Taqiyya Revisited: A Response to the Critics

by Raymond Ibrahim
Jihad Watch
February 26, 2009
http://www.meforum.org/2094/taqiyya-revisited

Having written at length on various aspects of Islam, it is always my writings

concerning doctrinal deceit that elicit (sometimes irate) responses. As such, the purpose
of this article is to revisit the issue of deceit and taqiyya in Islam, and address the many
ostensibly plausible rebuttals made by both Muslims and non-Muslims.

The earliest rebuttal I received appeared last year, days after I wrote an essay called
"Islam's doctrines of deception" for the subscription-based Jane's Islamic Affairs
Analyst. Due to the controversy it initiated among the intelligence community and
abroad, the editors were quick to publish an apologetic counter-article by one Michael
Ryan called "Interpreting Taqiyya."

For starters, Ryan is not a careful reader: he says I fail to mention ijma (consensus)
among the ulema, even though I repeatedly cite and delineate the ulema's (quite
consensual) verdicts supporting taqiyya; he sardonically suggests that, of course all
people, not just Muslims, engage in deception during war—a point I stressed; and he
evinces shock that I say Islam has no "common sense" and is "legalistic," when I simply
wrote that sharia law is not based on common sense but rather the 7th century words
of Muhammad, which may or may not rely on what we would today call "common
sense." (I had in mind anecdotes of Muhammad saying camel urine heals, people
should cover their mouths when yawning (lest Satan dive down their throat), men
cannot wear gold, only silver, and in order to be in each other's company, women
should "breast-feed" strange men ).

Next, Ryan makes the usual (and ultimately superficial) arguments without any backing:
that I "cherry-picked citations from the Quran"; that I focused on a "very narrow use of
the term taqiyya"; and that there are "other respected jurists who disagree" with the
notion of taqiyya I stressed.

Unfortunately, he overlooks the fact that, right or wrong, none of this denies that there
are Koranic references that do permit deception; that, even if there are "broader"
definitions for taqiyya, the "narrow" one I delineated is still valid; and that if there are
"respected jurists who disagree," there are still more who agree.

As expected, whereas I listed and quoted several authoritative jurists justifying taqiyya,
Ryan makes only flat counter-assertions whose plausibility rests solely in the fact that
they comport with the epistemology of the Western, secular reader, who cannot
comprehend that a religion would actually mandate temporal conquests and permit
deceit in their furtherance.
For instance, he makes comforting assertions such as "[I]t is manifestly not true that
Muslims as a whole desire eternal warfare with non-Muslims," even though I never
argue that Muslims desire eternal war but rather that sharia mandates it. Regarding a
verse I cited as being relied on by the ulema in support of taqiyya (2:73), he writes, "To
this reader, the verse inspires admiration rather than any other emotion." Odd that an
article in a publication geared to the intelligence community and dedicated to analyzing
Islam would bother evoking "emotions" in the first place—further revealing that Ryan's
rebuttal relies more on "shared feelings," not facts.

Moreover, like most of Islam's apologists who are obsessed with portraying the "true-
peaceful-and-tolerant" face of Islam, Ryan overlooks the pivotal fact that it matters very
little if the entire Muslim world believes in jihad and deception. What matters is that
some Muslims have, do, and always will. If 19 surreptitious jihadists managed to cause
horrific deaths and destruction on 9/11, insisting that not all Muslims accept these
doctrines is neither relevant nor reassuring.

Ryan next spends time making the argument that the word taqiyya "never appears in
the Quran. The root in other forms appears in various contexts, but it never means
dissimulation." As for taqiyya's cornerstone verse (3:28), Ryan, presuming the mantle of
mufasir (exegete), and after quoting an English translation, writes: "The English 'guard
against' is a translation of a verb that is taken from the same root as the word taqiyya
but it has nothing to do linguistically with lying or deception [emphasis added]."

Absolutely true. But of course, all this overlooks the fact that the Koran is not the all-in-
all in Islam; more important in determining right and wrong (i.e., in articulating sharia)
are the hadith-derived sunna, and the indispensable tafsirs and ijma (exegeses and
consensus) of the ulema. And these do use the word "taqiyya" and do define it as lying
and deception.

Moreover, there is widespread consensus among the ulema. According to Imam Tabari,
whose multi-volume exegesis is a standard reference work in the Islamic world, 3:28
means: "If you [Muslims] are under their [infidels'] authority, fearing for yourselves,
behave loyally to them, with your tongue, while harboring inner animosity for them."
Regarding 3:28, Ibn Kathir recommends the advice of Muhammad's companion: "Let us
smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them."

