChinaUS Intensifying Rivalry Does
not Amount to Cold War; The Chinese journal of international politics;
Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: ChinaUS Intensifying Rivalry
Does not Amount to Cold War; April 6th, 2012;
file:///C:/Users/Kenney/Dropbox/Appeasement%20Generic/Emma/Football
%20Game.pdf
the character of SinoUS relations as
that of superficial friendship determines that conflicts of interests between
the two states will continue to be intensified , and that there will be an increasing
trend wherein the two compete more than they cooperate. Obamas strategy
of pivoting towards the Asia Pacific Region is a product of relative decline in
US power and of the increased pace of Chinas rise. It is only natural for
structural conflict between China and the United States to deepen as the relative gap in
As the comprehensive power of China and the United States continues towards parity,

their national power narrows. As conflicts of interests between the two states grow at a rate faster than that of shared interests, regardless of the outcome of the US

hedge will by necessity

be the cornerstone of the US policy toward China . As such, the superficial
friendship between the United States and China will continue to tilt towards
competition outweighing cooperation, or the development of an adversarial relationship that exceeds one of friendship.
Presidency elections in 2012that is of whether Obama continues to be President or if a Republican enters office

Furthermore, as its comprehensive national power decreases, United States will as a matter of necessity narrow its strategy, and apply its strategic resources to the
globes most vital strategic areas.

Chinas rise has gradually made the Asia Pacific the center of

the world, and by narrowing the scope of its strategy, United States can enhance its domination in the Western Pacific. In 2011, when announcing the US naval
strategy for the next 1015 years, US Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert stated that in the future the United States would place more than one-third of its
warships in the Western Pacific.54 Such a deployment will undoubtedly increase strategic conflict between the United States and China.

Containment Now/Shift
Status quo is a clear shift away from engagement it
hasnt changed China politically and short-lived
cooperation isnt pulling the relationship away from
containment now
Shambaugh 6-15 (David Shambaugh, David Shambaugh is professor of
political science and international affairs at George Washington University,
and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This is excerpted
from a lecture he gave at the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong
on Wednesday. 6-11-15 "In a fundamental shift, China and the US are now
engaged in all-out competition," http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-allout. Date Accessesd 7-15-16. DDI-AC)
The relationship between the United States and China has rightly
been described as the most important relationship in world affairs . It
is also the most complex and fraught one. These two titans are the world's two
leading powers and are interconnected in numerous ways bilaterally,
regionally, and globally. It is therefore of vital importance to
understand the dynamics that underlie and drive this relationship at
present, which are shifting. While Washington and Beijing cooperate where they can, there
has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship. This balance has now shifted, with
competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now
trumps economics in the relationship. The competition is not only strategic competition, it is actually
comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomatic, technological, even in the
academic world where China has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring
pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China.

Mutual distrust is pervasive in

both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on
this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of both public view US-China
relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people
in both nations still had positive views of the other. One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in
the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and
trajectory into the future.

The "engagement coalition" is crumbling and a

"competition coalition" is rising. In my view, the relationship has been
fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find
extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership .
The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for
an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers. The macro trajectory for the last decade
has been steadily downward - punctuated only by high-level summits between the two presidents, which
temporarily arrest the downward trajectory. This has been the case with the last four presidential summits.

Occasionally, bilateral meetings like the Strategic and Economic

Dialogue, which will convene in Washington in two weeks' time,
provide similar stabilization and impetus for movement in specific
policy sectors. But their effects are short-lived, with only a matter of months
passing before the two countries encounter new shocks and the deterioration of ties resumes. The most
recent jolts to the relationship, just a few months since Xi Jinping and Barack Obama took their stroll in the
Zhongnanhai (the so-called Yingtai Summit), have been the escalating rhetoric and tensions around
China's island-building in the South China Sea. Behind this imbroglio lies rising concerns about Chinese
military capabilities, US military operations near China, and the broader balance of power in Asia. But there
have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the
relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and

falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft NGO and national security laws), human
rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the
US Office of Personnel Management most recently) and problems in trade and investment. Hardly a day
passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more - and serious - friction. This is the "new
normal" and both sides had better get used to it - rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship
that is not achievable. This has given impetus to an unprecedented outpouring of commentary and reports
by Washington think tanks in recent months. I have lived and worked there a long time, and cannot recall
such a tsunami of publications on US-China relations - and they are all, with one exception (Kevin Rudd's
Asia Society report), negative in nature, calling for a re-evaluation of US policy towards China, as well as a
hardening of policy towards China across the board. A qualitative shift in American thinking about China is

the "engagement" strategy pursued since Nixon

across eight administrations, that was premised on three pillars, is
unravelling. The American expectation has been, first, as China
modernised economically, it would liberalise politically; second, as
China's role in the world grew, it would become a "responsible
stakeholder" - in Robert Zoellick's words - in upholding the global liberal order; and third,
that China would not challenge the American-dominant security
architecture and order in East Asia. The first premise is clearly not
occurring - quite to the contrary, as China grows stronger economically, it is
becoming more, not less, repressive politically . There are any number of
examples, but political repression in China today is the worst it has been
in the 25 years since Tiananmen. With respect to the other two, we are not witnessing
occurring. In essence,

frontal assaults by China on these regional and global institutional architectures. But we are witnessing
Beijing establishing a range of alternative institutions that clearly signal China's discomfort with the US-led
postwar order. Make no mistake: China is methodically trying to construct an alternative international
order.

America is fearful of a rising china and has switched

policies in the direction of containment
Salman Rafi; 2016; Salman Rafi Sheikh is a freelance journalist and
research analyst of international relations; The Asian times; The US double
game to contain china; February 19th 2016; http://atimes.com/2016/02/usdouble-game-to-contain-china/ (EK)
America does not want the emergence of China as a giant in the global
hierarchy of states
the
US is also very much concerned over the rise of China as an economic
power.
Washington plays the wooing game in an attempt
to contain it For instance, its move to vote in favor of Chinas membership in
the select IMF basket of currencies is only to stop Beijings own drive towards
establishing an alternative system
. While issues like the militarization of South China Sea give it

opportunity to attack China and win praise from ASEAN members involved in

islands row,

Hence, while occasionally admonishing Beijing,

also

While the recently held US-ASEAN summit was another important occasion for the U.S. for attacking China for making military

advances in South China Sea, the disputed islands are far from the focus of their bi-lateral tussle. Although the joint statement of the summit did not mention China directly, enough had already been said about the increased militarization of the
region, the crucial need for lowering tensions and implementation of international norms. The end of the summit saw U.S. and China making claims and counter-claims regarding deployment of missile system by China on a disputed island.

Simply put, the US-China bilateral tussle is about one hegemon resisting the emergence of another in the
global hierarchy of states.
While the summit was literally littered with explosive content of China threat theory, the roots of this imaginary or real threat lie somewhere else.

Although the U.S. is undergoing the crucial hegemonic fatigue, its resistance against Chinas emergence is not merely aimed at denying the latter enough

breathing space within the IMF/World Bank controlled global economic system. Nor is the occasional mention of disputed territory in South and East China seas the only anti-China strategy the U.S. is following. As some of the recent

the U.S. is containing

China
The U.S. deep
engagement with the ASEAN countries and periodic comments on the
disputed islands in the South China Sea constitute its element of
containment of China.
developments indicate, there are at least two broader ways by which

and, at the same time, wooing

through.

A relatively recent example of this was when the US Ambassador to Thailand Glyn Davies berated the Thai government for not adding its voice to calls for China to

peacefully resolve conflicts over its appropriation of islands in the South China Sea. Similar messages and accompanying political and economic threats have been delivered by U.S. to other capitals across Southeast Asia. As far as wooing China
into the IMF/World Bank programed economic system is concerned, the passage of 2010 IMF reform package by the U.S. Congress in December 2015, and the consequent increase of Chinas share from a meagre 3% to 8% stand out-standing.
Not only this, the December 18 US approval of the long-awaited IMF reforms followed another decision of Washington to vote in favor of Chinas membership in the select IMF basket of currencies called Special Drawing Rights. The IMF official
statement then declared, The Board today decided that the RMB met all existing criteria and, effective October 1, 2016 the RMB is determined to be a freely usable currency and will be included in the SDR basket as a fifth currency, along with
the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the British Pound. Can this be called the much-awaited change of heart from the U.S.? Not really, since Washington is wooing China into the post Second World War system only to foil Beijings

own drive towards establishing an alternative system, or at least limit its scale. Although we cannot predict at this stage how alternative and different this system would be, a number of recent developments clearly indicate its formation.
China-led developments, especially the establishment of AIIB, have much to do with Asias need for financial resources to develop the much required infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that Asia will need $8 trillion
over the next decade for energy, transportation, telecommunication and water sanitation. Now private investment in infrastructure runs a mere $13 billion a year, most in low-risk projects. Official development assistance adds another $11 billion
a year. There is thus an annual shortfall of almost $700 billion. This is where Chinas alternative system becomes relevant; and this is precisely where this system also becomes China threat theory, as far as the U.S. and its regional allies
position is concerned. The announcement for the establishment of an alternative system, which came earlier this year, has since been followed by some important projections regarding the flow of loans from AIIB to the potential target
countries of the region. On December 4, at an annual China-South Korea Banking Development Forum in Shanghai, Chen Huan, head of the AIIBs Multilateral Interim Secretariat, announced that when it begins raising capital on international
bond markets beginning January, 2016, the new bank will concentrate on energy, transportation, rural development, urban development and logistics. Jin Liqun, the president-designate of the AIIB, has stated that the AIIB plans to lend $10
billion to $15 billion a year for the first five or six years, a modest contribution to an $8 trillion infrastructure deficit. While the pronouncements in themselves look promising, there are some grey areas that certainly seem to dampen the knightin-the-shining-armor status of this alternative system. For instance, while Jin Liqun, who was once Chinas Alternative Executive Director of China to the World Bank and the Vice-President of the Asian Development Bank, a Japan led byproduct of the World Bank, seems to have in his possession enough knowledge about the nature of the IMF/World Bank dominated system and its in-built flaws, what is exceedingly ambiguous about his selection by Beijing is what Beijing
actually wants to achieve through him: a system truly different from the IMF/World Bank or a tacit approval for AIIB from the erstwhile masters? Chinas economic growth notwithstanding, its various initiatives and the response it has received
from some European countries such as Germany (read: Germanys annual $4.5 billion contribution to AIIB, making it the fourth largest supplier of capital to AIIB) do not in themselves constitute enough strength to challenge the Brettonwood
system. China cannot afford to turn on a virtual confrontation mode vis--vis the old system. The reason is not difficult to understand. Consider this, for instance: In recent years, through a state policy called go global, Chinese state-owned
companies have sought investment opportunities in the United States. In one of the splashiest recent deals, Ambang Insurance Group, a firm with connections to Chinas leadership ranks, bought New Yorks Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Indeed,
President Xi will be staying at the luxury hotel when he visits the United Nations, displacing its usual occupant, the U.S. President Barack Obama. Besides it, China is also the fastest-growing national investor in the U.S., targeting real estate,

for
the U.S., China is a rising giant that it needs to contain in order to limit its
influence
hospitality and technology services, in particular.The Chinese investment is growing in the U.S. though prospects of success in securing a bi-lateral investment treaty are becoming elusive. For China, the U.S. is an attractive market;

. The development of AIIB, its potential impact and its area of operation are limited, as the name indicates, to Asia only. But Chinas own target market exists well beyond Asia. The U.S. is one of the most important of

all. This is where the U.S. wooing strategy becomes relevant. By wooing China into tacitly increasing its share in the IMF/World Bank, the U.S. is actually aiming at filtering Chinas billion dollar investments in the U.S. (as also in Europe)
through a system that the U.S. has complete control over. While China cannot, therefore, afford to adopt a confrontation mode, it can certainly use its presence inside IMF/World Bank system to consolidate its own geo-political position in Asia. It
is, perhaps, for this reason China had no problem in raising its contribution to 8%. The U.S. is wooing China. To an extent, this policy of the U.S. is in Chinese interest as far as the latters access to the Western market is concerned.

There is a major American shift in how we think about

policy with china; containment and balancing chinas
rise is the new American trend
Bill Powell; 2015; Senior writer for the times, graduate of northwestern
university with an education in journalism and history; Newsweek; In
Washington a strategic shift on china, towards containment; April 29, 2015;
http://www.newsweek.com/washington-shift-china-toward-containment326591 (EK)
"China represents and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. As such, the need for a more coherent U.S. response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue. The
words are dispassionate: significant competitor; not "enemy. They are careful: "A more coherent response." That suggests that heretofore the U.S. response to increasing Chinese power has been at least somewhat
coherent. But there should be no mistaking the significance of the above sentences. They are the first of many in a lengthy new report issued by the Council on Foreign Relations. For decades, the council, as the
cognoscenti call it, has been the core of the American foreign policy establishment. When it comes to foreign affairs, it doesn't just regurgitate the conventional wisdom, it creates it. Given that, the just issued report

Robert Blackwill, one of the most distinguished American diplomats of his generation, signifies a major shift
in establishment thinking about China. And the conclusion is, as these things go, astonishing: The U.S. should place "less strategic emphasis on the
goal of integrating China into the international system, and more on balancing China's rise. Which is to say, we should basically chuck what has been
U.S. policy for the past three decades, and try something that sounds almost (but not quite)
like containment. The report comes amidst whispers that senior foreign policy grandees of former administrationsboth Democratic and Republicanhave started to sour on hopes
on U.S.-China relations, co-authored by

that Beijing could be brought without much rancor into the existing international order. They worry that President Xi Jinping is more interested in becoming No. 1, as opposed to co-existing with the U.S. at the apex
of the international pecking order. It also comes amidst the Obama administrations so-called pivot to Asia, which it goes to great lengths to insist is not about containing China. The only problem with that claim is
that there isn't anybody among traditional U.S. allies in the region who believes it. And the China as rival and not strategic partnerwhich is what the Obama administration used to call itis increasingly evident.

Pushing for support for the Trans Pacific Partnershipa broad free trade deal
with 12 Pacific nationsObama recently told The Wall Street Journal that if
we don't write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region. As that
kind of us-or-them rhetoric indicates, even the economic relationship between the two
countrieswhich is its fundamental coreis under some strain. In their recently released annual survey of business conditions in China, the American chambers
of commerce in both Shanghai and Beijing recently reported an uptick in the number of their members concerned about increasing regulatory and legal scrutiny from the government in Beijing. The conventional
wisdom is that the current leadership in Beijing watches all this and, unified, sets an ever more defiant course both abroad and at home. Beijing, it is said, suspects the U.S. of trying to encircle Chinaof trying to
blunt if not reverse its rise. So it flexes its muscles in the east and south China seas, and moves to exert ever more influence to its west through massive government-led investment plans to create a new silk road.
(On April 21, Xi was in Islamabad hawking an aid and investment deal with Pakistan with a headline number$46 billionthat drew attention around the world.) There is, to be sure, an element of truth in all that.
But it's also more complicated. No one at any level of the Chinese leadership ever draws attention to himself by publicly questioning the party line; but there remain people in the Beijing government who can safely
be called pro-Western, and who believe a strong relationship with the United States is in the countrys best interest. And they are watching, with increasing (if still muted) concern, the tide go out on what has been an
era of bipartisan policy in Washington toward Beijing: one that accentuated the economic benefits to both sides in the short run, with the hope that in longer run, increasing prosperity in China would bring about
some form of political liberalization. Those daysand hopesare gone. And the day may be drawing near when a behind-the-scenes debate breaks out in Beijing that poses a straightforward question: Who lost
Washington? In the U.S., of course, "Who lost China?" was a rancorous Cold Warera debate in the wake of the 1949 Communist takeover in Beijing. The second-guessing in China over current foreign policy will
not, of course, be so public, but that doesn't mean it won't come. A scholar at a government-affiliated think tank with close ties to several senior party officials acknowledges that there are some questions in the wind
now, certainly. No one quite says, Who lost Washington?we're not there yetbut people I would call internationalists with a pro-Western bias wonder where this is headed, and whether we've played our hand
intelligently both in terms of relations with Washington but also in our own backyard. Those questions have to do with the perception that Beijing over the past few years has bullied small neighbors like the
Philippines and Vietnam, as well as whether it needed to pick a fight with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. (China refers to them as the Diaoyu Islands and calls them disputed; Tokyo denies theres any doubt they
belong to Japan.) Beijing points outand diplomats in Tokyo concurthat the two countries worked hard over the last year to drain some of the poison out of the islands dispute, which had alarmed Washington,
and, as one former U.S. diplomat says, put the pro-China crowd at the State Department very much on the defensive. For now, the issue has receded, and foreign ministry officials in Beijing say the effort shows
that the notion that nationalistic hawks are running wild in the Chinese capital, as the government think tank scholar puts it, is overblown. But theres little question that any measure of trust between Beijing and
Washington has diminished; a foreign ministry official late last year told Newsweek that there is "no question" that relations between the two countries were better when George W. Bush was president than they are
today. The question is, to what extent does that matter to Beijing? Foreign diplomats there seem increasingly to think its not that big a deal to Xi & Co.; Beijing is increasingly suspicious of the U.S. as a rival in

There is
increasing talk in Washington that the U.S. needs to reverse the shrinkage in
its Navy. Most of the leading Republican presidential candidates support an increase in the number of aircraft carriers in the U.S. fleet, as well as a modernized version of the so-called Ohio class of
nuclear submarines, which are slated to go out of business in just over a decade. Nor is it unthinkable that Hillary Clinton, should
she be Barack Obamas successor in less than two years, would add more military heft to the
so-called pivot to Asiaparticularly if U.S. policy is to balance Chinas rise . There
Asia and increasingly convinced that its own ascendancy is irreversible. The quest for supremacy in the Pacific, therefore, is likely to intensify. If true, those attitudes will have consequences.

is also growing anger over Beijings purported cyber offensive against both the U.S. government and big U.S. corporations. (And lets face it, the Fortune 500 is the core of Beijings constituency in the United
States.) If China, in fact, doesnt care that it's losing Washington, that only makes it more likely that it will lose it. And at the moment, that appears to be the road Beijing is on

AT: Engagement Rhetoric

The US is drifting towards anti-Chinese containment
policies Obama claims of engagement are a
smokescreen
Anatol Lieven; 2016; British author, Orwell Prize-winning journalist, and policy analyst.
He is a Senior Researcher at the New America Foundation; Valdai Discussion Club; Obamas
foreign policy doctrine. Containment of china or pivot to Asia. Part 3; April 20 th, 2016;
http://valdaiclub.com/news/obama-s-foreign-policy-doctrine-containment-of-china/ (EK)

The Pivot to Asia essentially means containing what is now probably the biggest economy and second
biggest military power in the world in its own back yard, and is drawing the USA further and further into territorial disputes involving China.
Clintons own speeches and writings when Secretary of State made this abundantly clear: By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic
and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions
across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of
our efforts in all these areas. Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the AsiaPacific. (Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy October 11th 2011) Viewed from from Chinas point of view, Americas Pacific Century
means a continued commitment to unilateral US hegemony in East Asia; working relationships means treating China not as a great power
but on the same basis as Japan, Vietnam, Philippines; Bilateral security alliances are with potential enemies of China; references to the US
position in Europe suggests creation of a NATO in East Asia; democracy promotion threatens China with same fate as USSR.

The

hostility to China has been made clear by subsequent US actions, especially in economic field: The TransPacific Partnership, and even more the crude and unsuccessful attempt to block Chinas creation of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is true that some of

no attempt has been made by US

policy under Obama to distinguish between different Chinese claims, or to propose compromises (thus as far as I can see, China
Chinas actions have been highly provocative, especially in South China Sea; but

has a good claim to the whole of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, a good claim to share the Paracels 50:50 with Vietnam, but no legitimate claim at all to the Spratlys

Instead, US is drifting towards backing anti-Chinese

positions in all cases. I have been appalled by two recent pieces of news in particular: The talk in the Obama administration of getting
or Scarborough Shoal).

Cam Ranh Bay from Vietnam as a US naval base which would risk tying USA inextricably to Vietnamese territorial claims; and the US proposal that India
participate in naval patrols in South China Sea. India wisely refuses because China can hit back very hard in Himalayas, and by support for Pakistan and would
do so if challenged by India in the South China Sea. Such moves may be too detailed for the President to take a personal hand but they illustrate whole tendency
of US establishment to maintain US dominance, and not to seek compromise with other powers unless absolutely unavoidable, as in Syria. In the case of China,
the US may well be forced to acquiesce in Chinese faits accompli; but may also be drawn into Vietnamese war to defend what Hanoi sees as its territory, with

the Pivot to Asia go against the enlightened

realism that Obama claims to represent. They violate the ethic of consequences by not thinking through the likely
disastrous results for whole of mankind. Both the cases of Ukraine and

results of US actions; they fail the fundamental realist test of accurately judging the power available to both sides and their willingness to use it; and they fail Hans
Morgenthaus test of a true statesman, which is the ability to put himself into the shoes of his opposite numbers from rival countries: not necessarily in order to
agree with them, but to judge how important a given issue is to them, and therefore what resources they will commit and how much they will risk over the issue. In
Ukraine, Russia has clearly been willing to commit far more than the USA, and the USA has only avoided a much more dangerous conflict because President Putin
is in the end a cautious and pragmatic former secret service official, not a reckless militarist. In failing to seek compromise with China, the USA may be running
infinitely greater risks. This failing however is that of the US establishment in general. US ideological nationalism (euphemistically known as Exceptionalism)
means that in the end, very few US policymakers or analysts can accord any legitimacy to views or interests that seriously conflict with those of the USA, and
above all, cannot grant any real legitimacy to political systems that are neither democracies nor subservient to US wishes). In conclusion however, it is only fair to
add two things: On what Obama has called and what obviously is - by far the biggest threat facing the USA and mankind in the foreseeable future, Obama has
been entirely correct, while most of the US political establishment (including all the Republican Party though not, it must be noted Hilary Clinton) has been wrong:
this is the need to take serious action to combat climate change. Here, I think one can say that he has gone as far as the US constitution and present political
configuration will allow him to go. Tragically, that is not very far as evidenced by the impossibility of passing legislation through Republican-dominated Congress
(or even for that matter when Democrats in a majority) and latest Supreme Court decision blocking the Presidents Clean Power plan. But at least he has tried, and
tried hard. For this and other reasons, I would say that in many ways Obama is the best foreign policy president the USA has had since George Bush senior or the
Nixon-Kissinger combination (which is admittedly not saying much); but despite some of his statements in the Atlantic Monthly, he has not been able to free himself
sufficiently from the Washington foreign policy elites and the shibboleths to which they became addicted during the long years of American global dominance, and
achieve a truly realistic US world policy which corresponds to the new world and Americas new relative position in it. Then again, he has at least tried, which is
more than his likely successor Hillary Clinton has tried to do. Whoever wins in November, we are likely to look back on Obamas foreign policy with considerable
nostalgia.

China Rise: Balancing Inevitable

China aggressive posturing inevitable, risking
miscalculation. Tougher stance sends a better signal.
Malik, Mohan (7/14/14). China and Strategic Imbalance, The Diplomat.
Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-and-strategicimbalance/?allpages=yes July 13 // DDI - CS
The recent Shangri-la meeting in Singapore saw some sharp exchanges between Chinese and other
participants. Beijings deployment of an oil rig protected by more than 80 naval vessels in the South China
Sea four days after President Barack Obamas reassurance trip to Chinas East Asian neighbors in April
2014 was widely seen as a deliberate and calculated provocation. Yet Chinas move fits a pattern of
advancing territorial claims on its periphery through coercion, intimidation, and the threat of force through

Chinas drilling rig is also

a political statement of Beijings resolve and capability to control
and exploit the South China Sea and deny it to others and this message is
what may be called paramilitary operations short of war (POSOW).

meant as much for Washington as for Tokyo, Hanoi, Manila, Jakarta, and New Delhi. While exploring oil in
the disputed waters, the $1 billion oil rig is supposedly drilling a big hole in Washingtons pivot strategy

it undermines Washingtons credibility as regional security

anchor or security guarantor. In essence, it makes a mockery of Obamas
security assurances to regional countries against Chinese coercive
tactics aimed at changing facts on the ground. Beijing calculates that neither the mighty United States
insofar as

nor Chinas weak and small neighbors would respond with force to counter Chinese incremental efforts to
turn the South China Sea (SCS) into a Chinese lake. China is known for doing things in small steps and
piecemeal, quietly, patiently, eventually bringing the pieces together when the conditions are ripe. The
key reason for Chinas aggressive posturing on the seas is the tectonic shift in Beijings strategic
environment that occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For the first time in its long
history, China no longer faces any threat whatsoever on its northern frontiers and this immense
geopolitical development largely explains Chinese militarys expansionist moves on its eastern seaboard
and southwestern frontiers. It is worth recalling that the successive Chinese dynasties built the Great Wall
to keep out the troublesome northern Mongol and Manchu tribes that repeatedly overran Han China. In
1433, faced with increasingly bold raids made by Mongols and a growing threat from other Central Asian
peoples to its land borders in the northwest, Chinas Ming rulers halted Admiral Zheng Hes expensive
ocean voyages so as to concentrate their resources on securing the Middle Kingdoms land borders. From
the 18th to 20th centuries, threats first from the ever-expanding Czarist Russia and then the Soviet Union
kept the focus of Chinese military planners on their northern frontiers. Except for a very brief period of
bonhomie in the 1950s, Beijing was preoccupied throughout the Cold War with the threat from the north
until the Soviet collapse in 1991. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a
month. Despite Moscows geopolitical concerns about Chinese encroachments in Russias Far East and the
loss of Central Asia to Chinas growing influence, President Vladimir Putin faced with isolation by Europe
and the United States following Russias annexation of Crimea and continuing unrest in eastern Ukraine
has accepted unpalatable terms from China to clinch a massive gas pipeline deal that will diversify Russian
energy export markets away from Europe, and make China Russias major ally. On a whole range of issues,
Russia, along with China, is challenging the postwar international order. Even though China has backed
Russia neither on Georgia nor on Crimea, Putin believes the ties between Moscow and Beijing are at their
peak. If a Sino-Russian alliance is being resurrected, then in a complete reversal of roles from the early
Cold War era, China not an economically and demographically shrinking Russia is the stronger partner
in this alliance. As in the past, entanglements in the West have once again led Russia to make concessions
in the East.

Beijings game plan is to make Russia economically

dependent on China just as the West has become addicted to the cheap Chinese
manufactured goods. India will need to re-calibrate ties with a Russia that plays a second fiddle to China
and joins Beijing in arming Pakistan. Not surprisingly, media is awash with reports of a new Sino-Russian
strategic alliance threatening to dominate [the Eurasia] heartland, thereby signaling a nightmare of
Mackinderesque proportions for Washington. Some envision a Beijing-Moscow-Teheran axis based on
energy, trade and security across the Eurasia. Though Russias pivot to Asia is motivated by turbulence on
the western front and comes from a position of relative weakness, Washington is nonetheless being
increasingly challenged by states seeking to revise regional balances of power. Thus, the public perception
of Asia out of balance is widespread. Americas war-weariness in times of fiscal constraints is apparently

emboldening revisionist powers China and Russia. The Obama Administrations efforts to rebalance the
U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific were influenced by public perceptions of strategic imbalance and rapidly
changing geopolitical equations. The struggle for dominance over contested commons (maritime, cyber
and outer space) is intensifying. Strategic concerns loom large as Chinas growing ambition, power and
reach run up against the interests of old, established powers. The Diplomats Zackary Keck and Chen
Dingding have started a debate on whether China will be a different kind of a global hegemon or behave
just like the United States and other hegemonic powers in the past. Chinese leaders, of course, leave no
opportunity to eschew any hegemonic aspirations or superpower behavior. Yet, official claims to the
contrary notwithstanding, China is behaving just as other rising powers have behaved in history: it is laying
down new markers, drawing new lines in the land, air, water, sand and snow all around its periphery,
seeking to expand its territorial and maritime frontiers, forming and reforming institutions, and coercing
others to fall in line. Map-making seems to be a growth industry in China. Beijings international behavior
(i.e., its exercise of power) is not and wont be different from other great powers. The Asia-Pacific region
is thus on the threshold of change the known and unknown; challenges and uncertainties abound. I argue
that seven major strategic shifts will determine Chinas strategic behavior and Asias geopolitical
landscape in the years and decades to come. Rising Versus Retiring Powers Power in the international
system is relative and ever-shifting. Over the past three decades, China has demonstrated tremendous
ability to plan and mobilize national resources to implement goal-oriented, timely action strategies in
economic, diplomatic, and military arenas. The global impact of Chinas success will be Chigantic (amend
the Oxford Dictionary). If China can sustain its growth, Chinas gross domestic product (GDP), military, and
R&D spending could rival those of the United States, albeit not in terms of quality but quantity. China has
the potential to emerge as a peer competitor far more powerful than the Soviet Union. No rising power is
ever a status quo power. Power is, by nature, expansionist. It is actually intoxicating. In 2009, the

When the world is their oyster,

why would China be so unhappy, one might ask. Historically, rising
powers are highly suspicious, paranoid powers: they think others are
out to get them, and stop their march to glory. Expecting too much
too soon, they overreact. That sometimes leads to their unraveling. Think Japan and
Germany. Rising powers also tend to be risk-takers and impatient powers. They flex their
muscles and test the resolve of old, established powers. They seek
to benefit from the weakness in resolve not capabilities of the
established powers by employing asymmetric strategies to chip
away at their hegemony. Post-2008 financial crisis, China has transitioned from hide and
bestseller in China was a book called Unhappy China.

bide policy to seizing opportunities, taking lead and showing off capabilities to shape others choices in

The postwar international order has depended on three

factors: U.S. alliances, uncontested American maritime dominance,
and a stable, unmolested balance of power. All these are now being
challenged by Chinas growing power and purpose. For, China the biggest
Chinas favor.

beneficiary of the postwar order no longer sees U.S. primacy as serving its interests. One Chinese
military officer observed: American forward presence and alliances constrain Chinas future growth and
goals in the region. Beijing dubs U.S. alliances relics of the Cold War which must be dismantled to
restore what it calls natural power balance in the region (translation: a Sino-centric hierarchical order of
pre-modern Asia). It is not in Chinas DNA to play second fiddle to any other power. Moscow learned this
the hard way in the 1950s. Now its the turn of those Americans who have long dreamt of co-opting China
as a junior partner. Many would argue that regimes that do not share power or abide by the rule of law in
domestic politics do not abide by the rule of law in international politics or share power in world politics.
Chinas Asia strategy is to undermine the United States credibility as regional security guarantor. Beijings
diplomatic rhetoric notwithstanding, the New Type of Great Power Relations seeks U.S. recognition of
Chinas primacy in Asia in a geopolitical deal that limits Washingtons regional role and presence, and
relegates traditional U.S. allies (especially Japan) to the sidelines. This push and shove will continue for
decades because the Chinese see the U.S. as in irreversible decline, and growing weaker as China grows
stronger. From Beijings perspective, the main issue is how to manage, and profit from, Americas decline.
The challenge, from Washingtons perspective, is how to manage Chinas rise within the U.S.-led order
without diluting American role and presence. Who emerges at the top in this poker game will ultimately
determine the future of world order. It is against this backdrop that the Obama administration officials have
been visiting Asian capitals to reassure U.S. friends and allies about security commitments, and reaffirm
Washingtons determination to rebalancing to Asia. Significantly, China is not rising in a vacuum. Under
Shinzo Abes leadership, Japan is becoming a normal nation with the lifting of restrictions on collective
self-defense and arms transfers. India has been economically and strategically rebalancing toward the

Asia-Pacific for nearly two decades under its Look East policy. With the victory of Narendra Modi-led BJP
government in May 2014 elections, India may well be back in the reckoning. Since Beijing will not abandon
its policy of engaging India economically while strangulating it geopolitically, a revitalized India will form
the southern anchor of an Asian balance of power and frustrate Chinese efforts to establish supremacy.
Small and middle powers (Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Australia) are
also maneuvering for balance and advantage. Indonesia and Vietnam, in particular, are upgrading their
naval power, as territorial disputes in the South China Sea escalate. For its part, Russia is using its vast
energy resources to stage a comeback on the world stage. Though it pre-dates the Ukraine crisis, the
Russian pivot to Asia is set to deepen given Western isolation under sanctions, Gazproms 30-year gas deal
worth $400 billion with China, and growing demand for Russian weaponry and energy by Chinas
neighbors. Russia is unlikely to slide into the role of Chinas Canada without resistance. It is indeed a
very complex and crowded geopolitical space out there. These Asia-Pacific powers are today where
Germany, France, Britain, and Italy were at the beginning of the 20th century. They are looking outward
globally in search of markets, resources and bases, jockeying for power and influence, outmaneuvering
and outbidding each other in different parts of the world, and forming natural resources-based
partnerships characterized by hedging strategies. The major power competition is between China and the
United States, but in the maritime and continental domains, it is between China and Japan and between
China and India. Indian and Chinese navies are showing the flag in the Pacific and Indian oceans with
greater frequency. The logic of geopolitics that is, Japans and Indias worries about their place in a Sinocentric Asia will forge a closer bond under the Abe-Modi leadership. It will intensify Beijings strategic
competition with both Tokyo and New Delhi. Much like Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the
Asia-Pacific of the early 21st century is thus home to several rising, contending powers and some fragile or
failing states. As new powers rise in Asia, new strategic balances are emerging as partnerships and
alliances among states shift. Simply put, the Asia-Pacific of the early 21st century bears more resemblance
to Europe of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, not Europe of the old, retiring powers of the 21st
century. Russias moves against Ukraine may have unnerved European powers but there is no sign of a
major strategic pushback by European countries against Moscow. That is certainly not the case in Asia. For
the first time in modern history, Asians are now spending more on defense than Europeans. The rise of
nationalist leaders in Japan, the Philippines and India is in part because of their predecessors perceived
failure to deal strongly with Chinese transgressions. Geopolitical Discomfort, not Containment This is the
decade of power transitions in Asia. For small and weak states in Chinas neighborhood, this is the decade
of living dangerously. Among regional countries, China arouses unease because of its size, history,
proximity, power, and, more importantly, because memories of the Middle Kingdom syndrome or
tributary state system have not dimmed. Historically, there has never been a time when China has
coexisted on equal terms with another power of similar or lesser stature. As in the past, a rich and powerful
China demands obeisance and deference from other countries. What has changed is that Beijings
economic interests have now displaced the ideological fervor of the past. In Asian capitals, there are hardly
any takers of Chinas peaceful rise (ask Mongolia, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines or India) or of noninterference in internal affairs rhetoric (ask North Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar,

The growing economic ties between China and its Asian

neighbors have created a sense of dependency and despondency.
While Chinas neighbors do not oppose Chinas power and
prosperity, they do not welcome their own loss of strategic
autonomy in foreign policymaking. With the exception of a few
(notably Pakistan), most Asian countries (including North Korea)
show little or no desire to live in a China-led or China-dominated
Asia. Instead, they seek to preserve existing security alliances and
pursue sophisticated diplomatic and hedging strategies designed to give them
more freedom of action. Given Chinas centrality in Asian geopolitics,
hedging, or old-fashioned balancing vis--vis China is becoming the most
preferred option, without giving up on the many benefits of engaging
Beijing. To this end, each major power is rebalancing its posture and strategy. The U.S. rebalance,
Nepal or Sri Lanka).

