Wilhelm Reich quotes:

what religion calls freedom from the outside world really means fantasized
substitute gratification for actual gratification. This fits in perfectly with the
Marxist theory that religion is the opium of the people. This is more than just a
metaphor. Vegetotherapy was able to prove that mystical experience actually
sets the same process going in the autonomic living apparatus as a narcotic
does. These processes are excitations in the sexual apparatus that cause
narcoticlike conditions and that crave for orgastic gratification
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https://revolutionarydesire.wordpress.com/a-cop-sleeps-in-each-of-us/wilhelmreich-beyond-the-mad-scientist-paradigm/

Revolutionary Desire
Wilhelm Reich: Beyond the Mad Scientist Paradigm
Sex-Politics
If Fenichel strives to reconcile a basically Freudian view of the Oedipus complex with a
basically Marxist understanding (or perhaps little Marxian reminders) of the actual reality of
the family, Wilhelm Reichs project is to explore and expand this connection. Reich, a
psychoanalyst, did his early work along mostly orthodox psychoanalytic lines, producing the
highly influential mostly-orthodox text Character Analysis, a work that would lead Reich to
posit a material existence for ideology. Throughout his career as a psychoanalyst, Reich
emphasized the economic viewpoint, leading him to find sexual potency as a key requirement
for health because of what he saw as orgasms unique ability to discharge vast amounts of
libido otherwise consumed by symptoms and repression. In an interesting parallel, Reich
looked to capitalist economic reality as a determinant factor behind the creation and
maintenance of neurosis. He finds in the actual reality of the family a sexually repressive
institution that is the primary source of neurosis. And, as he moves away from a strictly
psychoanalytic or Marxist angle, Reich attempts to form a new theory of the economics of the
family. The family can only be, according to this line of thought, a mini economy of actual
libidinal energy. The source of libidinal energy that Reich thought he had discovered he
dubbed the orgone.
Reichs theory of orgonomy is widely loathed and disregarded. Reich was imprisoned by the
F.D.A. in connection with his sale of devices designed to harness this energy. Many credible
scientists find nothing of merit in Reichs orgone work. Marxists and psychoanalysts find
something of value in his early work but distance themselves from his later work, seen as a
degeneration or even a psychosis. Clearly, there is a certain amount of confusion inherent in
Reichs orgone period. The work on its own, from the perspective of synthesizing Marxism
and psychoanalysis, is not particularly valuable. However, in context, this work makes plain
some tendencies present not only in Reichs earlier work but also latent in orthodox Freudian
psychoanalysis.
Reichs psychoanalytic work emphasizes the role of orgasm in sexual health because of its
capacity to discharge great amounts of libidinal energy. A certain degree of genitality was

already present in Freuds basic opposition of genital sexuality to non-genital perversion. [1]
Reich clings to this differentiation and blames perversionwhich he sees as basically
undesirableon the existence of anti-sexual morality. Repressive attitudes in the family
toward natural, genital sexuality lead to the widespread counter-moral phenomena of
perversion, prostitution, and masturbation. None of these is a real expression of healthy,
natural sexuality in Reichs view. But these phenomena are deeply rooted; even Engels, of
course, recognized the deep link between monogamy and prostitution.
At the same time, Reich has rightly been criticized by Herbert Marcuse for a tyranny of
genitality. [2] Reichs view, which correctly traces the existence of perversion to the
repression of sexuality, still upholds Freuds basically normative distinction between perverse
and normal or neurotic sexuality. For Reich, perverse sexuality would basically fade away
after communist revolution and the overthrow of sexual morality. Marcuses work speculates
that the revolutionary upheavalseen through the lens of an end to surplus repression
would act against the exclusivity enjoyed by genitality under capitalism. Rather, work itself
would be restored of its erotic nature; the body would be re-sexualized, back toward a kind of
polymorphous perversity. Work becomes play. [3] Marcuses vision is valuable insofar as it
attacks this weakness in Reichs theory and attempts to resolve psychoanalytically the issue
of alienated labor after revolution. Reichs theory, on the other hand, like Freuds, offers a
cogent and detailed analysis of conditions as they exist nowwhich certainly does not
exempt it from being attacked for overstepping from describing to defending the status quo.
However, despite its reactionary tendencies, Reichs project flows from the pressing need for
revolution in order to resolve both social and individual problems. For a period, before being
expelled from the International Psychoanalytical Association for being a Marxist and from
the Communist Party for being a psychoanalyst (perhaps both situations are more nuanced,
but the point still stands), Reich produced a remarkable body of work attempting to merge the
two fields of psychoanalytic and Marxist thought. The direction this work takes him is clear;
Reich seeks to answer how the masses can come to desire fascism or their own repression.
Mechanical Marxists expected a direct translation of economic interests and crisis situations
to revolutionary consciousness. Instead, for many, the opposite seemed to be true. Reich thus
moves from Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis, an important and formative text in
Freudo-Marxism, to The Mass Psychology of Fascism, a detailed application of his
combinatory efforts, with its own points of departure and leadings-up to orgonomy. In this
book is one of Reichs points which seems to broadly exemplify his overall aims:
what religion calls freedom from the outside world really means fantasized substitute
gratification for actual gratification. This fits in perfectly with the Marxist theory that religion
is the opium of the people. This is more than just a metaphor. Vegetotherapy was able to
prove that mystical experience actually sets the same process going in the autonomic living
apparatus as a narcotic does. These processes are excitations in the sexual apparatus that
cause narcoticlike conditions and that crave for orgastic gratification. [4]
Reich definitely understands his work as continuing and combining that of Marx and Freud.
For the stretch of his Freudo-Marxist period, he offers valuable insight into the relations
between sexuality, family, class struggle, and revolution. To begin with, Reich aims to extract
the revolutionary core of psychoanalysis, one that he thought even Freud moved away from
with the introduction of the death instinct. The great gain made by psychoanalysis is
withdrawing the discussion of morals from the sphere of philosophy. [5] Morality is not
metaphysical; it is rooted in education and parenting. By any interpretation, this is in line

with the classical Marxist formulation of material base determining an ideological

