CASE B

Word Count: 2249

What sorts of charitable organizations or causes should we give monetary
donations to? In this paper, I argue from a utilitarian framework that we ought to donate
to charitable organizations that focus on mortality reduction and improving access to
basic needs, as these have a greater positive impact on overall welfare. Before
applying utilitarianism to the case, I will first give a concise explanation of utilitarianism
and address some substantial objections to the theory.
Consequentialism is a broad class of ethical theories in which moral rightness
is linked to value-maximization of outcomes (Sinott-Armstrong). For utilitarianism in
particular, happiness or utility is the only intrinsic value and thus the only good to be
maximized; all other goodssuch as liberty, knowledge, beauty, and the likeare but
instrumental to the promotion of happiness, or at the very least the mitigation of pain
(Mill 145). According to its right-making criterion, well-known as the Greatest
Happiness Principle, an act is morally good if and only if it brings about or tends toward
the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 (Mill 144). From this right-making
criterion, some general characteristics of utilitarianism can be discerned.
First, utilitarianism is act-centered, which is to say that it evaluates the
goodness of particular acts as such (Hooker 431). As it is formulated, utilitarianism
does not give us a criterion for evaluating the moral goodness of persons. Second,
utilitarianism is outcome-oriented (as in all consequentialist theories), and so the
motive of the moral agent is irrelevant in assessing the rightness of an act (Mill 159).
It makes no difference if I donate to charitable organizations out of concern for the

More specifically, this is the right-making criterion of act-utilitarianism (Bales 257; Hooker 431), the
most widely known form of utilitarianism. For brevity, this paper uses utilitarianism when it refers to
act-utilitarianism in particular.

worse-off or out of a need to pad my own ego, so long as the overall happiness of the
outcomes are the same. Third, utilitarianism is agent-neutral, which more or less
means that the perspective of a particular moral agent does not factor in in the calculus
of utility. The moral rightness of an act is viewed from the reference frame of a
disinterested observer (Mill 156; Railton 443). Each persons happiness counts equally
regardless of this persons relationship to a moral agent; my best friends happiness is
worth just as much as the happiness of a stranger I have never met. In line with this,
each moral agent is responsible for maximizing overall happiness, not just the
happiness of ones familial, social, or communal circle (Singer 467, 469).
Before I move on to the discussion of the case using this ethical framework, I
will first respond to some substantial objections pitted against utilitarianism. In so
doing, my aim is not to address all objections and thus present a definitive argument
for utilitarianism, but to show at the very least that it is a plausible theory worthy of
consideration.
First, utilitarianism is an untenable theory because there is not enough time,
information, or psychological capacity for a moral agent to deliberate on the utility of
each possible action in every case (Bales 257-258; Hooker 431). There are
conceivably many scenarios in which directly applying utilitarian deliberation would
actually lead to suboptimal outcomes, such as deciding whether to perform CPR on a
kid rescued from a pool, or even something as trivial as deciding whether to allocate
time to deliberate at all (Bales 258; Railton 449). There seems to be a paradox in that
it may be utilitarian not to be utilitarian (Bales 258; Railton 444).
Such an objection betrays a confusion between utilitarianisms right-making
criterion and its decision-making procedure. It should be pointed out that utilitarianism
itself, as it is formulated, does not impose that utilitarian deliberation be directly applied

as a decision-making procedure for specific cases (Bales 263). The Greatest

Happiness Principle is a claim as to what is morally right as a matter of fact, not a claim
on what procedure to use in action. Regarding what decision-making procedure to
use, many utilitarians are in agreement that there ought to be stringent, exceptionless
rules-of-thumb, which when followed can reliably bring about the best outcomes in
most cases (Bales 259; Hare 462-463). This distinction between right-maker and
decision procedure is a crucial one, and understanding this will shed more light on the
utilitarian response to the next objection.
Second, utilitarianism may promote all manner of intuitively bad behavior
lying, stealing, killing, or whatnotso long as overall happiness is increased. Consider
an admittedly light example in which I lie to a friend about whether her diet regimen
has been working. It may be the case that lying would have the positive effects of not
causing her displeasure and fostering ill will between us. It would thus seem that the
utilitarian would advise me to lie in this and in other, possibly more serious
circumstances in which it would appear advantageous to do so.
This objection can be responded to on two levels. On the first level, it must be
said that whereas the objection makes it appear that the utilitarian looks at the
consequences of actions from the perspective of short-term gratification, in fact the
utilitarian must evaluate the consequences of actions in the long-term. Though lying
may at first seem expedient in the example given, it sets a precedent that can have
negative long-term effects (Mill 162). Perhaps lying to my friend will predispose me to
commit more lies, not only to her but to others. Or perhaps my friend will eventually
discover that I have been dishonest and will no longer have trust in me, effectively
ruining the foundation of our friendship. It should be emphasized that the utilitarian
would think that lying and other intuitively unsavory acts are morally wrong only insofar