Indias Look East, ASEANs Look West, Australias Look North policies, and Japans defense
cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and India are signs of the times. Territorial integrity is
the core interest of all nations: weak or strong, big or small. The mounting tensions between China and its
neighbors from India to Japan over land and maritime disputes have geopolitical implications. Chinas
unresolved land and maritime disputes and the Middle Kingdom syndrome work to Beijings
disadvantage, and to Washingtons advantage. Referring to heightened tensions over territorial disputes,
Chinas Defense Minister, General Chang Wanquan, told U.S Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in April

2014 that Beijing would make no compromise, no concession, [and] no trading in the fight for what he
called his countrys territorial sovereignty. Chang warned Hagel: The Chinese military can assemble as
soon as summoned, fight any battle, and win. The Chinese are genuinely aghast at the defiance and
insolence displayed by their smaller and weaker neighbors. Beijing expects its neighbors to respect Chinas
core interests by placing them over and above their national interests a sort of tributary relationship that
acknowledges China as the lord of Asia. In this context, the U.S. military support is seen as the biggest
hurdle in inducing Asians to accommodate and acquiesce to Chinese power.

Beijings

aggressive posturing since 2007 on land and maritime disputes all along its periphery has
driven Chinas neighbors into Washingtons embrace . So, I would argue that
much like everything else these days, Washingtons pivot or rebalance strategy is also made-inChina. Chinas unresolved territorial disputes with neighbors are creating allegiances where they never
existed before. Examples include Canberra-Tokyo, Manila-Hanoi, Manila-Tokyo, Tokyo-Hanoi, Hanoi-New
Delhi, and Tokyo-New Delhi strategic partnerships. The target of everyones balancing in Asia is China, not
Russia or the United States. In fact, those balancing China (India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia
to name a few) are being armed by both Russian and American weaponry. Historically, the rise of a
continental power has always led to the formation of a coalition of maritime powers to counterbalance it.
This is particularly so if that continental power happens to have an authoritarian regime nursing historical
grievances with active territorial disputes and/or happens to be a polarizing power. China is no exception
to this rule. Being a distant hegemon, the United States remains the balancing power of choice for most
countries on Chinas periphery. All want to benefit from economic ties with China, but none want the region
dominated by Beijing or their policy options constrained by China. Put simply, there is no desire to replace
the fading American hegemony with Chinese hegemony. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for
full access. Just $5 a month. Much as Beijing would like to restore Chinas primacy that prevailed in premodern Asia, Chinas territorial expansion and structural changes in Asian geopolitics over the last 300
years rule out a return to the Sino-centric hierarchical tributary state system of the past. Since geography
defines a countrys role and power, there is no turning back the clock. A major reason the United States is
a global superpower is its unique geography. China does not have Canada and Mexico on its borders, but
large powerful states Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia and India that will do everything to
counterbalance Chinas growing power for historical, civilizational, geopolitical, and geo-economic reasons.
This gap or disconnect between Chinas ambitions in Asia and the changed geopolitics which works against
the restoration of Chinese supremacy is what the Chinese ruefully call the containment of China.
Objectively speaking, this is Chinas geopolitical discomfort, not containment. For containment, in the
classic George Kennans multidimensional concept (economic, diplomatic, military and political), is largely
counter-productive in a globalized economy. Managing Chinas rise and molding its behavior is the biggest
diplomatic challenge facing the region and the world in the coming years. The Old New Great Game
Economic expansion creates overseas interests, fuels grandiose geopolitical ambitions, and inevitably
leads to military expansion. It was the search for natural resources to fuel industrial growth; markets to
dump manufactured goods; and bases (coaling stations) to protect both that led to the colonization of Asia,
Africa and Latin America by industrializing European powers in the 18th and 19th centuries. These three
resources, markets and bases usually go together. Trade, markets, resource extraction, port and
infrastructure development are also the key ingredients of Chinas foreign policy today. China is pivoting to
the West (toward Africa, the Middle East, Russia, Southwest and Central Asia) for resources, markets, and
diplomatic space. As in the past, the new great game is essentially about having pliant and friendly
regimes in resource supplier nations and port access. The game of world politics does not change much,
only players do. Global Dominance Is Pass No single power can dominate in the future, no matter how
much soft and hard power it has. Nor can G-2 manage the world. What kind of a power you are actually
matters more than how powerful you are. The Chinese seem convinced that once their country acquires
comprehensive national power, everything will fall into its proper place and everybody will fall in line.
However, the acquisition of comprehensive national power alone will not make China a global
superpower. Major powers become great powers with the support of small and middle powers. In terms of
number of allies (58) and potential partners (41) worldwide, the United States still remains an unrivalled
superpower. The support of small and middle powers, or lack of it, makes all the difference between great
power dominance and defeat. You cannot be a leader if you dont have followers. During the Cold War,
China and Egypt were two middle powers and swing states. When China and Egypt shifted their support
from the Soviet Union to the United States, they became pivotal players in the Asian and Middle Eastern
balance of power respectively. That tilted the scales against the Soviet Union and the rest is history. In a
geopolitical replay, Washington is courting the new swing states India, Indonesia and Vietnam to balance
China. Mackinder Matters as Much as Mahan Asias geopolitical center of gravity is shifting inland, with
implications for the maritime powers. Mahan matters but so do Mackinder, Spykman, Kautilya and Sun Zi.
Notwithstanding the focus on maritime rivalries, new economic hubs, institutions, transport corridors, highspeed railways, expressways, and pipelines networks are changing the geopolitics of Eurasia. During the
Cold War, much of the economic growth took place within the U.S. hub-and-spokes alliance network in
maritime Asia. Post-Cold War, economic growth has taken place in China, India, and continental Southeast

Asia, outside of the U.S. Pacific alliance network. China, much like Britain and Russia in the past, is now
employing modern transportation technology, high-speed railways, expressways, pipeline networks to redraw the geopolitical map of Eurasia. As part of its Go West strategy, Beijing is spending hundreds of
billions to create its economic hub-and-spokes system in continental Asia via pipelines, highways, railway
networks linking China with Central, Southwest and Southeast Asia. These spokes or arteries will bring in
raw materials and energy resources and export Chinese manufactured goods to those regions and beyond.
However, not enough attention is being paid to Eurasia because three centuries of Anglo-American
maritime dominance seem to have caused a certain degree of land-blindness among policymakers.
Technology: the Great Equalizer Technology is a game changer. In war and peace, technology shapes
relations among nations. Technology determines hierarchy in international relations. Few economists
predicted the rise of China as an economic powerhouse. Why? Because economists cannot foresee the
impact of technologies of the future. Just as no one could foresee in 1990 how Internet will change
everything, the rapid diffusion of disruptive technologies such as 3D/4D printing, advances in
biotechnology, robotics, and quantum computing will be a game changer. What would a revolution in
manufacturing based on 3D/4D printing mean for made-in-China? Tomorrows technological breakthroughs
will create new winners and losers and offer new opportunities and challenges. Geopolitics and geology are
closely interlinked. Just when China and the rest were writing off America as a declining power, the country
finds itself on the cusp of achieving energy self-sufficiency, thanks to a breakthrough in fracking
technology. The shale revolution could help the United States rejuvenate itself and prolong American
dominance of the international order. The energy boom in the U.S. and Canada if exploited fully has the
potential to change the power dynamics among great powers and revitalize U.S. alliances. It could turn

Just as the old Middle East is moving

East to forge closer energy ties with China and India, the new
Middle East (comprising Canada and the United States) could be
looking West to sell tight oil and gas to Japan, India, South Korea,
and Southeast Asian countries. The shale oil and gas bonanza would not only enhance
yesterdays winners into tomorrows losers.

American diplomatic leverage, it will also make the world oil market more diversified and more stable for
oil prices, and will reduce consumers over-dependence on the volatile Middle East, the OPEC cartel, and
Putins Russia. The Future of Asian Geopolitics These strategic trends will shape the future of Asian
geopolitics, in particular the interactions among the United States, China, Russia, Japan and India. Power
asymmetry among major powers means that each will form flexible ad hoc partnerships with the others
where their interests converge, mobilize the support of one against the other when their interests collide,
and checkmate the other two from forming an alignment against it as they compete, coalesce and collude
with each other when their objectives coincide. China is, of course, the most important piece of the
geopolitical puzzle. No country threatens China today as it is presently constituted. As the largest (in terms
of territory) and the most powerful (economically and militarily) country in Asia, should Beijing agree to
freeze and accept territorial status quo all along its land and maritime boundaries, it could unravel the Cold
War-era U.S. alliances and undermine the raison dtre of the U.S. forward presence. But dont put your
money on that: as one Chinese strategist (essentially echoing Defense Minister General Chang) said:
Giving up claims to lands lost to othersIts unthinkable. Its inconceivable. Since the prospects of the

the question then facing the United

States and its friends is how to sustain a robust balance of power
that deters intimidation and aggression and reassures friends and
allies faced with an increasingly confident and powerful China
determined to establish its dominance on the Asian continent and its adjoining
PLA accepting the territorial status quo are nil,

waters. Peace and stability will prevail if major powers work for a multipolar Asia with inclusive multilateral
institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, competition, rivalry, and even conflict will result
should bipolarity re-emerge or should Beijing seek to re-establish a unipolar Sino-centric hierarchical order
wherein the Middle Kingdom behaves in a hegemonic manner expecting obeisance and tribute from its
neighbors. Last but not least, nothing is inevitable in life and politics domestic or world. The future is not
a straight line. It is full of crossroads, shocks, setbacks, surprises, discontinuities, non-linearity and
reverses. The Soviet Union and Japan illustrate that nothing is inevitable about the rise of China.
Historically, rising powers, expecting too much too soon, have often shown an uncanny knack for being
their own worst enemies. Contrary to what International Relations textbooks teach us, a countrys foreign
policy is not a cold calculation of costs and benefits or pros and cons alone. Its a mix of five Ps: passion,
power, profit, pride and prejudice. That is what makes the task of predicting Chinas future or the future of

The risk of miscalculation lies in the Chinese military

overestimating its strength and the rest of the world
underestimating Beijings ambitions, power and purpose.
world politics so difficult.

China Rise: Security Competition Inevitable

Intense security competition inevitable containment
limits negative regional influence by China
Navarro 3-16, Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics
and Public Policy at the Paul Merage School of Business, University of
California, Irvine and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 310-2016, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-andgreg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)<
what the Chinese would like to do, is theyd like to push the United
States back towards the United States. And the first step would be to push them
And

beyond the First Island Chain, which would allow them to control all of the waters in between that First
Island Chain and the Chinese mainland. And then, of course, if they push the Americans out beyond the
Second Island Chain, theyd control most of the West Pacific. Theyd control the waters off their
coastline.On the inevitably of conflict between the US and China, its roots lie in the necessity of adopting a
containment strategy much as the US had to do with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Says

the optimal strategy for the United States for

dealing with China is to pursue a containment strategy similar to the one
Mearsheimer: I think that

that we pursued with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There will be some people who will argue for
preventive war or for a rollback strategy, but it would be remarkably foolish, in my opinion, to pursue that

It makes much more sense for the United States just to work with Chinas
neighbors to try and contain it and to prevent it from becoming a
regional hegemon. The problem that we face, however, is that as we move towards
a containment strategy now, we almost certainly guarantee that
there will be an intense security competition between the United
States and China. One might say to me: John, the argument youre making for containment now,
option.

basically creates a situation where you have a self-fulfilling prophecy, where it guarantees that China and
the United States will compete for security and they will always be a danger of war. My response to that is

but we have no choice because we cannot afford to let China

grow and dominate Asia for fear that it might have malign
intentions. So, therefore, we have to contain it now, and it is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
And my argument is that this is the tragedy of great power politics.
its true,

Chinese intent is irrelevant political considerations will

eventually force a violent rise.
Navarro 3-16 (Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public
Policy at the Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine and
holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 3-10-2016, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-onstrangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)
Ive talked about the fact that I think China cannot rise peacefully, probably a hundred
times; and the argument that is used against me most often is clearly the economic interdependence
argument, and it goes like this: The United States and China, and China and its neighbors are all hooked on
capitalism and everybody is getting rich in this world of great economic interdependence; and nobody in
their right mind would start a war because you would, in effect, be killing the goose that lays the golden
egg. So that what is happening here is that economic interdependence has created a situation where its a
firm basis for peace. I think this is wrong. Let me explain. I think theres no doubt that there are going to be
certain circumstances where economic interdependence will be enough to tip the balance in favor of
peace; but I think as a firm basis for peace, it wont work because there will be all sorts of other situations

People who are making the economic

interdependence argument are basically saying that economics
trumps politics. There are no political differences that are salient enough, right, to override those
economic considerations? Again, there will be cases where thats true. But there will be many
more cases, in my opinion, where political considerations are so powerful,
so intense, that they will trump economic considerations. And just to give you an
example or two. Taiwan: The Chinese have made it clear that if Taiwan were
to declare its independence now, they would go to war against
Taiwan, even though they fully understand that that would have
major negative economic consequences for Beijing. They understand
that, but they would go to war anyway. Why? Because from a political
point of view, it is so important to make Taiwan a part of China, that
they could not tolerate Taiwan declaring its independence. Another
where politics trumps economics.

example is the conflict in the East China Sea between Japan and China, over the Diaoyu or Senkaku
Islands. It is possible to imagine those two countries, China and Japan, actually ending up in a shooting
match over a bunch of rocks in the East China Sea. How can this possibly be because it would threaten the

But
the fact is, from the Chinese point of view and the Japanese point of
view, these rocks are sacred territory. The politics of the situation
are such that it is conceivable that should a conflict arise, it will
escalate into a war because politics will trump economics.
economic prosperity of both countries? It would have all sorts of negative economic consequences.

Link Extensions

Diplomatic Engagement
Diplomatic engagement with China increases their
economic growth and emboldens them to takeover the
SCS
Hendrix 16, (Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy Captain, a former director of the
Naval History and Heritage Command, and a senior fellow and director of the
Defense Strategies and Assessments program at the Center for a New
American Security, 5/24/16, Is war with China now inevitable,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435749/us-china-war-obama-weaknesseast-asia)
China is acting like it wants a war. It probably doesnt, but it doesnt want the
United States to know that. Chinas communist leaders know they must keep
growing the economy and improving the lives of their citizens, or risk
revolution and the loss of power. They also know that they are on a clock:
Within the next ten years, Chinas recently amended one-child policy will
invert the countrys economy, forcing that one child to pay the medical and
retirement costs of his two parents and four grandparents. Under these
circumstances, the state will need to begin allocating additional resources
toward the care of its citizens and away from its burgeoning national-security
apparatus. China has to lock down its sphere of influence soon, becoming
great before becoming old. Its time for Chinese leaders to go big or go home,
and theyre slowly growing desperate. The United States, for its own part, has
not helped ward off the regional threat that desperation poses. Its policy of
strategic patience and its prioritizing of Chinese cooperation on nuclear
issues to the exclusion of local security concerns have created an almost
palpable sense of growing confidence in the Chinese among nervous U.S.
allies nearby. The lack of credible Freedom of Navigation operations since
2012 and the Obama administrations failure to offer any significant
resistance in the face of Chinas construction of artificial islands in the South
China Sea have emboldened the Chinese to press ahead with their planned
campaign to claim sovereignty over those waters. Such claims threaten the
national interests of the United States and directly impinge upon the security
of treaty allies and partners in the region. Chinas actions are representative
of a new phenomenon that is increasingly characterizing the foreign policies
of authoritarian states around the world. Like states such as North Korea,
Iran, and Russia, China has recognized that America is trapped by its
doctrinal adherence to phasing, the method by which it goes to war as
delineated in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, first published in the
early 1990s. As its name suggests, the method lays out six major phases of
war: phase 0 (shaping the environment), phase I (deterring the enemy),
phase II (seizing the initiative), phase III (dominating the enemy), phase IV
(stabilizing the environment), and phase V (enabling civil authority). Its a
step-by-step approach that has come to dominate American tactical and
strategic thought. The problem is that when you write the book on modern

warfare, someone is going to read it, and those that seek to challenge the
United States most certainly have. They know that U.S. war planners are all
focused on phase III the Dominate the Enemy phase and treat the
separation between phases as impermeable barriers. Americas concentration
on phase III has allowed rising competitors to expand their influence through
maneuvers that thwart U.S. interests in the preceding three phases,
maneuvers cumulatively grouped in a category known as Hybrid warfare.
Authoritarian states have mastered the art of walking right up to the border
of phase III without penetrating it, slowly eroding American credibility without
triggering a kinetic response. Nations work out their differences through
consistent and credible interactions. Exercises and real-world operations
allow states to define their interests and then defend them. Competitor
nations take these opportunities to test the will of states they are
challenging. The consistency of these activities allows tensions between
states to be released at a constant rate, so that pressures never rise to
dangerous levels. But when a nation vacates the arena of competition for too
long or fails to conduct credible exercises, as the United States has done in
the Western Pacific over the past five years, strains begin to warp the fabric
of the international order. Chinas construction of artificial islands as a means
of extending its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea have left the
United States with few options. The U.S. can continue its policy of sending
mixed messages, dispatching individual warships on innocent-passage
profiles that come within twelve miles of the islands while avoiding normal
military operations, but this will only play into Chinas plan to slowly boil the
frog as it continues arming the islands, establishing a new security status quo
in the region. Chinas strategy mirrors Russias actions in Georgia, the
Crimea, and Ukraine. There, Russian forces operated below the U.S.s radar,
conducting phase I and II operations and standing pat in the face of
international sanctions, confident that neither the United States nor its NATO
allies really wanted to risk war to re-institute the regional order that had just
been upended. China clearly feels that time is on its side so long as it only
incrementally expands its influence, avoiding direct confrontation with the
United States. Such an approach will, of course, leave the United States no
choice but to suddenly and directly confront China at some critical point in
the future. Americas adherence to its founding principles of free navigation
and free trade, not to mention its belief in a free sea, will not allow it to
tolerate a Chinese assertion of sovereignty over such a large swath of
heretofore-open water. Perhaps when the time comes the United States could
simply land an international force of marines on one of the artificial islands as
part of an amphibious exercise. As the islands are not Chinese sovereign
territory, there is no reason not to use them as the staging ground for an
international exercise. And such an exercise would force Chinas hand,
making it choose between resisting the assembled international marines with
armed force or acknowledging the illegitimacy of its own claims. While some
might view such American action as too confrontational, it was made
necessary by the Obama administrations failure to nip Chinas ambitions in
the bud. America will now have to skip a phase, taking strong and abrupt

action to reset the status quo. As things stand, should China suddenly move
to militarize the Scarborough Shoals just off of the Philippines, it is unclear if
the United States would defend its ally, in keeping with its treaty
commitments, or simply dispatch Secretary of State John Kerry to insist on
one thing while his bosses actions demonstrate the opposite. Such
continuous, systematic acts of accommodation as have been demonstrated
with Iran, Syria, and Russia invite conflict and ultimately lead to large-scale
major war. Maintenance of a strong military and the upholding of our
founding core principles remain the surest guarantee of peace.

Economic Engagement
Facilitating economic growth in China increases
competitiveness and counter-balancing. Economic
containment is preferable.
Navarro 3-16
(Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at
the Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine and holds
a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 3-10-2016, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimeron-strangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)<
As part of the research for my Crouching Tiger book on the rise of Chinas military and its companion
documentary film, I interviewed 35 of the top experts in the world from all sides of the China issue. These
are key edited excerpts from my sit-down at the University of Chicago with Professor John Mearsheimer,

if
China continues to grow economically over the next 30 years, much
the way it has over the past 30 years, that it will translate that
wealth into military might. And it will try to dominate Asia, the way
the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. And my argument is that this
makes good strategic sense for China. Of course, the United States will not allow that to happen if it can .
And the United States will, therefore, form a balancing coalition in Asia,
which will include most of Chinas neighbors and the United States.
And they will work overtime to try to contain China and prevent it from
dominating Asia. This will lead to a very intense security competition
between the United States and Chinas neighbors on one hand, and
China on the other hand. And there will be an ever-present danger of
war. Of course from this observation rises the imperative if not to strangle
Chinas economy then to certainly slow it down. Theres no question that
author of the realist classic work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. My argument, in a nutshell, is that

preventive war makes no sense at all, but a much more attractive strategy would be to do whatever we

if it doesnt grow economically, it

cant turn that wealth into military might and become a potential
hegemon in Asia. I mean, what really makes China so scary today is the fact that it has so many
could to slow down Chinas economic growth. Because

people and its also becoming an incredibly wealthy country. Our great fear is that China will turn into a

if it has a per capita GNP thats anywhere near Hong

Kongs GNP, it will be one formidable military power. So the question is, Can
giant Hong Kong. And

you prevent it from becoming a giant Hong Kong? My great hope is that Chinas economy will slow down

its in Americas interest, and its in the interest of Chinas

neighbors to see the Chinese economy slow down in terms of its
growth rate in really significant ways in the future because if that happens, it then cant
become a formidable military power.
on its own. I think

Economic interdependence doesnt check war

containment necessary to quell nationalism that causes
war
Navarro 3-16

(Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at

the Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine and holds
a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 3-10-2016, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimeron-strangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)
As for the idea that economic engagement itself is a viable peace
strategy, Professor Mearsheimer sees this as decidedly counter-historical: Many people find it hard to
believe that countries that engage in security competition also continue to trade with each other

But if you look at Europe before World War I and, indeed,

if you look at Europe before World War II, what you see is that there
was a great deal of economic interdependence on the continent and
with Britain before both world wars. So I believe that if China continues to
grow economically, there will still be much economic intercourse
between China and its neighbors and China and the United States.
And I still think that you will have a lot of potential for trouble between
these two countries. And dont forget, even though you had all this economic intercourse
between World War I and World War II, you still got World War I and you still got World War II. If you
look at Europe before World War I, there were extremely high levels
of economic interdependence between Germany and virtually all of
its neighbors, certainly between Germany and Russia, Germany and France, and Germany and
Britain, these were the main players. And despite this economic interdependence,
these high levels of economic interdependence, you still got World War I. Another
example would be the period before World War II. The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22,
economically.

1941. And for the previous two years, Germany and the Soviet Union this is Nazi Germany and Stalins
Soviet Union had been close allies in Europe. In fact, in September 1939 they had invaded Poland

there was a great deal of economic intercourse

between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union between 1939 and 22 June, 1941.
Nevertheless, that economic interdependence did not prevent World
War II from escalating into a major war between Moscow and Berlin.
together and divided it up. So

And, in fact, there are all sorts of stories about the German forces invading the Soviet Union and passing
trains that were going into the Soviet Union that were carrying German goods, and trains coming from the
Soviet Union towards Germany that were carrying Soviet raw materials and some Soviet goods as well.

So there was economic interdependence between Germany and the

Soviet Union and yet you still got a war. Closely related to the argument that
economic engagement will prevent war between the US and China is the economic interdependence
argument. In Professor Mearsheimers world thats a dangerous gamble because

politics and

nationalism can often trump economics.

US economic appeasement to China creates concessions

and backlash
Segal 4 (Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and
National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program,
5/28/04, Practical Engagement: Drawing A Fine-Line For US-China Trade
http://www.cfr.org/china/practical-engagement-drawing-fine-line-us-chinatrade/p7063)
The U.S. strategy of engaging China economically has generated substantial
theoretical debate about potential security benefits and risks but a good deal

less in the way of practical policy recommendations. For proponents of

economic engagement with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), trade not
only is good for its intrinsic value but also is anticipated to bring China further
into the international order and make it a more responsible actor.1
Proponents of engagement expect trade to empower more internationalist
and cooperative elements within Beijing, whereas critics fear that trade will
not moderate Chinese behavior. They warn that the proceeds that China
has gained in more than 25 years of rapid economic growth could
one day be turned against the United States. The trade, investment,
and technology provided by the United States could all make China militarily
more powerful than it would otherwise be. In response to the U.S. decision to
grant China permanent normal trade relations, Representative Dan Burton (RInd.) may have summed up such fears most candidly: This will give them
[the Chinese] more money to buy the rope with which to hang us. They have
the largest army in the world, and its going to get bigger and were going to
pay for it.2 The logic linking trade and Chinese military modernization
appears straightforward. During the Cold War, tight control over technology
transfer was considered a key part of preventing the Soviet Union and the
Eastern Bloc countries from improving their military capabilities. With the
Cold War behind us, some now see China as the most likely potential greatpower competitor to the United States and thus are tempted to try to restrict
the flow of advanced commercial technologies that may improve the ability of
the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to threaten Taiwan or project power in
Asia. Others argue more expansively that the United States should not engage in any activities that help Chinas economy grow, given that increased
wealth could be used to expand Chinese military capabilities.

Economic Engagement is appeasement which weakens US

policy.
Altman et al. 07 (Roger C. Altman, Council on Foreign Relations Task
Force, April 2007, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A
Responsible Course, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-relations/p12985)
Today, the geopolitical terrain is shifting again, altered by the emergence of
China as a major power in a world dominated by the United States since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the overall success of engagement in
helping to shape Chinas interests in ways desired by the U.S. government,
U.S. political support for engagement is under strain. As Chinas economic
and military power grows, there is considerable uncertainty about its future
course. Chinas development has raised concerns about the implications for
Americas economic health, security, and global political influence. Many
Americans are not confident that Chinas strategic interests are still
compatible with those of the United States and argue that
engagement does not sufficiently protect the United States against a
China that could emerge as a threatening adversary in the future.3 Others
have concluded as Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) did in the late 1990s: Those

who support economic engagement with China must recognize it for what
it is appeasement. . . .We must have a new approach.4

Economic Concessions to China weaken US interests in

Asia.
Blackwell & Tellis 15 ( Writers for theCouncil on Foreign Relations, CFR,
3/15, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf)
attractiveness, endurance, and exportability of this so-called Beijing
model are suspect on multiple grounds, the fact remains that it has more or less served China
well until now.20 This model has bequeathed Beijing with huge investible surpluses (in the form of vast
Although the

foreign exchange reserves), substantially increased its technological capabilities (thanks to both legitimate
and illegitimate acquisitions of proprietary knowledge), andmost importanthas tied the wider global

Although this last development has generated

wealth and welfare gains globally, it has also produced several unnerving
strategic consequences. It has made many of Chinas trading partners, especially its smaller
economy ever more tightly to China.

neighbors, asymmetrically dependent on China and thus reluctant to voice opposition even when Chinas

Chinas economic integration has also produced

higher relative gains for itself, even with its larger trading partners, such as
the United Statesnot in the narrow sense pertaining to the bilateral terms of
trade, but in the larger strategic sense that its overall growth has risen far
faster than it might have had China remained locked into the autarkic policies
of the pre-reform period. U.S. support for Chinas entry into the global trading system has thus
policies leave them disadvantaged.21

created the awkward situation in which Washington has contributed toward hastening Beijings economic
growth and, by extension, accelerated its rise as a geopolitical rival. Furthermore, Chinas growing
economic ties have nurtured and encouraged various internal constituencies within Chinas trading
partners to pursue parochial interests that often diverge from their countries larger national interests with

Finally, economic integration has shaped the leadership

perceptions of many of Chinas trading partners in ways that lead them to
worry about their dependence on and vulnerability to China. Even if such
worry is sometimes exaggerated, it weakens their resistance to both Chinese
blandishments and coercion.23 Given these outcomes, it should not be surprising
that Beijing has consciously sought to use Chinas growing economic power in
a choking embrace designed to prevent its Asian neighbors from challenging
its geopolitical interests, including weakening the U.S. alliance system in Asia .
regard to China.22

Beijings commitment to sustaining high economic growth through deepened international

interdependence, therefore, provides it not only with internal gainsa more pliant populace and a more
powerful statebut consequential external benefits as well, in the form of a growing military and
deferential neighbors who fear the economic losses that might arise from any political opposition to China.
These gains are likely to persist even as Chinas economic growth slows down over timeas it inevitably
willso long as Beijings overall material power and its relative growth rates remain superior to those of its
neighbors.24

Engagement
Engagement is bad it facilitates Chinas ascendancy and
challenges to the U.S., guaranteeing uncontrolled
competing interests
Cai 15 (Peter Cai, Business spectator, 5/15/15, From engagement to
containment, a shifting strategy on China,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/fromengagement-to-containment-a-shifting-strategy-on-china/newsstory/7b4b62aaae12ea96430f2b479adf7f25)
However, the consensus on the need to engage with China seems to be
cracking. Some leading US foreign policy experts have started to doubt the
usefulness of engaging with China and are questioning the past bi-partisan
China policy. Robert Blackwill, a former deputy national security advisor under
President George W. Bush and Ashley Tellis, a former senior advisor to the
undersecretary of state for political affairs, have just published a thoughtprovoking and controversial policy paper that calls for the systematic
containment of China. Because the American effort to integrate China into
the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy
in Asia -- and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to
American power globally --Washington needs a new grand strategy toward
China that centres on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than
continuing to assist its ascendancy, Blackwill and Tellis write in Revising US
Grand Strategy Toward China, published by Council on Foreign Relations.
Their argument rests on two simple premises: the previous policy of
engagement is a failure and it has helped to create a Frankenstein
that the US now has to deal with, and that Beijing wants to replace
the US as the undisputed leader of Asia. Consider this first -- Blackwell
and Tellis, two seasoned US foreign policy veterans, believe the US support
for Chinas entry into the global trading system is bad and that it has helped
to create a geopolitical rival for the US. Instead of looking at the Chinese
economic miracle as a positive outcome for hundreds of millions around the
world, including Australia, they see it as a strategic blunder on the part of the
US. Beijing has used the benign US approach to the rise of Chinese power to
strengthen its domestic economy and thus the CCPs hold on power, they
argue in their policy paper. Blackwill and Tellis also view Chinas long-term
ambition with deep suspicion and they believe Chinas goal is to challenge
the USs supremacy in Asia, which is not acceptable for Washington and its
allies. They cite Chinese president Xi Jinpings speech at the Conference on
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in early 2014 as one of
many pieces of evidence. Asias problems ultimately must be resolved by
Asians and Asias security ultimately must be protected by Asians, Xi said. In
light of their analysis of past US policy and Chinas long term ambition, the
duo advocate for a systematic containment of China. They want the US to
adopt a pro-active strategy to roll back or contain China on every front from

economic interaction to military capability. On the economic and trade front,

Blackwell and Tellis urge Congress to quickly ratify the Transpacific
Partnership, a pan regional free trade agreement that excludes China. The
agreement is currently being held up by Congress. They also want the USs
European and Asian allies to adopt a coordinated approach in denying
Chinese access to advanced technologies both military and civilian that could
be used to build Beijings capability. On the military front, Blackwell and Tellis
want the US to substantially increase its defence budget, develop new
technologies to counteract Chinas new capabilities as well as increase its
presence in the Asia pacific region. They also single out cyber security as an
area where the US needs to adopt more punitive measures against Chinese
cyber espionage. Australia, which they see as the southern anchor of the US
relationship in the Pacific, needs to play a more active role in containing
China, according to their design to deepen the US alliance in the region. The
two countries should work together to more rapidly identify potential
Australian contribution to ballistic missile defence, is just one of many
recommendations. The two authors have a fundamentally pessimistic outlook
on the future of China-US relationship and they dont believe in the possibility
that the two countries may peacefully coexist. They are not alone in their
assessment; more and more prominent American scholars and policy makers
are advocating a more hardline approach towards China.

Appeasement historically fails actually excelerates

Chinese aggression
Newsham, Grant 9/8/14 (Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for
Strategic Studies.). China, America and the "Appeasement" Question, The
National Interest. Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226?page=2 July 14 // DDI CS
In February 2014, Philippine President Benigno Aquino warned that
failure to challenge the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRC) territorial seizures
in the South China Sea would be repeating the 1930s era
appeasement of Hitlers Germany. The Chinese were predictably outraged while
the rest of the world mostly ignored President Aquino. Appeasement is still a dirty word. But

until the Nazis invaded Poland in September, 1939, European

and American elites considered appeasement to be a sophisticated,
nuanced approach to dealing with increasingly powerful
authoritarian regimes. To these elites, appeasement was more than simply disarming
in the 1930s,

and letting unpleasant people have their way. Appeasement actually had a coherent logic. The
elites believed that aggressive, authoritarian regimes act the way they do out of fear,
insecurity, and at least partly legitimate grievances such as German resentment of the harsh
Treaty of Versailles. Understand and address these issue, remove their fears, and the regimes
will become less aggressive and transform into responsible members of the international

elites argued.
Challenging these regimes could dangerously isolate them and even
needlessly provoke them into miscalculations. The elites thought
community and operate under international norms. Or so the

engagement and transparency were beneficial in their own right, as only good things
could come from familiarity with one another. In the 1930s, the major Western powers all

attended each others war games. The US Marine Corps even took the German World War I
fighter ace, Ernst Udet on a ride in a USMC dive bomber. This engagement and
transparency did not make the Nazis nicer, but perhaps gave them some ideas about dive
bombing and Blitzkreig. Even the Soviets and Germans had close ties with joint training,
military technology development, and raw material shipments to Germany. There was also
extensive political and diplomatic interaction. Close economic ties were believed to be a
further hedge against conflict breaking out, and companies such as Ford, IBM, and many
others did profitable business in Germany. The elites believed anything was better than war.
Preserving peace, even if sacrificing principles and certain small nations was considered
wise and statesmanlike. People who criticized appeasement policy in the 1930s, most notably
Winston Churchill, were ridiculed as dolts and war mongers. We know how this turned out.
Curiously, appeasement (by another name) reappeared even before the end of the war in calls
to address Stalins fears and allow him to dominate Eastern Europe. And throughout the Cold
War, in Western academic and government circles it was argued that Soviet behavior was
simply a reaction to fears of Western containment. The appeasers protested the peacetime
draft as threatening the Russians. They also pushed for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and
opposed the Pershing missile deployment and the neutron bomb well into the 1980s. Ads by
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President Jimmy Carter, once he

tried something akin to appeasement as
national policy. It was not until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that
Carter learned his lesson. It perhaps will take another case of an authoritarian
regime rearranging its neighborhood to understand the cost of modern appeasement. US
policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in
recent times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to
understand the PRCs concerns and its resentments going back to
the Opium Wars and the century of humiliation, to accommodate
these resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened .
Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater
transparency and openness especially in the military realm as such openness is
perceived as inherently good. In return, the PRC is expected to
change, to show more respect for human rights and international
law and to become a responsible stakeholder in the international
community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this
concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive
PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even
in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese
assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior
towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for
human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of
expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft
continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, we
invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the engagement
mantra expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some
Earth Were These Russians Thinking?? Even

overcame his inordinate fear of communism,

argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps,

we are just as likely to be seen as nave or weak. From the Chinese

perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very
well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger.
Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy,
and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with
China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if
but

they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some revisionist historians argue that Neville
Chamberlains 1930s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm.
This overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western
democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease oneself into a corner. And the
beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain
without great sacrifice. One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at
Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the US Governments unwillingness to even verbally
challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generations Rhineland. Had the West resisted
Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II,
no Holocaust, and no Cold War. Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply

Our policy must

accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful
confrontation. Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its
neighbors and followed the civilized worlds rules? While ensuring we and our
allies have a resolute defense both in terms of military capability
and the willingness to employ it it is important to maintain ties and
dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear
between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy.

signs of transforming to a freer, less repressive society. Ads by Adblade Trending Offers and
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We should constantly stress that

China is welcome as a key player in the international order but only
under certain conditions. The US and other democratic nations have
not done enough to require China to adhere to established
standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining the
global system that has allowed the PRC to prosper. Human nature and
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history are a useful guide to where appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also

a strong defense and resolutely standing up for ones

principles is more likely to preserve peace.
show that

Engagement fails miserably it hasnt resulted in any

positive China liberalization.
Jeff Smith; 2015; Jeff M. Smith is the Director of South Asia Programs and Kraemer
Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington DC. This article was
drawn from excerpts of his new book Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21 st Century;
The national interest; RIP: Americas Engagement strategy towards china; August 3 rd,
2015; http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?
page=show (EK)

America has approached a rising China with an

engagement strategy guided by two key assumptions: first, that political
liberalization would ultimately follow economic growth; and second, that
supporting Chinas integration into the global order would preempt Beijing
from forcibly challenging that order While confidence in those assumptions
has waxed and waned, never did a consensus emerge that they were
fundamentally flaweduntil now.
the goals of
political liberalization and peaceful integration appear to grow more distant,
while the prospect for conflict with China draws nearer Even advocates of
engagement
are warning that the strategy is unraveling
Since its historic rapprochement with Beijing in the 1970s,

Today, Washington is confronting the dreadful realization that with each passing year,

, like Dr. David Shambaugh,

while domestic repression in China

is the worst it has been in the twenty-five years since Tiananmen. So what went wrong? After a decade of reaping the benefits of a soft-power offensive, Chinas peaceful rise took an abrupt turn in the late 2000s. The country that emerged
from a unique confluence of events beginning in 2008 has proven a more assertive, authoritarian and nationalistic rising power. While the precise causes for this shift are still being debated, we know the 2008 global financial crisis was
(mis)interpreted by much of Chinas elite as symbolic of long-term U.S. decline and retreat from the Western Pacific. For some in Beijing, the crisisand Chinas hosting of the Olympics that yearreinforced the coalescing perception that Chinas
long wait to reclaim its position atop the Asian hierarchy had come to an end. Second, in 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted proposals to a UN commission outlining expanded sovereignty claims in the disputed South China Sea. A surge in
provocative Chinese posturing there followed, culminating most recently in an unprecedented artificial island-building spree that is inflaming regional tensions. In 2012, China assumed an equally combative posture in the East China Sea after

China
witnessed the precipitous rise of a new strain of nationalism, cultivated and
magnified by a new media and technology landscap
Japan nationalized the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with Chinese naval and air forays into the territorial waters of the disputed islands now a regular occurrence. As these events unfolded,

e. Once confined to a handful of stodgy Communist Party mouthpieces, Chinas

public space has expanded rapidly in the digital age. While liberal commentary has been heavily restricted, hawkish rhetoric and nationalist outlets like the Global Times have been permitted to fill the void. This

proliferation of nationalist discourse has partly served the Partys interests,

but its also created new pressures and incentives that reward hardline
posturing and raise the political cost of concessions and compromise.
Xi has expanded
the definition of Chinas core interests, militarized its maritime doctrine,
and overseen devastating cyberattacks against the U.S. government. At
home hes adopted a hard line on domestic dissent and launched repeated
broadsides against Western values
these events either
dislodged China from a more peaceful course, or accelerated its path along a
preordained, nationalist trajectory. Likewise, Americas engagement
strategy was either flawed from the start, or is simply proving insufficient to
cope with the realities of a neonationalist China
Xis China has brought
the flaws in Americas China strategy into sharper focus

Finally, the early tenure

of Chinas avowedly nationalist and politically powerful president, Xi Jinping, has produced a material rise in domestic repression and tensions with the United States and Chinas neighbors.

