THE CHERNOBYL POWER PLANT NUCLEAR DISASTER

Overview of the Chernobyl power plant reactor

The accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986 was the most severe in the history of the nuclear
industry, causing a huge release of radionuclides over large areas of Europe. The recently
completed Chernobyl Forum concluded that after a number of years, along with reduction of
radiation levels and accumulation of humanitarian consequences, severe social and
economic depression of the affected regions and associated psychological problems of the
general public and the workers had become the most significant problem to be addressed by
the authorities. The majority of the affected land is now safe for life and economic
activities. (M.I. Balonov, 2007) Reactivity slightly smaller than 1 by the positive scram is
concluded as a possible direct cause of the accident, which acts as a trigger to increase the
reactor power. Other possibilities as a trigger of the accident such as cavitation in pumps
and pump coast-down were investigated. (Hiroyasu Mochizuki, 2006)
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant forth reactor in the Soviet Ukraine suffered a
power excursion on 26 April 1986 during a low-power test requested by the Moscow
authorities.
The test was about to find a solution of cooling the core of the reactor in an
emergency situation.

Due to a large power increase, the water coolant was no longer able to carry off the
large amount of heat generated thus evaporated quickly leading to a steam
explosion which destroyed the reactor.
136 plant workers and rescue workers got an enormous dose of radiation and 28 died
within months and thousands of local inhabitants died of cancer due to radiation.
(world-nuclear.org, June 2016)

Main Engineering causes of the accident

There were two official explanations of the accident: the first which was the lack of
knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and engineering, as well as the lack of experience and
training, was published in August 1986 and effectively placed the blame on the power plant
operators. The second report published in 1992 was less critical of the operators and placed
much greater emphasis on the design of the reactor itself. (world-nuclear.org, June 2016)

Lack of safety management and reviews from plant operators.

Imperfect reactor design according to standards requirements of nuclear reactor
safety.
Reactor was operated with inadequately trained operators.
Overall management control of the plant operations was not clearly established.
Limited time and pressures to complete the test procedure.
The test was performed at lower power (700MW) which has contributed the inability
to control the reactor which was thus unstable. With lower flow rate of circulation
pumps, the water inlet temperature was very close to saturation and this had led to
an increase in power with much greater increase in steam voids and reactivity than
normal.

Done by: HALKHARI Vedhish (141 3874) & SEENAUTH Nitin (141 1317)
BEng (Hons) Mechanical Engineering (Minor: Energy systems) Level III

The test procedures were not followed and control rods were misoperated. Control
rods were withdrawn beyond safety limits to compensate for xenon buildup and
negative reactivity resulting from void suppression in the core.
The reactor scram signal for the second turbine-generator was bypassed and the
accident would not happen if the reactor scrammed at the start of the test.
The emergency core cooling system was deactivated for over nine hours while the
plant was operating.

Done by: HALKHARI Vedhish (141 3874) & SEENAUTH Nitin (141 1317)
BEng (Hons) Mechanical Engineering (Minor: Energy systems) Level III