Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

CHINA BANKING G.R. No. 172192

CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ASB HOLDINGS, INC., ASB CHICO-NAZARIO,
REALTY CORP., ASB NACHURA, and
DEVELOPMENT CORP. REYES, JJ.
(formerly TIFFANY TOWER
REALTY CORP.), ASB LAND,
INC., ASB FINANCE, INC.,
MAKATI HOPE CHRISTIAN
SCHOOL, INC., BEL-AIR
HOLDINGS CORP.,
WINCHESTER TRADING, INC.,

VYL DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

GERICK HOLDINGS CORP.,
and NEIGHBORHOOD Promulgated:
HOLDINGS, INC.,
Respondents. December 23, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE Constitutional proscription on impairment of contracts and preference of credits

are at the core of this controversy involving the rehabilitation plan of ASB
Development Corporation, a debtor of petitioner China Banking Corporation (China
Bank).

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision[1] of

the Court of Appeals (CA) upholding the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
approval of respondents corporate rehabilitation plan.

The Facts

In 1999, respondent ASB Development Corporation applied for and was granted a
credit line by petitioner China Bank in the principal amount of P35,000,000.00. The
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over two contiguous lots
with a combined area of 1,332.5 square meters in Grace Park, Caloocan City. The

said properties are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 2981096 and
298110 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.

In 2000, respondent ASB Realty Corporation, an affiliate of ASB Development,

obtained an omnibus credit line from petitioner China Bank in the amount of
P265,000,000.00. The loan was secured by two real estate mortgages: (1) over two
parcels of land situated at Salcedo, Legaspi Village, Makati City, covered by TCT
Nos. 205136 and 206189; and (2) over a parcel of land located at Constellation
Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati City, covered by TCT No. 201933.

Respondent corporations defaulted in the payment of the agreed loan

amortizations, interest, and other charges. Demands to pay were left unheeded.

On May 2, 2000, ASB Development Corporation and its affiliates, including ASB
Realty, ASB Holdings, ASB Land, ASB Finance, Makati Hope Christian School, Bel-Air
Holdings, Winchester Trading, VYL Development, Gerick Holdings and Neighborhood
Holdings, filed before the SEC a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for suspension
of actions and proceedings, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended,
docketed as SEC Case No. 05-00-6609. In its petition, respondent averred, inter alia,
that:

6. The total assets of petitioner ASB Group of Companies, together with petitioner
ASB Allied Companies, amount to Nineteen Billion Four Hundred Ten Million Pesos
(P19,410,000,000.00).

7. The Projects were financed with loans or borrowings from bank and individual
creditors which resulted in petitioner Group of Companies having a total liability in
the amount of Twelve Billion Seven Hundred Million Pesos (P12,700,000,000.00).

8. On account of the sudden non-renewal and/or the massive withdrawal by

creditors of their loans to petitioner ASB Holdings, Inc., coupled with the recent
developments in the country, like, among others, (i) the glut in the real estate
market; (ii) the severe drop in the sale of real properties; (iii) the depreciation of the
peso vis--vis the dollar; and (iv) the decreased investor confidence in the economy,
petitioner Group of Companies was unable to complete and sell some of its projects
on schedule and, hence, was unable to service its obligations as they fell due.

9. Petitioner Group of Companies possesses sufficient property to cover its

obligations. However, petitioner Group of Companies foresees its inability to pay its
obligations within a period of one (1) year.

10. Because of the inability of the Group of Companies to pay its obligations as they
respectively fall due, its secured and non-secured creditors pressed for payments of
due and maturing obligations and threatened to initiate separate actions against it,
which will adversely affect its operations and shatter its hope in rehabilitating itself
for the benefit of its investors and creditors and the general public.

11. There is a clear, present and imminent danger that the creditors of petitioner
Group of Companies will institute extrajudicial and judicial foreclosure proceedings
and file court actions unless restrained by this Honorable Commission.

12. The institution of extrajudicial and judicial foreclosure proceedings and the filing
of court actions against petitioner Group of Companies will necessarily result in the
paralization of its business operation and its assets being lost, dissipated or wasted.

13. There is, therefore, a need for the suspension of payment of all claims against
petitioner Group of Companies, in the separate and combined capacities of its
member companies, while it is working for its rehabilitation.

14. Petitioner Group of Companies has at least seven hundred twelve (712)
creditors, three hundred seventeen (317) contractors/suppliers and four hundred
ninety-two (492) condominium unit buyers, who will certainly be prejudiced by the
disruption of the operations of petitioner ASB Group of Companies which seeks to
protect the interest of the parties from any precipitate action of any person who
may only have his individual interest in mind.

15. The business of petitioner ASB Group of Companies is feasible and profitable.
Petitioner Group of Companies will eventually be able to pay all its obligations given
some changes in its management, organization, policies, strategies, operations, or
finances.

16. With the support of this Honorable Commission, petitioner Group of Companies
is confident that it will be able to embark on a sound and viable rehabilitation plan,
with a built-in debt repayment schedule through the optimal use of their present
facilities, assets and resources. Although a proposed rehabilitation plan is attached
to this petition, a detailed and comprehensive rehabilitation proposal will be
presented for the approval of this Honorable Commission, with the foregoing salient
features:

a. Servicing and eventual full repayment of all debts and liabilities, focusing on debt
restructure and possible liquidation through dacion en pago, transfer and
assignment, or outright sale of assets, in order to lighten the debt burden of
petitioner Group of Companies;

b. Forming of strategic alliances with third party investors, including joint ventures
and similar arrangements;

c. Contributing specified properties from petitioner ASB Allied Companies;

d. Streamlining the operations of petitioner ASB Group of Companies, and the

effective management of its revenues and funds towards the strengthening of its
financial and business positions; and

e. Stabilizing the operations of petitioner Group of Companies, and preparing it to

take advantage of future opportunities for growth and development.[2]

In filing the petition for rehabilitation, respondents contended that while they have
sufficient capitalization, the company will be hard-pressed to service its obligations
in favor of petitioner bank and its other creditors due to a glut in the real estate
market, the depreciation of the currency and decreased investor confidence in the
Philippine economy. Respondents then prayed that the SEC, after due hearing: (a)
appoint an interim receiver; (b) suspend all actions against the ASB Group for a
period of sixty days subject to extension; and (c) approve a rehabilitation plan for
the ASB Group and appoint a rehabilitation receiver to monitor the implementation
of the said rehabilitation plan.

On May 4, 2000, the Hearing Panel of the SEC Securities Investigation and Clearing
Department, finding the petition for rehabilitation sufficient in form and substance,
issued a 60-day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against the
ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board,
body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from disposing of their
properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from
paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c)
appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies.

On May 22, 2000, the SEC Hearing Panel issued an order appointing Mr. Fortunato
Cruz as interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies, replacing Atty. Monico
Jacob.

On August 18, 2000, respondent ASB Development Corporation submitted the

rehabilitation plan for approval of the SEC. The plan, in part, provides:

x x x Based on the program, secured creditors claims amounting to PhP5.192 billion

will be paid in full including interest up to April 30, 2000. Secured creditors have
been asked to waive all penalties and other charges. This dacion en pago program
is essential to eventually pay all creditors and rehabilitate the ASB Group of
Companies. If the dacion en pago herein contemplated does not materialize for
failure of the secured creditors to agree thereto, this rehabilitation plan
contemplates to settle the obligations (without interest, penalties, and other related
charges accruing after the date of the initial suspension order) to secured creditors
with mortgaged properties at ASB selling prices for the general interest of the
employees, creditors, unit buyers, government, general public, and the economy.[3]

On April 26, 2001, the ASB rehabilitation plan was approved by the SEC.

Aggrieved, petitioner bank appealed the plans approval to the SEC En Banc.
According to petitioner, the SEC order compelling the bank to surrender its present
collateral and accept certain properties located in Pasig City and Paraaque City as

payment of the obligations due it violates the constitutional proscription against

impairment of contracts. It was likewise argued that the value of the properties
being offered by ASB via dacion en pago is insufficient to cover the amount of its
outstanding loans; and that the preference conferred by law to the bank as a
secured creditor has been rendered illusory.

On June 10, 2003, the SEC En Banc denied with finality petitioner banks appeal.
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via petition for review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

CA Disposition

On October 28, 2005, the CA dismissed the banks petition for lack of merit. In ruling
against petitioner bank, the appellate court opined:

The assailed rehabilitation plan does not violate the principle of mutuality of
contracts. In fact, the provisions of said plan recognize the secured creditors right to
refuse or reject the dacion en pago arrangements proposed therein. To illustrate, the
rehabilitation plan pertinently states:

x x x If the dacion en pago herein contemplated does not materialize for failure of
the secured creditors to agree thereto, this rehabilitation plan contemplates to
settle the obligations (without interest, penalties, and other related charges
accruing after the date of the initial suspension order) to secured creditors with
mortgaged properties at ASB selling prices for the general interest of the
employees, creditors, unit buyers, government, general public and the economy.

Inasmuch as the proposed dacion en pago can proceed only upon agreement of all
the parties concerned, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that its freedom to
contract is unduly curtailed and that it is being compelled to accept certain
properties as settlement for respondents obligations.

On the other hand, We find no cogent reason to disturb or reverse the findings of
the lower tribunals regarding the valuation of respondents assets and viability of the
rehabilitation plan. As the SEC en banc observed:

x x x the selling values and net realizable values of the properties are not much
higher than the appraisals conducted by Cuervo Appraiser, Inc. in 1997 and 2000. In
addition, the valuations given to the unfinished projects proposed to be dacioned to
secured creditors are based on the selling price of appellees [respondents] on
similar projects for which deeds of absolute sale have been consummated.
(Resolution dated June 10, 2003)

It is a basic principle of law that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion or judgment of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies (Olaguer vs. Domingo, 359 SCRA 78). Given their special
knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a
better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts (Palele vs. Court of Appeals,
362 SCRA 141).

At any rate, petitioners concerns about the viability of the rehabilitation plan should
be laid to rest by the fact that less than two years after its approval by the SEC
hearing panel, 54% of respondents obligations to creditor banks had already been
paid. This only shows that the continued implementation of the rehabilitation plan
may well lead to petitioners full recovery of its claims against respondents.

All told, We find that the SEC correctly upheld the order of the hearing panel
approving the ASB Groups rehabilitation plan.[4]

Issues

Petitioner has resorted to the present review on certiorari, raising twin issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ASB REHABILITATION PLAN VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES OF

MUTUALITY OF CONTRACTS, CURTAILS A PARTYS FREEDOM TO CONTRACT;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASB REHABILITATION PLAN PRESENTS A TRUE, ACCURATE,
AND INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED PICTURE OF RESPONDENTS-DEBTORS RESPECTIVE
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS.

Our Ruling

This is not the first time that the matter of the rehabilitation plan of respondent ASB
Development Corporation has reached the Courts corridors. This Court, in two
separate occasions, has already placed the said plan under the crucible.

In Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. ASB Holdings, Inc.,[5] the Court was
confronted with triple questions:

a. The rehabilitation plan compels petitioner bank to accept, through a dacion en

pago arrangement, the mortgaged properties based on ASB Group of Companies
transfer values and to release part of the collateral. This forced transfer of
properties and diminution of the banks right to enforce its lien on the mortgaged
properties violate its constitutional right against impairment of contracts and right
to due process.

b. The rehabilitation plan compels petitioner bank to waive the interests, penalties
and other charges that accrued after the SEC issued its Stay Order. Again, this is in
violation of the constitutional mandate on non-impairment of contracts and due
process.

c. Only respondent ASB Holdings, Inc. suffered financial distress as stated in the
Rehabilitation Plan and, as such, the coercive reach of the SECs Stay Order under
P.D. 902-A can extend only to the enforcement of claims against this distressed
corporation. It cannot suspend the claims and actions against its affiliate
corporations.[6]

In resolving the questions in favor of the distressed corporation, the Court held
then:

We are not convinced that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan impairs petitioner
banks lien over the mortgaged properties. Section 6[c] of P.D. No. 902-A provides
that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board
or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any
court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended.

By that statutory provision, it is clear that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan
and the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspend the actions for
claims against respondent corporations. Petitioner banks preferred status over the
unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens is retained, but the enforcement
of such preference is suspended. The loan agreements between the parties have
not been set aside and petitioner bank may still enforce its preference when the
assets of ASB Group of Companies will be liquidated. Considering that the provisions
of the loan agreements are merely suspended, there is no impairment of contracts,
specifically its lien in the mortgaged properties.

As we stressed in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, such suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a
secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor, for what P.D. No. 902A merely provides is that all actions for claims against the distressed corporation,
partnership or association shall be suspended. This arrangement provided by law is
intended to give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should
still be a possibility for doing so, without being unnecessarily disturbed by the
creditors actions against the distressed corporation. However, in the event that
rehabilitation is no longer feasible and the claims against the distressed corporation
would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors, like petitioner bank, shall
enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors.

Likewise, there is no compulsion on the part of petitioner bank to accept a dacion en

pago arrangement of the mortgaged properties based on ASB Group of Companies
transfer values and to condone interests and penalties. The Rehabilitation Plan
itself, under item IV-A, explains the dacion en pago proposal, thus:

IV. THE REVISED REHABILITATION PLAN

A. The Total Approach

It is apparent that ASBs corporate indebtedness needs to be reduced as quickly as

possible in order to prevent rapid deterioration in equity x x x. In order to reduce
debt quickly, we must do the following:

1. Complete or sell on-going projects;

2. Invite secured creditors to complete dacion en pago transactions, waiving all
penalties; and
3. Invite unsecured creditors to purchase real estate parcels and other assets and
set-off the amount of their outstanding claim against the purchase price.

The assets included in the above program include all real estate assets.

In order to determine the feasibility of the above, representatives of our financial

advisors met with or had discussions with most of the secured creditors. Preliminary
discussions indicate support from the secured creditors towards the concepts of the
program associated with them. The majority of these secured creditors appear to
want to complete dacion en pago transactions based on MUTUALLY AGREED UPON
TERMS x x x. We continue to pursue discussions with secured creditors. Based on
the program, secured creditors claims amounting to PhP5.192 billion will be paid in
full including interest up to April 30, 2000. Secured creditors have been asked to
waive all penalties and other charges. This dacion en pago program is essential to
eventually pay all creditors and rehabilitate the ASB Group of Companies. If the
dacion en pago herein contemplated does not materialize for failure of the secured
creditors to agree thereto, this rehabilitation plan contemplates to settle the
obligations (without interest, penalties, and other related charges accruing after the

date of the initial suspension order) to secured creditors with mortgaged properties
at ASB selling prices for the general interest on the employees, creditors, unit
buyers, government, general public, and the economy.

xxxx

Indeed, based on the above explanation in the Rehabilitation Plan, the dacion en
pago program and the intent of respondent ASB Group of Companies to ask
creditors to waive the interests, penalties and related charges are not compulsory in
nature. They are merely proposals for the creditors to accept. In fact, as explained,
there was already an initial discussion on these proposals and the majority of the
secured creditors showed their desire to complete dacion en pago transactions, but
they must be based on MUTUALLY AGREED UPON TERMS. The SEC En Banc in its
Resolution dated April 15, 2003, affirming the SEC Hearing Panels Order of April 26,
2001 approving the Rehabilitation Plan, aptly declared:

x x x petitioner asserts that the Rehabilitation Plan is not legally feasible because
respondents cannot dictate the terms of dacion.

We do not agree. A cursory reading of the Rehabilitation Plan debunks this

assertion. The Plan provides that dacion en pago transaction will be effected only if
the secured creditors, like petitioner, agree thereto and under terms and conditions
mutually agreeable to private respondents and the secured creditor concerned. The
dacion en pago program is essential to eventually pay all creditors and rehabilitate
private respondents. If the dacion en pago does not materialize in case secured
creditors refuse to agree thereto, the Rehabilitation Plan contemplates to settle the
obligations to secured creditors with mortgaged properties at selling prices. This is
for the general interest of the employees, creditors, unit buyers, government,
general public, and the economy.

With respect to the third assigned error, we note that the same was not raised by
petitioner bank in its Comment/Opposition to the Rehabilitation Plan filed with the
SEC Hearing Panel. Such belated issue cannot be considered, especially because it
involves a question of fact, the resolution of which is normally beyond the authority
of this Court as it is not a trier of facts.

At any rate, the SEC En Banc found that the SEC Hearing Panel acted within its legal
authority in resolving this case. Neither it over stepped its lawful authority nor acted
whimsically in approving the Rehabilitation Plan. Hence, it cannot be faulted of
grave abuse of discretion. We find no reason to disturb such finding, it being a
fundamental rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the SEC, which
have acquired expertise as their jurisdiction is confined to special matters such as
the subject of this case, are generally accorded great respect and even finality,
absent any showing that they arbitrarily disregarded evidence or misapprehended
evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had
been properly appreciated.
Petitioner bank also argues that ASB Group of Companies is merely a generic name
used to describe collectively various companies and as such, it is not a legal entity
with juridical personality and cannot be a party to a suit. True, ASB Group of
Companies is merely used in this case as a generic name, for brevity, to collectively
describe the various companies/corporations that filed a Petition For Rehabilitation
with the SEC. However, in their petition, all the respondent corporations are
individually named as petitioners, not ASB Group of Companies.[7]

In a related case, Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Securities and Exchange

Commission,[8] the Court En Banc would be more emphatic in holding that:

The petition must be denied.

The very same issues confronted the Court in the case of Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company v. ASB Holdings, et al. In this case, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(MBTC) refused to enter into a dacion en pago arrangement contained in ASBs
proposed Rehabilitation Plan. MBTC argued, among others, that the forced transfer
of properties and the diminution of its right to enforce its lien on the mortgaged
properties violate its constitutional right against impairment of contracts and right
to due process. The Court ruled that there is no impairment of contracts because
the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver merely suspends the action for claims against the ASB Group, and MBTC
may still enforce its preference when the assets of the ASB Group will be liquidated.
But if the rehabilitation is found to be no longer feasible, then the claims against the
distressed corporation would have to be settled eventually and the secured
creditors shall enjoy preference over the unsecured ones. Moreover, the Court
stated that there is no compulsion to enter into a dacion en pago agreement, nor to
waive the interests, penalties and related charges, since these are merely proposals
to creditors such as MBTC, such that in the event the secured creditors refuse the

dacion, the Rehabilitation Plan proposes to settle the obligations to secured

creditors with mortgaged properties at selling prices.

Rehabilitation proceedings in our jurisdiction, much like the bankruptcy laws of the
United States, have equitable and rehabilitative purposes. On the one hand, they
attempt to provide for the efficient and equitable distribution of an insolvent
debtor's remaining assets to its creditors; and on the other, to provide debtors with
a fresh start by relieving them of the weight of their outstanding debts and
permitting them to reorganize their affairs. The rationale of P.D. No. 902-A, as
amended, is to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation, by preserving a
floundering business as going concern, because the assets of a business are often
more valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated.

The Court reiterates that the SECs approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not impair
BPIs right to contract. As correctly contended by private respondents, the nonimpairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial
or quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the hearing panel that heard the petition
for approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was acting as a quasi-judicial body and, thus,
its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the
freedom to contract.

Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes a dacion en pago
approach does not render it defective on the ground of impairment of the right to
contract. Dacion en pago is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers
another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an
outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in a sense of the nature of sale,
that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, the payment
for which is to be charged against the debtors debt. As such, the essential elements
of a contract of sale, namely; consent, object certain, and cause or consideration
must be present. Being a form of contract, the dacion en pago agreement cannot be
perfected without the consent of the parties involved.

We find no element of compulsion in the dacion en pago provision of the

Rehabilitation Plan. It was not the only solution presented by the ASB to pay its
creditors. In fact, it was stated in the Rehabilitation Plan that:

x x x If the dacion en pago herein contemplated does not materialize for failure of
the secured creditors to agree thereto, the rehabilitation plan contemplates to settle
the obligations (without interest, penalties and other related charges accruing after
the date of the initial suspension order) to secured creditors with mortgaged
properties at ASB selling prices for the general interest of the employees, creditors,
unit buyers, government, general public, and the economy.

Thus, if BPI does not find the dacion en pago modality acceptable, the ASB Group
can propose to settle its debts at such amount as is equivalent to the selling price of
the mortgaged properties. If BPI still refuses this option, it can assert its rights in the
liquidation and distribution of the ASB Groups assets. It will not lose its status as a
secured creditor, retaining its preference over unsecured creditors when the assets
of the corporation are finally liquidated.[9]

We are inclined to rule in a similar fashion here.

In intruding into corporate affairs, the State must, at all times, promote a wider and
more meaningful equitable distribution of wealth and protect investments and the
public. To Our mind, the approval by the SEC of the rehabilitation plan of respondent
corporations is a step towards that direction.

The terms of the rehabilitation plan unveil that secured creditors like petitioner bank
may refuse or reject the dacion en pago arrangements stated in it. It cannot be
implemented without petitioners consent.

Further, the approval of the plan and the appointment of a receiver merely suspend
actions and claims that may be raised against respondent bank. They do not, in any
manner, obliterate petitioners status as a preferred secured creditor.

Questions on the viability of the plan should likewise be laid to rest. As the CA aptly
observed, majority of respondents obligations to creditor banks had already been
paid as early as two years upon the approval of the plan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Court of Appeals Decision
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 61-68. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate
Justices Mario Guaria and Sesinando Villon, concurring.
[2] Id. at 116-118.
[3] Id. at 63.
[4] Id. at 66-67.
[5] G.R. No. 166197, February 27, 2007, 517 SCRA 1.
[6] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. ASB Holdings, Inc., id. at 10-11.
[7] Id.
[8] G.R. No. 164641, December 20, 2007.
[9] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Securities and Exchange Commission, id.

Today is Tuesday, September 06, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24670

December 14, 1979

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.

Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.

Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.

SANTOS, J.:

An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited
Partnership, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at
Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes presiding, which dismissed its complaint in Civil Case No.
7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and
Trust Company, defendant," for lack of merit.

The following facts a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are
based on a stipulation of facts entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff
(formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant
Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance

with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business,
developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1

On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over
two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills
Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed
the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of
sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions
that:

1.
The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove
soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.

2.
All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly
painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the
public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less
than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. 2

The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma
Chavez. 3

Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613
and 106092 issued in its name, respectively and the building restrictions were also
annotated therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma
Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot
No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex
"E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the
same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic Flour Mills
purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances,"
as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez.

Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509,

101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building
scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills
Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where
commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established. 8

Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the
western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig
River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27,
dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges
that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in
said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years
after the area ... had been declared a commercial and industrial zone ... 11

On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and

commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to
banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to,
and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant
demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the
commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand,
contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning permit
applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained
building and planning permits to proceed with the construction. 12

On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the
lower court for decision. The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of
"a writ of preliminary injunction ... restraining and enjoining defendant, its agents,
assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf from continuing or completing the
construction of a commercial bank building in the premises ... involved, with the
view to commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building
restrictions annotated in the defendant's transfer certificate of title."

In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue,
whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring
Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of

the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiffappellant on the lots in question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued.

The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding
that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27, supra.
It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality,
and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and welfare.
" In short, it upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that
the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as
against defendant-appellee. 14 The trial court decision further emphasized that it
"assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no issue raised by
either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void. 15

On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above

decision, 16 which motion was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.
17 It averred, among others, in the motion for reconsideration that defendantappellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in its
favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title
issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It also invited the trial court's attention to its
claim that the Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant corporation." 18

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965.
19

On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision
dismissing the complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion
for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond." 20 On April 14,
the appeal was given due course 21 and the records of the case were elevated
directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised. 22

Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred

I.
When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others,
as part of the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the
exercise of its police power; and

II.
When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power
to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it
did not make a finding that the building was erected along the property line, when it
should have been erected two meters away from said property line. 23

The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this

connection, We already had occasion to hold in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not
incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position, and is
seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error, "

The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960
is a valid exercise of police power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or
supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.

