PEOPLE V.

ALICANDO
JUSTICE PUNO
FACTS: The accused, Arnel Alicando, was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide. The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic petition for review (Rule 45???).
ISSUE: W/N the accused should be convicted.
RULING: NO. The Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to
death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is
on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by
scoliotic logic.
1. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed
to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment
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the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant
was read in the language or dialect known to him

the Information against the appellant is written in the English

language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English
language

neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant; nor

is there any showing that the Information couched in English was
translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt

2. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The
trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant
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records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty
of conducting a "searching inquiry"

the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment.

Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1)
the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea

the questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of

the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate
appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea (no
personality profile whatsoever; failed to explain what mandatory
means

the trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of

maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested,
who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he
was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc; it
limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse
alone; regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following
damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo
PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was
mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma

Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea
of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability
beyond reasonable doubt

3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea

of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were
considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
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Physical evidence. These are inadmissible evidence for they

were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a
result of custodial interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the
benefit of counsel.

PO3 Tan admitted such under cross-examination

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple
sense to reduce the all important confession of the
appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to
have competent and independent counsel despite the
blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial
court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the
records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned
as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The
pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were
evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally
extracted by the police from the appellant.

4. But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were
admissible evidence, still, the trial court erred in holding that they
"strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim
was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude
that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The
pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that
they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no
testimony that the stains were caused by either the blood of the
appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that the tshirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed
the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to
have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation.

REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

PEOPLE V. JANUARIO
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN

FACTS: The accused, Januario and Canape were charged for violating RA
6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Law. During the trial, as a response to the
prosecutions presentation of evidence, the defense displayed their desire to
file a demurrer to evidence. But such did not come to fruition as the court
itself enjoined them from filing one on account of the defense counsels

failure to be present during the scheduled hearing days, as well as their

failure to file the promised demurrer to evidence. Nevertheless, counsel for
the defense Claro mailed a "demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss on
(sic) insufficiency of evidence. On January 10, 1990, the trial court denied
the motion finding that the demurrer did not "contain any reason compelling
enough to recall the previous order," disallowing the filing of said pleading.
Then, upon the manifestation of Atty. Claro that appellants would no longer
present evidence, the trial court issued an order considering the case
terminated as far as appellants were concerned. However, it granted a
"reservation" to present evidence as regards Cid. The trial court further
directed Atty. Claro to present Cid before the court on March 9, 1990. It
ordered the filing of memoranda "as the case of accused Januario and
Canape is now considered closed." It set the "partial promulgation of
judgment" on March 9, 1990 "insofar as the two (2) accused are concerned."
On March 1, 1990, appellants' counsel filed their memorandum. On March 9,
1990, the trial court did not make a "partial promulgation of
judgment." Instead, it ordered the "continuation of proceedings for purposes
of rebuttal evidence." They then proceeded to the presentation of witnesses.
On May 11, 1990, the defense manifested that it was closing its case. The
prosecution having waived its right to present "any rebuttal evidence," the
trial court issued an order requiring the filing of the parties' respective
memoranda. The trial court convicted the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was error in the order of trial that was conducted?
RULING: NONE. The court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has
rested his case or even after the defense has moved for dismissal, to present
involuntarily omitted evidence. The primary consideration is whether the trial
court still has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: W/N the accuseds right to counsel was violated during the custodial
interrogation?
RULING: YES. The main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants
were their own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted
and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a lawyer who was
applying for work in the NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be considered
independent because he cannot be expected to work against the interest of

a police agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later, he in fact was
admitted into its work force.
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Moreover, accused Canape was not properly informed of his

constitutional rights. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told
of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was
willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means,
be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.

Also, the fact that Saunar admitted that he was only present during
the interrogation on March 2, when the sworn statement was dated
March 27 deserves consideration.

