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Raymond Jones, Pro Per

Anne Jones, Pro Per
123 Shadylane Road
Sunnydale, California
reyfJones@mymail.com
714-123-0000

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ORANGE COUNTY

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Raymond Jones and

Anne Jones

CASE NO.: ____________________

Plaintiffs,

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vs.

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VERIFIED PETITION TO QUIET TITLE

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,
REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Maplaqua ASSET MANAGEMENT and all
persons of entities unknown, claiming any legal or Assigned to Honorable:__________
equitable right, title, estate, lien or interest in the
property described in this complaint adverse to
Plaintiffs' title, or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' title
thereto and DOES 1 through 25

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Defendants

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Come now Plaintiffs Raymond Jones and Anne Jones, people of the United States, in the

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above-entitled Court of Record being duly sworn do depose and complain of Defendants,

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JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. of New York, and Maplaqua Asset Management et al, and

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herein Pray for relief by way of a Decree and or Order granting Plaintiffs QUIET TITLE to the

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subject real property as described herein as against all Defendants. Plaintiffs have read this

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Complaint and the other documents, attached hereto, and are familiar with their contents. Plaintiffs

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are informed and believe the information contained in these documents is true.

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THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffs Raymond Francisco Jones and Anne Marie Jones, husband and wife,

hereinafter also referred to as Plaintiffs were living in the State of California at all times

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relevant to the Complaint and property located at 1234 Maplaqua Drive, Dana Point, California

92629 identified by Tax ID Number 123-253-12 (Property).

2.

The legal description of the Property is in the City of Dana Point, Lot 12 in Block 7

of Tract No. 123, as per map recorded in Book 26, Page 2 of miscellaneous maps, in the office of

the County Recorder of County of Orange, State of California.

3.

Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WAMU) was the beneficiary of a Deed of Trust

recorded against the subject property in Orange County, California, on August 22, 2006,

Instrument # 1106000558762.

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4.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, (JPMorgan) Defendant, putative buyer of the assets of

WAMU is not named on the Note or Deed of Trust.

5.

Maplaqua Asset Management, Defendant, was the beneficiary of a Deed of Trust

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recorded against the subject property in Orange County, California, on June 11, 2012, Instrument

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# 2012000304044.

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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

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6.

This Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction over the matters related to the

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emergency, injunctive, provisional, and equitable relief sought herein, pursuant to the

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agreements of the parties referenced below, and, as the real property, subject of the instant action

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is located in this county. (Cal. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 760.040(a)).

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7.

The deed of trust transactions were originated within Orange County, California.

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8.

The parties herein are subject to certain contractual obligations that are the subject

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of this litigation.
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE

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9.

The Real Property (hereinafter the property) the subject of any and all claims of

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any of the Parties hereto, and which is the subject of this instant action, of which Plaintiffs pray

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for a Decree and/or Order of Quiet Title thereto, is legally described including its street address,

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within the Property Securitization Analysis Report which is attached hereto and incorporated

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by reference herein as Attachment (1). (Cal. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 761.020(a)).
PROCUREMENT OF CHAIN OF TITLE EXHIBITS

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10.

A current Property Securitization Analysis Report and Title Report have been

procured by Plaintiffs and is incorporated by reference herein, and made available for inspection,

use and copying by any and all of the Parties hereto, and designated as Attachment (1). (Cal.

Code of Civ. Proc. Sec. 762.040(b)).

DATE OF DETERMINATION

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Plaintiffs herein request that the date of the judicial determination sought be that of

the date of the filing of the instant Complaint. (Cal. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 761.020(d)).

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RESCISSION AND REVOCATION OF DEED OF TRUST BY GRANTORS

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12. As a preliminary affirmation, Plaintiffs herein represent that the Deed of Trust

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(DOT) dated August 15, 2006, has been revoked, canceled and rescinded by trustors,

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Raymond Francisco Jones and Anne Marie Jones, as to subject real property, due to failure by

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Washington Mutual Bank, FB (WAMU) to execute and accept the DOT (non-acceptance is

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non-agreement) and due to its failure to perform (no receipt was issued for Plaintiffs' deposited

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note/security instrument; no acknowledgment of liability1 by WAMU for Plaintiffs' deposited

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security was issued to grantors) and further, for lack of delivery acknowledgment by the

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beneficiary Washington Mutual Bank, FB or its agent. The beneficiary must accept and

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acknowledge delivery of a deed of trust and must issue a receipt for Grantors' security. Should it

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fail to do so, the DOT is void and the Trustors/Grantors have the power and the duty to revoke

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the unexecuted, unaccepted and void DOT lest they acquiesce to fraud and theft. (See Exhibit 1,

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Revocation of DOT recorded on 3/21/2016, Instrument No.2016000115784 and Exhibit 2, the

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revoked, canceled and rescinded DOT, unexecuted by WAMU, attached). There can be no

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enforcement of a claim where the agreement was never formed and where the putative

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As expert witness Walker Todd, Esq., of the Federal Reserve Bank stated: When a bank accepts bullion, coin,
currency, checks, drafts, promissory notes, or any other similar instruments from customers and deposits or records
the instruments as assets, it must record offsetting liabilities that match the assets that it accepted from
customers. The liabilities represent the amounts that the bank owes the customers, funds accepted from
customers, (my emphasis). (BANK ONE, N.A., v. Harshavardhan and Pratima Dave, Oakland County, MI case
#03-047448-CZ). (See Exhibit 11 Walker Todd Affidavit)

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beneficiary concealed theft and fraud, and failed to accept and failed to perform. WAMU stated

the incorrect amount of the debt: The original debt was actually zero because borrowers

financial asset was exchanged for FED promissory notes in an even exchange, as confirmed

by the Federal Reserve Bank2 in its publication Modern Money Mechanics. It must be noted

that an exchange is NOT a loan. This is further confirmed by the sworn testimony of

Walker Todd, expert witness, cited herein, that the borrower's deposited note/security is a

liability of the bank owed to the borrower. Additionally, the Legal-Dictionary defines the term

signature as, A mark or sign made by an individual on an instrument or document to signify

knowledge, approval, acceptance, or obligation. In light of WAMU's misrepresentation, (an

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exchange is NOT a loan), and its failure to issue a receipt (theft), Plaintiffs' did not have

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knowledge of WAMU's failure to lend/theft at the time the purported loan, and therefore, do not

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approve, or accept the falsely represented obligation, and, therefore the rescission of their

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signatures upon the Note and DOT is legal, lawful and appropriate. Moreover, due to

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WAMU's fraud, the contract (Note and DOT) is void. There is no question of the general

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doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. United

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States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (, 25 L.Ed. 93)

13. For a promissory note to be a negotiable instrument, under UCC Article 3, it must

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comply with specific statutory requirements. The note must be an unconditional promiseto

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pay a fixed amount of money UCC 3-104 (a). The note must be payable on demand or at a

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definite time UCC 3-104(a)(2) and not contain additional undertakings by the obligor

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persuant to UCC 3-104(a)(3). And finally, the note must be payable to bearer or order when

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first issued UCC 3-104(a)(1). Therefore, mere possession of the note does not entitle JPMorgan

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the right to enforcement.

14.

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A deed of trust is presumed to be a valid agreement provided there is no evidence of

defect, or fraud, such as fraud in the factum or in the inducement. In this case however, WAMU
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What they [banks] do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the
borrowers transaction accounts. Loans (assets) and deposits (liabilities) both rise... Modern Money Mechanics,
page 6.

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failed to execute the DOT, failed to issue a receipt for Plaintiffs' deposited security, a theft of

said security, thereby rendering the DOT void ab initio. Further, WAMU securitized and sold the

Note to WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, which it passed to LaSalle Bank,

NA, Trustee of WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006 AR17 Trust. WAMU

cannot object to this rescission, or bring suit to enforce the DOT: as of September 2008, WAMU

is no longer in business. WAMU no longer exists. Thus, although pursuant to RegZ the

rescission must be within 3 years of the loan (automatic), under Equitable Tolling,3 and upon

newly discovered evidence of wrong-doing cited herein, the clock stopped on September 2008,

prior to the 3 year limit, when WAMU went out of business. Thus, time stopped running as of

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the date of the WAMUs dissolution, and will not start again as there is no bonafide holder of the

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assignment (there is no assignment) and note (which is now discharged). JPMorgan, after Notice

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and Opportunity, failed to rebut, failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Notices of Counterfeit Security,

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and thereby admitted that it is not the lawful holder, and is without authority to foreclose, (see

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Exhibit 5). Pursuant to U.S. v. Tweel, JPMorgan had a duty to answer, as Silence can only be

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equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left

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unanswered would be intentionally misleading. U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297

15.

