1.

GANZON VS CA
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and
misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the
issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local
officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which
supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority.
It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government
officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But
from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power.
He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
2. Espiritu vs. Melgar February 13, 1991
FACTS:
Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of DILGcharging Mayor Nelson Melgar of
Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution
and conductprejudicial to the best interest of the public service. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered his arrest
and detention in the municipal jail of Naujan without filing any charges until his released the following day. An identical
letter complaint was filed by Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro Benjamin Espiritu, accusing Melgar of
the same violations. A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action Center, OP. Mayor Melgar submitted
his answer wherein he said that while he was delivering a speech during a graduation ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped
causing disturbance on the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speech, he instructed a policeman to

investigate Garing. It appeared that Garing was drunk. The mayor also presented medical certificate proving thatGaring
was not hurt. A balisong was then taken from Garing. The mayor informed Garing to go home (he had sobered up), but he
refused to go and only did so the following morning. TheSangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed
Resolution No 55, recommending to the Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 days
pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. When the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed a
"Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order" in the RTC of Oriental Mindoro
alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. The RTC
judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order ofsuspension
against Mayor Melgar. On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in granting the preliminary injunction since
the Governor is empowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension
pending decision of an administrative case against the elective municipal official. Also, under Sec 61 LGC, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over the complaints against any municipal official, while Section 19(c) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1930 withdrew from RTCs jurisdictions over such cases. Also, the mayor has a remedy of
appeal under Sec66 LGC.
ISSUE: 1. WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor.
2. WON the RTC has jurisdiction to stop the provincial governor from placing a municipalmayor under
preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges against the latter

HELD:
1. YES, Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively suspend
the municipal mayor of Naujan anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to
exist:1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of;2.
When the evidence of culpability is strong;3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or when the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is
given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the
normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses. Since the mayor
believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from
the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting
administrative remedies was premature.
2. NO. The RTC had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
case. There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they
warrant disciplinary action. However, as a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or
suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a flagrant abuse of the
exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers demand
that the action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed. However, in this particular case. since the 60-day
preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on
August6, 1991, and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
3. AGUINALDO vs. SANTOS, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992
Grounds for Disciplinary Actions

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order,
petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990
in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the local
elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint
for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba
and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against
petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to thecomplaint.
In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in itsexecution, though
he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's
reply letter as his answer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof, respondent
Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even
cross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from
deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. While this case was pending before this
Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections.
As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution pavedthe way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of disloyalty
committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of
evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to the Republic.
Held:
NO.
Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending before the
Court moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes
among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however,
finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined
and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected
Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence.
4. REYES V COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996 Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of Reyes and of Garcia which involved same resolutions of the COMELEC. The case of
Reyes is based on the resolution of the COMELEC declaring his disqualification from running for local office and on the
resolution dated July 3, 1995 which denied his petition for reconsideration. An administrative complaint was filed against

him for collecting money from each market stall holder and these were not reflected in the book of accounts of the
municipality; and that he also took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. He was held guilty
as charged and was ordered to be removed from office. But before the Sanggunian rendered judgment, Reyes filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro which alleged that he was not given a
chance to be heard in the proceedings which was already terminated. After the expiration of the restraining order, an
attempt was made to serve the judgment to the petition but he refused to accept the decision. On March 20, 1995, Reyes
filed a certificate of candidacy. But even with a petition for disqualification as candidate for mayor on the basis of Art. 40
(b) of RA 7160, Reyes was still voted for in the May 1995 elections. Despite the resolution from the COMELEC which
affirms the disqualification of Reyes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers who are unaware of the disqualification,
proclaimed Reyes as the duly elected mayor. The July 3, 1995 Resolution of the COMELEC declared that Reyes is
disqualified as a candidate and to set aside his proclamation. On the other hand, Garcias case is for the annulment of the
July 3, 1995 resolution which denied his motion to be proclaimed as the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro
since Reyes was already deemed disqualified. Garcia contends that he obtained the second highest number of votes in the
election and since Reyes was already disqualified, he should be proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor of Bongabong.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Reyes is disqualified from running for reelection.