Appellants might have indeed committed the crime in

concert with Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos. However,
what could have been their valuable admissions and
confessions as far as the prosecution was concerned were
sullied and rendered inadmissible by the irregular manner
by which the law enforcement agents extracted such
admissions and confessions from appellants. Without such
statements,
the
remaining
prosecution
evidence
-consisting mostly of hearsay testimony and investigation
reports -- is sorely inadequate to prove appellants
participation in the crime.

Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the mandate
of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights but, after making
"inquiries" from appellants about the crime, they likewise
illegally detained appellants as shown by the admission of
one of the NBI agents that appellants were deprived of their
liberty while in their custody. Appellants were even made to
travel for ten (10) hours from Naga City to Manila just so
their formal confessions could be executed in the latter
city. According to NBI Agent Vela, they "actually arrested"
the appellants when the court issued the warrant for their
arrest. The records show however that the NBI turned
appellants over to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of SilangAmadeo in Cavite only on March 30, 1989. On the same day,
the same court turned them back to the NBI for "detention
during pendency of the case."

Note: both confessions and admissions warrant the assistance of

counsel

RTC Cavites decision set aside. The accused are acquitted.

PEOPLE V. SAMONTANEZ
JUSTICE DE LEON JR.

FACTS: The accused, Roberto Samontanez, was charged with rape with
homicide. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Before
trial on the merits could ensue the accused, through counsel, manifested his
intention of changing his earlier plea of not guilty to that of
guilty. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the accused be re-arraigned in
Tagalog, a dialect which he understood, and the said accused then pleaded
guilty to the charge of rape with homicide as stated in the instant
information. After being satisfied that the accused entered a voluntary and
informed plea by asking some questions, the trial court required the
prosecution to adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability pursuant to Article 116, Section 3 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution then proceeded to
present its witnesses and submit the pieces of evidence it gathered. The
defense on the other hand had the accused sit on the witness stand and
reiterate his guilty plea. The trial court found the accused to be guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence this petition for review.
IMPORTANT: Three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of
guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused: 1. The trial court must
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea; 2. The trial court must require the prosecution
to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability through the requisite quantum of evidence; and 3. The trial
court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires. It must be emphasized that the said
procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N accuseds guilty plea was invalid?
RULING: YES. The Court is unconvinced that such lengthy inquiries
conducted by the trial court during the re-arraignment of the appellant as

well as during the subsequent hearings for the presentation of evidence of

both the prosecution and the defense sufficiently established voluntariness
and full comprehension of the appellant of his plea of guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. It may be noted that the appellant earlier
entered the plea of not guilty to the Information in this case during his
arraignment on February 1, 1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested,
through his counsel de officio, his intention to change his previous plea to
that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the Information. After having
entered the plea of guilty on re-arraignment, the trial court proceeded to
propound questions on the appellant during which affirmative responses
were elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his subsequent plea
of guilty was his own voluntary decision. The trial court per its Decision
under review, however, failed to dwell on a significant development that
transpired during the scheduled hearing on November 13, 1997 when the
appellant revealed in open court, through counsel, that his subsequent plea
of guilty was prompted by pressure from a certain policeman so that he
(appellant) agreed to admit the commission of the offense charged.
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It did not propound any clarificatory questions about the matter on

the same occasion such as the identity of the concerned policeman,
the nature of the pressure and the circumstances under which the
alleged pressure was applied on the appellant.

Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the clarity of

appellants grasp of the true meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed to mention
and explain clearly to the appellant the elements of the crime of
rape with homicide as charged in the Information. As a result,
appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, which
is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.

Another error: The trial court lamentably considered pieces of

evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. The facts show that Samontaez was actually

arrested by police authorities at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III,

Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was
apprised of his constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation
which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. It
also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during the said
custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession
obtained from the appellant during the police custodial investigation relative
to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said
confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to
during the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal
belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop
cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant when the
police authorities returned to the appellants place of work at the
Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they
illegally obtained a confession from the appellant.
RTC RULING ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. CASE IS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL
COURT.

