SPOUSES ROBERTO AND VENUS BUADO V.

CA AND NICOL
FACTS:
Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also adjudged to pay the sum of P40,000.00 representing
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost. Erlindas property however, was insufficient to
answer for the liability so the sheriff levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses (real property on
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy was annotated on the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-125322). Romulo Nicol, the husband questioned the levy and the subsequent sale
claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence, levy upon the conjugal property was improper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject conjugal property is liable for the obligation of Erlinda arising from her criminal
liability?
HELD: NO
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly
provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime
or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the
crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012

EFREN PANA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City. Efren was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
On May 24, 2001, on appeal the court rendered a decision finding Melecia and another person guilty but
reduced their sentence to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court ordered those guilty to pay each of
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the Court made an award of
P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00 exemplary
damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them.3 The decision became final and executory on October 1,
2001.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of
the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the conjugal
properties of the marriage.
HELD:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but
at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.
Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above
applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.25 Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however,
the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the
other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity
for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children
for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity
for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not
altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending]
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

What is Efrens Contention?

BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the
name and style of A & L INDUSTRIES), respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as
evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L Industries.
Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo,
who manages A & L Industries and under whose name the said business is registered, supposedly
authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the
loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal
home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud
consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a
construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby
prayed for was issued by the trial court but the petitioner, not contented with the order, filed a motion for the
examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to
secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although Augusta Yulo and she
are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five (5) months before the filing of
the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed; that her signature
in the special power of attorney was forged because she had never authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity
to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor,

that she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that
as a result of the illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries,
the latter closed its business and was taken over by the new owner.
ISSUE:
WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and
therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the
spouses does not destroy its conjugal. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161
of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the
conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo
for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and
had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A
& L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the
said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code.
"It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163
of the new Civil Code. However, as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession
or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family.
Conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case.
Moreover, it would negate the plain object of the additional requirement in the present Civil Code that a debt
contracted by the husband to bind a conjugal partnership must redound to its benefit. That is still another
provision indicative of the solicitude and tender regard that the law manifests for the family as a unit. Its
interest is paramount; its welfare uppermost in the minds of the codifiers and legislators.
We, therefore, rule that the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against his
conjugal properties with respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment cannot issue
against the said properties.
HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIENA MALABONGA,
respondents.
The claim not having been extinguished by the death of Christina Ayuste, we ordered the substitution of her
heirs Marlon Ayuste and Arlaine Ayuste-Yu for Christina Ayuste in our Resolution dated August 11, 1999.
FACTS:
Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961. Although the couple resided in Manila, they
operated a machine shop in Barangay Iyam, Lucena City, which was managed by Rafael Ayuste. In order to
serve as a temporary residence for Rafael Ayuste while in Lucena, the couple purchased on August 26,
1982 a parcel of land with an area of 180 square meters on which a residential house was built situated at
Yale Street, University Village, Barrio Ibabang Dupay, Lucena City.
A deed of absolute sale[6] was executed by Rafael Ayuste in favor of private respondent whereby the former
sold the abovementioned parcel of land to the latter for P40,000, which amount Rafael Ayuste acknowledge

having received in the deed. On page 2 of this deed appears the signature of Christina Ayuste below the
phrase With my conformity. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of deeds of Lucena City on
March 5, 1987 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50046 was issued in the name of private respondent.
After Rafael Ayustes death on October 13, 1989, Christina Ayuste discovered, in the course of an inventory
of their properties, that the title to the land in Lucena was missing. She searched for it in the office of her
husband in Lucena City and it was then that she learned from her employees about the sale of the house
and lot by her husband to private respondent.
Christina Ayuste filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment of the sale,
cancellation of the title issued in the name of private respondent and for the payment of moral, exemplary
and actual damages. In her complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was
forged and that her husband Rafael Ayuste sold the property without her knowledge and consent.
RTC Rendered a decision declaring the deed of absolute sale null and void.
CA Reversed the decision of the RTC by holding that Christina Ayustes right to being an action for the
annulment of the sale is barred by laches (unreasonable delay in asserting a claim) because of her failure to
file it during the existence of the marriage in accordance with article 173 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners averred that the present action is not barred because the action to declare the nullity of a contract
does not prescribe. Futhermore, Christina Ayuste cannot be faulted for having brought the action only after
the death of her husband, despite the periods stated in article 173 of the Civil Code, since she had no
knowledge of the sale during his lifetime as he concealed the same from her.
ISSUE:
Whether or no the petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael
Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste.
HELD: NO.
Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wifes consent, subject only to
certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose
of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which states thatThe wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution
of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by
the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable[14] The action for annulment must be brought during
the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.[15] Where the law speaks in
clear and categorical languange, there is no room for interpretation there is room only for application.
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on October
13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower
court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned
transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved upon the death of
Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been
filed out of time.
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material.

The registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole world.[18] Precisely,
the purpose of the legislature in providing a system of registration is to afford a means of publicity so that
persons dealing with real property may search the records and thereby acquire security against instruments
the execution of which have not been revealed to them.[19] Since the deed of sale was registered on March
5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such date.