superstructure. Psychoanalysis, though, is a method which makes it possible to definitively
reveal the link from an individuals morality to family arrangement and education. Thus,
Reich seizes upon it as a weapon against mysticism.
While Reich sees psychoanalysis as incredibly important in this struggle, this places it at
something of a disadvantage. If, as Reich believes, psychoanalysis undermines the influence
of mysticism, then it undermines the psychical basis for bourgeois class rule. If its practice
becomes widespread and popular, then this can only come at the expense of the potency of its
revolutionary critique:
And so the capitalist mode of existence of our time is strangling psychoanalysis from the
outside and the inside. Freud is right: his science is being destroyed, but we addin
bourgeois society. If psychoanalysis refuses to adapt itself to that society, it will be destroyed
for certain; if it does adapt itself, it will suffer the same fate as Marxism suffers at the hands
of reformist socialists, that is to say death by exhaustion of meaning: in the case of
psychoanalysis, above all neglect of the theory of the libido. [. . .]
Because psychoanalysis, unless it is watered down, undermines bourgeois ideology, and
because, furthermore, only a socialist economy can provide a basis for the free development
of intellect and sexuality alike, psychoanalysis has a future only under socialism. [6]
Psychoanalysis of Character
Reichs book Character Analysis, which does contain some material disputed by orthodox
analysts (in particular his denunciation of the death instinct theory) is also perhaps his most
important psychoanalytic work. Readers of Reichs work, typically Marxists or
psychoanalysts or both, tend to view his writings as standalone products rather than milemarkers in a broader process. Contemporary editions of Character Analysis contain a section
explaining the transition from character-analytic work to orgone therapy. Like it or not, as
Juliet Mitchell points out, Reichs work led him to the orgone and to radically rethink his
entire platform. In Character Analysis, though, it is possible to observe the aspects of his
more palatable moments which make possible his wide deviation from both Marxism and
psychoanalysis.
This book, widely accepted in psychoanalytic circles, attempts to formulate a systematic
method for attacking the patients ingrained resistances that appear as long-seated ways of
living life but function in psychoanalysis to hinder the discoveries of the unconscious. The
goal of the treatment remains the same: to interpret the analysands speech and render its
unconscious meanings conscious. Yet these interpretations often fall to the spears of the
defenses. The resistances of the patient, then, must be resolutely and systematically attacked
in order to open up conditions favorable to interpretation. This is because the interpretations
must be accepted for their own merit, while interpretation under conditions of defense will be
accepted only for reasons related to the transference, that is, not for its correctness but by
virtue simply of the nature of the analytic relationship. [7] This, of course, opens the
treatment up to all the old vulnerabilities of hypnotherapy or any therapy which does not
analyze the transferencethe therapeutic motive force, perhaps, but also its cardinal
resistance.

It is known in psychoanalytic pathology that the various forms neurosis takes can be
categorized in part by the dominant fixation and regression that they activate. Reich applies
this same methodology to the differentiation of the character neuroses, offering several
categories including the hysterical character, the compulsive character, the phallic-narcissistic
character, and the masochistic character, the latter providing details essential to Reichs attack
on the death instinct. While here Reichs thought is perhaps not all that psychoanalytically
controversial, the division between the genital character and the neurotic character is one that
is contentious and highly necessary for understanding Reich and the direction his work took
him. Mitchell heavily criticizes Reich for a kind of normative genitality:
Though his model at this time was still one of progressive evolution in his descriptions, Freud
was aware that as these are re-expressed in adulthood the various stages will be experienced
simultaneously or in a new temporal sequence, a different structural arrangement. Reichs
alteration of Freuds thesis amounts to what could be described as a moral assertion:
genitality is unique and best. Given this supposition, all that detracted from genitality was
perverse or disturbed. Freuds careful diversification of sexuality into component parts, and
various erotogenous zones and different sexual objects, was rejected in favor of a value
judgement. [8]
Perhaps her judgment is right on some level. Freud is certainly to be praised for not assuming
that sexuality is limited to genitality. Reich does not assume this either. Instead, his emphasis
on genital sexuality is tied to his theory of the orgasm as the main mechanism for libidinal
discharge. Perhaps because of the sheer amount of libido invested in the genitals, an
inhibition of genital drives over-cathects other drives and makes them difficult to sublimate.
This is because:
The genital apparatus, as opposed to all the other partial drives, is physiologically the most
strongly equipped because it has the capacity for orgastic discharge; and in terms of libido
economy, it is the most vital. Thus, we can assume that its impulses have a far greater
similarity with hunger, as far as inflexibility and tenacity are concerned, than they have with
impulses from other erogenous zones. This may well be a powerful blow to certain ethical
conceptsbut that cannot be helped. Indeed, the resistance to these findings can also be
explained: their recognition would have revolutionary consequences. [9]
Reichs position on genitality is not at all isolated from the rest of his theory, despite how
disturbing this could be to Marxists who find themselves initially attracted to his theory of
fascism. His entire theory of neurosis revolves around this conception of the orgasm as the
ultimate, and only satisfactory, discharge of the libido imbued into the genital zone. In his
view, the process goes as such. First, an external prohibition is internalized, producing a
libido stasis, or an actual neurosis. This actual neurosis creates a dammed-up state that
imparts its pathological energy to the experiences of the Oedipal stage and, perpetuated as a
consequence of sexual repression, keeps the psychoneurosis constantly supplied with energy
in a kind of cyclic motion. [10] Clearly, then, the task of therapy is not simply the undoing
of the psychoneurosis, but the elimination of the actual neurosis underlying it by making
possible genital gratification through orgastic release. One has a sense that Reich is
attempting to do to psychoanalysis something akin to what Marx did to the dialectic:
concretizing an abstraction, attaching an idea to a material reality.
The question of material base also arises in connection to the death instinct. Reich takes
extreme issue with postulating cellular dissimilation as a somatic source for the so-called