1.
The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of
Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place,
the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that
the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment
of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within
the issues framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties to present all
questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the
appellate court is to enable the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate
court upon appeal may determine whether or not such ruling was erroneous. The
requirement is in furtherance of justice in that the other party may not be taken by
surprise. 26 The rule against the practice of blowing "hot and cold" by assuming one
position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent
deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or properly
litigated 29 or pleaded 30 in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on
appeal.

In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly,
in the stipulation of facts below. when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same.

The only controversy then as stated by the trial court was whether or not the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4
and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots
in question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if
impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.

But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to
raise the issue of the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the
opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise
known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly,
the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore,
granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory
measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the
provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "

An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its
interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be
"liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it
shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general
welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and
material progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under
Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province,
city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the
original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly,
do not apply in the case at bar.

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute,
since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. 35 Invariably described as
"the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the

greatest and most powerful attribute of government, 37 the exercise of the power
may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through Justice
Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39
police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not,
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when We
declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right
to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police
power.

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the
health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality,
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway;
industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main
traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise
and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents
in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the
circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this
Court, speaking thru Justice Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al.,
41 Thus-

As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed. 169),
'the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful
today may in the future, because of changed situation, the growth of population or
other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to
yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was observed that
'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of the state today
things which were not thought of as being with in such power yesterday. The

development of civilization), the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public

opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government
to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought
within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered. 42 (Emphasis, supplied.)

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health
and prosperity of the state 43 and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. 44

The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid
exercise of police power may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein
Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict "between one
welfare and another, between particular and general, thus

Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial
a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation What
is critical or urgent changes with the times. 46

The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and
it being a " legitimate response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar
the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it
aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to
the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." 48

Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General 49

that laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into
contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus

Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between
the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by

virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains

adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.

Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50

through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the law forms part of, and is read into, every
contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is
allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations
Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice,
restates the rule.

One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American

jurisprudence and authorities 52 to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution
in question cannot nullify or supersede the agreement of the parties embodied in
the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the obligation of contracts in
violation of the Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced.

In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not
per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be
construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent
may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al., 55 two Of the
cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial
court, i.e. that the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual
undertaking between the parties. Dolan v. Brown, states that "Equity will not, as a
rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of property by injunction where the property
has so changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for
use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the
complainant to whatever remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the remedy of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific
holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions
which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial
enjoyment of the estate. 57 Applying the principle just stated to the present
controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health
and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendantsappellees should be permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated under
the police power of the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes. In
Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running with the
land are binding on all subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the
zoning ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the
ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements,

covenants or other agreement between parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such

proviso is found in the subject resolution.

It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by
the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds
of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the
contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through
the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5
and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint,
is hereby AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and MelencioHerrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee * and Aquino,JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in question is commercial. It

would be worse if the same were to be left as residential and all around are already
commercial.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by Justice Guillermo S. Santos
commends itself for approval. I feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence,
The observation, however, in the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos relative to
restrictive covenants calls, to my mind, for further reflection as to the respect to
which they are entitled whenever police power legislation, whether on the national
or local level, is assailed. Before doing so, however, it may not be amiss to consider
further the effect of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.

1.
Reference was made in the opinion of the Court to Philippine American Life
Insurance Company v. Auditor General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice
Sanchez. A concurrence came from me. It contained this qualification: "It cannot be
said, without rendering nugatory the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment,
and for that matter both the equal protection and due process clauses which equally
serve to protect property rights, that at the mere invocation of the police power, the
objection on non-impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in other
cases where governmental authority may trench upon property rights, the process
of balancing, adjustment or harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three
leading United States Supreme Court decisions, Home Building and Loan Association
v. Blaisdell, 3 Nebbia v. New York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,
5 I stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an enactment of a police
power measure does not per se call for the overruling of objections based on either
due process or non-impairment based on either due process or non-impairment
grounds. There must be that balancing, or adjustment, or harmonization of the
conflicting claims posed by an exercise of state regulatory power on the one hand
and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural or of juridical persons, on the
other. 'That is the only way by which the constitutional guarantees may serve the
high ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus effectively
preclude ally abusive exercise of governmental authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence
stop there: "In the opinion of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief Justice
Hughes, there was this understandable stress on balancing or harmonizing, which is
called for in litigations of this character: 'The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority
to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the

constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had
progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court.' Also to the same effect:
'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair
intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to
destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in
harmony with each other. This principle precludes a construction which would
permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of
contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow that
conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be
consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be
found to be within the range of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital
interests of the community.' Further on, Chief Justice Hughes likewise stated: 'It is
manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a growing
appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding
paragraph of my concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. case: "If
emphasis be therefore laid, as this concurring opinion does, on the pressing and
inescapable need for such an approach whenever a possible collision between state
authority and an assertion of constitutional right to property may exist, it is not to
depart from what sound constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then, perhaps much more so than in
other disputes, where there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary
cannot escape what Holmes fitly referred to as the sovereign prerogative of choice,
the exercise of which might possibly be impugned if there be no attempt, however
slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the respective claims of state
regulatory power and constitutionally protected rights." 8

I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a departure therefrom in the
able and scholarly opinion of Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is
a fundamental postulate of our Constitution. The only point I would wish to add is
that in the process of such balancing and adjustment, the present Constitution, the
Philippine American Life Insurance Co. decision having been promulgated under the
1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that the claim to property rights based on the nonimpairment clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our present
fundamental law: "The State shall promote social Justice to ensure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the

State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9

2.
Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by Hart and Sacks
under the category of "private directive arrangements. " 10 Through them people
are enable to agree on how to order their affairs. They could be utilized to govern
their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their future conduct. It is a well-known
fact that the common law relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such
covenants are an important means of ordering one aspect of property relationships.
Through them, there could be delimitation of land use rights. It is quite
understandable why the law should ordinarily accord them deference, It does so, it
has been said, both on grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there are limits
to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the extent that they ignore
technological or economic progress, they are not automatically entitled to judicial
protection. Clearly, they must "speak from one point of time to another." 11

Today is Tuesday, September 06, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 79538

October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development
Corporation.

COURTS, J.:

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter
dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April
2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR],
seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled
in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356
which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public
bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance
of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession
area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a)
That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within
a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in
the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965
until June 30, 1990;

(b)
That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
[hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest
concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of
the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p.
49];

(c)
that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the
contents of which were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO

STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE
CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT
AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE
INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A
COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED [Annex "4" of
the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

(d)
That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately
sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought
reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions
to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard
prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e)
That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of
the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on
July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers,
Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f)
That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through
then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying
petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract
within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could

be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner

was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was
made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva
Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx

xxx

xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been
denied in view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva
Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of
conservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic]
in respect to forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has
to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for
the future generations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are
well documented. Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well
known. The government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of
sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions and the
liberty and democratic way of life of its people.

xxx

xxx

xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among

others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null
and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated September 15,
1986. stating in part:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA
No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be
declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of
reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted,
issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as
the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them
when the national interest so requires.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and
authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the
order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others,
where movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an
order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the
portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or
superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.

xxx

xxx

xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was

likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986,
issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the
President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting
through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's
appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of

petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August
27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari.
Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective comments,
and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22,
1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several
factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner.

1.
Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of

administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions
and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the
same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata
thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority
acting within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
(1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June
26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR
[now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March
17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a
memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its
timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356
subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the
law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of
these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter
dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting
reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as
far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil.
300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609;
Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19,

1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of
Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by
Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this
letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against officials under the
previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In the
letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective
logging and reforestation practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other
administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the
fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by
the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

2.
Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of
certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a
reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is
whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative
orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition
ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and
granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983
and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to
have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for
certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for
the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The
yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the
acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same"
[Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And
failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders
the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality
of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982,
119 SCRA 392).

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno
v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right
may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily,
the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights
(Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37
Phil. 435 (1918)].

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau
actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its
inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which
were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari
requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

3.
Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of
certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely
this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general application of the
rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister

Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public

policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at

bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the
policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an
ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the
executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are
presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of
timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation
and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed

and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter
disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country.
The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest
resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna
peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic
and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle
of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy
resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the
country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure
future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands
effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation
of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the
government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced
and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters

which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v.
Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez
v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543;
Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877;
Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v.
Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in
the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that
of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For
this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural
resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these
resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice
to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses
and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of
appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged
irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging
concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in
contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue

influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical

exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest
resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will
not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be
brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the
DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy,
the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the
exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue
a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

*
As a result of the creation of the province of Quirino the municipality of
Maddela is now deemed part of the Quirino province.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING
FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.

A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC

Present:

PUNO, CJ,
QUISUMBING*,
YNARES-SANTIAGO*,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO**, and
ABAD**, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 19, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C.
Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote:

The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Indorsement to
pay a nominal fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10
million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice System previously denied by an
up-front excessive court fee.

The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with
OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this privilege to indigent
persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law seems to

be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much room for
interpretations.

In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it does not include
Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As
seen in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
reached-out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned
babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who
cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, to broken families who
returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been working hard for the very
Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach to, or have
rejected or abandoned them.

Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged
people, the same option granted to indigent people?

The two Executive Judges, that we have approached, fear accusations of favoritism
or other kind of attack if they approve something which is not clearly and
specifically stated in the law or approved by your HONOR.

Can your Honor help us once more?

Grateful for your understanding, God bless you and your undertakings.

We shall be privileged if you find time to visit our orphanage the Home of Love and
the Spiritual Retreat Center in Antipolo City.

To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people.

The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies
and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision
on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by
the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature
to such specific protection of the poor.[1]

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court,[2] and Sec. 19,
Rule 141, Rules of Court,[3] which respectively state thus:

Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent
was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)

Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real
property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more
than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of
legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an

affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached
to the litigants affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.

The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of
Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the
State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members,[4]
is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.[5] As a juridical
person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees
granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and
underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly
premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only a
natural person can suffer.

There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in
favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on
the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to
abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly
by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees.
Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove
too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be

extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent
and underprivileged people.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave) (On official leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

* On official leave.
* On official leave.
** Took no part in the deliberation.
** Took no part in the deliberation.

[1] Bernas, 1987 Philippine Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A

Commentary, 1996 Ed., p. 4064, citing the Journal of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention 1275-1277.
[2] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[3] As revised, effective August 16, 2004.
[4] The Civil Code provides:
Art. 44 The following are juridical persons:
1)

The State and its political subdivisions;

2)
Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
[5] Art. 46, Civil Code.

Today is Tuesday, September 06, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila

Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two
thousand nine.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9999

AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal Assistance Act of
2010".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value the
dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of every individual,
particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal counsel.

Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies and programs that provide adequate social services
and improve the quality of life for all.

In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure
that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon
determination it appears that the party cannot afford the services of a counsel, and
that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and protect of
the party.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal services to
be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include,

among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and
contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices,
bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be
defined by the Supreme Court.

Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and
services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a
certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ)
or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal
services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and
that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private
counsel.

For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer
and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or
organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary
certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.

The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited
association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided for in this Act
and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.

Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional

partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court,
shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that
could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten
percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal
profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein
contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid
services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the
Supreme Court.

Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The DOJ, in

cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is hereby mandated to
conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform the lawyers of the procedures
and guidelines in availing tax deductions and inform the general public that a free
legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is being provided by the
State.1avvph!1

Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the effectiveness

and social impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall submit an annual report
to both Houses of Congress indicating therewith the number of parties who
benefited from this Act.

The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location, demographic
characteristics and socioeconomic profile of the beneficiaries of this Act.

Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety (90) days from
the date effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the necessary revenue
regulations for the proper implementation of the tax component as envisioned in
this Act.

The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations with respect to the legal services covered under this Act and the process
of accreditation of organizations and/or associations which will provide free legal
assistance.

Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared

unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected by such declaration
shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or administrative circular
not consistent with any provision of this Act is hereby amended, repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES

Speaker of the House of Representatives

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2361 and House Bill No. 4301
was finally passed by the Senate and the House of the Representatives on January
27, 2010 and January 26, 2010, respectively.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General
House of Represenatives

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary of Senate

Approved: FEB 23, 2010

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, September 06, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108494

September 20, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, ALLAN TAN, alias "Allan Yao,"
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM DOE, accused.

SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City,
Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged
with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7,
1992. 1 On June 4, 1992, an amended information was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias
"Allan Yao," was indicated as an accused instead of John Doe. 2 A warrant of arrest
was thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but the same was returned unserved, 4
hence trial proceeded with regard to herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.

Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on May 15,
1992. 5 After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered by the court below on
October 8, 1992 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the
heirs of Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as
actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs. 6

The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified appellant as the

triggerman in the killing of Nelson Tandoc. Din recounted that at around 2:00 A.M.
on March 7, 1992, he and his friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each
other in front of Lucky Hotel located at M.H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan City, which
was owned by the witness' father and of which he was the administrator. He noticed
a man pass by on the opposite side of the street. The man made a dirty sign with
his finger and Din informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive act and
called them by waving his hands. Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter
stopped in front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez
streets. They demanded an explanation from the man but they were not given any.
7

At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was going on.
Tandoc informed him that they were just demanding an explanation from the man.
Din was surprised when Tandoc unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A brawl
ensued, with Tandoc clashing with the two men while Din exchanged blows with the
man who made the dirty finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their three opponents ran
away in a westward direction. 8

Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they were about to
enter the place, they noticed that the men with whom they just had a fight were
running towards them. Sensing danger, they ran inside the annex building of the
hotel and immediately secured the lock of the sliding outer door. They entered a
room and waited until they felt that the situation had normalized. After ten to fifteen
minutes, thinking that the men were no longer in the vicinity, they left the room.
Having decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a sudden, Din
saw Appellant, who at that time was wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot
Tandoc with a revolver. There was a fluorescent bulb installed at the front of the
hotel which enabled Din to identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot in the middle of
the chest and he fell down. Then, Din saw four to five men scamper away from the
scene. 9

Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase
appellant and his companions but he failed to catch up with them. Din and his wife
then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor Hospital. The victim was taken to the
emergency room but he expired an hour later. 10

At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City
Police Station received a report about a shooting incident at the annex building of
the Lucky Hotel. He proceeded to the crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando Garcia,
SPO3 Mauricio Flores and SPO3 Noli de Castro. Upon their arrival about five minutes
later, they were informed by the wife of Jimmy Din that the victim had been brought
to the Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the hospital where Din informed them
that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc and that the killer was, at that
time, wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. 11

They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the security
guard of a nearby bus company, they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual
incident that happened in the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the guard of
"Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some companions, chasing two persons running

towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He further added that the man was wearing a polo
shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular guard might be, he
pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. The man eating was not in a
security guard's uniform. 12

They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security guard of
"Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter answered in the affirmative. After a series of
questions, they learned that he was Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was from
7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M. the following day, that he was still on duty
at around 2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the firearm issued to him
was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they proceeded to Marra's
residence at Interior Nueva Street. 13

When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an aparador and
handed it to De Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell.
Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he last
fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked
him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first denied the accusation but when
informed that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense, firing at
the victim only once. Tandoc allegedly had a samurai sword with him at the time of
the incident. However, persistent efforts on the part of the policemen to thereafter
locate said bladed weapon proved futile. Marra also admitted that prior to the
incident, he chased the victim and Din. The officers then took Marra to the police
station where he was detained. 14

Meanwhile, De Vera went to Villaflor Hospital from where he fetched Din and
brought him to the police station. There, Din definitely identified Marra as the
assailant. During the investigation, De Vera also found out that Marra had not
firearm license. 15

Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City, testified that he
conducted an autopsy on a certain Nelson Tandoc. He found a gunshot wound on
the victim with the point of entry of the left side of the anterior chest wall and the
point of exit at the lower left portion of the right shoulder. 16

Prosecutor Gregorio Gaerlan, stepfather of the victim, testified on the funeral, burial
and other expenses incurred by the family. He declared that they paid Funeraria
Quiogue P25,000.00 for its services; Villaflor Hospital, P2,875.00 for the
confinement of Tandoc; St. John Memorial Cathedral, P350.00; Eternal Garden,
P3,000.00 for the interment fee and P150.00 for the rent of the tent during the
burial; and that they spent P2,300.00 for the video tape expenses and P11,800.00
for food and drinks during the wake. 17

Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the incident. Marra declared in

court that he used to work as a security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" from seven
o'clock in the evening to six o'clock in the morning of the following day. On March 6,
1992, he reported for duty at seven o'clock that evening as was his usual practice.
At around four o'clock down of the following day, he went home to change his
clothes. He proceeded to the Five Star Bus Terminal which was adjacent to "Linda's
Ihaw-Ihaw." He saw Neneng, the cashier of said eatery, and together they ordered
arroz caldo. Later, at about 5:00 A.M., he was approached by four policemen who
inquired if he was a security guard. He answered in the affirmative. He was also
asked about his sidearm. When he answered that it was at his residence, they all
went to his house to look for it. After he handed over the firearm to the policemen,
he was brought to the city hall where he was detained. 18

Under cross-examination, he insisted that when he handed the gun to the

policeman, there were five live bullets, and not four live bullets and one empty shell
as claimed by the prosecution. Prior to the incident, he had never met Jimmy Din
nor does he know of any cause why Din would harbor any ill feelings against him. 19

After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective evaluation of the evidence,
the Court is not disposed to reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of
the latter being amply supported by the established facts and fully sustained by the
applicable law.

In assailing the decision of the court below, the defense argues that "Jimmy Din . . .
was not able to identify the assailant in a definite and believable manner." It goes
on to state further that " Jimmy Din was inside the hotel when Nelson Tandoc was
shot and his vision was o(b)structed by the door. Jimmy Din was also not familiar
with the accused. Under the circumstances by which he allegedly witnessed the
shooting, how could be identify clearly an assailant at the distance of 45 meters?"
20

Appellant's counsel is only partly correct, having conveniently failed to mention

other vital parts of Din's testimony. An impartial review of said testimony readily
reveals that Din was indeed in a position to know the identity of the assailant.
Firstly, Din knew for a fact that the persons he and Tandoc fought with near the
Dunkin' Donuts store were the same men who chased them while they were on their
way back to the hotel because he was able to take a good look at them. During the
chase, he naturally turned around to look at the men who were running after them
and who were at that time in front of the Balingit Trading store which was welllighted. 21 It logically follows that they were the same persons who were waiting for
them when they later came out of the hotel, and he was familiar with their identities
because of their previous encounter.

Secondly, we do not agree with appellant that the door blocked the view of Din. Said
door, partly made of plywood, had a spring hinge which makes it possible for the
door to close by itself. However, at that time the spring hinge had been weakened
by long and constant use such that it would take some time for it to close the door,
thereby allowing Din sufficient opportunity to have an unobstructed view of the
scene outside. 22

Thirdly, Din was quite near the victim and appellant, which proximity, enabled him
to clearly see what really happened. He thus readily perceived the actual shooting
at the time when Tandoc pushed the door open. At that precise moment, Din was at
the left side of Tandoc and about four to five meters away from the assailant. 23

Lastly, the place was brightly illuminated by a 20-watt fluorescent bulb installed on
the outside wall in front of the hotel. Marra was only about three meters away
therefrom. Such physical conditions would undeniably afford a clear view from
inside the hotel of the immediate area outside and in front of the same where the
incident took place.

The prosecution presented another vital witness in the person of Sgt. Reynaldo de
Vera, whose testimony we shall repeat here for easy reference. In capsulized form,
De Vera narrated the sequence of events that happened after he and his
companions went to the crime scene to conduct an investigation. Having received
information that a man in a security guard's uniform was involved in the incident,
they sought information from a security guard of a nearby bus terminal. Said
security guard pointed them to Marra, who at that time was eating in a carinderia

nearby. Informed by Marra that his gun was at his residence, they all went to
Marra's residence to get the same. After receiving said firearm, De Vera asked
appellant why he killed Tandoc but Marra initially denied any participation in the
killing. Nevertheless, when confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it,
Marra admitted the act although he alleged it was done in self-defense. This
testimony of De Vera as to the confession of Marra is of significant weight, but the
admissibility thereof shall also be passed upon.

Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(a)ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. . . . ." The critical inquiry then is whether or not Marra
was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked selfdefense. We believe that he was not so situated.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule
begins to operate. 24

In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made
the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a
statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the very start
when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry
had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect.
They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely informed
that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we held
in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to Pat. Padilla was a
spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary
manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of
formal custodial investigation. 26 The trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have
erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial
investigation is not applicable in the instant case, . . . ."

Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. de Vera assumes a dominant dimension because

it totally destroys the defense of denial cum alibi subsequently raised by appellant.
In his answers to Sgt. De Vera, appellant expressly admitted that he shot Tandoc,
albeit with an exculpatory explanation. This admission of Marra is in complete
contrast to the statements he later made in open court.

In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be
given in evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be
considered as part of the res gestae. In a similar situation involved in the aforecited
case of People vs. Dy, this Court held:

. . . the oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a
tourist" and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he
wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9) is
competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 29 [now
Sec. 33], Rule 130). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.
The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard
and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in
such a case it must be given in substance. (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People vs. Tawat,
G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431). (Italics supplied.)

In any event, even without his admission, the case against appellant has been duly
established by the other evidence of the prosecution, as earlier discussed. However,
persistently arguing for an acquittal, the defense points out that when the police
officers saw Marra, he was not in a blue uniform whereas Din testified that the
person who shot Tandoc was wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform.
This is a puerile argument since appellant himself removed any lingering doubts on
this point. He said that on ending his tour of duty at 4:00 A.M. of March 7, 1992, he
decided to go home to change clothes, after which he went to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw"
to eat. This explains why, at the time the police officers saw him, he was already in
civilian clothes. The shooting had taken place earlier at around 2:00 A.M. At that
time, Marra was still in his security guard's uniform, being then on duty.

However, while we agree that the crime committed by appellant was murder
qualified by treachery, we reject the finding that the same was aggravated by

nighttime. No evidence was presented by the prosecution to show that nocturnity

was specially sought by appellant or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the
commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity from capture. 27 At any rate,
whether or not such aggravating circumstance should be appreciated, the penalty
to be imposed on appellant would not be affected considering the proscription
against the imposition of the death penalty at the time when the offense in the
instant case was committed.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel

Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty
and civil liabilities therein stated is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

Original Record, 1.

Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 29.

Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 11.

Decision, 9-10; Original Record, 118-119; penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron.

T.S.N., August 13, 1992, 3-8.

Ibid., id., 8-9.

Ibid., id., 10-15, 25.

10

Ibid., id., 21-22, 26-27.

11

Ibid., July 21, 1992, 4-7; ibid., July 23, 1992, 6-7.

12

Ibid., id., 8-10; ibid., id., 4.

13

Ibid., id., 10-13; ibid., id., 9.

14

Ibid., id., 14-16, 23; ibid., id., 16-20.

15

Ibid., id., 23-24, 27.

16

Ibid., July 2, 1992, 2, 4-5.

17

Ibid., July 14, 1992, 8-9, 11-12.

18

Ibid., September 3, 1992, 16-17, 20-29.

