G.R.No.169766.March30,2011.

ESTRELLITA
JULIANOLLAVE,
petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDAA.TAMANOandADIBAHMADA.TAMANO,
respondents.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial
which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.
Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her
Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this
Court.However,inupholdingtheRTC,theCAcorrectlyailedthat
the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the
proceedingsbeforethetrialcourt.Anapplicationforcertiorariisan
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial
whichresultedintherenditionofthejudgmentcomplainedof.
Same; Answer; Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she
should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the
prejudice of the other party.Herfailuretofileananswerandher
refusaltopresentherevidencewereattributableonlytoherselfand
sheshouldnotbeallowedtobenefitfromherowndilatorytacticsto
the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court
correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it
deemedEstrellitatohavewaivedherrighttopresenthersideofthe
story.
Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their personal
status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.Even granting that there was registration of mutual
consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under
the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code
governstheirpersonalstatussincethiswasineffectatthetimeof
thecelebrationoftheir

_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.

638

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

marriage.InviewofSen.Tamanospriormarriagewhichsubsisted
at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is
correctlyadjudgedbytheCAasvoidab initio.
Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.While the Family Code is silent with
respecttotheproperpartywhocanfileapetitionfordeclarationof
nullityofmarriagepriortoA.M.No.021110SC,ithasbeenheld
thatinavoidmarriage,inwhichnomarriagehastakenplaceand
cannotbethesourceofrights,anyinterestedpartymayattackthe
marriagedirectlyorcollaterallywithoutprescription,whichmaybe
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since
A.M.No.021110SCdoesnotapply,Adib,asoneofthechildrenof
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his
motherhadfiledsincebothofthemstandtobebenefitedorinjured
bythejudgmentinthesuit.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolutionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Laura Love PearandaGuevarra forpetitioner.
Carmina S. Abbas forprivaterespondents.
DELCASTILLO,J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past.
Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested
rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.
ThispetitionforreviewoncertiorariassailstheDecision1
_______________

1 CA Rollo, pp. 129142; penned by Associate Justice Aurora

SantiagoLagman and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alino
HormachuelosandRebeccadoGuiaSalvador.
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

datedAugust17,2004oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA
G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita JulianoLlaves (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal AJ. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
voidab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano
married Estrellita twiceinitially under the Islamic laws
and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently,underacivilceremonyofficiatedbyanRTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was
indicatedasdivorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to
thewholeworldasSen.Tamanoswife,anduponhisdeath,
hiswidow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
ZoraydaA.Tamano(Zorayda)andhersonAdibAhmadA.
Tamano(Adib),intheirownbehalfandinbehalfoftherest
ofSen.TamanoslegitimatechildrenwithZorayda,5fileda
complaintwiththeRTCofQuezonCityforthedeclaration
ofnullityofmarriagebetweenEstrellitaandSen.Tamano
forbeingbigamous.Thecomplaint6alleged,inter alia,that
Sen.TamanomarriedZoraydaonMay31,1958undercivil
rites,andthatthismarriageremainedsubsistingwhenhe
marriedEstrellitain1993.Thecomplaintlikewiseaverred
that:
_______________
2Id.,atpp.205210.
3Records,p.103.
4Id.,atp.13.
5 Namely Jamila, Jacob, Amina, Macapanton, Ysmael, Soraya, Adel

andAquil.
6Rollo,pp.5460.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

11.The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda,

having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore
governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code,
the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same
while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still
subsisting, and his status being declared as divorced has no
factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
ComplainantZoraydainhislifetime,andhecouldnothavevalidly
donesobecausedivorceisnotallowedundertheNewCivilCode;
11.1Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have
divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for
the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to
havebeenonecontractedunderMuslimlawasprovidedunderArt.
186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant
Zorayda)didnotregistertheirmutualdesiretobethuscoveredby
thislaw;7

SummonswasthenservedonEstrellitaonDecember19,
1994.Shethenaskedfromthecourtforanextensionof30
daystofileheranswertobecountedfromJanuary4,1995,8
and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995,
bothofwhichthecourtgranted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita
filedaMotiontoDismiss11onFebruary20,1995whereshe
declaredthatSen.TamanoandZoraydaarebothMuslims
who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been
averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
PersonalLawsofthe
_______________