death instinct. Freuds positing the death instinct allows him to abandon the viewReichs
viewthat masochism is a secondary phenomenon, a turning of sadism inward. Reich says:
no, no, no! Sadism is for Reich not a turning outward of a primary masochism or death drive
but rather the mixture between the sexual demand itself and the destructive impulse against
the person responsible for its frustration. [11] As the stakes of this disagreement, it is
interesting to observe how Reichs writing, defending sexuality and seeing aggression as
resulting only from sexual repression, itself becomes most aggressive at the moments when
he senses that sexualityor the gravely monumental stakes of its repressionis under attack
by theoretical interlocutors.
Reichs position is quite similar to Fenichels. Both share the concern that the theory of the
death instinct undermines the radical conception of neurosis as struggle between individual
instinct and frustrating external world. [12] The danger is a political one: Reich senses a need
to defend sexuality from repressive class society, and the new theory offers an instinctual
basis for what Reich sees as the social force of repression. Michael Schneider criticizes
Freud, calling the death instinct that of a murderous and suicidal class, the imperialist
bourgeoisie. [13] Reich, it must be said, operates within the Freudian context of instincts as
basically individual and biological. From a Marxist perspective, Schneiders position is
highly interesting, perhaps pointing the way toward a more socially oriented conception of
instincts. For now, though, it is helpful to remain within the Reichian view in order to see
how the theory of character analysis helps lead Reich toward the orgone, away from both
Marxism and psychoanalysis.
Thus, at the same time they are political, the stakes of the death instinct are also clinical. For
sure, Reich shares with Fenichel a concern that the theory would oversimplify the analysis of
some cases, particularly those of masochism. Reich maintains that masochistic characters do
not, as Freud thought, go beyond the pleasure principle. Reichs main problem here is that the
so-called repetition compulsion has been asserted, but not demonstrated, to be a primary
phenomenon in the human organism. Insofar as the repetition compulsion was understood to
mean the law that every instinct strives to establish the state of repose and, moreover, to
reexperience pleasures once enjoyed, there was nothing to object to. [. . .] When conceived of
in this way, the repetition compulsion lies wholly within the framework of the pleasure
principle; indeed, the pleasure principle itself explains the compulsion to repeat. [14] In
Reichs view, masochism does not undermine this theory at all. The masochist seeks pleasure
like any other person, but this seeking is disturbed; thus, the masochist perceives sensations,
which are experienced as pleasurable by the normal person, as unpleasurable when they
exceed a certain intensity. [15]
In analyzing masochism, we see Reich bring in his finest elements of critique. He intimately
understands that the problems in this seemingly simple or semantic debate have consequences
far beyond their clinical potential. The biologizing of a need for suffering or punishment,
The prevailing psychoanalytic assessment, led to a misguided modification of the analytic
theory of neurosis, had a negative effect upon the theory of therapy, obscured the problems of
the prophylaxis of neurosis, and concealed the sexual and social etiology of the neurosis.
[16] Psychoanalysis, with all its radical findings, acts at times as a barrier to a revolutionary
theory of psychology. Yet the division between work that advances such a cause and work
that retards it is unclear. Even Fenichel allows for the possibility, in explaining variations in
the phenomenon of a so-called latency period of sexual development in children, that social
influences could cohere into biological changes in the organism. [17] Fenichels view seems
to allow for the possibility of social development influencing more primordial forces of

evolution (or rather hints at their fundamental inseparability). And, though Reichs points are
well taken on the dangers of accepting an inherent counter-Eros force, his own theory of the
incapacity of the masses for freedomwhich arise in particular in his theory of fascism
seem strangely in line with such a nearly evolutionary conception as the one Fenichel allows
for as a possibility.
Reich, however, is certainly to be commended for his careful attention to social factors. So it
is not particularly surprising that he draws from his direct clinical experience, contrary to
other analysts, the realization that psychoanalysis has failed to deliver a critique of
patriarchal and familial upbringing because it has underestimated the devastating power of
injuries inflicted upon the children by the parents. [18] It is this perspective that draws
Reich forth into creating some of the most jarring critiques of the family that had been yet
formulated under class society. Certainly, Reichs work on issues of compulsory morality and
the family were far ahead of the work being done by communists or psychoanalysts alone.
Yet he should not be free from criticism, particularly for not seriously handling the
representation of family dynamics in the psyche. In some ways, Reichs incredible work on
the family is a prelude to his orgone workboth downplay the psychic impact of the Oedipus
complex insofar as it is given (in psychoanalytic theory) a reality greater than the material
reality of the family situation which engenders it. Reichs focus on the family is very Marxist,
yet it (partly) leads him to a new school of thought far removed from either psychoanalysis or
Marxism, into the lonely realm of either genius or insanity or stupidity.
The Authoritarian Family and Sexual Morality
Reichs position of hostility toward the patriarchal family flows from his views on sexual
morality. Whereas for Freud, the main problem in neurosis is inadequate repression which
can be overcome through conscious sublimation and renunciation of instincts, Reich sees
sexual morality itself as the primary cause of symptomatic expressions of sexuality. The
ruling class which arises early in society has a material interest in sexual morality against the
natural sexual instinct, by means of repression, nongratification, etc., [which] creates
secondary, pathological, antisocial drives that must, of necessity, be inhibited. [19] Reichs
view is that there is some truth behind the idea that these antisocial drives are undesirable.
However, the repression of sexuality itselfwhich can be traced to the ruling classcreates
these antisocial drives that society as a whole must then repress. Thus, Reich is against
perversion, but extends this critique to sexual morality which he blames for the very
existence of perverse drives.
Reich links sexual morality to the repressive nature of the family. He traces the development
of the function of the family from an economic organization to one serving a basically
political need. It exists, primarily, to serve as the factory of authoritarian ideologies and
conservative structures. [20] Here the connection to Reichs prior work on character is
striking. Character is in many ways equatable with authoritarian ideology. Both result from
development in the family. Here, plainly, is the connection between the Oedipus complex (a
major factor in character structure) and ideology. Whereas Althusser (and others) see the
Oedipus complex as the dramatic structure, the theatrical machine imposed by the Law of
Culture on every involuntary and constrained candidate to humanity, [21]that is, as a
theaterReich sees the family itself as a factory of ideology.
Not only does the family produce the authority-fearing, life-fearing vassal which allows the
ruling class to remain in power, it also reproduces the conditions of its own existence by