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JPMorgan is not named in the DOT or in the Note; it is not the beneficiary, has

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failed to record or show any assignment from WAMU, is without lawful possession of the Note,

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without a chain of title, failed to respond to Plaintiffs' Notices of Counterfeit Security (see

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attached Exhibit 5), as well as the Revocation of the DOT, (see Exhibit 1), and has thereby lost

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any claim it could make. JPMorgan is without standing or authority to object to the rescission or

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to foreclose. Plaintiffs' rescission was executed, recorded and delivered to Defendant, JPMorgan,

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to give notice that the DOT was void from its inception. Since WAMU never executed the DOT

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and is now out of business, it cannot object to rescission by Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs have the

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power to revoke their signatures from a document unexecuted by any other, and, in which

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Equitable Tolling: Function: noun: a doctrine or principle of tort law: a statute of limitations will not bar a claim if
despite use of due diligence the plaintiff did not or could not discover the injury until after the expiration of the
limitations period.

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Plaintiffs were misled and became the victims of WAMU's fraudulent conversion. This

rescission has no expiration. It can only be removed by (a) a proper pleading, and (b) proof that

said rescission should be canceled and removed from the chain of title. There is no lawsuit

required to make rescission of a clearly void unexecuted contract effective. There is no tender

required. There are no conditions whatsoever, (see Jesinoski v. Countrywide (SCOTUS).) It is

effective as a matter of law, and if recorded, remains a permanent impediment to any subsequent

instrument claiming clear title in any instrument executed or recorded after the rescission was

sent or recorded. The time limit is set on the bank, not on the borrower. It is set by statute at Title

15, Chapter 41, Subchapter I, Part B, 1635, as 20 days from receipt of rescission (which was

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delivered to JPMorgan in court on March 28, 2016, over four months ago). JPMorgan was

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required to (1) comply or (2) file suit to vacate or cancel the rescission. This is a burden on the

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bank, not the borrower. To construe the statute any other way would be to violate the terms of

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the statute and to violate the specific explicit instructions from the U.S. Supreme Court. Any

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decision or ruling that the bank or creditor could contest after 20 days would mean that the

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rescission is not effective when recorded and mailed as set forth by the Statute and Jesinoski.

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Such a ruling would mean that the rescission is not effective by operation of law; it would mean

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that the rescission is effective ONLY if and when the bank files suit to vacate or cancel the

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rescission and loses. To say that the rescission is not effective until there is a lawsuit is contrary

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to law and precedent. Rescission therefore is a fact and not a claim, pleading or defense. The

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Note and DOT were rendered VOID by operation of law and as specifically stated in Reg Z

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which carries the full force of law. It follows that the void instrument (i.e. the subject deed of

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trust) must be removed from the chain of title as a void instrument. Hence quiet title is

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appropriate.

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To quiet title in itself, the plaintiff must prove it has title to the property which is

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superior to the title claims of all other persons with an interest in the property. Beaulah Hoagland

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Appleton Qualifed Pers Residence Trust v Emmet County Rd Commn, 236 Mich App 546, 600

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NW2d 698 (1999). Once plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the defendants must prove a superior

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right or title. Beaulah Hoagland, supra. The court reviews the whole situation and grants or

withholds relief as good conscience dictates. Republic Bank v Modular One LLC, 232 Mich

App 444, 591 NW2d 335 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Stokes v Millen Roofing Co,

466 Mich 660, 649 NW2d 371 (2002). California Code of Civil Procedure 761.020 specifically

states what must be pled for a quiet title claim. Because the complaint is verified, the answer

must also be verified (a verified answer cannot contain a general denial, all allegations must be

specifically admitted, denied, or denied for lack of information and belief). California Code

of Civil Procedure 761.030 specifically states what must be pled by a defendant in an answer.

Defendants must prove a superior right or title, and, in this case, must prove from the record that

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they are not estopped (estoppel by silence) from arguing pursuant to their defaults (Notice of

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Counterfeit Securities, exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8), and the Revocation of DOT (see exhibit 1).
PROMISSORY NOTE SECURITIZATION

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17.

Plaintiffs herein allege, without confirming the existence or validity thereto, that

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any and all Debt, Loan(s), and or Promissory Note(s) relative to and which, allegedly, have been

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secured by any Security, alleged Secured Instrument, and or alleged Deed of Trust

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(DOT) referenced herein have been fully and completely Securitized, and Sold, Assigned,

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and/or Transferred into an investment and or Securitized Investment Trust or Pool, i.e. WAMU

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Mortgage Pass-Through Certifiates Series 2006-AR17 Trust, and, as such, by way of the legal

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relief sought herein, any and all Rights, Title, and or Interests to the property, allegedly held by

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any of the named or unknown Defendants herein has been extinguished, relinquished, discharged

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and or detached as to any and all Security, alleged Secured Instrument, or DOTs

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referenced herein.

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ABSENCE OF ANY PROMISSORY NOTE OR VALID HOLDER THEREOF

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Plaintiffs herein allege that there exists absolutely no Debt, Loan(s), and or

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Promissory Note(s) or Mortgage relative to, hypothecated, or that which pertains to subject

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property, nor is there in existence any individual or entity who could or might claim to be a

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holder in due course of any such Debt, Loan(s), and or Promissory Note(s) or Mortgage. As

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such, no named or unknown entity or individual could present a claim Adverse or otherwise as to

any Rights, Title or Interest in the subject property. The term holder is defined as An

individual who has lawfully received possession of a Commercial Paper, such as a check, and

who is entitled to payment on such instrument. As there is no assignment or other evidence of

record that shows defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., lawfully received possession and is

entitled to payment, it may not be presumed that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is the holder of the

subject note.

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19.

That JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not comply with the terms of the Purchase

and Assumption Agreement, and did not acquire title to the subject note and DOT is clear from

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the Property Securitization Analysis Report, page 15, which quotes the P&A Agreement at

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Article IX, paragraph 9.2 Additional Title Documents, The Assuming Bank shall prepare such

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instruments and documents of conveyance (in form and substance satisfactory to the Receiver) as

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shall be necessary to vest title to the Assets in the Assuming Bank. The Assuming Bank shall be

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responsible for recording such instruments and documents of conveyance at its own expense.

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The Property Securitization Analysis Report (Attachment 1) concludes by stating that

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JPMorgan Chase Bank made no such transfer of title in County records in apparent concealment

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of any effective gain from its bargain purchase. Thus, there is no evidence of record that title to

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the subject note and DOT ever vested in JPMorgan Chase Bank. As there is no assignment or

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other evidence of record that shows defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., lawfully received

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possession and is entitled to payment, it may not be presumed that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

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is the lawful holder of the subject note, even if it were to produce such an instrument.

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ASSIGNED; TRASFERRED; SOLD

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ANY AND ALL DEBT; LOAN(S); PROMISSORY NOTE(S)

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20.

Plaintiffs herein allege, based upon information and belief, without confirming the

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existence or validity thereto, that any and all alleged Debt, Loan(s), and or Promissory Note(s),

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allegedly pertaining to, and or hypothecated by any of the Security, Secured Instruments,

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and or DOTs as referenced herein, have in fact been Sold, Assigned, and/or Transferred. The

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Selling, Assigning, and/or Transferring of such Debt, Loan(s), and or Promissory Note(s),

without confirming the existence or validity thereto, was effectuated previously thereto,

concurrently therewith, and or subsequent to the execution, creation or making of any of the

Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs, as referenced herein as follows:

As to the Adjustable Rate Note Account No.3010622854-077,

from: Washington Mutual Bank, FSB (WAMU) (prior to WAMU's Receivership),

to:

WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

to:

WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR17 Trust.