, NGOs and civil-society groups. Depending on whom you ask,

. Whatever the case,

. Rapid economic growth has correlated with greater repression,

while efforts at engagement and integration have been met with more brazen challenges to the status quo.

Human Rights
China never obeys agreements, human rights will never
solve and only creates more concession in China
Boxwell 16 (Robert Boxwell, director of the consultancy Opera Advisors,
4/5/16, South China Morning Post, By making too many concession to China,
the West has given Wings to the Tiger,
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1933643/making-toomany-concessions-china-west-has-given-wings-tiger, date accessed: 7/16/16,
BC)
In his 2011 book, On China, Henry Kissinger recounted a discussion between US national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping () in 1978 as the US and China sought to normalise relations,
a rapprochement driven largely by both sides desires to check the Soviet Union. Deng chided Brzezinski

US negotiations with the Soviets: To be candid with you, whenever you

are about to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union it is the product of
[a] concession on the US side to please the Soviet side. It was, according to
Kissinger, a mocking assessment. Since Tiananmen Square, Western business interests
have hijacked politics The same could be said for practically every negotiation the
West has had with Beijing since; non-stop, predictable concessions, usually in
return for promises that dont arrive. Since Tiananmen Square, Western
business interests, drooling over Chinas billion people, have hijacked politics,
ignoring inconveniences like human rights with a greed-driven insouciance. A
few months after taking office in 1993, Bill Clinton pledged to tie the annual
renewal of Chinas most-favoured-nation trading designation to
improvements in human rights. The core of this policy will be a resolute
insistence upon significant progress on human rights in China, he said to an
audience that included student leaders from China alongside business
leaders from the US. Whether I extend MFN next year, however, will depend
upon whether China makes significant progress in improving its human rights
record. Chinas road or the Western way: whose economic development model will prevail?
Clintons resolute insistence didnt last a year. The students left and the
business leaders stayed. Human rights became just one of the full range of US
interests in China, demoted by the money to be made trading with the Tiananmen crowd and their
about

friends. They called it engagement. At least back then Chinas leaders played along, making vague

Today they tell the West to shut up and

mind its own business. Two decades of a cheap yuan and millions of migrant
workers ballooned both Chinas trade surplus and billionaire count.
Meanwhile, migrant workers jump off the roofs of factory dormitories. Its
promises about trying to improve human rights.

socialism with Chinese characteristics. Watching Mark Zuckerberg humiliate himself sucking up to Beijing

Thanks to Western
investment and markets, China now has the worlds second-largest
economy and largest military, yet doesnt seem to quite like the
rules that got it there. The West helped transform a China that is
massively stronger than a generation ago and appears to be less
interested in human rights than ever. Watching Facebooks Mark Zuckerberg humiliate
is watching a rich guy give away something money cant buy

himself sucking up to Beijing is watching a rich guy give away something money cant buy. Its
entertaining, but its also a reminder that fools with money and short-term views continue to drive the
Wests politics. If you run a tech business in Silicon Valley, you can have a state dinner with Barack Obama

and Xi Jinping (). If you run a bookstore in Hong Kong, you can have a state dinner with the guards.
Facebooks Mark Zuckerberg meets Chinas propaganda chief in Beijing During Brzezinskis meeting with
Deng, foreign minister Huang Hua () summed up the situation by invoking an old Chinese proverb:
Appeasement of Moscow, he said, was like giving wings to a tiger to strengthen it. Through decades of
doing just that with China, Western leaders have given plenty of wings to the tigers in Beijing. Perhaps no
promise was more hopefully accepted than that of one country, two systems. When Margaret Thatcher,
meeting Deng for the first time, indicated Britain would like to stick around in Hong Kong, the old man set
the tone for negotiations by threatening to invade. I could walk in and take the whole lot this afternoon,
he told her bluntly. There is nothing I could do to stop you, she replied, but the eyes of the world would
now know what China is like. If Deng had invaded Hong Kong, or simply turned off its water, he would
have made China a pariah in the West, weakened his hand with the Soviets and aborted Chinas gestating
era of economic transformation. Yet Britain blinked rather than call his bluff, like the rest of the West since.
Its hard to imagine today that Beijing could have ever intended to honour the Sino-British Joint
Declaration. Theres no way they could ever turn on democracy in Hong Kong because there is no way they
would be able to turn it off in 2047. Imagine: decades of democracy, books, media, speech freedom all
gone one day without a peep? Not likely. Beijing was never going to put itself in that position. No longer a
shining example, what good is an intellectually bankrupt Hong Kong to China? But if the democracy waffle
werent proof enough that Beijing will do as it wishes with Hong Kong, the saga of the booksellers
punctuates the fruitlessness of hoping for the best. The bookseller story could have turned out just the
opposite. If mainland authorities had sent the booksellers home and made a statement that taking them
was wrong, the guys who did it will be reprimanded, it wont happen again, and the mainland respects
Hong Kongs rights, they could have scored a major propaganda victory. But they didnt. And the story just
keeps growing stranger, as if someone in Beijing were having fun concocting events that will generate the
biggest laugh at a humiliated West. A smiling Lee Po, reassuring all that he is fine and, by the way,
renouncing his British passport. Gui Minhai, sneaking into China from a Pattaya condo to report to prison
for an old drink-driving offence. Sure. Then Lee and two of the others slipping back into Hong Kong just to
tell the police theyre not missing before returning to the mainland. I dont know about you, but if I were
under arrest on the mainland and got one foot over the border, Id make like Usain Bolt for the nearest US
embassy and try out my story on the receptionist. But five booksellers are easy to ignore, even the two
with Western passports, especially, as in Britains case, when government plans to fix an ailing economy
include investment from new BFF China. Less easy to ignore, and coming to a refugee camp near you, will
be the tens of thousands of Hongkongers who dont want to live under Beijings oppression after 2047 and
want to get out before mainland agents start taking names, or worse. The US should extend its hand to
Hongkongers The US should extend its hand to these Hongkongers. This will annoy Beijing, but who cares?
The Communist Partys propaganda machine is already in overdrive on Donald Trump, calling him a racist,
among other things. He could confound them, and many of his detractors at home, by announcing hell
make a path to US citizenship, now, for pre-handover Hongkongers who want to emigrate. Hillary Clinton
could announce the same and begin to wind back the human rights sell-out in which her husband
participated. Bernie Sanders needs no announcement hes the type who will let the persecuted bunk in
his living room if they need temporary accommodation. As for the rest of the relationship with Beijing, the
only thing more fatuous than hoping Beijing would change a generation ago is hoping it will now. In 20
years in Asia, Ive never heard as much talk about rethinking China as I do today. Its overdue. Though
China needs all the economic help it can get, Beijing isnt interested in playing by the Wests rules, despite

The Wests
choice is to snap out of the combination of naivety, wilful ignorance and
short-term greed called engagement, or continue the appeasement, giving
wings to the tiger. And we all know where appeasement leads.
those rules lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. Thats their choice.

Taiwan
There is no give on Taiwan any pro-China policy will be
considered a concession and unravel US credibility in the
region
Li, Thianhok 9/18/2002 (Li Thian-hok is a freelance writer based in
Pennsylvania.), Dont Appease Chinese Expansionism, Taiwan Times.
Retrieved from
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2002/09/18/0000168514
/2 July 13 // DDI - CS
There are several million Chinese-Americans residing in the US and half a
million Taiwanese-Americans. The number of Chinese-Americans is growing
rapidly because many Chinese graduate students manage to remain in the
US after their studies and because of the smuggling of workers from China.
Although a minority of Chinese-Americans, typically of Cantonese descent
whose forebears emigrated to the US in the 19th century, still support the
ROC, a growing number of Chinese-Americans support the PRC, particularly in
regards to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Prominent Chinese-Americans
sometimes write opinion pieces in the US papers to support Beijing's
positions. A common refrain is that the US should promote peaceful
unification of Taiwan with China, without selling out the interests of the
people of Taiwan. This is an oxymoron and an impossible task. Over 85
percent of the 23 million Taiwanese are against unification. They
prefer the status quo of a de facto independent nation. After decades of
struggle against the KMT's rule, the people of Taiwan have built a
thriving free market economy and a democracy which respects
human rights. China is a repressive authoritarian state governed by
the monolithic Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For the US to pressure
Taiwan to forfeit its hard-won freedom and accept the CCP's harsh rule
would violate a cardinal goal of US foreign policy -- to promote the
universal values of democracy. Such perfidy would ruin US credibility,
scuttle the US-Japan security alliance, and create dangerous
instability in East Asia. Another misinformed claim is that Taiwan has
historically been an integral part of China's sacred territory which should
never be allowed to split from China. To claim Taiwan is an indivisible part of
China is to merely parrot Beijing's propaganda. In the past 400 years, Taiwan
was ruled by the Dutch, the Koxinga Kingdom, the Qing Dynasty, Japan and
Chiang Kai-shek's KMT, but never by the PRC. As a result of its defeat in the
Sino-Japanese War, the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, in
perpetuity. Since 1895, Taiwan has been ruled by a central government in
China for only four years, from 1945 to 1949. In 1945, Chiang's troops
occupied Taiwan on behalf of the allied powers but the ROC never took title to
Taiwan. In the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan merely gave up its
sovereignty over Taiwan, without specifying any beneficiary. Taiwan's history
may be characterized as an incessant struggle for liberty against alien rulers.

Taiwan has been separated from China for long periods of time. The reality is
that Taiwan is a sovereign state, separate from China. To quote President
Chen Shui-bian (), "only the people of Taiwan have the right to decide
the future, fate and status of Taiwan." The Taiwan Relations Act, the basic
law which governs US-Taiwan relations, says the objective of the US
is to preserve and expand the human rights of the people of Taiwan.
The right to self-determination is a basic human right enshrined in the UN
Charter and in the 1966 International Covenant on Human Rights, to which
both the US and China are signatories. Chinese-Americans are fully aware of
the Beijing's govern-ment's violation of human rights. These include the
killing of hun-dreds of Falun Gong practitioners through torture, imprisonment
of hundreds of thousands of dissidents in labor reform camps, mistreatment
of Tibetans, system-atic harvesting of human organs from executed prisoners
for profit and the slaughter of thousands of students at Tiananmen Square in
1989. Yet there are entirely too many unconscionable Chinese-Americans who
would be happy to have such a government imposed on the Taiwanese from
the safe perch of their far away life in the US. Still another theme is that the
US should not treat China as an enemy lest it becomes one. But the US has
always been friendly and polite to China. It is China which is baring its fangs.
China's mass media is tightly controlled by the security agencies. Yet there is
widespread, virulent anti-American rhetoric. On Sept. 11 last year a group of
Chinese reporters visiting the US were overwhelmed with glee over the
terrorist attacks on the US. They were promptly sent back to China by their
irate hosts. China has helped Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in building a
better air defense to shoot down US jet fighters. China's proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction to rogue states in the "axis of evil" is well
documented. China is actively developing the capability to launch a blitzkrieg
against Taiwan. China is expanding the number of ICBMs targeted at the US
homeland and testing new ICBMs with multiple nuclear warheads. Should the
US blithely help China build its economy and its military power, hoping China
will become a peace-loving nation? That would be a foolhardy policy. After
150 years of humiliation by Western powers, China has a deep sense
of aggrieved nationalism, compulsively driving it to first become the
hegemon of Asia and then to challenge the US for its "rightful" place
as the Middle Kingdom, to become the undisputed superpower under the
heavens. It is in the interest of the US to resolutely discourage such
ambitions and to steer China toward the path of democracy and
peaceful economic development. To earn the respect so badly coveted by
the Chinese, China needs to learn to respect human rights and join the ranks
of civilized nations. Chauvinism and military aggrandizement will only lead
the Chinese people to calamity. Chinese-Americans should be careful, lest in
unthinkingly supporting Beijing's belligerent expansionism, they end up
grievously harming the national interests of the US, Taiwan and yes, China.

Moving away from Taiwan is appeasing beijing convinces

China US is weak
Tucker & Glaser 11 (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser,
Center for Strategic International Studies, fall 2011, Should the United
States Abandon Taiwan?,
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19262/uploads)
Would abandoning or reducing support for Taiwan secure smoother U.S.China relations? Those in China
and the United States who call for a change in Taiwan policy insist there would be significant benefits. The
decision by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to trade Taiwan for normalization with Beijing facilitated a
momentous improvement in U.S.China relations, setting a powerful precedent.2 To choose China over
Taiwan once again, it is asserted, could help Washington resolve differences with China over maritime
rights, nuclear proliferation, cyber security, and the uses of space. This line of thinking argues that even
issues not directly connected with Taiwan policy could be easier to reconcile if what China deems a core
interest were satisfied. Beyond breaking the U.S.Taiwan bond, Beijing has denied any desire to push the
United States out of Asia. It has reaffirmed Deng Xiaopings injunction to hide its light and bide its time,
while getting something accomplished (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei).3 It has repeatedly put
development and peace first. However, Chinas superior economic performance during the recession,
surging global trade and investments, and developing military might led Beijing during 2010 to implement
a series of assertive initiatives which caused widespread anxiety in its neighborhood and internationally. As

A decision to
jettison Taiwan, or even cut back significantly on U.S. support, would
prove to an increasingly confident China that Washington has
become weak, vacillating, and unreliable. The 2009 U.S.China Joint Statement
Chinas power grows, its allegiance to Dengs maxim becomes more dated and stale.

reflected Beijings estimate that Washington could be intimidated or misled, as it juxtaposed a reference to
Taiwan as a Chinese core interest with concurrence that the two sides agreed that respecting each others

Analysts
who argue that Washington can safely appease Beijing because
territorial concessions are not always bound to fail are, without
evidence, assuming improbably modest Chinese objectives (emphasis
core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.SChina relations.4

added).5 Relying on the sacrifice of Taiwan to fulfill Chinese ambitions ignores more than intentions, it also
overlooks internal dynamics in China. Beijing confronts constant domestic turmoil. Corruption, income
inequality, and environmental degradation have tarnished the accomplishments of the government and
party. Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions
in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment
of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists.

Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring

balance to internal unhappiness. Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which,
though fostered by the government, is still difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not
adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime

a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not

thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its
power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that
need. Accommodating Chinas demands on Taiwan, moreover, would
not necessarily cause Beijing to be more pliable on other matters of
importance to the United States. Beijings positions on issues such
as Korea and Iran are shaped by Chinas national interests and are
not taken as favors to Washington. Beijings determination to preserve stability in its
stability. Accordingly,

close neighbor and ally North Korea would continue to prevent China from increasing pressure on

Resolving Chinas Taiwan problem would

also not mean greater cooperation in preventing Iran from going
nuclear given Beijings almost universal opposition to muscular
Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons.

sanctions, its growing energy needs, and desire to promote Chinese

influence in the Middle East.

Unconditional/Concessions
US Engagement with China because they are a
superpower increases Chinas aggression
Erickson & Liff 14 (Andrew and Adam are writers for foreign affairs
magazine, Foreign Affairs, 10/9/14, Not-So-Empty Talk,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk )
Ever since his February 2012 visit to Washington, Chinese President Xi Jinping
has championed his vision for a new type of great-power relations between
China and the United States. The Obama administration, in an apparent
desire to avoid conflict with a rising China, seems to have embraced Xis
formulation. In a major speech last November, U.S. National Security Adviser
Susan Rice called on both sides to operationalize the concept. And during a
March 2014 summit with Xi, U.S. President Barack Obama declared his
commitment to continuing to strengthen and build a new model of
relations. In uncritically signing on to the new type of great-power relations
slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, the Obama
administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major chance
to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit.
And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials
dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as
innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S.
acceptance of the new type of great-power relations concept offers
ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of
the United States weakness and Chinas inevitable rise. After all, the
phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any
conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S.
security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the formulation
risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly
committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital
and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Already
troubling, each additional invocation of a new type of great-power relations
grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation,
Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly
articulate and champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations,
which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for
Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving
responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very
international order that has enabled Chinas meteoric rise. TROUBLING
TERMINOLOGY The Obama administrations continued flirtation with the
new type of great-power relations concept appears to have been
misunderstood in Beijing and beyond, and risks being misperceived as
a precipitous change in U.S. power and policy. First, the terminology
paints an absurd picture of a United States too feeble to articulate, much less
defend, its own vision for promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia -only furthering perceptions of U.S. decline in China and its neighbors. The

Obama administrations rhetoric, however well intentioned, sometimes

exacerbates this misperception. A case in point: Kerrys statement to his
Chinese counterparts at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue that there is no U.S. strategy to try to push back against or be in
conflict with China. The Obama administration is certainly right to try to
allay concerns -- unfounded but extremely prevalent in China -- that the
United States is attempting to contain China. But it is ill advised to do so in
a manner so easily heard as an apology. Second, Beijings interpretation of
new type of great-power relations appears to be linked to an assumption
that Chinas growing material power has made a power transition inevitable,
compelling Washington to accommodate Beijings claims in the South and
East China Seas now. Such arguments reveal ignorance, first, of fundamental
changes to the international order since the days of might makes right and,
second, of the manifold sources of U.S. power and preeminence. By allowing
the terms great-power relations and equality to permeate official
discourse on bilateral relations, Washington risks tacitly condoning such
anachronistic views of international politics. Third, Chinas economic growth is
slowing, and the countrys future is ever more uncertain as various societal
and other domestic headwinds strengthen. Decades of extraordinary
economic and military growth make many Chinese assume that the rapid
increases in material power will continue indefinitely. That is unlikely, but the
consequences of such bullishness are real and unsettling: growing
expectations within China for U.S. concessions and anachronistic calls for
equal treatment and space. If that werent enough, the new type of
great-power relations concept is also unnerving to U.S. allies and
partners in the region. If fears of abandonment grow, some may seek
other -- potentially more destabilizing -- options for deterring China.

AT: Cooperation Overwhelms Perception

Chinas rise is aggressive, even if motivated by some US
history. Chinese perception cant be undone and moved
toward peace.
Navarro 3-16 (Peter Navarro, Peter Navarro is a Professor of Economics and Public
Policy at the Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine and
holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. 3-10-2016, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-onstrangling_b_9417476.html DDI-AC)
Many Chinese believe that there will not be trouble in Asia because
China is a Confucian culture. This is what I called the Confucian Pacifism argument; and
the argument is that China has historically not behaved in an
aggressive way towards its neighbors. Its behaved in a Confucian way, which is to
say that it has behaved very defensively. Its not been aggressive at all; and to the extent that China has
been involved in wars, its due to aggression on the part of its neighbors. In other words, China is always
the good guy, and its adversaries in wars are always the bad guys. This is a lot like American
Exceptionalism, right? Americans believe that theyre almost always the good guy, and its the other side
that is the bad guy. We tend to see the world in very black and white terms, where were the white hats
and the other side is the black hats. The same thing is true with Confucian Pacifism. Its basically a story
that says, you know, the Chinese are the white hats. The fact is if you look at Chinese history, what you

the Chinese have behaved, over time, much like the European great powers, the
United States, and the Japanese. They have behaved very aggressively whenever they
can; and when they have not behaved aggressively, its largely because
they didnt have the military capability to behave aggressively. But the idea that
see is that

China is a country that has not acted according to the dictates of realpolitik and has always been the
victim, not the victimizer, is clearly contradicted by the historical record. China is like everybody else. As
hard as Professor Mearsheimer is on Chinas hegemonic intentions, he is equally critical of an American
pattern of aggression that has, in his view, helped give rise to Chinas own increasingly militaristic

Many Americans think that because the United States is a

democracy and it is a hegemon, that it is a benign hegemon. And those same Americans
behavior.

think that the rest of the world should view the Americans in those terms. They should see us as a benign

But thats not the way most other countries around the world see us, and its
the Chinese see us. The United States has fought six
separate wars since the Cold War ended in 1989, the first of which was against
hegemon.

certainly not the way

Saddam Husseins Iraq in 1991. Then we fought against Serbia over Bosnia in 1995, and again, in 1999
against Serbia, but this time over Kosovo. And then we went to war against Afghanistan in the wake of
September 11th, and then in 2003, March 2003, we invaded Iraq. And in 2011 we went to war against
Libya. So anyone who makes the argument that the United States is a peaceful country because its
democratic, right, is confronted immediately with evidence that contradicts that basic claim. Its not an
exaggeration to say that the United States is addicted to war. We are not reluctant at all to reach for our

countries like China understand this. And when countries

like China see the United States pivoting to Asia, and they see what our
record looks like in terms of using military force since 1989. And when they think
about the history of US-Chinese relations, when they think about the Open Door policy and how we
exploited China in the early part of the 20th century. And when they think
six-shooter. And

about the Korean War - most Americans dont realize this, but we were not fighting the North Koreans

the Korean War, we were fighting the Chinese from 1950 to 1953. We had a major war, not
China remembers all these things. So
they do not view the United States as a benign hegemon . They view
during

with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but with China.

the United States as a very dangerous foe that is moving more and
more forces to Asia and is forming close alliances with Chinas
neighbors. From Beijings point of view, this is a terrible situation.

Impact Extensions

Expansionism
China Will Take Advantage of US and Continue Chinese
Expansionism Causing the Next World War
Thomas E. Ricks, 6-11-2015, "One cheer for appeasement, especially in dealing with
tensions in the Pacific," Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/11/one-cheer-forappeasement-especially-in-dealing-with-tensions-in-the-pacific/ [KKC]
Recently a headline advised, Heres How to Avoid World War Three. As I read the article I recalled the
collective behavior and patterns prior to the second of the 20th Century World Wars. We are fortunate to
have these examples because they highlight some significant elements. First, prior to the Second World
War, we saw the example of two cases of so-called appeasement, one on each side of the globe, both with

with
Chinas expansionist maritime moves in the Pacific . Both prior to WWII and today, in
Europe and in the Pacific, these events posed (and pose) major challenges to the
existing global system of collective security designed to avoid another world
war. The insights we get from the two cases prior to WWII could not be more different, but they have
similarities to the issues at play with Russian and Ukraine (and Georgia for that matter) and

great value for today because they force us to pose probably the right sorts of general questions.

Appeasement. It is such an ugly word, at least for Westerners socialists, liberals, and
conservatives alike. It brings up images of Hitler, Banzai cheers at Nanking (Nanjing)
in 1937, and Italian planes gassing Ethiopian tribesmen in the period between World
Wars I and II. It also brings up images of (maybe) the Japanese Delegation walking out of the League of
Nations in 1933; the Emperor Halie Selassie famously speaking at that same League three years later; and
most of all British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain waving a scrap of paper after returning from
Munich in 1938 and triumphantly proclaiming peace in our time. Appeasement at one time seemed the
best choice to avoid World War, or some other moderate form of it.

Appeasement Causes China to Ramp up Its Chinese

Expansionism Efforts
Kim R. Holmes, a distinguished fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the think
tanks defense and foreign policy team for more than two decades., 2-8-20 14, "US Continues
to Turn a Blind Eye to Chinese Aggression," Daily Signal, http://dailysignal.com/2014/02/08/uscontinues-turn-blind-eye-chinese-aggression/ [KKC]
Chinas rise has the Obama administration looking as uncertain as the proverbial deer in the headlights.
Caught between the unappealing alternatives of embracing or containing China, it largely chooses
inaction. Its famous pivot to Asia has stalled a casualty of Secretary of State John F. Kerrys near

Chinas aggressive
territorial claims against U.S. allies. Meanwhile, widespread defense cuts
have led, inevitably, to a depletion of American military power in the region.
obsession with the Middle East. There has been little meaningful response to

Chinas a tough issue, no doubt, but thats no excuse for not having a coherent policy. Americas interests

The United States needs

to demonstrate, clearly and concretely, that America plans to stay involved in
Asia as a great power. China has clearly been upping the ante. Its most recent
in East Asia are simply too important to be managed as an afterthought.

move was to announce that all foreign fishing boats must obtain clearance from Beijing before sailing in

China essentially is
laying claim to the entire South China Sea , putting it at odds with Washington and with our
areas of the South China Sea that we recognize as international waters.

ally the Philippines, as well as Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia. This move follows an even more

declared an
air-defense identification zone over a large swath of the East China Sea that
brazen assertion in November. Amid tension with Japan over the Senkaku islands, China

it claims as a maritime exclusive economic zone. China also angered South Korea by incorporating an
undersea mountain.

By pressing territorial claims across the board, China is trying

to force us to decide between it and our allies. Its looking for that sweet spot of
confrontation in which we abandon an ally, which Beijing knows will send shock waves throughout the
region.

Human Rights Cred

Appeasement tanks US Human Rights Credibility
Victor Davis Hanson, the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics
and Military History at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a professor of Classics
Emeritus at California State University, 12-16-09, " Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama:
Victor Davis Hanson Answers the Questions," Tribune Media Services,
http://victorhanson.com/wordpress/?p=2072 [KKC]
BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can
anything good result from President Obamas marked submissiveness [7] before the world [8]? Dr. Hanson:
Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some
Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas.

Much of diplomacy

rests on public perceptions, however trivial . We are now in a great waiting game, as
regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape whether China, Venezuela, Iran,
North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. are just waiting to see whos going to be the first to
try Obama and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it
will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage
mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, etc.

Impact Calculus: Bigger Wars Later

Appeasement can only delay war and causes bigger wars
later --Jacobs 15, (Bruce Jacobs is Emeritus Professor of Asian Languages and
Studies at Monash University, 11/1/15, Appeasement will only encourage
China, http://www.smh.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourageexpansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html)
The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous.
They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about
becoming involved in a war. History has taught us that "appeasement" of
such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only
temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger
war later. Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions
that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among
China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue
expansionist policies without international protest. The pretence that
Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false.
Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status
quo that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not
announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign
power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to
war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be clear that China is the
only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders
of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that
Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks. In classical
balance-of-power theory, the rise of one expansionist power creates a
coalition among other powers. China's expansionist actions have already
created a substantial democratic coalition in Asia prepared to prevent China
from starting a major war.

Containment is key to secure Chinas periphery secures

later cooperation that doesnt sacrifice stability
Christopher Ford, a Senior fellow for the Hudson Institute now on the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee 9-27-2012, "Challenges of Regional Peace and Stability in East Asia,"
Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/9308-challenges-of-regional-peace-andstability-in-east-asia [KKC]

our agenda should be focused upon alliance reinforcement, the

cultivation of deeper and more cooperative political, economic, and military
relationships around Chinas periphery, the development of approaches to regional affairs
which facilitate coordination and collective action by regional states vis--vis the PRC, and robust and
sustainable military planning and operational postures that underscore the importance
This suggests that

to China that regional disputes are approached only through peaceful negotiation and that conflict not
break out at any level. These things, I should stress, would definitely not seem friendly to Beijing, as

it may be through such

unfriendliness that we have the greatest odds of eliciting cooperative
indeed the current so-called pivot to Asia has not. Ironically, however,

Chinese behavior.

This may be a counter-intuitive conclusion, but I think it follows. (To be sure, it will
also be our challenge to ensure that the support and reassurance given to friends in the region concerned
about Chinas rise and its taste for regional bullying does not encourage provocative actions by these
friends. It would do little good to reinforce caution in Beijing only to see a tense regional standoff burst into
flame because one of Chinas neighbors discovers a taste for incautiousness. Everyone will need to show

Through such a forward-leaning competitive strategy,

we can help blunt Chinas taste for regional confrontation and
nudge it toward more cooperative patterns of behavior , at least for a while longer. The
caution and perspicacity.)
however, I hope that

challenge will then be to sustain the things which accomplished this, foremost among them a forwardleaning and deeply engaged diplomatic, politico-military, and economic strategy that seeks to support and
sustain the open political order there for another generation. Such work will require ongoing and deeper
involvement with and cultivation of regional friends especially regional democracies and those willing to
move more toward democracy, for it is cooperation among them that Beijing particularly fears and indeed
all who share an interest in preventing the region from falling under the sway of any regional hegemon. It
will require not just a showy pivot of diplomatic attention, but also corresponding shifts of emphasis in

it will require clarity of mind in

developing a competitive strategy not just individually but collectively that
supports peace, stability, and preservation of the open political and economic
order that has brought such extraordinary benefits to everyone in the Pacific
Rim (including the PRC) for many years. This wont always be easy work, but it is essential.
the provision of resources and commitment over time. And

Taiwan
Chinese Appeasement Leads to Taking Control of Taiwan,
additionally this Would Signal Weakness of the global
Hegemon Causing Global Chaos
Damon Linker, a senior correspondent at TheWeek.com He is also a consulting editor at the
University of Pennsylvania Press, 3-21-2014, "What would America do if China invaded
Taiwan?," TheWeek.com, http://theweek.com/articles/448962/what-america-china-invadedtaiwan [KKC]
Earlier this week, President Obama stated explicitly what everyone already knew: The U.S. is not prepared
to go to war with Russia over its annexation of Crimea. We'll impose some tough sanctions, we'll say some
mean things about Vladimir Putin, and John McCain will fulminate for a while longer on Sunday-morning
talk shows. But the current situation on the ground isn't going to change because Putin successfully
showed that the American president never had any intention of backing up his warnings and threats with
military force. Since I don't think the United States has much of a strategic interest in preventing Russia
from swallowing parts of eastern Ukraine any more than Russia would be especially concerned if we
annexed a chunk of northern Mexico I have a hard time getting worked up about recent developments.
But that doesn't mean the events of the past few weeks won't have dangerous geopolitical consequences.

Every time the president allows a stated line to be crossed as he did in Syria last
year over Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons, and now again with Russia's actions in Ukraine

he signals that American security commitments may be hollow. The overall

importance of such signaling in international relations is a contentious topic among those who study
foreign affairs. But there is one potential theater of conflict in the world where we can be quite certain that
America's recent actions or rather, inactions have been very closely noted: the Taiwan Straits. Ever
since Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government fled Mao Zedong's communist takeover of mainland China
in 1949, relocating to the island of Formosa (henceforth renamed Taiwan), the United States has tacitly
guaranteed the island's security. The arrangement became more explicit with the Taiwan Relations Act of
1979, which included a commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the
island. Over China's strenuous objections

the People's Republic considers Taiwan to be

its sovereign territory

we've backed up that pledge by selling the Taiwanese government

significant numbers of weapons over the years, most recently a $5.8 billion package of military hardware
in 2011. So what happens if China, having noted our reluctance to stand up to Assad and complete

On one level,
going to war with a major world power of 1.35 billion people in order to
defend an island on the other side of the planet sounds crazy a quintessential act
unwillingness to challenge Moscow militarily, decides to test us by taking Taiwan?

of imperial overreach. That's certainly my initial reaction, since I'd prefer to see the U.S. playing a more
modest role in world affairs more generally. What better way to downscale our global commitments than to
back away from this East Asian relic of Cold War brinksmanship? But before we make that move, we need
to be clear about the stakes and the likely consequences. The United States has made a lot of blunders
and done a fair amount of geopolitical mischief over the years. But all told and weighed against the
realistic alternatives, our military hegemony since the end of World War II has been salutary, minimizing
cross-border conflicts and enforcing order across large swaths of the globe. The Pax Americana isn't just a

If we allowed China to take direct control of Taiwan (even if the

it would signal once
and for all the end of this American-dominated era and the start of another.
Coupled with our passivity in the face of Russia's recent actions, we would
swiftly find ourselves in a world where nations revert to acting as they have
for much of human history: freely invading each other's borders and fighting
wars in the pursuit of national self-interest, with no overseeing hyperpower
imposing global peace and order from above. How likely is it that China will make a move
propaganda slogan.

mainland promised to treat it as a semi-autonomous region, like Hong Kong),

against Taiwan? At the moment, not very. Relations between Beijing and Taipei have improved since Taiwan
elected Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008. On the other hand, China has recently started flexing its
military muscles in unprecedented ways. And earlier this week hundreds of Taiwanese university students
stormed and occupied the national legislature in Taipei to protest a trade pact with the mainland, a

reminder that nationalist sentiment remains strong in Taiwan. How might Beijing respond if the opposition
gains the upper hand, threatening to scuttle its plans for slow-motion reunification with an island it still
considers a breakaway province? The fact is that we just don't know. (Last spring no one would have
predicted that a year later Crimea would be a part of Russia.) What we do know is that, if China does make
a move in the Taiwan Straits, the future of the geopolitical order will depend on how America responds. Or
doesn't.