crippling people sexually. [22] The family is seen as the only allowable expression for
genital sexuality, according to Reich, giving rise to antisocial and pathological sexuality.
Basically, the mechanisms of the Oedipus complex as outlined by Freud still operate in
Reichs schema; Reich, however, is not afraid to trace their cause to the reality of the family.
Reich certainly agrees with Freud that the successful outcome of the Oedipus complex is
symbolic castration and the accompanying repression; he simply does not think this state of
affairs is in line with the material interests of the working masses. Because it serves to cloud
workers consciousness with ideology, it must be attacked.
The Oedipus complex is to be seen as one aspect of this ideology. Reich certainly deserves
praise for emphasizing the real nature of the family more strongly than other psychoanalysts,
but there is also truth to Juliet Mitchells assertion that his theory is more like one of an
Oedipus simplex: as Reich traces the Oedipus complex to the real, material family
situation, he begins tracing it to an even deeper level, that of the instincts. [23] While Freud
did not attempt to fully examine the mechanisms by which the family gives rise to the
Oedipus complex, nor the mechanisms by which biology gives rise to drives, Reich attempts
to bridge both gaps. In the end, the state of science will lead him to discoveror invent
the orgone as a material process underlying these epiphenomena.
Along the way, however, Reichs theory allows him to criticize orthodox Communist
ignorance of childhood development. Infantile masturbation serves as a key example.
Whereas the question of whether or not to allow children to masturbate is a question mostly
ignored by the Communists, For the Church, infantile masturbation is politics. [24] This is
not to be left to individuals to address aloneafter all, Reich can show beyond doubt that
they are themselves previously conditioned by the same process of repression they will
engage in with their children; rather, even something seemingly so private as the question of
masturbation is for Reich a class question to be solved politically, not personally. Not only is
Reich fighting for the communist revolution which can and must overthrow the patriarchal
family; he is also proposing transitional positions for struggle toward that end.
Reichs positions are derived intensely from both of his fields. It is not particularly surprising
that Reich believes that, generally speaking, youths attachment to family ties is correlated to
their political viewsrevolutionaries tend to break from the family, while reactionaries tend
to embrace it. [25] With what is known about the familys role in producing morality and the
super-egoessentially an alien class force for the proletarianthis makes sense. Particularly
interesting, however, is Reichs extrapolation of specifically psychoanalytic findings to
support his Marxist arguments; here, he widely diverged from many other psychoanalysts.
Psychoanalysis itself is a means by which to combat authoritarian ideology: for the causal
and comprehensive therapy of neuroses, the socially instilled morality of the parents had
nearly always to be banished. [26] Not only must one become conscious of the repressive
and detrimental effects of sexual morality in order to free oneself of neurosis; one must also
break with them entirely.
Women are of decisive importance in this process. Women are sexual beings, yet ideology
denies this: Sexually awakened women, affirmed and recognized as such, would mean the
complete collapse of the authoritarian ideology. [27] Reich often tends to overstate his
points, and this is no exception. Yet even here, Reichs optimism demonstrates an underlying
faithfulness to psychoanalytic (perhaps not Marxist) theory. After all, this conclusion
certainly seems to flow from Freuds view that female sexual development instills a weaker
super-ego and identification with the father. Perhaps it is accurate, and not at all reactionary,

to say that womens oppression in the family holds them back from cultural development.
Freud did not see women as oppressed, but the latter is essentially his position. Reich exploits
this weakness in sexual development; he believes womens situation actually makes them of
utmost importance in the struggle against authoritarian morality. Ultimately, women are not
reproductive tools but sexual beings. Authoritarian society needs them to fill this reproductive
role at the expense of fulfilling their sexual needs. Women, thus, perform a service to society
analogous to the production of the workerwomen workers, doubly so.
Reichs critique of the family is really part of a broader sex-economic critique which takes
him into the relatively uncharted waters of exploring the interplay between ideology and
economy. He argues, for example, that late capitalisms vastly large reserve army of the
unemployed no longer necessitates (to the same degree) the prohibition on abortion for purely
economic reasons. Yet it is obvious that the reasons are in fact economic ones, that is, of the
psychic economy.
Sex-Economy Against Fascism
Sex-economy is the term Reich uses to describe his usage of both Marxist and
psychoanalytic categories in his illuminating critique, best exemplified in his work on Nazi
ideology, The Mass Psychology of Fascism. The book does not seek to explain, as might a
similar book from a bourgeois perspective, why there are revolutions, but rather, why are
revolutions unsuccessful? Reichs question can be simply summed up: how can the masses,
whose long-term objective interest lies in socialist revolution, side with the fascist
counterrevolution? This very search put Reich at odds with orthodox Marxism, undergoing as
it was the putrefying influence of Stalinization. In this light, it is helpful to see how Reich pits
his theory of fascism against that of the Communist Party and other orthodox Marxist organs
whose failure, arguably, bears responsibility for the victory of the Nazis and the defeats of
the revolutionary process in Germany and other countries. From the very beginning, Reich
scorns the traditional view of a superstructure strictly determined by its material base:
Notwithstanding the the fact that vulgar Marxism now speaks of the lagging behind of the
subjective factor, as Lenin understood it, it can do nothing about it in a practical way, for its
former conception of ideology as the product of the economic situation was too rigid. It did
not explore the contradictions of economy in ideology, and it did not comprehend ideology as
a historical force. [28]
Ideology, in Reichs view, is a force comparablein terms of class consciousnessto the
raw workings of the economy, the laws of motion of capital as outlined by Marx. Explaining
these objective laws, as the Marxists had sought to do, speaks nothing to the ideology that
acts to prevent the masses from reaching revolutionary consciousness. It counters the
mysticism of bourgeois thought, to be sure, but it is not in itself necessarily convincing to
workers who do not perceive the totality of capitalist economic relations in their daily work.
Reichs work on character structure and the authoritarian patriarchal family is a logical leadup to his attempt to solve this problem. If psychoanalysis must engage in character analysis to
undo the character armoring that Reich traces to the family and educational apparatus of the
state, then it is not far-fetched that Marxists should be doing the same. Before character
analysis was systematically formulated by Reich, analysts were already attacking patients
resistances. Reich shows in his work the futility of simply interpreting the unconscious of the
patient directly at any and all forks in the analytic road. Viewed in this light, The Mass