SATISFACTION OF THE TERMS & PROVISIONS OF ALL SECURITY,

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SECURED INSTRUMENTS AND OR DEEDS OF TRUST

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21.

Plaintiffs herein allege, based upon information and belief, that the terms and

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provisions of any and all Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs, as referenced

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herein, specifically dictate, state and possess the enumerated condition that subject Security,

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Secured Instruments, and or DOTs, will only remain valid, enforceable, and in full force and

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effect until all sums have been paid in full, and, when satisfied, shall require a full recon-

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veyance. By virtue of the fact that any and all alleged Debt, Loan(s) and or Promissory Note(s),

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without confirming the existence or validity thereto, and allegedly pertaining to, relative to,

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and/or hypothecated by any of the Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs, as

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referenced herein have in fact been Sold, Assigned, and or Transferred for full value, then as a

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factual result, any and all subject Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs, have in

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fact been fully satisfied. As such, no Named or Unknown individual or entity herein could

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present a claim Adverse as to Plaintiffs' Rights, Title or Interests in the subject property.

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22.

Further, on or about June 15, 2011, defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

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received via Registered Mail, RE 683 173 688 US, a Notice of Tender, (see attached, Exhibit 3),

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of registered instrument (UCC filing number 117266961160) in the amount of $2,818,000.00,

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sent by Paul Charles Bird, Sr., Notary Public and third party witness, to set off JPMorgan

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account #3010622854. After notice and opportunity to rebut, or to declare a defect, this fact has

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remained undisputed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

23.

Pursuant to Public Law 73-10, United States Public Policy at House Joint

Resolution, (HJR) 192 of June 5, 1933, and 31 U.S.C. 3123, said tendered instrument is an

obligation (debt) of the United States (12 U.S.C. 411 and 18 U.S.C. 8); Geneva Convention,

Article 75; and United Nations (UNCITRAL) Convention on International Bills of Exchange

and International Promissory Notes, Articles 2-10, 12, 13, 36, 39, (46)3, 47, & 55. Regarding

SATISFACTION OF LIABILITIES, said registered instrument stated that, The PAYEE may

demand payment of all or any portion hereof at its discretion by posting the payment to the

Private Offset Account above-indicated dollar-for-dollar and transferring the obligation by

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TT&L or presentment to: Timothy F. Geithner (Secretary), Secretary of the Treasury, U.S.

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Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220.

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Further, said registered instrument stated that The PAYEE shall have ten (10) days

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from presentment to dishonor this bond by returning it to the Principal by registered mail at the

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exact mailing location shown below. Failure to return this bond will stipulate acceptance and

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honor.

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25. On or about September 23, 2011, Paul Charles Bird, Sr., Notary Public and third

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party witness, executed and sent his Notice of Administrative Judgment to Michael J.

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Cavanaugh, JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 270 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017,

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stipulating that JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA had consented by non-response to the Notice of

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Default in Dishonor, Consent to Judgment, presented on July 22, 2011; that the aforesaid

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instrument to setoff was accepted and not returned. Said Notice of Administrative Judgment was

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recorded on 01/09/2012 at the Pinal County, Arizona, Recorder's office, record #2012-001607.

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(See attached Exhibit 4, Notice of Administrative Judgment). Absent a timely rebuttal of record,

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Defendants and this court may not contest or ignore the fact of record that JPMorgan has by its

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silence acquiesced and accepted the Notice of Default in Dishonor, Consent to Judgment,

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thereby acquiescing to the fact that it received the registered instrument in the amount of

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$2,818,000.00, sent by Paul Charles Bird, Sr., Notary Public, and failed to return it.

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26.

Private Instrument (International Bill of Exchange) No. RFM-20160011952 valued

at $1,146,499.85, credited to the order of the United States Treasury, for further credit to

JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., was also tendered in full settlement, discharge, and closure of a

claim brought without proof of standing by putative Creditor, JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., in

Bankruptcy Case No.8:12-bk-22571 MW, against Raymond F Jones. This private instrument was

sent by Registered Mail and received by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of

California for settlement of said claim in Case/Account No.8:12-bk-22571 MW. This private

instrument was tendered in good faith for the release of all associated property/collateral in

accordance with Uniform Commercial Law Article 3-603 and according to international law

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and treaty law (UNCITRAL Convention). This International Bill Of Exchange Negotiable

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Instrument credited to the order of the United States Treasury was delivered to a court of the

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United States is an obligation of the United States, under Title 18, USC (Part 1- Chapter 1-,

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Sec. 1, Sec. 8) and, as such is legal and lawful tender for all debts public and private. (See

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Notice of Tender filed on April 15, 2016 as Exhibit 12).

MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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27.

Each and all of the foregoing pleadings are to be by reference incorporated here as

though stated in full.

28. Plaintiffs, Raymond and Anne Jones, are the record title holder of the real property

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located at 1234 Maplaqua Drive, Dana Point, California 92629 which is now being threatened by

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Defendants, with imminent fraudulent foreclosure, causing irreparable injury, and therefore

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move this court for injunctive and declaratory relief.

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29. Plaintiffs will continue to be in jeopardy injury by the Defendants wrongful

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conduct by the now threatened foreclosure sale irrevocably damaging Plaintiffs by denying them

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the right to maintain the status quo between the parties pending resolution of the present dispute.

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30.

For these reasons, it is essential that the Court immediately and temporarily restrain

Defendants from continuing with the conduct described in this petition. It is essential that the

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Court act immediately, prior to notice on the Defendant and a hearing on the matter, because

Defendant intends to sell the property at foreclosure.

31. Further, for the reasons stated in this pleading, the Plaintiffs request that, after

hearing on a temporary restraining order that Defendants and/or its agents, be enjoined from

prosecuting any continuance of a foreclosure sale of the subject property pending a trial on the

merits of this case.

32. Raymond and Anne Jones will suffer irreparable harm by denial of this preliminary

injunction. Raymond and Anne Jones will suffer insult, degradation, and deprivation of

personhood by denial of this preliminary injunction.

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33. The record shows the undisputed revocation of the void (never formed) deed of

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trust; the record shows the unrebutted default in dishonor and consent to judgment by defendant

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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (See exhibits 5, 6, 7). Thus, Raymond and Anne Jones are likely to

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prevail in the above styled action. The evidence of record submitted by Plaintiffs and attached

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third party supporting affidavits make Raymond Jones averments undeniable.

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34. Public interest will not be impaired by granting this preliminary injunction. The

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public interest will be gravely impaired by denial of Raymond and Anne Jones's preliminary

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injunction by public awareness that citizens can be victimized by wrongful foreclosures.

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35. Raymond and Anne Jones have no other remedy at law to effect protection from

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threatened wrongful foreclosure. The injuries and losses are continuing. The Plaintiffs real

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property residence and rights involved are utterly unique and irreplaceable, so that it will be

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impossible to accurately measure, in monetary terms, the damages caused by the Defendants

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wrongful conduct.

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36. Denial of Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction will cause Raymond and Anne Jones to

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bear a greatly unbalanced harm. J.P. Morgan Chase Banks harm would be delayed possession of

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property to which it has no right. Raymond and Anne Joness harm will be loss of property,

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damage to reputation and character and assault on personhood. Denial of Raymond and Anne

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Joness preliminary injunction goes beyond economic injury. Subject property was custom

designed and built by Plaintiff himself.

37. The cost to the court on error later corrected to the favor of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank

is not as great as the cost to the Court for error later corrected to Raymond and Anne Jones

favor.

38. Granting Raymond Jones Motion for Preliminary Injunction conserves the

property(s) no matter who prevails. Denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction would

deny Plaintiffs due process, impair their right to recover Plaintiffs' securities which, pursuant to

12 USC 1813, are liabilities of alleged assignee, and would reduce matters to the status of a bell

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which cannot be un-rung.