Taiwan: Escalates/Likely
Taiwan is the most likely spark for war would catch the
US flat-footed and go nuclear
Lowther 8/11/2015
(Dr. Adam Lowther is Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence
Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command. Alex Littlefield is a professor at
Feng Chia University.) Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and
America, The Diplomat. Retrieved
from http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-warbetween-china-and-america/July 13 // DDI - AC,CS)
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, Chinas aggressive efforts to assert questionable
claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build
the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile
capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and

Given that American political and military leaders have a

poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their
opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a
future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is
worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight
into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a
possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear
weapons. In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S.
Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty longrange nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from
Chinas eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit
Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East
Coast home to the nations capital and largest economic centers.
To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based
variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to
sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new
mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving
the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile
defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of Chinas nuclear
rapidly escalate.

arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what
end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is
straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an
American first strike. As China argues, it has a no-nuclear-first policy which makes its arsenal purely
defensive while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including
Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that Chinas investment in advanced warheads and
ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the East

China is rapidly
catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads
each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment
unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use
its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or
Wind. While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S.,

not taking a number of actions that are against its interests.

Chinas
fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to
provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the
United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the
Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia,

China sees its position and ability

to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While
there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States
and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over
Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S.
would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to
ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack,

accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from
intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning
with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of
force in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese

aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to
resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response
to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the
Chinese. Given the regimes relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and
conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle
conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S.
carrier in Chinas self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of
China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in
sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a
domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the
Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that
nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is
incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United
States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States far more
is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a
successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a
point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured
destruction (MAD) is not part of Chinas strategic thinking in fact it is explicitly rejected the PRC will see
the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of
the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China
does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with
Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As
long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to
Chinas power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony
in its own neighborhood. Chinas maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and
significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the
relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. Chinas
relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.
Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to
supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a
longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be
responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to Chinas ability
to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and
communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of
these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them
even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can
deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington
invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its
geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control,
and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence
high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the
Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis.
The U.S. brought an end to the mainlands antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into
the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force
targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not

forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the
Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results
China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or
capitulate. While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact than many American readers
will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when
attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like
their counterparts in the United States .

Unless we give serious thought to possible

scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the United States may
be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to
prevent a catastrophe.

War/Conflict
Appeasement increases Chinese demands culminates in
war
Jacobs 15 (Bruce Jacobs, 11-1-2015, "Appeasement will only encourage
China," Sydney Morning Herald,
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourageexpansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html)
World attention has again focused on our region of the globe, with the
American navy asserting its "freedom of navigation" near Chineseconstructed artificial islands World attention has again focused on our region
of the globe, with the American navy asserting its "freedom of navigation"
near Chinese-constructed artificial islands in the so-called South China Sea. In
less than 80 days, in the midst of threats from China, Taiwan's voters will vote
for their president and legislature. Polls suggest the opposition will win, thus
giving Taiwan its third transition of power from opposition to government in
the six presidential elections since democratisation.third transition of power
from opposition to government in the six presidential elections since
democratisation.The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China. On
the basis of false "history", China claims the South China Sea, the East
China Sea and Taiwan. Yet China has no historical claims to the
South and East China seas. Historically, south-east Asian states conducted
the great trade in the South China Sea. China had almost no role.
Furthermore, geographically, the contested areas are close to Vietnam,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than
1000 kilometres south of China. China's claims for sovereignty in these
areas have no historical basis and its constructing of "islands" on
submerged reefs only demonstrates China's expansionism.Similarly, in
the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku Islands (which China calls
the Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The People's Daily of January 8,
1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago,
and a World Atlas published in China in 1958 showed that these islands
belong to Japan. China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no
historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow,
stated that Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese
Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party
separately claim that Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese
regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to
1949. These four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history
because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese
in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of
Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan
from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their rule was a Chinese
colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek
and systematically discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the
accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-

kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a
country with a population the size of Australia, has become a democratic
middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including
the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang
Ching-kuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without consulting
Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and
India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And,
although these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One
China, one Taiwan" policies. The arguments of people such as Age columnist
Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say
we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. History has taught
us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not
stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and
ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China
only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper
tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders
that they can pursue expansionist policies without international
protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature
can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu,
want to maintain the status quo that Taiwan is de facto an independent
state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we
were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill
Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be
clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close
talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia
demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the
risks. In classical balance-of-power theory, the rise of one expansionist power
creates a coalition among other powers. China's expansionist actions have
already created a substantial democratic coalition in Asia prepared to prevent
China from starting a major war.

AT: Containment = Escalation

The US should take riskier containment moves pure
accommodation ensures escalation and emboldens
Chinese assertiveness
Mastro, Oriana S. 2015 (assistant professor at the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) Why Chinese Assertiveness
Is Here to Stay, The Washington Quarterly Winter 2015 // DDI - CS
As Chinese political, economic, and military power continues to grow at impressive rates, the impact of
Chinese external behavior on the region has correspondingly increased. Since 2010, it has become
commonplace for observers to refer to Chinese foreign policy behavior as abrasive, muscular, or assertive.
However, Chinas heightened willingness to rely on coercive diplomacyor the simultaneous use of
diplomacy and limited use of force to accomplish ones objectivesbegan much earlier with the Impeccable
incident in March 2009.1 In this case, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in
dangerously close proximity to the U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable.2 In the following months, commentators
predicted that China would moderate its behavior in the face of regional backlash. Instead, instances of
Chinese platforms maneuvering in a dangerous and unprofessional manner only became more frequent.
Whether Chinese foreign policy has become more assertiveness and the implications of such a shift are the
source of great debate among China hands. Analysts Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe argue that stability still
characterizes U.S.China bilateral relations because the ties between the two countries are more extensive,
varied, prioritized, and interdependent than ever before.3 Harvard professor Alastair Iain Johnston argues
that pundits overstate the change because they underestimate how assertive China has been in the past
demonstrating that Chinese official discourse on sovereignty and territorial issues has been relatively
consistent over the past fifteen years.4 Others argue that the narrative does not go far enough. Australian
analyst Jeffrey Reeves articulated that accusations of assertiveness too narrowly focus on Chinas Oriana
Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University. The author would especially like to thank Sungmin Cho, Zi Yang, Tianyi Wang, and Denise Der for
their research assistance. Dr. Mastro can be reached at om116@georgetown.edu. Copyright # 2015 The
Elliott School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly 37:4 pp. 151170
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002161 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015
151 Oriana Skylar Mastro expansive territorial claims, disruptive diplomacy in ASEAN, and growing use
of economic sanctions, while ignoring other policies that contribute to regional instabilityspecifically
Beijings reliance on economic ties to advance its relations with smaller developing countries in Asia.5
Commentators admittedly tend to ignore areas of cooperative Chinese actions such as convergence in U.S.
and Chinese voting on the UN Security Council and China has been credibly communicating its threats by
increasing the risk of accident. increasing U.S. exports to China.6 Former State Department official Thomas
Christensen cautions that Chinas counterproductive policies toward its neighbors and the United States are
better understood as reactive and conservative, rather than assertive and innovative.7 Qin Yaqing, a
professor at China Foreign Affairs University, postulates that Chinas main strategic policies emphasis on
U.S.China relations, rejecting alliances, reliance on economic diplomacywill continue even as some
policies change. For instance, we could see an emphasis on core interests like sovereignty and territorial
integrity, even over economic development.8 While true that Chinese diplomacy may not have, on the
whole, become more assertive, most agree that in the area of maritime disputes, China has demonstrated
an increased willingness to threaten and use limited force to promote its sovereignty claims. The dangerous
Chinese interception of U.S. Navy planes conducting routine patrols above the South China Sea in late
August 2014 is only the latest of countless instances of China credibly communicating its threats by
increasing the risk of accident.9 Many U.S. strategists were hopeful that Beijing would moderate its

this more muscular approach to maritime disputes

has obviously proved counterproductive and detrimental to Chinas
own interests. Chinas muscle-flexing has driven allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia
behavior because, they argue,

into a closer alliance with the United States.10 A recent Pew poll demonstrated that 70 percent of
respondents in the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, and India expressed concern over potential
conflict with China.11 The Chinese, said Rob Taylor, a close advisor to Australian Prime Minister Tony
Abbott, with their current foreign policy, as distinct from what they were doing over a decade agois [sic]
genuinely counterproductive.12 Given the Western consensus that, as The Economist wrote, it would be
hard to construct a foreign policy better designed to undermine Chinas long-term interests,13 and that
fundamentally China has no wish to be branded an international outlaw,14 as Wall Street Journal
columnist Andrew Browne pointed out, many are waiting for a reversion to previous policies. 152 THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay Unfortunately,

Chinas reliance on coercion, both in the form of deterrence and

is likely to persist for the foreseeable future
for two reasons. First, Chinese assertiveness is the result of a deliberate
such a shift back is unlikely.

compellence, over maritime disputes

strategic decision central to Beijings overarching anti- access/area denial

(A2/AD) strategy. The Economist refers to anti-access as the ability to prevent an opposing force from
entering an area of operations. The objective of area denial, on the other hand, is not prevention but
disruptionto compel the desired behavior by impos[ing] severe costs on the enemys freedom of action

China is actually hoping to

prevent balancing by being assertive, and operationally it is trying
to create a domestic and international environment that will limit
U.S. ability to intervene effectively in a given conflict . Second, there are
once it has [gained access].15 While it seems counterintuitive,

influential and loud voices in China that believe such a strategy has been working, and is better than the
alternatives. Such arguments are not without merit. While a few countries view of China is worsening, a
median of 49 percent of the worlds publics surveyed in a 2014 poll still hold a positive view of China
overall.16 Xi Jinping himself has articulated more hardline policies concerning territorial disputes, and
Chinese assertiveness has noticeably increased under his watch. Additionally, the costs of any negative
perceptions are uncleareven Australia has been hesitant to be drawn into the diplomatic fray given its
close economic relationship with China.17 And even if countries are unhappy, it is hard to ignore the fact
that Chinas tactic of exploit[ing] perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries...to change
the status quo in its favour, as the International Crisis Group puts it, has been largely successful in

In short, Chinese assertiveness is here to stay,

and U.S. strategy needs to adjust accordingly. Specifically, I lay out three areas of
strengthening Chinas claims.18

Cold War-era concepts that the United States needs to jettison if it hopes to protect regional interests and
avoid conflict if possible. Asias Own Balancing Most U.S. strategists and scholars argue that Chinese
muscular behavior in its territorial disputes has been counterproductive in that Chinas relations with its
neighbors, and therefore Beijings security environment, have deteriorated as a result. Many concluded that
Beijing was learning similar lessons and would adjust its foreign policy accordingly. Chinas relentless
pursuit of its territorial Unfortunately, a shift back from Chinese coercion is unlikely for two reasons.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 153 154 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015
Oriana Skylar Mastro claims has hardened the position of its neighbors and hurt its international image.19
According to a 2014 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) poll of strategic elites in eleven
countries, 61 percent of respondents felt China had a negative impact on regional security.20 More and
more, regional actors anxiety about Beijings long-term intentions is encouraging them to conduct their
own balancing. Such behavior includes external balancing, such as improving ties with the United States
and other major players in the region, as well as internally strengthening and modernizing their own
militaries.21 We can see this internal balancing in the defense spending of Asian countries, which spent a
total of $287.4 billion on defense in 2012. This total represents the first time that Asian defense spending
exceeded total European defense spending, including both NATO and non-NATO countries.22 Further, from
20082012, Asia and Oceania accounted for 47 percent of global imports of major conventional weapons,
with India, South Korea, and Singaporefirst, fourth, and fifth, respectivelyall in the top five of importers
of major conventional weapons worldwide.23 Real (inflation-adjusted) defense spending in India, Japan, and
South Korea increased from 2000 to 2011 by 47, 46, and 67 percent, respectively, an increase too large to
be explained by natural modernization trends.24 Moreover, the reversal of downward spending trends in
2008 and subsequent accelerated increases, coupled with focus on investment in naval and air forces,
suggest such spending trends are partly in response to China.25 The AsiaPacific will comprise 26 percent
nearly $200 billionof global maritime security builds in the next 20 years, represented largely by
shipbuilding.26 India has been the largest importer of weapons for the past five years and has more active
duty military personnel than any other Asian country except China. Indias defense budget rose to $46.8
billion in 2012, and it is projected that by 2020 India will become the fourth-greatest defense spender in the
world, overtaking Japan, France, and Britain.27 Even South Korea, a much smaller country, boosted its
defense budget by 67 percent from $17.1 billion in 2000 to $28.6 billion in 2011.28 In terms of external
balancing, many countries are strengthening their ties with the United States. In 2013, the United States
and Vietnam established a comprehensive partnership, and subsequently have frequently worked together,
for example to mobilize a multinational response in 2010 to Chinas perceived attempts to promote its
maritime claims in the South China Sea.29 In April 2014, the Philippines and the United States signed an
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that, among other things, allows the United States to base
troops there on a rotational basis for the first time in 20 years.30 Later in 2014, Australia and the United
States signed a 25-year agreement allowing 2500 U.S. Marines and USAF personnel to train there and interoperate with Australian forces.31 Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay Japan has perhaps
made the greatest changes by incrementally raising its defense budget, extending its security perimeter,
improving its armaments, and considering boosting the status of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) by
extending its operational range. Japanese defense spending in 2013 increased for the first time in eleven
years by 40 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 4.7358 trillion yen.32 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe announced in July 2014 a reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution to allow, for the first time in sixty
years, collective self-defense. This means that Japans military may engage in hostilities to come to the aid
of friendly countries, such as the United States, even when Japan itself has not been attacked.33 In addition
to strengthening relations with the United States, Asian countries are also expanding their ties with one
another. To cite just a few examples, South Korea and Japan are gradually moving from security dialogue
toward closer intelligence and defense cooperation. While a painful history limits the level of trust between
the two countries, officials in Seoul and Tokyo are quietly moving ahead with strengthening both bilateral
relations and trilateral cooperation with the United States. Korea is also becoming a major economic
partner, arms provider, and trainer for select Southeast Asian states including Indonesia and Vietnam. Japan

and India have also upgraded bilateral defense ties and have pledged to enhance cooperation, especially in
the realm of maritime security; to that end, the two countries held the first purely bilateral joint naval
exercise off the Bay of Tokyo in June 2012. Japan and Australia have signed an accord to cross-service
logistics for military platforms. Japan has also moved to improve defense relations with Vietnam and the
Philippines. Due to Chinas sensitivities, Australia tends to downplay its cooperation with Japan, but it is far
more vocal about strengthening ties with India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Japan,
Australia, and ASEAN members increasingly seek after India, with its Look East policy, recast in November
2014 by Prime Minister Modi as its Act East policy, and blue-water naval power. India provides arms and
professional military training, especially of junior officers, to Vietnam, and Hanoi has granted India berthing
rights at its Nha Trang port.34 A Deliberate Strategy Chinese assertive behavior is here to stay because it is
the manifestation of a deliberate long-term strategy. Many scholars are more comfortable arguing that a
rogue military, a need to cater to Chinese nationalism, or individual leadership traits explain Chinese
assertiveness because those explanations suggest Chinas dangerous and Chinas assertive behavior is the
manifestation of a deliberate long-term strategy. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 155
156 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 Oriana Skylar Mastro provocative behavior is a
temporary paroxysm.35 But the speeches of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, and
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlight the belief that unfriendly, and even hostile, powers are
besieging China, especially in the maritime sphere. Wang Yi has emphasized that China periodically
exercises restraint, but must stand its ground when provoked in territorial disputes.36 In a May 2013
speech in Germany, Li Keqiang suggested that Chinese assertiveness is even in defense of the post- World
War II international system. Though a tenuous connection, Li basically insinuates that Chinas active pursuit
of its East China Sea claims supports the world order laid out in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.37 And in
recent months, Xi himself has publicly stressed the critical importance of a strong military to a successful
foreign policy and dismissed the option of passivity.38 Remaining firm is the preferred official Chinese
approach. Xi Jinping has also emphasized the importance of prioritizing the economic interests of countries
that support Chinese core interests, even if it comes at a relative cost economically.39 Past economic goals
solely prioritized making money, with little consideration to strategic factorsbut today, Chinese leaders
are starting to think about how they can use the immense economic benefit of doing business with China in
order to gain political influence. The political priority seems to be defending maritime sovereignty above all
else. Historically, upholding maritime sovereignty has been critical to a nations success, and therefore
China should follow a similar trajectory of building a powerful navy that can protect its commercial
interests.40 Researchers at Peking University pulled together extensive statistics to demonstrate how
important maritime territory is for Chinese economic, and therefore national, interests. They argue that
China must utilize available resources to defend vital sea lanes, which include military, diplomatic, and
economic wherewithal.41 Meanwhile, Chinas top leadership stresses that in spite of Chinas assertiveness
in maritime disputes, other countries need not worry about Chinas rise because it does not seek hegemony
or promote imperialism. An anonymous analysis published in the Hong Kong Economic Times of Xi Jinpings
November speech concludes that his foreign policy approach is tough and unyielding, though not
unnecessarily aggressive.42 China is unlikely to shift strategies away from relying on coercion and
manipulating risk to achieve its territorial objectives not only because the top leadership publicly promotes
them, but also because they correspond well with Chinas overarching strategy of active defense (jiji
fangyu). Active defense is the operational component of Jiang Zemins National Military Strategic Guidelines
for the New Period (xin shiqi guojia junshi zhanlue fangzhen), which serves as the highest level of strategic
guidance for all PLA military operations during war and preparation for war during peacetime.43
Specifically, the guidelines Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay necessitate developing
capabilities to deter, deny, disrupt, and delay the deployment of U.S. forces into the Chinese theaterhence
the Western nomenclature A2/AD. These can be leveraged to accomplish Chinese goals in its maritime
disputes through four distinct but interrelated pathways: 1. geographic: increasing the distance and time
required for U.S. forces to arrive in theater from areas of safety before China achieves its political
objectives; 2. kinetic: degrading the U.S. militarys ability to penetrate anti-access environments with an
enhanced conventional precision strike system, consisting mainly of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as
attacks on key enabling capabilities such as space-based networks that enable C4ISR (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) missions; 3. political:
exploiting perceived weaknesses in political support and resolve of U.S. allies and friends, thereby keeping
the United States out because countries will not allow it to base there; and 4. deterrent: making
involvement so costly that the United States opts out of responding, or responds minimally, in a given
contingency.44 Assertiveness is therefore, in many ways, the logical extension of this Chinese strategy as it
grows more confident in the capabilities it has been developing over the last twenty years as part of this
active defense strategy. While the strategic objective is the same for each of the pillars, the theory of
victory of the first two pillars is significantly different from that of the latter two. Kinetic and geographic
aspects rely largely on brute force in that China could theoretically accomplish its goals by force alone,
without any collaboration from the United States.45 Take this hypothetical exampleif in the early stages of
a conflict, China attacks U.S. bases in Japan, cratering runaways and burying aircraft, no amount of U.S.
resolve will make those planes fly. In this case, the United States may want to support a Taiwan contingency
but be unable to do so. Coercive strategies, meanwhile, rely on the collaboration of the opponent; one can
only succeed if the other side concedes. If China instead lobs missiles at U.S. bases every other day until the
United States agrees to halt surveillance operations in the South China Sea, this is coercion. The political
and deterrent (third and fourth) pillars are thus harder to grasp because their theory of victory relies on
compliance. They are premised on the belief that China can convince countries not to put up a fight by
manipulating risk and imposing costs. Chinese Assertiveness is the logical extension of Chinas active
defense strategy. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 157 158 THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 Oriana Skylar Mastro assertiveness in maritime disputes since 2009 is largely

While the kinetic and

geographic components of Chinas active defense approach have
received the most attention in Washington policy circles, the more
elusive political and deterrent A2/AD pillars can be just as effective, if not
more so, in undermining U.S. ability to project power in the region to
intervene in a maritime dispute. The political pillar refers to the idea
that, in a conflict, China will pressure countries with military threats
or economic inducements to limit or deny the U.S. use of facilities
necessary for power projection into the East China Sea, South China
Sea, or Taiwan Strait. As Congressional Research Service naval expert Ronald ORourke
coercive in nature, and therefore tends to fall under these last two pillars.

convincingly argues, To threaten regional bases and logistics points, China could employ SRBM/MRBMs
[short- range and medium-range ballistic missiles], land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces,
and computer network attack (CNA). Strike aircraft, when enabled by aerial refueling, could simultaneously
engage distant targets using air-launched cruise missiles equipped with a variety of terminal-homing

Even during peacetime, though most countries want the

United States to remain in the region, the priority on stability above
all else may translate to nations throughout the region pressuring
the United States to accept a greater degree of parity with China,
thereby displacing U.S. influence, and perhaps eventually presence ,
warheads.46

in the region to a certain degree. An example of such efforts came from Chinese defense strategist and
retired senior military officer Song Xiaojun. In a May 2012 opinion piece, Song warned Australia that it could
not reconcile its close economic relationship with China with the fact that it relies on the United States for
security, and would have to, at some point, choose which country to prioritize in its foreign-policy decision
making. He argued that Australia has to find a godfather sooner or later, and whom Canberra chooses
depends on who is more powerful based on the strategic environment.47 An editorial in a nationalist
Chinese state-run newspaper also responded to the news that the United States will station 2500 Marines in
Darwin with the warning that Canberra is risking getting itself caught in the cross fire between China and
the United States.48 The deterrent A2/AD pillarperhaps the most important and most difficult to counter
posits that Washington may opt out of responding in a number of contingencies, for example maritime
disputes, given that Chinas active defense initiatives exceed the political costs for the United States. This
could involve deterring a U.S. intervention decision altogether, or involve a Beijing-directed preemptive
strike on U.S. forces attempting to deploy to the region, in the hopes of delivering the necessary
psychological shock to the United States, its allies, and friends in the region. Why Chinese
Assertiveness is Here to Stay Chinas public response to the 2012 U.S. declaration that it will rebalance

The main theme found

throughout Chinese media sources has been that the United States
is too weak-willed to carry through its policies, which are in any case illadvised. The Chinese media further claims that the past ten years of U.S. war in
Southwest Asia has eroded the U.S. sphere of influence and has
seriously affected the state of U.S. regional hegemony in the
western Pacific.49 Chinese writers also note that, while the United
States may want, theoretically, to return to being the main force in
the AsiaPacific, its economic dependence on China and its relative
depletion of resources imply that it will fail to fulfill its
proclamations and promises.50 In short, so the argument goes, while the United States
toward Asia reflects Chinas beliefs underpinning the deterrent pillar.

wants to protect vital regional interests in East Asia, its desire to do so at an acceptable cost trumps all
other considerations. Concordant with this view, China believes it can increase the real and perceived costs
of intervention and successfully convince the United States to restrain itself in maritime disputes and other
regional contingencies. The ultimate aim of Chinas assertiveness, therefore, is effectively to convince the
United States to self-impose an anti-access doctrine in any conflict involving Chinese territorial interests.
Chinas Positive Assessment of Assertiveness The positive internal assessment of Chinas assertiveness
strategy is the second reason why Beijing is unlikely to change course. In part because of all this evident
reaction to Chinese behavior, Chinese scholars and strategists themselves are debating the relative merits
and risks associated with Chinese assertiveness, a strategy that Xi Jinping himself articulated in an October
2013 speech at the foreign affairs conference of the Chinese Communist Party as striving for achievement
(fenfayouwei).51 Since 1990, China had adhered to Deng Xiaopings maxim of keeping a low profile while
still getting Even scholars loyal to Dengs maxim say its time to stress actively getting something done.
things done (taoguangyouhui, yousuozuowei). Many Chinese scholars warn against jettisoning this

strategy.52 But domestic support for a more assertive, confident, proactive foreign policy is growing. Even
scholars that prefer to stay loyal to Dengs maxim say its time to stress the second part, actively getting
something done (yousuozuowei). Chinese proponents rely on two main rationales supporting the shift in
foreign policy approach that provide insight into what lies ahead. First, the previous policy of
taoguangyouhui was insufficient to protect national interests because it did not persuade others to respect
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 159 160 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER
2015 Oriana Skylar Mastro Chinas interests in the region. Second, while some admit that the United
States and neighboring countries are uncomfortable with the new approach, they argue it is more practical
and effective than reverting to a China that suffers disgraces and insults in order to bide time. As Chinas
power grows, its leaders are prioritizing strategies that they think command respect and will persuade
others to increasingly accommodate Chinese preferences. Many Chinese thinkers complain that the
potential benefits of keeping a low profilea positive international image or greater support and friendship
from neighboring countrieshave failed to come to fruition.53 Neighboring powers were suspicious of
Chinas rise long before the foreign policy shift, and the behavior of other South China Sea claimants during
that period suggest that an unprincipled strategy like biding time does not command respect.54
According to Fudan University researcher Zhao Huasheng, while China will promote policies that resolve
disputes in a reasonable way, core interests cannot be shelved to be dealt with at a later date, regardless
of how much turmoil they cause now.55 Other voices add that placating others did not keep Vietnam and
the Philippines from violating Chinas sovereignty, or Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from visiting the
Yasukuni shrine.56 One prominent scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) commented
in a recent interview that China had tensions with its neighbors even when its strategy was pliant, flexible,
and gentle, because contemporary security issues result from Chinas rise.57 As one Chinese major general
argued, principles of harmonious co-existence and peaceful development do not resonate with many
countries, and Chinas promotion of these ideas was like playing the zither to a cowineffective.58 While
Chinese strategists recognize that other regional actors are unhappy with the shift, they also argue that
both China domestically and other countries internationally are still in the process of acclimating to Chinas
new foreign policy approach. These strategists argue that the palpable anxiety of the United States and
some neighboring countries is completely understandable, but does not suggest the strategy is ineffective.
The argument goes something like this: countries are used to a weak and accommodating (renru fuzhong)
China, so they are understandably startled by Chinas recent tendency to push back.59 In other words, they
will adjust, but the strategy should not change. According to an article in the Chinese nationalistic
newspaper The Global Times, Chinas comprehensive national power has reached a point where it is time
to actively get something done, the latter part of Dengs biding time maxim.60 Many pair their support
for this more proactive foreign policy approach with words of cautionChina needs to learn how to use its
power so as to command respect without being unnecessarily quarrelsome or prideful. This is a critical
period for Chinas rise, and the last thing the country needs is to provoke robust balancing designed to
thwart Chinas rise.61 Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay One of the greatest proponents of
the striving for achievement strategy, Tsinghua University professor Yan Xuetong, argues that the

When
China was laying low, focusing on economic development and
attempting to expand its soft power, countries were still anxious
about Chinese intentions and increasingly saw China as a threat.
But, Yan argues, countries like the United States and Japan will inevitably
see China as a threat, because China will likely replace them as the
regions strongest and richest country, respectively. Contrary to Western arguments,
strategy has actually contributed greatly to improvements in Chinas international situation.62

Yan believes that major competitors have been accommodating Chinas preferences more and more, largely
due to Chinas increased assertiveness. He cites U.S. acceptance of the November 2013 announcement of an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ); Washingtons moderate reaction to the December 2013 Cowpens
incident, in which a PLAN Amphibious Dock Ship maneuvered dangerously close to the U.S. ship; and
President Obamas downgrading of his February 2014 visit with the Dalai Lama to the Map Room instead of
the Oval office as examples of the strategys success.63 He also argues that bilateral relations are more
stable with the United States because both Beijing and Washington now admit to a structural conflict, and
therefore preclude unreasonable expectations for favorable actions that then lead to overreaction and
disappointment.64 The key for continued success, he argues, is to seek strategic partnerships with
countries not based on where China can make the most money, but on which countries have the most clout
strategically. There are differing opinions on the relative merits of various strategies, but as one Chinese
scholar warned, China must show a united front so as not to send the wrong message of confusion or lack of
consensus to the outside world.65 As an opinion piece in Chinas nationalist newspaper The Global Times
argues, the international community wants China to be a responsible stakeholder and proactive in some
areas, but swallow its anger in others. It goes on to say that even if China tried to adhere to these
expectations, this would only convince the international community that China is weak and can be bullied,
the wrong message to send and the wrong strategy to implement if the goal is protecting Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity.66 This suggests that even if some Chinese thinkers disagreed with this
interpretation of assertiveness leading to great foreign policy achievements, Chinese leaders may bury this
dissent and double down on its preferred methods of promoting foreign policy interests regardless. U.S.
Strategic Response: What More Can Be Done? If Chinas tendency to rely on coercive diplomacy to promote
its territorial claims indeed persists, as I have argued, what does that mean for U.S. policy? Many THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 161 162 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 Oriana
Skylar Mastro officials are hoping that balancing within Asia and positive trends in other aspects of the

bilateral relationship will prove sufficient to manage Chinas abrasive behavior in territorial disputes.
Secretary of State John Kerry argued that creating sustainable growth, enhancing economic ties, and
empowering the individual to improve their communities will ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia
Pacific.67 The idea that engagement and partnership will shape Chinas choices and change how the
leadership defines its national interests and the best way to promote them is also a strong theme among
U.S. officials. The current ambassador to China, Max Baucus, put forth his plan to partner with China as it
emerges as a global power and encourage it to act responsibly in resolving international disputes,
respecting human rights, and protecting the environment.68 Everyone agrees that engagement should not
be abandoned. Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Miche`le Flournoy argued, abandoning efforts
to engage with China would likely accelerate Beijings assertiveness and run counter to a wide range of U.S.
economic and security interests.69 Thomas Christensen posits that the United States can empower
moderate elites in China by consistently offer[ing] China an active role in multilateral cooperative
efforts.70 George Washington University professor Robert Sutter argues, through

constructive engagement with their Chinese counterparts, U.S.

leaders can demonstrate the long-term benefits Beijing would enjoy
from a Chinese regional posture that eschews egregious pressure,
intimidation, and zero-sum competition and embraces existing world
norms that hold promise for uninterrupted Chinese development .71
Scholars, policymakers, and officials stress that containment, defined as attempting to suppress
[Chinas] growth by isolating Beijing from its neighbors and the world is not the answer.72 But
containment is not the only Cold War paradigm that deserves casting off given the contemporary challenges
of a rising China. Many scholars have offered specific recommendations on how to address these challenges,
with most designed to impose costs to compel a change in Chinese assertive behavior. But such measures
are unlikely to be implemented effectively, or at all, until policymakers and strategists abandon two
different elements of a Cold War mentality: overly relying on a strong forward military presence for a

U.S. officials must

accept risk without being reckless, and it must permit the possibility
of escalation while maintaining stability. The U.S. mindset needs to shift to accept
credible deterrent and fixating on de-escalation in crises. In its place,

greater risk without being reckless. Military power alone does not guarantee a credible deterrent. U.S.
efforts to bolster its military presence in the AsiaPacifica central pillar of the rebalancing strategy
counter the geographic, kinetic and political pillars of Chinas A2/AD strategy. For example, the United
States is forward-deploying more assets in the region, such as the Marine Air Ground Task Force Why
Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay Detachment already deployed to Australia as well as the stated goal
of positioning 60 percent of all U.S. warships to the AsiaPacific by 2020. This addresses the geographic
pillar. Attempts to address the kinetic pillar include new operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle, which
relies on highly integrated and tightly coordinated operations across war-fighting domains in order to
disrupt and destroy enemy A2-AD networks and their defensive and offensive guided weapons systems in

Bolstering
U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines,
and Thailand, as well as partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia,
India, Singapore, Vietnam, and New Zealand are critical components
to U.S. efforts to ensure political access and support in the region .
order to enable US freedom of action to conduct concurrent and follow-on operations.73

These efforts are commendablethe United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and
retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were
land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the
credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not
because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of
resolve. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia.
Chinas strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war
the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, Chinas experience in fighting the
Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically
superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is
the foundation of Chinas new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account
for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S.
willingness, not ability, to fight. The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue.
The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent
escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has
created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with The
U.S. mindset needs to shift to accept greater risk without being reckless. China is testing the balance of
resolve, not power. This means that military might is insufficient. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY &
WINTER 2015 163 Oriana Skylar Mastro Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindsetthey
believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders
decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75

China is masterful at chipping

away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and

coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to
escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when
he wrote it is the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under

Because China introduces risk for

exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on de- escalation through crisis
management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behaviorif anything
it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of
inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United
States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the
U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability
by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To
signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict,
Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of
conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve.
This may include reducing channels of communication during a
conflict, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly
demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve
to its advantage. The current mindsetthat crisis management is the answer in all scenarios will
control ... that can intimidate the enemy.76

be difficult to dislodge, given the tendency among U.S. military ranks to focus on worst-case great battle
scenarios. While realistic in Cold War operational planning, decision makers should consider instead the less
violent and prolonged engagements that characterize Chinese coercive diplomacy when evaluating risk and

The idea that

any conflict with China would escalate to a major war, destroy the
global economy, and perhaps even escalate to a nuclear exchange
has no foundation in Chinese thinking, and causes the United States
to concede in even the smallest encounters. While the Chinese leadership has
reward, such as the 1962 SinoIndian War or the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands.

proven to be more risk-acceptant than the United States (or perhaps more accurately, to assess the risks to
be less than those perceived by U.S. strategists),

Xi still wants to avoid an armed

conflict at this stage. In his November 2014 keynote address at the Central Foreign Affairs Work
Conference, he noted that China remains in a period of strategic opportunity The U.S. focus on
de-escalation will, if anything, only encourage greater Chinese
provocations. 164 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 Why Chinese
Assertiveness is Here to Stay in which efforts should be made to maintain the benign strategic
environment so as to focus on internal development.77 Ultimately, the U.S. regional objective must be
peace and stability at an acceptable cost. Given this, it is critical to understand the four components of
Chinas A2/AD strategy, the strategic foundation for Chinas recent assertiveness, and how best to maintain
the U.S. position as a Pacific power. In addition to regularly attending meetings in the region and developing
new technology, new platforms, and new operational concepts designed to defeat Chinas A2/AD strategy,
the United States needs to break free of its Cold War- based paradigm paralysis and rethink conceptions of
limited war, escalation, and risk. Scolding China and imposing symbolic costs for each maritime incident is

The United States needs

to fundamentally change its approach by accepting higher risk and
allowing for the possibility of escalationboth vertically in force as
well as horizontally to include other countries. This admittedly is a difficult
unlikely to inspire the corrective change U.S. thinkers are hoping for.

balance, especially given the need to avoid emboldening U.S. allies to take actions that run contrary to U.S.

only by mastering these two balancing actsfocusing on balancing

resolve, rather than forces, and prioritizing stability over crisis
managementwill the United States be able to maintain peace and
stability in East Asia without sacrificing U.S. or allied interests .
interests. But

China is a predator state, which can only be deterred

with tough, credible containment. The alternative is
inevitable conflict.
Mulgan, Aurelia G. 3/9/16 (professor of Japanese Politics, University of New
South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. Her
latest book (co-edited with Masayoshi Honma) is The Political Economy of
Japanese Trade Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).) Chinas Rise as a Predator
State, The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinasrise-as-a-predator-state/ July 14 // DDI - CS
Chinas land grab and subsequent militarization of islands in the
South China Sea have finally dispelled the myth that its rise will be
peaceful. Indeed, these developments point to an unwelcome fact that
China has become a predator state. Rands Michael Mazarr wrote about
predator states in the late 1990s. He argues that what distinguishes a
predator state above all is territorial aggression the
predisposition to grab territory and resources. China is one of two
contemporary examples; the other is Russia in Europe. The best
historical examples are Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,
and more recently Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These examples teach us that
predator states cause wars. Predator states are buoyed by an expansionist
ideology the active promotion of the idea that neighbouring territories (both
land and maritime) belong by rights to the predator. Such states often
possess a sense of historical grievance or victimization that can only be
righted by territorial grabs. Indeed, a Mazarr contends, the politics of
memory operates powerfullycausing [predator states] to react by forming
aggressive, predatory instincts. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe
for full access. Just $5 a month. Besides territorial aggression, predator states
exhibit several other distinguishing features. First, national policy
demonstrates very high levels of militarization. Predator states
divert large quantities of national resources into military expansion
for purposes of power projection. The emphasis in military planning and
weapons acquisitions is inherently offensive rather than defensive and is
geared to intimidating potential adversaries and winning offensive wars. The
flipside domestically is, as Mazarr writes, that military, nationalistic, and
territorial issues continue to play a large role in domestic politics and in the
states approach to the world. In Chinas case, nationalism has overtaken
Marxism and more recently developmentalism as state ideology. Second,
predator states adopt a strongly strategic perspective on national
advancement and display an associated willingness to use all the
institutions and instruments of the state over which they maintain
control economic, cultural, military, technological, resource, trade,
legal, media in the pursuit of this overwhelming important
strategic objective. China, for example, deployed a broad range of
retaliatory instruments against Japan over the Senkaku Islands affair in 2010,
including restricting the export of rare earth metals. The use of such

strategic instruments extends beyond such punitive acts of state retaliation

to a whole range of long-term, so-called market-based investments. These
include foreign acquisitions in strategically important and sensitive areas
such as land, resource and water assets and critical infrastructure as well as
in private-sector developments and industries. The strategic element
cannot be discounted in these acquisitions because the line between private
enterprise and state-owned enterprises in the Chinese case is imprecise
given the complex interweaving of business and state actors. In the end,
everything becomes strategic in the sense of supporting national
advancement and security. Third, predator states are not democracies
where there exist checks and balances and other moderating influences that
negate the potential for predation against other states. Predator states have
authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political
leaders are only answerable to other power cliques and display a
willingness to engage in political repression, including imprisonment
and even murder of their opponents. In such states, there is no real
separation of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of
law. Levels of domestic lawlessness are matched by international
lawlessness. Predator states do not respond to appeals to
international laws or norms because they are inherently lawless
themselves they understand and respect only power in
international affairs. Chinas actions in the South China Sea clearly
demonstrate that it does not support a rules-based regional or
global order; nor does it believe that you can fight power with rules
as other states are attempting to do in dealing with this issue.
Finally, predator states show a predisposition to act unilaterally
rather than multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation is entertained only
where it fits with the long-term strategic interests of the state. Moreover,
there is little willingness to trade off state interests for larger collective
interests in the international community. In that sense, predator states are
not interested in providing international public goods and should not be
considered as potentially benign hegemons. How should other states deal
effectively with predator states? First of all, they need to recognize what they
are dealing with and react accordingly. Predator states demand tough
responses starting with vigilance, deterrence and containment. At
the very least there must be reinforcement of surveillance regimes,
the formation of counterbalancing coalitions, and a willingness to
act across a whole range of spheres military, economic, financial,
trade and diplomatic so that predator states actions are not costfree. Other states must also accept that doing nothing is not an option.
This only invites further provocation, which increases the risk of
serious conflict.