Psychology of Fascism is an attempt to attack the masses resistance to reaching revolutionary

communist consciousness, that is, the consciousness of their own objective interests. Until
Marxists are able to comprehend, explain, and attack these resistances and their sources,
revolutionary propaganda falls on deaf ears. [29]
And yet the disparity between the workers interest and consciousness is not only a matter of
thought. It is not so simple as to convince the workers that they are mistaken.
Since man, however, regardless of class, is not only the object of these influences [of his
material position and the general ideology of society] but also reproduces them in his
activities, his thinking and acting must be just as contradictory as the society from which they
derive. But, inasmuch as a social ideology changes mans psychic structure, it has not only
reproduced itself in man but, what is more significant, has become an active force, a material
power in man, who in turn has become concretely changed, and, as a consequence thereof,
acts in a different and contradictory fashion. [30]
Ideology is quite insidious. Individuals, whose consciousness is necessarily contradictory and
perhaps never fully aligned with their class interest, act to reproduce the ideology of the
ruling class. Not even workers are immune to this, particularly insofar as they come to
represent the interests of the state in carrying out the repression inherent in family
organization. Ideology becomes a material force insofar as it influences the actions of its
subjects, which in turn affect the material base through their participation in the production
process. In 1934 Reich had described the ideology holding back workers class consciousness
as bourgeoisification [31] which is seemingly a nod to Lenins theory of the
bourgeoisified labor aristocracy [32] created by the scraps of imperialist super-profits
with all its economic emphasis on class and flows of surplus value. Coinciding with Reichs
removals from both the Communist Party and the International Psychoanalytical Association
is an observable trend toward a sex-economic theory of ideology as fused dialectically with
economy. Reich in 1936:
As soon as an ideology has taken hold of and molded human structure, it becomes a
material, social power. [. . .] There is no development of the productive forces per se, but
only a development or an inhibition of the human structure, its feeling and thinking on the
basis of economic and social processes. [33]
Ideology is material, and Reich clearly considers his position materialist, but the real
manifestation of economic development is human structural growth. By 1945, Reich writes
that authoritarian and progressive ideologies have nothing to do with economic class
distinctions. [. . .] The emotional and mystical excitations of the masses must play at least as
large a role in the social process as do purely economic interests. [34] Ideology is now
totally divorced from economic interest, which is only one factor next to mystical and
emotional motivations (which are ideological).
In understanding mysticism, which boils down to an irrational divide between class interest
and individual consciousness, The Freudian conception comes considerably closer [than
vulgar Marxism] to the facts of the case, for it recognizes such behavior as the effect of
infantile guilt-feelings toward the father figure. [35] Vulgar, mechanistic Marxism
particularly of the Stalinist varietysimply ignores this irrationality and does not seek even
to explain it. It is assumed out of existence. As Adorno points out, Freuds primal father fits
Hitler to a tee. Adorno, whose work will not be examined in great detail, explains quite

similarly to Reich that since fascisms goals are totally at odds with the interests of the
masses it depends upon for support, there must be a psychological basis for its success.
Fascism, unlike communist revolution, can exist purely on the repressive psychological
configuration already ingrained in the masses. [36] Whereas Reich sees the masses as
biologically rigid and incapable of freedom [37] and fascism as manifest in every single
individual of the world, [38] Adornos Freudian examination of the unconscious
mechanisms of fascism does not emphasize character structure as does Reichs. Thus, fascism
for Adorno is not caused by psychological dispositions, it is a psychological area which
can be successfully exploited by the forces which promote it for entirely nonpsychological
reasons of self-interest. [39] While Reich also agrees that economic interest gives rise to the
phenomenon of fascism, for him it fails to fully explain why the masses support it. And here
Reich comes ironically close to the fascists he criticizes for seeing the incapacity for
freedom of masses of people as an absolute biologic fact. [40] For the fascists, the
determinant is race; for Reich, it is orgastic potency (genital by definition).
On the other hand, Leon Trotskys explanation of fascism is framed primarily in class terms.
Trotsky, who believed that petty-bourgeois psychology flows from the social crisis
exacerbated by proletarian struggle, does not see fascism through the Oedipal lens informing
Reich, Adorno, and Freud (whose work on group psychology Adorno applies to fascism). Yet
the mechanism is similar:
The petty bourgeoisie is economically dependent and politically atomized. That is why it
cannot conduct an independent policy. It needs a leader who inspires it with confidence.
This individual or collective leadership, i.e., a personage or party, can be given to it by one or
the other of the fundamental classeseither the big bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Fascism
unites and arms the scattered masses. Out of human dust, it organizes combat detachments. It
thus gives the petty bourgeoisie the illusion of being an independent force. It begins to
imagine that it will really command the state. It is not surprising that these illusions and
hopes turn the head of the petty bourgeoisie! [41]
For Reich, the petty bourgeoisies economic position is certainly responsible for its mass
disillusionment with bourgeois society. On the other hand, the petty bourgeoisies relative
independence means that its family situation is of heightened importance. Because the middle
class family constitutes an economic enterprise on a small scale [42], it is necessary for
Marxists to examine this family arrangementbecause in a certain sense, it is already a class
division. The family, for Reich, is a repressive apparatus, and in this is explained why the
lower middle classes flocked to fascism. To Trotsky, the fascist parties gained strength
because of the void of a revolutionary party capable of seizing power. The German
Communist Party misunderstood the nature of the situation and refused to commit fully to the
united front against fascism (its so-called social fascism policy toward the also-proletarian
Social Democrats, adopted under orders by the Cominternbut sustained by the Party
masses lingering transference in 1917? Or in Lenin or Stalin?), and the fascists exploited the
opportunity. There is thus in Trotsky a thread similar to the parties he criticized, an
economistic view of politics. Reich, in his passionate appeals to communists to begin
addressing daily and sexual concerns of the working masses as opposed to dry material on the
mechanics of capitalism, indicates that perhaps there is more to the story than Trotsky sees.
Trotskys account fails to explain why the German Communist Party did not become capable
of seizing power through the revolutionary turmoil that provided the opportunity. Clearly,
there are unanswered questions, and the strength of Reichs account lies in its directly
addressing the irrationality of fascism and the sources in the masses of this irrational desire.

