Ramos v Director of Lands

Director of lands vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract
of land in Nueva Ecija (1882) by taking advantage of the
Royal Decree to obtain possessory information title to the
land and registered as such.
Parcel 1 was sold to Ramos and wife Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the groung that Ramos had
not acquired a good title from the Spanish Government, and
by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the Parcel 1
was forest land.
Trial Court excluded Parcel 1 from registration.

Facts:

Issue:
WON the actual occupancy of a part of land sufficient to give title to
the entire tract of land

Held:
Yes, based on the doctrine of constructive possession.
The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a
portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in
adverse possession of another.
The claimant has color of title, he acted in good faith and he
has open, peaceable and notorious possession of a portion
of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession.

The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It

adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano
have converted it into a fishpond.
In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that
they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly
through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it is not
within any forest or military reservation
The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the
Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on
the principal ground that the land applied for is WITHIN THE
UNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such
area are denominated as FOREST LANDS-do not form part
of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in
favor of the Valerianos. This was affirmed by the CA which
said in part that since the subject property is entirely
devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as
part of forest lands.

Issue:
WON the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
Held:

Courts cannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and

jurisdiction.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative
of the Executive Department (Bureau of Forest
Development) and not of the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition.

Since the subj property is still unclassified, whatever

possession Applicants (Valeriano) may have had, and,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of the subj property into a fishpond by
Applicants does not automatically render the property as
alienable and disposable.

Kasilag v Rodriguez
Facts:

Kasilag and Ambrosio entered into a contract of mortgage of

improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the
payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest.

The parties stipulated that Ambrosio was to pay the debt with
interest within 4 years and in such case, mortgage would
not have any effect. They also agreed that Ambrosio would
execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4
years and that she would pay the tax on the land.

After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the
tax.

Hence, they entered a verbal agreement whereby she

conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the
condition that they would not collect the interest of the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by
the fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement
thereof.

Issue:

These pacts made by the parties independently were

calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered
into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The
contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening
the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in

good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
Held:
Yes.

From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we

can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was
aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition,
aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This
being the case, the question is whether good faith may be
premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the

basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may
be such basis.

It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws

because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that
he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation
of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does,
that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes
of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien,
was prohibited by section 116.

These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that,

as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section
116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his
good faith.

El Banco Espaol-Filipino v Peterson

Facts:

BEF executed a contract of loan in favor of Reyes who was

already indebted to the bank. His total debt was around
200,000.
To secure the payment, Reyes executed a public instrument
mortgaging several properties and pledging part of his
personal property which were stored at a warehouse he
rented.
BEF and Reyes agreed that the goods should be delivered
to Garcia, the depositary, for safekeeping. Reyes turned over
the goods by giving the warehouse keys. Garcia was then
substituted by Sierra as depositary.
A certain Juan Garcia sued Reyes, judgment was rendered
against Reyes upon which judgment execution was issued
against his property.
On that same day of judgment, Sheriff Peterson entered the
warehouse where goods pledged to BEF were stored and he
levied 30,000 worth of goods depriving BEF of possession.

Issue:

WON Reyes is still in possession of the pledged goods thereby

making the contract defective
Held:
Contract of Pledge was valid.
Reyes was no longer in possession of the pledged goods
because BEF had symbolic possession of the same.
The contract complied with all the requisites.
The fact that the goods are still in the warehouse rented by
Reyes does not affect the validity and legality of the pledge.
Since the contract of pledge is valid, BEF had a better right to the
goods.
SPS. MACASAET v SPS. MACASAET
Facts:

Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents

Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael
is the son of respondents and Teresita is his wife.
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTC of Lipa
an ejectment suit against the children.
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of 2 parcels of
land, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal
lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in Mar.
1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their
construction business; and that despite repeated demands,
petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease
agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them to
construct their residence and business on the subject lots in
order that they could all live near one another, employ marivic,
the sister of Ismael, and help in resolving the problems of the
family.
They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land
they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
children.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners
to vacate the premises. It opined that Ismael and Teresita had
occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but
by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.
As their stay was merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily
bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand.
On appeal, the regional trial court updheld the findings fo the
MTCC. However, the RTC allowed the respondents to
appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by
petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Art.
448 in relation to Art. 546 and 548 of the NCC.
The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael
and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the
tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Citing Calubayan v. pascual,
the CA further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to that

of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but

whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
Consequently , in ascertaining the right of the petitioners to be
reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on
respondents properties, the appellate court applied the Civil
Codes provisions on lease.

Facts:

Issue:
W.O.N. the courts should fix the duration of possession.