19

Ibid., id., 31-32.

20

Appellant's Brief, 7; Rollo, 44.

21

TSN, August 18, 1992, 8-9.

22

Ibid., id., 14, 18.

23

Ibid., August 13, 1992, 15.

24

Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 473 (1964).

25

G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988, 158 SCRA 111.

26
373.

Citing People vs. Taylaran, G.R. No. L-49149, October 31, 1981, 108 SCRA

27
People vs. Pasilao, et al., G.R. Nos. 98152-53, October 26, 1992, 215 SCRA
163; People vs. Bigcas, et al., G.R. No. 94534, July 20, 1992, 211 SCRA 631.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104383*. July 12, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIAS,

FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN and DIASCORO VIAS y
ODAL, accused,
ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

One of the cardinal rules of criminal law is that the guilt of the accused must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.[1] In the present case, there being a doubt as to the guilt of accusedappellant, the constitutional presumption of innocence stands and he must be
acquitted.

This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 36930 finding accusedappellant Albino Bagas guilty of the complex crime of robbery in band with double
rape and sentencing him accordingly.

At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22, 1991, a group of eight armed
men wearing masks entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos
Lacsamana at Sacred Heart Village, Kalookan City and robbed the said premises of
valuables in the total amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery, two
members of the gang raped Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago, niece and
employee, respectively of complainant Lacsamana.

On February 27, 1991, accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo,

Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias and four other accused, whose identities are
unknown and who are still at large up to the present, were charged with the
complex crime of robbery in band with double rape under the following information:

That on or about the 22nd day of February 1991, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

conspiring together and mutually helping one another, all armed with guns, with
intent of gain, and by means of violence, threats and intimidation upon the person
of Perlita delos Santos de Lacsamana, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:

Cash money in the amount of -----------P128,000.00

Jewelries worth ------------------------- 600,000.00

Total ------------------------------- P728,000.00

all belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the
aforesaid amount of P728,000.00; and on the occasion thereof, said accused
conspiring together and mutually helping one another likewise by means of force
and violence and with the use of their weapons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with Fe Catanyag y Cabaero and Estrella Rolago y Madrid
both residents of said house, against their will and without their consent.

Contrary to law.[2]

On arraignment, all the accused including accused-appellant Albino Bagas pleaded

Not Guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The facts as found by the trial court and as presented in the Solicitor Generals Brief
are as follows:

The incident happened at the compound of Block 5, Road 32, Phase II of the Sacred
Heart Village in Kalookan City (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 2, 1991). In the compound are the
main house where Mrs. Perlita Lacsamana resides and another house which serves
as the office and quarters for Lacsamanas employees. In between of these two
houses is about three (3) meter-wide area where the dirty kitchen and the garage
are found. In the first floor of the main house is the masters bedroom, and on the
second floor is the guestroom (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 2, 1991).

While at the masters bedroom on that particular evening at about 9:30 p.m.,
Lacsamana overheard her maid, cried aray, aray, aray. She immediately went out
but as soon as she opened the door of her room, two (2) men (one of them is
accused Amestuzo while the other one remains unarrested) poked their guns on her.
At gun point, Lacsamana, Lea, Edwin, and Belen were forcibly brought to the second
floor of the main house. Thereat, Lacsamana saw four (4) other male persons
ransacking her premises. The said male persons, armed with guns and knives, tied
her including all her employees and members of her household with the use of torn
electric fan wire and television wire. After that they were told to lie down with face
against the floor but a minute later she was asked where the masters bedroom is
and when she answered that it is on the ground floor, she was again forcefully
brought down. On her way down, she saw, aside from the six (6) male persons who
were inside her house, two (2) other male persons (later identified as accused
Ampatin and Vias) outside the main house but within the compound (pp. 8-10, TSN,
July 2, 1991).

Once they were already inside the masters bedroom, the six (6 ) armed male
persons (two (2) of them were Amestuzo and Bagas) ransacked the same and took
all her monies, jewelries, shoes, jackets, colored television and imported wine.
Likewise, aforesaid accused ate the foods found by them in their kitchen. (pp.10-11,
13, TSN, July 2, 1991).

After ransacking the room, two (2) of the accused, one (1) of them is Amestuzo,
brought Estrella Rolago inside her room and afterwhich she was in turn brought to
the guest room. Thereat she heard Rolago pleading Maawa kayo, maawa kayo then
after ten (10) minutes, Rolago, with bloodstain on her shorts, was brought in back to
the guest room (pp. 13-14, TSN, July 2, 1991). Rolago was raped by Amestuzo (pp.
17-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).

Almost simultaneously, Bagas likewise sexually assaulted and ravished Fe Catanyag

(pp. 38-40, TSN, July 3, 1991; pp. 2-5, TSN, July 4, 1991). Thereafter, Bagas shouted
at her to stand up and although she was experiencing pain on her private part
which was bleeding at that time, she stood up, dressed up and proceeded to the
servants quarter (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 4, 1991).

Thereafter, Mrs, Lacsamana shouted for help. Sensing that the accused had already
left, they locked the door. With the help of her employer and co-employees, more

particularly Nanding, she and Rolago were brought the nearby Neopolitan Clinic and
from there they proceeded to the St. Lukes Hospital where Dr. Brion treated
Catanyag and Rolago (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 4, 1991; pp. 19-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).[3]

On November 28, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the
accused. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment CONVICTING accused VALERIANO

AMESTUZO y VIAS, FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN,
DIOSCORO VINAS y ODAL of the complex crime of ROBBERY IN BAND WITH DOUBLE
RAPE and sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment of DOUBLE RECLUSION
PERPETUA and orders them to jointly and severally indemnify to complainant Perlita
delos Santos de Lacsamana the amount of P800,000.00 representing the value of
monies and properties taken forcibly away by the accused and to indemnify, jointly
and severally, Ma. Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS each.

SO ORDERED.[4]

From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-appellant
Bagas appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged
deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel during his
identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due weight to the open court
identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court
identification, and (3) the trial courts improper rejection of his defense of alibi.

Accused-appellant maintains that from the time he was arrested until he was
presented to the complainants for identification, he was deprived of the benefit of
counsel. He narrates the circumstances surrounding his arrest and investigation as
follows:

On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen
together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the
handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as
a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain Mario and searched the first
and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at

the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito
and Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to
accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.

Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with
accused Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused Ampatin told him that he
(Ampatin) committed an error in pointing him out to the police, namumukaan lang
niya ako, napagkamalian lang niya ako. They were brought to the Urduja Police
Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together with the other two
accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant
was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he was
asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and
Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the
complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited
complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped
when one of the policemen intervened.[5]

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it
deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his
investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for identification
without the benefit of counsel, accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the
constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from
the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on detention. He maintains
that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was as much
entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while
he is under custodial investigation.[6] Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.[7] Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
[8] This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing[9] and in the more recent
case of People vs. Salvatierra.[10] The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only
during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation
process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory[11] and it is usually the witness or the

complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the
line-up.[12]

Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he
was presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet
part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his
identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any
admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact, records show that the
police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the
complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused
while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which
an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of his conviction.[13] In the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial admission.

Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was
presented to the complainants for identification. It is alleged that the identification
was irregular as he was not placed in a police line-up and instead, made to stand
before the complainants alone.

Again, the contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification.[14]
The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand
before the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or
persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process.

However, we agree that complainants out-of-court identification of accusedappellant was seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we have applied the
totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankee[15]
which lists the following factors:

xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.

The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the

police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before
complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-face when he
was brought our of the detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the
police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and
that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits. According to
accused-appellant -

Q: When the complaining witnesses arrived at the Urduja precinct at that time you
mentioned, were you immediately kicked by them?

A: No, sir.

Q: How long a time from the time they arrived at the Urduja precinct to the time
that you were kicked by them?

A: Around 10 minutes, sir.

Q: And how were you identified or recognized by the complaining witnesses?

A: Because upon arrival at the Urduja police station, the policemen announced that I
am one of the suspects in this case and thereafter, the complainants started kicking
me, sir.

Q: So that the announcement of the policemen that you were one of the suspects
came first then they started kicking you?

A: Yes, sir.[16]

It is, thus, clear that the identification was practically suggested by the police
themselves when they announced to the complainants that accused-appellant was
the person pointed to by Ampatin. The fact that this information came to the
knowledge of the complainants prior to their identification based on their own recall
of the incident detracts from the spontaneity of their subsequent identification and
therefore, its objectivity.

In a similar case, People vs. Cruz,[17] accused Cruz, a suspected co-conspirator in a

case of robbery with homicide, was presented to the witnesses alone and made to
walk and turn around in their presence. Then the police pointed out to the accused
and several others as the persons suspected by the police as the perpetrators of the
robbery committed in Goso-on. The Court, in rejecting the subsequent identification
made by the witnesses, reasoned that:

The manner by which (witnesses) were made to identify the accused at the police
station was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none,
activated visual imagination, and all told, subverted their reliability as eyewitnesses.

In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,[18] an NBI agent first pointed the accused to the
witnesses after which the latter identified the accused. The Court held that such
identification was doubtful as the same was not spontaneous and independent as
there was improper suggestion coming from the NBI agent. We ruled that a show-up
or the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification is
seriously flawed as it constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification
procedure now or ever used by the police.

Likewise in People vs. Meneses,[19] where the accused was presented to the lone
witness as the suspect in the crime inside the police investigators office, the Court
pronounced that although the police officer did not literally point to the accused as
in the Tuason case, the confrontation and the identification proceeding therefrom
was objectionable.

The Court also finds that the trial court erroneously rejected accused-appellants
alibi.

Accused-appellant clearly and positively testified that at the time of the crime,
February 22, 1991, he was working as a shell cutter in a factory in Pasay City where
he was a stay-in employee. He rendered overtime work until ten oclock in the
evening that night because they had to rush work. After ten p.m., he, together with
his stay-in co-workers, went to sleep. Four days later, he was arrested when
accused Ampatin randomly pointed him out to the police.[20]

This testimony of accused-appellant was materially corroborated by two of his coemployees who were with him on the night of the incident. Rodolfo Rosales, his coworker, testified that he worked overtime until 10 p.m. in the Pasay City factory
together with accused-appellant. Upon finishing work, they went to sleep in their
quarters on the second floor of the building because they were stay-in employees of
the factory.[21] Another co-worker of accused-appellant, Clemente Gahelan, was
similarly offered as a witness to corroborate Rosales testimony and his testimony
was duly admitted by the prosecution.[22]

The employer of accused-appellant Rolando Ocasla, likewise testified that on the

night of the incident, accused-appellant worked overtime in his factory until 10 p.m.
After 10 p.m., he personally locked the door of the premises which was the only
means of ingress and engress, as he always does because it was his means of
preventing any pilferage of materials. He was the only one who had keys to said
door. Around five a.m. of the following day, he woke up accused-appellant and told
him to drink his coffee. He also declared that there was nothing unusual about
accused-appellants behavior either, before, during or after the date of the alleged
crime.[23]

The defense of alibi or denial assumes significance or strength when it is amply

corroborated by a credible witness.[24] And to be given weight, accused must prove
not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he
was so far away that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [25]

In this case, we find accused-appellants alibi sufficiently corroborated by the

testimonies of his co-workers and his employer who categorically stated that they
were with accused-appellant on the night of the crime. There was no evidence that
these witnesses were related to accused-appellant; neither was it shown that they
had any personal interest nor motive in the case. As impartial credible witnesses,
their testimonies cannot be doubted absent a clear showing of undue bias or

prejudice, or convincing proof of the impropriety of their motives to testify for the
accused.[26]

Accused-appellant vehemently argues that it was physically impossible for him to

have been present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission. First, the crime was committed around 9:30 in the evening of
February 22, 1991. Accused-appellant, as well as two other witnesses, testified that
he worked in the factory until 10 p.m. that night and went to sleep after. Second,
there was only one door in the factory which was the only means of entrance and
exit and this door was kept locked by witness Ocasla after ten p.m. that night.
Ocasla was the only person who had a key to this door. Third, the windows on the
first floor of the building consisted of hollow blocks with small holes which do not
allow passage. The second and third floor windows were 14 and 21 feet high,
respectively. There was no possible means of exit through these windows without
accused-appellant getting hurt or injured. Lastly, the crime took place in Kalookan
City around 9:30 p.m. while accused-appellants place of work was in Pasay City.
Assuming for the sake of argument that he was able to leave the premises after 10
p.m. that night, by the time he reaches Kalookan, the crime would have already
been completed.

The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the courts
should not be too readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken in the light of all
the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as
found by the trial court and thereby rightly set the accused free.[27] Though
inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the present case has been sufficiently
established by corroborative testimonies of credible witnesses and by evidence of
physical impossibility of accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime.
Alibi, therefore, should have been properly appreciated in accused-apellants favor.

Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is the voluntary
confession of accused Federico Ampatin absolving accused-appellant Bagas of the
crime. Ampatins testimony was clear and categorical:

Q: When you reached that house where Bagas was working what happened?

A: All the persons were ordered to lie down, sir.

xxx

Q: And what did they do to you?

A: Immediately I was instructed to follow the policemen who went upstairs, sir.

Q: Why did that policemen go upstairs?

A: He was looking for Mario, sir.

xxx

Q: Upon reaching the second floor, what happened there?

A: They did not see any person there, sir.

Q: What followed next?

A: P/O Melmida pistol-whipped me, sir.

Q: Where were you hit?

A: On the left portion of my neck, sir.

Q: Did Melmida utter any remark while hitting you?

xxx

A: He told me to point to somebody else, sir, saying these words, Magturo ka ng tao
kahit sino.

xxx

Q: So what did you do when you were ordered to point to anyone?

A: Because at that time I cannot yet stand up he forced me to go downstairs, sir.

xxx

Q: Were you able to reached (sic) the ground floor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what happened there?

A: I pointed to Albino Bagas, sir, because he was the only first person I saw there at
the ground floor while his companions were on the other side because I dont want
to get hurt anymore, Your Honor.

Court: When you see (sic) Bagas was lying face down at the tme you pointed to
him?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Court: You did not bother to look at his face?

A: No more Your Honor because I was in a hurry to point to somebody because I was
afraid that I will be hurt again, Your Honor.

xxx

Court: You mean to say at the time you pointed to Albino Bagas you did not know
him?

A: No I dont know him, Your Honor.[28]

Ampatin and accused-appellant were charged as co-conspirators in the crime of

robbery with rape. As a co-accused, it would have been more consistent with human
nature for Ampatin to implicate accused-appellant if indeed he was one of the gang.
In fact, the Court has recognized that as is usual with human nature, a culprit,
confessing a crime is likely to put the blame as far as possible on others rather than
himself.[29] The fact that he testified to the innocence of a co-accused, an act
which resulted in no advantage or benefit to him and which might in fact implicate
him more, should have been received by the trial court as an indicum of the truth of
Ampatins testimony and the innocence of herein accused-appellant. Ampatins
testimony, therefore, should have been given weight by the trial court. More so, the
same was substantially corroborated by another witness, Rodolfo Rosales, accusedappellants co-worker and who was present when accused-appellant was arrested.
Rosales testified as follows:

Q: Now, do you know when was Albino Bagas arrested in connection with this case?

A: Last February 25, that was Monday, sir.

Q: And where were you when he was arrested?

A: I was there at that time.

xxx

Q: xxx what was the reaction of Albino Bagas when he was being pointed to and
arrested by the arresting officers?

A: The situation goes like this, sir, the policemen arrived there and they were
holding the persons of Ampatin and they were looking for a person named Mario
that was what I heard, sir, and then the policemen forced us to be identified or to be
seen by the guide. Ampatin at first at the ground floor but since there was nobody
there by the name of Mario they proceeded to the second floor and upon looking
one of the policemen shouted, Wala rito, niloloko lang tayo ng taong ito.

Court: Then what happened next?

Witness: And I noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid, so,
because of fear he was able to point on the person of Albino Bagas but when asked
he does not know the name of Albino Bagas, Your Honor.

Atty. Pacis: Before going to the second floor, because according to you the arresting
officers and the guide went to the second floor, was Albino Bagas at the ground
floor seen by the guide and the policemen?

A: We were the first group of persons seen by the policemen and Albino and I were
beside each other, sir.

Q: And you want to impressed (sic) upon this Honorable Court that at first at the
ground floor, Albino Bagas was not identified by this Ampatin before going to the
second floor?

A: The guide was not able to identify the person of Albino Bagas and that was the
reason why they still made searches at the second floor, sir.

Q: How was Federico Ampatin able to identify Albino Bagas when he was
accompanied by the policemen went downstairs?

A: I noticed from the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid after hearing
the shout of the policemen, sir.

xxx[30]

The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatins declaration in court that he

does not know herein accused-appellant and merely pointed to him out of fear of
the police. These testimonies remain unrebutted by the prosecution as the arresting
officers were not presented to refute or deny the same. The foregoing testimonies
exculpating accused-appellant have sufficiently cast at least a shadow of doubt as
to his guilt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Albino

Bagas of the crime of robbery with multiple rape is hereby REVERSED and he is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate release is hereby ordered unless
he is held for some other valid charges.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

* This case was transferred to the ponente pursuant to the resolution in AM No. 009-03-SC. - Re: Creation of Special Committee on Case Backlog dated february 27,
2001.

[1] People vs. Libag, 184 SCRA 707 (1990).

[2] Rollo, pp. 5-6.

[3] Id., at 138-140.

[4] Id., at 44.

[5] TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 20-21, TSN , August 15, 1991, pp. 2-10.

[6] People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); People vs. Andal, 279 SCRA 474 (1997).

[7] People vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1990); People vs. Labtan, 320 SCRA 140
(1999).

[8] People vs. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471 (1995); People vs. Dela Torre, 294 SCRA 196
(1998).

[9] Ibid.

[10] 276 SCRA 55 (1997). The case of People vs. Lamsing overturns the Courts prior
ruling in the case of People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 307, where identification of an
uncounselled accused made in a police line-up at the start of the custodial
investigation was held to be inadmissible.

[11] See note 10.

[12] People vs. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994).

[13] People vs. Tiadula, 292 SCRA 596 (1998); People vs. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751
(1998).

[14] Brief for the Appellee, pp. 7-8 citing the case of People vs. Espiritu, 191 SCRA
503 (1990).

[15] People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, 95 (1995).

[16] TSN, August 15, 1991, pp. 8-9.

[17] 32 SCRA 181 (1970).

[18] 241 SCRA 695 (1995).

[19] 288 SCRA 95 (1998).

[20] TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 18-21.

[21] Id. at 4-5.

[22] Id., at 17.

[23] TSN, August 21, 1991, pp. 14-23.

[24] People vs. Entila, 325 SCRA 226 (2000).

[25] People vs. Alib, 322 SCRA 93 (2000).

[26] People vs. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 (1991).

[27] People vs. Uson, 224 SCRA 425, 435-436

[28] TSN of August 22, 1991, pp. 29-30.

[29] People vs. Victor, 181 SCRA 818 (1990).

[30] TSN of August 14, 1991, pp. 5-8.

Today is Tuesday, September 06, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94262

May 31, 1991

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its agent, FEEDER INTERNATIONAL

(PHILS.) INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fourteenth Division, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for

petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated May 8, 1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of
Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as
amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel
oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the
forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo.1

The facts as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
20470 are as follows:

The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by
Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986
carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to
Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.

On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo
without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only
came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian

informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo
dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report.

The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required
ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of
Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga."

In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then
filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention
which the District Collector denied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.

In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective
counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts, to wit:

l.
That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI" subject of Sl-2-86, herein
identified as Exh. "A", is admitted.

2.
That the existence and identity of l,100 metric tons of gas oil, subject of Sl-286-A, herein identified as Exh. "B", is admitted;

3.
That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil, subject of Sl-286 herein identified as Exh. "B-1", is admitted;

4.
That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 and was cleared by Singapore
customs authorities for Zamboanga, Philippines;

5.
That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island, Municipality of Nueva
Valencia, sub-province of Guimaras, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about 1120HRS,
May 14,1986;

6.
That subject vessel was boarded by Customs and Immigration authorities for
the first time in the afternoon of May 19, 1986, at about 1600HRS;

7.
That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986, submitted by the Team
leader of the Customs and Immigration Team, Roberto Intrepido, marked and
identified as Exh. "C", is admitted;

8.
That at the time of boarding, the Master of subject vessel could not produce
any ship and/or shipping documents regarding her cargo except the Port Clearance
Certificate No. 179999 issued by the Port of Singapore authority dated May 4, 1986,
marked as Exh. "D", which is hereby admitted;

9.
That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULU WAI", Capt. Romeo E. Deposa
filed a Marine Protest dated same date, which Marine Protest, marked and identified
as Exh. "E", is hereby admitted;

10.
That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E. Deposa, marked and
identified as Exh. "F", given on May 26, 1986 before Atty. Hernando Hinojales,
Customs Legal Officer, is admitted;

11.
That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres, Owner's representative of M/T
"ULU WAI" marked and identified as Exh. "G" given before Atty. Hernando Hinojales
on May 28,1986, is admitted;

12.
That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas, Master of M/T "CATHEAD"
given before Lt. Dennis Azarraga on June 4, 1986, marked and identified as Exh.
"H", is admitted;

13.
That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41 entered into by and
between the National Stevedoring & Lighterage Corporation and the Far East
Synergy Corporation, marked and identified as Exh. "I", is admitted; and;

14.
That the Preliminary Report of Survey Sounding Report dated June 17, 1986,
signed by J.P. Piad, Surveyor of Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and duly attested
by Ernesto Cutay, Chief Officer of the M/T "ULU WAI" marked and identified as Exh.
"J", is also admitted. 2

On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T "ULU WAI" hereby found guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD
1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are
hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530* (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same
Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated

May 13, 1987, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 19, 1987 of the
District Collector of Customs of Iloilo, ordering the forfeiture of M/T "ULU WAI" and
its cargo of 2,100 metric tons of gas and fuel oil is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED. 4

On June 25, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to
enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision. On December 14, 1988,
the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision, with this dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs dated May 13,

1987, ordering the forfeiture of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" for violation of Section

2530(a) of the Tariff and Custom Codes (sic), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100
metric tons of Gas Oil and 1,000 metric tons of Fuel Oil for violation of Section 2530
* (a) and (f), and (I-1) of the same Code, is hereby affirmed. With costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioner, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax
Appeals' decision with this Court. On March 21, 1990, we issued a resolution6
referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of our decision
in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 7 holding that
final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having
been denied on July 4, 1990, it interposed this instant petition contending that:

1.
The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence
that an illegal importation had been committed;

2.
Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right
to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by
proof beyond reasonable doubt; and

3.
The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of
counsel in violation of their constitutional right thereto.8

We find no merit in the Petition.

1.
It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and
customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by herein
petitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of first Instance of Rizal etc., et al., 9 this

Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in

relation to criminal proceedings, as follows:

. . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and
customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the
offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the
Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such
as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the
main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to
unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure
cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed
against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be
imposed.

In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure
proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe
on contraband or illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue
law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being assimilated in
lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties
imposed and satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of the
government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or
possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty be falls on
him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the
probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively
liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture
does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in respondents'
car and seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability
lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the
information can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents'
exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven
not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally

imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the
degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
10

In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently
established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been
committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture
of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code.

Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it

bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to
invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

2.
The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal
importation committed, or at least an attempt thereof, which would justify a
forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.

Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation
had been committed on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on
Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated,
forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133
which involves. such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt does not apply.

Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when
the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention
to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload
is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is
rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11
and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and
circumstances generally. 12

In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been
an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly
demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision:

It is undisputed that the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" entered the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. The issue that calls for Our resolution is whether or not there was an
intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borne by the evidence convince Us
that there was intent to unload. The following circumstances unmistakably point to
this conclusion.

1.
Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga
was shorter and Iloilo lies further north.1wphi1 It is not logical for the sailing vessel
to travel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.

2.
When the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras,
Iloilo, it did not notify the Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. The master
of the vessel did not file a marine protest until 12 days after it had anchored,
despite the supposed urgency of the repairs needed and notwithstanding the
provision (Sec. 1016) of the Code requiring the master to file protest within 24
hours.

3.
At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and
shipping documents were not on board except the clearance from Singaporean port
officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner claims that these were turned
over to the shipping agent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986. However, this
claim is belied by the sworn marine protest (Exhibit "E") of the master of M/T "ULU
WAI" Mr. Romeo Deposa.

It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the crew to: get
down of (sic) the vessel and find means and ways to contact the vessel's
representative.

Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit "G"), ship agent, Antonio Torres, stated
that he did not know the buyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the Local
Purchase Order of the alleged buyer, Pogun Construction SDN. Torres also swore
that his knowledge came from the vessel's owner, without mentioning the shipping
documents which indicate such data. He also said that he did not know the
consignee of the oil which would have been patent from the documents. Lastly, as
also pointed out by the court a quo, the captain of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" Romeo
Deposa, in his sworn statement to custom authorities on May 26, 1986, enumerated
the documents he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio Torres, but did not mention as

among them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and the Bill of
Lading.

4.
When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T "CATHEAD", and the large
M/T "SEMIRANO NO. 819" were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge
and the tugboat were contracted by Consignee Far East Synergy to load the cargo of
the vessel into the awaiting barge and to discharge the same to Manila (Exhibits "I"
and "I-1").

It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T
"ULU WAI" Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was the
vessel's cargo which was to be unloaded and brought to Manila by them. 13

The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance

with the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as
affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to
deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,
and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to
great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

3.
The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the
assistance of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. As explained in the case of Nera vs.
The Auditor General: 14

The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during
the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his
right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the
trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by himself and counsel," either
retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense. These
guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the
person facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to
defend his liberty (and before even his life) against the awesome authority of the
State.

In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as
urgent nor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the
Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound
by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause
such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored
or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all
except only with a lawyer at his side.

Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of
Deposa and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage
of the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was not done
by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly performed
stands. In addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally,
petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the
assistance of counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were
taken under anomalous circumstances which would render them inadmissible as
evidence against petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity
or veracity of the said sworn statements.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado T. Limcaoco, with Associate Justices Arturo B.

Buena and Socorro Tirona Liwag concurring; Petition, Annex "E"; Rollo, 85.

2 Rollo, 86-89.

3 Petition, Annex "P"; Ibid., 145.

4 Id., Annex "R"; Ibid., 154.

* Omitted in the original text.

5 Penned by Presiding Judge Amante Filler, and concurred in by Associate Judges

Constante C. Roaquin and Alex Z. Reyes Petition, Annex "V"; Rollo, 210.

6 Petition, Annex "D"; Rollo, 84.

7 180 SCRA 609 (1989).

8 Rollo, 9-16.

9 101 SCRA 86 (1980).

10 Magistrado vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., 174 SCRA 605

(1989); Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

11 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 947.

12 Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., 494.

13 Rollo, 92-93.

14 164 SCRA 1 (1988).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and
unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys
not only her future but of the youth population as well, who in the teachings of our
national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is
confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed no less upon
a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock on the
portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically
evil act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of
death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor
does there exist any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust
ought not to lust.

The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the
horrible experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the
bloody hands of appellant, as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record:
[1] *

"Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November
20, 1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction
adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street,
Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela , Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment
also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN,
September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).

"The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She
used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound
yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While they were playing,
appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a
septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-22).

"On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking
spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left
Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN,
September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).

"Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the
compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds
inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished
house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's store (TSN, September 18, 1995,
pp.9-11).

"On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his inlaw's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the
trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip.
On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That
same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of
the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).

"Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to

buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She
notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was
disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he
looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the
compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).

"Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She
last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair
ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber
slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).

"Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following
day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger
jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of
the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared (TSN,
September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-17).

"That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria
inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's
parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).

"With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following
findings:

Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,

Contusions, supra pubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,

Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.

Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm, angle of the left eye, lateral
aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x
1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left,
posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area,
left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle
third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm. forearms,
left, posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm.
thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd, 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect,
lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd , 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral
aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect
2.2 x 1.0 cm.

Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.

Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural

petechial hemorrhages.

Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.

Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,

Contributory.

REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots.
(TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126)

"Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing.
According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the apartment
since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the same day or early
morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-11-27).

"SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant
was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded
to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to
work at the factory but she did not know his present whereabouts. Appellant's
townmate, on the other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found
on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).

"The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house
under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to
belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of
blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Appellant. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of
dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's belongings.
These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13;
August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).

"A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the
office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the
victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).

"After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay

Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to Valenzuela Police Station. On
July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the
victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt,
he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He
pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 1321)."

Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an
Information which reads:[2]

"That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y
CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO
against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault,
the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y
CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.

"Contrary to law."[3]

to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion
of the trial court's decision states:

"WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic).
He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral,
burial and wake of the victim.

"Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.

"SO ORDERED."[4]

Upon automatic review by the court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended,[5] appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. In his testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered
his version of what transpired as follows:

(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking
spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellants employer. After
consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to clean the
jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 oclock noon. Then he had lunch and
took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a
movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 45).

At 2 oclock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to
rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one
case of red horse beer. Around 6 oclock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at
Gregorio Riveras house. They went to Zaldys house and bought a bottle of gin. They
finished drinking gin around 8 oclock p.m. After consuming the bottle of gin, they
went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was already 9
oclock in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet.
After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16,
1995, pp. 6-7).

On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Riveras store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded
to Isips apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the
second floor of Isips unfinished house. Around 10 oclock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet
arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room where
appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy
and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him.
He, However, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist
them in bringing the dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body
into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever
see him again, they would kill him. At 4 oclock the following morning, he left the
compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October 16,
1995, pp. 4-13).

Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas.

The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila.

There, appellant heard the police officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit
that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extrajudicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only
when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp.
9-11).[6]

This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in
the review thereof since there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x
x x than the termination of a human life.[7] For life, once taken is like virginity,
which once defiled can never be restored. In order therefore, that appellants guilty
mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the records are not shy, for
him to verify.

The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellants proffered
excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily
absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence[8] and pursuant
to settled jurisprudence,[9] conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur:

1. there is more than one circumstance;

2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.

Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all

circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[10]
Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.[11]

In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove
appellants guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial
evidence are as follows:

FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the
unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body
of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located,
categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25, 1995, accused
Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound of her
sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle
(lugaw). That she noticed the accuseds hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsaging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking
deeply. That the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but
went inside the compound.

SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically, testified that on

June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws
house, he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-laws
residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house of Maria
Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the
unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.

THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where
victims body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay
is her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a
Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That after finishing
some work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on
the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes
in the next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was
arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.

FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying

the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Diam St., Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the
passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early
morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.

FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a
clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said premises.

There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic)

fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused.
The absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the
witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado,
58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 756).

SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having
been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes of the Public Attorneys Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the
commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment
on his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA 311). He did
not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his
statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or
leniency. That his confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted
that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified
by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional
rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed
the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is
expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the
investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings
shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head
injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that
he pushed the victim and the latters head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness.

Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos
tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape ko na
siya.

There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement.

There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that
he was mauled by the police officers.

There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a
result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct
the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true,
correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v.
Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)

SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to
enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he
proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while
sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and dumped it
inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex with
the dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist them in dumping
the dead body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp8-9 October 16,
1995). This is unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the
apartment and not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished
house only that night of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying
was already closed. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he
(Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished house.

Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the
room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was
sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be
disposed/dumped later in the septic tank located in the ground floor. Boyet and
Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by themselves.

It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the
dead body of the child.

We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver
knowledge observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)

EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise
Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who interviewed him.
His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An innocent person will at
once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of
preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A
persons silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference
that he is not innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).

NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness
of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the incident and did not
return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.[12]

Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:[13]

1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;

2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme
caution; and

3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with
homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:

When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1.) By using force or intimidation;

2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or

on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the

penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.[14]

At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime
against chastity,[15] although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353),
rape has since been re-classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A
and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the
offended party.

The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a
woman by force and without consent.[16] (Under the new law, rape may be
committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a man.)[17] If the woman
is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial[18] not
only because force is not an element of statutory rape,[19] but the absence of a
free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will
therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is be proven. But if the woman is 12 years
of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first
element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other element that the
perpetrators evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence,
intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this
case.

Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately
proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post
mortem examination on the childs body:

Q: And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine?

A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.

Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?

A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 oclock and 8:00 oclock
position and that the edges were congested.

Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?

A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an

organ.

Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?

A: Adult male organ, sir.

Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?

A: I am very sure of that.[20]

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself

admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child.

15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?

S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na

ginagawa, tapos dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto
hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa
mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.

16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?

S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigators
table. Subject evidence were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).

17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?

S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.

18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?

S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.

19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?

S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.

20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?

S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung
anong petsa, basta araw ng Linggo.

21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?

S: Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.

22. T: Alam mo na ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?

S: Hindi ko po alam.

23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong
ni rape at pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?

S: Oho.

24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?

S: Naka-isa po.

25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng NAKARAOS, maaari
bang ipaliwanag mo ito?

S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.

26. T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?

S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.

27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong
ginawa?

S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.

28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?

S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.

29. T: Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?

S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.

30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?

S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.

31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?

S: Natatakot po ako.

32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?

S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.

33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?

S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.

34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?

S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.

35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa
ba siya o patay na?

S: Buhay pa po.

36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?

S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.[21]

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victims vagina;
rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is
enough to consummate the sexual intercourse.[22] The mere touching by the males
organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the womans private
parts is sufficient to consummate rape.

From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants own account,
he pushed the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell
unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious
and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile invasion,
was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not given free and
voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.

Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession, which
he, however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
But his contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer
who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed preinterrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer:

Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?

A We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta
and we were told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to
confess of the crime of, I think, rape with homicide.

Q And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other
person present?

A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the
investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.

Q- And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the
accused already there?

A The accused was already there.

Q Was he alone?

A he was alone, sir.

Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP
Officers, what did they tell you, if any?

A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to
confess of the crime charged, sir.

Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?

A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorneys Office.

Q Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the
accused?

A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.

Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period
start?

A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.

Q And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that
you did as assisting lawyer to the accused?

A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.

Q What are those right?

A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his
own choice and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that
he has the right to refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him.

Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do

you recall whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in
writing?

A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.

Q I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing,
will you be able to recognize the same?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document
you mentioned?

A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.

ATTY. PRINCIPE:

May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A proper.

Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused
whether you asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?

A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.

Q But you were present?

A I was then present when he signed.

Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and
after there are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?

A These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.

Q The signature of whom?

A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.

ATTY. PRINCIPE:

May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compaero
be encircled and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.

Q After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining
to him in Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?

A- Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.

Q What was the reply?

A He said Opo.

Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment?

A It was the Police Officer who asked him.

Q In your presence?

A In my presence, sir.

Q And when he said or when he replied Opo so the question started?

A Yes, sir.

Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present
also when he signed this waiver?

A Yes, sir, I was also present.

Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?

A I had also explained to him, sir.

Q In Filipino?

A In Tagalog, sir.

Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name
Larry Mahinay, Nagsasalaysay, whose signature is that?

A This is also signed in my presence.

Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?

A He signed in my presence, sir.

Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry
Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this
signature?

A This is my signature, sir.

Q And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have
personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary
executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize the signature?

A This is also my signature, sir.[23] (emphasis supplied).

Appellants defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the
victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of ViceChancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey,[24]

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.

Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of
having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses
department on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.[25] In this case, the trial courts findings, conclusions and
evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest
respect,[26] the same being supported by substantial evidence on record. There
was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded relevant facts
and circumstances which when considered would have affected the outcome of this
case[27] or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court
below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such
motive exists.[28] Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers
who testified against appellant.

Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 when
by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death. This special complex crime is treated by law in the same degree as qualified
rape -- that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) attendant circumstances enumerated in
the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is death. In cases
where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot
be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the
imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC. However,
if any of those circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the
imposition of the penalty because Articles 63 of the RPC in mentioning aggravating
circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if
any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be
treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered
as an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death subject to
the usual proof of such circumstance in either case.

Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for
the crime of rape with homicide, the court has no option but to apply the same
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended
the commission of the crime[29] in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as
amended.[30] This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of death which

is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as

amended, which provides:

The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under
existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or
when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the
required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in
which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied).

In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty,
appellant tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few
months old at the time he committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription
on the imposition of death if the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the crime.[31] Again, the record rebuffs appellant on this
point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of age when
he did the heinous act.

Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by present amended law, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not
less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).[32] In addition to such
indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil
Code[33] in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[34] Civil Indemnity is different from the award
of moral and exemplary damages.[35] The requirement of proof of mental and
physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with
because it is recognized that the victims injury is inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of
moral damages.[36] Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the
award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof.[37]

Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was
attended by one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the
Civil Code[38] after proof that the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate
and compensatory damages.[39] Under the circumstances of this case, appellant is

liable to the victims heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the
evidence against and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as
guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties
which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions
must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the
time of the custodial interrogation[40] in accordance with the Constitution,
jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438:[41] It is high-time to educate our lawenforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called
Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in
the light of new legal developments:

1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be

informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by
said person;

2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement
he makes may be used as evidence against him;

3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have
the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;

4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a

lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any
person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that
no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of
his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;

6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or
messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be

informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise,
he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and
chooses to speak;

9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner
at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with
warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if
the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already
begun;

10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements;

11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray[42] that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it

prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of

the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award
of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS
P50,000.00 moral damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Martinez, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 146-154; Appellees Brief filed by the Solicitor General, pp. 2-10.

* Sic is no longer indicated so as not to clutter the narration and other quotations
from the records and the transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN).

[2] Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 4974-V-95 filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

[3] Rollo, p. 8; RTC Records, p. 2.

[4] Decision dated October 25, 1995 penned by Judge Adriano R. Osorio of Branch
171 of the RTC of Valenzuela; Rollo, p. 130.

[5] Article 47, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22, R.A. 7659 provides:
In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; automatic review of death
penalty cases. x x x In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial
court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than
fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any
motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within
ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (Emphasis
supplied).

[6] Rollo, pp. 152-154.

[7] People v. Galera, 280 SCRA 492.

[8] Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence.

[9] People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 117471, September 3, 1998; People v. Quitorio, et. al.,
G.R. No. 116765, January 28, 1998; People v. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111; People v.
Abrera, 283 SCRA 1; People v. Doro, 282 SCRA 1; People v. Dabbay, 277 SCRA 432;
People v. Bonola, 274 SCRA 238; People v. Grefaldia, 273 SCRA 591.

[10] People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141.

[11] People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335.

[12] Rollo, pp. 126-129; RTC Decision pp. 15-18.

[13] People v. Gallo, 284 SCRA (1998) 590.

[14] Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and
further amended by R.A. No. 8353, was renumbered to Articles 266-A and 266-B of
the RPC which reads:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and how committed. - Rape is committed -

1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a.) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b.) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c.) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d.) When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2.) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the

occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any
law enforcement or penal institution;

3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4.) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling
and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the
commission of the crime;

5.) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

6.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immuno-Deficiency
Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;

7.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

8.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.

9.) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of
the commission of the crime; and

10.) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding Article shall be punished by prision
mayor.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal.

When the rape is attempted and the homicide is committed by reason or on

occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal or reclusion perpetua.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua.

Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the
ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.

[15] This case occurred after the passing of the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659)
which took effect on December 31, 1993.

[16] People v. Philip Tan, Jr. 264 SCRA 425.

[17] Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,

[18] People v. Lagrosa, Jr., 230 SCRA 298; The two elements of statutory rape are:
(1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is
below twelve years of age. (People v. Andres, 253 SCRA 751).

[19] People v. Abordo, 328 Phil. 80; People v. Oarga, 328 Phil. 395; People v. Ligotan,
331 Phil 98.

[20] TSN, September 1, 1995, Dr. Antonio Vertido, pp. 18-19.

[21] Sinumpaang Salaysay of appellant Larry Mahinay, dated July 8, 1995; RTC
Records p. 20.

[22] People v. Ligotan, 331 Phil 98; People v. Lazaro, 249 SCRA 234.

[23] TSN, August 11, 1995, morning session, Atty. Restituto Viernes, pp. 6-11.

[24] Cited in Daggers v. Van Dyck, 37 N.J. Eq., 130, 132; See also People v. Cara,
283 SCRA 96.

[25] People v. Philip Tan, Jr. 264 SCRA 425.

[26] People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296; People v. Tenorio, 284 SCRA 420.

[27] People v. Dio, 44 SCAD 559; People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613.

[28] People v. Ravanes, 284 SCRA 634.

[29] People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 129439, September 25, 1998.

[30] Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, It shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the deed. X x x

[31] Article 47, RPC, as amended.

[32] People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998; People v. Bernaldez,
G.R. No. 109780, August 17, 1998 citing People v. Victor y Penis, G.R. No. 127903,
July 9, 1998.

[33] Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxxxxxxxx

(3) seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;

xxxxxxxxx

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3
of this Article, may also recover moral damages.

[34] People v. De los Santos, G.R. No. 121906, September 17, 1998; People v. Victor
y Penis, supra.

[35] People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998 cited in People v. Mostrales,
G.R. No. 125937, August 28, 1998.

[36] People v. Perez, supra.

[37] People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 129054, September 29, 1998 citing People v.
Prades, People v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 124213, August 17, 1998; See also Article
2219(3), New Civil Code.

[38] People v. Bernaldez, supra.

[39] People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 129439, September 25, 1998; People v. Tabugoca,
285 SCRA 312.

[40] People v. Dicierdo, 149 SCRA 496.

[41] Under R.A. No. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON
ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING, AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) which took effect only on July 7,
1992, custodial investigation includes the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed.

[42] 267 SCRA 682 (1997).

6/21/00 11:16:37 PM

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122142. May 17, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA,

accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: HTML

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila,
finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victims Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50,000.00 each
and to pay the sum of P4,000.00 representing the amount of money stolen.

The information alleged

That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name, identity and
present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and carry away
the amount of P4,000.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the
damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine
Currency; that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery, the
said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked,
assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA and
REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby inflicting upon the said
victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their
death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has
been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon,
trial ensued.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial
G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District
investigated the robbery with homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following
effect:

Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business

was selling chickens to customers. Cabosass business was located in Blumentritt
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. CODES

In the morning of August 11, 1989, accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed
chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344
C.M. Recto Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant
came back and turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines
testified that after receiving report of the killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to
see Angie Cabosas from which they learned that the latter has received a call from
Emma Cabrera informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids
killed. They were told that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to
attend the burial of his grandfather. Pat. Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor Valdez, Pfc.
Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. Renato Gutierrez went to Rosales, Pangasinan
but failed to find accused-appellant. They were told by the sister of accusedappellant, Merly Asuncion, that accused-appellant had gone to La Union. According
to Pat. Ines, accused-appellant confided to his sister that he had allegedly done
something wrong in Manila.

Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements, both executed on August 11, 1989, one of
which, he said, had been executed by Helen N. Moral, a househelp of Emma
Cabrera, and the other by Angie C. De los Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I,
Moral said that upon arriving in the house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her
employers nephew, Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on
the floor. She told Pat. Ines that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed
chicken to their place.

On the other hand, in her sworn statement given on August 14, 1989 and marked as
Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated that on August 11, 1989, she had seen
accused-appellant and Ronnie Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out
of the Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.[2]

Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990, he and his group received information from
Pat. Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that accused-appellant was in
Cataban, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and
the next day, March 4, 1990, they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom
they brought to Manila. Pat. Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by
Anita De los Reyes as one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the
Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands.[3]

Pat. Ines testified that on that same day, March 4, 1990, accused-appellant gave a
confession (Exh. O) in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los
Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and
Remedios Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the
circumstances of accused-appellants arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to
sign the booking and information sheet.[4] yacats

Accused-appellants extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as Exhibit O.

[5] In it, accused-appellant said he started working for Angie Cabosas in the latters
business on Blumentritt Street, Manila three or four months before the incident.
Cabosas and accused-appellants sister Merly Asuncion, had been neighbors in
Rosales, Pangasinan. Accused-appellants work was to deliver dressed chicken.
Emma Cabrera was a regular customer to whom he made deliveries in the morning.
On August 10, 1989, his fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob
Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family. On August 11, 1989,
after learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of Emma Cabrera,
accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth
of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as she tried to run away,
Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who
stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she died. Thereafter, the two
proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the
house of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while
accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in
Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.

The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the
WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he
happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD, representing a client accused of illegal
recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to
assist accused-executing an extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los
Reyes, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him
that any statement made by him could be used against him in court, but accusedappellant said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the
commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.[6]

The other prosecution witness was Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, medico-legal officer who
conducted autopsies on August 11, 1989 on the victims, Nena Berjuega and
Remedios Hitta. After proper identification (Exh. D) by the victims employer, Antonio
Cabrera, Dr. Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega
suffered 16 stab wounds from which she died. olanski

Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her
vital organs, specifically the right and left lungs and the heart, causing her death.
Six of these wounds were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate
medical attention. He concluded that the assailant and the victim could be facing
each other when wounds nos. 1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were
inflicted and that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side of the victim
when he inflicted wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5) and at the victims back when assailant
inflicted wound no. 16 (Exh. B-6). He said that there could be one or more assailant
who inflicted these wounds by using a single bladed weapon.[7]

Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. F) that Remedios Hitta
suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died.

Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones
that caused her death. The fatal wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the
heart that she would not survive despite immediate medical attention. He observed
that in wounds nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Exhs. G-1, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant
and the victim could be facing each other, while in wounds nos. 4, 9 and 11 (Exhs.
G-4, G-6, and G-7, respectively), the assailant could have been at the back of the
victim. He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds
using a single bladed weapon.[8]

Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims, Nena Berjuega and
Remedios Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He stated that the weapon used on both victims
could have been the same and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds.[9]

With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the
extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral
(Exh. I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. L), the prosecution rested its case.

The defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla.
Accused-appellant testified that he had worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt
Street for four (4) months before the incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of
his sister, Merly Asuncion, in Pangasinan. Angies business was selling dressed
chickens. Accused-appellant said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 11, 1989, he
delivered dressed chickens to Emma Cabreras residence on C.M. Recto Avenue. He
came back from his errand at around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of
P2,000.00 which had been paid to him. He denied participation in the commission of
the crime and claimed that he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He
claimed that, after being informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up
and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He
denied having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not
understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he
does not know how to read.[10]

On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and punishable
under Article 294(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
He is further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims, Remedios Hitta and Nena
Berjuega the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity
for their death and the additional sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of money taken,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED. haideem

Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial
confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his
confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he
refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the
extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by
him.

Art. III, 12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:

(1)......Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2)......No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3)......Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall

be inadmissible in evidence against him.

There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this

constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods
such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in
paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda
warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12.

Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat.
Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and
violence on him. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical
examination. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession
five times is proof that he refused to sign it.