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ADMISSION BY JPMORGAN, BY DEFAULT, THAT IT IS NOT THE

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HOLDER/CREDITOR ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE NOTE

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39. On September 27, 2013, Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, and CEO, Jaime

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Dimon, were served with Plaintiff's Notice of Counterfeit Security and Other Violations of

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Federal Law and Statement of Facts, (see attached Exhibit 5, recorded at Lamar County

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Georgia, Superior Court, BPA Book 30, pages 456), along with an Accounting and True Bill

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in the amount of $2,181,000 (treble damages) with regard to Plaintiff's property at 1234

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Maplaqua, Dana Point, California 92629. On October 4, 2013, Defendant, JPMorgan Chase

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Bank, was served with a Notice of Fault, Opportunity to Cure With Regard to Your Counterfeit

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Securities, (see attached Exhibit 6). On October 16, 2013, Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank,

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was served with a Notice of Final Default With Regard to Your Counterfeit Securities, (see

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attached Exhibit 7). By its default J.P. Morgan Chase Bank has agreed that J.P. Morgan Chase

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Bank: is not a 'Real Party in Interest,' has failed to prove that it is a 'creditor,' or a party with an

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interest in the property; (there are no notes and no assignments of record); has failed to record

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(upon the county record) the deed(s) of trusts, or, to bring forward said notes or other

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evidence that it actually acquired said notes: has failed to establish that it is the owner and

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holder of the note(s), which includes proving that it is a party in interest with an interest in the

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13

property(s); has failed to show it is the beneficiary under the deed(s) of trust, or, that it has any

authority to make a claim against Raymond Jones and Anne Jones. (See exhibit 5, paragraph

21).

40.

Plaintiff, Raymond Francisco Jones, executed on November 8, 2013, his Affidavit

of Acceptance Agreement and Accord, attesting to the aforesaid default by J.P. Morgan Chase

Bank. (See attached Exhibit 8), with Due Presentment dated November 9, 2013, executed by

third party witness, Paul Charles Bird, Sr., Notary Public.)

41.

Further, DEFENDANTs LACKS LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE ORIGINAL

TANGIBLE ARTICLE 3 PROMISSORY NOTE ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS

10

PRECEDENT TO ENFORCE AN ALTERNATE MEANS OF COLLECTION IN

11

ACCORDANCE WITH UCC 3-308 & U.C.C. 7-501:

12

42.

Plaintiffs herein allege that Defendants have not acquired the original tangible

13

U.C.C. 3 Promissory Note by proper negotiation in a regular course of business, as required

14

pursuant to UCC 7-501.

15

43.

Plaintiffs herein allege that they are not the account Debtor associated to [any]

16

Loan(s), and or Promissory Note(s) or hypothecated Security, Security Instruments, and or

17

Deed of Trust, relative to any and all purported perfected Rights, Title, and or Interests to the

18

Subject Real Property purportedly held by any of the Named or Un-Known Defendants.

19

44.

Defendants Named or Un-Known without confirming the existence or validity

20

thereto purport a perfected interest to [all] alleged Debt, Loan(s) and or Promissory Note(s),

21

allegedly pertaining to a hypothecated Security, Secured Instrument(s), and or Deed of

22

Trust encumbering Plaintiffs' Real Property by way of claims of being a holder with rights

23

over the original U.C.C. 3 Tangible Note; purportedly verifiable by a purchase and sale

24

agreement; transfer receipt, delivery receipt, and a bond if the Note was allegedly negotiated

25

indorsed in blank, a receipt of funds for the purchase of the Note(s), and a disbursement of funds

26

for the acquisition of the Note(s).

27

45.

Plaintiffs herein allege Defendants Named or Un-Known do not have nor can

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produce these business records to substantiate a proof of claim for the instant action, and are

estopped (estoppel by silence) from arguing the matter as Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank

has waived its right to do so. (See Administrative process and default, exhibits 5, 6, 7, and 8).

4
5
6

46.

Plaintiffs herein allege the Named and Un-known defendants are parties to a 26

U.S. Code 1031 - Exchange of property held for productive use or investment.
47.

Plaintiffs herein alleges their signatures on the U.C.C. 3 instrument as

accommodation party constitute a statutory capacity as surety for the (Non Depository Payor

Bank) WAMU, the original secured party of record accommodated party acting as Trustee/

Account Debtor in a Special Deposit 26 U.S. Code 1031 - Exchange of property held for

10
11

productive use or investment.

48.

Plaintiffs herein allege prior to the cut-off date of the (SPV) the (Non Depository

12

Payor Bank) executed a statutory conversion of the tangible U.C.C. 3 Promissory Note into a

13

U.C.C. 8 transferable record or eNote/Smart Note electronic chattel paper for the purpose of

14

bifurcating the payment intangible from the U.C.C. 3 Tangible Promissory Note to be securitized

15

in accordance with the Special Deposit 26 U.S. Code 1031 Exchange of property held for

16

productive use or investment.

17

49.

Plaintiff(s) herein alleges that in WAMU's bifurcation the U.C.C. 8 payment

18

tangible through conversion of U.C.C. 3 Instrument rendered that U.C.C. 3 Instrument less than

19

full value.

20

50.

Plaintiffs herein allege the Special Purpose Vehicle Trust (SPV) purportedly

21

accepted delivery of the tangible U.C.C. 3 Note for a Service Release Premium; settlement on

22

fees for WAMU's services rendered as Accommodated Party/Account Debtor in a Special

23

Deposit 26 U.S. Code 1031 - Exchange of property held for productive use or investment and

24

not in a regular course of business by operation of law.

25

51.

Plaintiffs herein allege that the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation

26

secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security

27

interest or lien; is not applicable to liens encumbering real property in a Special Deposit 26 U.S.

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15

Code 1031 Exchange of property held for productive use or investment. As the exchange is

not a simultaneous transfer of [all] beneficial interest in the Tangible U.C.C. 3 Promissory Note

for full value or the security securing the Security instrument encumbering real property as

U.C.C. 9 does not secure U.C.C. 8 electronic chattel paper.

52.

Plaintiffs herein allege the ability to accelerate the power of sale to foreclosure

derives from a principal capacity as proper party to enforce the U.C.C. 3 Tangible Note

Obligation.

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9

53.

Plaintiffs herein allege the Named and Un-known defendants are not the proper

party to enforce the Tangible U.C.C. 3 Note in a Special Deposit 26 U.S. Code 1031 -

10

Exchange of property held for productive use or investment and that the (Non Depository Payor

11

Bank) acted beyond their scope as accommodated party and subsequently nullified any statutory

12

capacity of Plaintiffs as guarantors under the Tangible U.C.C. 3 payment obligation.

13

54.

Plaintiffs herein allege Named and Un-known defendants are attempting to

14

foreclose with Unclean Hands on Plaintiffs' Real Property without sufficient authority to do so.

15

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION QUIET TITLE

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Plaintiffs herein incorporate by reference, re-allege, and reassert any and all previous
allegations, facts, and paragraphs.
55. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs Raymond Francisco Jones and Anne Marie

19

Jones, are individuals and residents of the State of California, in and of the County and City

20

where subject property is situated, which is within this Courts Judicial District, and at all times

21

herein relevant to this complaint, Plaintiffs are the true owners of the subject property as

22

described herein, as further evidenced by a Grant Deed naming Plaintiffs as the true & correct

23

title holders, (see Grant Deed, Exhibit 15).

24
25
26
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56.

Pursuant to California Revised Statutes, Plaintiffs will record a Lis-Pendens shortly

after obtaining a case number from the court clerk.

57.

Because the DOT has been split from the note, the former is a nullity and should be

stricken from the public record and chain of title.

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58. Because the Deed of Trust referenced herein has been fully Securitized, and Sold,

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Assigned, and/or Transferred into a Securitized Investment Trust or Pool, i.e. WAMU Mortgage

Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006 AR17 Trust, any and all Rights, Title, and or Interests to

the property has been extinguished, relinquished, and discharged.

59. Because the Deed of Trust (DOT) was never executed or accepted by Washington

Mutual Bank, FB, (non-acceptance is non-agreement), and because WAMU issued no receipt for

Plaintiffs' deposited security instrument, and failed to acknowledge its liability for said deposit

pursuant to 12 USC 1813 4, no valid agreement was ever formed, and the void DOT should be

stricken from the public record and chain of title.

60.

10
11

Maplaqua Asset Management's claim is void as it offered no consideration to

Plaintiffs, required to form an agreement.

61.