PEOPLE V. MOJELLO
JUSTICE YNARES-SANTIAGO

FACTS: The case involves an automatic petition for review regarding

accused Mojellos conviction for the crime of rape with homicide by the RTC
Cebu.
ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial confession executed by the accused is
admissible in evidence?
Context: The accused contends that such confession was not freely,
intelligently, and voluntary entered into.
RULING: YES. The Court was not persuaded by the contentions of the
accused. he extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23,
1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep.
Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on
the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the

appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence. As correctly pointed

out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of
his Miranda rights under the Constitution. The court a quo observed that the
confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him
of such rights. Furthermore, the accused was provided with a competent and
independent counsel who advised appellant of his constitutional rights and
even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and
not to do so if he was not sure of his answer.
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the phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation
is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the
tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest.

Although during the first custodial interrogation which transpired

immediately after accused was nabbed, he was not accorded with
his constitutional rights; the fact remains that the subsequent
custodial investigation where his confession was extracted complied
with the constitutional mandate

He was apprised of his constitutional rights in a dialect that was

known to him

His claim that he confessed because his life was threatened also
holds no water as he neither filed any case against such person nor
reported such incident to his counsel

His claim that he did not understand the confession which was read
in the Visayan dialect is belied by the fact that he admitted that he
often converses using the Visayan dialect

ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING: NO. Although accuseds guilt regarding the victims rape was
undoubtedly proven, the records do not adequately show that appellant
admitted to killing the victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a
homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence

further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual
assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction. No
estimated time of death was given, which is essential in making a connection
with the appellant's story that he went home after a night of drinking.
ACCUSED IS ONLY GUILTY OF STATUTORY RAPE.

HO WAI PANG V. PEOPLE

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO

FACTS: The instant case involves an appeal by the accused regarding the
appellate courts decision which affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
accused were found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating RA
6425 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused were nabbed
in the airport when upon inspection of their baggage, the person in charge
found suspicious looing chocolate boxes which were later revealed to contain
shabu. The day after the contraband was discovered, the accused were
brought to the NBI and were questioned. After which, six information
regarding a violation of the CDDA were filed against them. Petitioner
however filed a motion for reinvestigation. Such was granted and paved way
to the finding of conspiracy among the accused. During the arraignment, the
six pleaded not guilty. The trial court however found them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused filed an appeal with regard to such judgment
before the SC. During the pendency of the appeal, five among the accused
withdrew their appeal; such withdrawal became final. The petitioner on the
other hand persisted and his case was referred to the CA. The CA rendered a
decision affirming the Decision of the RTC. While conceding that petitioners
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed
violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient
to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was
deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against
him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence of
conspiracy among the accused.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in rendering admissible the evidence taken during
the custodial investigation?

RULING: NO. While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not,
however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence
are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v.
Paiste, the Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation.

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during
his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement
was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused,
the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. Petitioners conviction in the
present case was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante
delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession
or admission.
ISSUE: W/N the accused was denied of his right to confrontation?
RULING: NO. Petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers
and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It
is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him
and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any
rate, petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioners right to
confront the witnesses against him. (petitioner did not object to the witness
testimony despite the absence of an interpreter)
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There was conspiracy. Such was duly proven by circumstantial

evidence
Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
TRANSPORTING DRUGS IS MALUM PROHIBITUM

PETITION DENIED

GAANAN V. IAC
JUSTICE GUTIERREZ, JR.

FACTS: Complainant, Atty. Pintor filed an information against Atty. Gaanan

for allegedly violating RA 420 or the Anti-Wire Tapping Act when the latter,
using an extension telephone, listened to the proposed conditions for the
settlement offered by their side. The trial court found them guilty. Such
verdict was affirmed on appeal. Hence this petition on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer
listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison
sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both
listen to an alleged attempt at extortion?
RULING: NO.
1. On the nature of the conversation the Court agreed that such was
private.
2. An extension telephone is not included in those devices or
arrangement contemplated by the law.
- The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.
- An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section
1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
3. Penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
4. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a
prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more

concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to
a telephone conversation.