China doesnt perceive US engagement as credible or

effective
Christopher Ford, a Senior fellow for the Hudson Institute now on the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee 9-27-2012, "Challenges of Regional Peace and Stability in East Asia,"
Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/9308-challenges-of-regional-peace-andstability-in-east-asia

balance was destabilized by the U.S. financial crisis and

our present indebtedness and ineffective political leadership. In Chinese
eyes, I think we no longer appear an attractive teacher or model of modernity,
which reduces the benefits of friendly engagement side of the equation.
Our continuing politico-economic woes have also encouraged Beijing to think
we are on a steep downhill slope in what Chinese strategists call comprehensive national
To my eye, however, this

power, thus also reducing the costs of confrontation element.

Mistrust inevitable dual threat perceptions necessitate a

harder stance
Christopher Ford, a Senior fellow for the Hudson Institute now on the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee 9-27-2012, "Challenges of Regional Peace and Stability in East Asia,"
Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/9308-challenges-of-regional-peace-andstability-in-east-asia [KKC]

No matter how hard we try and no matter how much outreach we do, we
probably lack the power to make Chinese leaders like us and trust us, not least
because the CCPs modern legitimacy narrative essentially requires us to be
depicted and treated as an international foil and threat-figure. If we work together
with our friends and use our available resources prudently, however, we can probably persuade Beijing
that there is still reason to remain strategically cautious.

Aff Answers

China Rise: No Challenge

Engagement best China cant challenge the US in the
status quo; they are no military threat
Feng 12 (Zhu Feng, 6/25/12, US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and Its Impact on
Regional Security, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-chinanext-generation-dialogue/us-pivot-and-its-impact-on-regional-security, date
accessed: 7/16/16, BC)
Regional security in East Asia is in transition. The United States has recently launched the first wave of its
Obama offensive. From Honolulu to Bali, and from Australia to the Philippines, the United States
reasserted its high-profile leadership role of the Asia-Pacific region while vowing to tie China down to the
rule of law as a responsible stakeholder. To this end, President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton have coordinated their offensive. They announced the establishment of a new military base at
Darwin Port in northern Australia, ushered in the Manila Declaration promising a security guarantee and
economic partnership with the Philippines and pushed for a new framework based on multilateral
resolution to the South China Sea issue at the East Asia Summit in Bali in an effort to address US concerns
over the freedom of navigation. This offensive is obviously grounded in a strategy of persuading and even

Despite repeated denials by US

government officials of any intention to contain China, the Obama offensive
has touched off a media frenzy of strategic encirclement of China. It now
appears that the US-China relationship might be headed towards the brink of
a new Cold War. Chinese Assessment of the US Strategic Turnaround What are the key drivers behind
compelling China through strong US engagement in the region.

the Obama offensive? Is it propelled by US domestic politics in the run-up to the 2012 election or by the
apprehension of the Obama foreign policy team over Chinas rise and Americas decline? Does the
offensive herald a fundamental change of US policy towards China or simply indicate the Obama
administrations frustration with Chinas rising nationalist sentiment, lack of substantial cooperation over
North Korea, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Chinas desire to throw its weight in East Asia? These questions
are unanswerable for now. The Obama offensive is the alignment of reality and rhetoric. The reality is that
the United States wants to build a strategic and economic coalition of allies and partners to resist the
expansion of Chinese influence in the region. The rhetoric is that the United States intends to redraw its
Asia-Pacific strategic periphery and manage the context of Chinas rise. However, faced with the regional
turmoil in the Middle East and a lingering domestic economic crisis, the White House seems devoid of
enough power to actually contain Chinaa booming economy second only to America and the most
successful business partner in the world. Secretary Clintons bold pronouncement that the twenty-first
century will be Americas Asia-Pacific century is destined to be an empty promise without substantive
engagement between the United States and China. There is little reason for the US and Japan to overstate
the China threat. Since Chinas military modernization has not quantifiably altered the power disparity
between Washington and Beijing,

China is still in no position to actually challenge the

US presence in the region for the foreseeable future. Despite the apparent concerns of
the US leadership, American preponderance in the Asia-Pacific is actually at an all-time high since the end
of the Cold War, especially in the light of the enhanced US alliance system, expanding defense
partnerships and growing popularity in the region. Chinas rise has caused East Asian countries to feel
increasingly uneasy about the regional security order. Since East Asian nations have grown accustomed to
American hegemony, they are wary of Chinas growing influence. Many East Asian countries believe that
the United States comprehensive involvement will benefit the region. While the two giants have a certain
level of geopolitical competition, this competition may actually benefit the region as long as both countries
avoid a military buildup. Many East Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even
ASEAN nations, advocate greater US commitment in the region to hedge against China. In response, the
Obama administration has deftly seized this uneasiness in East Asia over Chinas future impact to bring all
the countries of the region closer to the United States. Thus, the United States continues to utilize all the
instruments of its power to strengthen its regional preeminence as Chinas abrasive diplomacy broadens
the US strategic space in the region. In recent years, Chinas diplomacy toward the East Asian region has
lacked vision and creativity in contrast with Secretary Clintons successful use of the US smart power
portfolio of foreign policy tools. China has encountered difficulties in its efforts to strengthen and
perpetuate its influence in the region. Despite Beijings insistence on its policies of a peaceful rise and
harmonious relations with its neighbors through material benefit and benevolence, the populism of the
Chinese media and nationalism of the Chinese public, as well as a sense of infallibility in Beijings foreign

policy bureaucracy, have damaged the international image of Chinas peaceful rise and deepened the
United States suspicions and regional countries discontent. Chinas diplomatic blunders have generated
leeway for the White House to reap a China bonus in the region. How Should China Respond? The most
important question is how China will ultimately respond to this new wave of the US strategic offensive, and
how far the United States is prepared to advance its new type of leadership on geostrategic issues in

it is
unlikely that China will now dare to start a standoff with the United States . In
resisting Chinas challenge. Chinese foreign policy is traditionally pragmatic and risk-averse, and thus

light of this, the trend of Sino-US relations seems worrisome. Despite Secretary Clintons proclamation that
the twenty-first century will be Americas Pacific century, the reality is that the United States never left
Asia. The United States is a long-term stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific, but the Obama offensive portends a
worrying trajectory for the Sino-American strategic relationship. Diplomatically, the Obama administration
has continually sought to keep China cornered and subdued with regard to the South China Sea issue by
allying with Vietnam and excluding China from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. From a military perspective,
the United States has sought to increase its combative preparedness for Air-Sea Battle, a response to
Chinas A2/AD strategy, by selling advanced F-16 C/D jet fighters to Indonesia and establishing a new
military base at Darwin Port in Australia. The Sino-American relationship of today includes a new aspect
never before seen since normalization in 1979power competition over geopolitical influence in East Asia.
This power competition is highlighted by Secretary Clintons historic visit to Myanmar at the beginning of
December. Beijing is fearful that its commercial ties with Yangon will be at stake in the face of the US
offensive and that the United States strong push for Burmese political liberalization might ignite a new
Color Revolution on Chinas periphery. Undoubtedly, the most damaging aspect of the Obama offensive is
not the fundamental change to Beijing-Washington relations but the deepening of the perceived security
dilemma. What matters more are not the frayed ties but the growing strategic distrust between the two
capitals. Therefore, there is an increasing likelihood for escalating geostrategic tension between the two
countries. Beijing has been highly vigilant of the negative consequences of the Obama offensive for
Chinas role in East Asia. On December 6, Chinese President Hu Jintao unambiguously asserted that China
should accelerate the transformation of its naval force structure and promote combative readiness. His
remarks are likely not only an attempt to placate his Chinese domestic audience but also the start of a
counter-offensive against the United States. In order to mitigate security concerns for both countries,
Washington should clearly explain to what extent the United States will respect Chinas legal interests
while not at the cost of American primacy, and Beijing should work to increase strategic trust between
China and its neighbors as well as the United States. In addition, how can the United States better
influence China, and how can China change itself from within? These questions remain far from answered.

Avoiding a new Cold War is a common goal for the United States and China,
as well as the rest of the world. To a large extent, this depends on whether the United States
adopts a balanced China policynamely, a policy of hedging against the power aspirations of China, while
also actively influencing and positively encouraging China to innovate itself. Of course, this also depends
on whether China itself can clearly and accurately reset its foreign and security policy toward the United
States and the region. Chinas Global Times newspaper fiercely criticized the direction of US strategy,
saying the United States return to the Asia Pacific is the foundation for an anti-China alliance.
Regardless of how academics or government officials bitterly debate the future direction of the SinoAmerican relationship, neither country will take substantial steps towards a strategic confrontation in the
Asia-Pacific region. China cannot confront the United States head-on over this wave of its strategic
offensive, and the prospect of a new Cold War is quite unlikely to come to fruition. Currently, Beijing
remains stuck in this round of Sino-American power-wrestling and seems puzzled by the worsening
strategic environment along its periphery. Yet, Chinese officials will not independently seek answers to
some crucial questions. Chinas rise has brought the East Asian region economic development and
prosperity, and China has become nearly every East Asian countrys largest trading partner. China is
sincere in its desire for a peaceful rise and in its desire to enhance its image as a major power through a
win-win strategy. However, why is a rising China still unable to command the level of respect it deserves?
Why is China, whose economic contribution to the region far surpasses that of the United States, losing its
strategic clout? At the same time, the Chinese people must ask themselves why China declared a litany of
core interests but instead again and again was thwarted in its pursuit of these interests? Why has the last
10 years of Chinas foreign policy been unable to safeguard Chinas interests? Chinese foreign policy has
truly reached a moment for introspection and is in need of a complete overhaul. From 1990 to the 2008
global financial crisis, China was far weaker and held only a few cards in its hand. However, through
Beijings charm offensive and smile diplomacy, Chinas international prestige and status have been on
a steady rise, and Chinas relations with states in the region have substantially improved. Now that China
has a good hand, stacked with useful cards, it seems that Beijing does not know whether to stand pat or to
play its cards. For this confusion, the Chinese should stop blaming the United States, Japan, Vietnam and
the Philippines, and instead reflect on their own diplomatic blunders. As Beijing faces a crucial period in its
transition to the fifth generation of political leadership, Chinese foreign policy will have difficulty
substantially altering its current course. This means that China will likely not stand up to the US offensive

and ratchet up Sino-American geopolitical competition in the region. Beijings current low-key response
demonstrates that China does not desire a standoff with the United States and instead seeks to deflect the
impact of the Obama offensive. The twelfth round of defense consultations between the United States and
China, held in Beijing on December 7, is the best example of Beijings pragmatic stance. On November 16,
Cui Tiankai, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, said that China wants to prevent US-China relations from being
hijacked by domestic politics or electoral demands, reflecting Beijings search for a way out of the
shadows of an escalating US-China confrontation. However, Beijings official response still oscillates
between finding excuses to gloss over Chinas loss in this round of US-China competition and indulging the

The most important

task for Beijing is to avoid showcasing its uncompromising determination in
its confrontation with the United States. Instead, Beijing should reconsider the
reasons China is losing the battle over the hearts and minds of the region
to the United States. What will be able to force China to sober up from its speed daze, largely
emotional medias din in the face of the United States diplomatic punches.

induced by its fast-paced economic growth and international influence? Although the strong-weak
dichotomy is even more pronounced, it is still not enough. If this wave of the United States Obama
offensive can actually serve as an excuse for the Chinese foreign policy bureaucracy to avoid engaging in
introspection of its numerous problems and seeking to increase its real appeal, then this certainly is a lucky
thing for China. Otherwise, we will soon see a fierce battle of wills between Beijing and Washington.

U: Economic Engagement Now

Obamas economy is already elevating China and pushing
economic conflict their link is not unique
Kadlec 2011. (Charles, 11-14-2011, "Obama's Policies Make China
Stronger And The U.S. Weaker," Forbes, Date accessed 7-13-16.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/charleskadlec/2011/11/14/obamas-policies-makechina-stronger-and-the-u-s-weaker/#123f31c42843 /DDI-AC)
President Barack Obama continued his efforts to make China stronger
and America weaker during last weekends Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hawaii. How? By pressuring Chinese President
Hu Jintao to increase the value of the yuan relative to the dollar. If
successful, this policy will make Americans poorer relative to the
Chinese. The theory behind the Obama Administrations weak dollar policy is
seductive, but wrong. A rise in the value of the yuan relative to the dollar is
supposed to make Chinese imports more expensive, and U.S. exports to
China less expensive, thereby reducing Chinese imports and increasing U.S.
exports. The problem is this theory has failed miserably ever since President
Nixon broke the dollars link to gold and devalued the dollar in 1971. Since
then, the dollar has fallen by more than 70% against the euro/German mark
and the Japanese yen. And the net trade account has gone from near balance
in 1971 to massive deficits today. The results with China are the same. Since
2004, the dollar has fallen by nearly 25% against the yuan. By last
year, U.S. exports to China had increased $57 billion, but imports
had gone up by $168 billion, leading to a $111 billion increase in the
bilateral trade deficit. The danger of a weak dollar policy is in the
total incoherence between its objective to make Americans more
prosperous and its prescription to make Americans poorer by
increasing the price of our imports while reducing the value of what
we sell in exchange. When a weak dollar makes imports more
expensive, our standard of living goes down as we pay more for
goods we buy at the mall. Those who are demanding China allow the dollar to
fall 25% against the yuan are, in effect, advocating a 25% increase in the
price of clothes, toys, shoes and the myriad other goods we import from
China. To the extent we have to spend more on imported goods, we have
less money to spend on domestically produced goods and services.
You cant make America richer by making our paychecks and savings
worth less. Second, a stronger Chinese currency makes the Chinese
richer. Now, their money buys 25% more on world markets. The value
of their savings has also appreciated 25%. In addition, a strong yuan
increases Chinas international competitiveness and economic
power. The increase in the value of the yuan since 2004 means that the
price of oil, iron ore, copper, agricultural products and all other
commodities have gone down by 25% for China-based manufacturing
relative to U.S. based manufacturing. That allows Chinese exporters
to keep their prices down relative to their U.S. competitors, not only

in the U.S. market, but throughout the world. This combination of rising
prices in the U.S. and slower price increases in strong currency
countries over time offsets any short-term benefit that may be
gained by devaluing the dollar. Thats why Lexus and BMWs do not cost
three times more than American produced luxury cars even though the value
of the German and Japanese currencies has more than tripled against the
dollar over the past 40 years. But the harm inflicted by a falling dollar on
the U.S. economy remains. A weak dollar chases capital out of the
U.S. as investors seek to protect themselves against losses
associated with a falling currency. Such outflows hurt capital
intensive U.S. companies and destroy U.S. manufacturing jobs
relative to the less capital intensive service sector. For example, from
2000 to 2007 under the weak dollar policy of President George W. Bush, the
10% increase in industrial production was a full 8 percentage points less than
the expansion of real GDP.

Link Answers: Climate Coop

US China engagement over renewables is massive interest
conversion even where US/China policy is failing, climate
cooperation solves
Winglee 15 (Michelle Winglee, a former Research Assistant at a DC think
tank where she worked on U.S.-China economic relations. Her current
research focus is on the intersection of sustainable and economic
development, 8/14/16, The Diplomat, A Bright Spot in US-China Relations:
Renewable Energy, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/a-bright-spot-in-uschina-relations-renewable-energy/)
Trade disputes also stir up a win/lose perception that cheap Chinese
manufacturing undermines American jobs. But in fact, Malaysia (not
American industry), has been the real beneficiary of the U.S. tariffs on
Chinese solar industry products. With its assembly line wages roughly on par
with Chinas coastal areas about ten times less than average U.S. monthly
wages Malaysias solar industry has been growing rapidly. According to a
New York Times report, the Malaysian solar industry receives a 10-year
exemption from corporate taxes specially allotted to large domestic and
foreign investors, and is almost entirely owned by American, European, South
Korean and Japanese companies. Though solar manufacturing in Malaysia has
yet to illicit domestic outcry in the United States, already Malaysia is the third
largest producer of solar equipment behind China and the EU. Rather than
letting clean energy fall victim to another trade dispute, the U.S. and China
should recognize the opportunity in cooperation on bilateral investment that
could bypass trade frictions and help both sides capture the positive
externalities of green technology. The United States and China are currently
in the midst of negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which has the
potential to create new incentives to invest in each others clean energy
sector. With China not in the U.S.-led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade
agreement and the United States not involved in Asias Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade initiative, the U.S.-China
Bilateral Investment Treaty offers a singular opportunity for the two countries
to engage, and not to favor the red or blue, but the green. According to
Melanie Hart of the Center for American Progress, moving toward a clean
energy economy in the United States will require more than $1 trillion of
investment in the electricity grid, new fuels, mass transit, power generation,
and manufacturing. The United States is a relatively secure investment
destination, home of leading solar technology, and has a strong domestic
market for clean energy. With Obamas new regulatory planunder the EPA,
establishing first-ever national standards to limit carbon pollution from power
plants, demand for clean energy is expected to increase. Meanwhile, China,
with about $3.8 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, is increasingly
employing its money towards outward investment and has strong incentives
to invest in clean energy. In China, coal accounts for about 60 percent of

Chinas CO2 emissions, which are causing massive health problems because
of the smog they generate as well as social discontent. In June, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang submitted a carbon-curbing plan to the UN, pledging to
cut Chinas greenhouse gas emissions per unit of gross domestic product by
60-65 percent from 2005 levels. However, even with the right incentives,
supply does not always meet demand. Good policies are necessary to
capitalize on opportunities. As Hart points out, foreign companies operating in
the United States are disadvantaged. U.S. tax credits for residents and
corporations that generate energy through renewable sources primarily help
large and well-established companies that can pay the high upfront costs for
renewable projects. Foreign and smaller companies with less operational
capacity need investment incentives that can help reduce considerably high
upfront costs and risk from the start. Another clean energy incentive, loan
guarantees issued by the U.S. Department of Energy, would be especially
hard for a Chinese company to obtain given the political controversies of U.S.
government benefits to a Chinese company. Meanwhile, companies like
Apple, Google, and even Goldman Sachs have been trailblazing investment in
solar energy. In February, Apple Chief Executive, Tim Cooke announced an
$850 million agreement to buy enough solar energy from lead developer,
First Solar, to power all of its California operations. Though Cook certainly
deserves credit for proactively decreasing the companys carbon footprint,
U.S. tax policies and creative financing techniques have also made this
commercially profitable. In a Wall Street Journal interview with Lisa Jackson,
the woman overseeing Apples environmental policy, she commented, The
difference in what were going to pay for the power through this deal and
what we would pay commercially is hundreds of millions of dollars. On the
other side of the Pacific, China is creating financial incentives for clean
energy too, though by providing free or low-cost loans and artificially cheap
input components, land, and energy designated to promote the renewables
sector. In April, Apple made forays into the China arena, agreeing to back two
larger solar farms in China. Both sides have recognized the need to adjust
domestic policy and provide government support, but can the two countries
work together? Few companies have been able to help capture clean energys
positive externality, and the U.S. and China have yet to figure out how to
make collaboration happen at the international policy level. Financial support
for clean energy does not measure up to the tax breaks and other policies
propping up fossil fuels. An IMF study estimated that the cost of global fossil
fuel subsidies in 2015 would amount to $5.3 trillion or $14.5 billion a day.
Chinas energy hungry domestic market could help validate new technologies
that burn coal more cleanly. The U.S. demand for residential solar has also
risen dramatically and stands to benefit from Chinese investments that could
help finance more clean energy jobs. As the two biggest carbon emitters
globally, the United States and China have the most to gain from allowing
clean energy to access international markets of scale. The United States has
the opportunity to set a new tone before Xis state visit to the White House
this September and seize upon this opportunity where interests align. The
visit could perpetuate economic tensions and frictions that have lasted since

Chinas ascension to the WTO in 2001, or establish a more cooperative

relationship towards a sustainable future that better aligns economic
incentives with environmental ones under a green BIT.

Green Energy Cooperation is not appeasement its

engagement (not shifting US Policy)
Winglee 15 (Michelle Winglee, The Diplomat, 8-14-2015, "A Bright Spot in
US-China Relations: Renewable Energy," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/a-bright-spot-in-us-china-relationsrenewable-energy/)
Chinese President Xi Jinpings upcoming visit to Washington in September
comes on the heels of cyber accusations, tensions in the South China Sea,
and grumbling about Chinas currency devaluation all just as a new U.S.
election cycle starts to kick in, a time notorious for being tough on China. The
Obama administration faces a narrowing window for engagement with the
Chinese, who have viewed the United States pivot to Asia as a
containment rather than an engagement strategy. Still, there has
always been one topic that both sides have been able to agree upon.
From President Barack Obamas first visit to Beijing in November 2009, which
heralded a new U.S.-China renewable energy partnership, to his most
recent visit five years later, featuring an historic agreement to reduce
carbon emission growth, both sides agree about the need to reduce
greenhouse gases. However, even a common goal as well intentioned as
saving the planet can be derailed without an understanding of the underlying
frictions that have prevented bilateral cooperation between the worlds two
largest carbon emitters.

Link Answers: Taiwan

Willingness to show restraint on Taiwan policy only
chance to break security dilemma
Friedberg 15 (Louis Friedberg served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of
the Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for nationalsecurity affairs and director of policy planning and graduated Harvard in IR
and Politics, 5/19/15, The Debate Over US China Strategy,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046227)
Reassurance A second strategy, outlined in a recent book by James Steinberg and Michael OHanlon
(Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.China Relations in the Twenty-First Century), is less optimistic in
its assumptions, and less ambitious in its goals. Steinberg and OHanlon acknowledge that

the US

China relationship contains elements that are inherently

competitive and dynamic, and they accept the necessity of some measure of continued
balancing. As they put it, each country will continue to feel compelled to find ways to demonstrate that it

Left unchecked, however,

these self-protective impulses could easily lead to an escalating spiral of
tension and a growing danger of war. In order to reduce the
likelihood of such a tragic outcome, the authors recommend a
specific and targeted form of engagement: each side must take
steps designed to demonstrate restraint (which they define as
forgoing actions that may be misinterpreted as threatening), while
at the same time increasing transparency regarding both
capabilities and intentions.11 Steinberg and OHanlon offer more than 20 concrete
has the necessary will and capacity to defend its vital interests.10

proposals. Some aim to slow what the authors see as an escalating arms race. (Thus, they suggest that
China should level off military spending once its budget approaches 50 percent of the U.S. level and limit
development and deployment of antiship ballistic missiles, while the United States should restrain
modernization and deployment of long-range strike systems, especially precision conventional strike, and
commit not to develop a national missile defense [system] capable of neutralizing the Chinese

Others are intended to head off potential crises or to

reduce the risk that they might escalate. (Thus, the United States
should commit not to support unilateral Taiwanese independence in
return for a Chinese promise to use exclusively peaceful means to
resolve that long-standing issue. Moreover, Washington and Beijing should create a
deterrent.12)

dedicated military-to-military hotline and provide advance notice of military exercises and deployments
in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.13)

No Spillover: Congagement Solves

Engagement balances containment nuanced
congagement solves inadequacies in both strategies
Eisenman 16, (Joshua Eisenman, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs,
1/21/16, Rethinking US Strategy Towards China,
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756)
How can the U.S. improve its policy towards China to avoid, and yet be
prepared for, conflict? Since the Nixon Administration, the U.S. strategy
towards China has been predicated on the assumption that if the bilateral
relationship is properly managed conflict can be avoided. Many contend that
through engagement the U.S. can shape China's choices in ways that
reduce the chances the U.S. and China will come into conflict.
Whether a conflict occurs, the argument goes, depends on whether China is
dissatisfied with the prevailing international order, because as James
Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon have written: "only if it believes that it is
disadvantaged will China necessarily choose to use its newfound power to
create a world more to its own liking in potentially disruptive ways.1 Jeffery
Bader, who served as a top White House official in the first Obama
administration, agrees that China could play a more constructive role than it
would by sitting outside of that system.2 So the prevailing wisdom holds and
the thinking behind engagement goes, if China participates extensively in the
international system, then it will help create a system it likes and not become
revisionist. According to Evan Medeiros, who stepped down in June 2015 after
six years as a top White House official on China, the U.S. and China "agreed
that we would develop our relationship defined by cooperation on regional
and global challenges while affectively managing our differences.3 Medeiros
explained in an interview with China's official CCTV how this policy sought to
avoid what IR theorists call the Thucydides Trap: Beginning when President
Obama met President Xi for the first time formally at Sunnylands... we agreed
that we did not believe conflict was inevitable between China and the United
States, a rising power and an established power, and we agreed that we
would work to make sure that rivalry didn't become inevitable. So that's the
basic framework for our relationship, and we think we've succeeded in
accomplishing that in recent years.4 To help make Beijing more cooperative,
Washington can shape its choices, according to Bader: Underlying our
approach was a clear understanding that our political, security, and economic
policies in Asia needed to be grounded in traditional state-to-state relations
and a commitment to shaping the choices of emerging powers like China
through our diplomacy and deployments.5 But how to shape China's choices?
To establish "a modicum of trust between U.S. and Chinese leaders so that
there could be political incentives for cooperation," Bader recalls that
Obama's Asia team built a China strategy based on "three pillars," which can
be considered the pillars of engagement:6 (1) a welcoming approach to
China's emergence, influence, and legitimate expanded role; (2) resolve to
see that its rise is consistent with international norms and law; (3) endeavor

to shape the Asia-Pacific environment to ensure China's rise is stabilizing

rather than disruptive.7 The goal, according to Steinberg and O'Hanlon, is to
shape "China's interpretation of U.S. strategy" and its "leaders' assessments
of U.S. intentions." They argue that: "Washington can craft its own policies in
ways that will call forth reciprocal, positive Chinese actions.8Chinese
assessments range from one extreme that the United States is determined
to maintain its hegemonic position and resist China's rise. At the other, they
accept the argument that the United States is prepared to 'share power.'"9
The chances to avoid hostilities can be improved if "U.S. policymakers can
reinforce the domestic political forces in China that are likely to support
constructive Chinese strategies." By empowering Chinese moderates U.S.
policymakers will reduce the possibility that more hawkish leaders will push
China toward aggression. Thus, by reiterating the U.S.' willingness to share
power with China Washington can reduce the chances of conflict with Beijing.
In practice, this engagement-based China strategy means that scores (if not
hundreds) of U.S. policymakers in numerous government agencies
correspond regularly with their Chinese counterparts across a wide breadth of
issues. In September 2014, President Xi Jinping said there were over 90
official mechanisms for U.S.-China exchange.10 Questioning Engagement
Now, however, a growing contingent in Washington and beyond is arguing
that extensive U.S. engagement has failed to prevent China from threatening
other countries. One longtime proponent of engagement with China, David M.
Lampton, gave a speech in May 2015 entitled "A Tipping Point in U.S.-China
Relations is Upon Us," in which he noted that, despite the remarkable "policy
continuity" of "constructive engagement" through eight U.S. and five Chinese
administrations, "today important components of the American policy elite
increasingly are coming to see China as a threat."11 Former Australian Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd summarized this view: Beijing's long-term policy is
aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese
sphere of influence spanning the region.12 Similarly, in June, former Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson said on PBSNewshour: "The longstanding consensus
that China's rise is good for the U.S. is beginning to break down.13 In
response to these misgivings about Beijing's intentions, there have been calls
for Washington to actively shape China's strategic choices by enhancing U.S.
military capabilities and strengthening alliances to counterbalance against its
growing strength. Recent publications reflect increasing apprehension; most
argue that policymakers must avoid an enduring "structural problem" in
international relations that causes rising powers to become aggressive. Some
experts, like Princeton's Aaron Friedberg, contend that the U.S. should
"maintain a margin of military advantage sufficient to deter attempts at
coercion or aggression.14Thomas Christensen, former U.S. deputy assistant
secretary of state for East Asia, noted in June, that there are two primary
questions for U.S. security vis--vis China: How to dissuade China from using
force in East Asia? How can we get China to actively contribute to stabilizing
global governance? These initiatives, Christensen noted, are based on the
assumption that "whenever a country becomes a rising power, tensions with
neighbors arise.15 Christensen agrees with Bader that the U.S.' "strategic

goal" vis--vis China is to "shape Beijing's choices so as to channel China's

nationalist ambitions into cooperation rather than coercion." 16 To elicit
Beijing's participation U.S. policymakers should persuade China that bullying
its neighbors will backfire, while proactive cooperation with those neighbors
and the world's other great powers will accelerate China's return to great
power status.17 The U.S. should build a robust deterrence architecture to
counter-balance China's rise and push Beijing towards meaningful
engagement, Christensen argues. The U.S. and its allies "need to maintain
sufficient power and resolve in East Asia to deter Beijing from choosing a path
of coercion or aggression.18 "Chinese anxiety about a U.S. containment effort
could carry some benefits for the United States: the potential for
encirclement may encourage Chinese strategists to become more
accommodating," resulting in more "moderate policies." Both engagement
supporters and deterrence supporters agree that the U.S. should change
China's strategic calculus in ways that increase the benefits of cooperation
and the costs of aggression; where they disagree is on how to achieve this.
Beyond 'Congagement'? The time has come, as John Podesta, former chief of
staff to President Clinton has said, to "move beyond the 'engage and hedge'
framework for China policyan approach openly premised on mistrust and
suspicionto a strategy that maximizes opportunity," while "managing
risk.19 The problem is that the U.S. China policy has been captured by the
dichotomous framework of realism, sliding back and forth between
engagement and containment; a policy many call congagement. Yet, given
the complexities of the U.S.-China relationship, international relations theory
is insufficient and produces flawed comparisons between China and previous
rising powers, e.g. Sparta, World War I Germany, or World War II Japan. To
improve U.S. policy towards China to avoid, and yet be prepared for, conflict
requires going beyond simplistic applications of international relations theory.
It means opening the 'black box' of China's policymaking process to
understand why it makes the decisions it does and how this process has and
is changing. Unfortunately, barriers continue to prevent the U.S. from better
understanding and responding to China. Most importantly, Friedberg
identified a "yawning ideological chasm" that inhibits the success of U.S.'
engagement, arguing that: "The very different domestic political regimes of
the two pacific powers" make the liberalization of the Chinese political system
essential for "a true trans-Pacific entente." CPC repression inhibits change in
China and presents "a significant additional impetus to rivalry.20 American
policymakers' beliefs about China are rooted in their own preconceived views
and experiences in China. Since Americans began visiting the PRC in the early
1970s, rosy assessments have become commonplace. As the Sinologist
Robert Scalapino observed after his 1973 visit: There is serious risk that one
may be badly misled by what one sees, hears, and instinctively feels [in
China]. This is partly due to the tendency within all of us to superimpose our
own values and cultural perspectives on another environment. Such tendency
surely exists, and for some, it represents an ever-present bias. Their writings
consequently reveal far more about their own views of their own social order
than about China. Each individual, in any case, carries his prejudices with him

in some measure, and he may well reinforce them as he goes.21 "Because

China is so vast," James Palmer recently observed in the Washington Post, "its
successes can be attributed to whatever your pet cause is.22 In short,
Americans see what we want to see in China, and what we want to see most,
argues Michael Pillsbury, is ourselves: "In our hubris, Americans love to
believe that the aspirations of every other country is to be just like the United
States. In recent years, this has governed our approach to Iraq and
Afghanistan. We cling to the same mentality with China."23 American
misunderstanding has been facilitated by Beijing's courting of influential
Americans. China has done a better job at using engagement to improve
American perceptions of China than America has done in changing Chinese
perceptions of U.S. intentions. The Communist Party of China (CPC) uses
bilateral engagement to assess U.S. capabilities, collect intelligence,
and manipulate their American counterparts. Extensive economic,
educational, scientific, cultural, and personal ties allow the CPC to
build a large, loose coalition of Americans to carry the message that
Beijing is Washington's indispensable partner.24 U.S. officials,
however, are generally ignorant of CPC objectives and tactics toward
them, collectively known as the United Front Doctrine. Americans
interact with only a "thin outer crust" of Chinese policymakers.25 Each
institution has an office that deals specifically with foreign visitors, and the
party maintains dozens of front groups that conduct hundreds of interactions
and conferences every year with Americans. The CPC's International
Department's front organization is the China Center for Contemporary World
Studies; the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and the China
Institute of International Relations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' front
groups; the Ministry of State Security's is the China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations, and so on. The CPC has also created
entities specifically to conduct "host diplomacy" with Americans, including
the Hong Kongbased ChinaUnited States Exchange Foundation, which
"promotes the positions of the Chinese government through the research
grants it gives to American institutions.26 These groups both observe
Americans and work to influence their views through dialogues and the
distribution of English-language propaganda with titles such as The Strength
of Democracy: How Will the CPC March Ahead.27 Information asymmetry is a
longstanding aspect of U.S.-China relations, but has become increasingly
problematic since President Xi Jinping took power in 2011. In July 2015, China
enacted new laws regulating all aspects of Chinese interaction with
foreigners, including a national security law that covers every domain of
public life in Chinapolitics, military, education, finance, religion, cyberspace,
ideology and religion. These initiatives are "aimed at exhorting all Chinese
citizens and agencies to be vigilant about threats to the party.28They help
explain why Washington's engagement strategy has been unable to change
party leaders' perceptions or successfully support moderates over hawks. The
consequence of Americans knowing so little about the CPC and its strategies
and tactics towards them is that many Americans continue to be badly misled
by what they hear and see in China. The extensive U.S.-China engagement

architecture has produced analytical limitations, or blind spots, within the

U.S. policy community that if remain unaddressed are likely to produce the
same types of intelligence failures that have occurred repeatedly in U.S.China relations since 1911. The only way to redress these systemic
deficiencies is to move beyond engagement and containment and adopt a
nuanced strategy that prioritizes high quality human intelligence about
Chinese leaders and policymaking and incorporates them effectively into U.S.
policymaking towards China.