To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not
the same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He signed his name on
page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3)
Then, he signed again as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he
agreed to give a statement. (Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of
page 2 to authenticate that page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he
signed the third page at the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his
name again on the third page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh.
O)

We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that
it was signed by accused-appellant five times. kirsten

Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact
that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he
were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times,
there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well.
The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute
the confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and
information sheet.

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive

evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated,
such confession will be sustained.

Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime
could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he
who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed
the crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same
weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other
helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings

that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the
same bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by
the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind
on which violence and torture have been applied.[11] When the details narrated in
an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by
one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in
the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence
exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is
admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to
be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the
essential facts contained in such confession.[12] barth

But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that
accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the
Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States
from which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced.
Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical
of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand
of counsel.

Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in
custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be
informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says
can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to
counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[13]

In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to
establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accusedappellant executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified:[14]

Q......What happened during the investigation of the accused?

A......He consented to give a written statement to me, sir.

Q......Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to give statement, Patrolman,

was he assisted by counsel?

A......Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer.

Q......And who was that lawyer that was provided by you?

A......Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir.

Q......And who personally took down the statement of the accused?

A......I was the one who personally took the statement of accused Obrero. Jksm

Q......Do you know what was the gist of that statement that was given to you, what
was it all about?

A......Its all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero, the gruesome slaying of two
househelps.

....

Q......Before having taken down the admission of Jimmy Obrero, what investigative
steps did you undertake relative to his constitutional right, patrolman?

A......I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent, to have an
attorney; that everything that he will say will be used for or against him. He,
however, consented to proceed with the written statement.

Q......Now, Patrolman, did you indicate his constitutional rights that you stated in
this written statement of Jimmy Obrero?

A......Yes, sir, I put it on the statement which he voluntarily gave.

Q......And will you please tell us which part of the statement of Jimmy Obrero is it
indicated, the consent which he gave after having pointed out to him his
constitutional right?

A......This portion sir, this "sagot-opo" and then it was further affirmed by his
signature over his typewritten name, sir.

For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified:[15]

Q:......Were you able to confront the suspect at that time, herein accused? Chief

A:......Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of investigation -- custodial investigation I
can render my services to him and afterwards avail the services of another lawyer
and I told him his rights under the law, sir.

Q:......What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero, the accused, in this case at that time
you confronted Jimmy Obrero?

A:......He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he wanted
to secure my services, sir.

....

Q......After having manifested that he will retain your services as counsel for the
investigation, Atty. De los Reyes, what happened next?

A......I told him the rights under the Constitution, the right to remain silent, the right
to secure lawyer, the right not to give statement, the right not to be placed in any
identification procedure in a police line up, and I told him that all the evidences he
might give will be utilized against him in the court with respect to the case -- and
despite of that, he said he wanted to give his statement to the police in my
presence.

Q......Was he able to give statement to the police?

A......Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the client and observing fairly [when
he] gave statement voluntarily.

Q......Was that statement taken down into writing?

A......In a question and answer form, sir.

Indeed, the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads:

MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG SALIGANG BATAS:

Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang

Pagnanakaw na may kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga
karapatan ayon sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas:

1. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag sagutin ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo;

2. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na maaaring

makatulong sa iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka makakakuha ng iyong
abogado ay bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa iyo; Esm

3. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong

salaysay ay maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o pabor sa iyo o sa
kanino mang tao sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.

Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan, nais mo pa bang

magbigay ng iyong malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?

SAGOT : (ni Jimmy Obrero y Corla)Opo.

TANONG: Kung ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa
ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko?

(Sgd.) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA

There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accusedappellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have
counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to
appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions[16] of this
Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit
meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have
been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was
specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade
of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v. Januario:[17]

Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation

(if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or
by the latters relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the
court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to
file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in
many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can
be symbiotic.[18] Esmsc

Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was
assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be
considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason
that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accusedappellant. On this point, he testified as follows:

Q......Now, whenever there is a crime committed wherein the member of police to

which you belong or working but could not solve the crime and then you were
designated as counsel to extend legal assistance to a suspect who is under a
custodial investigation and in that conference with the suspect you may have
inquired confidential information, what would you do, will you keep it to yourself or
you must have to divulge that to your co-policeman because you know that?

A......If I am the lawyer, then all the testimonies and declaration is my preferential
right, I can divulge it even to my fellow officer.

Q......Now, by the way, do you have authority to practice the law profession, did you
get approval or permit from the civil --

A......Previously, when I was at the JAGO, we are authorized verbally [as long as] it
will not hamper our time, we will not work our time during the police duty, maam.

Q......According to you, you were extending legal assistance to your client who was
charged of illegal recruitment, do you not consider that conflict of duty because no
less than your organization was the one investigating that? Esmmis

A......I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the case

because if it is true that he committed the crime then I will back out, if I found
suspicion and there is no proof at all, I go to the litigation.

ATTY. ALISUAG:

That is all, Your Honor.[19]

The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:

As shown in Exhibit "O", accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession

after he was informed of rights under custodial investigation, by affixing his
signature thereto (Exhibit "O-3"). And absent any showing that the assisting lawyer,
though a station commander but of another police station, was remiss in his duty as
a lawyer, this Court holds that the proceedings were regularly conducted. In fact, he
testified that he first asked the accused if he is accepting his legal services (TSN,
March 5, 1991, p. 4); that he informed the accused of his Miranda rights and despite
the warning, he decided to give his confession just the same; that he was at all time
present when the accused was being interrogated with the accused giving his
answers voluntarily (Ibid, p. 4); that he read to the accused the questions and
answers before he signed his extrajudicial confession (Ibid, p. 8). Clearly shown was
the fact that Atty. De los Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member
of the police force, when he lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody
interrogation.[20]

This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula,[21] the independent counsel

required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to
the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander
of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have
effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his
claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render
illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.[22]
Esmso

For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible in evidence.

Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot

stand. The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accusedappellants guilt consisting of the sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral,
the househelp who said accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the
Cabrera residence, and Anita de los Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was

passing in front of the Gatlin Building where the killing took place when she saw
accused-appellant running down the stairs with blood in his hands. These
statements are likewise inadmissible for being hearsay. Consequently, there is no
identification of accused-appellant.

And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no
evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which,
as already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed
to object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack
of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the
prosecution. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of
the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial
of the case. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the
prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the principle that it is far better to
acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person.

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime
of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accusedappellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the
Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED. MENDOZA, J

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

De Leon, Jr., J., on leave.

[1] Per Judge Rosmari D. Carandang.

[2] TSN (Pat. Benjamin Ines), pp. 2-4, Feb. 6, 1991; pp. 1-4, Feb. 26, 1991.
[3] Id., pp. 5-6, Feb. 26, 1991.
[4] Id., pp. 7-10.
[5] RTC Records, pp. 179-181.
[6] TSN (Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes), pp. 2-10, March 5, 1991.
[7] TSN, pp. 2-6, Aug. 29, 1990.
[8] Id., pp. 7-9.
[9] Id., pp. 10-12.
[10] TSN, pp. 2-5, Dec. 8, 1993; pp. 3-22, March 2, 1994.
[11] People v. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356 (1997)
[12] People v. Elizaga, 23 SCRA 449 (1968)
[13] People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); Cf. People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2
(1980); People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986)
[14] TSN, pp. 6-7, Feb. 26, 1991.
[15] TSN, pp. 3-4, March 5, 1991.
[16] People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443 (1997); People v. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232
(1997); People v. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 (1993)
[17] 267 SCRA 608, 632 (1997)
[18] Citing People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, 638 (1995)
[19] TSN (Atty. Bienvenido delos Reyes), p. 9, March 5, 1991 (emphasis added)
[20] Rollo, p. 21.
[21] 232 SCRA 566 (1994)
[22] People v. Matos-Viduya, 189 SCRA 403 (1990)

Today is Tuesday, September 06, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-56291

June 27, 1988

CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XXIX,
respondent.

Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order,
to annul and set aside the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales, Accused," and to restrain
the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the aforementioned case.

Petitioner alleges that:

On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy,
without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was
brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained
therein together with several others.

The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including
petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is
a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to
their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being
interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of
her.

On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.

On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2

April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.

On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,

manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to
Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground
that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.

On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in
the petition at bar) denying the Motion to Acquit:

For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that the
constitutional rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process, have been
violated. After considering the allegations and arguments in support of the said
motion in relation to the evidence presented, the Court finds the said motion to be
without merit and, therefore, denies the same.

The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the accused
is hereby set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

Hence, the instant petition.

On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of

this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the court". 1

Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said
order, in denying his Motion To Acquit, is null and void for being violative of his
rights to counsel and to due process. 2

We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.

To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in
issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980.

It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. 3 To warrant
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction,
excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all, in contemplation of law. 4 This is not the situation in the case at bar. The
respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as well as the prosecution's
evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.

The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987

Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every person is entitled to the full
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution,
reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987
Constitution. Section 12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2)
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions
or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person
being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of

extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel.
The above-cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for
equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel,
engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and
that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. 5

As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in
this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:

When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not
been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the
custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that
when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as
when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail
of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal
Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his
Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal
offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel
because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have
violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between
the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the police lineup by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore,
not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he
professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against
him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time.
He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being
investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued. 6

Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner
would have no cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due

process. In Kirby vs. Illinois, 7 the facts of the case and the votes of the Justices
therein are summarized as fellows:

After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police station,
police officers learned that certain items found in their possession had been stolen
in a recent robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police station and
immediately Identified the petitioner and his companion as the robbers. No attorney
was present when the Identification was made, and neither the petitioner nor his
companion had asked for legal assistance or had been advised of any right to the
presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the petitioner and his companion were
indicted for the robbery. At trial in an Illinois state court, the robbery victim testified
that he had seen the petitioner and his companion at the police station, and he
pointed them out in the courtroom and Identified them as the robbers. The
petitioner and his companion were convicted, and the Illinois Appellate Court, First
District, affirmed the petitioner's conviction, holding that the constitutional rule
requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court Identification
procedures conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to pre-indictment
Identifications (121 III App 2d 323, 257 NEE 2d 589).

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an

opinion, affirmed. In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of the
court and expressing the view of four members of the court, it was held that the
constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal proceedings were
initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court Identifications in the
absence of counsel did not apply to Identification testimony based upon a police
station show-up which took place before the accused had been indicted or
otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.

BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his
agreement that the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were
formally made against an accused.

POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule should
not be extended.

BRENNAN J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the grounds that
although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary rule happened to

involve post-indictment Identifications, the rationale behind the rule was equally
applicable to the present case.

WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing the
exclusionary rule governed the present case. 8

Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the
Court, said:

In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's landmark
opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527, it has
been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him. See Powell v. Alabama, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US
458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019, 146 ALR 357; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7 L
Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct 157; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct
792, 93 ALR 2d 733; White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050;
Messiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 12 L Ed 246, 84 S Ct 1199; United States v.
Wade, 388 US 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926; Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263,
18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90 S
Ct. 1999.

This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
counsel only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches at
the time of arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the
time of a preliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. But the point is that,
while members of the court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in
the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points of
time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. (Emphasis supplied). 10

As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and
beyond the guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to
counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine

Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a

respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the
accused have begun.

Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend
to those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better
than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to
afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is
a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from
said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way,
deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by
a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead
opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due
process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The case at bar is
far from this situation.

In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order
denying a Motion To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that,
upon arraignment, the defendant shall immediately either move to quash the
complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the defendant
moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he
should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the
merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant (in the motion to quash), he
can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections (earlier raised
in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to review by the appellate
court.

An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is

interlocutory and not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be
the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in
the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial. As stated in
Collins vs. Wolfe, 12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, 13 the accused, after the denial
of his motion to quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court

below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and,
upon such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be decided by the
appellate court in a petition for certiorari.

In Acharon vs. Purisima, 14 the procedure was well defined, thus:

Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases
filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy
was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice on his part
to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if, after trial on
the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as authorized
by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a writ of certiorari
before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is unwarranted it being
contrary to the usual course of law. 15

Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his
rights to counsel and to due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense
or objection, upon the trial on the merits, and, if that defense or objection should
fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.

On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or
information before he pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which
are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the complaint or information does
not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. 16

Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its
evidence and rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not
applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived objections which are grounds for a
motion to quash.

Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among
the grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a
complaint or information. Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying
petitioner's Motion to Acquit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on

3 March 1981 is LIFTED. The instant case is remanded to the respondent court for
further proceedings to afford the petitioner-accused the opportunity to present
evidence on his behalf.

This decision is immediately executory. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and

Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur because it does not appear from the narration of the facts in this case that
improper suggestions were made by the police to influence the witnesses in the
Identification of the accused.

In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, the U.S. Supreme Court observed through
Justice Brennan:

What facts have been disclosed in specific cases about the conduct of pretrial
confrontations for Identification illustrate both the potential for substantial prejudice
to the accused at that stage and the need for its revelation at trial. A commentator
provides some striking examples:

In a Canadian case ... the defendant had been picked out of a line-up of six men, of
which he was the only Oriental. In other cases, a black-haired suspect was placed
among a group of light-haired persons, tall suspects have been made to stand with
short non-suspects, and, in a case where the perpetrator of the crime was known to
be a youth, a suspect under twenty was placed in a line-up with five other persons,
all of whom were forty or over.

Similarly state reports, in the course of describing prior Identifications admitted as

evidence of guilt, reveal numerous instances of suggestive procedures, for example,
that all in the lineup but the suspect were known to the Identifying witness, that the
other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect,
that only the suspect was required to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit
allegedly wore, that the witness is told by the police that they have caught the
culprit after which the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in
jail, that the suspect is pointed out before or during a lineup, and that the
participants in the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits only the
suspect.

I reserve my judgment on any subsequent case where the question raised here is
submitted anew and the same or similar circumstances as those described above
are present.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring

Pro hac vice.

YAP, C.J., Dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. In my opinion, after the police
line-up with other detainees in which the accused was pointed out by the
complainant as one of the "companions" of those who allegedly committed the
crime of robbery, the investigatory part of the proceedings started when the
accused was singled out and "ordered to sit down in front of the complainant" while
the latter gave her statement which led to the filing of the information. The majority
opinion holds that the police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner (the herein accused) was not yet entitled to counsel. But this overlooks
the fact that the incident objected to took place after the police line-up, when the
accused was made to confront the complainant, and the latter made her statement
which became the basis of the information filed against the accused. At this point, it
can be said that the custodial investigation had already begun.

The applicable provision of the 1973 Constitution states that "any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to counsel, and
to be informed of such rights." (Sec. 20, Art. IV, Bill of Rights). A similar provision
has been incorporated in the 1987 Constitution. I do not agree with the view that
since the accused was not asked any question, he was not "under investigation."
The investigation commenced the moment he was taken from the police line-up and
made to sit in front of the complainant, while the latter made her statement to the
police.

Neither do I agree with the view of the Solicitor General, which is sustained by the
majority opinion, that the accused at that point was not entitled to be informed of
his right to counsel, because "the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to
be used against him." The right to counsel must be afforded to the accused the
moment he is under custodial investigation, and not only when a confession is being
exacted from him.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the petitioner should have been
informed, at that stage, of his constitutional right to counsel, and accordingly, I vote
to grant the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

Insofar as the majority would deny the accused the right to counsel (at an incustody confrontation) in this particular case, I am constrained to dissent.

The accused was arrested, without a warrant, for vagrancy, on July 19, 1979. It is
clear that at that time, no probable cause to indict him for robbery existed. For this
reason, he was "booked" for vagrancy alone and thereafter detained.

Unexplainably, he was made to take part in a line-up the following day, July 20,
1979, upon the behest, apparently, of the complainant, who unabashedly pointed to
him as a "companion" in a certain robbery case. He was later made to "sit down in
front of" the said complainant while the latter gave her statement which led to the
filing of the information.

It is the view of the majority that "the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not
part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage,
to counsel." It is my own view, however, that given the particular circumstances of
this case, he was entitled to counsel pursuant to the provisions of Section 12, of
Article III, of the Bill of Rights.

It is noteworthy that the accused was already in custody at the time. And although
he was detained for some other cause vagrancy, it left him little or no choice other
than to face his accuser. It cannot be then gainsaid that as far as he was concerned,
the situation had reached what American jurisprudence refers to as the "critical
stage" 1 of the inquiry, in which the confrontation becomes an accusation rather
than a routine procedure preliminary to a formal prosecution. He was in custody not
for the "usual questioning" but for an existing charge, although the investigation
was in connection with another offense. The confrontation, exacerbated by the
pressure of actual custody, had become adversarial rather than informational, and
the assistance of counsel to the accused, a matter of Constitutional necessity. That
he was being held for vagrancy whereas the line-up involved a complaint for
robbery does not make a difference to him. He was under detention, a development
that made him vulnerable to pressures, whatever offense was involved.

While I am not prepared to hold that a police line-up per se amounts to a critical
stage of the investigation, for in most cases, it merely forms part of the evidence
gathering process, the fact that the accused herein stood charged for an offense
and has been detained therefor should make this case different. 2

So also is it noteworthy that the accused was made to confront the complainant in
an interrogation following the line-up. It is my belief that, other than such a line-up,
the subsequent confrontation had reinforced his need for legal assistance. Verily, he
was an unwilling audience to his accuser, if a mute witness to his own prosecution.
In People v. Hassan, 3 we struck down a similar confrontation for repugnancy to the
Constitution. This Court said therein:

The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the
accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was
"pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual
imagination, and, all told, subverted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual,
coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts against the
accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just
man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance."

Moreover, the corfrontation arranged by the police investigator between the selfproclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially
at its most crucial stage the Identification of the accused.

As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that

critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the
young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case
in which only the a d was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in
the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched
protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
4

It is in such cases indeed that the more questions are asked, the more convinced is
the complainant of the accused's guilt, and in extreme cases, the better
"convinced" is the accused himself that he is truly guilty. The presence of counsel
would have obviated the one-sidedness of the investigation.

To be sure, the majority itself would concede that something is amiss in such a
procedure, at least in this case ("this occasion may be better than any to remind
police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the

services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an
urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect,
he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the
waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel"). 5 The point,
however, is that such a police procedure is invariably intended to secure admissions
from the accused (assuming that he is Identified), unless the authorities are
possessed of other evidence. They would not be so obtuse to do a useless act.

To my mind, the accused herein was not only denied the right to counsel which I
hold to be available under the circumstances, he was deprived of due process the
day he was arrested. Albeit it does not appear to have been put in issue in his
petition, he was not apprised of his rights when he was apprehended for vagrancy.
The next day, he was placed in a line-up upon a complaint for robbery. To my mind,
he was a readymade suspect for an offense in which no probable cause existed to
warrant a custodial interrogation. If this is a customary police procedural, I do not
hesitate to condemn it for Constitutional reasons.

While it is true that he was not denied the right to present his defense, it does not
cure the defect surrounding his arrest, or make admissible whatever evidence
gathered in the course of the confrontation and investigation. The resulting
unfairness has deprived him of the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense.

I agree that in terms of the provisions of the Rules of Court, the accused may not
challenge, on certiorari, a denial of a motion to acquit. But it seems to me that the
case, for all its Constitutional implications, should stand on its merits and not on the
errors of the counsel for the accused on his choice of judicial remedies. Accordingly,
I am for denying the Rules of their rigidity and for deciding on the petition on
Constitutional grounds.

I vote to grant the petition.

Gancayco, J., concur

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur because it does not appear from the narration of the facts in this case that
improper suggestions were made by the police to influence the witnesses in the
Identification of the accused.

In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, the U.S. Supreme Court observed through
Justice Brennan:

What facts have been disclosed in specific cases about the conduct of pretrial
confrontations for Identification illustrate both the potential for substantial prejudice
to the accused at that stage and the need for its revelation at trial. A commentator
provides some striking examples:

In a Canadian case ... the defendant had been picked out of a line-up of six men, of
which he was the only Oriental. In other cases, a black-haired suspect was placed
among a group of light-haired persons, tall suspects have been made to stand with
short non-suspects, and, in a case where the perpetrator of the crime was known to
be a youth, a suspect under twenty was placed in a line-up with five other persons,
all of whom were forty or over.

Similarly state reports, in the course of describing prior Identifications admitted as

evidence of guilt, reveal numerous instances of suggestive procedures, for example,
that all in the lineup but the suspect were known to the Identifying witness, that the
other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect,
that only the suspect was required to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit
allegedly wore, that the witness is told by the police that they have caught the
culprit after which the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in
jail, that the suspect is pointed out before or during a lineup, and that the

participants in the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits only the
suspect.

I reserve my judgment on any subsequent case where the question raised here is
submitted anew and the same or similar circumstances as those described above
are present.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring

Pro hac vice.

YAP, C.J., Dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. In my opinion, after the police
line-up with other detainees in which the accused was pointed out by the
complainant as one of the "companions" of those who allegedly committed the
crime of robbery, the investigatory part of the proceedings started when the
accused was singled out and "ordered to sit down in front of the complainant" while
the latter gave her statement which led to the filing of the information. The majority
opinion holds that the police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner (the herein accused) was not yet entitled to counsel. But this overlooks
the fact that the incident objected to took place after the police line-up, when the
accused was made to confront the complainant, and the latter made her statement
which became the basis of the information filed against the accused. At this point, it
can be said that the custodial investigation had already begun.

The applicable provision of the 1973 Constitution states that "any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to counsel, and
to be informed of such rights." (Sec. 20, Art. IV, Bill of Rights). A similar provision
has been incorporated in the 1987 Constitution. I do not agree with the view that
since the accused was not asked any question, he was not "under investigation."
The investigation commenced the moment he was taken from the police line-up and
made to sit in front of the complainant, while the latter made her statement to the
police.

Neither do I agree with the view of the Solicitor General, which is sustained by the
majority opinion, that the accused at that point was not entitled to be informed of
his right to counsel, because "the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to
be used against him." The right to counsel must be afforded to the accused the
moment he is under custodial investigation, and not only when a confession is being
exacted from him.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the petitioner should have been
informed, at that stage, of his constitutional right to counsel, and accordingly, I vote
to grant the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

Insofar as the majority would deny the accused the right to counsel (at an incustody confrontation) in this particular case, I am constrained to dissent.

The accused was arrested, without a warrant, for vagrancy, on July 19, 1979. It is
clear that at that time, no probable cause to indict him for robbery existed. For this
reason, he was "booked" for vagrancy alone and thereafter detained.

Unexplainably, he was made to take part in a line-up the following day, July 20,
1979, upon the behest, apparently, of the complainant, who unabashedly pointed to
him as a "companion" in a certain robbery case. He was later made to "sit down in
front of" the said complainant while the latter gave her statement which led to the
filing of the information.

It is the view of the majority that "the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not
part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage,
to counsel." It is my own view, however, that given the particular circumstances of
this case, he was entitled to counsel pursuant to the provisions of Section 12, of
Article III, of the Bill of Rights.

It is noteworthy that the accused was already in custody at the time. And although
he was detained for some other cause vagrancy, it left him little or no choice other

than to face his accuser. It cannot be then gainsaid that as far as he was concerned,
the situation had reached what American jurisprudence refers to as the "critical
stage" 1 of the inquiry, in which the confrontation becomes an accusation rather
than a routine procedure preliminary to a formal prosecution. He was in custody not
for the "usual questioning" but for an existing charge, although the investigation
was in connection with another offense. The confrontation, exacerbated by the
pressure of actual custody, had become adversarial rather than informational, and
the assistance of counsel to the accused, a matter of Constitutional necessity. That
he was being held for vagrancy whereas the line-up involved a complaint for
robbery does not make a difference to him. He was under detention, a development
that made him vulnerable to pressures, whatever offense was involved.