7 Id.,atp.57.
8Records,pp.1415,2526.
9 Id.,atpp.2526.
10Id.,atpp.17,29.
11Id.,atpp.3238.
12Id.,atpp.3840.
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Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving
Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdictionofShariacourts.
ThetrialcourtdeniedEstrellitasmotionandassertedits
jurisdictionoverthecasefordeclarationofnullity.13Thus,
EstrellitafiledinNovember1995acertiorari petitionwith
thisCourtquestioningthedenialofherMotiontoDismiss.
OnDecember15,1995,wereferredthepetitiontotheCA14
whichwasdocketedthereatasCAG.R.SPNo.39656.
DuringthependencyofCAG.R.SPNo.39656,theRTC
continued to try the case since there can be no default in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondentfailedtofileananswer.Estrellitawasallowedto
participateinthetrialwhileheropposingpartiespresented
their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were
postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on
March22,1996,suspendedtheproceedings16inviewofthe
CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29,
1996,enjoiningitfromhearingthecase.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition
adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30,
1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts
judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari docketedasG.R.No.126603.19
SubsequenttothepromulgationoftheCADecision,the
RTCorderedEstrellitatopresentherevidenceonJune26,
_______________
13Id.,atpp.109111,123.
14Id.,atp.143.
15Id.,atpp.151,153,173.174.

16Id.,atp.213.
17Id.,atp.176.
18Id.,atpp.230236.
19Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz,353Phil.775;291SCRA584(1998).
342

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the

hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this
scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22
Unhappywiththedelaysintheresolutionoftheircase,
Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision,23
reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case.
Estrellitaopposed,onthegroundthatshehasnotyetfiled
her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No.
126603.24
OnJune29,1998,weupheldthejurisdictionoftheRTC
of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as
Sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdictionincasesofmarriagescelebratedunderboththe
Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction
oversuchcases.InourResolutiondatedAugust24,1998,26
we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with
finality.
Afewdaysbeforethisresolution,oronAugust18,1998,
the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring
EstrellitasmarriagewithSen.Tamanoasvoidab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos
subse
_______________
20Records,p.237.Thetrialcourterredinstatingthatletreception
ofplaintiffsevidencehereinbesetonJune26,1997xxxwheninfact,
itwasalreadydefendantsturn.
21Id.,atp.240.
22Id.,atpp.242244.
23Id.,atpp.315318.

24Id.,atpp.319322.
25Rollo,pp.6976.
26Records,p.367.
27Id.,atpp.354362.
28Rollo,pp.7782;pennedbyJudgeElsadeGuzman.
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

quent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29Thecourtsaid:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately
showsthatthesecondmarriageofthelateSenatorwith[Estrellita]
was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda].Thisrendersthesubsequentmarriagevoidfromthevery
beginning.ThefactthatthelateSenatordeclaredhiscivilstatusas
divorcedwillnotinanywayaffectthevoidcharacterofthesecond
marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the
Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriagewassolemnizedundertheCivilCodeorFamilyCode.30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied
her right to be heard as the RTC rendered its judgment
evenwithoutwaitingforthefinalityoftheDecisionofthe
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the
RTCshouldhaverequiredhertofileheranswerafterthe
denialofher
_______________
29 FAMILY CODE , Article 35. The following marriages shall be void
fromthebeginning:
xxxx
(4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article41;
xxxx
NewCivilCode,Article83.Anymarriagesubsequentlycontractedby
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with

anypersonotherthansuchfirstspouseshallbeillegalandvoidfromits
performance,unless:
(1)Thefirstmarriagewasannulledordissolved;
xxxx
30Rollo,p.80.
31CARollo,pp.1741.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is

capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent
divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code.
Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to
questionthevalidityofhermarriagetothedeceased.
IndismissingtheappealinitsDecisiondatedAugust17,
2004;32theCAheldthatEstrellitacannolongerbeallowed
tofileheranswerasshewasgivenampleopportunitytobe
heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements.Sheneverfiledheranswerdespitethelapse
ofaround60days,aperiodlongerthanwhatwasprescribed
bytherules.ItalsoruledthatEstrellitacannotrelyonher
pendingpetitionforcertiorari withthehighercourtssince,
asanindependentandoriginalaction,itdoesnotinterrupt
theproceedingsinthetrialcourt.
Astothesubstantivemeritofthecase,theCAadjudged
that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio
forbeingbigamous,reasoningthatthemarriageofZorayda
andSen.TamanoisgovernedbytheCivilCode,whichdoes
notprovideforanabsolutedivorce.Itnotedthattheirfirst
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the
subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial.
Zoraydathen,accordingtotheCA,hadthelegalstanding
to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence,
the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous
marriagewithEstrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied
Estrellitas Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the
allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the
existenceofcollusioninviolationofbothRule9,Section3(e)
oftheRulesofCourt34

_______________
32Rollo,pp.3446.
33Id.,atpp.4853.
34RulesofCourt,Rule9,Section3(e)Where no defaults allowed.If
thedefendingpartyinanactionforannulmentordecla
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

andArticle48oftheFamilyCode35willnotinvalidatethe
trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the
parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of
collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined
before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas
refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded
Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously
rendereditsjudgmentwaypriortoourremandtotheRTC
oftherecordsofthecaseratiocinatingthatG.R.No.126603
pertainstotheissueonthedenialoftheMotiontoDismiss,
andnottotheissueofthevalidityofEstrellitasmarriageto
Sen.Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo,
Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the
RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued,
depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to
presentherevidencetodisputetheallegationsagainstthe
validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to
dismissinsteadofananswersuspendstheperiodtofilean
answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspendproceedings
_______________
rationofnullityofmarriageorforlegalseparationfailstoanswer,the
courtshallordertheprosecutingattorneytoinvestigatewhetherornot
a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervenefortheStateinordertoseetoitthattheevidencesubmitted
isnotfabricated.
35FamilyCode,Article48.Inallcasesofannulmentordeclaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting

attorneyorfiscalassignedtoittoappearonbehalfoftheStatetotake
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidenceisnotfabricatedorsuppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shallbebaseduponastipulationoffactsorconfessionofjudgment.
36457Phil.463;410SCRA365(2003).
646

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She
maintainsthatshemerelyparticipatedintheRTChearings
because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings
willbewithoutprejudicetowhateveractiontheHighCourt
willtakeonherpetitionquestioningtheRTCsjurisdiction
and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered
anadversejudgmentonAugust18,1998,monthsbeforethe
records of GR. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on
November11,1998.37Shealsoquestionsthelackofareport
of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there
was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceedingcouldbeheldwhenapartyhasfailedtofilean
answerinasuitfordeclarationofnullityofmarriage.
Estrellitaisalsosteadfastinherbeliefthathermarriage
with the late senator is valid as the latter was already
divorcedundertheMuslimCodeatthetimehemarriedher.
She asserts that such law automatically applies to the
marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of
registeringtheirconsenttobecoveredbyit,asbothparties
areMuslimswhosemarriagewassolemnizedunderMuslim
law.ShepointedoutthatSen.Tamanomarriedallhiswives
under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the
siblingsofthedeceased.38
Lastly,EstrellitaarguesthatZoraydaandAdibhaveno
legalstandingtofilesuitbecauseonlythehusbandorthe
wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriageunderSupremeCourtResolutionA.M.No.0211
10SC.39
Refutingthearguments,theSolicitorGeneral(SolGen)
defendstheCAsreasoningandstressesthatEstrellitawas
neverdeprivedofherrighttobeheard;and,thatfilingan

