Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Suffrage
Qualification and disqualification of voters
Registration of Voters
Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
Political Parties
a. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political
parties
b. Registration
F.
Candidacy
a. Qualification of candidates
b. Filing of certificates of candidacy
i. Effect of filing
ii. Substitution of candidates
iii. Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive
certificate
iv. Nuisance candidates
v. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel certificates of candidacy
vi. Effect of disqualification
vii. Withdrawal of candidates
G. Campaign
a. Premature campaigning
b. Prohibited contributions
c. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda
d. Limitations on expenses
e. Statement of contributions and expenses
H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers
a. Composition
b. Powers
I.
Remedies and jurisdiction in election law
a. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy
b. Petition for disqualification
c. Petition to declare failure of elections
d. Pre-proclamation controversy
e. Election Protest
f. Quo Warranto
J. Prosecution of election offenses
SUFFRAGE
a.
Kinds of Election
1
Regular election refers to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage and
not disqualified by law and who are registered voters.
2.
Special elections election not regularly held
but which is conducted
A. SUFFRAGE
1)
b.
In referring to Article IX-C, Section 2(1), the SC said that the said
provision is explicit that Comelec has power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. To enforce
means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance of such
act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or operation, a
plan or measure which entails all the necessary and incidental
power for it to achieve the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and credible elections (HOPE FRECRE). The SC was surprised
that for the first time, Comelec yielded its historic jurisdiction over
a motion for reconsideration which was even filed out of time, thus
rendering it without jurisdiction to entertain the same.
INITIATIVE are lawmaking powers that belong to the people
and have been described as the people power features of our
Constitution (Asked in the 2000 BAR). Initiative under RA 6735 is
defined as the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
REFERENDUM power of the electorate to approve or reject a
piece of legislation through an election called for the purpose.
(Sec. 2, R.A. 6735).
Section 2, Article XVII
of
the Constitution provides that
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein.
Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution provides that Congress
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum and the exceptions therefrom, where the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law
or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body after
the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
thereof.
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 also provides for a
local initiative defined as the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose,
enact, or amend any ordinance. Sec. 126 thereof provides for a
local referendum defined as the legal process whereby the RV
of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
Classes of Initiative 1) On the Constitution; 2) On Statutes; 3)
On Local Legislation. Indirect Initiative is exercised by the people
through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body
for action.
Classes of Referendum 1) On Statutes; 2) On Local Laws.
Santiago, et. al. v. Comelec, et. al., 270 SCRA 106 (336 SCRA
843), the controversy brought to the Supreme Court by way of a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of Initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with the Comelec to amend the
constitution, specifically to lift the term limits of elective officials,
by peoples initiative. Atty. Delfin asked the Comelec for an order:
The Supreme Court upheld the Comelecs ruling on the petition for
peoples initiative on October 25, 2006 with a close 8-7 vote. As
ruled:
2)
10
11
Limitations on Registration
12
13
14
15
16
17
the
Allocation
of
Seats
for
Party-List
Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 21 April 2009 After
the VFP v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, 136786 and 136795, 06
October 2000, ruling of the Supreme Court and the controversial
application of the Panganiban Formula by the Abalos
Commission, Party-list participants in Banat et al., filed separate
complaints against the Comelec on the proper allocation of seats in
the party-list system. On 23 April 2009, the Supreme Court
declared the 2% threshold clause in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats of RA 7941 unconstitutional.
Following Section 5, Article VI, par. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, 20% of all seats in the HR is reserved for sectoral
representatives elected in the party list system. This formula is
now called the Carpio formula.
Under the Banat and Bayan Muna cases (G.R. No.
179271 and G.R. No. 179295, 21 April 2009), the SC laid down the
latest formula in the allocation of seats for party-list participants:
1) The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2) The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2%
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking above-mentioned in paragraph no. 1 hereof, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than 3 seats.
Banat abandoned the matter of computation held in the Veterans
Party case considering that the intention was to fill the 20% seats
in the HR.
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES
Candidate defined: The term candidate refers to any person
aspiring or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. (Sec. 79, OEC)
The terms candidate under the Automated Election System (AES)
in 2010, refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office who has filed his COC and who has not dies or
withdrawn or otherwise disqualified before the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his COC. Provided, that,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.
(Comelec Reso. No. 8678).
As regards a Party-List system, a candidate also refers to any
registered national, regional, or sectoral party, organization or
coalition thereof that has filed a manifestation to participate under
the part-list system which has not withdrawn or which has not be
disqualified before the start of the campaign period. (RA 7941).
Comelec Reso. No. 9615 adopted a broader definition of the term
candidate for the 13 May 2013 Elections to include party-list in
include all the above-definitions.