Perhaps Ryan thinks his non-Muslim, that is, infidel, exegesis of 3:28 will be more
acceptable to the average Muslim than the exegeses of the pious Tabari, Ibn Kathir,
and other ulema? And what "consensus" does he have in mind when the Muslim author
of the authoritative Al Taqiyya Fi Al Islam asserts, "Practically every Islamic sect agrees
to it [taqiyya] and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is
mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the
mainstream"?

Ironically, and despite all the above, Ryan closes his article by saying

"It would be fundamentally incorrect to suggest that the strained positions of Osama
bin Laden and other extremists somehow grow out of normal or mainstream Muslim
thought: Al-Qaeda's deception does not grow out of valid religious duty. [Yet
Muhammad said, "War is deceit."] If we fail to make the distinction between radical
Islamists and valid, thoughtful and authoritative views of expert Muslim jurists,
[apparently the many I delineated in my original essay don't count] we risk
undermining one of the most promising tools to defeat radical thought. I am referring
to recent successful programmes by the Saudis and Egyptians to persuade what the
West might call radical jihadists that their extremist activities are actually against the
canons of Islam as interpreted by mainstream jurists [emphasis added]."

What "successful programmes" have been initiated by the Saudis and Egyptians to de-
radicalize Muslims? Is he referring to Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation through tennis,
finger-paints, and GameBoys—which has by and large not been successful? And again,
which "expert" and "mainstream" jurists is he talking about?

In short, Ryan's points crumble in face of the fact that, all philology, sophistry, and
appeals to emotions aside, in mainstream Islam, what ultimately matters is how the
ulema—especially the "mainstream jurists" he continues evoking—have understood and
articulated the doctrine of taqiyya.

Regarding my more recent "War and Peace—and Deceit—in Islam," others have written
to me complaining that, by not juxtaposing more "moderate interpretations" to the
mainstream ones I delineated (e.g., Tabari, Ibn Kathir, al-Qurtubi, al-Razi, al-Arabi, et
al), I am supposedly "distorting." While there are in fact "moderate interpretations,"
most of these come from minority sects—such as the Ahmadiyyas or the Quraniyuns—
who, as they make up a trivial percentage of the Islamic world, and are in fact often
accused of and persecuted for apostasy by mainstream Muslims, are definitely not
representative of the latter.

Other critics express dismay as to how I can interpret certain verses as being
supportive of taqiyya. Of course, being neither a Muslim nor one of the ulema, I hardly
ever interpret this or that verse as being supportive of taqiyya/deception, but rather
always attribute such exegeses to the appropriate jurist, scholar, or theologian—the
ulema, who have the final say in mainstream Islam. (Ironically, being only a 4,000 word
essay, I only supplied a tithe of the numerous albeit subtle taqiyya decrees and
interpretations I have surveyed in Arabic texts dedicated to this topic.)

Still other critics point to strange English translations of the Koran that do not capture
the actual meaning of the Arabic—definitely not the way the ulema understand it—in an
effort to obfuscate the doctrine of taqiyya. For instance, some have written to me
insisting that Koran 3:28 has "absolutely nothing" to do with deceit. As evidence, they
quote the following translation from the website IslamUSA.org: "Let not the believers
take the disbelievers for friends in preference to the believers unless you very carefully
guard against evil from them."

The original Arabic says absolutely nothing about "guarding against evil from them." (Is
IslamUSA.org practicing taqiyya in regard to ayat al-taqiyya, or the verse of taqiyya?)
Instead, the original Arabic most literally says, "Let believers not take infidels for friends
in place of the believers; whoever does this shall have nothing left with Allah—unless
you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions." In other words, it does not
warn Muslims against befriending infidels due to the latter's proclivity for evil (which
may contaminate Muslims who do not actively "guard" against it), but simply because
they are infidels, non-Muslims—by default, the enemy. As for "guard[ing] yourselves"
and "taking precautions," once again, however one wants to interpret these, the fact is,
the ulema have already settled and interpreted it as aforementioned: deceit.

(Incidentally, is it not curious that while people are nitpicking about what the latter half
of that verse means, no one seems to be interested in the far from ambiguous former
half, where Muslims are simply commanded to not befriend non-Muslims in the first
place? Is that not, in and of itself, demonstrative of Islam's position vis-à-vis the other,
the infidel?)