_______________
37Rollo,p.217.
38Id.,atpp.133,135.
39InadvertentlyreferredtoasA.M.No.001101SC.
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

originalactionforcertioraridoesnotstaytheproceedingsof
themainactionbeforetheRTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public
prosecutorifthereiscollusion,theSolGensaysthatthisis
no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of
Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of
collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents
legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas
purportedmarriagewithSen.Tamano,reasoningthatany
properinterestedpartymayattackdirectlyorcollaterallya
voidmarriage,andZoraydaandAdibhavesuchrighttofile
the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital
union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any
comment.
Issues
Theissuesthatmustberesolvedarethefollowing:
1.Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
judgment,eventhoughthelatterwasrenderedprematurely
because:a)thejudgmentwasrenderedwithoutwaitingfor
the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari
petition,i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her
answerandthuswasdenieddueprocess;andc)thepublic
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether
therewascollusion;
2.Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the
lateSen.Tamanowasbigamous;and
3.WhetherZoraydaandAdibhavethelegalstanding
tohaveEstrellitasmarriagedeclaredvoidab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually

led to the loss of her right to answer; and her

pending petition for certiorari/review on certio
648

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

rari questioning the denial of the motion to

dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal
suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was
deprivedofherrighttodueprocess.Shewasneverdeclared
indefault,andsheevenactivelyparticipatedinthetrialto
defendherinterest.
EstrellitainvokesJudge Macias v. Macias40tojustifythe
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
proceedingsinthetrialcourtuntilherpetitionforcertiorari
questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we
affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which,
apparently,isEstrellitasbasisforherargument,towit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to
Dismiss? instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The
filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by
the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on
the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under
Section6,Rule16ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure[nowSection
4],thePetitionerhadthebalanceoftheperiodprovidedforinRule
11ofthesaidRulesbutinnocaselessthanfive(5)dayscomputed
fromserviceonheroftheaforesaidOrderoftheRespondentCourt
withinwhichtofileherAnswertothecomplaintxxx 41 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we

pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to
suspendtrialuntilitfinallyresolvesthemotiontodismiss
that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states
thatthetrial

_______________
40Supranote36.
41Id.,atp.468;369.
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

courtshouldsuspenditsproceedingsshouldtheissueofthe
proprietyorimproprietyofthemotiontodismissberaised
beforetheappellatecourts.InMacias,thetrialcourtfailed
toobservedueprocessinthecourseoftheproceedingofthe
casebecauseafteritdeniedthewifesmotiontodismiss,it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidenceex parte and resolved the case with undue haste
evenwhen,undertherulesofprocedure,thewifestillhad
timetofileananswer.Intheinstantcase,Estrellitahadno
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the
trialcourtaftershefiledmotionsforextensionoftimetofile
ananswer.
Estrellitaarguesthatthetrialscourtprematurelyissued
itsjudgment,asitshouldhavewaitedfirstfortheresolution
ofherMotiontoDismissbeforetheCAand,subsequently,
beforethisCourt.However,inupholdingtheRTC,theCA
correctlyruledthatthependencyofapetitionforcertiorari
doesnotsuspendtheproceedingsbeforethetrialcourt.An
applicationforcertiorariisanindependentactionwhichis
notpartoracontinuationofthetrialwhichresultedinthe
rendition of the judgment complained of.42 Rule 65 of the
RulesofCourtisexplicitinstatingthat[t]hepetitionshall
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent
fromfurtherproceedinginthecase.43Infact,thetrialcourt
respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only
aftertheCArenderedjudgmentdidtheRTCagainrequire
Estrellitatopresentherevidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by
way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the
trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With
her

_______________
42Sps. Diaz v. Diaz,387Phil.314,334;331SCRA302.320(2000).
43RULESOFCOURT,Rule65,Section7.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained

obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her
evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the
trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and
sheshouldnotbeallowedtobenefitfromherowndilatory
tacticstotheprejudiceoftheotherparty.Sans heranswer,
the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and
rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have
waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No.
126603tobecomefinalandexecutory,norshoulditwaitfor
its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No.
126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to
Dismissandnottheissueofvalidityofmarriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as to the nonexistence
of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9,
Section3(e)oftheRulesofCourt,theRuleonDeclarationof
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 021110SC)44 also requires
theparticipationofthepublicprosecutorincasesinvolving
void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to
submithisinvestigationreporttodeterminewhetherthere
iscollusionbetweentheparties:
Sec. 9.Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph(3)ofSection8above,thepublicprosecutorshallsubmit
areporttothecourtstatingwhetherthepartiesareincollusionand
serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if
any.
_______________