Containment doesnt produce effective balancing a mix

of both strategies is best
Harding 15 (Harry Harding, 10/30/15, The Washington Quarterly, Has US
China Policy Failed?,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall
2015_Harding.pdf, date accessed: 7/16/16, BC)
Swaine believes that this proposal will be mutually acceptable because, like
Glaser, in the end he is confident that both China and the United States will
act rationally with regard to both ends and means. Each will realize the costs,
risks, and ultimate futility of seeking to maintain or achieve dominance in the
AsiaPacific region, and will thus be willing to strike the grand bargains both
he and Glaser envision. This optimistic assumption downplays the importance
of non-rational factors in international politics: the power of competing
national historical narratives, the pressures from skeptical domestic publics,
the controversies that surround the calculation of a shifting balance of power,
and the uncertainties inherent in interpreting the actions of another and in
redefining interests as new problems arise. The assessment of relative gains
and losses will be extremely difficult and therefore will prove highly
controversial both within and between the two countries. Deals that strike
some as entirely reasonable, others will regard as premature appeasement,
as The East-West Centers Denny Roy has put it.53 Toughen Up Under the
final set of proposals, whose proponents include strategists like Aaron
Friedberg, University of Chicagos John Mearsheimer, and Blackwill and Tellis,
the United States would give up any illusions that China will become a
friendly and cooperative partner, whether those illusions stem from nave
liberal assumptions by Americans or misleading reassurances by Chinese.
Instead, the United Has U.S. China Policy Failed? THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY FALL 2015 113 States should strengthen its military and
diplomatic position in Asia and then, together with its friends and allies,
increase the pressure on Beijing to moderate its ambitions and take more
responsible positions on global and regional issues. Few, except perhaps for
Mearsheimer, say that they are proposing to return to a policy of containing
China. 54 Instead, they insist they are continuing most of the aspects of
current policy, but placing a greater emphasis on balancing China in the Asia
Pacific region in a responsible but determined manner. Some go further,
however: Blackwill and Tellis propose that the U.S. rebalancing should
extend into the Indo-Pacific as well, and also advocate that the United

States should develop offensive as well as defensive military capabilities to

deal with the threats posed by China.55 Some of those who advocate a
tougher posture toward China suggest additional modifications of present
U.S. policy as part of toughening up. As already noted, both Blackwill and
Tellis as well as Pillsbury argue for a careful cataloguing, and then a reduction
or termination, of the various government programs that provide technical
assistance to China, although not, presumably, those offered by U.S. NGOs.
They also advocate strict controls over technology transfer to that country,
and Blackwill and Tellis would even consider across-the-board tariff increases
on U.S. imports from China, all aimed at restricting Chinas growth. They also
favor the indefinite exclusion of China from the TransPacific Partnership and
would presumably oppose Beijings creation of new international institutions
that might further facilitate or legitimate Chinas rise. The obvious questions
about a policy of balancing China are whether the United States can afford its
financial costs and geopolitical risks, as well as the extent to which U.S. allies
would follow such an initiative. Both of these issues would presumably
become greater if Chinas military and economic power relative to the United
States continues to grow, and if the importance of commercial relations with
China to U.S. allies continues to increase. Here, the classic dilemma inherent
in alliances may become ever more salient: no country wants to face
abandonment by its ally in light of a major security threat, but neither does it
want to become drawn into an allys conflict with a country that it does not
regard as threatening. Many Asian countries take what might be called the
Goldilocks view of U.S.China relations, in that they want a relationship that
is not too hot, not too cold, but just right. Pushing rebalancing too soon and
too far would likely be seen as turning the relationship too cold, just as
excessive accommodation would be seen as turning it too hot. How can
Washington The final set of proposals places a greater emphasis on balancing
China in the Asia-Pacific. H. Harding 114 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
FALL 2015 prevent Beijing from securing the defection of U.S. allies from its
balancing strategy, if they face increasing costs and risks from following the
U.S. lead?

Mixing engagement and containment best sole focus

ensures miscalculation. Internal political divisions in
China will prevent a true challenge otherwise.
Kurth, James. (James Kurth is a Senior Fellow in FPRIs Center for the Study
of America and the West and a member of the Orbis Board of Editors. He is
Professor of Political Science Emeritus and Senior Research Scholar at
Swarthmore College. He is the author of over 120 professional articles and
editor of three professional volumes, in the fields of U.S. foreign and defense
policy, international politics, and the comparative politics of America and
Europe. His recent publications have focused upon the interrelations
between the global economy, cultural conflicts, and U.S. foreign and defense
politics. Professor Kurth received his A.B. in history from Stanford University
and his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, where he

also taught as an assistant and associate professor of government. He has

been a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, NJ),
visiting professor of political science at the University of California at San
Diego, and visiting professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, where
he received the Department of the Navy medal for Meritorious Civilian
Service. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute
(Philadelphia), where he has served as the Chair of its Study Group of
America and the West and as Editor of its journal, Orbis: A Journal of World
Affairs. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York),
and of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London).) Confronting
a Powerful China with Western Characteristics - Foreign Policy Research
Institute. (2016). Retrieved from
http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-withwestern-characteristics/ July 13 // DDI - CS
The rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power has produced the most fundamental change in the global system
since the end of the Cold War, and it poses vital questions about China's future direction. Many Western analysts argue
that China's great power will cause it to become more like the West, i.e., like Western great powers. Other Western
analysts believe that China will continue to be the same, i.e., like the China of the past few decades. An alternative
interpretation, however, is that China's new power will enable it to become even more Chinese than it is now, i.e., to
become more like the traditional and imperial China that existed before the Western intrusions of the 19th century. This
China was the Central State of a distinctive Chinese world order, operating with distinctive conceptions about diplomatic
relations, military strategy, and economic exchange. However, the new China will be unlike the old China in at least two
important ways. It will be a naval, and not just a land, power, and it will be a financial, and not just a trading, power. In

As a formidable naval and

financial power, China will present fundamental challenges to the
United States and to both the long-standing U.S. security order in
the Western Pacific and the long-standing Washington Consensus about the global
economic order. There was once a great power, one so great that its power not only reached all around the
other words, it will be a powerful China with Western characteristics.

world, but it was recognized as the world's leading power. Its economic practices, political system, and conceptions of
international law provided the models and set the standards for numerous other powers. And at the core of its power, and
backing up its models, was a special form of military powerthe greatest navy in the worldand a special form of
economic power, the greatest financial system in the world. That great power was Great Britain, that navy was the Royal
Navy, that financial system was centered in the City of London, and that era was just a century ago. However, the
greatness of British power had been established almost a century before that, after Britain's victory in the Napoleonic
Wars. That victory had largely been won with the advantages provided by the Royal Navy and the Bank of England. The
Old Great Power and the New I: Britain, Germany, and America But at the beginning of the 20th century, the old
established great power was challenged and confronted by two rising ones. One of these was Germany, and the other was
the United States.1 Britain responded to the challenges posed by these two quite different rising powers in two very
different ways. Toward Germany, Britain essentially pursued a policy of containment. As the Germans rapidly built a large
and advanced navy and deployed it in their two adjacent seas, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, the British responded by
building up their own navy, so that it was even larger and more advanced than it had been before. The tensions and
alarms produced by this naval arms race spilt over into other arenas where there were disputes diplomatic (e.g.,
alliances), colonial (e.g., the Boer War), and economic (e.g., trade competition). Britain's actions in all of these arenas
were shaped by its containment policy toward Germany, and Germany's actions in all of these arenas were shaped by its
determination to break out of this containment. In the end (1914), Germany did break out, Britain did try once more to
contain it, but this time with military force, which resulted in the greatest war in Western history (called at the time the
Great War). In contrast, toward the United States, Britain essentially pursued a policy of appeasement. As the Americans
rapidly built up a large and advanced navy and deployed it in two of their adjacent seas, the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean Sea, a number of incidents and disputes occurred between Britain and the United States with respect to this
region, culminating in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895. In this case, however, Britain backed down, and, over the course of
the next decade, it steadily withdrew its military forces and ceded its leading role in the region to the United States. The
mentality of accommodation provided by this military appeasement spilt over into other arenas where there had been
disputesdiplomatic (e.g., new treaties), colonial (e.g., the new Panama Canal project), and economic (e.g., a new
preponderant role for American trade and finance in the region). In the end (1917), the United States had come to such a
mutuality of interests with Britain that it came to its aid not only in the Great War or First World War, but also in the
Second World War. The Old Power and the New II: America and China Of course, in our own time, there is once again a
long-established and world-leading great power, indeed superpower. Its economic practices, political system, and
conceptions of international order have provided the models for numerous other powers. And at the core of this power,
and backing up its models, has been a special form of military power: the greatest navy in the world and a special form of
economic power: the greatest financial system in the world. That power has been the United States, that navy has been
the U.S. Navy, that financial system has been centered in Wall Street, and that time has been the past 70 years, or ever

since America's victory in the Second World War. But now, in the second decade of the 21st century, the old established
great power is challenged and confronted by a rising one, China.2 The big question for U.S. foreign-policy and nationalsecurity officials is how should the United States respond to this challenge. And to this question, foreign-policy and

these two
answers for the U.S. policy response toward the rising power of
China today correspond to the two different policy responses of Britain toward the two rising great powers of a
century ago. In essence (although, of course, not in name), these responses are a policy of
containment versus a policy of appeasement. The Two Views from the West and the
national-security analysts and advisors have given two very different answers. As it happens,

View from China From a different, more academic angle, these two answers or policies also correspond to two different
theories or schools of international relations, the Realist School, which thinks in terms of military power and of
containment policies, and the Liberal Internationalist (now really liberal globalist) School, which thinks in terms of
economic interdependence and accommodation policies. The Realists and containment advocates often point to pre-1914
Germany as a prototype for contemporary China. Conversely, the Liberal Internationalists and accommodation advocates
often point to 20th-century Anglo-American cooperation as a prototype for contemporary Sino-American relations.
Whatever their differences, however, the two theories and the two policies agree on one big thing, and that is that as
China becomes even more powerfulboth in economic strength and in military strength, it will become more Western, i.e.,
it will become more like some Western power of the past. For whatever their differences, both Germany and the United
States were both Western powers, as was, of course, Great Britain itself, which, as we have seen, had provided the very
models of what a Western power should be (including both the naval model and the financial one). In particular, the
Realists and containment advocates see China becoming a naval power (and serious threat), like other Western nations
(and Japan) once did, but unlike China in the past, which had always focused upon land forces and ignored naval ones.3
On their part, the Liberal Internationalists and accommodation advocates see China becoming a financial center (and
responsible stakeholder), like other Western nations (and Japan) have been, but unlike China in the past, which had
always focused upon trade relations and ignored financial ones. But of course, there is a third academic school which only
deals with China, consisting of the professional China specialists or experts, be their formal academic Ph.D. degree in
history, political science, or economics. These China experts often insist that, whatever the level of economic and military
development that China achieves, it will essentially remain Chinese. Western intrusions and influences have come and
gone, but Chinese identity and behavior has endured. When some China experts turn their attention to military forces,
they often emphasize China's tradition as a land power, and indeed as a defensive one (the Great Wall mentality).4
When other China experts turn their attention to economic relations, they often emphasize China's tradition as a trading
economy, indeed one engaged in cooperative exchange. There is, however, a possible variation on this view of what
China's already-great economic power and its consequent rising military power might mean for its conception of itself. It is
that China's new power will enable it to become even more like its old self. In particular, earlier historical and traditional
Chinese conceptions of her place in the world, and of the strategies and tactics which can maintain or advance this place,
will return and will provide the guidelines for China's objectives, strategies, and tactics in the future. The interpretation in
this article will largely conform to views held by China experts, that as China continues to gain in economic and military
power, it will remain Chinese. Indeed China will be able to become even more Chinese than it was able to be anytime
during the past 170 years, or since the First Opium War. But as China becomes more Chinese in some ways, it will also be
a China with Western characteristics in other ways. And with regard to these latter ways, the two schools that see China
becoming Western will also have something to add. The Discrediting of the Western Model and the Crediting of the
Chinese Model There are good reasons that have become especially strong in the past two or three years, to believe that
something like this development is now underway. The global economic crisis, which began in the United States in 2008
and which quickly spread to the rest of the West, has thoroughly discredited the Washington Consensus American
economic model. The ensuing partisan polarization and policy paralysis in the United States has similarly discredited the
American political model of liberal democracy. And the recent U.S. budget crisis and reduced military spending portend a
period of military austerity and diminished U.S. military strength. At the same time, however, China's response to the
economic crisis (a kind of Keynesian policy of vast spending on infrastructure and capital projects) has made it the most
robust large economy in the world. Since the world depends upon it even more than before, the attractiveness of the
Chinese alternative economic model, the Beijing Consensus, has been enhanced.5 Moreover, China's continuing political
stability (including the impending transition in 2012 from the fourth generation of political leadership to the fifth
generation) and policy effectiveness has also increased the attractiveness to developing countries of the Chinese political
model of an authoritarian regime ruling a market economy, a sort of market-Leninism as the successor to MarxistLeninism. Further, China's continuing increase in military spending and procurement of advanced weapons systems is
producing impressive Chinese military strength that must now be taken into account. Finally, the conjunction of all of
these recent changes means that, from a Chinese perspective, the contemporary global crisis has produced an
auspicious moment, perhaps a tipping point and strategic opportunity in the grand historical drama of the decline of
Western, and particularly of American, power and the supplanting rise of Chinese power.6 The Chinese Conception of
Space: The Central State and the World Order As is well known, China's traditional conception of itself (and one that
largely corresponded to reality for two thousand years from the 210s B.C.E. to the 1700s C.E.) was as the Central
Kingdom or Central State. China was by far the largest country, the most powerful state, and the most advanced
civilization in the world which was seen by the Chinese (even if that world was largely the region of East Asia and South
East Asia). Surrounding the Central State was a series of much smaller countries or tributary states, several of which
were also smaller versions of the political and cultural model provided by China; these were Korea; Lu-Chu (the Ryukyu
Islands, including Okinawa); and Annam (Vietnam). Together, these tributary states composed a sort of string of pearls
around the Central State.7 At the center of this Central State and Chinese world order was the capital city of Beijing
(Northern Capital), at the center of Beijing was the imperial palace compound (the Forbidden City), and at the center
of the imperial palace was the Emperor. The Emperor radiated authority and power, right and might, out of the imperial
palace through the Gate of Heavenly Peace to Beijing, to China, and to the rest of the world. However, although Beijing
was normally the imperial capital and center of China and the Chinese world order, the original capital and center was
Xian, some 600 miles to the southwest of Beijing. Xian was established as the capital by Qin Shohuang, the original Qin

(or Chin) Emperor, from whom China took its name. If one draws a great circle with Xian at its center, it nicely includes
all the lands which the Chinese traditionally saw as part of their world order. As it happens, this circle largely corresponds
to the boundary of China plus its tributary states during the late Qing or Manchu dynasty, i.e., the late 18th century (see
Figure 1). Figure 1. Political map of Asia in 1890, showing late-Qing China. Figure 1. Political map of Asia in 1890, showing
late-Qing China. The Chinese Conception of Time: Historical Cycles and China's Destiny The Western conception of
Western history (at least since the Enlightment's doctrine of progress) has largely been linear. Western history begins in
a primitive state followed by a Dark Age and then advances steadily upward, (admittedly with occasional setbacks such
as the Thirty Years War or the two World Wars), through successive stages of higher technological, economic, and political
development. The Western conception of Chinese history has been somewhat similar: Chinese history begins with an
impressive level of culture, but also with an authoritarian political system, one characterized by extensive cruelties,
frequent turmoil, and periodic civil wars. The early Chinese encounters with the West issue in a long period of especially
acute turmoil and war for China, but in the endespecially when America became the undisputed leading Western power
Western ideas and practices have at last put China on an upward path, similar to that which the West itself has taken. In
contrast, the traditional Chinese conception of its history has largely been cyclical (as in the theory of the dynastic
cycle). Chinese history begins at an already civilized level and after a period of political turmoil and Warring States (475221 B.C.E.), the Qin Emperor unites China into one great Central State (221 B.C.E.). Forever after, China's destiny is to
remain one great state and one great civilization. Particular dynasties will rise and fall, according to the dynastic cycle,
and there will be periods of schism and disunion. But, in the end, the unity of China's state and of China's central place in
the world will be restored. These two conceptions of historythe Western and the Chinesehave several elements in
common, but, in essence, they are different and even contradictory. They can be combined, however, into a new one,
which might be described as the Chinese historical conception with Western characteristics. That is, there has indeed
been a long series of dynastic cycles, but successive cycles have, in large part, played out at successively higher levels of
development. At its height (the 18th century), the Qing (Ching) dynasty reached a stage even higher than that reached
by its predecessor, the Ming (the 15th century). The subsequent decline of the Qing was so deep and the ensuing time of
troubles was so grave that it could accurately be called the 100 Years of Humiliation. However, in 1949, China under the
leadership of the Communist Party, began a new period of unity and advance, and this period is taking China to the
highest level of development in its entire two-and-a-half millennial history. The culmination of China's dynasties and the
fulfillment of China's destiny means that the China of the 21st century will not only become more like the China of the
18th century and before, but that China will become even more Chinese than it was before, because China will be
realizing its potential more fully. Moreover, it will be doing so by incorporating all the benefits of Western science and
technology, and on an even wider scale by extending the Chinese definition of the world order from East Asia to the world
beyonda world order which ultimately will include, in some still indistinct sense, the West itself. The Chinese Conception
of Military Power and Strategy: Power Projection over Land In the traditional Chinese conception of military power, a strong
and effective military force was indeed at the core of the Central State and of imperial power.8 However, the idea was that
the military should rarely be used in addressing a strategic problem, and never as the first resort. Rather it was best held
in reserve, and used as a last resort. Again however, it would be best if other rulers and potential adversaries knew that
this reserve of military power actually existed and could be deployed when the Chinese rulers deemed it necessary. In the
meantime, it would also be best if the actual realities of unequal power were clothed with a symbolic veil of reciprocal
respect and cooperation. The imperial military was a sort of cannon behind the curtain, which every party knew was
there, but which was discreetly covered. In the fullest realization of this conception, military power was a center of gravity,
a solid and weighty mass which radiated outward gravitational lines of force, which gently, but firmly and steadily, bent
the will of other rulersand of potential adversariesso that they would more and more be inclined and conformed to
Chinese designs and priorities. In the long course of China's history, this concept of military power was, for the most part,
only applied to the use of armies, i.e., the gravitational force lines were only projected across land. However, there had
been a few rare exceptions when that power was also projected across the sea. The most important of these cases was
Taiwan. (There were also two abortive invasions of Japan, undertaken by the Yuan or Mongol dynasty, and the epic, but
temporary, voyages of Admiral Zheng He, undertaken during the Ming dynasty). The Chinese Conception of Military
Operations and Tactics: Encirclement and the Sudden Blow These ideas about the center of gravity, the last resort, and
the cannon behind the curtain were elements of the traditional Chinese conception of strategy. But the Chinese also have
had a traditional conception of what might be seen as operations and tactics. Here, the focus has been on the steady and
persistent accumulation of positions of strength, of peripheral bases of gravity in addition to the above mentioned core
center of gravity.9 Over time, these accumulated bases add up and amount to an encirclement of the diminishing
positions of strength of a potential adversary or target. Finally, there comes a time when the Chinese positions or bases
are so strong vis--vis those of the opponent that everyone, including the opponent, can draw the obvious and sensible
conclusion that the opponent should accept the realities and conform to the Chinese design, i.e., to accept his appropriate
place within the Chinese world order. This acceptance of military realities is also clothed with the appearance that the
opponent submits willingly, because he sees this to be the course that is most reasonable and in conformity with the
world order, an order that is best for all. Of course, there will also be occasions when the opponent does not act upon
these obvious military realities. In such cases, the Chinese tactic has been to await an auspicious moment, one in which
the opponent is especially vulnerable, and then to strike a sudden blow, one that is both dramatic and effective. This in
itself creates a new reality so that everyone, including of course the opponent, can draw the same obvious and sensible
conclusion that the opponent could, and should, have accepted before. The realities have now been demonstrated with a
stark clarity that could leave the opponent humiliated, but the Chinese tactic will often include some element (such as the
quick withdrawal of the victorious Chinese military force to nearby positions) which will allow the opponent to retain some
degree of respect (i.e., face). The Chinese Conception of Economic Power and Strategy: Exchange of Goods through
Trade The traditional Chinese conception of economic power was analogous. A healthy and productive economic base was
also at the core of the Central State and of imperial power. But here, the idea was that the economy should frequently be
used in addressing a strategic problem, and often as a first resort. It would be best if other rulers and potential
adversaries were well aware of the advantages to them of peaceful economic relations with China, particularly the
exchange of goods through trade. However, the foreign rulers, with their small economies and inferior cultures, would
need Chinese goods far more than the Chinese rulers would need theirs. Therefore, it would also be best if the actual
realities of unequal attractiveness were balanced with foreign rulers also giving the Chinese signs and symbols of
deference to the Chinese conception of the world order, with the Chinese Emperor at its center. This was important to the

Chinese notion of imperial legitimacy, thus the famous kowtow ritual at the imperial court in Beijing. In the fullest
realization of this conception, economic power was also a center of gravity, a solid and weighty mass which radiated
outward gravitation lines of force, which gently but firmly and steadily shaped the will of other rulersand of potential
adversariesso that they would more and more be inclined and conformed to Chinese designs and priorities. In the long
course of imperial history, this Chinese conception of economic power was, for the most part, only applied to the
exchange of goods, i.e., the gravitational force lines were only projected through trade. However, there had been
occasional exceptions, when that power was also projected through China's supply of precious metals, i.e., through
finance. This review of traditional Chinese conceptions of China's geography, history, and destiny can be useful in
interpreting contemporary perspectives and objectives in the minds of Chinese leaders and, indeed, of some of the wider
Chinese population. And the similar review of traditional Chinese conceptions of the strategy, operations, and tactics
needed to achieve Chinese objectives can be particularly useful in explaining recent actions of the Chinese government
and anticipating its future moves. Current events require a special focus on actions and moves in two arenas: The naval
arena of China's three littoral seasthe Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Seaand the financial arena
of China's massive holdings of U.S. currency and debt and the resulting status of being the world's leading creditor state.
These are the very arenas which many scholars think have no real precedents in China's history and which are supposed
to be arenas of Western history. The Three China Seas and Chinese Naval Power China has not been a dominant naval
presence in its three littoral seasthe Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Seafor more than 170 years,
i.e., ever since the arrival of the British navy in force during the First Opium War. Instead, a succession of foreign navies
has dominated these seas, first the British, then the Japanese, then ever since World War II, the American. Moreover, even
before the arrival of foreign navies to dominate these seas, China itself for centuries had not operated much of a navy
there. It has been natural, therefore, for historians of Chinese strategy and its military to not only think that China is a
land power, but that it is only a land power. And this view has been largely accurateup until now. However, there is an
alternative interpretation of the place of these three littoral seas in the Chinese mind. The reason that China for centuries
did not deploy a significant navy in them was that in those times there was no significant foreign navy which posed a
threat there. A Chinese naval presence was therefore unnecessary. Then, when the British navy arrived, it immediately
overwhelmed Chinese forces and established a dominant presence. This dominance by foreign navies continued in an
unbroken chain down until contemporary times. A Chinese naval presence was therefore impossible. However, the three
littoral seas have never been excluded from the Chinese conception of the Central State and the world order. (For
example, they are included within the great circle's delineation of China's proper realm Figure 1.) The Chinese have
always assumed that these three seas should be understood to be Chinese lakes, as much dominated and secured by
Chinese power as is Chinese land. Of course, Taiwan the large island which connects two of these seas, the East China Sea
and the South China Sea must be Chinese because it is both Chinese land and central to the Chinese lakes. And so, it is
natural for the contemporary Chinese leadership to think that the proper destiny of these three seas, the seas between
the Chinese mainland and the First Island Chain, will only be fulfilled when they are dominated by Chinese military
power. This will include not only naval power narrowly defined, but also land-based aircraft and missiles which can project
power and denial capability over these seas. It is therefore only a matter of timea time that could arrive with an
auspicious moment and strategic opportunityuntil China's destiny in these seas will be realized. In the meantime, China
will steadily and persistently seek to accumulate positions of strength in these seas, and some of these positions will add
up to a kind of encirclement of sections within them. These positions will include islands, even very tiny ones, which are
scattered around the seas. Such islands might appear trivial from a practical perspective, although some are in or
adjacent to deep sea oil fields, such as the Spratly (or Nansha) Islands, in the South China Sea. However, from a strategic
perspective, they are important symbols and can become markers or even bases for encirclement of the seas. This is
particularly the case, given the vigorous Chinese use of the international law concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), which extends 200 miles out from recognized land territory. This is one way to interpret the series of recent Chinese
naval and diplomatic actions over such islands in each of the three seas. Beginning in the Spring of 2009 (and at the time
when the global economic crisis had put the United States into substantial disarray), China created a succession of naval
and diplomatic incidents, and these have continued down through the Summer of 2011. These incidents have occurred
over (1) U.S. naval maneuvers in support of South Korea in the Yellow Sea; (2) the Senkaku Islands claimed by Japan in the
East China Sea; and (3) the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South China Sea. Each of these encounters
has directly challenged some state which also claims jurisdiction over the island or surrounding section of the sea. By now,
the list of these challenged states adds up to (from north to south) South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the
Philippines, i.e., every state which borders on the vast maritime realm stretching from the southern part of the Yellow Sea
through the East China Sea, to the northern part of the South China Sea. However, also it is evident that each of these
encounters has indirectly challenged the United States, as a formal ally of most of these states (South Korea, Japan, the

One of the Chinese

purposes has been to test the U.S. resolve to protect the interests of
the challenged states, particularly those interests which could be seen to be as trivial as the islands
themselves and perhaps to demonstrate to everyone, particularly to the
challenged state that, given the new strategic realities of the
current period, the United States is not really a reliable ally and
protector after all. By now, after two years of such challenges, China has not definitively achieved its
Philippines) or as a potential protector of the others (Taiwan and Vietnam).

purposes. The islands and the waters around them remain disputed, and, because of its generally firm statements and
consistent support, the United States remains a plausible ally or protector. At the present time, it seems that the period
2009-2011 has not been an auspicious moment for China after all. However, the traditional Chinese response to such
developments (or lack of them) is to simply return to being patient, while awaiting the eventual arrival of the next
auspicious moment. In the meantime, China is building other kinds of positions of strength with a massive build-up of
advanced weapons systems which can project power over, and deny access to, the three littoral seas. These include, most
dramatically, procurement and deployment of a large fleet of surface vessels, including China's first aircraft carrier.
However, although this surface fleet has a good deal of symbolic meaning, it does not have much substantive importance.

China's surface fleet by itself will not pose a significant threat to the U.S. Navy for many years if ever. Instead, the real,
substantive, threat to the U.S. Navy comes first from China's large number of advanced attack submarines and second,
and even more ominous, from the thousands of surface-to-sea missiles which the Chinese are deploying. The most
threatening of these is the rapid development by the Chinese of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).10 The U.S. surface
fleet including its magnificent and splendid aircraft carriers now has no effective defense against an ASBM threat, and
there is no such defense in the now-foreseeable future. Given China's future objectives and capabilities in its three littoral
seas and over Taiwan, what can be the U.S. policy response? Here, we will consider three strategic options: (1)
containment, likely turning into confrontation; (2) appeasement, likely turning into marginalization; and (3) a conjunction
of regional appeasement and global containment. Containment and Confrontation The obvious, or at least the
conventional, response for the United States to China's challenge in the three littoral seas and Taiwan is to simply

the policy of containment, which it has pursued there for more than 60 years, in
one form or another, ever since the outbreak of the Korean War. Just as China modernized its
military forces in the region, so too would the United States
modernize its military forces there. In particular, this would entail enhanced anti-missile
continue and update

defenses for the U.S. surface fleet, especially the aircraft carriers; enhanced capabilities to destroy Chinese missiles at
their land locations; and, most importantly, enhanced capabilities to conduct and prevail in cyberwar conflict with the
Chinese. Although the weapons systems would be new, the strategic objectivecontainmentwould remain the same.

The U.S. would deny China the capability to exercise dominance over
these three seas, as well as over Taiwan, and it would deny China
the capability to deny U.S. free military and commercial access to
and through the three seas (what can be termed Denial 2). This containment policy obviously evokes
the experience of other maritime containment policies in the past. Some were successful, i.e., they achieved their
objective of denying dominance to a rising challenger without ending in war. These cases include not only the successful
U.S. maritime containment of China up until nowdespite several tense confrontations and crises over the yearsbut
also the successful U.S. maritime containment of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, and 1980s. It then seemed that the
Soviets build-up of their own maritime forces might enable them to dominate not only their own littoral seas, the Baltic
Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Black Sea, but also to deny U.S. access to adjacent seas, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea,
and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. When the U.S. Navy confronted this threat, it developed a comprehensive and
systematic Maritime Strategy and also built toward a 600-ship Navy to back-up the strategy.11 Other maritime
containment policies, however, were less successful as the previously mentioned British containment policy toward
Germany before 1914, which ended in a catastrophic war (although the immediate causes of that war did not involve
maritime issues and naval forces). However, the impending maritime confrontation between the United States and China
will be shaped by the distinctive features of both of these powers in the contemporary era. In other words, it would
probably be U.S. containment with Chinese characteristics. Given the earlier analysis, China's conception of its proper
destiny and its acquisition of a formidable naval capability probably means that China will see itself as an irresistible force,
one which moves patiently but persistently and which anticipates an auspicious moment and strategic opportunity. At the
same time, America's diminished military and economic capability to sustain a successful maritime containment policy
probably means that the United States and its Navy are ceasing to be an immovable object. However, Americans, or at

In
such a conjunction of rising Chinese capabilities and expanding
ambitions on the one hand, and declining American capabilities but
stubborn positions on the other, misperceptions and miscalculations
are inevitable. A small confrontation could easily and quickly
escalate into a major crisis, and then escalate into a big war. Earlier in the
least important elements amongst them, may still think of themselves as strong and resolute, i.e., as immovable.

outbreak of this war, we would likely see something like the sudden blow against the U.S. Navy. The most dramatic
possibility would be an attack by Chinese conventional anti-ship missiles against one or more U.S. aircraft carriers.12 The
destruction of one of these magnificent ships would mean not only the decapitation of an entire U.S. naval battle group,
but also the death of more than 5000 American sailors. And this disasterlike the Japanese carrier-aircraft attack on the
magnificent U.S. battleships at Pearl Harbor 70 years agowould be only the first tragedy in what would then probably
become a great war, a war which would be mutually catastrophic. Appeasement and Marginalization Hypothetically, one
could imagine a very different policy response for the United States to China's challenge in the three littoral seas and
Taiwan, and that is the classic alternative to containment, its very opposite i.e., appeasement (although it might be
termed accommodation). As we have seen, this was the policy which Britain followed toward the United States in its two
adjacent seas of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean in the 1890s-1900s. The policy was an ambiguous success, issuing
on the one hand in alliance with the United States during World War I and after, and on the other hand not only the end of
British power in the Western Hemisphere, but also, after World War II, effectively the world-wide end of British power. (Of
course, the most notorious case of appeasement was that of Britain against Germany in the 1930s, which issued in World
War II). If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral seas
and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments
there. The pace and direction of this reduction might be understood by China to be consistent with its own conceptions of
patience and persistence. In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese characteristics. Again,
however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting
this policy, making its application inconsistent and confusing and therefore again making for misconceptions and
miscalculations. However,

if the appeasement or accommodation policy were

carried out to its logical conclusion, there would be a massive

realignment of the long-established U.S. alliance system in the
Western Pacific, i.e., involving not only the states bordering the
three littoral seas and west of the First Island Chain, but also
involving Japan, which is a major component of that chain and a
principal power in the region. In other words, the loss of the three
littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the
waters that lie between the First and the Second Island Chains. In the end, the United States
could be reduced to being a secondary, or even marginalized, power
in the Western Pacific. Indeed, some Chinese military figures are beginning to raise the idea of a
partitioning of the Pacific between China and the United States, along a line roughly corresponding to the Second Island
Chain. Regional Appeasement and Global Containment Given the economic and military dynamics now underway in China
(and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem that the Chinese will inevitably displace the United States
from its dominant position in the three littoral seas and replace it with its own. The time and the way that this will happen
is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be
appeasement or accommodation in this regional arena. However, regional appeasement does not inevitably entail global
appeasement, i.e. appeasement in other arenas. When Britain gave up its strategic position in the Western Hemisphere to
the United States, it did not then give up its strategic position in the rest of the world. It continued to remain the leading
maritime power in all of the oceans and seas of the Eastern Hemisphere for the next thirty years. This suggests that were
the United States to relinquish its dominant position in the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, it still could
retain its dominant position elsewhere. This could be true not only in the obvious case of the Eastern Pacific (where the
United States would have strategic advantages comparable to those that China has in the Western Pacific), but in other
oceans and seas around the world. The most important of theseand a strategic counterpoint to the three littoral seasis
the Indian Ocean.13 In this regard, the traditional naval concept of a distant blockade might become useful. A near
blockade seeks to prevent an adversary from using his littoral waters for his naval and commercial purposes. This
requires that the blockading power have a great naval superiority over the adversary. In contrast, a distant blockade
allows the adversary the use of his littoral waters, but denies him the use of the waters beyond. If the adversary is largely
self-sufficient (as was the Soviet Union and its alliance system in many respects) a capability to impose a distant blockade
upon him will not be a major factor in his strategic calculations. However, if the adversary relies a great deal upon
seaborne commerce, its SLOCs (sea lanes of commerce or, in the conventional notation, sea lines of communication) will
be a major strategic factor. Traditional, imperial China was supremely self-sufficient. In this respect, it was thoroughly
Chinese. However, contemporary China is very dependent upon seaborne commerce, upon both its enormous exports of
industrial products and its enormous imports of the raw materials that are necessary for the continuing functioning of its
economy (and the continuing stability of its social system). In this sense, contemporary China certainly has Western
characteristics. This vital seaborne commerce passes, of course, through the three littoral seas. But much of it, including
the necessary raw materials and especially the necessary oil, also passes through the Indian Ocean. If China acquires a
dominant positionand denial capabilityin the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, the United States can
retain a dominant positionand denial capabilityin the Indian Ocean and in other seas beyond, through which passes
China's vital exports and imports. In short, if China acquires a dominant position in the Western Pacific, it will only be the
beginning of a grand and protracted bargaining process, engaging both China and the United States and involving both
the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and both the regional and the global arenas. In the end, there might be
constructed an explicit and effective system of mutual deterrence, based upon such concepts as red-lines, salient
thresholds, and tit-for-tat actions and reactions. Holdings of U.S. Currency and Debt and Chinese Financial Power China
now has the largest foreign exchange reserves, and particularly the largest holdings of U.S. currency and debt, in the
world, making it the world's leading creditor state. Yet, historically China did not see itself as a financial power, and it did
not have a large and powerful financial sector within it. In this respect, it differed from a number of Western great powers,
whose power included being a leading creditor state and major financial power. These have been, successively, the
Netherlands, Britain, and the United States, and on occasion France has also been a major financial power (as well as,
briefly in the 1980s, Japan). An important question, therefore, is how one might expect China to convert its financial power
into strategic power and thereby advance its regional and global ambitions, since it has had very little experience in doing
so. And here, it is once again useful to look at traditional Chinese conceptions of strategy, operations, and tactics. First, it
would be natural for the Chinese to extend their historical practices in the arena of trade to the arena of finance. China's
financial strength could frequently be used in addressing a strategic problem and often as a first resort, so long as this did
not contradict other strategic objectives. For example, China's setting of the exchange rate between the yuan (RMB) and
the dollar steers a course between the two objectives of (1) advancing Chinese industry through promoting exports and
(2) avoiding social discontent by managing the inflation rate. In the fullest realization of this strategic conception, China's
enormous financial reserves become a center of gravity, a solid and weighty mass which radiates outward gravitational
lines of force, which gently but firmly and steadily shapes the will of debtor nations, and potential adversaries, so that
they will more and more be inclined and conformed to, or at least accepting of, Chinese designs and priorities. The most
important of these potential adversaries, and the most important of China's debtor nations, is of course the United States.
One would expect that China will not readily resort to the financial nuclear option, i.e., quickly dumping large amounts
of dollars on the global foreign-exchange markets; that would also inflict severe economic damage upon the Chinese.
Rather, the most likely course is for China to use the less dramatic but still discernable option of not renewing its
purchases of U.S. government debt as it matures. And these moments of non-renewala non-event which can have as
much as an impact and influence as an eventcould coincide with those moments when China is engaged in a dispute
with the U.S. government on some issue in a completely different strategic arena, e.g., in one of the three China seas. In
the meantime, China will steadily and persistently seek to accumulate positions of strength in the financial arena, and
some of these positions will add up to a kind of encirclement of the American financial position. In particular, one could

expect the Chinese to draw the developing economies and neighboring states of Southeast Asia into a dense network of
debt dependency. The debt network could even extend beyond to other regions, where historically the United States has
been the major creditor state. Indeed, this is already beginning to happen in Africa and Latin America, and given the
current great financial instability and vulnerability of countries in Southern Europe, it is even beginning to happen there. A
Passive U.S. Strategic Option: Waiting Out the Chinese Regime The discussion thus far has assumed a continuing rise in
Chinese poweron both its economic and its military dimensionsfar into the future, or at least for the next two or three
decades. But of course, the Chinese themselves have traditionally thought in terms of Yin and Yang, and of the
simultaneous coexistence and continuing interplay between both strength and weakness. (A contemporary version is
thinking in terms of the dialectic.) And the contemporary Chinese leadership is very much focused upon China's
weaknesses, as well as its strengths.14 In particular, they are concerned about the three inequalitiesinequality
between the rich and the poor, between the cities and the countryside, and between the Eastern coastal areas and the
Western hinterlands. These three inequalities obviously overlap and reinforce each other; together, they give rise to much
social discontent and numerous mass demonstrations (more than 70,000 annually, by official count). The Chinese
leadership believes that this discontent can best be met with economic benefits, i.e., a continuing rise in China's economic
growth with special attention to broadening the scope of the benefits (to include more of the poor, the countryside, and
the Western hinterlands) and to controlling the rate of inflation. However, effective government management of the
benefits and burdens, of the opportunities and risks, of China's complex and dynamic economy poses its own serious
challenges. Consequently, one strategic option for the United States would be to adopt a feature of the Chinese strategic