12

At least thirty (30) days prior to the institution of this action Plaintiffs tendered and

13

delivered to the Defendants Quit Claim Deeds with respect to the real property described

14

hereinabove, together with the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) for execution and delivery

15

thereof, [pursuant to A.R.S. 12-1103(B)], and requested that each Defendant execute such Quit

16

Claim Deeds (a true and correct copy of the Quit Claim Deeds tendered to Defendants is attached

17

hereto as Exhibit 9).

62.

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Defendants have refused or neglected to execute the Quit Claim Deeds and, as a

result, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the costs of suit and attorneys fees incurred herein.
63.

20

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times relevant

21

hereto Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, is a New York Corporation doing business in the

22

state of California, in and of the County and City where subject property is located, which is

23

within this Courts Judicial District as fully described in Attachment 1.

64.

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25
26
27

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times relevant

As expert witness Walker Todd, Esq., of the Federal Reserve Bank stated: When a bank accepts bullion, coin,
currency, checks, drafts, promissory notes, or any other similar instruments from customers and deposits or records
the instruments as assets, it must record offsetting liabilities that match the assets that it accepted from
customers. The liabilities represent the amounts that the bank owes the customers, funds accepted from
customers, (my emphasis). (BANK ONE, N.A., v. Harshavardhan and Pratima Dave, Oakland County, MI case
#03-047448-CZ). (See Exhibit 11 Walker Todd Affidavit).

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17

hereto, and instant action is an in rem action relative to the subject property which is within the

Judicial District of the above entitled Court, of the County and City where subject property is

situated as fully described herein in Attachment 1.

65.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times relevant

hereto Defendants who are all persons or entities unknown, claiming any legal or equitable

right, title, estate, lien or interest in the property described in this Complaint adverse to Plaintiffs'

title, or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' title thereto are individuals and/or unknown business entities

doing business in the state of California, in the County and City where subject property is

located, which is within this courts Judicial District as fully described in Attachment 1. (Cal.

10
11

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 762.060(a)).

66.

Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities of any individuals and/or

12

entities sued herein under the fictitious names DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, and, as such, Plaintiffs

13

cannot state with any certainty that such a cause of action lies herein as against such individuals

14

or entities, or, Plaintiffs are unable to allege the elements of such Cause of Action at this time,

15

and, as such, said Defendants are herein named in accordance with the provisions of Cal. Code of

16

Civil Proc. Sec. 474. Plaintiffs thereon reserve the right to amend instant Complaint to allege the

17

true names and capacities of such fictitious named Defendants when the same become known, or,

18

when it has been ascertained with reasonable certainty that such Cause of Action hereunder can

19

be satisfactorily stated and maintained as against such fictitious named entity or individual.

20

67.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that in committing certain

21

acts herein alleged, some or all of the Named or Unknown Defendants herein were acting as the

22

Agents, Joint Ventures, Partners, Representatives, Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Associates, Assigns

23

and/or Employees and or Agents of some or all of the other Defendants, and that some or all of

24

the conduct of such Defendants, as complained of herein, were within the course and scope and

25

agency of such relationship.

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68.

On or about October 1, 2004, and subsequent thereto the subject real property, as

fully and legally described herein, was indisputably owned by Raymond and Anne Jones, and,

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thereafter by Plaintiffs, Raymond and Anne Jones, as evidenced by a certain Grant Deed

(instrument No.2004000959268) recorded on October 25, 2004. (See Exhibit 15)

69. That JPMorgan is clearly not the holder of the subject note, is supported by the

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4

sworn testimony of Lawrence Nardi, an officer of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and former officer of

Washington Mutual Bank, who was deposed in J.P. Morgan Chase Bank vs. Sherone D,

Waisome, in Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit for Lake County, Florida and stated (page 261,

line 2): No there is no assignments of mortgage. Theres no allonges. Theres no in the

thousands of loans that I have come into contact with that were a part of this purchase, Ive never

once seen an assignment of mortgage. There is simply not they dont exist; or allonges or

10

anything transferring ownership from WAMU to Chase, in other words. Specifically,

11

endorsements and things like that.5

70.

12

The Substitution of Trustee, (see Exhibit 13) appointing Quality Loan Service

13

Corp., as trustee of the subject deed of trust, is dated 3/13/2009, and signed by Rick Wilken as

14

attorney in fact. However, a sworn affidavit dated 1/10/2013, executed by John O'Brien,

15

Register of Deeds for Essex Massachusetts, (see Exhibit 14), states I am aware that RICK

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WILKEN is an alleged robo or surrogate signer, which said affidavit defines as the person on a

17

legal document processing assembly line whose only task is to sign previously prepared

18

documents affecting title to real property in a robotic-like fashion without reading the documents

19

or verifying the facts contained therein... Additionally, robo-signers regularly fail to establish or

20

simply do not have authority to execute these documents on behalf of the legal title holder or

21

principal on whose behalf they purport to act.

71.

22

Thus, not only was JPMorgan Chase Bank without authority to appoint Quality Loan

23

Service Corp., as trustee, (see Exhibit 13) but it used known robo-signer, Rick Wilken, to support

24

its baseless claim by executing said Substitution of Trustee, without authority.

25

As to any and all Rights, Title, and Interests Re: JPMorgan Chase Bank

26

72.

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Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis, allege, that on or about

http://www.scribd.com/doc/102949976/120509-JPMC-v-Waisome-FL-Lawrence-Nardi-Deposition

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August 15, 2006, Raymond and Anne Jones), at the inception, made, executed and delivered a

document entitled Deed of Trust (hereinafter referred to as the DOT), to Washington Mutual

Bank, FA, (recorded 8/22/06, as Instrument No.2006000558762) as the Trust therein. On or

about April 28, 2009 JPMorgan recorded a Substitution of Trustee naming Quality Loan Service

Corp (Quality) as Successor Trustee to the above DOT, thereafter, on March 16, 2009 Quality

recorded a Notice of Default on the subject property which appears to form the basis of an

alleged Adverse Claim. (see Exhibit 13)

As to any and all Rights, Title, and Interests Re: Maplaqua Asset Management

73.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis, allege, that on or about June

10

2, 2009, Raymond and Anne Jones), made, executed and delivered a document entitled Deed of

11

Trust (hereinafter referred to as the DOT), to Maplaqua Asset Management, (recorded

12

6/11/09, as Instrument No.2009000304044) as the Trust therein, which appears to form the basis

13

of an alleged Adverse Claim.

14

As to any and all Rights, Title, and Interests Re: All Unknown Entities or Individuals

15

74. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis, allege, that at the inception or

16

subsequent to the making, and execution of the previously alleged DOT, Plaintiffs made,

17

executed, and delivered a document entitled Deed of Trust (DOT), to any or all of the

18

Unknown Defendants who are all persons or entities unknown, claiming any legal or equitable

19

right, title, estate, lien or interest in the property described in this Complaint adverse to Plaintiffs'

20

title, or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' title thereto as the Trust therein, which appears to form the

21

basis of an alleged Adverse Claim.

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BASIS FOR RELIEF IN SUPPORT OF QUIET TITLE

23

I. SEVERANCE/BIFURCATION of the Debt & any SECURED INSTRUMENT (DOT)

24

75. As a Direct, Indirect, Legal, and or Proximate result or cause, of any and all

25

aforementioned assignment(s), transfer(s), and/or the sale of any and all Debt, Loan(s) and or

26

Promissory Note(s), without confirming the existence or validity thereto, and, allegedly

27

pertaining to, relative to, and or hypothecated by any Security, Secured Instruments, and or

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20

DOTs as referenced herein, which has in fact been effectuated as referenced above, and, due to

a lack of corresponding assignment (see Lawrence Nardi testimony, paragraph 69, supra) of any

Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs, a Severance and/or Bifurcation of the Debt

and Secured Instrument (DOT) has in fact taken place. As a result, subject Secured

Instrument (DOT) then became Null and Void by Operation of Law. Therefore any and all

Rights, Title and Interests in the subject property, for and on behalf of all Named and Unknown

Defendants has legally been extinguished, terminated, and/or discharged, due to such Secured

Instrument (DOT) having become Null and Void.