44DatedMarch4,2003,withaneffectivitydateofMarch15,2003.
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

(2)If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall
state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their
respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days
fromreceiptofacopyofthereport.Thecourtshallsetthereportfor
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall
dismissthepetition.
(3)Ifthepublicprosecutorreportsthatnocollusionexists,the
courtshallsetthecaseforpretrial.Itshallbethedutyofthepublic
prosecutortoappearfortheStateatthepretrial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed

thepublicprosecutortosubmittherequiredreport,45which
wefindtohavebeensufficientlycompliedwithbyAssistant
City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation
dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there
couldbenocollusionbetweenthepartiesandnofabrication
ofevidencebecauseEstrellitaisnotthespouseofanyofthe
privaterespondents.
Furthermore,thelackofcollusionisevidentinthecase
at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of
collusionoralackofparticipationbythepublicprosecutor,
justasweheldinTuason v. Court of Appeals,47thelackof
participationofafiscaldoesnotinvalidatetheproceedings
inthetrialcourt:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriageandlegalseparationproceedingsistodeterminewhether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion
thatcollusionexistedbetweentheparties.Thereisnoallegationby
thepetitionerthatevidencewassuppressedorfabricatedbyanyof
the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
noninterventionofaprosecutingattorneytoassurelackofcollusion
_______________
45Records,p.30.
46Id.,atp.56.

47326Phil169;256SCRA158(1996).
652

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the

proceedingsinthetrialcourt.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of

Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their mar
riage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
Zoraydawascelebratedin1958,solemnizedunderciviland
Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationshipsbetweenMuslimsandnonMuslimsalikewas
theCivilCodeof1950,undertheprovisionsofwhichonly
one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognizedexceptduringtheeffectivityofRepublicActNo.
39451whichwasnotavailedofduringitseffectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
marriageanddivorcewhereinbothpartiesareMuslims,or
whereinonlythemale
_______________
48Id.,atp.181;169.
49Supranote12,whereZoraydasdisbarmentcomplaintstatedthat
themarriagewasconductedunderbothrites.
50Malang v. Judge Moson,398Phil.41;338SCRA393(2000).
51AnActAuthorizingForAPeriodOfTwentyYearsDivorceAmong
Moslems Residing In NonChristian Provinces In Accordance With
Moslem Customs and Practices (approved on June 18, 1949), Section 1
ofwhichprovides:
Section 1.For a period of twenty years from the date of the
approval of this Act, divorce among Moslems residing in nonChristian
provinces shall be recognized and be governed by Moslem customs and
practices.

52UnderArticles4557.
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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordancewithMuslimlaworthisCodeinanypartofthe
Philippines.ButwealreadyruledinG.R.No.126603that
Article13ofPD1083doesnotprovideforasituationwhere
thepartiesweremarriedbothincivilandMuslimrites.53
Moreover,theMuslimCodetookeffectonlyonFebruary
4,1977,andthislawcannotretroactivelyoverridetheCivil
Codewhichalreadybestowedcertainrightsonthemarriage
ofSen.TamanoandZorayda.Theformerexplicitlyprovided
for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwiseprovided:
Art.186(1).Effect of code on past acts.Actsexecutedpriorto
theeffectivityofthisCodeshallbegovernedbythelawsinforceat
thetimeoftheirexecution,andnothinghereinexceptasotherwise
specificallyprovided,shallaffecttheirvalidityorlegalityoroperate
toextinguishanyrightacquiredorliabilityincurredthereby.

Ithasbeenheldthat:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that
all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
clearly,plainlyandunequivocablyexpressedornecessarilyimplied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre
existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Codein respect of civil
actsthattookplacebeforetheMuslimCodesenactment.54

AninstanceofretroactiveapplicationoftheMuslimCode
isArticle186(2)whichstates:
AmarriagecontractedbyaMuslimmalepriortotheeffectivity
ofthisCodeinaccordancewithnonMuslimlawshallbeconsid
_______________
53Tamano v. Ortiz,supra,note19atp.781;589.