Qualifications
For President and Vice-President No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least 40 years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least 10 years immediately preceding such election.
There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the
same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office
in the same manner as the President (Article VII, Section 2 and 3,
Constitution)
For Senator No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of election,
is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years
immediately preceding the elections. (Article VI, Section 3,
Constitution)
For Members of the House of Representatives No person shall be
a Member of the HR unless he is natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of election, is at least 25 years of age,
able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than on year immediately
preceding the election. (Article VI, Section 6, Constitution)
For Party-List Nominees No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural born-citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read to read and write, a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least 90 days preceding the day of the election and is at least 25
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term. (RA 7941).
Bengzon III v. HRET 357 SCRA 545 (2001) Repatriation results
in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
Local Government Officials An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang
panlalawigan,
sangguniang
panlungsod
or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
Common to All Offices - Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which they were
elected.
RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
Section 36(g) provides that all candidates for public office
18
19
Rulloda vs. Comelec G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003 The
absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates
in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against
said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read
into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more
reason to allow substitution of candidates where no political
parties are involved than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999 Substitution is
not allowed if certificate of the candidate to be substituted was
cancelled, because he was running for the 4th consecutive term. A
person without a valid COC cannot be considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not filed any COC at
all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
Talaga v. Comelec & Castillo and Castillo v. Comelec & Talaga, 683
SCRA 197 (2012) In this case, Ramon was disqualified having
been found to be ineligible for the position of Mayor of Lucena City
which disqualification became final prior to the May 10, 2010
elections. Barbara Ruby filed her CoC in substitution of Ramon.
Castillo was the opponent who filed a disqualification case against
Barbara Ruby on the ground that the substitution was not valid in
view of the ineligibility of Ramon, Ramon did not voluntarily
withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section
73 and that she was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor because her filing of her CoC was beyong the period fixed
by law. Comelec declared the substitution of Barbara Ruby as
invalid on May 20, 2011
Barbary Ruby garnered the highest number of votes
while Castillo garnered second. Castillo contends that since the
disqualification of Ramon was final prior to the election he should
be declared winner. Castillo made reference to case of Cayat. In
this case, Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was
disqualified and his disqualification became final before the May
10, 20014 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was
made, Thomas R. Pelileng, Sr. his rival remained the only
candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. (Cayat v.
Comelec 522 SCRA 23 (2007)).
In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the
May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the
electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the
electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for
by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo.
Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim of being the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and being
consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor. The Court
stressed that the existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua
non for a valid substitution.
20
21
22
Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Comelec, et. al. 644 SCRA 761 (2011)
- In order to justify the cancellation of CoC, it is essential that the
false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter
for the sanction imposed by Section 78 would affect the
substantive rights of the candidate the right to run for the
elective post for which he filed the CoC. Material representation
refers to qualifications for elective office (interpreted to refer to
statements regarding age, residence and citizenship or
non-possession of natural-born Filipino status); Aside from the
requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible; it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualification
for public office. (also ruled in Salcedo II v. Comelec 312 SCRA
447 (1999))
Two remedies available for questioning the qualifications
of the candidate: Distinction between the two proceedings under
Section 78 and Section 253 under B.P. 881, thereof (1) Before
elections under Section 78 and (2) After elections under Section
253. The only difference between the two proceedings is that,
under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings
must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for QW
under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds
(1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines,
and must be initiated within 10 days after proclamation of the
election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he
is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he
lacks any of the qualification for election office.
Clearly, the ONLY INSTANCE where a petition questioning
the qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be filed
before election is when the petition is filed under Section 78 of the
OEC.
Period for filing a petition under Section 78 In Loong v.
Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), the Court categorically declared
that the period for filing a petition for cancellation of candidacy
based on false representation is covered by Rule 23 and NOT Rule
25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for
filing of CoCs but not later than the date of proclamation, is
merely a procedural rule that cannot supercede Section 78 of the
OEC.
A petition filed under Section 78 must not be
interchanged or confused with one filed under Section 68 In
Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782 (2008), the Court stressed that
a petition which is properly a Section 78 petition must therefore
be filed within the period prescribed therein, and a procedural
rules subsequently issue by Comelec cannot supplant this statutory
period under Section 78.
Jurisdiction Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the Comelec over election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ENDS
and the HRET own jurisdiction BEGINS.
In Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 641 (1999) the Court does not have
jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent
who was already a Member of the HR at the time of the filing of
the petition for certiorari considering that by statutory provision
(Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the HR.
Procedure in filing Motion to Suspend Proclamation:
The
23
individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a petition shall
be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the
qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show
possession of these qualifications. On the other hand, the COC
denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there
is a false representation of a material fact.
