VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, et. al.

, petitioners,
vs.
The Honorable EDGARDO PARAS, et. al., respondents
Facts:
Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and cabarets in
Bulacan.
Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as a prohibition and closure ordinance
which was based on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (but was originally enacted
on June 20, 1953).
The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS."
Its first section reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city
shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs, cabarets and other similar places of amusement within
its territorial jurisdiction.
Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely the
power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit."
The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938.
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were
filed on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has
no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; (2) Ordinance No.
84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the
law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing; and (3)That under Presidential Decree No. 189 (as amended, by
Presidential Decree No. 259 the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented
businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of
Tourism.
The respondent Judge issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. Then came
on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari by way
of appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and
not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC
had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It

cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue

could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the
Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of
cabarets.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO,

petitioner,

vs. THE

HONORABLE

ANTONIO

M.

MARTINEZ,
FACTS:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly
known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the draweebank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty
prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than
one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double
said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the
full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to
cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to
establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge
where payment of the check "is refused by thedrawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of

the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute
provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for
payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides
that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with
the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto,
giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and
the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by
the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to
present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom
to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not
lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as
the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee
by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY

versus
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
G.R. No. L-34915 (June 24, 2983)
FACTS:
Section 9 of City Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
"At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to
their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation
not later than six months from the date of approval of the application."
For seven years, this provision has not been enforced until the Quezon City Council
passed the resolution requesting the City Engineer of Quezon City to stop and
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in QC where the owners
thereof failed to donate the required 6% for pauper burial. Pursuant to such
resolution, the City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino Inc in writing that Sec 9 of
Ordinance 6118 would be enforced.

Because of this, Himlayang Pilipino filed the CFI at QC a petition for declaratory
relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul
Section 9 of the ordinance for being contrary to the Constitution, the QC Charter,
Local Autonomy Act and Revised Administrative Code.
The lower court declared said provision null and void, thus the City Council of QC
filed the petition for review before the SC.
The QC Council argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it
is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon
City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to
make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein."
On the other hand, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation
of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the
use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also stresses
that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking
of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the
State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is
urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
ISSUES:
Is Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is a valid exercise of police power?
HELD:
NO.
The police power of Quezon City provides:
"To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may
prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section."
In a long line of cases, police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the

general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally
possessed article, such as opium and firearms. The provision in question is not
merely regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of its property
without compensation.
The provision can neither be sustained on the ground of presumption of validity of a
duly enacted legislation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside
of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Similarly, when the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate
private properties to construct public cemeteries.
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with conducive and
wholesome environments and the beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made
to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.