While I am not prepared to hold that a police line-up per se amounts to a critical
stage of the investigation, for in most cases, it merely forms part of the evidence
gathering process, the fact that the accused herein stood charged for an offense
and has been detained therefor should make this case different. 2

So also is it noteworthy that the accused was made to confront the complainant in
an interrogation following the line-up. It is my belief that, other than such a line-up,
the subsequent confrontation had reinforced his need for legal assistance. Verily, he
was an unwilling audience to his accuser, if a mute witness to his own prosecution.
In People v. Hassan, 3 we struck down a similar confrontation for repugnancy to the
Constitution. This Court said therein:

The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the
accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was
"pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual
imagination, and, all told, subverted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual,
coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts against the
accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just
man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance."

Moreover, the corfrontation arranged by the police investigator between the selfproclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially
at its most crucial stage the Identification of the accused.

As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that

critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the
young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case
in which only the a d was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in
the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched
protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
4

It is in such cases indeed that the more questions are asked, the more convinced is
the complainant of the accused's guilt, and in extreme cases, the better
"convinced" is the accused himself that he is truly guilty. The presence of counsel
would have obviated the one-sidedness of the investigation.

To be sure, the majority itself would concede that something is amiss in such a
procedure, at least in this case ("this occasion may be better than any to remind
police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the
services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an
urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect,
he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the
waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel"). 5 The point,
however, is that such a police procedure is invariably intended to secure admissions
from the accused (assuming that he is Identified), unless the authorities are
possessed of other evidence. They would not be so obtuse to do a useless act.

To my mind, the accused herein was not only denied the right to counsel which I
hold to be available under the circumstances, he was deprived of due process the
day he was arrested. Albeit it does not appear to have been put in issue in his
petition, he was not apprised of his rights when he was apprehended for vagrancy.
The next day, he was placed in a line-up upon a complaint for robbery. To my mind,
he was a readymade suspect for an offense in which no probable cause existed to
warrant a custodial interrogation. If this is a customary police procedural, I do not
hesitate to condemn it for Constitutional reasons.

While it is true that he was not denied the right to present his defense, it does not
cure the defect surrounding his arrest, or make admissible whatever evidence

gathered in the course of the confrontation and investigation. The resulting

unfairness has deprived him of the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense.

I agree that in terms of the provisions of the Rules of Court, the accused may not
challenge, on certiorari, a denial of a motion to acquit. But it seems to me that the
case, for all its Constitutional implications, should stand on its merits and not on the
errors of the counsel for the accused on his choice of judicial remedies. Accordingly,
I am for denying the Rules of their rigidity and for deciding on the petition on
Constitutional grounds.

I vote to grant the petition.

Gancayco, J., concur

Footnotes

Rollo, p. 33.

Memorandum of Petitioner, p. 17.

3
Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Lucero, 125 SCRA 337, 343 citing the
case of Panaligan vs. Adolfo, 67 SCRA 176.

4
F.S. Divinagracia Agro-Commercial, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA
180,191 citing the cases of Abig vs- Constantino, 2 SCRA 299; Abad Santos vs.
Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480 and Alafriz vs. Wable 72 Phil. 278.

5
People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465, 472 citing the case of Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,
121 SCRA 538, 554.

Memorandum for public respondent, Rollo, pp. 6-7.

406 US 682, 32 L Ed 2d 411, 92 S Ct 1877.

32 L Ed 2d at 411-412.

9
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice (now Chief
Justice) Relinquist; Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the result.

10

32 L Ed 2d at 417.

11
Fariscal vda. de Emnas vs. Emnas 95 SCRA 470,475; Tajonera vs. Lamarosa,
110 SCRA 438, 448.

12

4 Phil. 534.

13

101 Phil. 599.

14

13 SCRA 309.

15

Ibid., pp. 311-312.

16

Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:

U.S. v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967).

2
In People vs. Olvis (G.R. No. 71092, September 30, 1987), the Court implied
that line-ups are not by themselves offensive to the Constitution.

G.R. No. 68969, January 22, 1988.

Supra, 13-14.

G.R. No. 56291, 9-10.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Manila
EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. L-61356-57

September 30, 1986

-versusFELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA
and ROBERTO BERNADAS,
Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

We are, once again, constrained to take a hard look into the sufficiency of extrajudicial confessions as the sole basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death. The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564
for Robbery with Homicide. In the companion case of parricide, one was sentenced
to another death penalty while the two other appellants received sentences ranging
from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment. Our task is made difficult by the fact that the
crimes were specially ruthless and barbarous in their commission. No less than the
counsel for the appellants states that the people of Puerto Princesa are no strangers
to crime and that the frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow
benumbed the sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the discovery on June 9, 1978 of the
brutally and badly bashed corpses of two well-known and loved women of their
community was still shocking to their senses.
There is the added factor that the police officers who investigated the crime and
secured the confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three appellants are the
malefactors. The confessions are convincing in their details. The trial court noted
that "both victims were assaulted and killed with the might and fury of one really
who had harbored so long a grudge and hate" and only Felicisimo Jara had that kind
of ill-will against his estranged wife and her female companion. Moreover, Jara, a
recidivist for the crime of homicide, was characterized as an experienced killer.
There must be many residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus, convinced about the
correct solution of the crime. And perhaps, the appellants could have been the
killers.cralaw
The function of this Court, however, is not to indulge in surmises or probabilities.
The issue before Us is whether or not the evidence of guilt is admissible under the
standards fixed by the Constitution and, if the quantum of proof which We are
allowed by the Constitution to consider, establishes guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.cralaw
The decision of the former Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District,
Branch 1 in the consolidated cases of "People of the Philippines versus Felicisimo
Jara, et al." [Criminal Case No. 2564] for Robbery with Homicide; and "People of the
Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al." [Criminal Case No. 2565] for Parricide is
involved in this automatic review. All the three accused in Criminal Case No. 2564
were sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue in the sum of Pl,000.00, the
amount stolen, and the sum of
P12,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2565, for the
killing of Luisa Jara, accused Felicisimo Jara was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and meted out the maximum penalty of death while

the two other accused were found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve [12] years of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty
[20] years of reclusion temporal as maximum. All the accused were ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Luisa Jara in the sum of
P12,000.00.cralaw
The Information for the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 2564
reads as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at
Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, after gaining entrance to the house thru the window, an opening not
intended for entrance or egress, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously strike with a hammer, Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, hitting her on the vital
parts of her body and stabbed with a scissor while she was soundly sleeping in her
bedroom with one, Luisa Jara, thereby causing her instantaneous death as a result
thereof, and that after killing Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, accused in conspiracy with
each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took,
stole and carried away a piggy bank and a buddha bank containing money in the
amount of not more than P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, in the total amount of Twelve Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos [P12,200.00], Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstances of Recidivism
with respect to accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously convicted
of the crime of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and the aggravating
circumstance against all the accused that the crime was committed with treachery,
in the dwelling of the offended party, in the nighttime, and with respect to accused
Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, for having participated in the
commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.

In Criminal Case No. 2565, the Information charged the accused as follows:
That on or about June 9, 1978, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St.,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike several times, with a hammer
one, Luisa Jara, who is the lawfully wedded wife of accused Felicisimo Jara, and
thereafter, stabbed her with a scissor in her chest and abdomen, while the latter
was soundly sleeping with one, Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, resulting to the
instantaneous death of said Luisa Jara, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of

said Luisa Jara in the amount of Twelve Thousand [P12,000.00] Pesos, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with the aggravating circumstances of
recidivism with respect to accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously
convicted of the crime of Homicide in the CFI of Iloilo, and the aggravating
circumstance against all the accused, namely: [1] that the crime was committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, [2] in the nighttime, [3] and treachery; and the
aggravating circumstance against accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto
Bernadas of having participated in the commission of the crime in consideration of a
prize or reward.

All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the
prosecution and the defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases
which arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the same. The facts
according to the prosecution are as follows:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the waitresses at Alvin's
Canteen situated in Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, wondered why their
employer, the deceased Amparo Bantigue, did not answer when they called at her
door that morning [p. 7, T.S.N., March 21, 1979]. They went to the kitchen and
peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa Jara seemingly asleep. They
again went to the door and knocked but still no answer came. The waitresses called
one of Luisa Jara's waitresses at Aileen's canteen next door. Becoming
apprehensive, they went back to the kitchen for a second look. They discovered the
following: Amparo and Luisa were both lying in bed; Luisa was dressed only in her
underwear and there was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo, seemingly
asleep, lay beside her [pp. 9-11, T.S.N., March 21, 1979]. Finally, they decided to
inform Luisa's daughter, Minerva, about their apprehension. When they met Minerva
at the public market, she tearfully accompanied them back to Amparo's room. When
no one answered their knocking, Minerva kicked open the door. [pp. 11-12, T.S.N.,
March 21, 1979]. Inside, they found the two women dead from wounds inflicted on
their persons [p. 13, T.S.N., March 21, 1979].cralaw
The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered the room and saw the
condition of the victims [p. 15, T.S.N., March 21, 1979]. Inside the room, several
ceramic piggy banks belonging to Amparo containing coins estimated in the amount
of P1,000.00 were missing [p. 43, T.S.N., February 6, 1979]. Scattered underneath
the window of Amparo's bedroom were coins and bits and pieces of what used to be
ceramic piggy banks [Exh. "F"; pp. 17-20, T.S.N., Feb. 6, 1979]. Later, two suspects
in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, were
apprehended [pp. 59-60, T.S.N., March 19, 1979]. After investigation, they
confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in

Palawan and other police investigators [pp. 26-31, TS.N., May 28, 1979]. They also
positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the
killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation
[Exhibits "O" and "N"]. Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant City Fiscal of Puerto
Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore
to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of
Felicisimo Jara in the killing [see Exhibits "O" and "N"].cralaw
Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military authorities and the public,
with appellants Vergara and Bernadas participating [p. 14, T.S.N., July 19,
1979].cralaw
The autopsy reports [Exhibits "A" and "C"] submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City
Health Officer of Puerto Princesa on the examination of the cadavers of the
deceased victims indicate that death in both cases resulted from "hemorrhage,
intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed fracture of the cranial
bones." Amparo Bantigue's wounds were described as follows:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/4 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead,
right, upper portion.
2. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 1/3 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead,
central portion.
3. Wound, macerated, roughly circular in shape, about 1 1/5 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead,
medially to the left eyebrow.
4. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape with depressed-comminuted
fracture of the underlying bone located above the left eyebrow.
5. Wound, macerated, elongated with fracture of the alveolar bone, located at the
upper lip, central portion.
6. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 31/2 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone with brain tissue coming out located at
the left parieto temporal region.
7. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 21/2 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the left temporal region,
anterior portion.

8. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length, with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left face.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right
temporal region.
10. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length with depressedcomminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the right face.
11. Wound, stabbed, about an inch in length at the right chest, between the 3rd and
4th intercostal space, penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung.
12. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion,
penetrating the sternum, then thoracic cavity piercing the right auricle, heart.
13. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the right upper abdomen
penetrating the abdominal cavity involving the liver and stomach. [Exhibit "A"].
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTEDDEPRESSED FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES.

On the other hand, Luisa Jara suffered from the following wounds:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound,macerated,roughly circular in shape,about 1 1/2 inches in diameter with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bones, located at the right frontal
region.
2. Wound, macerated, with a letter T shape, about 2 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the central
portion of the frontal region.
3. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape, about 1 1/2 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right side of
the nose.
4. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 1 inch in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left eyebrow,
lateral portion.
5. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left lateral
portion of the forehead.

6. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with

depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the parietal
region, left.
7. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 1 inch in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal
region, left.
8. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 11/2 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal
region, left.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly stellate in shape, about 2 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left
mandibular region.
10. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/2 inches in length, with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left face.
11. Wound,incised,about l 3/4 inches in length, located at the left upper portion of
neck, left side.
12. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 3 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right
temporal region.
13. Contusion with hematoma, circular in shape, located laterally from the right
eyebrow.
14. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 2 inches in length with
depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the occipital
region, upper portion.
15. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion
penetrating inside the thoracic cavity involving heart and lung.
16. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the level of typhoid process
penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung, lower lobe. [Exhibit "C"].
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE, INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTEDDEPRESSED FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES.

Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa,
together with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and
testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street,
Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his stepdaughter's

house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto
Bernadas, retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their
participation in the crimes charged and identifying their mastermind as the accused
Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility
of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent re-enactment of the crime on
the ground that their participations in these occasions were not free and voluntary
and were without the benefit of counsel.
The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas
and Vergara [Exhibits "N" and "O", respectively], together with the proof of corpus
delicti of the Special Crime of Robbery with Homicide established the guilt of the
accused beyond moral certainty. In their brief, the accused-appellants contended
that the court a quo erred:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF ANY KIND OF
EVIDENCE, DIRECT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL.
II.
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS REYMUNDO VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS, WHICH WERE TAKEN
THRU FORCE AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF COUNSEL.
III.
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS REYMUNDO VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS AGAINST THEIRCOACCUSED, APPELLANT FELICISIMO JARA.
IV.
IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF
THEREOF.
V.
IN ALLOWING THE PLAYING OF AN ALLEGED TAPED CONFESSION.
VI.
IN ADMITTING THE PICTURES, EXHS. "T" TO "T- 23", WHICH WERE NEVER PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED.
All these assigned errors boil down to the issue of whether or not there is sufficient
evidence as borne by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.cralaw

Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the
absence of counsel. According to the records, there was a waiver by the accusedappellants of their right to counsel.
Was the waiver valid?
We are constrained to answer this question in the negative.cralaw
Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing,
Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in the presence of four other police officers, made the following
"Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo":
PASUBALI: Ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat at dahil dito ay ipinababatid
namin sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na sa ilalim ng ating Bagong Saligang Batas
ay ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang manananggol o abogado ayon sa sarili
mong pili mayroon ka ring karapatan na hindi maaaring piliting sumagot sa
anumang itatanong sa iyo sa alinmang Hukuman sa Pilipinas. Nauunawaan mo ba
ang lahat ng mga ipinaliwanag namin sa iyo ngayon?
SAGOT: Opo.
Likewise, in the case of the accused Vergara, the foreword of his signed sworn
statement reads:
TANONG: Marunong po ba kayong sumulat bumasa ng tagalog at umunawa ng
wikang tagalog na siya nating gagamitin sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
SAGOT: Nakakaunawa po ako at nakakabasa pero sa pagsulat ay hindi masyado.
PALIWANAG: Kung gayon po ay ipinababatid ko sa inyo ang inyong karapatan na
kayo ay maaaring manatiling tahimik kung inyong nais, magbigay o tumangging
magbigay ng inyong salaysay, maaari din na kayo ay sumangguni muna sa isang
abogado kung nais ninyo at ang lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting
pabor o laban sa inyo sa anumang Hukuman dito sa ating kapuluan ngayong alam
na ninyo ang ilan sa inyong karapatan kayo po ba naman ay handa na ngayong
magsalaysay kahit na kayo ay wala pang abogadong kaharap na siyang

mangangalaga sa inyong karapatan at lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay pawang

katutuhanan lamang
SAGOT: Opo.
[SGD.] REYMUNDO VERGARA DELA CRUZ
PATUNAY: Ako si Reymundo Vergara dela Cruz ay nagsasaad na ipinaalam sa akin
ang aking karapatang manatiling tahimik, kung aking nanaisin, na ang lahat na
aking sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting pabor o laban sa akin at nalaman ko rin na
ako ay maaaring kumuha ng sarili kong abogado na siyang nangangalaga ng aking
karapatan na kung hindi ko kayang kumuha ay bibigyan ako ng pamahalaan.
Nauunawaan ko ang mga karapatang ito, handa at kusang loob akong nagbibigay
ng aking salaysay ngayon, sa tanong at sagot na paraan. Hindi ko na kailangan ang
tulong ng isang abogado, nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa, walang pananakot,
pananakit, pangako, pabuya o anuman na ginawa sa akin upang ako ay
magsalaysay. Ito ay sarili kong kagustuhan.
[SGD.] REYMUNDO VERGARA DELA CRUZ
This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which
are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police
investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer
or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stated style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this
Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer
assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this
case.cralaw
The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extra-judicial confessions
bear clear earmarks of illegality and improbability. The Solicitor General gives the
following arguments for voluntariness:
An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily
executed [People v. Castaeda, 93 SCRA 56]. The confessant carries the burden of
convincing the trial judge that his admissions are involuntary or untrue [People v.
Ramos, 94 SCRA 842]. The trial court, in this case, was not convinced that the
extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made involuntarily. Consider the
following reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to appellants' claim:

[1] Apart from appellants' self-serving claim, no other evidence on record supports
the allegation of involuntariness [People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716].
[2] On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that the confessions
were voluntarily given.
[3] Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times to several
investigating authorities, not to mention the public re-enactment of the crime itself,
did not vary and they revealed details only the assailants could have possibly
known [People v. Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA
465].
[4] Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence of corpus delicti
established by independent evidence [People v. Francisco, 93 SCRA 351].
[5] The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the subscribing fiscal
that said confession was voluntary [People v. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150].
The People v. Castaeda ruling applies to a crime committed before the Bill of
Rights was amended to include Section 20 on the right to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed of such right. The presumption that "no one would
declare anything against himself unless such declarations were true" assumes that
such declarations are given freely and voluntarily. The new Constitution, in
expressly adopting the so-called Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436] rule, has
reversed the presumption. The prosecution must now prove that an extrajudicial
confession was voluntarily given, instead of relying on a presumption and requiring
the accused to offset it. There would have been no need to amend the centuries-old
provisions of the Bill of Rights and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him [the person being investigated]" if the framers intended Us to
continue applying the pre-1973 or pre-amendment presumptions.
Miranda v. Arizona, in explaining the rule which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted,
states:
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely
made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused
person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under
investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an
inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him
if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions, which is so painfully evident made the [continental] system so
odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.

It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions
in these cases should testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However,
the records show that the interrogations were conducted incommunicado in a
police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant Bernadas gave his confession, his
companions in the room were five police officers. The only people with Vergara
when he confessed were also police investigators. We quote some more passages
from Miranda:
Again, We stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, "Since
Chambers v. Florida, 309, US 227 [84 L ed 716, 60 S Ct 472], this Court has
recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 US 199, 206, 4 L ed 2d 242, 247, 80 S Ct 274 (1960). Interrogation
still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap
in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms. A valuable
source of information about present police practices, however, may be found in
various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with
success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These
texts are used by law enforcement agencies themselves as guides. It should be
noted that these texts professedly present the most enlightened and effective
means presently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By
considering these texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures
observed and noted around the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the "principal psychological factor
contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy - being alone with the person
under interrogation." The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or
at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every
psychological advantage. In his own home, he may be confident, indignant, or
recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his
indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family
and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own
office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the
invincibility of the forces of the law.
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the
police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward
appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of
the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments
toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by
asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has a bad
family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited

desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of
the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society. These tactics are designed to
put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what
the police purport to know already - that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary
are dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess are
patience and perseverance. One writer describes the efficacy of these
characteristics in this manner:
In the preceding paragraphs, emphasis has been placed on kindness and
stratagems. The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where the
sheer weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals
and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of
dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the
subject no prospect of sure cease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm
him with his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of
several hours, pausing only for the subject's necessities in acknowledgment of the
need to avoid a charge of duress that can be technically substantiated. In a serious
case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for food
and sleep, but without respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible in
this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The
method should be used only when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable.
[384 US at pp. 448-451].

The cited police manuals state that the above methods should be used only when
the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. As earlier stated, the investigators
in the cases now before Us appear to have been convinced that the accusedappellants were the culprits. Nonetheless, the evils of incommunicado
interrogations without adequate safeguards to insure voluntariness could still result
in the conviction of innocent persons. More important, what the Constitution
commands must be obeyed even at the risk of letting even hardened criminals mix
once more with the law-abiding world.
As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for what
was to follow. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible
confession are themselves inadmissible. There are other factors to be considered in
these cases. Vergara and Barnadas had been detained for more than two [2] weeks
before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two weeks of
soul-searching and introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have
been other persuasions.cralaw
There were two sensational murder cases in Palawan which preceded the killings
now before Us. The PC Command and the Integrated National Police were under

pressure to "solve" these additional sensational killings. The counsel for appellants
mentions a factor not refuted by the appellee in its brief, namely:
LT. COL. SABAS IMBONG, SGT. EUGENIO ENRIQUEZ, PFC HENRY PULGA and CPL.
ADOLFO JAGMIS all are connected with the Provincial Constabulary Command which
investigated the case, prematurely publicized the solution of the case with the
alleged "extra-judicial confessions" of two [2] accused, but who were rebuffed when
the two [2] accused, upon the first opportunity to do so in public, which was the
preliminary investigation, recanted and retracted their alleged "extra-judicial
confessions" as they were taken with the use of force, violence, and intimidation,
was prepared by the investigators themselves, and without benefit of
counsel.cralaw
All are comrades in-arms of Pat. Mamerto Bantigue, who is the son of the deceased
Amparo Bantigue. Pat. Bantigue was implicated in several coercion and physical
injuries cases filed with the City Court by persons who had been physically attacked
and violated by him in connection with the murder of his mother. Likewise, he
evaded justice by escaping from the law after murdering a companion of accused
Jara and attempting to kill the latter. He remains at large.cralaw
A PC Sergeant, Oscar Ponce de Leon, assigned at the PC Medical Dispensary,
testified that he treated Roberto Bernadas for cigarette burns and Reymundo
Vergara for a wound at the tip of his right hand. While the medicine he applied was
only merthiolate, the possibility cannot be discounted that in addition to the
psychological effect of incommunicado questioning, lighted cigarettes and other
means of persuasion which leave physical marks, were also utilized to secure the
confessions.cralaw
Accused Reymundo Vergara was given an opportunity to go scot free by turning
state witness. He refused. Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other
evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as perpetrators of the killing was
introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in
evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted.cralaw
The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of
his two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who bludgeoned
the two victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab
wounds. He was also alleged to have offered them P1,000.00 each if they would
help him in the killing of his wife. However, since the confessions of Bernadas and
Vergara are inadmissible against them, with more reason can they not be used
against Jara.cralaw
Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was
presented to support a verdict of conviction. Would such evidence in the absence of
the extra-judicial confessions be sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused Jara? Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara and his

wife had not been in good terms for about three years before the killings was
presented. They used to quarrel with each other and they had not been sleeping
together since the deceased Luisa Jara slept at Alvin's Canteen together with the
other deceased, Amparo Bantigue. Godofredo Anasis nephew of Luisa Jara, testified
that his aunt was a "tomboy" and that she and Amparo Bantigue lived together as
"husband and wife." The two went to the movies together. The relationship of the
two women angered Felicisimo Jara and was a cause of their frequent quarrels. He
resented not only his wife but also her woman companion.cralaw
The testimony on the fact of Luisa Jara and Amparo Bantigue sleeping together is
corroborated by the fact that they were bludgeoned to death while sleeping on one
bed and their bodies discovered on that same bed. At the Aileen's Canteen
managed by the deceased Luisa, accused Felicisimo Jara did the cooking and
whenever he committed even the slightest mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed
him, treating him as though he were only one of the servants of the restaurant.
[T.S.N., May 31, 1979, pp. 1821-1830]. The records are replete with testimony to
show that Felicisimo Jara had reason to hate his wife enough to kill her and her
companion.cralaw
The lower court, in its decision, stated that the nature and the number of wounds,
reflected in the autopsy reports, convincingly show that only a person who had
harbored so much hate and resentment could have inflicted such multiple fatal
blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only person who would have sufficient
motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had not been treated well as a
husband by his wife.cralaw
During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found
splattered in the trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also
smeared with blood. When asked to explain the presence of said blood stains,
accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the killing, he was with his
stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens. [T.S.N., May
28, 1979, pp. 397-398]. He also said in his testimony in open court that when he
saw his wife lying dead on the bed, he approached her and hugged her in his effort
to wake her up. [T.S.N., September 30, 1980, p. 1230]. After a laboratory
examination of the eyeglasses [Exhibit "I"], trousers [Exhibit "J"], and shirt [Exhibit
"K"], the NBI biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not chicken
blood but human blood [Exhibit "L"]. The blood stains found in accused Jara's
trousers formed certain identical circular patterns, a splattering of blood which,
according to the NBI biologist, could be caused by an instrument like that of a
hammner. Such circular patterns will only occur at the time of the impact of the
instrument, the very moment it hits the victim. He further explained that there was
no possibility of the splattering of blood if the victim died hours before because
blood starts to coagulate or clog, 15 minutes after the wound is caused. [T.S.N.,
March 19, 1979, pp. 227; 244; 248-250]. The blood of the deceased victims in the
case at bar had already coagulated in the morning of June 9, 1978, when accused

Jara claimed that the blood stains on his shirt were smudged when he hugged his
wife.cralaw
The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the Forensic
Chemistry Division, testified that human blood was found on the eyeglasses of
appellant Jara, on the front side lower portion of the left leg of the trousers, at the
left buttocks of the pants and the back portion near the trousers, and smudged
human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The human blood stains were Type B.
A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two victims keeps this second
circumstantial evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-nigh
conclusive. However, it is still strong evidence in the chain of circumstances
pointing to Jara as the killer of his wife.cralaw
Another circumstance is the cover-up attempt by Jara. He lied about the blood on
his clothes and eyeglasses. He falsely claimed that the blood came from the
chickens he had been slaughtering for the market. There is no explanation about
the source and cause of the human blood stains splattered all over him.cralaw
There is no question that appellant Jara was at the scene of the crime. Upon the
discovery of the bodies and the forcible opening of the door, Jara was with the
group. He went through the motions of embracing his wife although the observers
noted that even in death, there was no love lost between husband and wife. One of
the waitresses at the Alvin's Canteen who saw accused Jara's reaction as he entered
the room where the victims lay dead observed that he shed no tears and his face
did not show any indication of sorrow. [T.S.N., March 21, 1979, pp. 373-374].cralaw
The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is familiar.
It was proven during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter "A" on its
handle which was one of the instruments used in the perpetration of the crime,
belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's Canteen where her husband,
appellant Jara helped as cook.cralaw
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
[a] There is more than one circumstance;
[b] The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
[c] The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. [See People v. Duero, 136 SCRA 515].