At the same time, Reichs focus tends to draw him away from the merits of the Trotskyist
approach and its clear understanding of the tasks of a revolutionary party and the class
dynamics that make the proletariat the revolutionary impetus. He correctly blames character
structure for the masses complicity in fascism and oppression. Similarly, he is right to link
this structure to the patriarchal family situation. But his focus on orgastic potency, already
leaning away from psychoanalytic theory, implies that solution is possible under capitalism. It
is simply a matter of increasing the masses genital-orgastic potency, and they will become
free from interests alien to their class positions. This colors also his understanding of what
defines a fascist state. Whereas Trotskys definition was relatively clear (a revolutionary void
leads to the seizure of power by the petty-bourgeoisie), Reichs gets quite a bit muddled up by
the end of his book. Because the masses are essentially incapable of freedom:
the responsibility rests upon the state as well as upon masses of people, a responsibility in the
good and not the bad sense of the word. It is the states duty not only to encourage the
passionate yearning for freedom in working masses of people; it must also make every effort
to make them capable of freedom. If it fails to do this, if it suppresses the intense longing for
freedom or even misuses it and puts itself in the way of the tendency toward selfadministration, then it shows clearly that it is a fascist state. Then it is to be called to account
for the damages and dangers that it caused by its dereliction. [43]
Here Reich sharply diverges from Trotskys method. By this point, Reich not only robs
fascisms definition of its class character. He also implies that bourgeois states are capable of
making the masses capable of freedom, and could therefore be supportable. The united front
method, on the contrary, which defends the bourgeois state from the fascist takeover, is aimed
exclusively at arming and training the workers for their own self-defense. This task is one
that only the workers and oppressed can carry out. In every case of fascist takeover, the
bourgeois state shows not only its essential helplessness against the irrational desire of the
fascist masses, but its virulent hostility to the self-organization of the working class. Whereas
Trotskyists are prepared to defend the bourgeois state from the fascists, this is to be seen as a
grim necessity in preparation for the overthrow of this state and the revolutionary seizure of
power. Reich, whose analysis of fascisms irrational and unconscious characteristics is widely
spot-on, fails to provide a clear alternative to the existing communist methods. And yet,
Reichs frustrations are reasonable in light of the opposition he encountered from all sides.
Discussing the intense similarity in the sexual question of the Communist Party to various
religious organizations, he says, The fact that the Communist pastor Salkind, who was also a
psychoanalyst, was an authority in the field of sexual negation in Soviet Russia, speaks for
itself. [44] Indeed, one Communist-pastor-psychoanalyst figure personifies well the
reactionary overlap Reich discovered between religion, psychoanalysis, and even orthodox
communism.
Social Implications of Schizophrenia
At the end of later editions of Character Analysis is a case-study with a schizophrenic patient
Reich employing orgone theory and technique. [45] This is helpful to consider as an example
of Reichs inside-out explosion of psychoanalytic theory as well as a reminder that some of
his critical insight remains, despite the insanity of his theory. Reichs basic perspective, that
a living organism cannot experience anything unless there is some kind of reality behind it,
runs directly against the orthodox psychoanalytic view of psychotics as basically out of touch
with reality and untreatable. [46] One is reminded of how radical it was for Freud to take his
hysterical patients at their words describing symptoms lacking somatic origins.

There is more at stake with Reich, though, than simply accepting his patients reality; he
thinks schizophrenics can make valuable contributions to a critique of society. This puts them
at odds with homo normalis. Homo normalis is Reichs answer to the basic congruity
between normality and neurosisthe normal human is neurotic, is armored. The basic
difference between homo normalis and the schizophrenic is:
Homo normalis blocks off entirely the perception of the basic orgonotic functioning by means
of rigid armoring; in the schizophrenic, on the other hand, the armoring actually breaks down
and thus the biosystem is flooded with deep experiences from the biophysical core with
which it cannot cope. Understandably, therefore, armored homo normalis develops anxiety
when he feels threatened by the findings of orgonomy, whereas the schizoid character
understands them instantly and easily, and feels drawn to them. For the same reason, the
mystic, who is structurally close to the schizoid character, usually comprehends orgonomic
facts, although only as in a mirror, whereas the rigid mechanist looks with arrogant disdain on
all scientific dealings in the realm of the emotions and calls them unscientific. [47]
Whereas in The Mass Psychology of Fascism Reich conceives of mysticism mostly in terms
of its limiting influence on the capacity of the masses for freedom, now he finds that mystics
do have some openness to orgonomy which makes them fundamentally similar to
schizophrenics. What is tragic in Reich is his unshaken belief that his own theory is not
mysticism: We must seriously try to understand the mystical experience without becoming
mystics ourselves. [48] Perhaps a better modern question would be to understand Reich in
terms of the very mysticism he criticized. His theory of orgonomy, no doubt, attempted to
continue his wide sweeping critique of all forms of mysticism (orgonomy excluded!), though,
so there is value in a reading of the orgone work as extending this critique to its very limit,
perhaps to the very limit of its own anti-mysticismthat point at which his own theory
becomes abstruse mysticism. [49]
To begin down this path, it is necessary to agree with Reich that schizophrenics pose a far
lesser danger than that posed by class society. As he points out, even a violent schizophrenic,
if worse comes to worst, he kills himself or threatens to kill somebody else, which contrasts
starkly to the homo normalis nationalist leader who drives millions to their deaths and is
followed nonethelessthe world over. [50] The schizophrenics broken-down armoring
makes him or her a threat to the normal order of thingsan order which is undeniably cruel,
unjust, and fundamentally irrational. This difference is to blame for mental institutions
function as jails for psychotics. [51] Not even psychoanalysis manages to treat or cure the
schizophreniconly the mental institution remains.
If psychoanalysis fails to cure the schizophrenic, it is because it fails to perceive
schizophrenia beyond the psychic level of functioning. Whereas psychoanalysis finds a
present psychic reality for past experiences, Reich believes this can only be true if there has
been a change in the biophysical functioning of the organism. Thus, in his case study Reich
never even mentions the Oedipus complex, but rather focuses on the patients physical
blocks.
All the psychic processes involved in character analysis, the resolution of resistances, the
interpretation of the transference, ambivalence, etc., are no more than psychic descriptions of
the bio-physical processes of the Orgone. These may be observed in the muscular tensions, in
the movements of the diaphragm and in the vegetative phenomena and emotions which occur
in the course of the analysis. [52]