Held:

That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is

therefore clear, the issue is the duration of possession. In the
absence of a stipulation on this point, Art. 1197 of the civil Code
allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.
Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it
depends upon the will of the debtor.
Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties
intended a period. Such qualification cannot be inferred from the
facts of the present case.
The mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not
necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do so
It can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long
as the parents and the children mutually benefited from the
arrangement.
Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful
when the reason therefore love and solidarity ceased to exist
between them.

Cuaycong v. Benedicto

The Nanca-Victoria wagon road, which passes through

Hacienda Torena owned by Blasa and Ramona Benedicto,
has been used by the owners, tenants and employees
[plaintiffs and appellees] of the group of haciendas situated
between the southern boundaries of the Hacienda Toreno
and the barrio of Nanca for 30 or 40 years mainly for the
purpose of transporting goods to the barrio, until the
Benedictos close the road and began charging toll in 1911.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Benedictos and moved
that the court grant a preliminary injunction restraining the
latter from interfering in the use of the road during the
pendency of the trial; motion was granted.
After trial, CFI Negros Occidental held that the NancoVictorias road was a public highway over which the public
had acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription, and
ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction against
plaintiffs, restraining them from interfering in any manner
with the use of the said road.
Note that NO public funds have at any time been expended
on the construction or upkeep of the Nanca-Victorias road,
but from time to time work has been done on it by the
laborers employed by the present and former owners of the
Hacienda Toreno and the haciendas owned by the appellees
and their predecessors in title.

Issues
1. WON the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway. (NO)
2. If on the negative, WON the Nanca-Victoria road, or that part of it
which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, is subject to a private easement
of way in favor of the appellees Cuaycong et al. (NO)

Held

The Supreme Court from the testimonial evidence presented that the
use of the road in question is limited to the use of owners, tenants, or
employees of adjoining estates but there is nothing in the evidence
to indicate that the use extended beyond this i.e. not used by the
public in general.
It is not averred in the complaint that the road in question
was used by the public. On the contrary, it is averred that it
was used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors. It shows
that when they commenced this action they had in mind the
provisions of articles 564 [649 NCC], et seq. of the Civil
Code, which relate to the method of establishing the
compulsory easement of way. The owners of an existing
easement, as well as those whose properties are adjacent
with a public road, have no occasion to invoke these
provisions of the Code, which relate to the creation of new
rights, and not the enforcement of rights already in
existence.
Where it appears that the road has been kept in repair by
private enterprise and that the Government has not
contributed to the cost of its construction and maintenance,
such road shall be presumed private.
The mere fact that the tract of land has been used for a long
time as a road will not alone warrant the presumption that it
has been dedicated to the public.
There being no evidence that the original use of the road by
plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee
to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under
the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must
be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or
license of the owners of the estates affected.
Possession, to constitute the foundation of prescriptive right,
must be possession under claim of title i.e. it must be
adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one
who holds by mere tolerance of the owner cannot be made
the basis of the prescriptive acquisition of rights. This
principle is applicable not only with respect to the
prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the
prescription of right in rem.

With respect to discontinuous servitudes under the Spanish

law [Partidas] in order to establish a right of prescription
based upon use from time immemorial requires proof more
than the memory of living witness.
It must also be noted that the Benedictos are the owners of
Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title and that there was no
annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here
in question, either as a "public road" or as a "private way
established by law." The plaintiffs being the owners of the
property in question, the presumption of law is that it is free
from any lien or encumbrance whatever, and the burden
therefore rests upon plaintiffs to establish the contrary.
ASTUDILLO v PHHC
FACTS:

In behalf of his minor son, Mitra applied, for the purchase of

Lot 16, of the East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in
Quezon City.

His application was approved so he made a down payment

of an amount equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot.
PHHC and Mitra then executed a contract of conditional
sale.

After Mitra had paid in full the price, a final deed of sale was
executed in his favor and TCT was issued to him.

The lot in question is in the possession of Astudillo. She

constructed thereon a residential house (a shanty, according
to Mitra). She admits that she has been squatting on the said
lot uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present.

Astudillo filed a petition with the administrative investigating

committee to cancel the award of Lot 16 to Mitra.

Subsequently, Astudillo filed the same petition with the lower

court against the PHHC, Register of deeds of Quezon City
and the spouses Mitra.

After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra

spouses filed a verified motion for summary judgment.
Astudillo opposed the motion.
The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as
a motion to dismiss. It dismissed Peregrina's petition on the
grounds that she is a mala fide squatter and that the sale of
Lot 16 to Mitra cannot be assailed by means of certiorari and
mandamus.

In 1979, Sabater sold it to Peran.

Peran then asked Encarnacion to vacate the lot, but

Encarnacion refused.

Thus, Peran filed a complaint of Forcible Entry and Unlawful

Detainer against Encarnacion.

Municpal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona rendered its

Decision ordering private respondents to vacate the lot in
question, return its possession to petitioner

ISSUE:
W/N Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot
16 to Mitra.