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES AND

FLORENTINA MIJARES, respondents.
FACTS:
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974. Sometime in 1984,
Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold a lot approximately 396 sq. mtrs. Located in Balintawak,
Quezon City to respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40,000.00.
Said lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses conjugal properties having been
purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business.
Ignacia found out out that Vicente filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXI. Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia,
died on March 22, 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. On September 29, 1983,
the court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor children. Subsequently, in its Order dated October
14, 1983, the court authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.
Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the return of her share in the
lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably (in a friendly and peaceable manner), Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a
complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to
include Vicente Reyes as one of the defendants.
Respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it
was duly approved by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable and should it be annulled in its entirety or
only with respect to the share of the spouse who did not give consent.
HELD:
First Isue
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code,[29] the governing laws at the time the assailed sale was contracted,
provide:
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court
may compel her to grant the same
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent; express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable.
Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not

null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or
encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Second Issue
The trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its entirety.
The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that the plain meaning attached to the plain language of
the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wifes consent, may be
annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. To be underscored here is
that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal partnership is even
subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered, if it
turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should have no exclusive property or if it be insufficient.
These are the considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are
reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent
of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of
prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community) property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition as
void if done without the conjointconsent of the spouses or, in case of a spouses inability, the authority of the
court (footnote).

Pelayo vs Perez 141323 : June 8, 2005

FACTS:
In January 1988, David Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale, conveyed to Melki Perez 2 parcels of agricultural
rd
land situated in Panabo. Lorenza, Pelayos wife, signed only on the 3 page in the space provided for
witnesses on account of which Perez application for registration of the deed with the office of the Register of
st
nd
Deeds in Tagum was denied. Perez thereupon asked Lorenza to sign the 1 and 2 pages of the deed but
she refused, hence, he instituted an action for specific performance against her and her husband David
Pelayo.
SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space
provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A
wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set
forth in any particular document, so long as it is given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of
the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution
of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and
consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on
January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of
conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has been held that
the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose
consent was not obtained.

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG
BRANCH, Respondent.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage.
Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for
the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of
the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued
in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being
redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10,
1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband
nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the
proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the defense
that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.
PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffsappellees own acts, mission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches (unreasonable delay in asserting a claim), abandonment and prescription.
RTC - Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without Aguetes consent. Aguete may, during their marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her husband
entered into without her consent, especially in the present case where her consent is required.

CA Granted PNBs appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial courts decision, and dismissed
petitioners complaint.
The appellate court stated that the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it was improper
for the trial court to rely solely on Aguetes testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were forged.
The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full
consent.
Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros loan, the appellate court ruled that the
conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The
records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the familys business. Therefore, the
debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE:

HELD: We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.

The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or
from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the
husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of
legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court
may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the

courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguetes marriage. Ros and Aguete
were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no
doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October
1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros
mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the
loan and also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents.
Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved.18 The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot
be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.26]
For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

MUNOZ, JR. v. CARLOS G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010

FACTS:
seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong
City in the name of Erlinda Ramirez married to Eliseo Carlos,
Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlindas consent, to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan. The respondents
then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot.
Subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.
Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that
there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioners
name were falsified.

Respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a
first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00[10] advance to cancel the GSIS
mortgage, and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to
give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled,
and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property; with the
P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27[11] to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;
in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseos affidavit,
unsigned; since Eliseos affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and
to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance; since Erlinda could not
return the P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title;
and in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioners name, cancelling TCT
No.1427 in their name.
Petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject
property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying
capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was with the implied promise to
repurchase within one year,[13] during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents
would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of P500.00;[14] when the respondents failed to
repurchase the subject property within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in
his name on July 14, 1993.
The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject property
since it was registered in Erlindas name; the residential lot was part of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro
Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlindas parents.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal property.
HELD:
In determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the
Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or
efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting
increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property
of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary
deductions. From April 6, 1989[42] to April 30, 1992,[43] Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,[44] not the entire
amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27[45] paid by
Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is
fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76
amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted
with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents.

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements
on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness
to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground
that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining
lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on
July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. What is apparent from the facts of the case is that the judgment debt was contracted by
or in the name of the Corporation Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only signed as surety
thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondent-appellants right of recourse against appelleehusband as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal
partnership of gains of the family of petitioners-appellees.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably anticipate were
the following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his
monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated
through the loan obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should PBM survive
because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one
directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.