U.S. policymakers could work on

the assumption that eventually the social tensions in China will grow
to the point that they will weaken the Chinese regime and disrupt its
strategic objectives in the three littoral seas and elsewhere. After all, the United States has had
mentality, and that is its emphasis on patience and persistence.

considerable experience and success with this approach. Patience and persistence in containment was essentially how a
succession of U.S. policymakers dealt with the Soviet Union, even though it required 40 years before unambiguous

looking at Chinese history itself, one might observe

that it is a Chinese characteristic that there will always be a strong
centrifugal tendency toward disunity. Well aware of the Soviet precedent, as well as of
success was achieved. And

China's own social tensions, the Chinese leadership is seeking to reinforce its strategy of increased economic benefits with
a strategy of increased political legitimacy. Given the obvious fact that the old source of political legitimacyCommunism,
including Maoismis now believed by very few in China (including in the leadership itself), the regime has tried to come
up with a new ideology or philosophy that will give it a new legitimacy. And here, it has turned to two alternatives, and
particularly to a combination of them. One of these alternatives is actually very old, Confucianism, or more accurately a
modernized version of traditional Chinese conceptions of identity, history, geography, and China's destiny. These are the
very conceptions addressed in this essay, and the regime's turn to and reinvention of these traditional conceptions is a
major reason why they are important today. The second alternative is much newer and is actually Western in origin,
nationalism. But Chinese nationalism is Western nationalism very much altered by Chinese characteristics. Many Chinese
think of China as a nation which should become even greater. However, since China is a nation already so much greater
than its neighboring nations and states, it is a nation that is like no other. Indeed, it has been said that China is a
civilization pretending to be a nation.15 Chinese nationalism seems to be a perfect case of a big enough quantitative
difference becoming a qualitative difference. In any event, the strategies, operations, and tactics that contemporary China
now deploys to advance its national interests and purposes are very much like those traditional ones that imperial China
once deployed to advance its imperial, and civilizational, interests and purposes. The combination of a modernized
Confucianism and a nationalism with Chinese characteristics has provided a robust identity and a convincing ideology or
philosophy for many Chinese, particularly among the educated and professional classes. It has therefore provided a potent
legitimizing formula for the Chinese regime at least up until now. And this means that the regime will be driven all the
more to fulfill its objectives and China's destiny in the three littoral seas, and beyond. The Real U.S. Strategic Option:
Reinventing and Reviving the American Economy Underneath most of the strategic options of the United States lies a
fundamental assumption and perhaps a fatal flaw and that is that somehow the United States will be able to maintain
and modernize its military forces, particularly its naval forces, so that they can serve as a creditable counterpart to the
rising Chinese military. For this assumption to remain sound, however, the United States must also maintain and
modernize its economy, and particularly its industry, so that it can provide the necessary weapons systems and budgetary
expenditures to support its military. After all, the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy, and particularly of Chinese
industry, has been the real cause for the growing strength of the Chinese military. If over the past two decades, the
Chinese economic and industrial growth rates had only been equal to those of, say, Japan or Western Europe, there would
now be very little discussion of the Chinese military threat. Conversely, if over the past decade (the 2000s), the American
economic and industrial growth rates had been equal to those of the previous decade (the 1990s, when the economic
growth was led by the computer and telecommunications industries), there would be much more confidence that the
United States would be able to address the Chinese challenge. The real U.S. strategic option indeed, the fundamental
U.S. strategic necessity therefore, is to bring about a reinvention and revival of the American economy, particularly one
based upon the development of new American industries.16 This crucially was the path not taken by the United States in
the 2000s. It would require a reduction in the economic role and political power of the American financial sector and a
restoration of the economic role and political power of American industrial sectors, particularly new industries based upon
innovative technologies (e.g., biotechnology and clean energy), but also older industries which remain essential for a
strong military (e.g., aerospace, computers, and telecommunications). Of course, this path would be rather like the path
which China itself has taken over the past two decades. In other words, the United States would move more toward an
American economy with Chinese characteristics. These economic considerations obviously apply to those U.S. strategic
options centered upon some kind of containment. However, they also apply to the more passive strategic option of
waiting out the Chinese regime. Any great power which has had both a passive national strategy and a weak economy has
soon ceased to be a great power (e.g., both Britain and France in the 1930s, when each was characterized by an

appeasement policy and a depressed economy). This is because a weak economy usually produces a divisive and
paralyzed political system, and this kind of system cannot take advantage of any strategic opportunities against an
adversary which could arise in the course of waiting him out. In short, whatever might be a good strategic option for the
next decade or so, America's real solution to the Chinese challenge for the next several decadesfor the 21st centuryis
in one sense to become more like the Chinese have become in recent decades. But in another and more real sense, it is
for America to become more like what it was in the 20th centurythe American Century. In other words, America needs
to become more American.

Over-focus on containment bad need some element of

positive incentives
Stephen F. Burgess; 2016; Department of International Security Studies,
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base; Contemporary Security Policy;
Rising bipolarity in the south china sea: The America rebalance to Asia and
Chinas expansion; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1149968
Chinas growing assertiveness in the SCS is a sign that the situation is moving away from somebodys sea in which the United States has

Chinas increasing military presence in the SCS means that it will

be difficult for the United States to re-establish hegemony unless the United
States chooses to risk confrontation and conflict with China . Instead, the situation appears to
maintained hegemony.

be moving towards nobodys sea in which China will continue to assertively press its claims and confront the United States, the Philippines,

it is possible that
a sea of conflictprobably unplannedwill transpire if China moves too
assertively and does not draw back when confrontation escalates towards
war.3 Ultimately, China wants to move towards somebodys sea in which it eventually becomes the regional hegemon. SEA claimants
Vietnam and Malaysia with its security forces, while trying to avoid escalation to war. In a worst case scenario,

would like to move towards a scenario of everybodys sea: managed mistrust in which UNCLOS, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Code of Conduct (CoC) and American presence are used to move China away from expansion and towards cooperation. The United
States and its allies and partners are increasingly working together to dissuade China from further pressing its claims and move it to accept
everybodys sea. However, Chinas rejection of the CoC and UNCLOS, harassment of American warships and aircraft, and continued
expansion have so far precluded such a scenario. In regard to the establishment of stable cohabitation and a bipolar balance of power, this
would require a negotiated settlement of some of Chinas more vital claims as well as those of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam and
acceptance of continued American military engagement to maintain FoN and open skies. In the rebalance to Asia, the United States has
increased its diplomatic efforts and sought to increase economic influence through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Washington is also
stepping up its backing of the ASEAN CoC and multilateral diplomacy and international law through UNCLOS, as well as conducting more
military exercises with Southeast Asian states. Engagement has been one American response to Chinas rise, combined with measures to
dissuade Beijing from being overly assertive. In regard to the American rebalance to Asia, the argument here is that a combination of
American engagement with and balancing against China is the best way to influence China to fully accept the status quo and prevent it from
trying to revise the rules governing the seas and violate the sovereignty of smaller states. Neither pure engagement nor balancing will prevent

4 Containment is too forceful a strategy and will spur

the security dilemma,5 while engagement is too weak. American sanctions against China would be counter-productive, due
China from pursuing more assertive policies.

to the high degree of economic interdependence among the actors. While excessive coercive measures, such as blockading or occupying
Chinas outposts, risk escalation to conflict and generate the security dilemma, carefully calibrated coercion and shaming and offers of
cooperation may help moderate behaviour. Building alliances and partnerships to balance against a challenger involves accurately calculating
the potential and tendencies of the countries involved. Using relatively weak allies and partners can help in working to moderate the assertive
behaviour of a stronger neighbour but can prove useful in multilateral diplomacy and shaming. Of note is the fact that China changed its
position on Darfur in 2007 after threats were made by non-governmental organizations to the 2008 Olympics and after considerable
engagement and persuasion by the international community.6 Balancing can produce unintended consequences, such as weak neighbours
acting provocatively with the hope that their stronger ally will be dragged into conflict.7 Multilateral diplomacy, particularly through the ASEAN

Offering positive gains to all

involved in a dispute can assist in changing behaviour but must be combined with multilateral
CoC and UNCLOS provide an additional way to influence Chinas behaviour.

diplomacy and the possibility of punishment. It is likely that China will continue to rise and its power and interests will grow more rapidly than
those of the United States and its allies and partners, especially in the SCS. Power transition literature that focuses on rising powers and the
status quo contends that rising powers will challenge the status quo until conflict ensues. Over time, a power transition will occur in the region,
which will make efforts to balance power more liable to provoke conflict. Allies and partners may switch sides and bandwagon with China.
Therefore, the combination of measures and instruments of power that might work in 2020 may not be effective in 2030.8 Much depends on
how fast China and its neighbours grow and how much more coercive power the United States and its allies and partners are willing and able
to apply in balancing. The preceding discussion has generated propositions that will be examined in this article. First, it will be less difficult to
induce a rising power such as China to moderate its behaviour in the SCS if it is driven mainly by the defense of its interests rather than by
power maximization that challenges the status quo or by an expansive strategic culture and nationalism. Second, soft balancing9the use of
mainly multilateral diplomatic and economic instruments, backed by military poweris more likely to dissuade China from expanding its
claims in the SCS than hard balancing with mainly the military instrument or pure engagement. Third, soft balancing is the optimal strategy in
the short to medium term to moderate the behaviour of a strong regional state such as China in the SCS by the United States and weak
Southeast Asian states, given the challenges of developing the regional forces that can stand up to China and devising strategy to stop
expansion. The first proposition is examined through an analysis of Chinas behaviour and intentions, using the prisms of defensive realism,
constructivism and offensive realism. The second and third propositions are scrutinized

No Spillover: Economic Engagement = China

Reform
Economic engagement spills over to cooperation
improves benign reforms in China
Rivkin 15 (Charles Rivkin, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs, 5/14/15, Advancing US Economic Engagement In Asia,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2015/242411.htm)
We face a challenging environment in China for various aspects of our
economic agenda. But we believe that expanding the areas where the United
States and China can work together, while managing our clear differences, is
central to our engagement with Asia. We seek a relationship with China
defined by practical and tangible cooperation on challenges that face both of
our nations. On the economic side of the ledger, we have marks of real
progress as well as real potential. During President Obama's trip to Beijing in
November, we agreed to expand visa validity for business and leisure visitors
from one to 10 years, a win for the U.S. tourism industry and a win for U.S.
companies with interests in China. We also achieved an important bilateral
understanding with China to expand the WTO's Information Technology
Agreement (ITA), which will eliminate tariffs on next-generation ICT products
such as advanced semiconductors and high tech medical equipment. We
subsequently had a setback and there's still a lot of work to do, but we
remain hopeful that we will be able to conclude negotiation of the ITA. Also in
November, I joined Secretary Kerry in Beijing for a meeting with ten of the
most important CEOs in China, major companies that all of you know and
have heard of, who are doing extraordinary work and are also investing in the
United States. Secretary Kerry used that CEO roundtable to send a clear
message that the United States provides an open and reliable
investing environment. Together, the United States and China
account for a third of global GDP, $600 billion of trade between our
countries, and 40 percent of recent global growth. It is clear from
these numbers that we have an enormous stake in each others
economic success. Presently, negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) with China offer tremendous potential to unlock new opportunities for
U.S. firms and promote a more level playing field for U.S. investors in Chinas
market. A high quality BIT would provide strong investor protections
for U.S. investors that support transparency, predictability, and the
rule of law. We will continue to press China to provide a narrow negative
list, reflecting a high level of openness to foreign investment. In our
engagements with the Chinese, we have made clear that we would like to see
additional progress on the ground in terms of economic reform. We have also
encouraged China to do more to welcome American businesses and reassure
them that foreign firms wont be subject to discriminatory trade regulations.

No Spillover: Military
No spillover between trade or economic engagement and
Chinas military capabilities
Segal 4 (Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and
National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program,
5/28/04, Practical Engagement: Drawing A Fine-Line For US-China Trade
http://www.cfr.org/china/practical-engagement-drawing-fine-line-us-chinatrade/p7063)
Although such trends give U.S. defense analysts legitimate reason to fear the
impact of engagement with China, there are in fact few gains tied explicitly to
bilateral U.S.-China trade that facilitate critical growth in Chinas military
capabilities. As the 2002 U.S.-China Security Review Commission report
notes, It is difficult to document any direct connection between Chinas
bilateral trade surplus and the PRC military budget.10 Part of the
misconception about the potential military impact of U.S. trade derives from
the focus on bilateral numbers. To come to conclusions fairly about what
security benefits China derives from trade, bilateral trade between the United
States and China must be placed in the context of the PRCs participation in
the wider global economy. China has a large trade surplus with the United
States but not with the world as a whole, running deficits with Taiwan, Korea,
Thailand, and Malaysia. Chinas overall global trade surplus is not especially
large, approximately $25 billion in 2003, and it has fluctuated from year to
year. Limiting or denying access to the U.S. market may cause some
economic damage but probably less than might be imagined. For example,
such restrictions will have relatively little impact on Chinas overall trade
balance. Because China imports the machine tools needed to manufacture
export products, if China exports fewer sneakers to the United States, it will
import fewer stamping machines and less rubber from other countries, so
Chinas overall trade balance would remain about the same. In addition,
given Chinas increasingly central place in global supply net-works and its
role as the final assembly point for many exports originating throughout the
region, the pain inflicted by trade sanctions is bound to be felt by more
countries than just China.11 Japan, Taiwan, and Korea produce many of the
higher-value capital goods used to produce Chinese exports, and these
countries would thus also be hurt by U.S. trade restrictions. Chinese defense
planners clearly are trying to acquire civilian technologies, such as
microprocessors and telecommunication equipment, and to convert them to
military use, but it is not clear that there is much the United States can do to
prevent spin on. Commercial dual-use technologies are not unique to
the United States, and currently, only Washington considers the
transfer of these technologies to China to be a potential security
threat. The Europeans have few direct security interests in a potential
conflict in Asia, especially across the Taiwan Strait. Some defense analysts in
Tokyo see the rise of China as a potential threat, but Japan continues to
develop commercial and political ties with Beijing and to see its own

economic security as highly dependent on the development of the Chinese

market.12 The case of semiconductors may best exemplify the difficulties of
controlling the export and use of advanced information technologies. Although U.S. defense analysts fear that the migration of integrated circuit
manufacturing capability to Shanghai during the late 1990s may assist
Chinas development of long-range, precision-strike capabilities; better
command-and-control systems; and integrated air defenses, the United
States has been unable to reach agreement with its allies and friends on a
common multilateral export policy toward China.13 The United States is the
only member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies that considers
Chinas acquisition of these capabilities a cause for concern. European and
Japanese export control authorities have licensed sales of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment to China that is at least two generations more
advanced than the threshold stipulated by the Wassenaar agreement. When
the United States has banned or slowed exports to manufacturers in China,
European and Japanese suppliers quickly stepped in to make the sale. The
United States fear of spin on may be misplaced for at least two
reasons. First, Beijing does not have to rely on commercial
technology to improve its military capabilities over the next several
years. China is already able to purchase relatively advanced
destroyers, fighter aircraft, submarines, anti-ship missiles, and
torpedoes from Russia and continues to do so. Second, the limited
technological level of Chinas new economy and the ability of the Chinese
defense industry to absorb new technologies, developed abroad or
domestically, diminish the impact of the application of commercial
technologies on the defense sector. Even after two-and-a-half decades of
reform in China, ill-defined property rights, financial inefficiency, and
bureaucratic interference characterize the civilian S&T system.14 Al-though
S&T spending gradually increased in the 1990s, China remains far behind
most of the developed world in R&D funding. The PRCs gross expenditure in
R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) reached 1 percent in
2000, as compared to 2.02.5 percent of GDP spent on R&D by most
developed countries.15 The diffusion of imported technologies historically has
also been one of the weakest components of the Chinese S&T system. This
weakness has been the result of bureaucratic stove-pipingthe separation
of scientists and research institutes in one bureaucracy from those in another
that prevented the ex-change of ideas and technologyas well as Beijings
chronic under funding of the diffusion process. Even in commercial sectors
with a relatively direct link to potential military capability, it is difficult to find
evidence that new skills and technologies migrated to the defense side of
production and made a direct impact on military modernization. Twenty years
of Chinese cooperation with U.S. and other foreign aircraft manufacturers in
the aviation sector, for ex-ample, have had a limited effect on Chinese
military aircraft programs.16 To be sure, foreign cooperation has probably
helped bolster, in broad terms, the production processes and management
practices of major Chinese aviation producers in Xian, Chengdu, and

Shenyang. Yet, despite the joint ventures between major international

aviation firms and Chinese aviation firms for the past 20 years, Chinas
principal aircraft manufacturers have consistently failed to produce modern
military aviation platformsone of the main reasons for the Chinese
militarys purchase of such aircraft from Russia. Furthermore, re-ports
indicate that Chinas aerospace industries have been unable to capitalize on
what little technology was included in the transfers coming from these joint
ventures. Chinas aviation industry remains beleaguered by redundant
infrastructure and managers and a workforce with weak skills. This sectors
systemic problems will limit any potential spin-on benefits and so continue to
constrain rapid modernization of military aircraft production. Finally, the
likelihood that the United States will grow dependent on any one country,
much less China, for any one product, especially semiconductors, is
exceedingly small. The fear of technological dependence was high in
Washington during the early 1990s when, for example, the United States relied on a handful of Japanese companies for flat-panel displays. U.S.
dependence on one supplier never became a serious threat, however,
because within less than 10 years, dozens of companies in a number of
countries manufactured flat-panel displays. China is years away from having
a position in the global semiconductor market that is equivalent to Japans
position in the 1990s in the production of flat-panel displays. In 2000, China
produced 1 percent of the worlds computer chips, and that figure is expected
to rise to 23 percent in 2005. What Can the United States Do? Although the
bilateral trade surplus does not provide unique inputs to Chinese military
modernization, policymakers still must decide how they are going to manage
the potential security risks present in increasing economic and technological
flows between the United States and China. U.S. policymakers have been
overly focused on the long-term challenges of commercial technology spin on
and the prospect of dependence on the Chinese market rather than on how
the United States should respond to the systemic changes that have
reshaped the global economy and technological innovation as well as the
relationship of technological development to government sponsorship and
procurement. The real long-term threat to U.S. security is the potential
decline of the innovative capabilities that emerge from the interaction of U.S.
industries and re-search universities, as well as the competition among U.S.
commercial producers, in domestic and foreign markets. For this reason, the
predominant focus should be on continued innovation as the United States
moves into new technology areas and gradually reduces controls over older
technologies. To-ward this end, U.S. trade policy toward China should do two
things: combine control over a very limited number of critical dual-use
technologies and aggressively foster U.S. technological competitiveness,
including placing greater pres-sure on China to allow U.S. firms to have fair
access to the domestic technology market. Access to the Chinese market is
essential to U.S. industrial competitiveness; and Beijing, two years after
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), continues to erect barriers
to U.S. high technology products.

Accommodation Good: Security Dilemma

Containment doesnt work neither side can win while
locked in. Strategic accommodations comparatively
better ---White 12 - (Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian
National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. The Diplomat,
8/17/12, The China Choice: A Bold Vision for U.S.-China Relations,
http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/the-china-choice-a-bold-vision-for-u-s-chinarelations/ )
My new book, The China Choice, explores the decision America faces about
its relations with China and its role in Asia as Chinas power grows. But the
title may be a little misleading, because of course there is more than one
choice to be made. America faces at least two decisions, and one of the keys
to making them well and getting them right is to consider them in the right
order. The first is on the question of principle: should America even
contemplate changing the role it plays in Asia, in order to accommodate
Chinas rising power, or should it insist on preserving the status quo? The
second is on the question of degree: how far should America be willing to
go to accommodate China, and where should it draw the line beyond
which it is not willing to make further concessions? Rory Medcalfs
valuable critique of the book here on The Diplomat last week focuses
primarily on the second question, and makes some important points about it
which I will explore a little later. But Ill start by saying something about the
first question, because we cannot decide how far Washington should go to
accommodate Beijing before we are quite clear that it should even try to do
so, and why. In The China Choice I argue that America should try to
accommodate Chinas growing power. I propose that it should be willing
negotiate a new regional order in which it continues to play a major strategic
role, but not the kind of primacy that it has exercised until now. The main
reason is simply that China no longer accepts U.S. primacy as the basis
for the Asian order, and that as its power grows to equal and overtake
Americas, the chances of successfully imposing primacy on China are too
low, and the risks and costs of trying are too high, to be justified. Even if
China may not become strong enough to dominate Asia itself, it is
already strong enough to prevent the U.S. maintaining primacy. If
America tries to perpetuate the status quo, there is a very real risk
of an escalating contest which neither side could win, and which
could very easily flare into a major, and perhaps catastrophic, war.
The main reason for America to seek an accommodation with China
is to reduce the risk of such a catastrophe. Many people will disagree.
Some of them think that the relationship with China is working fine, and that
accommodation or further accommodation is unnecessary. They think that
Washington is committed to a good relationship with Beijing, and that China
will be satisfied with the kind of relationship America is offering now. I think

this is too optimistic. The relationship today can manage day-to-day

stresses, but is not robust enough to withstand real problems. Some
people cite the Chen case earlier this year as proof that the relationship is
strong, but the fact that such a minor issue can cause such anxieties about
the future of the worlds most important bilateral relationship surely points
the other way. The U.S.-China relationship is probably going to have to face
much greater stresses in future, and it is not at all clear that it is strong
enough to withstand them. Furthermore, the relationship seems to be getting
weaker rather than stronger over time, so the risk of a rupture grows. The
present fabric of the relationship is weak and getting weaker
because Chinas and Americas ambitions in Asia over coming
decades are inherently incompatible. It is important to my argument to
explain why this should be so. Those who think that America is already
accommodating China have perhaps not really registered what is at stake
here. For the past 40 years the Asian strategic order, and the U.S.-China
relationship, have been based on a conception of American leadership which
places all other countries in Asia in a clearly subordinate position. American
policy today precludes any substantial change in this status quo over the
coming decades. This was made clear by Barack Obama in his speech in
Canberra in November of last year. American optimism about the future of
the relationship therefore depends on the hope that China will find this
acceptable. It is often said that Americas policy towards China today
is not containment. But Washington clearly does resist any substantial
expansion of Chinas influence at the expense of U.S. primacy. So if its not
containment, that can only be because China is not seeking such an
expansion.

Accommodation Good: Sooner/Later

Appeasement avoids war
Friedberg 15 (Louis Friedberg served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of
the Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for nationalsecurity affairs and director of policy planning and graduated Harvard in IR
and Politics, 5/19/15, The Debate Over US China Strategy,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046227)
In contrast to a strategy of enhanced engagement, which has its roots in
liberal theories of international relations, the third approach reflects the harsh
logic of geopolitical realism. According to this view, if Chinas power
continues to grow, the United States will inevitably face a choice between
confrontation and accommodation. Given the enormous costs of conflict,
the latter course would clearly be preferable. Assuming a continuation of
current trends, it would be prudent to seek accommodation sooner,
when the relative power relationship between the two countries is more
favourable to the United States, rather than later, when it will become
steadily less so. The object of American policy therefore should be to
work out a mutually acceptable arrangement under which, in the words
of Henry Kissinger, both countries pursue their domestic imperatives,
cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict.
Under such an arrangement, neither side endorses all of the aims of the
other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify
and develop complementary interests.16 Kissinger envisions a process that
would lead over time to the creation of what he terms a Pacific Community.
While he does not attempt to define its precise content or parameters, this
would be a region to which the United States, China, and other states all
belong and in whose peaceful development all participate. The recognition of
such a community would make the United States and China part of a
common enterprise in which, as Kissinger puts it, shared purposes and the
elaboration of them would replace strategic uneasiness to some extent.17
Other self-described realists are more concrete (and perhaps more candid) in
their prescriptions. Writing in 1999, Robert Ross observed that the United
States and China were strategic competitors engaged in a traditional great
power struggle for security and influence.18 But he argued that, thanks
largely to the geography of East Asia, their rivalry need not escalate to the
point of open conflict. According to Ross, China is, by virtue of its location and
history, a continental power, while Americas strengths and interests in
Asia lie primarily in the maritime domain. If both sides recognise and
accept these realities, then it should be possible for them to work
out a stable modus vivendi, one in which China dominates eastern Eurasia
but forgoes the temptation of trying to develop serious naval capabilities,
while the United States retains its position as the preponderant maritime
power but does not challenge China on land. Ross acknowledged that there
were several areas in which the spheres of influence of the two great powers
might appear to overlap, but he was confident that any resulting tensions

could be managed with relative ease. As regards the Spratly Islands, Ross
argued that China had neither the ability nor the strategic interest to
challenge the status quo in the U.S.-dominated South China Sea.19 While
Washingtons alliance relationship with South Korea was a valuable U.S.
asset, it did not constitute a vital interest and, in the long run, Korean
unification and closer relations between Beijing and Seoul would not make
the United States significantly less secure or the balance of power less
stable.20 Only Taiwan truly sat on the seam between the two spheres.
Although Ross did not believe that its occupation by China would
significantly alter the regional military balance, he concluded that,
assuming Taiwans leaders did not make a move toward formal
independence, the United States could help the island to preserve
its physical autonomy for another quarter century by retaining its
security commitment and providing modest levels of support.21
Ongoing shifts in the military balance have caused some realists to revise
their assessment of the likely dimensions of a spheres-of-influence
arrangement, but not by much. In an article published in 2011, Charles Glaser
argues that, for a mixture of geographic and technological reasons, the
United States and China need not find themselves enmeshed in an intense
security dilemma. In Glasers assessment, the stabilising effect of the natural
geographic division of Asia is reinforced by the fact that both the US and
China possess secure second-strike nuclear forces. Although the United
States also has massive conventional capabilities, China should not find
these deeply threatening, thanks to the reassuring presence of its nuclear
deterrent, and because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics and support lie
across the Pacific.22 Still, while the prospects for avoiding escalating military
competition and open conflict are generally good, the growth in Chinese
power may require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will
find disagreeable particularly regarding Taiwan.23 Glaser concludes that
the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to
Taiwan because doing so would remove the most obvious and contentious
flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for
better relations between them in the decades to come.24 The goal of
American diplomacy should be to find a way to make this one,
comparatively minor adjustment in the existing dispensation.

Containment Bad: Economy

US containing china more, More containment risks
military escalation and econ decline.
Browne 15 - (Andrew Browne, 6-12-2015, "Can China Be Contained?,"
WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534)
Obama administration remains very much in favor of
engagement. Last years high-profile deal on climate change showed that cooperation is still
possible. Ahead of a planned summit in the U.S. in September, the two countries are hammering out an ambitious
Chinas fears notwithstanding, the

bilateral trade agreement. And it is often pointed out that not a single problem in the world, from piracy to pollution, can

Obama administration is trying

to sustain this policy of engagement while also ramping up its military options in Asia. China
is playing a similar game. And it is not clear how long both sides will be able to
continue before there is a clash, by accident or design. Mr. Obama himself sometimes strikes
be solved without their joint efforts. In an increasingly awkward dance, however, the

adversarial postures on China. In trying to push a massive Asia-Pacific free-trade zone through a resistant Congress, he

has been invoking a China threat. If we dont write the rules, China will write the rules out in
that region, he told The Wall Street Journal in April. He also has pursued a campaignultimately futile
to prevent allies such as Britain and Australia from signing on to a
Chinese regional development bank. Although the bank will help deliver much-needed
infrastructure, the White House interpreted it as part of a bid to undermine Americas leadership in global finance. For its

China believes that the U.S. will never accept the legitimacy of a
communist government. Mr. Xi has proposed a new model of great-power relations, designed to break a
part,

pattern of wars through the ages that occur when a rising power challenges the incumbent one. But America has turned
him down, unwilling to accept a formula that not only assumes that the two countries are peers but seems to place them
on the same moral plane. Appropriately, perhaps, tensions are coming to a head in the Spratly Islands, an archipelago of
reefs and sandbars in the South China Sea so hazardous that old British Admiralty sailing charts marked the entire area as
Dangerous Ground. In this mariners graveyard, China has massively expanded several reefs through dredging; one
boasts a runway long enough to land Chinas largest military planes. Chinas neighbors regard them as outposts for an
eventual Chinese takeover of the whole South China Sea. The Pentagon presents them as a threat to the U.S. Navys
unchallenged right to sail the oceans. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter is considering a show of forceand is under
political pressure to do so. Last month, Sen. Bob Corker, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, complained that the U.S. response to the island-building has been too passive. I see no price whatsoever that
China is paying for their activities in the South and East China Seas, Mr. Corker said. None. In fact, I see us paying a
price. Neither side wants a war. Mr. Xi is not anti-West in the manner of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and so far, he
has not acted rashly, as Mr. Putin has by grabbing territory in Ukraine. China still needs U.S. markets and know-how to
rise. A war against America would be an economic catastrophe for China. The U.S.-China relationship has weathered
storms before. Recall the days following the Chinese armys 1989 assault on pro-democracy students in Tiananmen
Square, when cooperation between the countries went into a deep freeze. But President George H.W. Bush calculated that
the U.S.-China relationship was too important to sacrifice, and he quickly sent emissaries to Beijing to ensure that it

trying to contain China

would be immensely costly: Neither country can succeed economically
without the other. Kennans containment strategy worked against the Soviet Union because it was
economically weak, with almost no commercial ties to America. But todays China is an economic
powerhouse, and its double-digit military budgets are supported by
a deep and diversified industrial base.
remained intact. Today, surely, that calculation carries no less weight. Moreover,

Containment Bad: Fails US Leadership

Containment is just posturing and unsustainable it will
lose the US critical leadership ground
Lee. 6/15
(Peter, Distinguished Scientist and the Managing Director of Microsoft
Research.. 6-17-2015, "Its official: America has a China-containment policy,"
Asia Times, Date Accessed 6-13-16. http://atimes.com/2015/06/its-officialamerica-has-a-china-containment-policy/ /DDI-AC)
a remarkably brazen show of the cloven hoof of containment
even while the US still spins the rather unconvincing were just here
to ensure freedom of navigation canard. But maybe FoN will soon get to take its
much deserved dirt nap. The United States real concern has always been military
freedom of the seas, not civilian freedom of navigation. FoS involves more than
In any case,

sailing through somebody elses EEZ in transit; it involves conducting purely military operations that have
no commercial or scientific dimension (which would invoke the economic rights of the EEZ claimant):
shooting off guns for practice, conducting training maneuvers and, most importantly, conducting
surveillance, maybe mapping the sea floor for classified military charts and maybe tracking the PRCs

When the PRC was not obviously strong &

aggressive, the Freedom of Navigation handwaving was needed to
provide a benign civilian overlay to the whole military FoS . In contrast to
the insistence of the United States on absolute, undiluted FoS, key US allies in the region,
including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam all seek to impose
limits on military FoS in a variety of matters relating to transit or
exercises within their EEZs, in a position that is arguably closer to
the PRC than the US; and even the Philippines has expressed reservations. And, for that
submarine strategic deterrent.

matter, the navy second most likely after the United States to exercise its FoS rights to operate inside the
EEZs of suspicious and aggrieved nations surrounding the South China Sea is the PLA Navy; so it is
perhaps understandable that Freedom of the Seas for military vessels was not a surefire propaganda

Now that the PRC is big & scary and the United States looks
ready to overtly challenge the PRC in the SCS as a matter of military
national security, maybe FoN and FoS can be discarded in favor of a
straight resisting Chinese aggression play. China hawks in the US Navy have
point.