Others have written to me, absolutely flabbergasted that I say Koran 4:29 or 2:195,
which command Muslims to not "kill/destroy themselves," encourages taqiyya. For the
record, I said no such thing; the ulema have—such as the classical exegete Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi (see Tafsir al-Kabir, vol.10, p.98). According to him, since Muslims are
commanded to not "destroy themselves," disclosing any truths that might lead to their
destruction is forbidden. Thus a mujahid ("jihadist"), according to Razi, must conceal
his identity, since infidels might "destroy" him if they were to discover what he was
about. And so, in this sense, 4:29 and 2:195 do permit deception.

Others are scandalized that I wrote Allah himself is described in the Koran as being the
best "deceiver" or "schemer." They write to me insisting that the Koran uses no such
language (based on their trusty English translations), but rather portrays Allah as the
best "planner" or "plotter"—the words used, for instance, in the widely quoted
translations of Yusuf Ali and Shakir. So, who am I to ascribe the word "deceiver" or
"schemer" to Allah?

Simple: in the original Arabic, the word translated (actually, euphemized) into English
as "planner/plotter"—makar—most literally denotes (and, to Arabic ears, connotes)
deception. Moreover, according to the definitive Hans Wehr Arabic-English dictionary,
the trilateral root "m-k-r" means "to deceive, delude, cheat, dupe, gull, double-cross."
One who takes on the attributes of "m-k-r"—such as Allah in the Koran—is described as
"sly, crafty, wily, an impostor, a swindler." In colloquial Arabic, a makar is a sly
trickster.

My reliance on one canonical hadith as supportive of deception has also come under
fire: Muhammad said, "If I take an oath and later find something else better, I do what
is better and break my oath." He also encouraged Muslims to do the same.

Many have written to me insisting that I "shamelessly" took these hadiths "out of
context." For the record, then, here is the context: Some Muslims came to Muhammad
requesting camel mounts to ride, but "he took an oath that he would not give us any
mounts, and added, 'I have nothing to mount you on.'" Later, some mounts fell into the
prophet's share of war plunder, and he gave these to the men. Overcome by altruism,
one of the men reminded Muhammad of his oath to which the latter replied, "If I take
an oath [to not give the men mounts] and later find something else better [the
opportunity to give mounts presents itself], I do what is better and break my oath."

Now, if Muhammad swore he would not give mounts, but then when he was able to, he
broke his oath ("to do what is better"), why should, say, jihadists fighting to make
Allah's word supreme, after giving oaths to infidels (e.g., peace-treaties of sulh, truces,
etc) not break their oaths when they too are able "to do what is better"? After all, what
is "better": breaking an oath so some men can have camels to ride, or breaking an oath
to make Islam—the embodiment of all good—supreme?

Once again, and whichever way one interprets this oath-breaking hadith, the fact
remains: breaking truces with infidels has a long lineage in Islam. The authoritative
Encyclopaedia of Islam, for example, simply states: "[T]here can be no question of
genuine peace treaties [between Muslims and non-Muslims]… only truces, whose
duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even such
truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated
unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict"—that is, if
the opportunity to do "something better" presents itself.

In closing, it should be noted that the most revealing aspect of the recent, and atypical,
barrage of disgruntled e-mails regarding my "War and Peace—and Deceit—in Islam," is
that no Muslim (minus fringe Ahmadiyyas, etc.) has written to deny the more troubling
aspects of the essay. For instance, while many nitpicked over the aforementioned, none
have denied the fact that Muhammad permitted lying in certain situations, affirmed that
"war is deceit," and permitted Muslims to deceive and assassinate infidels—all according
to canonical (sahih) hadiths (hence the reason mainstream Muslims cannot refute
them).

Moreover, the main point of my essay was not to demonstrate that Islam permits deceit
during war—a phenomenon I indicated also prevails among many non-Muslim
strategists as well—but to show that, for Islam, warfare with non-Muslims is eternal,
"until all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah (Koran 8:39). Yet no one wrote
denying this classical Islamic formulation of the world into Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam,
which must be in perpetual war until the latter subsumes the former (except of course
Michael Ryan, but he is simply another non-Muslim apologist).

Usually, silence is not necessarily indicative of assent; however, when large numbers of
people take it upon themselves to criticize certain (minor) aspects of an argument, it
seems reasonable to assume that their silence regarding the more revealing and
problematic issues—such as perpetual jihad—is, in fact, implicit assent.

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