HELD:

The CFI erred when it reckoned the counting of the 1 yr

period within which to file the action from Dec 31, 1972, and
not from the time of demand. A forcible entry and unlawful
detainer action must be brought within 1 yr.

The 1 yr period of limitation period commences from the time

of demand to vacate, and when several demands are made,
the same is counted from the last letter of demand.

The demand to vacate having been made in Jan 1979 and

the suit having been instituted on Feb 8, 1979, the Municipal
Court acted within its jurisdiction.

The CFI also erred in assuming that prior possession in

whatever character is protected by law.

The prior possession of Encarnacion and her husband was

only by mere tolerance and therefore does not vest in them a
right which they can assert against Peran.

Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this becomes illegal

when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor
refuses to comply with such demand. A possessor by mere
tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to
vacate upon demand.

HELD:
No.

Astudillo has no cause of action to impugn the award to of

Lot 16 to Mitra. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights
over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did not
prejudice her since she has no rights over the said lot which
could have been impaired by that award.

PERAN v CFI
FACTS:

Jose Evasco owns an unregistered land.

He executed an extrajudicial partition of it among his 5 heirs,

one of which was his son, Alejandro.

He allowed and tolerated his niece Encarnacion to erect a

house on a portion of his lot.

In 1972, Alejandro sold the lot to Torella.

Torella sold it to Sabater.

Yu vs. Honrado
Facts:
Subject of the case is the possession of about forty-two metric tons
of scrap engine blocks (valued at more than forty thousand pesos),
part of a stock which Marcelo Steel Corporation sold to an alleged
swindler and which scrap iron was allegedly purchased in good faith
by the Yu spouses from the swindler but retrieved from the
purchasers by Marcelo Steel Corporation by means of a search
warrant.

Marcelo sold to Refuerzo who paid through a bouncing

check.
Refuerzo sold to Soledad junk shop who paid in GF
(innocent purchaser) but items were seized by police
because court Judge (Honrado) declared it to have been
embezzled and returned to Marcelo Steel Corp.
The fiscal filed a case of Estafa against Refuerzo et.al. The
case temporarily archived the case. But resolution has to be
rendered as to the conflicting claims of the Soledad- Yu
spouses and Marcelo Steel Corporation with respect to the
scrap engine blocks.
The Yu spouses bought the scrap engine blocks in good faith
for 44,000 from the alleged swindler without any notice that
the same were obtained under false pretenses or by means
of a bouncing check. The purchase by the Yu spouses of the
scrap engine blocks from Refuerzo, doing business under
the tradename C. C. Varried Corporation, was covered by a
sales invoice and seemed to have been made in the ordinary
course of business

Held:

Marcelo Steel Corporation contends that it recovered the

scrap engine blocks by means of a valid warrant. The Yu
spouses counter that the search warrant was void
because it was issued without probable cause on the
basis of Nuestro's hearsay testimony.

The court held that the search warrant was lawfully

issued. Respondent Judge complied with the
requirements. But from the fact that the search warrant
was validly issued, it does not follow that Marcelo Steel
Corporation is entitled to retain the same. There is as yet
no decree of restitution in the criminal case entitling
Marcelo Steel Corporation to recover the scrap iron from
the third person who bought it in good faith and for
value. Hence, in the absence of any adjudication as to
the civil liability, there is no legal basis for allowing
Marcelo Steel Corporation to recover possession of the
scrap engine blocks.
Since Marcelo Steel Corporation and the Yu spouses acted
in good faith, the question is which of them should suffer the
loss occasioned by the acts of the alleged swindler?
The answer is found in the rule, enunciated by Justice
Holmes in Eliason vs. Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457 (applied here
by analogy), that, "as between two innocent persons, one of
whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the
one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear
the loss"

Cordero vs. Cabral

Facts:
Gregorio Z. Ocampo died and left widow Felipa Cordero and her
children all surnamed Ocampo with a parcel of land which is a
riceland- the southern portion of which is occupied by defendant
Victoria Cabral who refused to surrender and vacate said portion of
lands despite demands of Cordero.

Cabral claims that she and her predecessors in interest have

been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession of this portion of land for a period of more than
50 years. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants predecessors in
interest never really acquired owner of said land from the

deceased Ocampo through a valid sale but only as

prospective owner because the sale did not materialize. So
Cabrals possession cant be adverse nor continuous.
Neither did she acquire said land by prescription because
the land is titled and registered to Ocampo therefore,
'imprescriptible'.
Held: The defendants, by their own admission, are in
possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that

they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith

ceased when they were served with summons to answer the
complaint. (Art. 528, Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil.
356 [1929].) As possessors in bad faith from the service of
the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and
those which the legitimate possessor could have received, ...
(Art. 549, Civil Code.