People vs.

Vera- Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937

People of the Philippines & Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation- Petitioners
Jose O. Vera, Judge of the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Mariano Cu UnjiengRespondents

FACTS
Respondent Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case entitled The People of
the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", in which herein petitioner
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation is the offended party and acted as the
private prosecutor. Respondent Unjieng filed an application for probation under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 otherwise known as the Probation Law in the Court of
First Instance in Manila where Respondent Vera is the Judge ad interim. The Fiscal
City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation of respondent, stating
that Act No. 4221 is violative of equal protection under Sec 1 (1), Article 3 of the
Constitution because its applicability is not uniform among the provinces in the
Philippines, particularly, the Section 11 of the Act gives the power among the
provinces to determine whether to implement the said law in their province or not.
Petitioner corporation filed a supplementary opposition arguing that the Act is a
undue delegation of legislative power. Herein petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 and
alleging that respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his
jurisdiction in granting the probation. On the other hand, the respondents contend
that: the act is constitutional, that the private may not intervene in probation
proceedings, that the City Fiscal and the Solicitor General are estopped form
questioning the validity of the Act, that its validity cannot be questioned for the first
time before the Supreme court, and that the section in question of the act is
inseparable from the entire Act.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings
2. Whether or not the said Act is constitutional
RULING
1. Yes. Although the general rule is that only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been
held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the
issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention

of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute. In the case
at bar, the trial court in granting the probation derived its jurisdiction in the assailed
Act therefore the petitioner have standing in the raising the issue. With regard to
the Solicitor General acting as a representing the People of the Philippines, if indeed
the Act is violative of the constitution, then the People has substantial interest on
the issue. The well-settled rule is, the State can challenge its own laws.
In raising constitutionality questions, it must be raised at the earliest possible time.
However, this rule has exception, wherein courts has jurisdiction to determine the
time when question of constitutionality of a statute may be presented. It can be
raised even for the first time, if its resolution is necessary for the decision of a case,
which is the situation of the present case.

2. No. The constitutionality of the act is questioned on three grounds, namely:

a) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive
Pardon and probation are vested on different branches, the former to the
executive and the latter to the judiciary. The two are distinct acts, pardon
removes the penalties, disabilities and restores civil rights of the accused, on the
other hand, probation, is a suspension of sentence temporarily or indefinitely but
the conviction, liability and civil disabilities remains and become operative after
the suspension of when the judgement is rendered. Thus, the court ruled that
there is no encroachment in the pardoning power of the President since the two
are very different acts.
b) That it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The court rules that the section above constitute an improper and unlawful
delegation of the legislative power to the provincial board because of its
insufficiency. It does not does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. It does specify facts or conditions which
therefore gives the provincial board unlimited absolute power in implementing the
Act.
c) That it denies the equal protection of the laws
To implement the Act, the condition specified is the provision of the provincial
boards for the salary of a probation officer. Therefore, if a province do not comply
with it, the Act will not be enforceable in that province which means not all

provinces will be able to enforce it. These different situations is clearly a

manifestation of discrimination and inequality.
Considering that the Act particularly Section 11 is an undue delegation of
legislative authority that denies equal protection of laws, the court ruled it
unconstitutional. And since the said section is inseparable with the entire Act that
its elimination will render the law ineffective, the court further ruled Act No. 4221 as
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is granted.