The false
representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous
mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidates
qualification for elective office.
24
NOTE: The 1st ground for disqualification consists of two (2) parts,
namely: (1) those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude, regardless of the period of
imprisonment; and (2) those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense, OTHER THAN one involving moral turpitude, punishable
by one (1) year or more imprisonment, within 2 years after serving
sentence.
Sec. 40 of RA 7160 limits the disqualification to two (2) years after
service of sentence. This should now be read in relation to Sec. 11
of RA 8189 which enumerates those who are disqualified to
register as a voter. The 2 year disqualification period under Sec.
40 is now deemed amended to last 5 years from service of
sentence after which period the voter will be eligible to register as
a voter and to run for an elective public office.
In Marquez, jr. vs. Comelec and Rodriguez 259 SCRA, it was held
that fugitives from justice refer to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment. The SC ruled that when a person
leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound and
subsequently learns of the charges filed against him while he is in
his own country, does not outrightly qualify him as a fugitive from
justice if he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the
former state. When Rodriguez left the US, there was yet no
complaint filed and warrant of arrest, hence there is no basis in
saying that he is running away from any prosecution or
punishment.
office
as
result
of
an
In Aznar, it was ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmea
was holder of a certificate stating that he is an American citizen did
not mean that he is no longer a Filipino & that an application for
an ACR was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
Citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the
BID & was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a
year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor of
Makati, were just assertions of his nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
Valles v. Lopez, the Court held that the mere fact that Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an ACR are not act
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation
to effectively result in the lost of citizenship, the same must be
express (Com. Act 63, Sec. 1). Referring to the case of Aznar, an
ACR does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of
ones citizenship. Similarly, her holding of an Australian passport
as in the Manzano case, were likewise mere acts of assertions
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most,
Lopez had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino,
as well.
In reconciling the disqualification under Sec. 40 of RA 7160. The
Court clarified and as ruled in the Manzano case dual citizenship
as used in the LGC and reconciled with Article IV Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution on dual allegiance (Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. )
In recognizing situation in which a Filipino citizen may, without
performing any act, as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another
state (jus sanguinis for the Philippines where the child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of his/her place
of birth as opposed to jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth), the Court explained that
dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance.
The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for public office. For candidates with
dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Phil. Citizenship upon
the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of the certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
In the Certificate of Candidacy, one declare that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto.
Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008) The ruling in Valles in
2000 has been superseded by the enactment of RA 9225 in 2003.
RA 9225 expressly provides for the condition before those who
re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the
Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions xxx (2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
25
26
that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and
that the has fully served the three (3) consecutive terms.
In this case, respondent Talaga, Jr., was elected mayor of
Lucena City in May 1992. He served the full term, was re-elected
in 1995-98 but lost in the 1998 election to Tagarao. In the recall
elections of May 2000, Talaga, Jr. won and served the unexpired
term of Tagarao until 30 June 2001. Talaga Jr. filed his certificate
of candidacy for the same position in the 2001 elections which
candidacy was challenged by petition Adormeo on the ground that
Talaga, Jr. is already barred by the 3-term limit rule.
Adormeo contends that Talagas candidacy violated Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution which states that the term of office of
local elective officials shall be three (3) years and no such official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms citing the
case of Lonzanida v. Comelec To further support his case, he
adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who stated that in
interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to
serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no
matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed.
The Comelec en banc ruled in favor of Talaga which reversed the
ruling of the 1st division and held that 1) Talaga was not elected
for 3 consecutive terms because he did not win the 11 May 1998
elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his
victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall
elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in
the 3-term disqualification rule and finally 4) that he did not fully
serve the 3 consecutive term. His loss in the 11 May 1998
elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his
service as Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: Was Talaga disqualified
to run for Mayor of Lucena City in the 14 May 2001 elections?
In holding the qualifications of Talaga, the Court reiterated its
ruling in Borja that the term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
27
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and is voted for and received the
winning number of votes in such election, the Comelec shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.
CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION PROPAGANDA
Election period is 120 days - 90 days before the date of the
election and 30 days thereafter. Campaign period for Pres., VP
and Senators starts 90 days before the date of the election, 45
days for members of the HR and local candidate and 15 days for
barangay official, which excludes the day before and the day of
the elections.
Prohibited Activities Section 80 BP881 Election campaign or
partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for
any party or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign
period: Provided, That political parties may hold political
convention or meetings to nominate their official candidates within
30 days before the commencement of the campaign period and 45
days for President and Vice-President.