76. The well established, longstanding, applicable and relevant California authority

10

establishing such law may be found at California Civil Code Section 2936; U.S. Supreme Court

11

case Carpenter v. Logan, at 83 U.S. 271 (1872); California Supreme Court case Lewis v. Booth

12

at 3 Cal2nd 345 (1935), and California Appellant Court case Domarad v. Fisher & Burke Inc., at

13

270 Cal. App 2nd 543 (1969).

14

II. SATISFACTION OF THE TERMS OF THE SECURED INSTRUMENT (DOT)

15

77.

Additionally and alternatively, as a further Direct, Indirect, Legal, and or Proximate

16

result or cause, of any and all aforementioned assignment(s), transfer(s), and/or the sale for full

17

value of any and all Debt, Loan(s) and or Promissory Note(s), without confirming the existence

18

or validity thereto, and, allegedly pertaining to, relative to, and or hypothecated by any

19

Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs as referenced herein, which has in fact been

20

effectuated or accomplished, then by virtue of the terms and provisions of any and all Security,

21

Secured Instruments, and or DOTs referenced herein, factually there has been full

22

satisfaction. Therefore, any and all Rights, Title and Interests in the subject property, for and on

23

behalf of all Named and Unknown Defendants has legally been extinguished, terminated, and/or

24

discharged. A reconveyance is therefore warranted, and proper.

25

III. NON-COMPLIANCE with the Relative SERVICING & POOLING AGREEMENT

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27

78.

Additionally and alternatively, as a further Direct, Indirect, Legal, and or Proximate

result or cause, of any and all assignment(s), transfer(s), and/or the sale for full value of any and

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21

all Debt, Loan(s) and or Promissory Note(s), without confirming the existence or validity thereto,

and, allegedly pertaining to, relative to, and or hypothecated by any Security, Secured

Instruments, and or DOTs as referenced herein, which has in fact been effectuated or

accomplished into a Securitized or Investment Trust or Pool, as referenced herein, then, by

virtue of the terms and provisions of any related Servicing & Pooling Agreement any and all

Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOTs relevant thereto, factually must have been

handled, assigned, managed and/or controlled by the very directives, mandates, instructions,

provisions and/or terms of said Servicing & Pooling Agreement which in fact were not. There

was, in fact, a Non-Compliance with the terms and provisions of subject Servicing & Pooling

10

Agreement. Therefore, any and all Rights, Title and Interests in the subject property, for and on

11

behalf of all Named and Unknown Defendants has legally been extinguished, terminated, and/or

12

discharged. A reconveyance is therefore warranted, and proper.

13

IV. BY SECURITIZING THE NOTE, CONTRACT WAS MATERIALLY ALTERED

79.

14

By securitizing Plaintiffs' note, (i.e. changing the note from a promise to pay to

15

an order to pay) the agreement (note) was immediately and materially altered by the

16

lender (WAMU) without the knowledge or consent of the borrowers Raymond and Anne

17

Jones.

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A material alteration of a written contract by a party to it discharges a party who

does not authorize or consent to the alteration, because it destroys the identity of the
contract, and substitutes a different agreement for that into which he entered.
Mersman v. Werges and another, 112 U.S. 139, 5 S.Ct. 65, 28 L.Ed. 641 (1884).
V. REVOCATION OF DEED OF TRUST BY GRANTORS FOR GOOD CAUSE
80.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that defendant,

JPMorgan Chase Bank, has no basis for a claim after receipt and acceptance of a Notice of
Tender, (see Exhibit 3), of registered instrument (UCC filing No.117266961160) in amount of
$2,818,000.00, to setoff account No.3010622854, as attested by third party witness Paul Charles
Bird, Sr., Notary Public. Said registered instrument was not returned. The Trustors/Grantors have

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22

revoked the unexecuted, unaccepted and void DOT and delivered said revocation to JPMorgan

Chase Bank. (See Exhibit 1, Revocation of DOT recorded on 3/21/2016, Instrument

No.2016000115784 and Exhibit 2, the revoked, canceled and rescinded DOT, unexecuted by

WAMU, attached). Defendant, JPMorgan, is estopped from arguing this matter, as it waived its

right to do so (estoppel by silence).

VI. PLAINTIFF HOLDS A PRIORITY LIEN CLAIM AGAINST THE PROMISSORY

NOTE/SECURITY PURSUANT TO 12 USC 1813, AND AGAINST THE PROPERTY

8
9

81.

On November 11, 2014 Plaintiff filed a claim of lien, nunc pro tunc August 14,

2006, on the subject Adjustable Rate Note/Security due him as a liability of the putative lender

10

(see paragraph 82, below) and as a liability of any putative assignee, pursuant to 12 U.S.C.

11

1813, described by No.3010622854-077, with the California Secretary of State by way of a

12

UCC Financing Statement, filing No.14-7436129390, and the fixture filing, No. 2014000543713,

13

recorded at the Orange County California Recorders Office. (See attached Exhibit 10, UCC

14

filing and fixture filing).

15

82.

Thus, Plaintiffs' deposited note is both an asset and a liability of the lender bank

16

(as is the case with any deposit) as set forth in 12 USC 1813 as explained by expert witness

17

Walker Todd, Esq., of the Federal Reserve Bank: When a bank accepts bullion, coin, currency,

18

checks, drafts, promissory notes, or any other similar instruments from customers and deposits

19

or records the instruments as assets, it must record offsetting liabilities that match the assets that

20

it accepted from customers. The liabilities represent the amounts that the bank owes the

21

customers, funds accepted from customers, (my emphasis). (BANK ONE, N.A., v.

22

Harshavardhan and Pratima Dave, Oakland County, MI case #03-047448-CZ). (See Exhibit 11

23

Walker Todd Affidavit).

24

83.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on this basis allege, subject Security,

25

Secured Instruments, and or DOTs as referenced herein are, by Operation of Law, Null and

26

Void, and that there is no current holder of any valid Security, Secured Instruments, and or

27

DOT as claimed herein, as having any Adverse Claim, and, that no Party herein can otherwise

28
23

establish that they are the valid current holder of any such valid Secured Instruments,

Security, and or DOT whatsoever.

84.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that none of the alleged

Parties herein claiming to hold or possess Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOT can

establish that it is entitled to hold, or possess any Rights, Title or Beneficial Interest with regard

to any valid Security, Secured Instruments, and or DOT or the right to enforcement as

against any other Party herein or as against the subject property itself, the subject of this instant

Quiet Title action.

9
10
11

VII. THE NOTE IS NOT EVIDENCE OF A LOAN; NO LOAN WAS MADE BY

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FB, OR, RECEIVED BY PLAINTIFFS
85.

Plaintiff, Raymond Jones, in the attached Affidavit of Facts (see exhibit 16) states

12

under oath in paragraph 12 that since the above-described NOTE states that the referenced loan

13

was an event that allegedly had already occurred at some unspecified date in the past, prior to the

14

date the above-described NOTE was signed, the above-described NOTE cannot be relied upon as

15

evidence that a loan was, in fact, received, especially since the above-described NOTE merely

16

asserts that a loan was received by the Borrowers, but provides no evidence that a loan

17

disbursement ever occurred. Since the NOTE misrepresents that a loan had already occurred,

18

prior to Plaintiffs' signing, the resulting agreement (Note and DOT) is tainted and void ab initio.

19

86.

Lender WAMU, created and promulgated false assumptions. Plaintiff,

20

Raymond Jones, further states in paragraph 13 of his affidavit that, as of the date the above-

21

described NOTE was signed, along with other 'mortgage' documents, including the

22

accompanying security instrument, the 'Borrowers' were deceived into believing the following

23

false assumptions: a. A loan was being provided to the Borrowers by a 'lender,' b. Said loan

24

had not yet been provided to the 'Borrowers' by the time the NOTE was signed, c. The above-

25

described NOTE is the said loan and said loan commenced on the date the NOTE was signed,

26

and d. The NOTE would not be used for any purpose other than executing and commemorating a

27

loan agreement.

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24

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87.

