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Teddy Bear AC

This is a stupid topic and because I agree with Louie Kollar Im going to
debate it as little as possible.

Utilitarianism
I value morality based on the word ought in the resolution and the correct
value criterion is acting in a utilitarian manner, defined as maximizing
pleasure and minimizing pain.

1) Means-based ethics collapse to consequentialism


Cummiskey, David. Kantian Consequentialism. Published by Oxford University Press. 1996.
(p.142).

If I sacrifice some for the sake of others I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny
the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have dignity, that is, an
unconditional and incomparable worth that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons
also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes
give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself
thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one
focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one may
sacrifice some to save many.

2) Everyone takes the avoidance of pain as reasons for


actionsour bodies naturally reject pain and embrace
pleasure
Thomas Nagel. The View From Nowhere. HUP. 1986. 156-168.
I shall defend the unsurprising claim that

sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter

whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case.
Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification
and value. They are just [is a] sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel

everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the


promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reason s for action in a fairly simple way; they
involuntary desire or aversion. Almost

are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a
means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any,
ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of
judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin

there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain


have [has] no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would
by asking why

mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at
it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the
pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of
objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If

it is at least possible that I


have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot
stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of
the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then

a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobiahaving
nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itselfwhich helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled
by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink,
and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and
reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately
to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still
have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be
motivated to reduce pain for other reasonsbecause it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or
because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as
itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of
course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate
without reasonthat is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing

Without some positive reason to


think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you
intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to
the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What
self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane.

seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the
most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We
regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No
objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to
reject the appearances here.

3) Non-natural theories are epistemologically inaccessible


because they do not influence the physical world
David Papineau, Naturalism. SEP, 2007.( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/) RP
7/3/13
Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However,

any such

non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the
kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range
of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that
moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical
world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical
effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the
spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense
organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical
world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.

4) Only states of affairs give teleological relevance to


ethics
[Per Ariansen (University of Oslo, Department of Philosophy). Anthropocentrism with a human
face. Ecological Economics 24 (1998) 153162] LK
Suspending for a while the idea of morality as a game, one could approach the question of the nature of ethics from

What
traits of ethics cannot be lacking without ethics losing its meaning? Will ethics
be meaningful in a world where no suffering (to focus on the duty to alleviate suffering rather
that promote happiness) is known to anyone? Technically it would be possible to tell a
lie or break a promise in such a society, but the difference between lying and telling
the truth or breaking and keeping promises would have no moral significance, since any
outcome of any event is just as good (rather, as indifferent) as any other outcome of the event. In
another angle. One could try to seek out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ethics to be operative.

such a world any mention of responsibilities and duties would be meaningless. Ethics clearly needs to relate to joy and

axiological orientation is necessary to give meaning to the ethical


project, to mark it out as an ethical project in contrast to other projects of rationalization.
suffering. This

Contention
Handguns cause death
Susan P. Baker, Master of Public Health and Professor at the John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, Without Guns, Do People Kill People?, American Journal of Public Health, June 1985, Vol. 75,
No. 6, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1646203/

Firearms killed 33,000 Americans in 1982, accounting for one injury death out of five: 1,756 of
these deaths were classed as unintentional, 16,575 as suicide, 13,841 as homicide, 276 as legal intervention, and 540 of
undetermined intent [National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) unpublished data]. Firearms are the second leading
cause of death in the United States for ages 15-34, with motor vehicles in first place and cancer a distant third.1,2 For
ages 30 to 54, firearms generate as many deaths as motor vehicle crashes.' Despite the severity of the problem, data on
non-fatal firearm injuries are virtually non-existent.3 As with deaths from other causes, the risk of death from firearms is
not equally shared by the population. The death rate from unintentional injury is almost 10 times as high in low-income
areas as in high-income areas; rates are especially high among White teenagers, Blacks age 15-34, and Native
Americans.' Firearm homicide, accounting for two-thirds of all homicides, has a rate among Blacks that is more than six
times the White rate.' One Black out of 40 will be murdered with a gun between ages 20 and 44. In urban areas, the
statistics are even worse; firearm homicide rates for Blacks in large cities are more than 10 times the overall rate for the
US population (unpublished data). Firearms cause 57 per cent of all suicides. These differ from other suicides in that the
rates are highest in low-income areas. Firearm suicide rates are highest in elderly males, especially White males; a lower