The aim, then, is to reverse the biophysical modification of the patient-organism; this is
precisely what psychoanalysis effects, limited as it is to the psychic level. Whereas
psychoanalysis divides the psychic apparatus into the ego, super-ego, and id, Reich
establishes a biophysical arrangement of the functions of the total organism according to the
functional realms of bio-energetic core (plasma system), periphery (skin surface), and orgone
energy field beyond the body surface. [53] The two arrangements link up in the id, a
reservoir of libidinal energy which is basically derived from the field of orgone energy.

Figure 2: Reich's Diagram of the Schizophrenic Split [56]

Reichs schizophrenic patient projects forces in the form of hallucinations (which she
compares to the aurora borealis) onto walls and into the external world. The psychoanalytic
explanation of the projection mechanism in terms of repressed drives which are ascribed to
other people or things outside oneself only relates the content of the projected idea to an
inner entity, but it does not explain the function of projection itself, regardless of the projected
idea. [54] Since the mechanism itself can be generalized (and psychoanalysis does this), it
becomes necessary to explain not the individual content projected but rather the cause of
projection as opposed to other symptomatic forms of coping with the underlying drives.
Reichs patients self-perception had appeared where her forces usually appeared: at the
walls of the room when she projected forth part of herself into the external world. [55] To
Reich this is fundamentally a split in the organism between self-perception (which is now
outside her physical body) and her objective biophysical process that ought to be perceived.
[56] In Reichs healthy organism, these are fused; in the armored neurotic, the biophysical
organ sensations do not develop at all. [57] The schizophrenic rather experiences a
fundamental split between the sensations and the self-perception, putting him or her in a
position midway between health and neurosis (normality). And yet, the schizophrenic is not
wrong to assume that the forces seen are in fact something broader than simple delusions.
They are indeed the streamings of the orgone.

Figure 3: Reich's Diagram of Compulsion Neurosis [56]

In Reichs conception, the schizophrenic apparently has a much greater access to orgone
energy yet still encounters a block. Both blocked and blocking excitation (in Freudian terms,
the repressed representative of the drive and its repressing countercathexis) derive from
orgone energy. Reichs orgone fits, of course, much more neatly with Fenichels differing
modes of operation for one erotic instinct than with Freuds death instinct theory, which
Reich rejects.
Reichs theory, though, is clearly an attempt to unify the mind and body into one biological
whole. Whereas Freud distanced himself from physiology by examining only its psychic
manifestations, Reich wants to understand these as part of a complex whole. Perhaps he fails,
subordinating them to the deeper (in his view, more materialistic) orgone level. Reichs
attempt, though, gets at a basic truth of the matter, that psychoanalysis fails miserably when it
attempts to resolve the theoretical problems posed by schizophrenia in terms of the individual
content of the disorder. Reich summarizes his basic differences and what makes this disease
so fundamentally important for orgone theory:
The functions which appear in the schizophrenic, if only one learns to read them accurately,
are COSMIC FUNCTIONS, that is, functions of the cosmic orgone energy within the
organism in undisguised form. Not a single symptom in schizophrenia makes sense if one
does not understand that the sharp borderlines which separate homo normalis from the
cosmic orgone ocean have broken down in the schizophrenic; accordingly, some of his
symptoms are due to the intellectual realization of this breakdown; others are direct
manifestations of the merger between organismic and cosmic (atmospheric) orgone energy.
[59]
For example, withdrawal of libido from the world, a defining symptom of schizophrenia in
psychoanalytic theory, is a result and not the cause of the disease. [60] Reichs theory,
depending as it does on the unlikely existence of orgone energy, at least attempts to move
beyond the formulation of schizophrenia in terms of symptoms (psychoanalysis at its best) or
Oedipal neurotic conflicts (psychoanalysis at its worst).
Reichs theory, therefore, positions him to be able to conceive of the disease in terms of the
various specific blocks in which it manifests in the patient. At the same time, he sees
individual cases of schizophrenia, and of cancer, as manifestations of a broader emotional