2. Whether or not Garcia should be proclaimed the duly- elected mayor due to Reyess disqualification.
HELD:
1. Yes. Reyes is disqualified to run for reelection.
Article 40 (b) of RA 7160 provides that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case is disqualified
from running for any elective local position. And sinceReyes was held guilty of an administrative case, he is therefore
disqualified from running for office.
2. No. Although Garcia obtained the second highest number of votes in the election, it is a rule that thecandidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
And that Garcias contention that Reyess votes should be invalidated was also denied for it is held by the Court that the
finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the time of the elections.
5. Hagad vs gozo-dadole
Facts:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and
Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged
with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of
legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of
Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was
bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as
well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a
TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority
to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
HELD:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of
laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute
must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city
officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant.
The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the
modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.
6. Salalima v. Guingona
GR No. 117589-92, May 22 1996
FACTS:
The Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National Power Corporation. The latter, claiming that
it is tax exempt, refused to pay the said tax liability. Due to its refusal to pay, the Province of Albay took over the
properties of NPC and sold them in an auction sale. The Province was the sole bidder. Upon the failure of NPC to redeem
the property, the Province sought the issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court. The NPC challenged
this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. The Province, through its legal office Atty. Ricaforte, filed its comment on
the said petition on May 17, 1989.
On June 2, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 129-89, authorizing Salalima to engage
the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case. As such, on August 25, 1989, Atty. Jesus Carnago entered his
appearance with the SC as a collaborating counsel. On November 14, 1989, Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes of Cortes and
Reyna Law Firm sent a letter to Salalima, informing him that Atty. Carnago had filed a memorandum in the SC. He then
proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retainer agreement with the Province in connection with
the case. He charged 50, 000 as acceptance fee and a contingency fee of 18%. In response to this, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90 authorizing Salalima to sign a retainer contract with Cortes and Reyna Law
Firm.
On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. The latter then paid the lawyers amounting to
around 7 million. However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial Auditor informed the Province that COA had disallowed the
payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence of COA. An
administrative complaint was later on filed against the petitioners with the Office of the President.

The OP found that the petitioners incurred administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to defend it in the NPC
case.
OPs RATIO
1. Section 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer of the province has the duty to represent the LGU in all civil
actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party.
2. In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the Supreme Court ruled that the LGU cannot be represented by
private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial legal officer or provincial fiscal who can represent it. A private
lawyer has no standing in such a case.
3. Sec. 481 and Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok are applicable in this case. In hiring the private lawyers, the
petitioners violated the LGC and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme court.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private lawyers to represent the Province
HELD: Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer be held to answer for these in view of the fact that they
have already been reelected. Their reelection operates as condonation of any misconduct committed in their prior term.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled that offenses committed or acts done in a previous term are generally held not
to furnish a cause for removal in the current term of office. This is because each term is separate from other terms and that
the reelection operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefore. Such a rule is founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses the sovereign will of the
electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was
committed during the previous term. Also, sound policy dictates such a rule. A contrary rule would open the floodgates to
exacerbating endless partisan contests between reelected officials and their political enemies who may not stop to hound
the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous
term.
7. Grego vs comelec
Facts:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and
Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged
with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of
legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of
Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was
bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as
well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a
TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority
to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
HELD:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.

There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of
laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute
must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city
officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant.
The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the
modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.
8. Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon
Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He refused to suspend the mayor due to criminal
charges against the latter for the crime of unlawful appointment. The judge opined that an official cannot be suspended for
something that has happened in a previous term. Settled jurisprudence says this only applies to administrative, not
criminal cases.
Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes
or errors of judgment, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with the
basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. Also, if he did the act deliberately, he violated
Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
An RTC judge cannot overturn a settled doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be endless.

9. Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]

FACTS
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently into the session
hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to
file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension. Petitioner later Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. DILG denied the motion declaring that the
submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of
the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without
pay.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:

(a) Preventive suspension is proper;

(b) Procedural due process is violated;
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is
the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
HELD:

(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined;
(b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered
by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of
the province is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.
(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioners right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.
O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider
whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal
investigation. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O.
No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power
to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against
local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Josons claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very
heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of
his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain
matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.
10. Pablico vs Villapando
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against then Mayor of San Vicente,
Palawan Alejandro Villapando for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution because he entered into a
consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to
appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
In his answer, respondent countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. He invoked Opinion No.
106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate
within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as
prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service, and
was affirmed by the Office of the President. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of
Villapando.
The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to vacate the Office of the Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan.
ISSUE: May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal
from service on erring elective local officials?
HELD:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed
from office on any of the following grounds:
xxx

xxx

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper
court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring
elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that
[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in
the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that
(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The
grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining
authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority referred to
pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly
beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may
alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform,
not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the
statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)
11. Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Martinez
Facts:
1. Martinez, the incumbent Punong Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya, was
administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by the petitioner through the filing of a
complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner then filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended
Administrative Complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. The SB placed Martinez under preventive suspension for 60 days. It then rendered its Decision which imposed
upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.
3. The Decision was conveyed to Municipal Mayor Bagasao for its implementation. He issued a Memorandum,
stating that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service. However, the
Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite
suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.
4. Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the
trial court against petitioner, questioning the validity of the Decision.

5. Petitioner claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayanfinds that a penalty of removal is warranted.
Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office.
Decision: No, the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so.
Ratio:
1. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials
from office.
2. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the intent to confine to the courts
jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.
3. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc nullified Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 which granted to the disciplining authority the power to
remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts.
4. The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended
as a check against partisan activity. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to remove from office a local
chief executive, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free
the resolution of the case from partisanship.
5. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official would merit the penalty of removal from office, the
case should be filed with the RTC. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even
if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is
appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the elective official is suspension; if it deems
that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in
court.
12. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CA and BARRIGA
G.R. No. 172224. January 26, 2011

Facts:
Sometime in 2000, Sonia Q. Pua, a Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Cebu, filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman, alleging that MayorVirgilio E. Villamor, Municipal Treasurer Bontia, and respondent Municipal
AccountantBarriga, entered into several irregular and anomalous transactions in their official capacity.
In a Decision dated 28 August 2002, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Barriga guilty of misconduct and
imposed on her the penalty of six months suspension from the service.
Upon review, petitioner modified the decision and found Barriga guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and imposed on her the penalty of suspension for one year.Barriga filed a motion for reconsideration which
petitioner denied.
Later, in an Order dated 13 November 2002, petitioner directed the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu to implement the
decision dated 28 August 2002.
Barriga filed a petition for review with the CA which denied the petition for lack of merit.Barriga then elevated the case to
the Supreme Court which also denied the petition. MR and second MR was likewise denied.
After a month, petitioner, through the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, again directed the municipal mayor
of Carmen, Cebu to implement the Order dated 13 November 2002.

Barriga made a request that the implementation of the penalty of one-year suspension be held in abeyance pending the
issuance of the entry of judgment by this Supreme Court. The request was denied by petitioner.
However, Barriga, in order to delay the implementation of her suspension from service elevated the case once again to the
CA. The CA in rendering a favorable decision in favor of Barriga nullified the Ombudsmans orders from implementing
its decision. CA said that the immediate implementation of petitioners Order dated 13 November 2002 was premature
pending resolution of the appeal. Since Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 gives parties the right to
appeal then such right also generally carries with it the right to stay these decisions pending appeal. Thus, the CA
concluded that the acts of petitioner cannot be permitted nor tolerated.
Pursuant to the CAs Resolution dated 16 June 2005, the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu reinstated Barriga as
municipal accountant.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and raised the issue of finality of the Ombudsmans Decision dated 28
August 2002. The motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the orders of the Office of the Ombudsman to the
municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu for the immediate implementation of the penalty of suspension from service of
respondent Barriga even though the case was pending on appeal.

Held:
Yes. Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, states:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal
or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
It is clear from the provision that when a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of
the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, an appeal may be made to the CA.
However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as
a matter of course.

The CA is incorrect. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a
public official from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being executory. In Office
of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals and Macabulos, we held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately
executory even pending appeal in the CA.
Thus, the Ombudsmans order imposing on Barriga the penalty of suspension from office for one year without pay is
immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
13.