PETITION GRANTED. ACCUSED ACQUITTED.

KATZ v. US
FACTS:

Katz: was convicted in the district court of Southern California under an

eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering
information by telephone from LA to Boston, in violation of a federal
statute (he was transmitting gambling information)
The court allowed the government to submit evidence comprised of
petitioners telephone conversations overheard by the FBI (in
transmitting the wager information, Katz would use public telephones,
so the FBI agents in this case, placed a recording device on top of the
telephone booth in which Katz was in, doing his dirty work)
Contending that such evidence was inadmissible, petitioner went to
the court of appeals, such court however quashed his motion arguing
that what the FBI agents did was not a violation of the 4th amendment
as, "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the
petitioner]"

ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO

W/N A TELEPHONE BOOTH IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED

AREA? YES
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected. The Government stresses the fact
that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was
constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it
as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought
to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye -- it
was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply
because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.
W/N THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENTS IN THIS CASE CANNOT BE
TESTED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE THEY
EMPLOYED A SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUE WHICH DID NOT
CONSTITUTE ANY PHYSICAL PENETRATION OF THE TELEPHONE
BOOTH (ref: trespass doctrine)? (THE RECORDING DEVICE WAS

STRATEGICALLY PLACED ON TOP OF THE BOOTH SO SA LABAS

DAW KASI) NO
The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements,
overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property
law." It then becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure. The Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance
W/N THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONDUCTED IN THIS CASE
COMPLIED WITH CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS? NO
"Over and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate
of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes.
And that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions. Although the agents in this case acted with
restraint. The fact remains that this restraint was imposed by the
agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. Omission of such
authorization bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far
less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . .
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings
of hindsight judgment

US V. WHITE
401 US 745
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

FACTS: An information was filed against James white for having conducted
illegal transactions in narcotics. Among the bases for the charge was his
statements during a talk with a certain Jackson who wore a transmitter which
enabled government agents to listen to their conversation (this was
conducted without a warrant but with the consent of the informant). During

the trial in the lower court, the trial court overruled objections to the
testimony of the agents who conducted the electronic surveillance. The
appellate court however, applying the Katz doctrine, rendered the agents
testimonies as inadmissible for being violative of the Fourth amendment.
ISSUE: W/N the Fourth Amendment bars from evidence the testimony of
governmental agents who related certain conversations which had occurred
between defendant White and a government informant, Harvey Jackson, and
which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio
transmitter carried by Jackson and concealed on his person?
RULING: NO.
1. Katz involved no revelation to the Government by a party to
conversations with the defendant, nor did the Court indicate in any
way that a defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally protected
expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not then or
later reveal the conversation to the police.
-however strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague,
his expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government
agent regularly communicating with the authorities
- revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment
do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations
of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same
conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions
received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks
- one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police
2. Katz v. United States applied only to those electronic surveillances that
occurred subsequent to the date of that decision
- he events in question took place in late 1965 and early 1966, long
prior to Katz

CA REVERSED.

DISSENTS:
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Today no one perhaps notices, because only a small,
obscure criminal is the victim. But every person is the victim, for the
technology we exalt today is everyman's master. Any doubters should read
Arthur R. Miller's The Assault On Privacy (1971). After describing the
monitoring of conversations and their storage in data banks, Professor Miller
goes on to describe "human monitoring" which he calls the "ultimate step in
mechanical snooping" -- a device for spotting unorthodox or aberrational
behavior across a wide spectrum.

JUSTICE BRENNAN: I would stand by Berger and Katz and reaffirm the need
for judicial supervision under the Fourth Amendment of the use of electronic
surveillance which, uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state
Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous
utterances. Free discourse a First Amendment value -- may be frivolous or
serious, humble or defiant, reactionary or revolutionary, profane or in good
taste; but it is not free if there is surveillance.