For any population group, the availability and lethality of


firearms [is a] are major determinants of such death rates. This is vividly [as] illustrated
by data from the Aarhus region of Denmark published in this issue of the Journal.4 There, the rate for
all assaultive injuries treated at hospitals is almost as high as the rate in Northeastern
Ohio: six vs eight per 1,000 population4"5 [Comparable data are not available for other US areas]. [but] The
Danish homicide rate, on the other hand, is only one-fifth the rate for Ohio, 1.4 vs 7.2/100,000.1 6
The discrepancy [This] is largely explained by two facts. First, firearm injuries hav[ing]e an
extremely high case fatality rate (15 times the rate for knife assaults in the Danish study). Second, private
peak is seen among males in their 20s.1

ownership of guns is permitted only for hunting in Denmark but is common in the US, where half of all households have

data suggest that gun homicide rates are


highest in localities where gun ownership rates are highest. 8 We often hear that "Guns don't kill
guns and one in five has a handgun.7 South Carolina

people, people kill people." Especially relevant to this statement is the observation by Hedeboe and his colleagues4 that
injuries were inflicted by whatever was most available-most commonly fists or feet, followed by other objects likely to be
close at hand. Sometimes, no doubt, a person who is intent upon killing someone seeks out a lethal weapon. Far more
often, gun-inflicted deaths ensue from impromptu arguments and fights: in the US, two-thirds of the 7,900 deaths in 1981
involving arguments and brawls were caused by guns [unpublished data, Federal Bureau of Investigation]. These deaths
would largely be replaced by non-fatal injuries if a gun were not handy.9 Thus, a far more appropriate generality would be
that "People without guns injure people; guns kill them ." Despite the overwhelming
importance of gun availability, the problem of firearm injury and its solution are far from simple. Much attention has been
given to the possibility of restricting the sale and ownership of handguns and handgun ammunition, because of their very
low benefit-risk ratio. Although the size and concealability of handguns is of no benefit except for killing people, proposals
to limit private ownership or use of small, easily concealed handguns evoke strong reactions from the firearm industry, the
National Rifle Association, and many gun owners. 10 Lawsuits against manufacturers, based on their having introduced
unreasonably hazardous products into the stream of commerce, may eventually help to stem the tide of handgun
production and sales.9 Other approaches to reducing firearm injuries include development of less lethal handgun
ammunition and design of firearms so they cannot be discharged easily by young children, or inadvertently by teenagers
and adults. Given the magnitude of this public health problem, the time is past due to attack it on many fronts.