The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole advancement and benefit of Philippine
Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit extended by respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt
granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely signing as surety. While such petitioner-appelleehusband, as such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code
provisions is specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for which the
husband is liable may not be charged against conjugal partnership properties. Article 122 of the Family Code
is explicit The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by

the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for
the benefit of the family.
-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of
the loan itself.
-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the value of stocks might have
been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was entered into
are not only incidental but also speculative and too small to qualify the transaction as one for the benefit of
the suretys family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor corporation), only because said
husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits are not the benefits contemplated by
Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The benefits contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family
Code) are those benefits derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate
loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.
CHING VS CA
Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso
loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together with 2
other persons executed a continuing guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos. PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges
amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied
the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of
Mr. Ching then moved to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were
acquired by her and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp Investment
Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
ISSUE:
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of CityCorp
Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the burden of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized
in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to adduce evidence to
prove this assertion. In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise
of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or
was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby
embarked in the business of guaranty or suretyship.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must
be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can be inferred that when a
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited.
Private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the
PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latte

It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of the top 20
stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be
rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that Alfredos career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of
the Civil Code (Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot
merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC v CA).
CLEODIA U. FRANCISCO and CEAMANTHA U. FRANCISCO, represented by their grandmother v.
SPOUSES JORGE C. GONZALES and PURIFICACION W. GONZALES
FACTS:
Estranged couple Cleodualdo and Michele, whose marriage was later on voided, entered into a compromise
agreement involving their property covered by TCT No. T-167907 and located at 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang
Village where they agreed that said conjugal property shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation in
favor of their 2 minor children when they reach they reach 19 and 18, respectively. Meanwhile, Michele and
George Matrai were ordered by the court to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay back rentals,
unpaid telephone bills and attorneys fees. A notice of sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff
covering the property in 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang that was still under the name of Cleodualdo and
Michele.
ISSUE:

HELD:
It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was being made to answer was
incurred by Michele and her partner, Matrai. Gonzales alleged that the lease of the property in Lanka Drive
redounded to the benefit of the family. By no stretch of ones imagination can it be concluded that the said
debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or that some advantage accrued to
the welfare to the family.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to deliver the needed sum;
when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or
when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances means
that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wifes personal obligation.
To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going against the
spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of
the family as a unit.
It is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in
Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack
of legal basis.

What is the conjugal partnership of gains?

Oftentimes referred to as the CPG, it is one of the property relations between the spouses, under which the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses
shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. In other words,
the following are placed in a common fund:
1. the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties; and
2. those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.
In what instances shall the regime of CPG apply?
It applies only when the future spouses agree to it in the marriage settlement, if any. It also applies to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of the Family
Code, without prejudice to vested rights. This is the default property relationship under the Civil Code, which
was changed to that of absolute community of property under the Family Code.
When does the CPG begin?
It begins at the precise moment when the marriage is celebrated, exactly like in absolute community of
property.
Can a spouse waive his/her share in the community property during marriage?
No. Except in case of judicial separation of property, any waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute
community of property during the marriage can be made.
Are the rules on ordinary partnership applicable to the conjugal partnership of gains?
As a rule, yes, but only if not in what is expressly provided in the pertinent provisions of the Family Code or
by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
What are the exclusive property of each spouse?
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title (through pure liberality, as in donation
and testate/intestate succession);

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only
one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
What is the significance of having an exclusive property?
The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. A
spouse may also mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without
the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the
other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the
property is located. However, the alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other
automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be
turned over to the owner-spouse.
What properties belong to the conjugal partnership?
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as
well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the
property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to
the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses
therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
What is the presumption regarding properties acquired during marriage?
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
What is the rule in case of purchase by installment?
Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the
conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership.
What is the rule in case a spouse has a credit payable to him over time?
Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums
which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be

the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall
belong to the conjugal partnership.
What is the rule if improvements are made on that exclusive property using conjugal funds or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses?
The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall
pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
1. When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value
are MORE than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
2. When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value
are LESS than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall remain with
the owner-spouse.
3. In either case, the owner-spouse or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, is entitled to
reimbursement for the value of the principal property or the improvement, as the case may be.
4. It doesnt matter if the improvements are for utility or adornment.
What are the charges upon and obligations of the conjugal partnership?
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however,
the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of the Family Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the
other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity
for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children
for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity
for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
What are the rules concerning personal debts contracted before or during the marriage?
1. As a rule, the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership properties.
2. However, these debts shall be charged to the conjugal partnership properties insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family.
3. If the spouse has no exclusive property, it may be charged to the conjugal partnership, subject to the
provisions below.
What are the rules concerning fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed on each spouse?
These cannot be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
charges/obligations enumerated in above have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
What is the rule in case of winnings or losses in gambling?
Any loss incurred by a spouse during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any
other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by that spouse, and shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership. Any winnings, on the other hand, shall form part of the conjugal
partnership property.
Who has the authority to administer the conjugal partnership property?
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Can either spouse make donations of conjugal partnership property?
As a rule, neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other.
However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
When does the conjugal partnership terminate?
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage.
Does the separation in fact or de facto separation between the spouses affect the conjugal
partnership?
No. However, the following are the effects:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have
the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other
spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latters share.
What is the rule if a spouse abandons the other?
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family
(referring to marital, parental or property relations), the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
What is the applicable procedure in the event of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime?
The following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or
for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them.

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used
for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in
this Family Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
If a spouse dies, how is the conjugal partnership liquidated?
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the
same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse.
What happens if the foregoing procedure in the immediately preceding paragraph is not carried out?
If the procedure on liquidation, as outlined above, is not followed: (a) any disposition or encumbrance
involving conjugal partnership property by the surviving spouse shall be void; and (b) any subsequent
marriage shall be governed by the mandatory regime of complete separation of property.
How is support charged during the liquidation?
From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during
the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.