SARAO vs GUEVARRA

May 31, 1940

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of laguna
Ponente: Reyes, A.J,
Issue: NO reason in disturbing the decision appealed from. Decision
CONFIRMED.
Facts:
Appeal from decision of CFI dismissing plaintiffs complaint for
annulment of marriage in the ground of impotency
Married: June 3, 1936: Manila
Afternoon: plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge but
defendant asked to wait for the evening Night came: plaintiff again approached defendant - though he
found orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she
complained of pains of her private parts and he notices oozing
there from some purulent matter offensive to the smell
Upon advice of physician defendant submitted to operation
(august 7, 1936) and as medical verdict that the uterus and the
ovaries were bound to be effected with tumor surgically
removed with consent of plaintiff
Rendered defendant incapable of procreation but did not
incapacitate her to copulate
Under marriage law: marriage may be annulled if the party,
was at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering
into the married state and such incapacity remains incurable
Plaintiff wants to construe phrase of physically incapable of
entering into married state into incapacity to procreate
US generally held that the meaning on impotency is not the
ability to procreate but the inability to copulate
Defect must be of copulation not reproduction barrenness
will not invalidate the marriage
Defendant is not impotent in this case removal of parts
rendered her sterile but it byno means made her unfit for
sexual intercourse It was due to plaintiffs own voluntary desistance (memory of
first unpleasant experience) that made him give up the idea of
again having carnal knowledge of her even after she had
already been rid of her disease
Contention of fraud: she did not inform him of her disease in
sex organs but this contention is untenable since fraud is not
alleged in the complaint and has not been proved at the trial

BUCCAT V BUCCAT DE MANGONON

GR NO. 47101 APRIL 25, 1941
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUIDA MANGONON DE
BUCCAT, defendant-respondent.
HORRILLENO, J.:
FACTS:
1. It was established before the trial court
a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938
b. After several interviews, both were committed on
September 19 of that year
c. On November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married
the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in Baguio
d. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days
e. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on
February 23, 1939
f. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.
2. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment
of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed
that he consented to the marriage because the defendant
assured him that she was virgin.
3. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon
(Defendant) got married onNovember 26, 1938. Luida gave
birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filed for
annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to
believe by Luida that she was a virgin. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of
Plaintiff to the marriage?
DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that:
We see no reason to overturn the ruling appealed. It is unlikely that
the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the defendant, Luida,
was pregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got

married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they were
married.) Since Godofredo must have known that she was not a virgin,
the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an
institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To cancel it,
reliable evidence is necessary.
*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC

Corpus v. Orchotorena

Corpus v Orchotorena

o ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute

nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r ,- versus- CRASUS
L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t
FACTS:

RP V IYOY (CONFLICT OF LAWS)

o

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.
o ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
o Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the

celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the
care of respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received
a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers;
he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that
Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since
Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated
her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen
since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being
an American citizen, the law of her present nationality shall govern
her status.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:
Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid and
subsisting
RULING:
YES.
At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one
of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answer to every individual problem.

II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at
the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.

I. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to

support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. The root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained.

ESPIRITU VS COURT OF APPEALS. 242 SCRA 362

March 15, 1995
Fact of the Case:

At Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and

respondent Teresita Masauding began with a common law
relationship. Their relationship resulted to Rosalind, their daughter
who was born on August 16, 1986. When they were on brief vacation
in the Philippines, they got married. Upon returning to United States,
their second child Reginald Vince was born.
On January 12, 1988. Their relationship went sour and they decided to
separate some time on 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a
change as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and
the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his
children home to the Philippines, but he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburg. He had to leave his children with his sister, co
petitioner Guillerma Layug.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because she was afraid of being arrested since Reynaldo had filed a
criminal case for bigamy against her. On 1992, she returned to the
Philippines and filed the petition of writ of habeaus corpus to gain
custody over her children. The trial court favored Reynaldo for the
children chose him over their mother. However, the Court of Appeal
reversed the trial courts decision. Petitioner filed for review to the
Supreme Court contending that the Court of Appeals awarded the
custody of the children to the mother through an automatic and blind
application of the age proviso that children below 7 shall not be
separated from their mothers.
Issue:
Between the father and the mother, who is more suitable and better
qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, welladjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Held:
In ascertaining the best interest of the child, courts are mandated by
the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a
child is under seven years old, the law presumes the mother is the
best custodian. However, it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by
compelling reason. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount
but the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion the court

may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to third party as it deem fit under the circumstances.
Both children Reginald Vince and Rosalind are now over 7 years old,
capable of fair and intelligent decision. Their best interest would be
better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability
and a certain degree of material sufficiency for which they mother
Teresita sorely is incapable or lacking. There is nothing in the records
to show that Reynaldo is unfit under the Family Code. Moreover, the
childrens clear choice is their father.