been itching for such a policy for some while, and I would say their opportunity is at hand. Now, of course,
the DoD has a new bossSecretary of Defense Ash Carter; and PACCOM has a new commanderAdmiral
Sam Harris, and the general consensus is that the muscular defense sector has wrestled China policy away
from the milquetoastian White House. Interestingly, Admiral Harris was previously the Pentagons liaison to
to the State Department under Hillary Clinton as well as John Kerry, which reinforces my impression that
Hillary Clinton and her foreign policy advisors have pre-loaded China policy with her supporters, and I
expect things to get ugly quickly so that the nasty and awkward business of starting the confrontation can
be done under Obama before Clinton enters office. As I put it elsewhere: Hillary wants to inherit her China
crisis from Obama, not foment it herself. It may give heartache to the Chinese aggression is the root of all
evil crowd but anybody who doesnt see a crash US program to escalate what the PRC would like to limit
to a contained and manageable local friction in the SCS simply isnt paying attention. Right now, I would
say the goal is to escalate the crisis steeply enough to stampede Japanese public opinion to support the
enabling legislation for the new defense guidelines, which is now struggling in the legislature; and lock in
the civilian leadership of our Australian and Philippine allies, especially in anticipation of important
elections looming in the Philippines and Taiwan. The barrage of leaks and bellicose declarations from the
military quadrant in Australia, the Philippines, and Japan (typified by the Yomiuri article) with the apparent
objective of bucking up or boxing in the civilian leadership is a sight to behold. My apparently distinctly

marginal view is that this policy is not going to work very well (though its difficulties will be the source of

America
is not striving for the goal of regional security; it is chasing the
chimera of continued American leadership even as the strength of all
the Asian powersVietnam, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines as well as the PRCgrow, and US relative strength
declines. In other words, China will spend the next ten years
grabbing what it can; and the United States will be struggling to
keep what it cant.
much occupation and profit for the milsec fixer-uppers and explainers). As I see the problem,

Containment ineffective drives China closer to regional

neighbors. Engagement is more peaceful, keeps tabs on
Chinas rise.
Tellis, Ashley J. "Balancing Without Containment: A U.S. Strategy For
Confronting China's Rise." Washington Quarterly 36.4 (20 13): 109-124.
Academic Search Complete. Accessed July 12 // DDI - CS
Chinas rise constitutes the most serious geopolitical challenge facing the United States today. On current
trends, China couldmany say willdevelop a national economy larger than that of the United States as
early as the end of this decade, at least when measured in purchasing power parity terms.1 Chinas
national ambitions too are clear: at the very least, Beijing seeks to recover the centrality it enjoyed in
Asian geopolitics until the coming of colonialism.2 Its economic renaissance since the 1980s has now
positioned it to play a major global role that was simply unimaginable some thirty years ago. With its
extraordinary military modernization program, Beijing has also made tremendous strides toward holding at
risk the United States forward-deployed and forward-operating forces in the western Pacific, thereby
raising the costs of implementing U.S. security guarantees to its partners in the region. Its unique
characteristicsbeing a continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving
economy, having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military
capabilitiesadd up quickly to make China a consequential rival to the United States, even if it differs from
previous challengers in character, aims, and ambitions. Chinas rise, which is but part and parcel of the
larger rise of Asia, has been engendered in great measure by the permissive benefits of U.S. hegemony
since World War II. The U.S.-backed guarantee of open global commons, especially in the Asia Pacific
region, the creation of stable multilateral exchange arrangements, and the maintenance of the dollar as an
international reserve currency have all together produced inordinate gains for regional actors and the
international economy alike. As a result, China could actually grow not by the autarkic processes that
drove the rise of previous great powers, but by exploiting the interdependence arising from deliberate U.S.
investments in producing an open international trading system.3 The structural contradiction between the
United States and China is thus defined by the awkward reality that Washington sustains an international
economic order that, although producing great benefits for itself and others, simultaneously fuels the
growth of what could be its most significant geopolitical antagonist over time. Shorn of all subtlety,

Beijings rise poses a special problem for U.S. interests because it

threatens a possible power transition at the core of the global
system. Preserving American preeminence and by extension the current global system itself,
accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. This will prove difficult: Chinas
deep integration with the international economy, to include the U nited
States, implies that the obvious containment strategies that worked so effectively visa`-vis the preceding rival, the Soviet Union, are unlikely to be successfully replicated this
time around. Forget Containment, not Balancing Containing Chinadefined as attempting to suppress its

For one
thing, China has deep economic ties with the United States and the
international community, and all countries enmeshed in these
economic interactions profit from themeven if China accrues
greater gains than most. No state, therefore, would willingly forego its own
growth by isolating Beijing from its neighbors and the worldcannot work, for several reasons.

absolute gains deriving from trade with China. Even though Chinas neighbors in particular
recognize that they are contributing to growing Chinese power, and consequently are most anxious about

they are reluctant to limit their trading

relations with China so long as Beijing does not present an
intolerable danger to them and so long as non-military instruments, such
as diplomatic engagement and regional institutions, continue to offer some hope
of constraining China peacefully. Chinas incipient centrality has thus resulted in its
Beijings expanding military capabilities,

neighbors seeking to avoid any stark choices between China and the United Statesa preference that
could persist even in the event of conflict between these two powers. A Cold War-style containment
strategy is therefore likely to find little traction with key Asian states, and could in fact backfire if they are
presented with the intolerable binary of aligning with either Washington or Beijing. The net result of
globalization, therefore, is that rising, more powerful states, such as China, can exploit the phenomenon of
interdependence to increase their power and autonomy, even as their weaker partners become more
reluctant to cut off their trading ties for fear of losing out in absolute terms. This dynamic will persist so
long as U.S. military might suffices to protect the Asian security system, a system that U.S. power has long
underwritten. It is not clear, however, whether this will continue to be the case once Beijing acquires the
capacity to The U.S. benefits from its ties to China in absolute terms, but loses in relative terms. Ashley J.
Tellis 110 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 decisively undermine Washingtons extended

the strong SinoU.S.

trading relationship (one that was completely absent between the United States and the Soviet
Union during their rivalrys heyday), Chinas emerging role as an important U.S.
creditor, and the political power of key U.S. constituencies that profit
from strong ties with China all combine to frustrate any attempt by
the United States to restrain the growth of Chinese capabilities by
cutting off Beijings economic links with itself or with other states . The
deterrence capabilities in the Asian theater. Further complicating matters,

United States thus finds itself locked in a conundrum: it is tied to China through dense economic links that
have value because of their absolute gains, but it is threatened by the fact that the relative gains from this
relationship are arguably greater for Beijing and are increasingly used to build up Chinese military forces in
a way that threatens the security of the United States and its closest Asian allies. This problem has no easy
solutions. What alone is certain is that containment is infeasible today, even if it may be most needed as a
device for limiting Chinese power. This is why balancing becomes essential Chinas

rising
power cannot go unchecked. Even if Beijings intentions are peaceful today, there is no
assurance that they will remain so in perpetuity. Chinas rapid growth has already
elevated regional anxieties because of the dramatic shifts in the local correlation of
forces; it has weakened the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to the
littoral states, thanks to its ability to produce strategic instruments
capable of inflicting great damage on U.S. military assets deployed around
the IndoPacific; and it has threatened the traditional U.S. command of the
commons as a result of its growing capacity to deny the United States
unfettered use of the seas, space, cyberspace, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. These realities combine to generate a serious and deepening
challenge to U.S. power projection in Asia and, by extended implication, to U.S. primacy itself. If the United
States is to protect its global position amidst these challenges, it cannot afford not to balance China, even
if it must implement this response subtly and politely, garbed in the language of strategic partnership.

the United States must pursue a balancing strategy of

the kind that has not been attempted before. The core objective must be to protect,
and wherever possible to expand, the extant U.S. advantages in relative power, but
without incorporating those components that would spell containment. These
components include cutting Chinas access to the global trading
regime; integrating Chinas neighbors into a unified alliance system
against Beijing; developing collective defense strategies against
China; and pursuing an ideological campaign aimed at delegitimizing
Given these circumstances,

the Chinese state and its governing regime. Safeguarding U.S. hegemony requires instead a fourpronged strategy A trading relationship was completely absent between the United States and the Soviet
Union. If the U.S. is to protect its global position, it cannot afford not to balance China. Balancing without
Containment: A U.S. Strategy for Confronting Chinas Rise THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 111
that Washington must pursue concertedly in order to balance against growing Chinese power: first, it must
support the rise of other Asian powers located along Chinas periphery; second, it must deepen
globalization in specific ways to procure enhanced gains for itself and its friends; third, it must invest in
preserving its extant military superiority; and, finally, it must revitalize the U.S. economy to sustain its
dominance in the new leading sectors of the global economy. Dont Push China Down, Raise Others Up First
initiated by President George W. Bush but now continued purposefully by Barack Obama, the first prong of
the evolving U.S. strategy for balancing Beijing aims not at keeping China down, but raising others upor,
to put it differently, to propel the growth of other nations along Chinas periphery as a way of weaving the
net that produces a moderating effect on [Chinese] behavior.4 The logic of the strategy is simple and
aptly suited to present circumstances. If the consequential states abutting Chinasuch as Japan, India,
Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia, among otherscan be aided by U.S. power to realize their
strategic potential and to increase their mutual cooperation while deepening their partnership with the
United States, the net effect would be to create objective constraints that limit the misuse of Chinese
power in Asia. These checks would not materialize because the Asian partners necessarily bandwagon with
the United States or even champion all its policies vis-a`-vis Beijing. Rather, they would be produced by
the growing capabilities of these key nationsaided by the United Statesand their increased incentives
for collaboration both among themselves and with Washington. These elements, driven by the regional
actors own concerns about Chinas increasing power, would position the key Asian states in ways
fundamentally congruent with U.S. interests, especially the core objective of restraining the potential for
Chinese aggressiveness, while at the same time providing the necessary cushion that prevents [their]
tightened commercial interdependence [with China] from disrupting the delicate balance between

Such a regional equilibrium offers the

potential for balancing Chinaand inducing good behavior on the part of
Beijingwithout any necessity for containment, let alone conflict . The
economic gains and geopolitical risks.5

success of this approach, however, hinges on the ability of the United States to pay consistent attention to
the critical states abutting China, while at the same time keeping diplomatic relations with Beijing on an
even keel.6 Consequently, the United States (and its friends) ought to engage China at multiple levels,

Disagreement
over issues like human rights, political freedoms, the treatment of
minorities, nonproliferation, or military modernization should be
handled tactfully. Such an approach does not require the West to paper over what may be
both bilaterally and multilaterally, avoiding single-issue politics whenever possible.

troublesome Chinese domestic, foreign, or strategic policies, nor to shy away from visible and public
confrontations if egregious Chinese lapses demand it, but rather to ensure that all such responses are
sensitive to context, proportionality, and effectiveness. Put simply, the goal of deepened political
engagement with China ought to be encouraging it to stay committed to peaceful development both within
and without. To the degree that such engagement requires creating new inter-societal linkages or new fora
for bilateral and regional cooperation, these avenues should be explored. Ashley J. Tellis 112 THE

U.S. administrations have

more or less successfully pursued this emphasis on sustaining
productive relations with China. Such a focus, however, cannot be
allowed to eclipseas it often does in Washingtonthe equally vital objective of
strengthening U.S. ties with the key power centers located along
Chinas immediate and extended outskirts. Since 2001, for example, the United States has made
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 To their credit, recent

a special effort to transform its ties with India, the other rising Asian giant whose large continental size,
great economic and demographic potential, significant military capabilities, and sturdy commitment to
democracynot to mention its own ongoing rivalry with Chinamake it a particularly attractive partner for
Washington. This rapprochement with India should extend to other critical Southeast Asian states. Such an
effort will require considerable political attention at high levels in Washingtonand a remarkable degree of
consistency that in the past has often been the exception, not the norm. The endeavor is admittedly
challenging: the number of states that Washington must engage successfully is large; the partners
themselves are remarkably diverse in national capabilities and differ in alliance status; they each pursue
varying strategic objectives; and their capacity to respond to U.S. overtures is dissimilar as well.

Because they are all individually weaker than China, they are at
times easy to overlook; nevertheless, their role cannot go

underestimated. For that reason, U.S. policymakers should

continually strengthen the national power of these littoral entities
even when they cannot or will not reciprocate U.S. initiatives as fulsomely as may be desired. And if
these nations do reach their strategic potential as a result of
preferential U.S. assistance, they would effectively serve as a
powerful constraint on Chinas freedom of action in Asia. This would not
only limit Beijings capacity to dominate important centers of the
global economy, but would bring Chinas entire outer periphery
under the influence of nations friendly to the U nited States. Thus, U.S.
hegemony would gain another, more local level of protectionand in so doing
will buttress U.S. primacy for longer, and more cheaply, compared to many other alternatives. This
approach generates a positive converse as well. If U.S. assistance strengthens the regional powers, their
incentives to expand economic interdependence with China would grow; they would have no reason to fear
that the material gains accruing to Beijing could be used to threaten their security. The persistence of such
a positive-sum game all around, then, mitigates interstate rivalry and its potential for undermining larger

The strategy of nurturing the growth of major powers

along the Asian periphery in order to balance China without
containing it, therefore, provides the regional system with the best of both worlds: an
opportunity to limit Beijings capacity for malevolence without
sacrificing the common prosperity arising from trade and
interdependence.
gains in prosperity.

Appeasement creates a positive relationship any status

quo containment is not designed, its a default failing
approach
China US Focus Digest 14 (China US Focus Digest, October 2014,
Should U.S. Consider Accepting a Chinese Monroe Doctrine
http://www.chinausfocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Digest_Vol3.pdf )
Beginning with the Nixon administrations initial outreach to the Chinese
government in the early 1970s, and continuing through successive
administrations until the early years of the twenty-first century, the
engagement aspect in U.S. policy was dominant. But during the
administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the emphasis shifted.
Containment, albeit implicit rather than explicit, has now become the
principal featureand that trend is accelerating. Washington prods its East
Asian allies to devote greater efforts to defense, and U.S. officials seek to
transform the bilateral alliances with those nations to cover broader, regional
security contingencies. Especially during the Obama years, U.S. policy has
tilted in favor of countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which are
embroiled in territorial disputes with China involving the South China Sea,
and has backed Japan in its contentious confrontation with Beijing over the
disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Such informal
manifestations of containment deceive no oneleast of all, Chinese officials.
Washingtons current strategy is fomenting growing tensions with
China, and they could ultimately lead to a military collision in East
Asia between the two powers. Perhaps most troubling, Washington
has seemingly adopted a de facto containment policy almost by

default, concluding that there are no feasible alternatives, despite

rising Chinese anger. Before we continue down that path, we should at
least assess more seriously whether other, less confrontational and more
sustainable, options exist. One admittedly controversial option would be to
accept the likelihood that China, by virtue of its greater population and
mounting economic and military capabilities, is destined to become the
dominant power in East Asia. Even the hint of recognizing Chinese regional
pre-eminence, though, always produces shrill allegations of appeasement.
And that term has an especially odious connotation because of the disastrous
appeasement policy that the Western powers pursued toward Adolf Hitler in
the late 1930s. But so-called appeasement has a much longer and more
productive history than the calamitous 1930s model would suggest.
Indeed, the United States was the principal beneficiary of a milder version
that Britain adopted in the 1890s. In response to a nasty boundary dispute
between Venezuela and a neighboring British colony, London faced a stark
choice. It could confront an increasingly powerful United States, which was
mightily annoyed at what it perceived as a challenge to Washingtons
cherished Monroe Doctrine barring European interference in the Western
Hemisphere. The alternative was to concede that the United States was now
the dominant power in that region and to accept Washingtons policy
preferences. British officials chose the latter course, a move that ended
decades of tensions between the two countries over various issues and
created the foundation for what would ultimately become an extremely close
alliance. U.S. officials need to at least consider whether a similar concession
might create the basis for a new, far less contentious, relationship with
China while still protecting important American interests in the
Western Pacific. In other words, is it time to recognize a Chinese equivalent of
the Monroe Doctrine in East Asiaaccepting that China is now the preeminent regional power? There are essential caveats to such a dramatic
policy shift. At a minimum, Beijing would need to embrace not only the
original logic of the Monroe Doctrine, but also the so-called Roosevelt
Corollary. The latter, adopted during Theodore Roosevelts administration,
promised Britain and the other European powers that the United States would
maintain order in the Western Hemisphere and discipline irresponsible
governments in the region. That requirement would have direct applicability
to a pre-eminent role by Beijing in East Asia. Specifically, China would need
to accept responsibility for preventing rogue powers like North
Korea from disrupting regional peace and tranquility. Even if that
meant direct Chinese action to remove an offending regime in Pyongyang,
Beijing would need to be willing to undertake such action. Reducing the
danger of North Korean aggression against its East Asian neighbors (and
perhaps someday even against the United States) would provide a significant
benefit to America. Beijings willingness to undertake that responsibility
would be a crucial prerequisite for any U.S. decision to accept Chinas
regional pre-eminence. Unwillingness on Beijings part to embrace the role of
stabilizer would greatly reduce the appeal of a more accommodating U.S.
policy.

Containment Bad: Globalization

Its not World War 2 globalization forces engagement.
Containment ignores economic interdependency.
Yan Xuetong* and Qi Haixia; 2012; Yan Xuetong is Professor of
International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International
Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of
International Relations, Tsinghua University. They are the co-authors of
Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: ChinaUS Intensifying Rivalry Does
not Amount to Cold War; The Chinese journal of international politics;
Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: ChinaUS Intensifying Rivalry
Does not Amount to Cold War; April 6th, 2012;
file:///C:/Users/Kenney/Dropbox/Appeasement%20Generic/Emma/Football
%20Game.pdf (EK)
Economic

globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars
disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-

. Levels of
interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of
international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation
can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain
scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the
conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United
States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither
is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation . Economic interdependence, however, will not
flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression global village

diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for
superficial friendship between the United States and China. Involvement in the globalization process has rapidly expanded Chinas
involvement in international organizations in ever-growing fields,36 within many of which China accepts West-led international norms.37 The
country has thus shifted from opposing the international order to reforming the international order to maintaining the international

The growth of SinoUS

economic interdependence has prompted the United States adoption of a twopronged policy of military and political containment and of economic engagement. Its aim is to
reduce the risk of a head-on conflict that could considerably damage United
States interests. These contradictory strands of US policy towards China are an indicator of superficial friendship. Under the
order.38 Globalization has changed not only Chinas but also United States behavioral principles.

context of economic globalization, China has also developed economic interdependence with United States allies. This has reduced incentives
to participate in containment of China and also dampened United States resolve to maintain a policy of complete containment. As a result,

enhanced levels of interdependence among China and other

nations have diminished the probability of Chinas opting to rise through
forceful expansion.39 To be maintained over the long-term, superficial friendship requires that both China and the United States
certain scholars argue that

maintain a superficial friendship strategy. Chinas unilateral maintenance of such a strategy is not sufficient as well as not sustainable. One
reason why the United States has maintained a strategy of superficial friendship towards China over the long term is that of liberalist US
academics emphases on economic interdependence between China and the United States under the context of globalization. Some US

it is impossible for the United States to contain China under

conditions of globalization, and consequently that there is no other choice
than to adopt a policy of engagement. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense under Clinton Joseph S.
scholars argue that

Nye said that the United States does not need to adopt a policy of containment towards China, and nor is it possible to contain it. The only
chance is for China to contain itself. For example, over the past two years, disputes in the South China Seas and over the ChinaIndia border
have worsened Chinas relations with its neighbors, resulting in their bringing in US military might to hedge against China.

Containment would bring catastrophe, but cooperation could achieve win

win.

Containment Bad: Self-Fulfilling

Containment only fuels mistrust and increase tensions,
amplifying the risk of unnecessary war these cycles of
aggression are already happening now; instead, we need
to trod a middle path
Kim, Jihyun 2015 (assistant professor in the Institute of International
Studies at Bradley University, IL, where she teaches courses on US-East Asian
relations and problems on contemporary Asia, in addition to the Institutes
most widely offered general education course, Fundamentals of
Contemporary East Asian Civilizations. Dr. Kim holds a PhD in political science
from the University of South Carolina, where she specialized in international
relations and comparative politics. Her major research interests include
regional security and major power interactions in East Asia, Chinese and
Korean politics and foreign policy, and nuclear security and nonproliferation)
Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia
and Beyond, Strategic Studies Quarterly Summer 2015, pp.107-141 // DDI CS
As a rising (or reemerging) power, China has an increasing interest in
terms of showing its strength and safeguarding its pride. Thus, it is more
inclined to retaliate with force, if provoked, even though it may still be
reluctant to initiate and enter into a military conflict with any of its neighbors.
In this sense, the supreme irony of Washingtons Asia-Pacific pivot, which is
often seen as an American reprise of Cold War contain- ment now
directed at China, fueling an arms race and U.S. alliance structure
that is a growing threat to China, is that it has encouraged a list of
countries in the region, including the Philippines and Vietnam, as
well as Japan, to oppose and challenge China, and to decline to negotiate in good faith to resolve disputes, testing the limits of
Beijings restraint with US-led defensive alliances and
partnerships, which are deemed to be offensive in the eyes of Beijing.26 In
conjunction with the rise of nationalist competition in the region, this may
further facili- tate the process of Beijings shifting focus from economic to
geopolitical concerns, which in turn would expedite self-reinforcing
cycles of aggres- sion among all sides locked in the disputes.
Nonetheless, conflict is a choice, not a necessity, although enduring
disputes are more likely if established countries like the United States
(with its regional allies and friends) treat every advance in Chinas
mili- tary capabilities as a hostile act or China, as a rising power,
disregards the tenuous dividing line between defensive and
offensive capabilities and overlooks the consequences of an
unrestrained arms race.27 Un- der the circumstances, both China and its
neighbors, supported by the United States, may create the self-defeating
Thucydides trap.28 This implies that a deadly combination of the
growth of Chinese power and the anxiety that this caused in America

(and its allies and friends in the region) may evolve into mutual
distrust and turn their healthy rivalry into conflict and unnecessary
war. Interesting in this analysis is that Chi- nas increasing assertiveness
regarding issues like the South China Sea is Strategic Studies Quarterly
Summer 2015 [ 117 ] Jihyun Kim not as important in itself as a sign of things
to comethat being the potential danger of China, the United States, and
other claimants in the disputes falling into dangerous and destructive
zero-sum competition. At present, Americas strategic concerns include
losing its hegemonic status and being gradually pushed out of Asia. On the
one hand, there is Chinas fear of being militarily encircled by an outside
power aligned with inside powers, capable of impinging on Chinas territory or
intervening in its own regional affairs. Under the circumstances, just as
Chinese influence in surrounding countries may spur fears of dominance, so
ef- forts to pursue traditional American national interests can be perceived as
a form of military encirclement.29 The clash between these forces could
make concerns about those powers falling into the Thucydides trap more
than just an illusion. The critical question is whether, and if so under what
conditions, Chinas pragmatic realism would steer it to be more conducive to
peaceful conflict resolution instead of choos- ing a hostile revision of the
status quo. What follows is an analysis of the assumptions discussed above to
examine whether the United States and China, along with other Asian
nations, can avoid the Thucydides trap by letting their seemingly
irreconcilable objectives coexist with- out resorting to violence. In a larger
sense, this case has produced only partially known outcomes as tensions
over the contested waters of the South China Sea continue with sluggish
multilateral diplomatic efforts to institutionalize a binding code of conduct
(COC). ... As for Washington, the core task is to make it clear that the
nations pivot to Asia is not designed as a zero-sum game to target
and isolate China but to fulfill the US role as a reliable provider of
Asian secu- ritystill powerful enough to maintain its vital alliance
relationships and keep regional tensions at bay. In case of any regional
conflict over the disputed territories, the United States has a responsibility to
defend its long-standing ally, the Philippines, and to support its regional partners such as Indonesia and Malaysia. To do otherwise would undermine
Americas credibility not only in Southeast Asia but in the Asia-Pacific and
elsewhere. At the same time, it is important to embrace the real- ity
that encouraging restraint from all parties and peacefully resolving
these disputes will be in Americas best interests. In fact, direct
American intervention could be counterproductive, given the risk of
damaging [134] Strategic Studies Quarterly Summer 2015 Territorial
Disputes in the South China Sea its critically important ties with China in
the name of defending US allies and friends even if Chinese actions
might not directly threaten core American interests, including freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, Washington must pay
close attention to Bei- jings perception of American decline and maintain
comprehensive na- tional power in order to keep healthy and balanced
relations with a ris- ing China. Despite the significance of Sino-US

collaboration on a range of global problems, excessively accommodating

Chinas demands might backfire, as doing so could feed an image in
Beijing of weakness in the outside world, encouraging it to make a
further attempt to push.81 Thus, the United States needs to continue
its engagement in Asia with some muscle in its diplomacynot
necessarily to provoke China but to enhance deterrence to counter
Chinas expansionism and to convince Beijing there is nothing to be
gained by bullying its neighbors. At the same time, nothing good can
come from excessively pushing China, which has its own concerns
about Americas role in Asia, into a cor- ner.82 Under these conditions, it is
essential for the United States to find the right balance between
reassuring US allies and partners of Wash- ingtons commitment to
the stability in Asia-Pacific and maintaining Americas pragmatic
policy of engagement with Beijing so as to protect US interests
without exploiting Beijings anxieties. This would require the United
States to pursue a strategically nuanced approach to sustain its
credibility as the major balancer of power in Asia, while simultane- ously
making efforts to create an environment in which China would be
incorporated as an essential part of the regional community. Such an
approach would necessitate a delicate balance of alliance management on
the one hand and practical and vigorous engagement with Beijing on the
other. In this, the United States would have to work hard to enhance its
strategic relationship with China, even while striving to maintain its
military supremacy and to keep the regional balance of power in its
favor. Such a cautious and seemingly inconsistent approach would not
necessarily reflect the discrepancy of Washingtons Asia policy. Rather, it
would be a sensible manifestation of the realities of Americas complex
interdependence with China and other states in the region. Faced with the
risk of conflict and the task of reducing the geopoliti- cal tensions, scholars
and global leaders alike have called for building strategic trust, based upon a
new type of major power relationship be- tween Beijing and Washington.83
Henry Kissinger, for example, asserts Strategic Studies Quarterly Summer
2015 [ 135 ] Jihyun Kim that the emergence of a prosperous and powerful
China should not be considered in itself to be an American strategic defeat
given the non-zero-sum nature of their bilateral ties in the twenty-first
century.84 Perhaps then, the real danger is to treat a rising China as
detrimental to regional peace while seeing growing tensions in the
South China Sea simply as a reflection of Beijings expansionist
ambitions or concluding that Sino-US relations will follow the vicious
cycle of the rise and fall of the great powers. To fall prey to such
thinking will enhance an arms race and worsen the security dilemma.
Thus, there is no better time than now to heed Joseph Nyes counsel that
the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one,
leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy.85 In fact, the future of Chinas rise is
open-ended, which is not necessarily bad. Rather, it means it is still possible
to shape the future to become more peacefully and mutually-enhancing. Such
a promise can bring out pragmatic realism in China, which strives to emerge

not as a threat but a powerful, yet respected and proud, member of the
regional and inter- national communities. The specific issue of South China
Sea disputes, though deemed as a major geopolitical flashpoint, can still be
turned into an opportunity for creating a better future. Especially if China
wants to be recognized not merely as a rising power but also as a valued
leader in Asia and beyond, that nation must not miss this chance to mitigate
the ongoing tensions by assuaging its neighbors concerns about its aggressive expansionism and by promoting inclusive region-wide commercial
benefits and strategic partnerships.

Containment Bad: War

Containment is pure escalatory posturing - risks Military
miscalculation between Major Powers ending in Nuclear
War
Ted Galen, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National
Interest, 6-3-2015, "Here's How to Avoid World War Three," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-how-avoid-world-war-three-13027?page=show [KKC]
Although wars between even small nations are tragic for the populations involved and can cause wider

the prospect of armed conflict between major

powers is the true nightmare scenarioespecially in an era of nuclear
weapons. The two world wars that so horribly scarred the twentieth century provide important
problems in the international system,

reminders of the dire consequences of great-power conflicts. It follows that all responsible major countries
should avoid actions that increase the risk of needless confrontations. Unfortunately, the level of danger
from such conduct appears to be rising rather than declining. National pride and domestic political
pressure to show the flag and demonstrate credibility can sometimes overwhelm common sense in the
conduct of foreign policy. Recent actions by several major powers are reminiscent of playground posturing
by middle-school male students. For example, Russia has repeatedly engaged in provocative military
flights near the airspace of NATO members, especially the three Baltic republics. On one occasion, Russian
bombers even flew near Great Britains airspace. The foolish nature of that maneuver was underscored,
given that the bombers were obsolescent, propeller-powered aircraft. British and NATO military
commanders were not likely to be intimidated by weaponry embodying technology from the 1940s. Thus,
the flights had the unique combination of being annoying and ineffectualthe epitome of a needless
provocation. Flights by modern Russian fighter planes and surveillance aircraft in the Baltic region are
more serious, as are incidents involving Russian naval vessels operating near the territorial waters of
various European countries. U.S. and NATO officials have repeatedly denounced such conduct. But NATO
members have also engaged in foolishly provocative actions. In February 2015, the alliance conducted
exercises with tanks and 1,400 troops near Narva, Estonia, barely 300 yards from the Russian border. In
late May, Russian aircraft scrambled to intercept a U.S. destroyer that was operating in the Black Sea
adjacent to Russias territorial waters near the crucial naval base on the Crimean Peninsula. Such gestures
provide meager tangible military benefits. Conducting maneuvers with ground forces in the Baltic republics
is almost entirely a matter of symbolism. A high-ranking NATO military official candidly conceded that
Russia could occupy all three Baltic states in a matter of days, if Moscow chose to take that step. Unless
NATO is willing to fight a full-scale war with a nuclear-armed Russia, there is little that the alliance could do
to prevent such an outcome. And battalion-scale military maneuvers are not likely to weigh decisively in
the Kremlins assessment of whether NATO would honor its Article 5 pledge that an attack on one member
is considered an attack on all. Vladimir Putin and his cohorts either believe that commitment or they
consider it a bluff. Symbolic military gestures probably do not alter their calculation in any meaningful way.

On the other side of the world, major powers also exhibit an increasing
tendency to engage in risky, provocative gestures. That is especially true
regarding the ongoing territorial dispute between China and Japan over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Chinese fishing boats and naval vessels
frequently enter the waters around those small islands, and Chinese military aircraft fly near them. In
November 2013, Beijing proclaimed an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the disputed region,
despite vehement objections from both Tokyo and Washington. U.S. planes promptly defied the new ADIZ,
conducting military flights through the airspace without notifying China. Tensions are clearly on the rise.
Japan scrambled its fighter planes to intercept Chinese aircraft over the East China Sea some 415 times
between March 2013 and March 2014, and the pace has not noticeably diminished since then. For its part,
China has repeatedly intercepted U.S. and Japanese surveillance flights in or near the disputed territories.

When rival military aircraft operate in such a confrontational mode, a mere

miscalculation or accident could trigger an extremely nasty incident. That is
precisely what happened in the spring of 2001 when a U.S. EP-3 spy plane
collided with a Chinese fighter plane near Chinas Hainan Island. The resulting
crisis lasted for weeks before cooler heads prevailed and a compromise diplomatic solution was reached.
One might think that Beijing and Washington would have learned from that alarming experience and taken
steps to avoid similar dangers. But there is little evidence of such prudence. Indeed, both countries are

currently engaged in risky posturing regarding the South China Sea. Beijing flirts with the idea of
proclaiming an ADIZ in that region, despite the ongoing, multisided territorial disputes with its neighbors.
Washington is deepening its involvement in the underlying tensions, including by conducting air and sea
patrols in the area. It is bad enough if a conflict between major powers erupts because of intractable
grievances over crucial substantive issues. But it is even worse if such a tragedy occurs because rivals
engage in ill-considered, symbolic posturing. Unfortunately, that appears to be the trend in both East Asia
and Eastern Europe. It would be wise for all parties involved to reduce the level of risk and renounce such
conduct.

Containment Bad: Withdrawal

Accommodation is the only solution when dealing with
china
HUGH WHITE et al, MARY KAY MAGISTAD, ZHA DAOJIONG; 2015;
PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY, Mary Kay Magistad is the Beijing-based East Asia correspondent
for the Public Radio International/BBC program The World, Zha Daojiong is a
professor of international political economy at Peking University; Foreign Policy;
Is it time for America to consider accommodation with china? June 8 t h , 2015;
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/08/china-us-policy-rivalry-tension-great-powersaccommodation/ (EK)

it is time for the United States to consider an accommodation with

China, as several influential voices are now urging. This would not be easy. The United States would need to treat
That means

China as an equal for any deal to stand a chance, and Americans have never treated any country as an equal before. But the United States has never dealt with a
country as powerful as China before, either. And the United States would still need to back any deal with its power. Ultimately, China could only be held to an

Otherwise, the United States will

find itself facing the third alternative withdrawal from Asia. No one should imagine that this is not a
real possibility in future, just because it has been wrongly predicted in the past. If America is going to stay engaged in Asia, it must treat
China as an equal or confront it as a rival.
agreement over a new regional order that America is willing to go to war with it to enforce.

AT: Yan
US- China cooperation leads to more stabilization,
countries wont escalate into conflict.
Johnston 11, (Alastair Lain Johnston, Chinese Journal of International
Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, Stability and Instability in SinoUS Relations: A
Response to Yan Xuetongs Superficial Friendship Theory,
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/)
Yans argument, and the sketch of a security dilemma argument above, has
focused on the different explanations for instability in the USChina
relationship. But to avoid selecting on the dependent variable, we need to
acknowledge the stabilizing elements in the relations (elements that I think
Yan discounts), despite an emerging security dilemma. There are at least four
of them. First, I think there is evidence that the very top levels on both sides
actually have a better understanding of each others interests and red lines
than is implied by the public debates.56 There is evidence of an ability to selfreflect, and to correct behaviours that appear to contribute to security
dilemma dynamics.57 Indeed, much of the evidence of security dilemma
dynamics comes from outside the core decision-making units on both sides,
and is mostly found in some government-connected analytical communities,
in the media, and in think-tank communities. When leaderships are weak or
distracted by other issues, the narratives and conventional wisdoms of these
communities might contribute to security dilemma dynamics in the policy
process itself. The exception might be the mindsets behind military
programmes and policies aimed at countering the other side. Here, even
strong civilian leaderships probably struggle to monitor the practices of their
militaries, and to ensure that these are consistent with political policy. All of
this means, however, that a critical indicator of an intensifying security
dilemma will be the degree to which leaders can control, and insulate
themselves from, hardliner pressures, or can mobilize counter-hard-line
voices and interests. Second, it may well be that deterrence (including nuclear)
works. Both leaderships appear to realize the military, economic, and political
costs of major conflict. Thus, an indicator of an intensifying security dilemma
will be the degree to which key actors on both sides begin to discount these
costs. Third, ideological competition between the two sides is relatively low
compared with USSoviet rivalry. Ideological differences are important, since
these underscore perceptions of identity difference on both sides. But these
ideological differences affect how each society views the other, and do not
feature centrally in competition to win supporters abroad. Thus, another
indicator of an intensifying security dilemma might be just how much traction
the US liberal critique of the so-called China model gets, and to what degree
the notion of a China model begins to guide Chinese economic, military, and
political practices in the developing world. Finally, economic integration
appears to be mutually beneficial for sizeable constituencies on both sides.
Chinas economic rise has benefited from US policy (e.g. markets,
investment, entrance into the WTO). The US benefits overall from Chinas

cheap manufactures and its buying of American debt. Thus, yet another
indicator of an intensifying security dilemma will be the degree to which
advocates of de-integration and restricted economic interaction are able to
make their cases politically.58 The discussion above about an emerging US
China security dilemma explanation is clearly based on anecdotal evidence,
and awaits a more systematic testing of its three main hypotheses against a
clearer and more rigorously derived set of hypotheses from Yans superficial
friendship model. Probing the plausibility of an argument is a legitimate
reason for preliminary scholarly research, but I would encourage Yan to
develop further the theoretical micro-foundations and empirical implications
of his model beyond his current assessments of instability in the USChina
relationship.