RA 9006 (Fair Election Law), Section 3. Election propaganda
whether on television, cable television, radio, newspapers or any
other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political parties,
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating
under the party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates
seeking national and local positions subject to the limitation on
authorized expenses of candidates and political parties, observance
of truth in advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the
Comelec.
Requirements for Published or Printed Broadcast Election
Propaganda. RA 9006 now allows paid political advertisements for
print and broadcast media provided the said advertisement shall
bear and be identified by reasonably legible or audible words
Political advertisement paid for followed by the true and correct
name and address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the
election propaganda was printed or aired.
Free of charge if broadcast is given free of charge the radio and
television station, it shall be identified by the words airtime for
this broadcast was provided free of charge by followed by the
true and correct name and address of the broadcast entity.
Provided that said print, broadcast donated shall not be published
or printed without the written acceptance of the candidate or
political party which acceptance shall be attached to the
advertising contract and submitted to the Comelec.
Guidelines whether by purchase or donation Print advertisements
shall not exceed page in broadsheet and page in tabloids 3 x
a week per newspaper, magazine or other publications during the
campaign period. (Section 6, RA 9006).
Television/Radio Advertisements nation candidates/registered
political party shall be entitled to not more than 120 minutes of TV
advertisement and 180 minutes of radio. Local candidates not
more than 60 minutes of TV advertisement and 90 minutes of
radio.
28
29
OEC)
Chavez on various dates entered in formal agreement
with certain establishment to endorse their products and pursuant
thereto, 3 bill boards were set up on some strategic areas in Metro
Manila. Subsequently on 30 December 2003, Chavez filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator. On 06 January
2004, Comelec issued Resolution No. 6520 which contained
Section 32. Comelec directed Chavez to comply with the said
provision and replied how he may have violated the assailed
provision. Another letter was sent seeking exemption from the
application of Section 32, considering that the billboard adverted
to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
In Francisco Chavez v. Comelec et. al. G.R. No. 162777 31 August
2004, Chavez brought before the SC a Petition for Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as
taxpayer and citizen asking the Court to enjoin the Comelec from
enforcing Section 21 of its Resolution No. 6520 dated 06 January
2004. (Sec. 32 provides: All propaganda materials such as
posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other
materials showing the picture or name of a person and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the
image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office
shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station,
print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity
of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and the said radio
station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Sec. 80 of the
30
In granting Peneras MR, the SC En Banc held that Penera did not
engage in premature campaigning and should thus, not be
disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said-
On the issue that the provision was a violation of the Fair Elections
Act as billboards are already permitted as lawful election
propaganda. It was ruled that the provision does not prohibit
billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their
use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much
as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular
and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
Comelec was only doing its duty under the law (Sec. 3 and 13 of
the Fair Elections Act on lawful propaganda)
Section 80 of the OEC provides it shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity, except during the campaign period.
Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609.
The issue on premature
campaigning was raised. Facts show that Penera and Andanar
were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica in the last May 14, 2007
elections. Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election
Director, Caraga Region, Region XIII, a petition for disqualification
against Penera for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning
and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the
campaign period.
The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day before the start
of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007, Penera and
her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta.
Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to
vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera alleged that the
charge was not true although having admitted that a motorcade
did take place which was simply in accordance with the usual
practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of COC
was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the
completion of such filing. Penera in her defense cited Barroso v.
Ampig (385 Phil 2237; 328 SCRA 530) wherein the Court ruled that
a motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs
was not a form of political campaigning. Pending the
disqualification case, Penera was proclaimed as winner and
assumed office.
Comelec ruled that Penera engaged in premature campaigning in
violation of Section 80 and disqualified Penera from continuing as a
Penera moved for reconsideration arguing that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning,
since under Section 15 of RA 8436 (the law authorizing the
Comelec to use an automated election system for the process of
voting, counting of votes, and canvasing/consolidating the results
of the national and local elections), as amended by RA 9369, is not
officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
(a)
The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the
assailed Decision) considered a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the
campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated that a person
who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of such campaign period. In applying the said law
(1)
31
2)
(c)
4)
5)
32
3rd Comelec
terrorism,
the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
the election in any polling place has been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting on
account of FM, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes
after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the ER or in the custody of canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on the
same grounds.
33
34
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
BP 881, Section 242 The Commission shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all pre=proclamation controversies. It may motu
propio and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual
partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the
evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Matalam v. Comelec 271 SCRA 733/BP 881 a pre-proclamation
controversy is defined, as a general rule, any question pertaining
to or affecting the proceedings of the BOC which may be raised by
any candidate or any registered political party or coalition of
political before the board or directly with the Comelec, on any
matter raised under Sections 233 (when ER are delayed, lost or
destroyed), 234 (material defects in the ER), 235 (when ER appear
to be tampered with or falsified) and 236 (discrepancies in the ER)
of the OEC in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the ER and Certificate of Canvass.