Circumstantial evidence, as a basis for conviction of a crime, should be acted on

and weighed with great caution, particularly where the crime is heinous and the
penalty is death, as in the instant cases. In determining the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each case is to be determined on
its own peculiar circumstances and all of the facts and circumstances are to be
considered together as a whole, and, when so considered, may be sufficient to
support a conviction, although one or more of the facts taken separately would not
be sufficient for this purpose. [23 CJS p. 555]. No general rule has been formulated
as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, but that
matters not. For all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
[People v. Contante, 12 SCRA 653].
The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in
this case. The aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading
to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused Jara
beyond reasonable doubt [See US v. Villos, 6 Phil. 510; People v. Subano, 73 Phil.
692]. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the crime are only selfserving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence clearly
establishing his active participation in the crime.cralaw
The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself, the only
person who vouched for his presence at some place away from the scene of the
crime was his stepdaughter from whom he had sought abode. Hence, the alibi is
made more dubious considering that no other credible persons were presented who
would, in the natural order of things, be best situated to support the tendered alibi
[People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94, citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336; People v.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236; People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516]. More importantly, the
defense of alibi cannot prosper because it is not enough to prove that defendant
was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must, likewise,
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at that time. [People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812]. Such proof is wanting in
this case.cralaw
The killing of Amparo Bantigue was marked by treachery and evident premeditation.
The trial court noted recidivism insofar as Felicisimo Jara, previously convicted of
Homicide, was concemed, together with dwelling and nighttime. However, the
supposed robbery of the piggy bank and Buddha bank is proved only by the extrajudicial statements found inadmissible. The offense against Bantigue was simple
Murder. Insofar as the Parricide case is concerned against accused Jara, the lower
court did not err in finding guilt as having been established beyond reasonable
doubt.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is modified as follows:

In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are acquitted of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is
convicted of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise acquitted of
the crime of Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is convicted
of the crime of Parricide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Considering, however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age, the
penalty of death is lowered to reclusion perpetua.
In both cases, accused Jara is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Amparo Bantigue and Luisa Jara in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
[P30,000.00], respectively.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y

HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY,accused-appellant.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y

HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY,accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the

crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:

"That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of xxx,
province of xxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
AAA against her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in
order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said AAA,
attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly
caused her death.

Contrary to Law."[1]

The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in xxx,
AAA, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the xxx, left her home for
her school dormitory in xxx. She was to prepare for her final examinations on
February 21, 1994. AAA wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought
with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more
than P2,000.00 in cash.

AAA was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house.
He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be
taken. AAA agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then
punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust
sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the
house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled AAA, who was
still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by
a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood
on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the
fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a
piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After
silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it
towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.[2]

At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of AAA was
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt
pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.

The autopsy conducted by Dr. xxx revealed that AAA died of "traumatic injuries"
sustained as follows:

"1. Abrasions:

1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to
left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:

2.1 temple, right.

2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width,
from right MCL to left AAL.
2.7. elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.

3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

4. Lacerated wounds:

4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.

4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.

5. Fractures:

5.1 maxillary bone, right.

5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.

6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.

7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed
vaginal wall.

8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed

negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr.
Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to
Traumatic Injuries, Face."[3]

AAA's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor xxx of xxx to
form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place
where AAA's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete
block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim
pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as AAA's.[4]

Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on
the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house
and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accusedappellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma

surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair

of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a
wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and
allegedly belonged to appellant.[5]

The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in xxx. On
February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor xxx traced appellant in his
parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge
of AAA's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block,
the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and
said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed AAA and that he
was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two
bags of AAA.[6] Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and
Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police.
Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot
and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to AAA. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two
other suspects holding the bags.[7]

Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The
following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects
by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. xxx.[8] Appellant was found to sustain:

"HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions
(scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5
cm. in size Lt."[9]
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor xxx arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached
him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the
office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA." The mayor
opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no
lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.[10]
In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he
killed AAA and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked

for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it
because of ill-feelings against them.[11] He also said that the devil entered his mind
because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday.[12]
After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him.[13] His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide.[14]

Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26
and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again
interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime.
[15]

On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that

in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in xxx attending
the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His
wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00
P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to
collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped
his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and
they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police.[16]

Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at xxx. In one of the rooms, the
policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They
coerced him to confess that he raped and killed AAA. When he refused, they pushed
his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened,
appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house
where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to
go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower
pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.[17]

In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also
ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" is

found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the

Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous
crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
family of AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of AAA and P71,000.00 as
actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After
automatic review of this case and the decision becomes final and executory, the
sentence be carried out.

SO ORDERED."[18]

This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of

Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant contends that:

"I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND
THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;

II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED."[19]

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the
three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of xxx and four news
reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also
based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the

mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution provides:

"SECTION 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) x x x

(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) x x x"

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.[20] Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in
evidence against him.[21] The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption
that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.[22] The incommunicadocharacter
of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired.[23]

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person
under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when
it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating
or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.[24]
As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation

conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the

municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government."[25]

When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general
inquiry about the death of AAA. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even
before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of
SPO4 xxx, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:

"COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this
act?

WITNESS
First, the place where AAA was last found is at the backyard of the
house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third,
when we asked Romano Calma who were his other companions in the house, he
said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose
whereabouts were unknown, sir.

So you had a possible suspect?

Yes, sir.

You went looking for Pablito Andan?

Yes, sir.

And then, what else did you do?

A
We tried to find out where we can find him and from information
we learned that his parents live in xxx. We went there, found him there and

investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the
culprit."[26]

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the

police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and interrogated.[27] His confession is therefore
inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's
house. SPO2 xxx, a member of the investigating team testified:

"Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked
as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these
bags?

A
At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the
canal of the toilet.

Q In other words, you were given information where these two (2) bags were
located?

Yes, sir.

Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you
do?

A
We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know
where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.

Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the
place where the bags were located?

A
After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really
showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir."[28]

The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.[29]

The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor
xxx visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a
private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone
committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor xxx testified, viz:

"Mayor xxx: x x x. During the investigation when there were already many people
from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able
to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the
chief of police.

Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?

A
While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo
ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA." So when he was telling
this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to
hear what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who
did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera."[30]

xxx
xxx

xxx

Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of
Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed AAA . . .

Court:

He said to you the following words . . .

Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako
ang pumatay kay AAA," was that the only admission that he told you?

A
The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the
second one was before the media people, sir.

What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?

A
These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making
further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going
to say, sir."[31]

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's

confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has
"operational supervision and control" over the local police[32] and may arguably be
deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not
made in response to any interrogation by the latter.[33] In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor.
It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor
for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess
his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a
law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights.[34] Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.[35] What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[36] Hence we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The

confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the

police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements

spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.[37]

The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on
Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded
on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives.[38] Orlan Mauricio, a
reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February
25, 1994. He testified that:

"Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place
where the body of AAA was found, where did you start your interview, in what
particular place?

Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police
station of xxx and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir.
At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I
also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.

And what was the response of Pablito Andan?

A
His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for
raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was
voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on
his person because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he
said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he
was under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.

Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle
beside him at the time that you asked the question?

A
The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime

scene or in the place where AAA resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the
office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening
nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able
to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the
one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the
scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired during
the killing of AAA.

Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the
accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?

Yes, sir.

xxx

Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the xxx PNP,
you also went to the scene of the crime?

Yes, sir.

Who accompanied you?

A
I was accompanied by some xxx policemen including Mayor xxx and some of
the relatives of the accused.

At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?

Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of AAA was recovered.

How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?

A
There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at
that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the xxx police, sir.

Q Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in xxx, what
transpired?

A
I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where
I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how
he carried out the rape and killing of AAA, sir.

Did he voluntarily comply?

Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.

Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP xxx up
to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?

Yes, sir.[39]

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the

proceedings for three successive days.[40] His testimony is as follows:

"Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?

A
We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation
so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.

Were there people?

A
The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief
of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other
persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after
the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed AAA. I reiterated the question
to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with
murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he
said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated
it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.

And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?

A
Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some
pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the
group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect
answered the same.

Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?

The same group of people who were there, sir.

Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?

Court:

Use the vernacular.

A
I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and
gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay AAA? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." "Alam mo ba
itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw ang gumawa
sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay AAA?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."

xxx

Did you ask him, why did you kill AAA?

A
I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped
his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost
everyday before the crime.

Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and
the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?

A
As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body that he was really
down physically and I think he was in good condition.

Court:

He even admitted it, your Honor.

Court:

So he was not happy about the incident?

He was happy?

He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.

Court:

Was he crying?

A
As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear
that fell on his face.

Court:

Was he feeling remorseful?

As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.

x x x"[41]

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February

26, 1994.[42] He also testified that:

"Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?

Yes, sir.

And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?

A
The first person that I saw there was Mayor xxx, policemen from xxx, the chief
investigator, SPO4 xxx, and since xxx, the chief of police was suspended, it was the
deputy who was there, sir.

Q Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?

A
There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There
were people from the PNP and people from xxx, sir.

How about the other representatives from the media?

A
Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people
from the radio and from TV Channel 9.

How about Channel 7?

They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.

Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also
present?

A
Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the
wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions
that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.

How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?

I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people there, sir.

Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we
know what question did you ask and the answer.

My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."

What was the next question?

A
I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.

What was the next question that you asked him?

A
He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the
victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.

Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on
that?

Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.

Were there other questions propounded by you?

Yes, sir.

"Ano iyon?"

He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.

Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of AAA to the other side of the fence?

I cannot remember the others, sir.

But can you produce the news item based on that interview?

I have a xerox copy here, sir.

x x x"[43]

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any
undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant.[44] They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession
to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact
the commission of the crime.[45] In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant
protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even
supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family
and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant
by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual.
[46] It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect.[47] Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of
Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.[48]

In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical
evidence against him. Dr. xxx, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office,
conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent physical
injuries in the hymen.[49] Allegedly, the minimal blood found in her vagina could
have been caused by her menstruation.[50]

We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. xxx,
a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed
the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations,
thus:

"Hymen -- contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3
o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock."[51]

Dr. xxx testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been
caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive,
indicating the possibility of penetration.[52] His testimony is as follows:

"Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6
o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. x x x.

Court:

Include the descriptive word, fresh.

Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.

Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver
was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before
you did you re-autopsy?

Yes, sir.

Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have
been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?

A
Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim
which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds
could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had
already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the
use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was
already dead. So it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were
caused by those instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a
dead person we do not produce any bleeding.

Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted
blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have
been inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?

Yes, sir.

Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated
wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate
the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?

A
This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6
o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the
edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.

What could have caused those lacerations?

A
Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that
small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.

If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?

It is possible, sir.[53]

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does
not negate the commission rape[54] nor does the lack of complete penetration or
rupture of the hymen.[55] What is essential is that there be penetration of the
female organ no matter how slight.[56] Dr. xxx testified that the fact of penetration
is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh
and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.

Dr. xxx's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are
supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of
the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:

(1) The victim, AAA, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near
appellant's house;[57]

(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in
their house;[58]

(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a
meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at
the pigpen at the back of appellant's house;[59]

(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been
dragged over a flat rough surface.[60] This supports the thesis that she was thrown
over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;

(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in
his house;

(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found
positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the victim.
[61] AAA's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had type "A" and
type "AB."[62] The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O,"
appellant's blood type;[63]

(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain;
[64]

(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and
were later found at his parents' house in xxx;[65]

In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial

evidence justify the conviction of appellant.

Appellant's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi
cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the commission
of the crime. Xxx is only a few kilometers away from xxx and can be traversed in
less than half an hour.[66]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito
Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members
of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, AAA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

[1] Information dated March 11, 1994, Records, p. 1.

[2] TSN of May 11, 1994, pp. 34-38; Exhibit "P," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp.
13-14.

[3] Exhibit "U," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp. 18-19.

[4] TSN of April 19, 1994, pp. 47-51; TSN of April 20, 1994, pp. 45, 55-56; Exhibits
"A," "C" and "I."

[5] Exhibits "J," "K," "L," and "N."

[6] TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 71-72.

[7] Exhibits "O," "O-2," and "O-5;" Folder of Prosecution Exhibits; pp. 11-12; TSN of
May 2, 1994, pp. 72-73.

[8] TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 18-19.

[9] Exhibit "Q," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 15.

[10] TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 21-22

[11] TSN of May 2, 1994, p. 88; TSN of May 20, 1994, pp. 13, 50.

[12] TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 78-82.

[13] Id., pp. 20-24, 53, 59-64.

[14] Exhibits "AA" and "CC."

[15] TSN of April 27, 1994, pp. 14-18; TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 74-87; TSN of May
27, 1994, pp. 8-32; Exhibits "S," "KK-1" to "KK-4," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p.
41.

[16] TSN of July 22, 1994, pp. 12-20, 75-80.

[17] TSN of July 22, 1994, pp. 12-20, 75-80.

[18] Decision of the trial court, p. 23, Rollo, p. 52.

[19] Appellant's Brief, p. 3, Rollo, p. 69.

[20] This provision was taken from Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
which adopted the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694
[1966] and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. ed. 2d 977 [1964].

[21] People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 [1993]; Sampaga v. People, 215 SCRA 839
[1992]; People v. Penero, 213 SCRA 536 [1992].

[22] Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A

Commentary, p. 410 [1996]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457.

[23] Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 445; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294, 298
[1975].

[24] People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994]; People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566, 575
[1994]; People v. de Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People v Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
[1987].

[25] Bernas, supra, at 411.

[26] TSN of April 19, 1994, pp. 62-63.

[27] TSN of April 22, 1994, pp. 7-15; TSN of May 4, 1994, pp. 89-90; TSN of May 11,
1994, pp. 30-31.

[28] TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 71-72.

[29] People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 17-19
[1986].

[30] TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 20-21.

[31] Id., pp. 26-27.

[32] R.A. 6975, Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, Chapter
III (D), sec. 51 (b).

[33] Leuschner v. State, 397 A. 2d 622 [1979]; Vines v. State, 394 A. 2d 809 [1978];
Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294 [1975]; Howell v. State, 247 A. 2d 291 [1968];
Statements made by defendant while in custody of police officers but not pursuant
to any questioning by officers were properly admitted as spontaneously volunteered
statements State v. Matlock, 289 N.W. 2d 625 [1980]; State v. Red Feather, 289 N.W.
2d 768 [1980].

[34] Baysinger v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 445, 447 [1977], where a defendant, not in
custody, in talking with the sheriff wanted the sheriff for a confidant instead of a law
enforcement officer, his admissions on an incriminating taped conversation did not
violate the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and are thus
admissible.

[35] Aballe v. People, 183 SCRA 196, 205 [1990]; People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111, 123124 [1988]; People v. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373, 378-379 [1981]; see also People v.
Rogers, 422 N.Y.S. 18, 48 N.Y. 2d 167, 397 N.E. 2d 709, 714 [1979].

[36] People v. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426, 441 [1994]; People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47, 53
[1989].

[37] People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 752 [1982], the accused, under custody,
gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press reporters in the
office of the chief of the CIS.

[38] TSN of April 27, 1994, pp. 11, 13-14; Exhibit "S."

[39] TSN of May 4, 1994, pp. 11-14; 15-16; Exhibit "AA."

[40] TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 76-77.

[41] TSN of May 13, 1994, pp. 78-84.

[42] TSN of May 27, 1994, p. 9.

[43] Id., pp. 10-14.

[44] Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 183-184 [1994] We ruled that an
audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer nor did he, in this case, act as one.

[45] cf. People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 525-526 [1987] where several accused were
forced by the police to reenact the commission of the crime.

[46] People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 [1991].

[47] People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 590 [1995]; Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W. 2d
413, 417 [1957], citing Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 93, 358.

[48] 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v. Marti,
supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and seizures done by private
individuals without the intervention of police authorities; People vs. Maqueda,supra,
at 59 where we held that extra-judicial admissions of an accused to a private person
and to a prosecutor in connection with the accused's plea to be utilized as a state
witness where deemed outside the scope of the provision on custodial investigation.

[49] TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 22, 24-26.

[50] Id., pp. 43-44.

[51] Exhibit "Y," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 27.

[52] TSN of May 4, 1994, pp. 63, 75.

[53] Id., pp. 59-63.

[54] People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 [1994]; People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454
[1993;] People v. Magallanes, 218 SCRA 109 [1993].

[55] People v. Rejano, 237 SCRA 627 [1994]; People v. Palicte, 229 SCRA 543 [1994].

[56] People v. Fabro, 239 SCRA 146 [1994]; People v. Fortez, 223 SCRA 619 [1993];
People v. Abiera, 222 SCRA 378 [1993].

[57] TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 78, 95.

[58] TSN of May 2, 1994, p. 83; April 25, 1994, p. 38.

[59] TSN of April 19, 1994, p. 51; TSN of May 2, 1994, p. 66; Exhibit "I."

[60] TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 53-54.

[61] Exhibit "JJ," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 40.

[62] Exhibits "MM" and "NN," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp. 43, 44.

[63] Exhibits "LL" and "OO," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, pp. 42, 45.

[64] Exhibit "Q," Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 15.

[65] TSN of May 2, 1994, pp. 82-84.

[66] TSN of July 1, 1994, pp. 13-14.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146277. June 20, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERT CASIMIRO y SERILLO,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated October 17, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Albert Casimiro guilty of
violating Republic Act No. 6425, 4, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.

The information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2 DOROTHEO
SUPA of the 14th Regional Field Office, Narcotics Unit, posing as buyer, about nine
hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form, without any
authority of law to do so and knowing fully well that the article is a prohibited drug,
in violation of the aforecited provision of law.[2]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,

whereupon the trial of the case followed.[3]

Three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo Supa,[4] Alma
Margarita D. Villaseor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. Their testimonies established the
following:

On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of Police
Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng at the 14th Regional Narcotics Office, DPS
Compound in Baguio City. She informed Chief Inspector Leleng and PO3 Juan
Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant herein, was engaged in
the distribution or sale of marijuana. As proof, Rose told the police officers to wait
and accused-appellant would call them up on that day. Accused-appellant, however,
did not call up. Nonetheless, Police Chief Inspector Leleng formed a buy-bust team
composed of P/Insp. Edgar Afalla as team leader, PO2 Dorotheo Supa as poseurbuyer, and SPO2 Marquez Madlon and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. as back-up men.[5]

The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics agents to wait for
a call from accused-appellant. True enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the telephone
rang. When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he found that it was accusedappellant who was calling. Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa to accused-

appellant as someone who wanted to buy marijuana. Accused-appellant allegedly

agreed to meet PO2 Supa at around 1:00 p.m. the following day outside Anthonys
Wine and Grocery at the YMCA Building, Post Office Loop, Upper Session Road. PO2
Supa said he wanted to buy one kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said
it would cost P1,500.00. Accused-appellant said he would wear white pants and a
black leather jacket to their meeting the following day.[6]

On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went to the grocery
store. SPO2 Madlon and PO3 Piggangay waited secretly inside the Post Office
building, around 12 meters across the street, where they could see PO2 Supa and
Rose. At around 1:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived. Rose greeted him, O Bert,
heto na yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na kayong mag-usap. Aalis na ako.
(Bert, here is the buyer I told you about. Ill leave you two alone to talk.) Rose then
left the two men alone.[7]

PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana. Accusedappellant gave the poseur-buyer a paper bag, which contained an object wrapped in
plastic and newspaper. After determining from its appearance and smell that the
object inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up team to make
an arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no longer gave the marked
money to accused-appellant because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to
him his rights, while the back-up team ran from across the street.[8]

After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the 14th Narcom
Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the
brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The policemen
prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the
laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana.[9] They also prepared a
receipt of property seized, dated August 18, 1999, (Exh. L) which states:

18 August 1999

RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the undersigned seizing
Officer have seized and taken possession of the property described hereunder from
the

a. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs.-old, single, waiter, native of

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and resident of #2 Happy Homes, Old Lucban, Baguio
City.

b. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this office on or about
181330H August 1999, in front of Anthonys Grocery along the vicinity of Post Office
Loop, Baguio City.

c. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as amended by RA

7659.

EXHIBIT
QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION
REMARKS
A
One (1) Bricks Marijuana Dried Leaves wrapped in a newspaper page placed inside a
black plastic bag with markings Prime wear shirt haus place[d] inside a dark gray
paper bag with markings Spencer & SM City
Delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer.