Plaintiff and Affiant, Raymond Jones, therefore concludes in paragraph 14 of his

affidavit, as follows:
a. A loan had not been provided to the Borrowers and had not been received by the
Borrowers as of the date the NOTE was signed,
b. The author of the NOTE falsely and deceptively stated that the Borrowers had
received a loan when, in fact, no loan had been received by the Borrowers,
c. The only thing that commenced on the date the NOTE was signed was the execution of
the NOTE wherein a promise of a payment was made,
d. The NOTE was converted into a tradeable security as it was the subject of transmittal
or reference, in exchange for which, the lender, whose name appears on the NOTE and
mortgage (or the trustee named as the nominal title holder, taking title pursuant to the
trust agreement with the lender), received both full payment of the entire principal of
the NOTE and a premium of approximately 2.5% of the entire loan balance.
Consequently, it appears that (1) the note has been satisfied in full by third-party
payment, (2) no assignment or sale of the actual instruments occurred on record, nor was
the same disclosed, and (3) the transfer of certain rights prior to, or contemporaneous
with the alleged closing of this loan transaction, negated any interest in the
transaction by the lender and thus voided any authority of the lender to enter into any
agreement with a Trustee, who therefore holds title solely in constructive trust for the
Borrowers. Further, a transfer of rights has occurred, which involved the guarantee of
revenue and payments that were not provided in the NOTE. Since the NOTE is a
negotiable instrument under the Uniform Commercial Code, and represents a source of
passive income, it constitutes the issuance of security without compliance with the
applicable State and Federal securities law. Essentially, the Borrowers signed
documents which the Borrowers believed to be a standard mortgage, loan, and NOTE
with the standard relationships between Borrowers and lender. Instead, the records of
the Affiant indicate that the Borrowers were deceived into issuing a security. (See
exhibit 16).
88. Additionlly, there was no loan because the money advanced by the REMIC
investors was subject to a set of documents supporting a bond in which Plaintiffs were not the
payor and which Plaintiffs never signed. Plaintiffs were subjected to a set of documents that
failed to disclose the real party or the real terms of the entire transaction a black letter
requirement of the truth in lending laws.
89.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that the purpose of the

transaction was for the investment bank to get money from the investors and to get a signature
from the homeowner (Plaintiffs) without connecting the two. The real purpose of the transaction

28
25

was an investment scheme wherein the intermediaries took everything the money, the

property and the gains from credit default swaps, insurance and government bailouts.
90.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that many of todays so-

called Lenders only lend their name to the Mortgage loan transaction. In other words, the Lender

WAMU, did not lend to Borrowers (Plaintiffs) its money, rather, an undisclosed third party

provided the funds for the Borrowers making it appear as though WAMU provided the funds.

A group of investors created what is commonly known as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV),

(in this case, WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR17 Trust ) wired the

money to the Lender (WAMU) just prior to Closing. WAMU, now acting in the capacity of a

10

Nominal Lender, used this SPV money to transact the Closing. Once the Closing was completed

11

the Nominal Lender (WAMU) was paid in full plus a commission. Within twenty-four (24)

12

hours from Closing WAMU was required to physically conveye the subject NOTE to the true

13

Lender/Investors. Thereafter WAMU took on a new role as the Servicer of the debt. Plaintiffs

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made the monthly payments to the Servicer who Plaintiffs believed was the Lender, who

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forwarded the payment [less its fee] to the true Lender/Investor[s]. Plaintiffs were tricked into

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thinking they were Borrowers of a Loan, when in fact Plaintiffs were Sellers of a Mortgage

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NOTE into an Investment Trust / SPV, (WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series

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2006-AR17 Trust ).
91.

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Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that this Investment

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Trust has no right to a Mortgage which is used to facilitate the purchase a NOTE, fraudulently

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procured under the guise of a Loan, when in fact it was not a Loan but rather the Purchase /

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Sale of a Mortgage Note facilitating the foundation of these Mortgage-Backed Securities; the

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true nature of this Transaction was not disclosed to Plaintiffs either before or at Closing; and the

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Nominal Lender (WAMU) was paid in full plus a commission for a putative loan it did not

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fund.

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92.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that Plaintiffs, without

consent or knowledge, were converted from borrowers to a securities issuer, and the REMIC

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investors were converted from being a part owner in a valid REMIC pool to being the alleged

buyer of the security issued by Plaintiffs. Hence the right of rescission and damages arises not

only from TILA but from the SEC rules and regulations. And the time for filing didnt start to

run until the parties had enough information to know of the fraud perpetrated, (see # 14 supra.)

VII. LOAN ORIGINATOR, WAMU, FAILED TO ACQUIRE PLAINTIFFS' NOTE/

SECURITY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS

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93.

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Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that the converted

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Tangible UCC 3 Note~ Stripped of value UCC8 eNote/Smart Note through statutory

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conversion to electronic chattel paper was not eligible to be negotiated pursuant to UCC 3-

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203(d)6; as a Special Deposit 1031 exchange is what really happened (see above chart of a 1031

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Exchange above). In addition, the order paper or Bearer paper UCC 3-205(b)7 transfer was not

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(d) If a transferor purports to transfer less than the entire instrument, negotiation of the instrument does not occur.
The transferee obtains no rights under this Article and has only the rights of a partial assignee.
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(b) If an indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special indorsement, it is a "blank
indorsement." When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer
of possession alone until specially indorsed.

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for full value nor was it negotiated by operation of law UCC 3-302(g)8 as JPMorgan Chase

Bank, NA, would have this court believe (I.E. IN AN ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS as

set forth in UCC 7-501).

94.

Pursuant to UCC 7-501 ~(5) A document is duly negotiated if it is negotiated in

the manner stated in this subsection to a holder that purchases it in good faith, without notice of

any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person, and for value, unless it is established

that the negotiation is not in the regular course of business or financing or involves receiving the

document in settlement or payment of a monetary obligation. Procuring notes from borrowers

with funds from a REMIC is not a regular course of business.

95.

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Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that no Party herein,

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excepting Plaintiffs, have, possess or hold any Legal and or Equitable interests and/or rights to

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the subject property.

96.

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Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege that Plaintiffs' title to

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the property is free and clear as to any possessed Security, Secured Instruments, and or

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DOT, and therefore seek title to subject property to be Quieted to Plaintiffs, and for the benefit

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of Plaintiffs exclusively.
97.

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This action is brought, among other purposes, to restrain and enjoin the Defendants,

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their agents, employees, representatives, lawyers, directors and officers, from taking any action

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to improperly transfer, dispose of, or use Plaintiffs' property.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

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A.

That the Washington Mutual Bank FA (WAMU) Deed of Trust and the

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Maplaqua Asset Management Deed of Trust be declared a nullities by this Court and in an order

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noting the same be recorded with the Orange County Recorders Office;
B.

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That it be declared and adjudged that the Defendants have no estate or interest

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whatsoever in or to subject property, or in or to any part thereof, and that the title of the Plaintiffs

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is good and valid; whereby this court grants Quiet Title of the subject property to Plaintiffs.

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(g) This section is subject to any law limiting status as a holder in due course in particular classes of transactions.

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C.

That the Defendants be forever enjoined and barred from asserting any claim

whatever in or to the subject property, or to any part thereof, adverse to Plaintiffs.

D.

That Plaintiffs recover their costs and attorneys fees incurred herein.

E.

For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

FURTHER AFFIANTS SAITH NOT.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th Day of August, 2016.

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_____________________________________
Raymond Jones, Pro per
__________________________________
Anne Jones, Pro per

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF California
COUNTY OF Orange
In _________________________________, on the _____________ day of _________, 2016
before me____________________________, a Notary Public in and for the above state and
county, personally appeared Raymond Jones, and Anne Jones known to me or proved to be the
person named in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and being first duly sworn, such
person acknowledged that he or she executed said instrument for the purposes therein contained
as his or her free and voluntary act and deed.
Type of Identification Produced: ___________

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_______________________________

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NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires: ________________

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MEMORANDUMS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF QUIET TITLE

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98.