35
IN
Pre-PROCLAMATION
36
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. This
provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review
any decision, order or ruling of the Comelec, limits such power to a
final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
Comelec. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by
a Division of the Comelec.
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. Comelec/Dante Tinga 648 SCRA 561
(2011) The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review an
order, whether final or interlocutory even a final resolution of a
division of the Comelec the Court can only review via certiorari a
decision, order, or ruling of the Comelec en banc in accordance
with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a rule which admits
of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory
order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to
issue the same. (Court made reference to the case of Repol v.
Comelec 428 SCRA 321 (2004) which was affirmed in Soriano Jr. v.
Comelec 520 SCRA 88 (2007) and Blanco v. Comelec 554 SCRA
755. Ruling in Soriano. . . In the 2004 case of Repol v. Comelec,
the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to
review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution of a division of the Comelec. However, the Court held
that an exception to this rule applies where the commission of
grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what
was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time limit,
and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the
Comelec First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The
Court held that the status quo ante Order of the Comelec First
Division was actually a temporary restraining order because it
ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of
municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to
assume the post in the meantime. Since the status quo ante
Order, which was qualified by the phrase until further orders from
this Commission. Had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order
clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining Order has an
effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the
Comelecs denial of preliminary injunction.
Ceriaco Bulilis v. Victorino Nuez, Presiding Judge of MCTC, Ubay
Bohol, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 52, Talibon, Bohol 655 SCRA
241 (2011) - Facts: Bulilis was proclaimed winner for the
elections for punong barangay. Opponent Victorino Nuez filed an
EP (for judicial recount and annulment of proclamation) with
MCTC. The counsel of Bulilis filed his brief at 1:45pm on the date
of preliminary conference and when the case was heard at 2pm,
Nuez moved in open court to be allowed to present evidence ex
parte since Bulilis only filed his brief on the date of the preliminary
conference which is contrary to Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No.
08-4-15-SC which provides that the brief should be filed at least
one (1) day before the date of the preliminary conference. Judge
Garces granted the motion.
Bulilis filed MR which was denied by MCTC. Bulilis filed certiorari
with RTC which was dismissed on the ground that it is Comelec
that has exclusive jurisdiction in election cases involving municipal
and barangay officials. Hence, the petition for certiorari with the
SC.
(Rule 28, Sections 1 and 2 of CRP/Section 12 Amendments to
37
38
39
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31. Decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory and not appealable; All such election cases shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which was heard by
the 2nd division which reversed the decision of the RTC. In his MR
petitioner argues that the MR filed with the former 2nd division has
thrown the whole case wide open for review as in a trial de novo
in a criminal case yet Comelec en banc failed to conduct a
thorough review of the contested ballots. Election cases cannot be
treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal
from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open
for review and the appellate court can resolve issues which are not
even set forth in the pleadings.
Coquilla vs. Comelec, et. al. G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, the
SC resolved the issue on whether the 30-day period for appealing
the resolution of the Comelec was suspended by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration by petitioner. Private respondent in this
case contends that the petition should be dismissed because it was
filed late considering that the Comelec en banc denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration for being pro-forma and conformably
with Sec. 4 of Rule 19 of the CRP, the said motion did not suspend
the running of the 30-day period for the filing of the petition for
certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
The Comelec en banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration
was pro-forma on the ground that the motion was a mere rehash
of petitioners averments contained in his Verified Answer and
Memorandum, neither were new matters raised that would
sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the
Second Division.
The SC ruled however that the mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed
upon by the court does not make a motion pro-forma; otherwise,
the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the
decision but a new trial or some other remedy.
In explaining the purpose/objective of a motion for
reconsideration , the SC referred to its decision in Guerra
Enterprises Company Inc., v. CFI of Lanao del Sur 32 SCRA 314
(1970), where it held that the ends sought to be achieved in the
2)
40
41
Malaluan v. Comelec 254 SCRA 397, this was the first case where a
judge, acting without a precedent, granted the motion for
execution of its decision in an election protest case, pending
appeal. It was ruled that Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which allowed the RTC to order execution pending appeal upon
good reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply by
analogy or suppletorily to election contest decided by it. The
posting of the supersedeas bond was considered good reasons by
the judge.
Camlian v. Comelec 271 SCRA, executions pending appeal must be
strictly construed against the movant as it is an exception to the
general rule on execution of judgments.
Ramas v. Comelec 286 SCRA 189, what may constitute good
reasons for execution pending appeal
42
43
44