Underview

Disclosed Interp Theory


A. Interpretation: Debaters must accept all theory interpretations,
including theory spikes, disclosed on their 2015-2016 NDCA LD Wiki
pages as true. To clarify, this means that debaters may not offer
counter-interpretations to theory interpretations that they currently
have disclosed.
B. Violation: Ill bring this up if they violate
C. Standards
1) Checking Frivolous Theory: Under the interpretation debaters
will only disclose theory interpretations that they think are good
norms for debate or that check legitimate abuse because they'll
have to debate under them too. It stops theory from being a
tool to win rounds and ensures that theory is not used as a
crutch to avoid topical, philosophical, or critical debate that
provides real, portable education, unlike theory debating skills.
Theory will only be used to check abuse and make debate
better.
2) Reciprocity: When debaters disclose theory interpretations
they are proposing rules for debate that I must either follow or
prepare to rebut. If you allow them to break their own
interpretations then they're writing rules that apply to everyone
that's not them. Reciprocity is key to fairness because it
provides equal access to the ballot.
3) Strategy Skew: Theory disclosure is effectively the 0AC and
NC. It is intended to establish the rules that govern debate and
mitigate the need for theory to be read in round. It is distinct
from case disclosure because theory actually tries to solve the
point of contention instead of using it as a method for education,
because I am expected to adapt to interpretations, and because
interpretation disclosure theory prevents debaters from
accessing those arguments if they haven't been disclosed
because they'd be new arguments. If I write my case to comply
with their theory interpretations and they do not adhere to those
interpretations they have effectively severed out of arguments
they made earlier. Even if they dont read those arguments in
their 13 minutes of speech time, they were arguments that both
were intended to and did have in-round impacts that could not
have been accessed or would have been more difficult to access
if they weren't disclosed. Because theory disclosure is
effectively the 0AC and NC, if they violate their disclosed
interpretations its the same as if they violated a shell that they
read during their speech time. Not allowing me to access theory
interpretations they disclosed is the same as letting them sever

out of a theory shell, which lets them change the rules of the
debate halfway into the round, preventing me from forming a
coherent strategy. Strategy is key to fairness because it is
necessary to form a coherent ballot story, and to education
because it allows planning and critical thinking about argument
interaction.
4) Ground: The standard is ground, not checking ground skew.
Ground skew may be bad but the interpretation ensures that
there is ground available to debaters by killing mutually
exclusive theory arguments, which kill literally all ground. If
debaters must accept their own interpretations as legitimate
then they cant have mutually exclusive interpretations, as they
would violate one of them. Ground is key to fairness because it
gives us access to the ballot, and to education, because we need
to have something to talk about.
D. Voters
1) Fairness: Fairness is a voter because unfair arguments prevent
you from determining which debater did the better debating and
because debate is a competitive activity that functions better
when its fair.
2) Education: Education is a voter because its the reason schools
fund debate and parents support it, meaning its key to the
activity's survival. Additionally, its something we will carry with
us after our debate careers into the real world.
E. Theoretical Paradigm
1) Evaluate theory as competing interpretations because
reasonability is arbitrary, invites judge intervention, and
encourages debaters to get away with abuse through theoretical
defense, and because any benefit of the superior interpretation,
however small, will be multiplied throughout infinitely many
future rounds, meaning it will outweigh.
2) No RVIs on this interpretation because they can just not violate
it as they have yet to speak, meaning its not a NIB. Also,
showing you didn't cheat isn't a reason to win, meaning that
even if this were a NIB, which it isn't, it would be a good NIB.
3) Because consequentialism is true, as proven by Cummiskey and
Ariansen, the purpose of theory is to establish norms, not
check abuse, because it is okay to sacrifice an individual for the
greater good. That means that even if my opponent wins that
accepting my interpretation does them an injustice, which it
does not, accepting it is still obligatory because it benefits
debate as a whole.

4) Drop the debater on all theory violations, as it sets a


precedent for the better norms of debate, deters future abuse,
sends a clear message, and rectifies time lost running theory (if
they don't violate this interpretation then I'll be compensated
with a non-abusive round). Additionally, as my opponent hasn't
violated this shell yet it deters abuse in this round. My opponent
has yet to violate any theory interpretation but if they do then
drop the debater.

Presume AFF
Presume Aff to correct for the 7.4%1 neg side bias across over 12,000 rounds
this year. If the debate is a tie that means that I did the better debating
because Aff is harder.

1 As of December 10th, 2015, according to the VBriefly Side Bias tracker.


5631 rounds have gone Aff and 6532 rounds have gone Neg.
http://vbriefly.com/side-bias/

Prefer AC theory
Give AC theory extra weight when evaluating the round. Neg has 13 minutes
to attack any AC theory arguments whereas I only have 7 to attack any NC
theory, so prefer AC theory because it has undergone more scrutiny, meaning
that if it is still standing at the end of the round then it is more likely to be
true.

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