54Malang v. Judge Moson, supranote50atp.57;409.

654

654

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

ered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses

registertheirmutualdesiretothiseffect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual

consentforthemarriagetobeconsideredasonecontracted
under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
betweenZoraydaandSen.Tamanowillstillbeineffective,
asbothareMuslimswhosemarriagewascelebratedunder
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since
this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as
voidab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have
the legal personalities to file the declaration of
nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 021110SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife
the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective
in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a biga
mous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the
Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 021110SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under
Section2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the
exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may
directlyattackthevalidityoftheirownmarriage.
_______________
55ExecutiveOrderNo.209,whichtookeffectonAugust3,1988.
56 Sec.2.Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a)Who may file.A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
voidmarriagemaybefiledsolelybythehusbandorthewife.

655

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JulianoLlave vs. Republic

Estrellitaclaimsthatonlythehusbandorthewifein a
void marriagecanfileapetitionfordeclarationofnullity
of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if
thereasonbehindthepetitionisbigamy.
InexplainingwhyunderA.M.No.021110SConlythe
spousesmayfilethepetitiontotheexclusionofcompulsory
orintestateheirs,wesaid:
TheRationaleoftheRulesonAnnulmentofVoidableMarriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
SeparationandProvisionalOrdersexplicatesonSection2(a)inthe
followingmanner,viz.:
(1)Onlyanaggrievedorinjuredspousemayfilepetitions
for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be
filedbythecompulsoryorintestateheirsofthespousesorby
theState.[Section2;Section3,paragrapha]
Onlyanaggrievedorinjuredspousemayfileapetitionfor
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
andhence can only question the validity of the marriage of
thespousesuponthedeathofaspouseinaproceedingforthe
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regularcourts.Ontheotherhand,theconcernoftheStateis
topreservemarriageandnottoseekitsdissolution.57

NotethattheRationalemakesitclearthatSection2(a)
ofA.M.No.021110SCreferstotheaggrievedorinjured
spouse.IfEstrellitasinterpretationisemployed,theprior
_______________
57 Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli
Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429,
citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
DeclarationofAbsoluteNullityofVoidMarriages,LegalSeparationand

ProvisionalOrders.
656

656

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
JulianoLlave vs. Republic

spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely,

thisisnotwhattheRulecontemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
actionifheorshehadonlydiscoveredduringtheconnubial
periodthatthemarriagewasbigamous,andespeciallyifthe
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage,
it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
theinjuredspousewhoshouldbegivenalegalremedyis
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctityisprotectedbytheConstitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 021110SC precludes
the son from impugning the subsequent marriage. But in
the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalitiestofileanactionfornullity.AlbeittheSupreme
Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the
FamilyCode,suchisprospectiveinapplicationanddoesnot
applytocasesalreadycommencedbeforeMarch15,2003.58
ZoraydaandAdibfiledthecasefordeclarationofnullity
of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the
FamilyCodeissilentwithrespecttotheproperpartywho
canfileapetitionfordeclarationofnullityofmarriageprior
to A.M. No. 021110SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage,inwhichnomarriagehastakenplaceandcannot
bethesourceofrights,anyinterestedpartymayattackthe
marriagedi
_______________
58 Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574
SCRA116,132citingEnrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and

Trinidad CarliMedinaceli,supranote57at428.
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rectly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 021110SC does not apply,
Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has
property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the
realpartyininterestinthesuitheandhismotherhadfiled
since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgmentinthesuit.60
SinceourPhilippinelawsprotectthemaritalunionofa
couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would
preservetheirrespectiverightswhichincludestrikingdown
bigamousmarriages.WethusfindtheCADecisioncorrectly
rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
August17,2004DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAGR.
CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued
onSeptember13,2005,areherebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe
Castro andPerez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.Thenullityandannulmentofamarriagecannot
be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment,orconfessionofjudgment.(Carlos vs. Sandoval,
574SCRA116[2008])
o0o
_______________
59Nial vs. Bayadog,384Phil661,673;328SCRA122,134(2000).
60RULESOFCOURT,Rule3,Section2.

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