In support of the point of law that to have standing, party suing in mortgage

foreclosure must produce the original promissory note: in a mortgage foreclosure, complaining

party must (1). Prove standing by possession of the original promissory note, and (2). Must prove

damages by appearance of a competent fact witness: Where the complaining party cannot prove

the existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff

must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3)

that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and

owing on the note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLC. v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February

18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.), Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice Series, Chapter

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10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, ...; and no part payments should be made on the

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bond or note unless the person to whom payment is made is able to produce the bond or note and

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the part payments are endorsed thereon. It would seem that the mortgagor would normally have a

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Common law right to demand production or surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the

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case may be. See Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469, in

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Carnegie Bank v, Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992), the Appellate Division held,

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When the underlying mortgage is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for

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negotiability set forth in N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the

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rights and protections provided a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-302 Since no

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one is able to produce the instrument there is no competent evidence before the Court that any

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party is the holder of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. New Jersey common law

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dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in question, prove that the party

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sued signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the alleged note,

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and prove that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged note. Federal Circuit Courts have

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ruled that the only way to prove the perfection of any security is by actual possession of the

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security. See Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977). Under the

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Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice sufficient to inform all interested parties that a

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security interest in instruments has been perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his

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agent or bailee. Bankruptcy Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re

Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), Under the New Jersey Uniform

Commercial Code (NJUCC), promissory note is instrument, security interest in which must be

perfected by possession ... Unequivocally the Courts rule is that in order to prove the

instrument, possession is mandatory.

99.

In support of the point of law that party suing in mortgage foreclosure must prove

up their claim or they have no claim and the judgment is void: Trial court could not award

damages to plaintiff, following default judgment, without requiring evidence of damages.

Razorsoft, Inc. v. Maktal, Inc., Okla.App. Div. 1, 907 P.2d 1102 (1995), rehearing denied. A

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party is not in default so long as he has a pleading on file which makes an issue in the case that

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requires proof on the part of the opposite party in order to entitle him to recover. Millikan v.

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Booth, Okla., 4 Okla. 713, 46 P. 489 (1896). Proof of or assessment of damages upon petition

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claiming damages, it is error to pronounce judgment without hearing proof or assessing damages.

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Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654, Ann.Cas.1913E, 329 (1912);

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City of Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84 (1897). In the assessment of

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damages following entry of default judgment, a defaulting party has a statutory right to a hearing

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on the extent of unliquidated damage, and encompassed within this right is the opportunity to a

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fair post-default inquest at which both the plaintiff and the defendant can participate in the

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proceedings by cross-examining witnesses and introducing evidence on their own behalf. Payne

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v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999). A default declaration, imposed as a discovery sanction

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against a defendant, cannot extend beyond saddling defendant with liability for the harm

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occasioned and for imposition of punitive damages, and the trial court must leave to a

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meaningful inquiry the quantum of actual and punitive damages, without stripping defendant of

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basic forensic devices to test the truth of plaintiff's evidence. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d

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1088 (1999). Fracture of two toes required expert medical testimony as to whether such injury

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was permanent so as to allow damages for permanent injury, future pain, and future medical

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treatment on default judgment, and such testimony was not within competency of plaintiff who

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had no medical expertise. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991).

Rendition of default judgment requires production of proof as to amount of unliquidated

damages. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991). When face of judgment

roll shows judgment on pleadings without evidence as to amount of unliquidated damages then

judgment is void. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991). In a tort action

founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a defaulting party is deemed to have admitted

only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the court is without authority or power to enter a

judgment fixing the amount of recovery in the absence of the introduction of evidence. Graves v.

Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Presumptions which ordinarily shield judgments from

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collateral attacks were not applicable on motion to vacate a small claim default judgment on

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ground that court assessed damages on an unliquidated tort claim without first hearing any

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supporting evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Rule that default

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judgment fixing the amount of recovery in absence of introduction of supporting evidence is void

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and not merely erroneous or voidable obtains with regard to exemplary as well as compensatory

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damages. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Where liability of father for

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support of minor daughter and extent of such liability and amount of attorney's fees to be

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allowed was dependent on facts, rendering of final judgment by trial court requiring father to pay

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$25 monthly for support of minor until minor should reach age 18 and $100 attorney's fees

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without having heard proof thereof in support of allegations in petition was error. Ross v. Ross,

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Okla., 201 Okla. 174, 203 P.2d 702 (1949). Refusal to render default judgment against

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codefendant for want of answer was not error, since defendants and court treated answer of

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defendant on file as having been filed on behalf of both defendants, and since plaintiff could not

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recover without offering proof of damages and offered no such proof. Thomas v. Williams,

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Okla., 173 Okla. 601, 49 P.2d 557 (1935). Under R.L.1910, 4779, 5130 (see, now, this section

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and 2007 of this title), allegation of value, or amount of damages stated in petition, were not

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considered true by failure to controvert. Cudd v. Farmers' Exch. Bank of Lindsay, Okla., 76

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Okla. 317, 185 P. 521 (1919). Hearing Trial court's discovery sanction barring defendant from

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using cross-examination and other truth-testing devices at post-default nonjury hearing on

plaintiff's damages violated due process. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999).

100.

In support of the point of law that to prove up claim in mortgage foreclosure,

plaintiff must present evidence through a competent fact witness: Claim of damages, to be

admissible as evidence, must incorporate records such as a general ledger and accounting of an

alleged unpaid promissory note, the person responsible for preparing and maintaining the

account general ledger must provide a complete accounting which must be sworn to and dated by

the person who maintained the ledger. See Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334,

614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii

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App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and

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Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986). See

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also Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Ill. Dec. 890, 516 N. E.2d 1045 (3Dist. 1987).

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101.

In support of the point of law that statements of counsel in brief or in argument

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are not facts before the court and may not be relied on in the courts rulings and determinations:

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This finding of a continuing investigation, which forms the foundation of the majority opinion,

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comes from statements of counsel made during the appellate process. As we have said of other

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un-sworn statements which were not part of the record and therefore could not have been

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considered by the trial court: Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us

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in the disposition of [a) case. UNITED STATES v. LOVASCO (06/09/77) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.

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Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, Under no possible view, however, of the findings we are considering

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can they be held to constitute a compliance with the statute, since they merely embody

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conflicting statements of counsel concerning the facts as they suppose them to be and their

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appreciation of the law which they deem applicable, there being, therefore, no attempt whatever

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to state the ultimate facts by a consideration of which we would be able to conclude whether or

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not the judgment was warranted. GONZALES v. BUIST. (04/01/12) 224 U.S. 126, 56 L. Ed. 693,

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32 S. Ct. 463. No instruction was asked, but, as we have said, the judge told the jury that they

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were to regard only the evidence admitted by him, not statements of counsel, HOLT v. UNITED

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STATES. (10/31/10) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 2, Care has been taken, however, in

summoning witnesses to testify, to call no man whose character or whose word could be

successfully impeached by any methods known to the law. And it is remarkable, we submit, that

in a case of this magnitude, with every means and resource at their command, the complainants,

after years of effort and search in near and in the most remote paths, and in every collateral by-

way, now rest the charges of conspiracy and of gullibility against these witnesses, only upon the

bare statements of counsel. The lives of all the witnesses are clean, their characters for truth and

veracity un-assailed, and the evidence of any attempt to influence the memory or the impressions

of any man called, cannot be successfully pointed out in this record. TELEPHONE CASES.

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DOLBEAR v. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY. MOLECULAR TELEPHONE

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COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE

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COMPANY V. MOLECULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY. CLAY COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE

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COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY. PEOPLES TELEPHONE

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COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY. OVERLAND TELEPHONE

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COMPANY V. AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY. (PART TWO THREE) (03/19/88)

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126 U.S. 1, 31 L. Ed. 863, 8 S. Ct. 778. Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not

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sufficient for motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D. C. Pa. 1964,

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229 F. Supp. 647. Factual statements or documents appearing only in briefs shall not be deemed

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to be a part of the record in the case, unless specifically permitted by the Court Oklahoma

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Court Rules and Procedure, Federal local rule 7.1(h).

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I, Ricardo Jones, certify that on the 29th day of August 2016, I mailed a true and correct copy of

the above and foregoing Petition to Quiet Title, Request for Injunction, and Exhibits via certified

mail return receipt requested to:

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Superior Court of California

County of Orange
700 Civic Center Drive West,
Santa Ana, CA 92701
A copy of the foregoing served by process server & mailed this _____ day of August, 2016 to:
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA.
Agent for Service of Process
CT Corporation System
818 W Seventh Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Maplaqua Asset Management
12300 Charleston Blvd
Las Vegas, NV. 89135

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By _____________________________
Ricardo Jones

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