plague. In the individual, the block or tumor is only a functional part of a much more
insidious disease. The degeneration of a cancer victimas opposed to that of a schizophrenic
does not put him or her into conflict with the social structure due to the resignation
entailed. [61] Despite the schizophrenics forced opposition to society, though, a
transcendence of individual incapacity for healthy emotional expression requires thorough
disarmoring of the human animal on a mass scale and, first of all, prevention of biopathic
armoring in the newborn babies. [62] Reichs social critique shows its head again. Yet by
now, society is seen not in terms of its divisions into classes (materialistically), but rather in
terms of the flowings of orgone energy. Society is divided between those who are armored
and those who are not. Herein can be found the explanation for Reichs desperate search for
orgone energy and ways to harness it.
In order to preserve one of his basic insights, that ideology does not necessarily line up with
class interest, Reich invents orgone energy as a mystical explanation. Perhaps the theory can
be explained in terms of his personal disappointments with psychoanalysis and communism;
no doubt, his expulsions affected him dramatically. But essentially, the theory of the orgone
can be explained as a mysticism against mysticism. In many ways, this is the legacy also of
psychoanalysis. In Reich, the ridiculousness of the orgone serves to prevent many from
taking it literally, whereas in psychoanalysis, Oedipus is to this day still historicized. There is
no doubt that Reichs critical insight into society falls apart, losing its class dimension and
revolutionary implications. At the same time, his mystical flight is a warning for the cautious
both of the inherent dangers in psychoanalytic theory and the reactionary potential of an
attempt at linear synthesis between Marxism and psychoanalysis. It is in this vein that Reichs
work should be viewed: as a body, full of contradictions and lines of flight; the orgone,
mystical as it is, is definitively Reichs, as much as The Mass Psychology of Fascism.
Notes
1 Representing the orthodox tradition, Laplanche and Pontalis go so far as to define
perversion as Deviation from the normal sexual act when this is defined as coitus with a
person of the opposite sex directed towards the achievement of orgasm by means of genital
penetration. This is, quite simply, not a definition of sex that can be followed. Interestingly,
it rests firmly on the theory of the genital orgasm, an issue most heavily theorized by Reich.
The definition goes on more broadly: Perversion is said to be present; where the orgasm is
reached with other sexual objects (homosexuality, paedophilia, bestiality, etc.) or through
other regions of the body (anal coitus, etc.); where the orgasm is subordinated absolutely to
certain extrinsic conditions, which may even be sufficient in themselves to bring about sexual
pleasure (fetishism, transvestitism, voyeurism and exhibitionism, sado-masochism). The
Language of Psychoanalysis, 306-9.
2 Quoted in Myron Sharaf, Fury on Earth, 103.
3 See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 215.
4 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 129-30.
5 Wilhelm Reich, Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis, in Sex-Pol, 24.
6 Ibid, 56.

7 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 29.

8 Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, 163.
9 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 208-9.
10 Ibid, 15.
11 Ibid, 228.
12 Ibid, 231.
13 Michael Schneider, Neurosis and Civilization: A Marxist/Freudian Synthesis, 9.
14 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 234.
15 Ibid, 236.
16 Ibid, 256.
17 Other authors have pointed out that since among some primitive tribes a latency period
never appears, cultural restrictions must be responsible for the renunciation of sexual wishes.
However, there is no clear-cut contradiction between biologically and socially
determined phenomena. Biological changes may be brought about by former external
influences. It may be that the latency period is a result of external influences that have been in
effect long enough to have left permanent traces; perhaps at this point we are watching
external influences becoming biological. At any rate, during this period the forces operative
against instinctual impulses, such as shame, disgust, and so forth, develop at the price of
instinctual energies. Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 62.
18 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 259.
19 Wilhelm Reich, The Sexual Revolution, 22.
20 Ibid, 75.
21 Louis Althusser, Writings on Psychoanalysis, 29.
22 Wilhelm Reich, The Sexual Revolution, 82.
23 Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, 180.
24 Wilhelm Reich, What Is Class Consciousness? in Sex-Pol, 318.
25 Wilhelm Reich, The Sexual Revolution, 75.
26 Wilhelm Reich, The Imposition of Sexual Morality, in Sex-Pol, 93.
27 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 105.

28 Ibid, 14.
29 One might also wonder how parallel the winning of workers trust is to the transference
situation: if these transference resistances are not overcome, would masses accept the
economic arguments purely on the basis of transference to the revolutionary party? Is it true,
as Badiou argues, that the communist masses must come to despise the party: liquidation of
the transference? See Alain Badiou, Theory of the Subject, 247. Indeed, there is a deep and
potentially disturbing similarity between the democratic centralist party-form and the process
of initiation into psychoanalytic institutes, likely worth exploration.
30 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 18.
31 Wilhelm Reich, What Is Class Consciousness? in Sex-Pol: Essays, 1929-1934, 295.
32 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 14.
33 Wilhelm Reich, The Sexual Revolution, xxiv.
34 Ibid, xv.
35 The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 25.
36 It may well be the secret of fascist propaganda that it simply takes men for what they are:
the true children of todays standardized mass culture, largely robbed of autonomy and
spontaneity, instead of setting goals the realization of which would transcend the
psychological status quo no less than the social one. Fascist propaganda has only to
reproduce the existent mentality for its own purposes;it need not induce a changeand the
compulsive repetition which is one of its foremost characteristics will be at one with the
necessity for this continuous reproduction. It relies absolutely on the total structure as well as
on each particular trait of the authoritarian character which is itself the product of an
internalization of the irrational aspects of modern society. Theodor W. Adorno, Freudian
Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, 134.
37 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 319.
38 Ibid, 320.
39 Theodor W. Adorno, Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, in The
Essential Frankfurt School Reader, 135.
40 Wilhelm Reich, The Sexual Revolution, 323.
41 Leon Trotsky, Fascism: What It Is and How to Fight It.
42 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 48.
43 Ibid, 283-4.
44 Ibid, 124.

45 Laplanche and Pontalis list these characteristics as indicative of schizophrenia:

incoherence of thought, action and affectivity (denoted by the classical terms discordance,
dissociation and disintegration); detachment from reality accompanied by a turning in
upon the self and the predominance of a mental life given over to the production of
phantasies (autism); a delusional activity which may be marked in a greater or lesser degree,
and which is always badly systematised. Lastly, the disease, which evolves at the most
variable of paces towards an intellectual and affective deterioration, often ending up by
presenting states of apparent dementia, is defined as chronic by most psychiatrists, who
consider it inadmissible to diagnose schizophrenia in the absence of this major trait. The
Language of Psychoanalysis, 408-10.
46 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 436.
47 Ibid, 402.
48 Ibid, 437.
49 Dieter Wyss, M.D., Psychoanalytic Schools from the Beginning to the Present, 235.
50 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 417.
51 Ibid, 404.
52 Dieter Wyss, M.D., Psychoanalytic Schools from the Beginning to the Present, 235.
53 Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, 403.
54 Ibid, 437.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, 438. View full size images: (Figure 2) (Figure 3)
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid, 440-1.
59 Ibid, 448.
60 Ibid, 434.
61 Ibid, 433-4.
62 Ibid, 451.