WITNESSES:

(signed)
1. PO3 Juan A. Piggangay
PNP

(signed)
2. PO2 Dorotheo T. Supa
PNP
(signed)
ALBERT CASIMIRO Y CERILLO
(Suspect/ Owner)

(signed)
SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon
PNP (Seizing Officer)

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel.[10] The

dried leaves were then examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Cordillera
Administrative Region.[11] Police officer and forensic chemist Alma Margarita
Villaseor found the specimen to weigh 904.6 grams. The chemistry report dated
August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves were positive for
marijuana.[12]

The defense then presented evidence showing the following: Accused-appellant,

then 25 years old, residing at No. 1 Old Lucban Street, Happy Homes, Baguio City,
[13] said that at around 8:00 a.m. of August 16, 1999, he took the child of his
neighbor to the Christian Mission Center School near the Baguio General Hospital.
He then went home and stayed there during the day, as he usually did, except when
he needed to fetch the boy from school. At around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., he reported
for work at the Perutz Bar[14] on Magsaysay Avenue, where he worked as a waiter,
until 3:00 a.m. of the next day.[15]

On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call from Rose, an

acquaintance who worked as a guest relations officer at a club on Magsaysay
Avenue. Rose offered to help him find a better job and asked that they meet at
Anthonys Wine and Grocery. In the past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or
marijuana, but he refused to buy from her as he had no money.[16] At around 1:00
or 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant met Rose in front of the grocery store. While she
talked to him about a job opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay
grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted I-handcuff, i-handcuff! (Handcuff
him, handcuff him!) Accused-appellant was then taken to the Regional Narcotics
Office by the policemen, accompanied by Rose.[17]

At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accused-appellant about the

marijuana allegedly seized from him. Accused-appellant said he denied having
carried the bag of marijuana which he had seen Rose carrying earlier.[18] After
taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him in
a secluded place if he did not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make him
admit ownership of the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release accusedappellant if he gave them money. When accused-appellant replied that he had no
money, PO3 Piggangay said, If you have no money, then we will work on your
papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa. The policemen then took accusedappellant to a hospital for a physical examination and afterwards asked him to sign
a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report without explaining their
contents or allowing him to read them.[19]

On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of its decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Albert Casimiro guilty beyond doubt of
Violation of Section 4 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended by Sections 13
and 17 of RA 7659 (Sale or delivery of 904.6 grams of marijuana brick) as charged
in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a Fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The marijuana brick weighing 904.6 grams (Exhs. J to J-4) being the subject of the
crime and a prohibited drug is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.

The accused Albert Casimiro, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be credited in

the service of his sentence 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with
the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that the evidence against him is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[21]

We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, the rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of
weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the
trial court.[22] In this case, several such circumstances stand out as having been
overlooked or misapprehended by the lower court which entitle accused-appellant
to an acquittal.

First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the
lower court declared:

The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was
signed by the accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of
property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their standard
operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was seized. The
receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.[23]

Indeed, the receipt (Exh. L) could not be considered evidence against accusedappellant because it was signed by him without the assistance of counsel.[24] Art.
III, 12(1) of the Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of

counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the
suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as
suspect/ owner. In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited
drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the
assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized
from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.[25]

In People v. Obrero,[26] this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed

by the Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar
environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of a
police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.

PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while
he was being arrested outside the grocery:

Q: What happened after you brought out your comb and started combing your hair?

A: Sir, my two companions went to our place and effected the arrest of the suspect.

Q: What else happened after the two members of the team rushed to your place?

A: We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and brought him to our
Narcotics office.

Q: How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?

A: Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, You are under arrest
for violation of 6425. You have the right to remain silent. You have the rights to call

for a lawyer of your own choice. Anything you say may be used as evidence in favor
or against you. And we brought him to the office, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Sir, we investigated him and the suspect identified himself as Albert Casimiro.
[27]

The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accusedappellant could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was
perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It was merely
ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect.
[28] We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant
acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police investigators did
not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was willing
to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was
waiving his right to remain silent at all.

Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant. As he

points out, he could not have been so careless as to call the telephone number of
the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to the policemen there. Nor
can we believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed
place, Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one who wanted to buy
marijuana as if the latter were buying something not prohibited or illegal. While
drugs may indeed be sold to police officers,[29] these transactions are usually done
face-to face. It is improbable that a drug dealer would discuss the details of an
illegal sale over the telephone with someone he has never seen before.

Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a drugrelated case.[30]

In People v. Mapa,[31] accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after the

prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the NBI for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from the accused. In
People v. Dismuke,[32] this Court ruled that the failure to prove that the specimen

of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused
was fatal to the prosecutions case. In People v. Laxa,[33] the policemen composing
the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
alleged apprehension of accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he
marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the police
headquarters. It was held:

This deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces

doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Were the bags which the policemen
allegedly recovered from the scene of the buy-bust operation the same ones which
PO2 Espadera marked in the police headquarters? This question gives rise only to
surmises and speculations, and cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of
custody. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay
admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of marijuana immediately after
allegedly seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did so
in their headquarters.[34] The narcotics field test, which initially identified the
seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but
only at the narcotics office.[35] There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the
item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked
by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory
for examination.

According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw accused-appellant give PO2 Supa
was colored gray or blue, the same color as that of the bag sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service for laboratory examination.[36] PO2 Supa stated, however, that
the bag of marijuana which accused-appellant was carrying in the grocery was
colored brown.[37] The discrepancy in the testimony of these two police officers
casts additional doubt on the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the
corpus delicti.

Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a
buy-bust operation. The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves
everybodys support. But it is precisely when the governments purposes are
beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice
Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious

encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.[38] Our

desire to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the expense of constitutional
rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody,
unless he is being lawfully held for another crime. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Corona, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., abroad, on official business.

[1] Per Judge Ruben C. Ayson.

[2] Rollo, p. 10.

[3] Order dated September 30, 1999; Records, p. 27.

[4] Also known as Doroteo Supa.

[5] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), pp. 3-5, 21-22, Feb. 7, 2000; TSN (PO3 Juan
Piggangay, Jr.), pp. 5-6, 8, March 14, 2000.

[6] Id., pp. 5-8; TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), pp. 13-14, Feb. 29, 2000.

[7] Id., p. 8; TSN (PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.), pp. 11-12, March 14, 2000.

[8] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), pp. 8-10, 15 Feb. 7, 2000; TSN (PO3 Juan Piggangay,
Jr.), pp. 12-13, March 14, 2000.

[9] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), pp. 10-11, Feb. 7, 2000; TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa),
pp. 15-16, Feb. 29, 2000; TSN (PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.), pp. 14-18, March 14, 2000.

[10] Exh. L; Records, p. 11.

[11] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), p. 12, Feb. 7, 2000; TSN (PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.), p.
18, March 14, 2000.

[12] Exh C; Folder of Exhibits.

[13] TSN (Albert Casimiro), p. 2, April 4, 2000.

[14] Also known as Parrots Bar or Ferrets Bar.

[15] TSN (Albert Casimiro), pp. 2-8, April 4, 2000; TSN (Albert Casimiro), p. 2, May 9,
2000.

[16] Id., pp. 8-14; id., pp. 2-5, 7.

[17] TSN (Albert Casimiro), pp. 8-12, May 9, 2000.

[18] Id., pp. 12-16.

[19] TSN (Albert Casimiro), pp. 2-9, May 17, 2000; TSN (Albert Casimiro), pp. 2-7,
June 23, 2000.

[20] Decision, p. 11; Records, p. 125.

[21] Accused-Appellants Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 50.

[22] People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, July 20, 2001; People v. de los Santos, 314
SCRA 303 (1999).

[23] Decision, p. 9; Records, p. 123.

[24] Exh. L; Records, p. 11. Accused-appellant also claims that the policemen tried
to make him sign the arrest report and the booking sheet, although he refused to do
this.

[25] People v. Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193 (1997).

[26] People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000).

[27] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), pp. 9-10, Feb. 7, 2000.

[28] People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 (2000).

[29] People v. Flores, 243 SCRA 374 (1995).

[30] People v. Lacap, G.R. No. 139114, October 23, 2001; People v. Chen Tiz Chang,
325 SCRA 776 (2000).

[31] 220 SCRA 670 (1993).

[32] 234 SCRA 51 (1994).

[33] People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, July 20, 2001.

[34] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), pp. 10-11, Feb. 7, 2000; TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa),
pp. 15-16, Feb. 29, 2000; TSN (PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.), pp. 14-18, March 14, 2000.

[35] Certificate of Narcotics Field Test dated August 18, 1999; Records, p. 16.

[36] TSN (PO3 Juan Piggangay), p. 11, March 14, 2000.

[37] TSN (PO2 Dorotheo Supa), p. 9, February 7, 2000.

[38] People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, July 20, 2001.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000]

DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated

September 9, 1998 rendered by the former Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The assailed Decision affirmed the judgment[2] dated
October 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, finding
petitioner David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 8
and 16 of RA 6425, as amended, (for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs)
as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D, respectively.

The facts are as follows:

On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex
Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr., was arrested by elements of the PNP NARCOM, in
connection with the enforcement of a search warrant[3] in his residence at No. 331
Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. When the police operatives of
the PNP-NARCOM served the search warrant, which was issued by Judge Martin
Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, they found
the petitioner and his three (3) companions inside the comfort room of the masters
bedroom, at the second floor of the house.[4] During the search, the following
materials were found on top of a glass table inside the masters bedroom:

a. shabu paraphernalias, such as tooters;

b. aluminum foil;

c. two (2) burners (one small, one big);

d. fourteen (14) disposable lighters;

e. three (3) weighing scales;

f. plastic sealant used in repacking shabu;

g. several transparent plastic bags of different sizes;

h. about 1.4 grams of suspected marijuana fruiting tops contained in a small white
plastic;

i. about 0.7 gram of suspected dried marijuana contained in a small plastic

container.[5]

The PNP-NARCOM team also inspected the cars of accused Regala, Jimenez and de
Venecia, Jr. which were parked inside the compound of the residence of petitioner
Gutang. They found a Winchester Rayban case (sunglasses) with an undetermined
amount of suspected shabu residues and tooters in a black plastic container and
aluminum foil inside the car of Regala. The cars of Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr.
yielded negative results. The items which were confiscated were then brought to
the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon
City for laboratory tests. The results of the laboratory examinations showed that the
said items found in the masters bedroom of the residence of petitioner Gutang were
positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The items
found inside the car of Regala were also positive for shabu.

The findings are as follows:

PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-168-94

CASE: Alleged Viol. Of RA 6425

SUSPECTS: DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ

NOEL REGALA Y YORRO
ALEX JIMENEZ Y ESPINOSA
CAREY DE VENECIA Y LOCSIN
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 1430H, 05 MARCH 1994

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, 2nd SOG NARCOM

Camp Crame, Q.C.
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Exh. A One (1) white plastic bag containing the following:

Exh. A-1 One (1) white film case with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 1.56 grams.

Exh. A-2 One (1) small black box with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 0.70 gram.

Exh. A-3 Two (2) pieces of improvised tooter with white crystalline residue.

Exh. A-4 Several foil and small plastic bag with white crystalline residue.

Exh. B One (1) white plastic bag marked ROEL REGALA containing the following:

Exh. B-1 One (1) Winchester case with white crystalline substance.

Exh. B-2 One (1) black case containing several tooters with white crystalline
residue.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave the

following results:

1. Exhs. A-1 and A-2 POSITIVE to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug.

2. Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 POSITIVE to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.

CONCLUSION

Exhs. A-1 and A-2 contain marijuana, a prohibited drug.

Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a
regulated drug. xxx

REMARKS:

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1630H, Or

March 1994
(Annex A, pp. 6-8)
On the same day, March 5, 1994, immediately after Gutang, Regala, Jimenez and de
Venecia, Jr. were placed under arrest, they were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame. According to PNP Forensic Chemist Julita De Villa, their
office received from PNP-NARCOM which is also based in Camp Crame a letterrequest for drug dependency test on the four (4) men.[6] After receiving the said
request, Mrs. Esguerra of the PNP Crime Laboratory asked the four (4) men
including the petitioner to give a sample of their urine. The petitioner and his coaccused complied and submitted their urine samples to determine the presence of
prohibited drugs. After examining the said urine samples, PNP Forensic Chemist De

Villa came out with Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94[7] and Physical Report No. DT107-94[8] dated March 9, 1994, showing that the said urine samples all tested
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

Consequently, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D were
filed in court against the petitioner and his companions for violation of Sections 8
and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act) as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Incidentally, the charge against accused Oscar
de Venecia, Jr. was dismissed by the trial court in an Order[9] dated August 3, 1994
on the ground that he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and
confinement at the New Beginnings Foundation, Inc., a private rehabilitation center
accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board.

Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty. His co-accused,
Regala and Jimenez, likewise pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases
proceeded. However, petitioner Gutang did not present any evidence.

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds 1) accused DAVID GUTANG and
ALEXANDER JIMENEZ in Criminal Case No. 2696-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 as amended (Possession and use of prohibited
drug); and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs;
2) In Criminal Case No. 2697-D (Possession) accused DAVID GUTANG, NOEL REGALA
and ALEXANDER JIMENEZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
16 (ibid) and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs;
3) accused NOEL REGALA, in Criminal Case No. 2698-D (Possession of regulated
drugs) is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to
two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs.

The items confiscated are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and to be
disposed of in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner raises the following assignments of error:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY
SEIZED; EXHIBIT I AND EXHIBIT R; THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-168-94.
EXHIBIT D; THE CHEMISTRY REPORT NO. DT-107-94, EXHIBIT L; AND THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE REPORT NO. DT-107-94, EXHIBIT M ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.

Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibits I and R,
which are the Receipts of Property Seized, considering that it was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights. The said Receipts for Property Seized, which
described the properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant,
contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the said evidence were
obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount to
having been derived from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and, thus, are
inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of the poisonous tree.

We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the accused
in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained
without the assistance of counsel.[11] The signature of the accused on such a
receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime
charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained possession of
prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on
the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in
evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession
which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property Seized (Exhibits I
and R) are inadmissible in evidence, it follows that the Physical Science Reports Nos.
D-168-94 and DT-107-94 (Exhibit D and M) and Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94
(Exhibit L) finding the said items seized to be positive for marijuana and shabu, are
also inadmissible inasmuch as they are mere conclusions drawn from the said
Receipts and hence a part thereof.

We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are
inadmissible in evidence does not render inadmissable the Physical Science Reports
(Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined
materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength
of a valid search warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or taken
from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted
thereon were legally and validly done. Hence, the said Reports containing the
results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real
evidence of the prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that
the petitioner used and had the said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his
possession. In other words, even without the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I
and R) the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial
investigation when his urine sample was taken and chemically examined, Exhibits L
and M, which are the respective Chemistry and Physical Reports, both dated March
9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in
effect from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. Petitioner claims that the
taking of his urine sample allegedly violates Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution,
which provides that:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.

We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken
into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material.[12] In fact, an accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without
running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion.[13] The situation
in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the
accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and
his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact
voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.[14]

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete with
other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.

First of all, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the presence in his
bedroom of the assorted drug paraphernalia[15] and prohibited drugs found atop a
round table therein at the time of the raid.[16] Petitioners feeble excuse that he and
his co-accused were not in the masters bedroom but inside the comfort room
deserves scant consideration since the comfort room is part of the masters
bedroom.[17] Prosecution witness Capt. Franklin Moises Mabanag, head of the said

PNP-NARCOM raiding team, testified that when petitioner was arrested, the latter
showed manifestations and signs that he was under the influence of drugs, to wit:

By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)

Q: Mr. Witness, why was a drug defendant (sic) test requested on the persons of
David Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia?

A: A drug test was made on them because when we held these persons David
Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, they showed
manifestations and signs that they are under the influence of drugs.

Atty. Arias:

That is a conjectural answer. The witness is not authorized to testify on that.

Fiscal Villanueva:

We agreed as to the expertise of this witness at the time when I was qualifying him
(interrupted)

By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)

Court:

At any rate, that was only his observation it is not necessarily binding to the court,
that is his testimony, let it remain.

Atty. Arias:

But the rule is clear.

Court:

That is what he observed.

Fiscal Villanueva:

And what is this manifestation that you observed?

Atty. Arias:

Precisely, that is already proving something beyond what his eyes can see.

Fiscal Villanueva:

That is part of his testimony.

Court:

Let the witness answer.

Witness:

I observed they are profusely sweating and their lips are dry, I let them show their
tongue and it was whitish and their faces are pale, reason why we made the
necessary request for drug test.[18]

It is worth noting that the search warrant was served only after months of
surveillance work by the PNP-NARCOM operatives led by Chief Inspector Franklin
Mabanag in the residence of petitioner. Earlier, a confidential informant had even
bought a gram of shabu from petitioner Gutang. Prosecution witness Mabanag also
found, during the surveillance, persons who frequented the house of petitioner, and
that the confidential informant of the PNP-NARCOM had in fact gained entry into the
house. The police officers are presumed to have performed the search in the regular
performance of their work. Allegedly improper motive on the part of the PNPNARCOM team must be shown by the defense, otherwise, they are presumed to be
in the regular performance of their official duties.[19] But the defense failed to do
so.

All told, in the face of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1] Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, ponente, Justices Bennie A. de la Cruz and

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., members.
[2] Penned by Judge Mariano M. Umali, pp. 52-63, rollo.
[3] Records, p. 34.
[4] TSN, August 31, 1994, p. 68.
[5] Rollo, p. 57.

[6] Exhibit K, Records, p. 277.

[7] Exhibit L, Records, p. 278.
[8] Exhibit M, Records, p. 279.
[9] Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[10] Rollo, p. 62.
[11] People vs. Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193, 203 (1997); People vs. Bandin, 226 SCRA
299, 303 (1993); People vs. Mirantes, 209 SCRA 179, 186 (1992); People vs.
Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732, 740 (1992); People vs. De Las Marinas, 196 SCRA 504, 510
(1991); People vs. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 601, 605 (1991)
[12] People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455, 464 (1994)
[13] People vs. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615, 627 (1996)
[14] TSN, August 31, 1994, pp. 83, 93-94.
[15] Exhibits O, P, P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6.
[16] TSN, November 15, 1994, pp. 27, 29-30, 36.
[17] TSN, August 31, 1994, p. 68.
[18] TSN, August 31, 1994, pp. 42-44.
[19] People vs. William, 209 SCRA 808, 814 (1992); Perez vs. Rumeral, 200 SCRA
194, 201 (1991)

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

HO WAI PANG,

G.R. No. 176229

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.

October 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called

Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.[2]

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the
April 6, 1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City
in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka
Wang, Chan Chit Yue,[5] Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin San Ho[7] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III[8] of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed
is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion for reconsideration
thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates

Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the
Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny
Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco
(Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the
baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first
traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and
chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she
noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first
bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one
of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance
contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention
of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho
who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police.
Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while
bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger
manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found
to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing
except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes
earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed
and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan
Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in
all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused.

NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco

pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a
test on the white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the
NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.[10] The result of his examination[11] of
the white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with
tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were
turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings
show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples
were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[12] Out of the 13 tourists, the
NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his
five co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed
against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation[13] which the trial court granted. The reinvestigation conducted
gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to the
filing of a single Amended Information[14] under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to
the withdrawal of the other Informations.[15] The Amended Information reads:

That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country without lawful
authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
also popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost
identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no
knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all the accused guilty of
violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA
WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG, WU HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN
HO (HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to transport into the Philippines
31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu,
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6)
[sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30)
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
being imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the
accused though retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than that of life
imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine of P30,000.00 for each
accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the
accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION
AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the
offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY
WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.

SO ORDERED.[19]

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records
were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.[20] Later, all the

accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective withdrawal of
appeal.[21] This Court, after being satisfied that the withdrawing appellants were
fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal of their
respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997.[22] Per Entry of
Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997.
Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.

Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief[25] for the respondent
People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this Court
referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and determination pursuant to
this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were
other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners
claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the
witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the
existence of conspiracy among the accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] which the CA denied in

its Resolution[29] dated January 16, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.

IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO
OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE
CONSTITUTION.[30]

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not
assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation.
He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding
evidence taken during such investigation.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits
as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the
so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his
custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession
extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from
petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him.
Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court
based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the
existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran,[33] [a]ny
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Hence, petitioners claim
that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming[34]
to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the
facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The
disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each
case relied on in rendering their respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial
court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed
on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the

accuseds act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime
charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when
they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for
having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the
accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs
examiner whom it presumed to have performed his duties in regular manner.
However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said
examiners testimony was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of
his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and
not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco
was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be
corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in
People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be
corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach
a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the
lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the
trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.

Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another
case when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be
decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.

Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision
of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the
right to confrontation, viz:

Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a

speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what
the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence
being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.

In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to
confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel
cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the
proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it
before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless
able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices
as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.

We agree with the OSG.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco
despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack
of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that
petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other
witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In
People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the

Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness,
who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity

for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been

secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the
confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the

witnesses against him was not impaired.

Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.

Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of conspiracy
which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once
again herein reproduce with approval:

On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude
conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually
established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that
there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently prove
conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have known each
other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang
denied having known any of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho
Wai Pang identified him as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the
Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel agency and [that] Law Ka
Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be
place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been
known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as
cooks in a restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is
know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These
relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they have the capability to
enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances confiscated from the six
accused were contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same
weight all contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial
prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have
been perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy
with all the accused assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in
order to ensure its success.[37]

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.[38] [C]onspiracy which

determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at
least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.[39] It need
not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms
to enter into and pursue a common design.[40] The assent of the minds may be
and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced from petitioner
and his co-accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a
common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about
the crime committed.

Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were
found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was
his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him the possession
of the two chocolate boxes.

Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.

True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she
declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in
petitioners bag.[42] Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she
recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were still at
the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes
from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU.[43] To us, this slight clash in Cincos
statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.

The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence in its Order[44] of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus

In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to

command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco
is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in incriminating
accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even testified that she found nothing inside the
hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was
when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the
same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU,
after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate
boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved
from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it
was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54,
TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the
owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence.
They are facts from the personal perception of the witness and out of her personal
knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.[45]

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony

must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a
conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must
be calibrated and considered.[46] Also, where there is nothing in the records which
would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no
evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution,
Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is
convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing
else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was
caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu

into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of
denials.

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage
considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears
stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum
because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere
commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished
regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not
presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the
prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses
of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.[47]

All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging
petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the
country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Penalty

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate
court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled
that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15
of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.[48] The
decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be
imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced new
amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00 to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10 million. On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20,
Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law
shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua
under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659

could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in

view of its having a less stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x
x x.

And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused,
have, as to him, a retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment,
which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court
upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16,
2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] People v. Malimit, 332 Phil. 190, 202 (1996).

[2] Id.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 329-350; penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and
concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[4] Records, pp. 567-575; penned by Judge Alfredo R. Enriquez.
[5] Also spelled as Chan Chit Sue in some parts of the records.
[6] Also referred to as Tin Sun Mao in some parts of the records.
[7] Also referred to as Ho Kin San in some parts of the records.
[8] Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs.
[9] Rollo, pp. 90-91.
[10] TSN, July 24, 1992, p. 34.

[11] Incident Report, Exhibit N, records, p. 197.

[12] Exhibits E to E-9; id. at 189-B to 194.
[13] Id. at 23-30.
[14] Id. at 68-69.
[15] See the RTC Order dated November 29, 1991, id. at 70.
[16] Id. at 68.
[17] Supra note 14.
[18] Supra note 4.
[19] Records, p. 575.
[20] Id. at 584.
[21] CA rollo, pp. 76-80, 83-85 and 95-97.
[22] Rollo, p. 116.
[23] Id. at 117.
[24] Id. at 128-200.
[25] Id. at 240-268.
[26] Id. at 304-305.
[27] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[28] CA rollo, pp. 356-373.
[29] Supra note 9.
[30] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[31] CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 12 provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxxx
[32] G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 255, 270, citing People v. Malimit,
332 Phil. 190 (1996).