as committing such acts would lower overall happiness in the long-term, not because
these acts are intrinsically bad; should negative effects be removed, then in principle
the utilitarian would approve of such acts in certain circumstances.
On the second level, the utilitarian once again emphasizes the crucial
distinction between right-maker and decision procedure. Whereas it is possible to
conceive of scenarios in which the negative effects of lying, stealing, killing, and the
like are removed altogetherand in the context of those imagined circumstances the
utilitarian is willing to concede that such acts are rightsuch scenarios are removed
from reality and do not provide a good benchmark for what we ought to do in more
normal circumstances (Hare 462). Once again, utilitarians advocate the use of rulesof-thumb as guides to many of our day-to-day moral decision-making; only in select,
unfamiliar circumstances are we to use utilitarian deliberation directly (Bales 259; Hare
462-463).
Third, utilitarianism places unrealistic demands on the human person by
threatening his/her integrity, in this case understood as a persons unified sense of self
(Ashford 422; Williams 260). The moral agent, tasked to assume the role of an
impartial observer, may at times be called to set aside his/her personal interests,
convictions, and relationshipswhich are constitutive dimensions of his/her selfconceptin order to maximize overall good (Williams 259-260).
Such an objection implies that a persons ground projectsthose deep
commitments that give one a sense of fulfillmentshould place constraints on the
moral obligations he/she ought to have. On the contrary, our impartial moral
obligations should place constraints on what ground projects are good for a person to
have (Ashford 423). Maintaining our sense of integrity is important only insofar as this
integrity tends toward the promotion of happiness. One may feel very strongly about

supporting slavery and protesting its abolition; that person may have a sense of
integrity, but objectively it is by no means a good one (Ashford 423-424).
Having explained the essential aspects of utilitarianism and having addressed
some objections to the theory, I can now apply the theory directly to the issue on giving
monetary donations to charity. What sorts of charitable organizations should we
donate to? Given the limited resources we can allocate to various causes, to be
conscientious, moral philanthropists requires that we create criteria which we can use
to assess which organizations are worth donating to, and how these organizations
should be prioritized. We can borrow ideas from the practice of triage in medicine. With
limited resources for treating patients, the medical practitioner must ask the following
questions: Which patients are in most need of medical help? Which patients are most
likely to respond to medical treatment? Similarly, the discerning philanthropist should
consider the following questions: Which organizations contribute most significantly to
those most in need? Which organizations pursue causes that can be implemented
cost-effectively and lead to tangible positive results? This seems to me entirely
reasonable questions to ask, although it can be objected that there can be other criteria
used for evaluation, such as which organizations are most in line with ones personal
interests, convictions, and relationships. However, the discerning, moral philanthropist
ought to be impartial and take everyones happiness into consideration, not just the
happiness of those he/she feels more closely connected to.
If we were to approach our charitable giving rationally, then it becomes clear
that we ought to make monetary donations to organizations which focus on mortality
reduction and improving access to basic needs (e.g. food, clean drinking water,
shelter, and healthcare). These organizations, which satisfy the above criteria our
discerning philanthropist has set, do more for improving overall welfare than

organizations which cater to what we can call secondary human needs, those which
are not as necessary for human survival. In particular, the Make-a-Wish Foundation
spends an average of $7,500 to grant the wish of a terminally ill child, not to treat
his/her condition. For the same amount of money, more lives could be improved in a
significant way. For instance, if donating 7 pesos to HAPAG-ASA can feed a hungry
child for a day (Cleofas), then $7,500 can feed more than 130 children for an entire
year.
We should not be too quick to discount the positive effect that Make-a-Wish and
other similar organizations have on overall happiness, based on these numbers alone.
We should look not only at the direct effects of Make-a-Wish (i.e. making ill children
happy, one wish at a time), but also at its more indirect consequences. For this, let us
consider a specific case of wish-fulfillment. One of the most elaborate wishes granted
by Make-a-Wish, with cooperation from the city of San Francisco, is 5-year-old Miles
Scotts wish to be Batkid. The entire affair cost a total of $105,000, initially paid for by
local government before being reimbursed by two philanthropists, two of the many
people whose hearts were warmed by Miles story. The event garnered a lot of media
attention not only within the city, but also worldwide, resulting in an influx of donations
to Make-a-Wish. We ought to ask whether the attention Batkid received also
engendered considerable interest in, for instance, cancer research or pediatric care,
and whether this interest translated to monetary donations to these causes. If this is
the case, then it can be argued that extravagant costs incurred by Make-a-Wish are
offset by the positive social impact it creates. Could it be that Make-a-Wish makes
people more generous and concerned for the suffering because of its strong emotional
appeal?

Whether or not this is true, there is no reason to believe that organizations

focused on mortality reduction and improving access to basic needs cannot also be
avenues for cultivating generosity and concern for the suffering. In fact, it can be said
that such less-publicized organizations heighten our moral sensitivity even more so
than feel-good, self-gratifying causes such as Make-a-Wish, because it invites us to
consider the happiness of less-fortunate individuals we may never even encounter or
hear about. It should be acknowledged that it is in human nature for us to be more
invested in causes which are nearer to us and which have a human faceas in the
case of Batkid in particular and Make-a-Wish in generalas opposed to causes in
which the human person is far removed from us, relegated to a mere unfortunate
statistic. This is not so much a weakness in the utilitarian position so much as it is a
guide on a means of proceeding. How are we to convince people who are more
inclined to donate to Make-a-Wish to donate to worthier causes instead? We could
cram their heads with statistics about how many more people are suffering greatly in
contexts far different from ours. Or we could use human nature to our advantage,
appealing more to human empathy and concern for the suffering by giving these
worthier causes a rebrandinga human face. Instead of talking about how many
millions of destitute children are suffering from hunger in the Philippines, we can talk
about the young Carlo whose mental development has been stunted by malnutrition.
In summary, I have explained utilitarianism and applied the theory to the issue
of allocation of monetary donations to charities. I have argued that we ought to give
donations to organizations which focus on mortality reduction and improving access
to basic needs, as these have a considerably greater impact on overall welfare as
opposed to organizations such as Make-a-Wish. I have also proposed that we can use
the strength of Make-a-Wishits appeal to generosity and concern for the suffering

and apply it to worthier causes in order to get more people to allocate their donations
responsibly.

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Christabel Floi E. Bucao

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